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CASES
ON
PERSONAL PROPERTY
The following cases have been printed at the request of Levi T.
Griffin, A. M., Fletcher Professor of Law in the University of Mich-
y* . . .
igan, for use in connection with his lectures in that school. They have
been compiled by Prof. Griffin with the assistance of Walter Denton
Smith, Instructor in Law. They have been selected largely from
Adams' Cases on Sales.
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HOFFJIAN et al. v. CAROW.
(22 Woud. 285.)
Court of EiTors of New York. Dec, 1839.
Error from the supreme court. Carow
brought an action of trover in the superior
court of the city of New Yorli, against Hoff-
man & Co., auctioneers in the city of Balti-
more, in the state of Marj'Iand, for a quan-
tity of merchandise stolen from the plaintiff
in the city of New York, and forwarded by
the thief to the defendants to be sold at
auction. The thief was indicted and con-
victed of the felony in May, 18.33, previous to
which time the goods had been sold and the
I)roceeds paid over by the defendants to the
thief, without notice of the felony. The suit
was commenced in October, 1834, against the
defendants, who moved for a nonsuit on the
grounds, that the proceeds of the goods hav-
ing been paid over to the thief previous to
his arrest, and before the defendants had no-
tice of the robbei-y, the plaintiff was not en-
titled to recover; and that at all events im-
der the circumstances of the case, the plain-
tiff was bound to prove a demand and re-
fusal. The .iudge presiding at the trial re-
fused a nonsuit, and charged the jury to find
for the plaintiff. The defendauts excepted.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, up-
on which judgment having been entered the
defendants removed the record into the su-
preme court, where the judgment of the
court below was atSnued. See the opinion
delivered by the chief justice (20 Wend. 22).
A writ of error was thereupon sued out re-
moving the record into this court.
H. R. Winthrop and D. B. Ogden, for plain-
tiffs in error. I. Anthon, for defendant in er-
ror.
After advisement, the following opinions
were deUvered:
WALWORTH, Ch. The simple question
presented for our decision in this case is,
whether the purchaser of stolen goods, who
afterwards sells them as his own to a bona
fide purchaser, is liable to the owner of the
goods, in an action of trover for such con-
version thereof to his own use? One of the
members of this court, upon the argument,
supposed the bare statement of such a case
was sufficient to enable the court to decide it
without further argument; and I thought so
too, until one of the learned and very able
counsel for the plaintiff's in error assured us
he was sincere in believing the action could not
be sustained, and refeiTed to a case from the
English Term Reports which was apparently
a decision in favor of his clients. To under-
stand that case, therefore, and to distinguish
it from the present, I have found it necessary
to bestow a little more time upon the exam-
ination of this subject than I should have
otherwise deemed it my duty to give to it.
It is known to tlie professional members of
the court, that in the market towns in Eng-
land there are periodical fairs, where prop-
erty is iKJught and sold, called market days;
and that by the custom of the city of Lon-
don, every day except Suuday is a market
day, and every tradesman's shop is a market
overt for those things in which he usually
deals at that place; and that by the common
law, a sale in a market overt actually chan-
ges the title to the property in favor of a
bona hde purchaser thereof, even though it
has been stolen from the rightful owner. 5
Coke, S3a. The only remedy of the owner
of stolen property to recover it again, under
such circumstances, at the common law, was
to pursue his appeal against the felon to con-
viction, and then he was entitled to restitution
of his goods, although they had been sold in a
market overt. 2 Co. Inst. 714. So, also, if
goods were stolen, and the thief abandoned
or waived them in his flight, they were for-
feited to the crown, or the lord of the manor,
unless the owner proceeded upon his appeal
to attaint the thief. Foxley's Case, 5 Coke,
109a. But as this proceeding to convict the
felon by a private suit was very inconven-
ient and expensive to the owner of stolen
property, the statute 21 Hen. VHI. c. 11, was
enacted, by which the stolen goods were di-
rected to be restored to the owner upon his
procuring a conviction of the thief, upon an
indictment in the ordinary way, without the
necessity of an appeal. Staunf. P. C. (Ed.
1583) p. 167. Under this statute, it is the
settled law in England, that tipon the convic-
tion of the offender, the owner is entitled to
be restored to his property, notwithstanding
it may have been sold to a bona fide pur-
chaser in a market overt. Burgess v. Coney,
Trem. P. C. 315; 2 Co. Inst 714; J. Kel. 48.
In the case of Horwood v. Smith, 2 Term
R. 7.50, relied on by the counsel for the plain-
tiffs in error to show that they could not be
liable for a conversion of these goods which
took place before the conviction of the thief
in May, 18.33, there had been an actual sale
of the stolen property to Smith. th% defend-
ant, in a market overt. The title of the own-
er was therefore absolutely divested by this
sale, so that Smith, the defendant, could not
be guilty of a conversion as to him, by after-
wards selling the sheep to another person,
before the plaintiffs' right to the property
had been restored by a conviction of the fel-
on. By a reference to the opinion of Mr. Jus-
tice Biiller in that case, it will be seen that
he puts the decision upon that ground; and
the language put by the reporter into the
mouth of Lord Kenyon, that the title to the
stolen property was in dubio previous to the
sale to the defendant in the market overt, I
shall presently show is not considered as
law, even in England. The case under con-
sideration, therefore, differs from Horwood
V. Smith in this: that there had been a sale
in market overt in that case previous to the
alleged conversion, and the title which Smith
acquired by that sale was not divested by the
subsequent conviction until long afterwards.
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HOFFMAN et al. v. CAROW . 
(22 Wend. 285.) 
Court of Errors of New York. Dec., 1830. 
Error from the supreme court. Carow 
brought an action of trover in the superior 
c-ourt of the city of New York, against Hoff­
man & Co., auctioneers in the city of Balti­
more, in tl1e state of l\1aryland, for a quan­
tity of merchandise stolen from the plaintiff 
in the city of New Yorlc, and forwarded by 
ti.le ti.lief to the defendants to be sold at 
nuction. The thief was indicted and con­
Yicted of the felony in l\Iay, 18.33, previous to 
whicll time the goods bad been sold and the 
vroceeds paid over by the defendants to the 
thief, without notice of the felony. The suit 
was commenced in October, 18.3-±, against the 
<1efendants, who moved for a nonsuit on the 
::rounds, that the proceeds of the goods hav­
ing been paid over to the thief previous to 
his arrest, and before the defendants had no­
tice of the robbery, the plaintiff was not en­
titled to recover; and that at all events un­
der the circumstances of the case, the plain­
tiff was bound to prove a demand and re­
fusal. The judge presiding at the trial re­
fu-ed a nonsuit. and charged the jury to find 
for the plaintiff. The defendants excepted. 
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, up­
on which judgment having been entered the 
defendants removed the record into the su­
preme court, where the judgment of the 
court below was affirmed. See the opinion 
delivered by the chief justice (20 Wend. 22). 
A writ of error was thereupon sued out re­
moving the record into this court. 
H. R. Winthrop and D. B. Ogden, for plain­
tiffs in error. I. Anthon, for defendant in er­
ror. 
After advisement, the following opinions 
were delivered: 
WAL WORTH, Ch. The simple question 
presented for our decision in this case is, 
whether the purchaser of stolen goods, who 
afterwards sells them as his own to a bona 
fide purchaser, is liable to the owner of the 
goods, in an action of trover for such con­
version thereof to bis own use? One of the 
members of this court, upon the argument, 
supposed the bare statement of such a case 
was sufficient to enable the court to decide it 
·1Yithout further argument; and I thought so 
too, until one of the learned and very able 
counsel for the plaintiffs in error assured us 
he was sincere in believing the action could not 
he sustained, and referred to a case from the 
English Term Reports which was apparently 
a decision in favor of bis clients. To under­
stand that case, therefore, and to distinguish 
it from the present, I have found it necessary 
to bestow a little more time upon the exam­
ination of this subject than I should have 
otherwise deemed it my duty to give to it. 
It is known to the professional members of 
the court, that in the market towns in Eng-
TE RNET A R CH V E  
land lllcrc are periodical "fairs, where prop­
erty i · boug-bt and sold, called marlrnt clays; 
and tbat by tbc custom of tbc city of Lon­
don, eycry clay except Sunday is a w·trket 
day, ancl eYcry tradesman's shop is a market 
overt for those things in which be usually 
deals at that place; and tbat by the common 
law, a sale in a market OYert actunlly chan­
ges the title to tbe property in favor of a 
bona fide purchaser thereof, even though it 
bas been stolen from the rightful owner. 5 
Coke, 8.3a. The only remedy of the owner 
of stolen property to recover it again, under 
such circumstances, at the common law, was 
to pursue bis appeal against the felon to con­
viction, and tllen be was entitled to restitution 
of bis goods, although they bad been sold in a 
market overt. 2 Co. Inst. 714. So, also, if 
goods were stolen, and the thief abandoned 
or waived them in bis flight, they were for­
feited to the crown, or the lord of the manor, 
unless the owner proceeded upon bis appeal 
to attaint the thief. Foxley's Case, 5 Coke, 
lOHa. But as this proceeding to convict the 
felon by a priYate suit was very inconven­
ient and expensive to the owner of stolen 
property, the statute 21 Hen. VIII. c. 11, was 
enacted. by which the stolen goods were di­
rected to be restored to the owner upon bis 
procuring a conviction of the thief, upon an 
indictment in tbe ordinary way, without the 
necessity of au appeal. Staunf. P. C. (Eel. 
1.:; 3) p. 167. Under this statute, it is the 
settled law in England, that upon the convic­
tion of the offeudcr, the owner is entitled to 
be restored to bis property, notwithstanding 
it may have been sold to a bona fide pur­
chaser in a market overt. Burgess v. Coney, 
Trem. P. C. 315; 2 Co. Inst. 714; J. Kel. -!8. 
In the case of Horwood v. Smith. 2 Term 
R. 750, relied on by the counsel for the plain­
tiffs in error to show that they could not be 
liable for a conversion of these goods which 
took place before the conviction of the thief 
in l\Iay, 1833, there bad been an actual sale 
of the stolen property to Smith. tli defend­
ant, in a market overt. The title of the own­
er was therefore absolutely divested by this 
sale, so that Smith. the defendant, could not 
be guilty of a conversion as to him, by after­
wards selling the sheep to another person, 
before the plaintiffs' right to the property 
bad been restored by a conviction of the fel­
on. By a reference to the opinion of l\Ir. Jus­
tice Buller in that case, it will be seen that 
be puts the decision upon that ground; and 
the language put by the reporter into the 
mouth of Lord Kenyon, that the title to the 
stolen property was in dubio previous to the 
sale to the defendant in the market overt, I 
shall presently show is not considered as 
law, even in England. The case under con­
sideration, therefore, differs from Horwood 
v. Smith in this: that there bad been a sale 
in market overt in that case previous to the 
alleged conversion, and the title which Smith 
acquired by that ale was not divested by the 
subsequent conviction until long afterwards, 
I T 
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which conviction was considered as giving
the original owner a new title to the proper-
ty; whereas, in tlie present case, tliere never
had been any sale iu a marL;et overt, to con-
vey any title to the defendants which re-
quired to be divested by a conviction. Wheth-
er there are any markets overt in Maryland,
where the defendants purchased this prop-
erty from the thief, I do not know; but if
there are, there was no attempt to prove on
the trial that they purchased the property
in a market overt; and the learned Judge
Blaekstone, "the English Justinian," says, in
so many words, that "if my goods are stolen
from me and sold out of market overt, my
property is not altered and I may take them
wherever I find them." 2 Bl. Comm. 449.
See, also, Foxley's Ca.^e, 5 Coke, 109a; and
Kelh, Laws of William the Conqueror, 73,
law 44.
The case of Parker v. Patrick. 5 Term R.
175, depends upon an entirely different prin-
ciple. The goods in that case were obtained
by fraud and not by felony. The sale to the
fraudulent vendee was. therefore, not void,
but only voidable at the election of the ven-
dor; and as the vendee had pawned them
to an innoceut person for a valuable consid-
eration, the pawnee was permitted to hold
them as against the owner who had enabled
the vendee to obtain property of the defend-
ant, upon the securitj- of property which had
apparently been sold to the pawnor, so as
to give him the legal title thereto. Moroy v.
AValsli, in om- supreme court (S Cow. 238),
was decided in favor of the bona fide pur-
chaser from a fraudulent vendee, upon the
same principle; although it will be seen the
chief justice said in that case, that in this
slate where we had no niarliets overt, a .sale
of stolen goods would not divest the title of
the owner. The same distinction between
the cases of goods obtained by fraud and
goods obtained by felony, is noticed by Lord
Dennian in Peer v. Humphrey, 1 liar. &; W.
28, wliich is also a direct authority in favor
of sustaining the judgment of the supremo
court in tlio i)resent case. Indeed, it is a case
upon all fours with this, and makes the dis-
tinction, which 1 liave lieen cndiavorlng to
explain, between ITorwood v. Smith, and the
case which we are now to decide. The serv-
ant of the plaintiff stole three o.xen and a
heifer from hlin and sold the three oxen to
the del'cnrlant for cash, but the sale was not
In a market overt; the thief was afterwards
taken and convlct('<l, but before that convic-
tion the defendant had sold the cattle to
other persons. After the conviction of the
thief the plalntlfl' brought his action of tro-
ver against \\\i- del'endnnt, for the previous
conversion, as In this case, and recovered tlic^
value of the cattle. Upon the cn.se iK-Ing
brought before the court ol' king's bench, the
••ounsel for the defendant cited llorwood v.
Smith, and referred to what Lord Kenyon
HtiUi as to the prop<Tty being In dublo be-
tween the felony and the conviction. To
which Lord C. J. Deuman replied "that must
be a mistake, or the consequence of the judg-
ment having been delivered hastily," and in
giving his opinion afterwards, he said that
in the case then imder consideration the
property in the cattle never was divested out
of the ti-ue owner; but that a sale in market
overt gave a prima facie right of property.
Justice Littledale says, "as the defendant did
not purchase in market overt, he acquired
no title whatever iu the cattle; that remain-
ed in the plaintiff, and therefore the defend-
ant's subsequent sale of them, amounted to
an act of conversion." And Justice Williams
said that Horwood v. Smith merely laid down
that a party by piu'chasing in market overt
acquired a property iu the thing stolen; but
as the purchase in the case they were then
considering was not such a sale, no property
passed to the defenilaut in point of law and
was never divested out of the plaintiff. The
verdict therefore was directed to stand. It
appears by this case, and also by that of
Gainsou v. Wood lull. 2 Car. & P. 41, that the
courts in England will not sustain a suit in
favor of the owner of the stolen propeity,
either against the thief or against a purchas-
er from him. uutil he has proceeded crim-
inally against the thief for the felony. This
practice imdoubledly proceeds upon the an-
cient common law principle that the civil in-
jury is merged in tlie felony; but as the Re
vised Statutes of isoi, which abolished ap
peals of felony in tliis state, also declavecf
that the civil remedy should not be merged
in the felony, or in any manner affected
thereby, this English rule does not apply to
suits commenced here. 1 R. L. 1801. p. 204,
In the present case, however, the plaintiff
had convicted the tliief before the com-
mencement of his suit. He was therefore en-
titled to recover according to the English
practice.
I have no doubt that the decision of the
court below, was correct; and the judgment
should be affirmed.
By Senator EDWARDS. In this case it Is
clcarl.v shown that Carow had the title to
the property. This title he could not be di-
vested of, but by his own consent or by the
ojx'ratlon of law. lie did not consent to part
with the properly because It was sIoUmi from
him, and the (inestion Is, has he been di-
vested of It by tlie operation of law since tln!
felony.
The sale of the projjorty at public auction
could not divest the owner of his rights. N^i
one can transfer to nnotlier a gn-ater inter,
est In personal property, than he or the prin
cipal for whom he .-lets, possesses. This is
one of the fundaniental principles by whlct
the right to personal property Is t<>8ted li!
cases of sale, and Is of great anihiulty. "Ne-
mo plus Juris In alluni translcrre potest,
qtiam Ipse li:ibel," w.'is considered a sound
and salutary principle of the civil law in
Trance and Scotland, even In the time o/
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4 PRELH!IX..l.BY COX,IDER.\..TIOX ,. 
which conviction was considered a gw1ng 
the original owner a new title to the proper­
ty; whereas. in the present case, there never 
had been any sale in a market overt, to con­
vey any title to the defendants which re­
quired to be divested by a conviction. Wheth­
er there are any market overt in ).laryland, 
where the defendants purchased this prop­
erty from the thief, I do not know; but if 
there are, there was no attempt to prove on 
the trial that they purchased the property 
in a market overt; and the learned Judge 
Blackstone, "the English Justinian," says, in 
so many words, that ''if my goods are tolen 
from me and sold out of market overt, my 
property is not altered and I may take them 
whereYer I fintl them." 2 Bl. Comru. -HO. 
See, also, Foxley's Case, 5 Coke, lO!>a; and 
Kelh, Laws of William the Conqueror, 73, 
law -H. 
The case of Parker v. Patrick. 5 Term R. 
175, depends upon an entirely cliITerent prin­
ciple. The goods in that case were obtained 
by fraud and not by felony. The sale to the 
fraudulent vendee was, therefore, not void, 
but only voidable at the election of the ven­
dor ; and as the vendee had pawned them 
to an innocent person for a valuable con id­
eration, the pawnee was permitted to hold 
them as against the ownel' who had enabled 
the vendee to obtain property or the defend­
ant, upon the secut·ity of property which had 
appa rently been sold to the pawnor. so as 
to gil·e him the 1 :::al title thereto. Morey v. 
Wal-h, in Olli' supreme comt ( Cow. '.!3'), 
was dccicled in favor or tlie bona fide pur­
c:ha er from a fraudulent venclee, upon the 
same principle; altllougb it will be seen the 
c-hief justic said in that ca -e, that in this 
state where "e had no marl;:ets ovel't, a sale 
or stok•n �oocls would not divest the til l or 
the ow1H.'r. The same 11istioction bet ween 
tbe c·ases of gon1ls obtilined by fraud and 
�omls obtained by felony. is notice1l by Lord 
D nman in Peer v. Ilu1111)hrey, 1 lfar. ,. "'· 
:.! , \Yhi<'h is also a direC't :iuthorit,\ in f;nor 
of • ustai11iu� the judgment or the supreiue 
rnurt in the 1n·es<'nt case. Intleccl, it is a �·:ise 
1111on all fours with this. and m:ikes the dis­
tindion, whic-h l have been en!l1•avoring to 
explain, hrlwc<'ll Horwood''· �mlth. :tll(l l llC' 
<'as<' wltieh we :ir now to clN·id('. The serv­
nnt ol' thr. plnlntlll' stole thrre oxl'n nncl a 
hr.lfPr rrorn him and solcl Utt' three oxen to 
1hc df'f1·r11ln11t for cash, hut the sale wns not 
In n rnnrl·pt overt; thr thief wns nrterwnrtli; 
t:1 k1·11 and c·o11vlcfiotl, h11l hPfnr t hnt conv ic· 
t 11111 t hP dPf!'IHl:t 111 h:trl Hnld the cal llP to 
ntl11·r Jll'r!Hlll!I. ,\rtf'I' tllC' ('011\'lc·tlon or thr 
thl1·f tlrn pl:dutllf 11111111-:ht hlH !l<'tlnn of lro 
\'Pr ni,::rln t th" df'!'entl:rnl, rnr th" pr!'vlo11H 
r•onv1•rslo11, ns In thl!I C':tl<I', n11tl n•c•ovprrrl th11 
\'1th11• of th(} 1·11ttlr t 11011 th rnsr lwlng 
hrnni;ht h1•fnrn th" f'nllrt nl' Jclng'H hench, th 
1·ounR1•l for the cli•ff'nrlnnt rltNl Tlorwontl v. 
Smith, nnil n•fPrrPrl to whnt Lnrtl J'PnJnn 
1111ld us to thr propPrty lwlnl! In <l11hlo lw­
'\ w"4.: 1 [lw r -�·w llllll lht' ('flll\'lrtln11 'J'o LJ I LI 'j. 
I NTE RNET A R C H  V E  
which Lord C .  J .  Denman replied "that must 
be a mistake, or the consequence of the judg­
ment having been delivered hastily," and in 
giving his opinion afterwards, he said that 
in the case then under cousi<leration the 
property in the cattle never was divested out 
of the true owner; but that a sale in market 
overt gave a priwa facie r ight of property. 
Justice Littledale sa.'S. "as the defendant did 
not purcba e in market overt, he acqnirell 
no title whatever in the cattle; that remnin­
ed in the plainti!I, and therefore the defend­
ant's subsequent ale of them, a mount 11 to 
an act of conversion." And Justice \'i'illiaru� 
said that Horwood v. Smith merely laid down 
that a party by pm·cbasiug in market overt 
acquired a property in the thing stolen; but 
as the purchase in the case they were then 
considering was not uch a sale, no property 
pa -sed to the defen1lant in point of law and 
was never divested out of the plainti!l'. The 
verdict therefore was direct1'\) tn stand. It 
appears by this ease, and als·• lly that or 
Gainson v. 'Yoodfull. :.! -'ar. & P. ·11, that the 
courts in England will not sustain a suit in 
favor of the owner oC the stolen prop�'tiy, 
either against the thief or against a pun·has­
er from him. until he has prol'eNlctl crim 
inally against the !bier for the felony. Thi� 
practice undoubtedl.1· procee1ls upon the an­
cient common law princi11l that the •iYil in· 
jmy is mer�ed in the felony; llut as the H.e 
vi etl tatntcs of 1 Ol. wllkh allolish!.'d ap 
peals of f lony LU tliis state, al o tleclnre•I 
that the civil remedy llould not be nwrgu\ 
in the felony, or in any manner affec\l'1l 
thereby, this English rule does not apply to 
suit' commenced her<'. 1 R. L. 1�01, p. ::?G·!. 
In the present case. how ver, the !)laintifC 
had coiwidetl the thief befor tho com­
m!.'ncement or his snit. Uc wa' therefore en­
titled to recon'r according to the English 
practice. 
I have no doubt that tbe decision of tho 
court b0low, wn corr ct; and the judgment 
shouill be nffirnlC'd. 
Ry �0mllor lCffW ARD In tbls case it ls 
clrariy t'lhown that C'arow bad tbl' title tn 
the IH'O\ll'l'(y. 'L'his title h could not he cli­
yested ot', but h�· bil'! own consent or h�· tlw 
01wr:ilion or law. ll did not <'ons1•nt to part 
with t be propc>rl y ht'l':1 use It \Y:tS stolPn from 
him, ancl th CJUestlon ls, bas be lh'en di. 
vt'stecl of It by the op ration of law Hlnl'e th•: 
r loll�'· 
'L'lw snl or th lH'opcrty nt puhllr :111dtn11 
coul1l uol dlvr!lt I he ownc>r of hlH rlc;ht!I. •I 
one can trn1mll'l' to nnnthPl' a gr!'nt1•r inter-. 
ei;t In perHmml property, thnn hC' or thr prl11· 
r1pnl for whom he :11·tt-t, p11ss!'H!l<'!t '!'his i> 
Oil!' Of the• ft11lrilll1H'lltlll l11'1llclp)NI hy Whirl. 
llw right lo 1w1·t-tn1111l pro1wrty Ii; t<'Rtl'd 11. 
cnHell ul' t':tl<', nnrl IH or J{rent nnllqull�. " "'" 
mo plllll j11rlH In :11111111 trnnsl'Prn• potP1<I, 
(Jllllfll IJit�e hnlwt ," was 1·n11Hltlrre1I n. Round 
nurl "1tl11l11ry prl1wlplP of th!' rlvll lnw 111 
Fr:rnrr :tnd Hr•11tl:tiid, <'\<'11 Jn tlw time of 
u I FO N 
KIGHTS IN STOLEN GOODS.
PoTliier and Erskine;* and although England
h;is departed from it in one instance in the
law of market overt, yet that law has never
been adoi)ted in this country, and whenever
the question has been presented to American
judicial tribunals it has been repudiated.
Wheelright v. De Peyster, 1 Johns. 480;
Dame v. Baldwin, 8 Mass. 518; 1 Yeates,
478; 2 Kent, Comm. 324. As to the question
therefore under consideration, it is wholly
immaterial whether the property be sold at
public auction by an auctioneer or at private
sale by any other individual; the owner's
rights cannot be affected in the one case
more than in the other, nor can the purchas-
er acquire any greater interest in the one
case than in the other. Disposing of or as-
sutning to dispose of another's property with-
out his consent, unless by the operation of
law, is a conversion for which this action
lies. Everett v. Coffin, 6 Wend. 609; 4 Maule
& S. 259; McCombie v. Davis, 6 East, 538;
Parker v. Godin, 2 Strange, 813; Wilbraham
V. Snow, 2 Saimd, 47; 2 Phil. Ev. 121. Nor
can even a bona fide purchaser protect him-
self under such a sale. The doctrine of ca-
veat emptor applies, and he is liable to the
action of trover by the real owner, notwith-
standing his purchase. Williams v. Merle,
11 Wend. 180; Prescot v. De Forest, 16 Johns.
IGO. Were the rule as contended for by the
counsel for the plaintiffs in error, all the fel-
on -would have to do to divest the owner of
the right to his property, would be to place
it in the hands of an auctioneer as soon as
stolen, and cause a sale to be made of it; a
rule of law that would thus encoiu-age felony
and deprive the owner of his property, would
be as absurd as unjust.
When property is taken without legal au-
thority or the consent of the owner, it is
unnecessary for him to make demand before
action brought. When he has once consent-
ed to part with the possession, in some cases
it is necessary to made a demand to show
a conversion, but when the possession is
wrongfully taken, there is a conversion and
no demand is necessary.
The Revised Statutes have not altered the
nature of this action in a case like the one
we are now considering, as the counsel
would seem to suppose from his argument.
The statute is intended to make provision
relative to stolen property, where it has been
arrested from the felon, and is in the custo-
dy of some legal officer, but does not extend
to a case where the felon has delivered the
property to an auctioneer to make sale of
it for his benefit. I am therefore for alfirm-
ing the judgment.
By Senator FURMAN. No case like the
present has ever been decided by this court;
and it is of the utmost consequence that an
adjudication, having the important bearing
that this promises to exercise upon the com-
mercial interests of our country, should not
be determined until after a patient investi-
gation of the principle In all its bearings,
and a due examination of the ad.iudgid
cases under which the doctrine is sought to
be established, and of the facts and circum-
stances under which they were decided.
The principle rests in the common law,
that a felon does not acquire an.y title to
the goods stolen, that he cannot transfer
title even to a bona flde purchaser, and that
the owner may take his goods which have
been so stolen wherever he can find them.
But it was very early discovered, that the
commercial interests of the English nation
required that some exception should be
made to this general rule, and it was for
that purpose that the courts in that king-
dom held that the principle did not apply
to sales made in market overt; and that
sales made under such circumstances Bhould
convey a title to the bona fide purchaser,
although the property might have been
stolen. Even this exception was not found
sufficiently broad to meet the wants of a
trading community, in which it is absolutely
necessary, for the well being of society, that
a bona fide purchaser should be protected in
his possession of personal property; and the
exception was still further extended to sales
made in public shops in the city of London.
It is well to remark here, that in England
such markets overt are held, either by pre-
scription or by charter, and in no instance
does the charter declare that sales made
therein shall be conclusive; but the doctrine
has arisen from the exigencies of trade, and
has been adopted with a view to protect and
favor the commercial interests of that coun-
try. But it is said by our courts, and with
truth, that the principle of sales in market
overt, as It exists in England, has no ap-
plication to this country. Although this is
admitted, yet I may be allowed to express
my surprize, that, with our trade and com-
merce, we should have no similar doctrines
or principles to protect it, but that, on the
contrary, we should seek to establish a rule
which governed England in the infancy of
its commerce, which was adopted by its
courts at a period when it had no manufac-
tures, and its whole trade consisted in rais-
ing wool and exporting it to Flanders to be
wrought into cloth, and which was repudi-
ated by those courts at a period when the
commercial relations of that country were
not of one quarter the importance or value
of those of our own country at the present
time. My surprize has not been diminished,
when 1 find that almost every commercial
nation, ancient as well as modern, beside
our own, had found it necessary to adopt
some such doctrine. It was wisely provided
by the laws of Athens, that all lawsuits re-
lating to commerce should be carried on in
the six months during which ships were not
accustomed to put to sea, to the end that
they might not lose their voyage by the im-
pediment of legal prosecutions. On the con-
trary, we, although depending on foreign
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HIGIITl::i IN STOLEN GOOD . 
PC1thicr ancl Erskine; and altl!ough England 
has departed from it in one instance in the 
1<1w of market overt, yet that law has 11ever 
IJeen aclopted in this country, and whenever 
the question has been presc11ted to American 
judicial tribunals it has been repudiated. 
Wheelright v. De Peyster, 1 Johns. 480; 
Dame v. Baldwin, 8 l\Iass. 518; 1 Yeates, 
478; 2 Kent, Comm. 324. As to the question 
therefore under consideration, it is wholly 
immaterial whether the prope1ty be sold at 
public auction by an auctioneer or at private 
sale by any other individual; the owner's 
rights cannot be affected in the one case 
more than in the other, nor can the pmchas­
er acquire any greater interest in tile one 
case than in the other. Disposing of or as­
suming to dispose of another's property with­
out his consent, unless by the operation ot 
law, is a con;ersion for which this action 
lies. Everett v. Coffin, 6 ·wend. 609; 4 Maule 
& S. 239; l\IcCombie v. Davis, 6 East, 538; 
Parker v. Godin, 2 Strange, 813; Wilbraham 
v. Snow, 2 Sauna, 47; 2 Phil. Ev. 121. Nor 
can even a bona fide pm·chaser protect him­
self under such a sale. The doctrine of ca­
veat emptor applies, a11d be is liable to the 
action of trover by the real owner, notwith­
standing bis purchase. Williams v. Merle, 
11 Wend. 180; Prescot v .  De Forest, 1G Johns. 
!CO. "·ere the rule as contended for by the 
ccunsel for the plaintiffs in error, all the fel­
•Jn would have to do to divest the owner of 
the right to his property, would be to place 
it in the hands of an auctioneer as soon as 
stolen, and cause a sale to be made of it; a 
rule of law that would thus encourage felony 
and depri;e the owner of his property, would 
be as a IJsurd as unjust. 
When property is taken without legal au­
cholity or the consent of the owner, it is 
unnecessary for him to make demand before 
action brought. When he has once consent­
ed to part with the possession, in some cases 
it is necessary to made a demand to show 
a conversion, but when the possession is 
wrong-fully taken, there is a conversion and 
no demand is uecessarv. 
The Revised Statutes have not altered the 
nature of this action in a case like the one 
ll"e are now considering, as the counsel 
"lvould seem to suppose from bis argument. 
Tile statute is intended to make proYision 
relative to stolen property, where it bas been 
arrested from the felon, and is in the custo-
1ly of some legal officer, but does not extend 
to a case where the felon has delivered the 
vroperty to an auctioneer to make sale of 
it for bis benefit. I am therefore for affirm­
ing the judgment. 
By Senator FURMAN. No case like the 
present has ever been decided by this court; 
and it is of the utmost consequence that an 
adjudication, ha Ying the impo1tant bearing 
that this promises to exercise upon the com­
mercial interests of our country, should not 
be determined until after a patient investi-
D 1 1t1zed by 
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gaiion of the principle In all its be:.i·ings. 
and a due examination o f  the a1l.i11dgul 
cases under which the doctrine is sou;.:ht to 
be established, and of the facts auu cin·um­
stances under which they were decide(). 
The principle rests in the common law, 
that a felon does not acquire any title to 
the goods stolen, that he cannot transfer 
title even to a bona fide purchaser, and that 
the owner may take his goods which have 
been so stolen wherever he can find them. 
But it was very early discovered, 1.hat the 
commercial interests of the English nation 
required that some exception should be 
made to this general rule, and it was for 
that purpose that the courts in that king­
dom held that the principle did not apply 
to sales made in market overt; and that 
sales made under such circumstances should 
convey a title to the bona fide purchaser, 
although the property might have been 
stolen. Even thjs exception was not found 
sufficiently broad to meet the wants of a 
trading community, in which it is absolutely 
necessary, for the well being of society, that 
a bona fide purchaser should be protected in 
his possession of personal property; and the 
exception was still further extended to sales 
made in public shops in the city of London. 
It is wel! to remark here, that in England 
such markets overt are held, either by pre­
scription or by charter, and in no instance 
does the charter declare that sales made 
therein shall be conclusive; but the doctrine 
has arisen from the exigencies of trade, and 
has been adopted with a view to protect and 
favor the commercial interests of that coun­
try. But it is said by our courts, and with 
truth, tllat the principle of sales in market 
overt, as it exists in England, has no ap­
plication to this country. Although this is 
admitted, yet I may be allowed to express 
my surprize, that, with our trade and com­
merce, we should have no similar doctrines 
or principles to protect it, but that, on th� 
contrary, we should seek to establii;;h a rule 
which governed England in the infancy of 
its commerce, which was adopted by its 
courts at a period when it had no run nufac­
turns, and its whole trade consisted in rais­
ing wool and exporting it to Flanders to be 
wrought into cloth, and which was re1rncli­
ated by those courts at a period when the 
commercial relations of that country were 
not of one quarter the importance or value 
of those of our own coulltry at the present 
time. �Iy surprize bas not been diminishetl. 
when 1 find that almost every commercial 
nation, ancient as well as modern, beside 
our own, bad found it necessary to adopt 
some such doctrine. lt was wisely provided 
by the laws of Athens, that all lawsuits re­
lating to commerce should be carried on in 
the six months during which ships were not 
accustomed to put to sea, to the end that 
they might not lose their voyage by the im­
pediment of legal prosecutions. On the con­
trary, we, although depending on foreign 
Origi P.a l  from 
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commerce for our prosperity to a much
greater extent than ever the inhabitants of
that ancient state did, hold a mere com-
mercial agent liable in damages, at any
time within sis years, for an act honestly
done by him in the course of business, and
that even without a previous demand before
the suit is instituted. In the Komau state,
Ulpian speaks of the great privileges grant-
ed by the government to merchants, and
gives for it the general reason, because
navigation is of the greatest service to the
state.
In England, the plaintiff could not recover
merely because the goods had been stolen,
without that fact having been first judicial-
ly ascevtained. Before the statute of the
21 Hen. VIII., the owner was not entitled to
a restitution of the stolen property, even
upon the conviction of the felon on indict-
ment, but could only obtain the same by
prosecuting an appeal. After the enactment
of that statute, appeals were disused, and
were rendered unnecessary, because the
court might, on the conviction of the felon,
award restitution; and the courts are now
in the habit of doing so. Our own statute
(2 Rev. St. 74", § 33) adopts the English stat-
ute on that point. In England, the action
under the award of restitution cannot be
maintained against any one except him who
shall be in possession at the time of the
conviction or attainder; and a demand is
also requisite before the action is brought.
G Mod. 412. The reasonable inference from
this statute, and the manner of proceeding,
seems to be tliat in t)ie case of stolen prop-
erty, the title of the plaintiff, so far at least
as to enable him to maintain trover, is not
estal)lished before the conviction or attain-
der; at any rale, he is not before then en-
titleil to a restitution under the statute. 2
Car. & P. 41, and note. It does not appear
from this case, that tlie felon was convicted
of the felony charged before this suit was
brought; but it does appear that the pro-
ceeds of the sale of the goods in question
wei'c paid over to him before he was even
iirrostod. Our statute docs not a\ithorizo
the plaintiff to recover his goods from any
one who may at any time have had the
goods In his i)ossession, but merely author-
izes a recovery in general terms. The stat-
ute (2 Uev. SI. 747, § 34) seems to recognize
the principle, that under certain circum-
stances, al.l.ougli tlie propert.v has been
stolen, a good title may be conveyed by a
per.ion not the owner, or at the least, a title
sufllclcnt to protect a bona tide iiurchaser
friini uu action of trover, for that section
provides, that "IP stolen iiniperty shall not
be cUilincd by the owner tlicrcof before the
exphallon of six months from the time an.v
por.HoM Kliiill lijivc been convicted of stealing
Rilcli priipcrty, the iniiglstrate, slierllT, cdii-
stnlde, or dIIht rdlh'cr. or person having the
sniue 111 Ills ciiHlody. sliall ih'llver hiicIi prop-
erty to the county Htipeilntendents of the
poor, on being paid thfi reasonable and nec-
essary expenses incurred in the preservation
thereof, to be appropriated to the use of the
poor of such count.v." This enactment is
made notwithstanding that by the general
law of the land, the owner is entitled to six
years within which to bring his action; and
certainly the legislature cannot be presumed
to have intended to authorize an illegal dis-
position of another's property.
But there is a stronger and more express
exception to this general principle, which is
to be found in the case of negotiable bills
of exchange and promissory notes, where
possession is prima facie evidence of prop-
erty, and a bona fide holder can recover up-
on the same, although a bill or note came to
him from a person who had stolen or robbed
it from the owner, provided the bona fide
holder took it innocently in the course of
trade for a valuable consideration, and un-
der circumstances of due caution. Suspi-
cion must first be cast upon the title of the
holder, by showing that the paper had got
into circulation by force or fraud, before
the burden is thrown upon him of showing
how he came by it, and what consideration
he gave for It. This protection is, for the
sake of trade, given to the holder of nego-
tiable paper, who receives it fairly in the
way of business; and why the same prin-
ciple should not be applied to other personal
property which p.asses through the hands
of an individual fairly, in the course of tr.ade
and without notice, is difficult to imagine.
If Lord Manslield, with his clear and com-
prehensive mind, felt himself called upon,
ex necessitate rei, to depart from the com-
mon law, and to establish the principle
above stated in the case of negotiable com-
mercial paiier, it cannot for a moment be
doubted, that If the judges who preceded
him had not deemed it necessary to protect
the innocent bona fide purchaser, by the doc-
trine of sales in market overt, that the great
founder of English commercial law would
have extended the same principle to all
other property the subject of mercantile
transaction.
It Is the boast of the common law, that It
accommodates Itself .to tlio growing wants
of a thriving commercial peojjle; and It has
not been in bravado merely, that this has
been put forth; but in tlie hands of the ven-
erated sages of the lOnglish (bench, It has
been pnieiically applied. Wluit did the .'igo
of Jlenry VIII., when the "tireat Abi'lrlge-
ment of the Statutes of the Realm" fornieil a
single volume hut little l.-irger than a poeket
Bible, know of the law of bills of exchange
and jiroMilssory notes, or of the law of insur-
ance and shipping? Nothing. All this, and
n thous.'ind \\M mor(>, has been engrafted
upon It by Judicial legislation, until It has
truly become the c(illecte<l wisdom of ages.
"Ita lex scrlpta est" was not regarded by
those sages, as It Is too much the case in
our day, a sutllcicnt answer to an arguini'nt
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6 PHELDI I:X .d..R Y  CO:XSIDE R .\. Tl OXS. 
commerce for our prosperity to a much 
greater extent than e;er the inhabita.nts of 
that ancient tate did, boll! a mere com­
mercial agent liable in damages, at any 
time within six years. for a n  act hone>stly 
done h; him i n  the course of business, anu 
that ev�n without a preYious demand before 
the suit is instituted. In the Homan sta.tP, 
rlpian speaks of the great privileges grant­
eu by the go,·ernweut to wen.:hantl', and 
giY<>s for it the general rea on. bec�rnse 
naY i::ation is of the greatest servke to the 
state. 
In England. the pla intiff could not reco;er 
merely because the goods had been stolen, 
without that fact haYin;r been first j uuicial­
Iy asr·.,1·t n i ned. Before the statute of tile 
21 Hen. Y I I I. ,  the owner was not entitled to 
a restitution of the stolen 11roperty, even 
upon the conviction of the felon on indict­
ment. but could only obtain the same by 
prosecuting a n  appeal. After the enactment 
of that statute, appeals were disused, a nd 
were rendered unnecessary. because the 
court mi:.rht. on the con Yiction of the felon, 
a \\ ,' n l  restitut ion ; and the courts are now 
in th li::ihit of 1loins- so. Our own statute 
(::! lte1·. St. T4T. � 33) a1lopt the English stat­
ute nn that point. ln En:rland, the action 
umll'r tlle a ward or rest itution cannot be 
mainta iucll against any one exc·cpt him who 
shall ue i n  possession a t  1 he time of the 
c·on1·iction 01· attaimler; anti a demand is 
also requisite before t he action i brought. 
t; ).[ml . 41 ::!. Tlle reasona l>le i nferC'nce from 
t h is statute, a1ul the manner of prcwcelling-, 
sc·PlllS to Ill' t l 1at in t h<' e:tsc of stokn prop­
Prty. the title of t he plaintiff. SO far at least 
ns to enable him to mainta i n  tro1·er, is not 
pst a hlishecl before t he conl'ictinn or attain­
<IPr; at any r:ite. he is not before t hl'll en­
title• !  to a restitution mulC'r the statute. 2 
f'a1·. & P. 41, arnl note. It doc>s not a ppear 
fr<>111  t h is e:lsl'. t h a t  t i ll' fclou was <·o n \'iC'tecl 
of t he fPl•rny eha 1·g-1" l heforC' t h is ·uit was 
hrn11;.:h t ;  hut it does appear that the lll'O­
"e•• i ls  ol' t hC' :<a le of ! hc> gno11R in nuestion 
l\'f'rt• 1 1a i < l  oYPl' to hi m hc·fol"l' he 11 as C'I c•n 
a 1Test c t l .  O u r  :-;t a t 11 te cl1ws nnl : 1 1 1 t hori:r.c 
t l 1 1 •  pla in t i ff t o  rp1 ·01·er his ;.:oo<ls t'n1 111 any 
n m · who 111ay at a 11 y  t i me' ha n• had t hP 
g-01 Jd.· In his 1 11>s�r>ssion, hut merely ant  hor­
l:r.C's a l'r<'l>YPI')' in g •n<•r:tl (l'rms. 'l'he st:it-
1 1 t P  (� He\'. l'I. j 17. § :1 1) RC<' lllR tn rN·ngll i Zl' 
t hr prhwi plP, t h : 1 t  n n cle>r l'Prt a l n  d1·c·11 m-
IH ll<'l'S, :ti • 0111:1 1  t l ie  prnpPrt .\· I1ns hPt•n 
t ol N 1 , a i;o111l t i t !<' 1 1 1ny lw <'<•nl"<',Yl'il h�· a 
P<'r 0 1 1  11111 t ill' ow11<'r, or at t h < · l t ·: 1 <1t, n l l t lc• 
Hlllll< • 1 f 'nt  In protP< ' I  a l 11 1nn l id< '  p11rd111 1iPI" 
frc•m n 11 a P l  1"1 1  of t rnvrr. for t ha t Ht'< t i• 11 
prn1 hi PH, t hit t " I r  Ill 0! 1 • 1 1  J ll"" l "'l"t y i; h :i 11 n ot 
J u• <'11 1 i 1w·d l 1y t h1• l ) \\'n"r t h l 'l"t•nf h!'fon· l h l' 
1•xpl l n l l o n  nf 11 l x  1 1 1u 1 1 t hs fro 1 1 1  t h l' t l nw : 1 1 1 y  
P"' 1 1 1 1  •hn l l  hll \'t' 1 11•<'11 N111 1 i<'tl'd or . t 1•11 I l n� 
Hll< 'h Pl'l1J1 •rt r. I I H' 1 1 1 111.:-l !; t rn t <', Hl u•rl II', 1·11n· 
tn hl c>, nr 11t l 1 1  I' . .  1 l l r•1•r, or 1 1 1 •ri;n 1 1  h:i vln i.: t lw 
Hll l l l  • I ll hi <'II Indy, h u l l  d t •l l \ 1 · r  Hl lr·h Jll"OI J •  
r-rty t 11  1 1 1 1• 1 ·  . .  1 1 1 1ty H 1 1 1 11•r l 1 1 t < ' 1 1d . .  1 1 t s  o l'  l h1• 
D ig itize by 
I NTE RNET A R CHIVE 
poor. o n  being paid th� reasonable a n d  nec­
essary expenses incurred in the pre erva tion 
thnreof, to be appropriated to the use of the 
11oor of such county." This enactment is 
wade notwithstanding th::it by the g-•nPral 
law of the land, the owner is entitleu to :,ix 
years within which t o  bring his actio n ;  and 
certainly the le;;i lature cannot be presuweu 
to ha>e intended to authorize an ille;;al dis­
po ition of another's property. 
But there is a stronger and more expres� 
exception to this general principle. which i s  
t o  b e  found i n  the ca e o f  neg-otiable bills 
of exchange and promissory notes, \\·here 
possession is prima facie evidence of prop­
erty, and a bona fide holder can recoYer up­
on the same, although a bill or note came to 
him from a person who bad stolen or robbed 
it from the owner, provided the bona fide 
holder took it innocently in the COUt"'e of 
trade for a valuable considera t ion. and un­
der circumstances of due caution. :511,..!1i­
C'ion mu t first be cast upon the title ot th!.' 
holder, by howing that the paper ll:t<l !:Ot 
into circulation by fon·e or fmud, hl'.fore 
the burden is thrown u11nn him of showin1-! 
how he came by it, and what con;;itlt•ra tion 
he gave for it. This protection is. for the 
sake of trade, given to the bolde1· or ne:..o­
tiable paper, who receive' it fairly in the 
\\":l y of busiue-s; and why tile' same prm­
ciple should not be applied to ot Iler pcrs1,na l 
proper!�T which pa cs throu:_:h th ha111ls 
of :tn individua l  fairly, in the course of tr,1<lc 
:11ul w i t hout notice, i difficult to ima�i lll'. 
l f  Lnnl :\ lauslield, with his clear aml c:ow­
prehl'llsiYe ruiucl. felt himRelf l':\ lk1l upon. 
ex necessitate rei. to depart from the l'Olll­
mon la11 . a nd to sta hlish thl' priudpil' 
ahoY1' s!a le1l i n  the l'ase or ncg-ot iable l'u1n­
merl'i:1 ! pa per, it cannot for a mo11w111 he 
clouhted, that if the j ucl;.:es w ho 111"1' 'l'<k1 l 
him had not deemed it uc:>cessa ry tn lll"lJted 
t he in nocent houn fide pUl'l'h:l sl'I'. by t he <l•w­
t rilll' of :;all's in market overt. t hn t tllc ;.:r<':l t 
fonmkr of Fn;.:lish c:o mmcrd:\ I la w wonhl 
h : t l'C <'Xlenckd the sa me IJl'in ciplc t o  a l l  
olhc•r property t h e  suhject ot' ll\C'l'<':l l l t i l e 
t r:l ns:lc't ion. 
It ls t h e boast of 1 he c·ommon law. t h a t I t  
arcn11 1 1111Hl11tes Itsel f . to t he .i::-rowi 11i.: 11 a1 1t..; 
of n t h rh·in:.:' <'Otn nll'rcial peoph•; :lloll It  hns 
not hc1111 In hraYadn mcrl'ly, tha t th!� hns 
I leen p ut fort h ;  h n L  I n  t i e h:11uls of t ill' 1 l'l•­
C'l":l t c •d ":1 ;.:es of the F11gl ish lll•lll'lt, ii has 
he1• 1 1  prnc •t i r •: 1 1 ly n ppllc>d. \Y h a t  < l id  t i t :t l-:l' 
of l l c• 1 1 r.r \" I l l . , 11 111' 11 t i ll' "1 : re:1 f  .\ hrltl g-1•· 
l l H ' l l t  of t he l' f a t u t c ·s of t h e' Hr n l l n" t"l lr1 1wd a 
sin gle 1"•1h1 1 1 1 !' l int  l l t t ll' ln rgl'r t h a 1 1  n P•l1 'i. l 't  
Blh lP, htt 1\\ of t lw l:t w o f  hHI:; 1 1 1' <'1i:l'hll 11g1• 
:ind pr1111 1 l 1<  or.r 1 1nl l 'I', or nf t hl' Il l  II' ot' i 1 1 1<1 1r·  
1 1 1 1< ' < '  1 1 1 1d :-; h l p p l 1 1 ;.: '/ • '11 1 1 1 1 1 1):. ,\ I I  t h i s, 11 1 1 1 1  
a t h11 1 1  1 1 1 < 1  l'old n101"(\ ha s hr1 1 1  1•1 1i:rn ft ,.rl 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  It hy J m lkl: 1 I  l 1 1gl l:tt lon, 11 n t l l  I t  ha-1 
t n 1 ly lw •'nll l< '  t l ll' 1•t1l l 1 ' < ' tPrl  wli<rlnm of' llJ:l'�. 
" l t :t J,. •• H<'rlpta ,. t" wns 1 1n t  n•;.::1 nl1•d h.r 
t ho . , ,  tl:lJ.:<1 , lltl I t  IN too 1 1 1 1 1 1•h l h 1• <':I 'll' 1 1 1  
ni l !' d a .r ,  n 1-1111 1 1 < - 1< ' 1 11. :t nRll <'l' J o  : 1 1 1  :t ri.:1111 1 1 1 1 1  
0 11 ir  ! fror 
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RIGHTS IN STOLEN GOODS.
however cogent, for the establishing a new
principle arising I'l-oni the wants of the com-
munity; but with tliein it advanced and ex-
panded to meet those wants. A tame sub-
serviency to precedent would have prevented
all tlie improvements in tliat body of law,
which have been the means of rendering it
the admiration of the world; and we have
great cause for thankfulness, that such was
not the course pursued in the country from
which we have derived our institutions as
well as our law.
Ou the part of the defendant in error, it is
contended that the goods in question having
been stolen, the delivery conferred no au-
thoritj' ou the iJlaiutiffs in error to sell them;
that such sale was a conversion; and that
the payment of the proceeds to the felon,
although without notice or knowledge of the
felony, does not discharge the plaintiffs in
error from responsibility to the right owner,
who it is insisted has a right to reclaim his
property, and to hold any one responsible
Willi has assumed the right to dispose of it;
and that the fact of the plaintiffs in eiTor
being auctioneers does not vary their re-
sponsibility. On the argument of, these
points a number of authorities were cited;
in the examination of which a short time
may not be unprofitably spent in order to
ascertain what were the facts and reasons
which led to their decision. Among tMe
cases on which the counsel for the defend-
ant in error relies to sustain the recovery
against the plaintiffs in error, is that of Peer
V. Humphrey, 2 Adol. & E. 500, in which the
property was stolen and sold to the defend-
ant who was a bona fide purchaser. Two
days after the sale, the plaintiff having dis-
covered his iiroperty in the defendant's pos-
session gave him notice that it had been stol-
en from him, and demanded possession, which
was refused. Three months after this notice
and demand, the defendant sold the property
in market overt and appropriated the pro-
ceeds to his own use. The thief was con-
victed of the felony on the prosecution of the
plaintiff; and afterwards, the plaintiff
brought an action of trover and recovered
against the defendant. Here it will be noted
that the property having been sold by the
defendant in market overt, the plaintiff could
not follow it up, and could not recover of any
other person than the defendant. No one,
however, would feel much reluctance in sus-
taining such a judgment, for the defendant
was possessed of the property at the time of
the demand, and disposed of it three months
after he had received notice that it had been
stolen. So if the auctioneers in this case
had sold the goods of Carow, after they had
notice of the felony, and after he had de-
manded the goods from them, and had then
paid over the money to the felon, it would be
a parallel case with that cited.
The next case is that of Stephens v. El-
wall, 4 Maule & S. 259. That was trover.
The plaintiffs were the assignees of a bauk-
mpt, who being possessed of the goods in
question, sold them after his bankruptcy to
one Deane, to be paid by bills on Heath-
cote, who had a house of trade in London,
and for whom Deane bought the goods.
Heathcote was in America, and the defend-
ant was his clerk, and conducted the busi-
ness of his house. The goods were delivered
to the defendant, who sent them to Heath-
cote in America. A demand was made on
the defendant before suit brought, but not
until after the expiration of nearly two years
from the purchase. The defendant was held
liable. It is not difficult to see that this
case rests mainly upon the principles govern-
ing bankruptcy cases in England. In that
case. Potter v. Starkle (decided in England
in 1807) is cited, and is also referred to by
the counsel for the defendant in error. There
the court held the sheriff liable in trover
although he had seized, sold and paid over
the money before the commission of bank-
ruptcy issued, and before notice, but after
the bankrupt had committed the act of bank-
ruptcy. The courts in England have in all
these bankrupt cases invariably, held the
doctrine, that after an act of bankruptcy, the
bankrupt cannot by sale pass the title to
any of his goods or property, or in any way
divert the same from the satisfaction of his
just debts; and that from that moment, the
property belongs to his assignees to be ap-
pointed under the commission. This doctrine
forms a part of the policy of the commercial
law of England; and arises from the foster-
ing and protecting care which the courts of
that nation exercise over their commercial
Interests. It is based upon the same prin-
ciples which have induced the courts to sus-
tain the exception in favor of sales in mar-
kets overt, and the peculiar custom as to
sales in public shops in the city of London.
The case of Cooper v. Chitty, 1 Burrows,
20, is another of these bankrupt cases, and
was trover brought by the assignees of
Johns, a bankrupt, against the sheriffs of
London, who had seized and sold goods in
the possession of the bankrupt under a fi. fa.
The facts were these: Johns committed the
act of bankruptcy Dec. 4, 1753. Dee. 8, he
was declared a bankmpt and the commis-
sion issued; and on the same day, the as-
signment was made. Twenty days after, the
sheriffs sold the goods on a judgment re-
covered against Johns after the act of bank-
ruptcy was committed. It is difficult to
see what question there could be about this
case; and in the decision of it. Lord Mans-
field says, it is admitted that the property
was by relation in the plaintiffs as and from
the 4th of December (which was before the
seizure by the sheriff's, and in fact before the
judgment was recovered), that this relation,
by the statutes concerning bankrupts, was
introduced to avoid frauds. And the court
held the defendants liable, on the ground
that the conversion was twenty days after
the assignment, and that the sheriffs ought
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RIG HTS IN , TOLE� GOODS. 7 
however cogent, for the establishing a new 
principle arising from the wants of the com­
munity; but with them it advanced and ex­
panded to meet those wn nts. A tame sub­
serviency to preee<lent would have prevented 
all the impl'Ovemenls in that body of law, 
which have been the means of rendering i t  
the admiration of the world; a n d  w e  !Jave 
great cause for thankfulness, that such was 
not the course pursued in the country from 
which we !Jave derived our institutions as 
well as our law. 
On the part of the defendant in error, lt is 
contended that the goods in question having 
been stolen, the delivery conferred no au­
tbority on the plaintiITs in error to sell them; 
tbat such sale was a conversion; and that 
the payment of the proceeds to the felon, 
although without notice or knowledge of the 
felony, does not discllarge the plaintiffs in 
error from responsibility to the right owner, 
who it is insisted has a right to reclaim bis 
property, and to bold any one responsible 
who bas assumed the right to dispose of it ;  
and that the fact of the plaintiffs in enor 
being auctioneers does not vary their re­
sponsibility. On the argument of, these 
points a number of authorities were cited ; 
in the examination of which a short time 
may not be unprofitably spent in order to 
ascertain what were the facts and reasons 
which led to their decision. Among tl:te 
cases on which the counsel for the defend­
ant in enor relies to sustain the recovery 
against the plaintiffs in error, is that of Peer 
v. Humphrey, � Atlol. & E. 500, in wbicb the 
property was stolen and sold to the defend­
ant who was a bona fide purchaser. Two 
days after the sale, the plaintiff having dis­
covered his property in the clefenclant's pos­
session gave him notice that it had been stol­
en from him, and demanded possession, which 
was refused. Three months after this notice 
and demand, the defendant sold tbe property 
in market overt and appropriated tbe pro­
ceeds to his own use. The thief was con­
Yicted of the felony on the prosecution of tbe 
plaintiff; and afterwards, the plaintiff 
brought an action of trover and recovered 
against the defendant. Here it will be noted 
that the property having been sold by the 
defendant in market overt, the plaintiff could 
not follow it up, and could not recover of any 
other person than the defendant. "No one, 
however, would feel much reluctance in sus­
taining such a judgment, for the defendant 
was poi:;sessed of the property at the time of 
the demand, and disposed of it three months 
after he had received notice that it had been 
stolen. So if the auctioneers in this case 
had sold the goods of Ca1·ow, after they had 
notice of the felony, and after he had de­
manded the goods from them, and bad then 
paid over tbe money to the felon, it would be 
a parallel case with that cited. 
The next case is that of Stephens v. El­
wall, 4 l\laule & S. 259. That was trover. 
The plaintiffs were the assi.guees of a bank-
D! 1t1z_ by 
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ru]Jt, who being possessed o f  the goods in 
question, sold them after his 11ankl'Uptcy to 
one Deane, to be paid by bills on Heath­
cote, who had a house of trade in Lo11<lo11, 
ancl for whom Deane bought the goods. 
Heathcote was in America, and the defend­
ant was his clerk, and conducted the busi­
ness of bis house. 'l'he goods were delivered 
to the defendant, who sent them to Heath­
cote in America. A demand was made on 
the defendant before suit brought, but not 
until aftE>r the expiration of nearly two years 
from the purchase. The defendant was held 
liahlt>. It is not difficult to see that this 
case rests mainly upon the principles govern­
ing bankruptcy cases in England. In that 
case, Potter v. Starkie (decided in England 
in 1807) is cited, and is also referred to by 
the counsel for the defendant in error. There 
the court held the sheriff liable in trover 
although he bad seized, sold and paid over 
the money before the comrutssion of bank­
ruptcy issued, and before notice, but after 
the bankrupt bad committed the act of bank­
ruptl'y. The courts in En;;land have in all 
these bankrupt cases invariably, held the 
doctrine, that a fter an act of bankruptcy, the 
bankrupt cannot by sale pass the title to 
any of his goods or property, or in any way 
divert the same from the satisfaction of bis 
just debts; and that from that moment, the 
property belongs to bis assignees to be ap­
pointed under the commission. This doctrine 
forms a part of the policy of the commercial 
law of England ; and arises from the foster­
ing and protecting care which the courts of 
that nation exercise over their commercial 
interests. It is based upon the same prin­
ciples which have induced the courts to sus­
tain the exception in favor of sales in mar­
kets overt, and the peculiar custom as to 
sales in public shops in the city of London. 
The case of Cooper v. Chitty, 1 Burrows, 
20, is another of these bankrupt cases, and 
was troYer brought by the assig-nees of 
Johns, a bankrupt, against the sheriffs of 
London, who had seized and sold goods in 
the possession of the bankrupt under a fi. fa. 
The facts were these: Johns committed the 
act of bankruptcy Dec. 4, 1753. Dec. 8, be 
was declared a bankrupt and the commis­
sion issued; and on the same clay. the as­
signment was made. Twenty (Jays after, the 
sheriffs sold the goods on a juclg-ment re­
covered against Johns after the act of bank­
ruptcy was committed. It is (l ifficult to 
see what question there could be about this 
case; and i n  the decision of it, Lord :\Ians­
field says, it is a dmitted that the property 
was by relation in the plaintiffs as anJ from 
the 4th of December (which was before the 
seizure by the sheriffs, and in fact before the 
j udgment was recovered), that this relation, 
by the statutes concerning bankrupts, was 
introduced to avoid frauds. And the court 
held the defendants liable, on the ground 
that the conversion was twenty days after 
the a<:;sig-nment. and that the sheriff;; ong-llt 
O rigi r.3 1  from 
U N IV E R S ITY OF CALI FO RNIA 
8PEELIMIXART CONSIDERATIONS.
uot to go on to a sale after a full discovery
that tlie goods belonged to a third person.
This principle I agree should be held appli-
cable to the cases of stolen property. A
party should be held liable if after a full dis-
covery that the goods belonged to a third
person he proceeds to a sale; but not other-
wise.
As to these bankrupt cases, it was very
early found necessary in governments which
authorized personal arrest and Imprisonment
for debt, to interpose and provide relief to
the debtor in cases of inevitable misfortune;
and this has been especially the case in re-
spect to insolvent merchants, who are obliged
by the habits, the pursuits, and the enter-
prising nature of trade, to give and receive
credit, and to encounter extraordinai-y haz-
ards. Thus we find the cessio bonorum, or
cessio miserabilis, was established at Rome,
by the Julian law; and when a person ap-
plied for the benefit of that law, the creditors
had their election either to grant to the in-
solvent a letter of license for five years, or
to take a general assignment of all his prop-
erty, on condition that he should not be im-
prisoned—a provision creditable to the gen-
eral intelligence of that early period; and
one better adapted to the exigencies of a
commercial nation than the laws now exist-
ing either in England or this country. Bank-
rupt and insolvent laws are designed to se-
cure the application of the effects of the
debtor to the payment of his debts, and then
to relieve him from the weight of thom. Un-
der these laws the title of the l)ankiupt to
the remnants of his property, becomes ab-
solutely vested in the assignees. These laws
are in the nature of a contract between the
government and the mercantile portion of
the comnumity, that if, in the event of mis-
fortune, they will surrender all their prop-
erty and effects to the satisfaction of llieir
creditors, the government will discharge
them from tlie penally consequent upon their
failure to meet their engagements, and it is
the duty of the couits to see that it Is rigidly
complied with on the part of the bankrupt
debtor. But the principles which the courts
In England have found it necessary to adopt,
in order to oblige a bona tide ai)i)Ilcaliun of
all the effects of the bankrupt to that object,
cannot reasonably be extended beyond tliat
das.s of cases, for the jiurpose of deciding
others which rest upon different principles.
Having thus gone through with an exnin-
Inntlon of the English cases cited and relied
upon by the counsel for the defendant In
error, to sustain the Judgment below, It Is
seen that In all of tlieni are to be found
f.11'18 which Induce us to yield our assent
to tlii'lr decision. Jn oiich of them we dis-
cover that notice of the slate of the case
was brought home to the defendant while
he renin Ined In (he iinsHcsslon of the prop-
erty In diNpute; and In all of them we find
that a doninnd was made before suit
lir'iueht Among those cases, lliroo of tliein,
viz. that of 4 Maule & S. 259, that of Potter,
V. Starkie (also cited in that volume), and
that of 1 Burrows, 20, are cases decided up-
on the peculiar principles which govern the
bankrupt laws of England; and there is but
one case, that of 2 Add. & E. 500, which is
similar to that in question, and the facts
which it appears it was deemed necessary
to prove in that case to warrant a recovery,
go far to sustain some of the objections
taken here by the plaintiffs in error against
this judgmenj. The result is, that I do not
find that any of those cases carry the doc-
trine sought to be enforced by the defend-
ant in error, to the extent to which it has
been carried by the decision of the supreme
court in the present case. It is now neces-
sary to make a similar examination of the
cases in our own courts in order to see in
what light they view this principle deduci-
ble from the common law.
The first of our own decisions by the su-
preme court, cited by the counsel in sup-
port of the doctrine laid down by the court
in this case, is that of Everett v. Coffin, 6
Wend. 603. The facts in that case were,
that CoUlns, the master of the brig Dove, at
New Orleans, signed a bill of lading that
Bridge & Vose had shipped in her for New
York, 179 pigs of lead, to be delivered to
Tufts, Eveleth & Burrell, or their assigns,
on paying freight. A letter was in evi-
dence, showing that it was shipped on ac-
count and risk of Otis Everett, of Boston.
The brig arrived in distress at Norfolk, a
portion of the lead was sold to pay ex-
penses, and the balance was transferred to
the schooner Dusty Miller, for New York,
a bill of lading was taken to deliver the
property to Captain Collins, (which was un-
doubtedly with a view to secure the freight
and expenses.) and the captain of the schoon-
er, by order of Collins, delivered the same
to the defendants. Tufts, one of the origi-
nal consignees, called on the defendants,
who shewed him the bill of lading from
Norfolk, made to Collins, and endorsed by
him to the defendants, and told him that
the lead had come to hand, and had been
sold and the money received; that the con-
tract of sale was made by Collins; that the
defendants had become responsible tor the
freight and average and had advanced mon-
ey to Collins. It does not appear from the
case, that they had ever accounted with
Collins and paid over to him the balance
after satisfying their responsibilities and
claim; but the Inference Is. that they had
the wliole proceeds of the sale then in their
iwssesslon, or had appropriated the same to
their own use. The circuit judge nonsuited
(lie plalntirr. The questions argued by the
counsel In the supreme court were, whether
tlie plaint IIT had sufllclcntly jiroved his right
to the property to iiialntnln the netlon; and,
whether tlie defendrinls had a lien upon the
same, and could retain It for the Hallsfaetlon
of that Hen. The court, by .Tustlce .Sullier-
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8 PRE LI.MIX ARY CON IDERATI O�S. 
not to go on to a sale after a full discovery 
that the goods belonged to a third per on. 
Thi principle I agree should be held appli­
cable to the cases of stolen property. A 
pmt:r bould be held liable if after a full dis­
covery that the goods belonged to a third 
per:on h e  proceeds to a sale; but not other­
wise. 
A'< to these bankrupt cases, it was very 
early found necessary in govemments which 
au thorized personal arrest and imprisonment 
for debt, to interpose and provide relief to 
the debtor in cases of inevitable misfortune ; 
and this bas been especially the case in re­
spect to insolvent merchants, who are obliged 
by the habits, the pursuits, and the enter­
prising nature of trade, to give and receive 
credit, and to encounter extraord inary haz­
a rds. Thus we find the cessio bonorum, or 
cessio miserabilis, was established at Rome, 
l•y the .Julian law; and when a person ap­
plied for the benefit of that law, the creditors 
bad their election either to grant to the in­
solvent a letter of license for five years, or 
to take a general assignment of all bis prop­
erty, on condition that be should not be im­
prisoned-a provision creditable t o  the gen­
eral intelligence of that early pe1iod ; and 
one l>etter adapted to the exigencies of a 
commercial nation than the laws now exist­
ing either in England or this country. Bank­
rupt and insolvent laws are designed to se­
cure the a1111lication of the effects of the 
del>to1· to the payment of bis debts, and then 
to relieve him from the weight o f  them. Un­
der these laws the title of the llanluupt to 
the remnants of his property, becomes ab­
solutely vested in the assignees. These Ja·ws 
are i n  the nature of a contract between the 
A'OYemment and the ruel'ca ntile portion of 
the eomm11n it�·. t bat if, in the eYent of ruis­
fortu11e, they will surrender all thei l· prop­
erty am.l effects to the sa t i-.;f:1ction of t heir 
crerlitors. the A"overnment will discharg-e 
t hem from the l·eual!y consequent u11un tllelr 
fu ilure to meet their eoga�emen t �. 11n 1l it is 
the duty of the co•Hts to see that it is ri�itlly 
"'1111plled wltb on tbe part of the bankru11t 
debtor. nut the principles which the courts 
In gn�lnnd ha ,.e found It necessnry to u1!011t, 
In orurr to ohligP a bona Ihle npplkutluu of 
all the effrC'tl! or t he han k rn pt to that ol>jecl, 
r·annot reasonably !Jc PXtc 11dt>1l beyond t h a t  
<'la!<S o f  <' !l.  1 ·s, for the )>11  rpo�I.' of dcl'l1J l11� 
<•l lwrs w!Jleh n•st upon d l ffl•J'Pllt  prlnl'l plcA. 
I l:l\  I n g  th111:1 gonP t h nrni;:h w i t h :III l'Xll l ll· 
l n n t lou of t h ,. Engli h •·a ,.A d l ed nncl rPli,.11 
11 11on by t hl• r•ntm cl for I hr c)Pf<'l11lant I n  
1 1·1 or, to 11 la i n t h e  j udg11 11•11t below, I t  i11 
1 •( •n t hut l 1 1  a II or t h1•111  u re to Ii> fou ncl 
f .l l ' tR w h 1 r•h l rul tt<'t' l lH  to y i Plcl our n SSPnt 
lo t lH I r  drc•l Ion. In t'll<'h nr t h1• 111 WI' ell -
C'O\' •r t b u t 1 101  ic·r• of t l u• i;ta 1 • •  of t l 11• <':l!H' 
wns hro11i:ht 1111111,. to the dPfc>ndn nt w h i h• 
he r •rnn lrwd In t lw Jin f'!!Slon nf t ill' prop· 
1 • 11 y  1 1 1  rl l put • ;  11 111 1 In ni l of thl'lll we find 
t h n t  n 1Jem11 111l  wa11 111:ull' l 11•fon• 11 1 1 l t  
hrought. ,\ 1110111: t l tn!ll' c• u  1 ·11. t h r• , .  nf t he111 ,  
Di itiz by 
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viz. that o f  4 Maule & S. 259, that o r  Pottrr, 
v.  Starkie (also cited i n  that volume). un1l  
that o f  1 Burrows, 20, are cases decided up­
on the peculiar principles which govern the 
bankrnpt laws of England; and there i but 
one case, that of 2 .A.dol. & ID. 500, which i • 
similar to that in question, and the fact,; 
which it appears it was deemed n ecessary 
to prove in that case to warrant a recoyery, 
go far to sustain some or the objections 
taken here by the plaintitis in error again t 
this judgmen_t. The result is, that I do not 
find that any of those cases carry the doc­
trine sougbt to be enforced by the defend­
ant in error, to the extent to which it bas 
been carried by the decision of the supreme 
court in the present case. It is now neces­
sary to make a similar examination of the 
cases in our own courts in order to see in 
what light they view this principle deduci­
ble from the common law. 
The first of our own decisions by the u­
preme court, cited by the counsel in sup­
port of the doctrine laid down by the court 
in this case, is that of EYerett v. Coffin, li 
Wend. 603. The facts i n  that case were, 
that Collins, the master of the brig DoYe. a t  
N e w  Orleans, signed a b i l l  o f  lading tbat 
Bridge & Vose bad shipped in her for New 
York, 179 pigs of lead, to be deli\ creel to 
Tufts, Eveleth & Burrell, or their assigns, 
on paying freight. A letter was in evi­
dence, showing that it was shipped on ac­
count and risk of Otis Everett, of Iloston. 
The brig arrived in distress at Norfolk, a 
portion of the lead was sold to pay ex­
penses, and the balance was transferred to 
the schooner Dusty :\Iiller, for :'o\l'W York. 
a bill of lading was taken to delirnr the 
property to Captain Collins, (which was u11-
doubtedly with a view to secure the frei�ht 
and expense .) and the capta i n  or the �l'lwon­
er, by order of Collins, deli vered the same 
to the defendants. Tufts. one of the origi­
nal consiA"nees, called on the defendants, 
who shewl'd him the bill or laclin� from 
Norfolk, made to ollins, and endorsed by 
h i m  to the defendants, and told h i m  that 
the lead bad come to hand, and bad bel'n 
sold and the money recrl ved ; that t he con­
tract of sale was made by Collins; tlln t t h <' 
11c fr11da 11 t s lmu become rcspon:iltle for 1 111• 
frel�ht and n vern�l' a n d  had adn1 m•c•d mnn-
1.')' to o l l i ns. It doe� uot u p1w:11: from t h1• 
c:tRC', t h at they ball ever an·ountc•d wi th 
Collins an cl 11:1 1!.l OYer to h i m  1 h P hal:1 11c!' 
u t  kr sn l i st°) i u �  thl'h' n·s11t111:,:ihl l i t l1•s a 111 l 
da im ; hut t he lnfen•1H·c> Is. t h:1t  t hl'Y had 
t he \\ hn ll• pro1•<•eds of t he :;:t ic• t lH'tt 1 1 1  t lwir 
1 1osses• lo n, or h:1d approprln h•rl f hl.' t'!l llH' to 
t lu•lr own u1o1e. The drc>11 l t  j11tl�c 11011s1 1 l l l'd 
I 1 11•  pl:1 lnt lff. The <111r1o1tloni- a rgn<••l hy t hi' 
1·n11 11s<' l I n  t h P 1o111 111·enw co u rt WPr<', w l tPt h1•r 
t h1• pla ln t llT hnrl sn!lll'!Pn l l y  pro\'l'd his rli;ht 
tn t he> Jll'OJH'rly to n 1:1 l n t a h1 t i ll' :t l'llon ; n nd, 
whPt hl'r t hl' dl'fP111!:1 1 1 t R  ltnd 1 1  1 1  .. 1 1  npnn t he 
Nll lllt'. 1 1 1 1 1 1  c•1 1 1 1 l d  l'Pl n l 1 1 l l  fnr t h e• 1o1nt hirnct ln11 
nf f l t:t t  1 1 1 · 1 1 ,  T h i' r·n 11 rt ,  h,r ,] 1 1 .., t ll'I' H 1 1 t lt1•r· 
UN VE 
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RIGHTS IN STOLEX GOODS.
fand, in deciding the case, held, that the
evidence of the right, and the demand and
refusal was sufficient; that Tufts, one of the
oiiginal consignees, had full legal authority
to do all that he did; and also, that the de-
fendants had a lien on the property, which
should have been paid or tendered before
the suit was commenced; that the plaintiff's
right of action was not complete until the
lien was satisfied; and the court conclude
by deciding that the plaintiff vra,s properly
nonsuited. This, in fact, decides the whole
case, and every question that could be prop-
erly raised, or was raised, as appears from
the report. There is no pretence that the
property was feloniously taken from the
plaintiff, for there is no principle better
settled than that without an express agree-
ment, the master of a ship is not bound to
part with the goods until the freight be
paid; and if the regulations of the revenue
require the goods to be landed and deposited
in a public warehouse, the master may en-
ter them in his own name, and thus preserve
his own or his owner's lien. In that case
the defendants, by the assignment of the
last bill of lading, stood in the place of the
master; and the same rule also applies to
the average on the loss. The court, how-
ever, proceed to lay down some general
principles, which they were not necessarily
called upon to do by any of the facts or cir-
cumstances in that case, as they appear by
the report of it; and they say that "the dis-
posing or assuming to dispose of another
man's goods, without his authority, is the
gist of this action; and it is no answer for
the defendants that they acted under in-
structions from another, who had himself
no authority,"— and cite in support of that
position the cases of 4 Maule & S. 259, and
1 Burrows, 20, which have been before ex-
amined and the bearing of them shewn.
There is no doubt that the law as laid down
by the supreme court, as to disposing of the
goods or property of another, without au-
thority, is correct; but in that case the de-
fendants had authority to hold possession of
the property under a lien. It is, however,
but a general principle; and lilie all other
general rules or principles has exceptions,
which I have before adverted to. Every
case attempted to be brought under it must
depend upon its own peculiar state of facts
as the same came out in proof, to ascertain
whether it belongs to the rule, or attaches
to one of the exceptions. That dictum, how-
ever, which is incidentally mentioned in the
course of the opinion of the court, together
with a similar one in 8 Cow. 238, which was
in a case of fraud, and not of felony, seem
to have formed the basis of the subsequent
decisions of that tribunal. And the next
succeeding case is the first one that applies
that principle in its broadest sense to the
facts of the case.
In Williams v. Merle, 11 Wend. SO, the
facts were these: November 1, 1829, the
master of a tow-boat, by mistake, took 4
barrels of potashes from a warehouse in Al-
bany, and discovering his mistake when in
New York, delivered them to the clerk of
the agents of his principals, who took them
to an inspector's office on the 3d of Novem-
ber following, obtained a certificate of in-
spection, and on the Gth of the same month
sold them to the defendant, a produce bro-
ker, who purchased them for a Mr. Patter-
son, at a fair price, and received the in-
spector's certificate. On the 10th of Novem-
ber, the defendant took the ashes from the
inspector's office, and shipped them to the
order of his principal. About the 1st of
September, in the following year, the plain-
tiffs demanded the ashes of the defendant,
who refused to account for them, saying he
had purchased and paid for them a year pre-
ceding the demand. The circuit judge, Ed-
wards, intimated his opinion, that if the de-
fendant had acquired the property bona fide
by purchase, in the regular course of his
business as a produce broker, and had dis-
posed of the same bona fide, pursuant to
the instructions of his principal, before suit
brought, the action would not lie. He, how-
ever, refused to nonsuit the plaintiffs, and
the jury, under his direction, found a ver-
dict for the plaintiffs for the value of the
ashes, and "interest. The case was brought
to the supreme court for revision; and that
court, in following up the general principles
mentioned in the cases of Howry v. Walsh,
and of Everett v. Coffin, decided that the
defendant was liable, and that the owner
of property cannot be divested of it but by
his own consent, or by operation of law, and
that the purchaser acquired no title. The
circuit judge took such a view of the facts
and of the legal principles which should be
applied to them, as seems to commend itself
to our common sense of justice; and such
an one as the equity of the case would seem
to require — which was to leave the plaintiffs
to their remedy against those who actually
converted and sold their jjroperty, and had
appropriated the proceeds to their own use;
but not allow them to sustain an action
against an innocent party who was only the
agent for the purpose of transmitting the
property from the hands of those who had
so converted it, to those of a third person.
Not that there was any doubt about the
general rule of law, as laid down by the
court in reviewing the case; but because
the defendant was in a business well known
to the commercial community as an agent,
a produce broker, transacting that business
bou.a fide; and because the great and im-
portant interests of the community required
that those men should not be rendered lia-
ble in damages for acts done by them with-
out the intent of committing a violation of
law. The reasonable presumption would be.
that if such a doctrine should be sanctioned
by the higher courts, and thus become the
settled law of the land, these agencies would
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RIG IITS I N  STOLEN" GOODS. 9 
rand, in deciding the case, held, that the 
evidence of the right, and the demand and 
refusal was sufficient; that Tufts, one of the 
ol'iginal consignees, had full legal authority 
to do all that he did; and also, that the de­
fendants had a lien on the property, which 
should have been paid or tendered before 
the suit was commenced; that the plaintiff's 
right of action was not complete until the 
lien was satisfied ; and the court conclude 
by deciding that the plaintiff was properly 
nonsuited. This, in fact, decides the whole 
<.:ase, and every question that could be prop­
edy raised, or was raised, as appears from 
t he report. There is no pretence that the 
i1roperty was feloniously taken from the 
plaintiff, for there is no principle better 
settled than that without an express agree­
ment, the master of a silip is not bound to 
part with the goods until the freight be 
paid;  and if the regulations of the revenue 
require the goods to be landed and deposited 
in a public warehouse, the master may en­
ter them in his own name, and thus preserve 
his own or his owner's lien. In that case 
the defendants, by the assignment of the 
last bill of Jading, stood in the place of the 
master; and the same rule also applies to 
tile average on the loss. The court, how­
e1er, proceed to Jay down some general 
principles, which they were not necessarily 
called upon to do by any of the facts or cir­
cumstances in that case, as they appear by 
the report of i t ;  and they say that "the dis­
posing or assuming to dispose of another 
man's goods, without his authority, is the 
gist of this action ; and it is no answer for 
the defendants that they acted under in­
structions from another, who ilad himself 
no authority,"-and cite in support of that 
position the cases of 4 Maule & S. '.?59, and 
1 Burrows, 20, which have been before ex­
amined and the bearing of them silewn. 
There is no doubt that the law as laid down 
by the supreme court, as to disposing of the 
,g"oods or property of another, witilout au­
thority, is correct; but in that case tlrn de­
fentlants had authority to hold possession of 
the property under a lien. It is, however, 
but a general principle; and like all other 
"eneral rules or principles has exceptions, 
which I have before ach-erted to. EYery 
<'ase attempted to be broup;ht under it must 
depend upon its own peculiar state of facts 
as the same came out in proof, to ascertain 
whether it belongs to the rule, or attaches 
to one of the exceptions. That dictum, how­
ever, which is incidentally mentioned in the 
course of the opinion of the court, together 
with a similar one in 8 Cow. 238, w hich was 
in a case of fraud, and not of felony, seem 
to have formed the basis of the subsequent 
decisions of that tribunal. And the next 
succeeding case is the first one that applies 
that principle in its broadest sense to the 
facts of the case. 
In W'illiams v. Merle, 11 Wend. 80, the 
facts were these: No-vember 1, 18:::!9, the 
D i gmzea oy 
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master of a tow-boat, by mistake, took 4 
ba nels of potashes from a warehouse in Al­
bany, and discovering his mistake when in 
New York, delivered them to the clerk of 
the agents of his principals, who took them 
to an inspector's office on the 3d of Novem­
ber following, obtained a certificate of in­
spection, and on the Gth of the same month 
sold them to the defendant, a produce bro­
ker, who purchased them for a l\Ir. Patter­
son, at a fair price, and received the in­
spector's certificate. On the 10th of Novem­
ber, the defendant took the ashes from the 
inspector's office, and shipped them to the 
order of his principal. About the 1st of 
September, in the following year, the plain­
tiffs demanded the ashes of the defendant, 
who refused to account for them, saying he 
had purchased and paid for them a year pre­
ceding the demand. The circuit judge, Ed­
wards, intimated his opinion, that if the de­
fendant had acquired the property bona fide 
by purchase, in the regular course of his 
business as a produce broker, an<l had dis­
posed of the same bona fide, pursuant to 
the instructions of his principal, before suit 
brought, the action would not lie. He, how­
ever, refused to nonsuit the plaintiffs, and 
the jury, under his direction, found a ver­
dict for the plaintiffs for the value of the 
ashes, and 'interest. The case was brought 
to the supreme court for revision ; and that 
court, in following up the general principles 
mentioned in tlle cases of l\Iowry v. 'Yaish, 
and of Everett v. Coffin, decide<l that the 
defendant was liable, and that the owner 
of property cannot be divested of it but by 
his own consent, or by operation of law, and 
that the purchaser acquired no title. The 
circuit judge took such a view of the facts 
and of the legal principles which should be 
applied to them, as seems to commend itself 
to our common sense of justice; and such 
an one as the equity of the case would seem 
to require-which was to lea.Ye the plaintiffs 
to their remedy against those wl.lo actually 
converted and sold their property, and had 
appropriated the proceeds to their own use; 
hut not allow tllem to sustain an action 
against an innocent party who was only the 
agent for the purpose of transmitting the 
property from the hands of those who had 
so conYerted it, to those of a tilird person. 
Not that there was any doubt about the 
general rule of law, as laid down by the 
court in reviewing the case; but because 
the defendant was in a business well kuowu 
to the commercial community as an a.�·ent. 
a produce broker, transacting that business 
bona. fide ; and because tile great and im­
portant interests of the community required 
that those men should not be rendered lia­
ble in damages for acts done by them with­
out the intent of committing a -violation of 
law. The reasonable presumption would be, 
that if such a doctrine should be sanctioned 
by the big-her courts, and tl.lus become the 
set lied law of the lan<l, these agencies would 
O r1 g1 a 1  from 
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be broken up, to the great annoyance and
expense, as well of the merchants as of the
planters; thus affecting not only the com-
merce but the agriculture of the country; or
at the least be the cause of creating very
serious impediments in the way of the trans-
action of that business which has been for
several years past peculiarly appropriated
by that class of men; and which constitutes
a very large amount of the whole business
of the country. The only ground upon which
a party should be held liable, is that he has
the property or its value in his possession,
or has with knowledge or under notice, il-
legally disposed of it; and not by reason of
having been the mere conduit for its trans-
mission from one to another, and that with-
out notice or knowledge of any claim hav-
ing been set up to the property by a third
person. I am inclined to think there is a
slight mistake in the case as reported in re-
lation to the doctrine held by the circuit
judge; in which he is made to intimate that
if the defendant had, in addition to the oth-
er circumstances by him stated, "disposed
of the property bona fide, pursuant to the
instructions of his principal before suit
brought, the action would not lie;" and that
he intended to have been understood as in-
timating, that if the defendant had in addi-
tion to those other circumstances, disposed
of the property bona tide, pursuant to the
instructions of his principal before notice,
or demand made, the action would not lie.
That would make the doctrine conform to
that deducible from the lOnglish cases, and
to what I believe to have been the law in
this state before the case of Mowry v. Walsh,
8 Cow. 2:J8, which was decided in 182S, al-
though I cannot see that the decision of that
case, viewed in a proper light, militates
against that rule.
This disposes of the adjudged cases cited
on the argument of this cause — there are
however two cases referred to by the learned
chief justice in delivering the opinion of tlie
supi'(une court, which should here be noticed.
The firet is that of Mowry v. Walsh, above
mentioned. There goods were obtained from
the plaintiffs by moan.s of a forged recom-
mendation, and a i)riimisp to iiay whatever
amount the plaintiffs might let him have.
After thus obtaining the goods, the party ob-
taining the grxMls, took them to Lansing-
burgh, and sold them to the defendant for
consideralile less than the prices which had
been charged Iilni by the pl:ilntllTs, at the
factory. The defendant's clerk however, tes-
tified that the price paid was a fair one.
The plaliifllTs Jifterwards demanded the
goods, and the defendant refused to surren-
der lliein and an action of trover was brought.
Tho circuit jiulge held that the gcMids were
oblalutsl fraudulently but not relonlo\is1y, and
the 'lefi-ndant having bought tliem buna fide
without notice of the frautl, the pliilnllfTH
eoiild not recover; and a verdict was ren-
dered for the defeMdant. The case was
brought before the supreme court, and that
court supported the decision of the circuit
judge, and held that it was a case of fraud,
and not of felony or larceny, and that the
finding of the jury and the testimony estab-
lished the fact that the defendant purchased
without notice of the fraud; that although
as between the original parties to the con-
tract, the sale was void in consequence of the
fraud, yet if that original fraudulent pur-
chaser afterwards sold the goods to a bona
tide purchaser without notice of the fraud,
the property passed, and the court would pro-
tect him in the possession thereof. Although
this decides the whole case which was
brought up for examination, the court also lay
down the general principles of law as appli-
cable to cases of stolen property — that if the
goods were taken feloniously no title passed
from the owners and they might pursue and
take their property wherever found; that
such is the law in England unless the goods
are sold fairly in market overt, and that
having no such market here, the sale can
have no other effect than mere private sales
in England. In deciding the case last men-
tioned, the supreme court cite that of I'arker
V. Patrick. 5 Term R. 71S, as being in favor
of the defendant; which is the same case
cited by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error
on the ;u-gumeut of the question. In P,arker
V. Patrick, the goods had been fraudulently
obtained of the defendant and pawned to tlie
plaintiff for a valuable consideration, with-
out notice of the fraud. After the conviction
of the offender, the defendant obtained pos-
session of his goods, but by what means does
not apijoar. The plaintiff brought an action
for their recovery, and it was contended that
he, although an innocent pawnee, could not
recover, as he derived title through a fraud,
and was like u peisou deriving title frmu a
felon. But Lord Kenyon thought the cises
distinguishable, and the plaintiff had a ver-
dict. A motion to set aside the verdict was
denied, and the court held that the statute of
'M lieu. VITI. c. 21, did not extend to cases
of fraud, but only to a felonious taking. By
that statute th<' owner of stolen property was
entitled to restitution upon the convietiou of
the felon. But as that statute did not apply
fo a fraudulent obtaining of goods, the owner
was not entitled to reslitution-and the ques-
tl(Ui was then, say our supreme court In com-
menting upon that case, purely at ciuninon
l.'iw. and the Innocent pawnee was allowed
to recover against the ovvMior. Although in the
slatenieut of that ease It Is said that It does
not apiie.'ir by what means the defendant olv
falned the possession of the gocKls, yet I
think If Is evident from the opinion of the
eoiu't that the olTeuder w;is prosecule<I for the
fraud and convictc<l; and fluit thereupon tho
I'liurt liefore whom he was tried, awarded
re'illliitlon to the owner, and fhls view of the
i-ase becomes the more Imporlaut. because
fho main q\iesflon to which (he alfeullon of
tho king's bench seems to have been called,
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10 PHELDJ I � A U Y  CO:Xbl D E B ATIONS. 
be bl'Oken up. to the gre:tt annoy:wce and 
expense. a s  well of the merchants as of the 
planters; thus affecting not only th" com­
merce but the agriculture of the t'ountry ; or 
at the least be the cause of cn ·1 • iug •ery 
serious impet1iments in the way of tl.Je trans­
action of that business which has been for 
se>eral years past peculiarly appropriated 
by that class of men ; and which constitutes 
a \ery I:.uge amount of the whole business 
of the country. The only gl'Ound upon which 
a pa ty should be held liallle, i s  that be has 
tlle vru1>1?rty or its •alue in his possession , 
or has with knowledge or unuer notice, il­
legally disposed o f  it;  and not by reason of 
having been the mere conduit for its trans­
mission from one to another, and that with­
out notice or know leuge of any claim hay­
ing been set up to the property by a third 
person. I am inclined to think t here i s  a 
slight mi stake in tlle case as reported in re­
lation to the doctrine held by the eircuit 
judge; in which he is made to intimate that 
if the defendant had, in addition to the oth­
er <'ircumsta nces by him stated, "disposed 
of the property bona fide. pursua nt to the 
instructions of his prin ·i11al before suit 
bron:;ht, tbe action woulcl not lie;" anu that 
he intended to ha>e been understood as in­
timating, that if the defendant bad in addi­
tion to those other circumstances. disposed 
of the property bona ficle. pursuant to t he 
i nst nl<'tions of his principal before notice, 
01· llcn1:1 1l<l made, the action woul<l not lie. 
That would make t he doctrine conform to 
that clelluciule from the En:;lish cast's, an<l 
to what I belieYe to haYe been the Jaw i n  
t h is state before t ile case o f  :\Iowry v .  \Yaish. 
S Cow. :!:lS, which was decided in 1 � . al­
though I cannot see that t he clC'C' isioo or t h a t  
c-asc, ,·iewed i n  a proper light, militates 
agn i n st that rule. 
Tllis d isposes of the a<l.in<l;:C'<l cases cilC'd 
on the arguiucnt of tbis ea use-tbcre are 
howc\·e1· two eases rcfC'rrecl to hy the learned 
chic!' justice in delh·ering t he opinion of th<' 
suprPlllC con rt, wb iC'h sbonhl here he 1101 il'ell. 
Tlw first is that of J\fowry v. \\'alsh. :thoYe 
nu•11ll<111erl. 'l'herc goods were nh1:1I1wd from 
thr. pla l 1 1li ffs by mrans or n forgell rrcom­
rncml a t i nn, :incl a pr1111 1isP t o  pay w h;t t P\'<'r 
:i111 1 1 1111t t he pln i u t i ft's m ight ll't him have. 
.\ ftl'r thus oht:t l n l n g t he gou<ls. the 1 1n rtr u1J­
t a l r1 i 1 1 g  t h e  gornls, tnolc t lw w  to Lansi n.·�· 
l 1 1 1 l'gh. n 111l  sold t hem to t he ckfPJH!:tnt for 
,.,, 1 1  !ch 1'1t hl<' lf'S t h n n  t he priers whkh hntl 
hl'f'll r•h , 1 rg1•r l  h i m  hy 1hc> pln l n t i lfs, :tt t he 
f1l<'l o1·y. ' l 'h< '  r!PfP11d n n t'H C'!Prlr hn \\'l'\'!'r, t PH 
t l ll 1 ·rl t h 1 1 t  I ll<' pl'lr·e pnlt l  wn:� n t'n l r  OJH'. 
Th" pla i n t  I ff :t fl Pl'\\':t rr!H c lrm�1 1 1 1 ll'<I t he 
grnJd. , : 1 1 1d I hP rl<'l'l' nrl:t nl n • flJo.;pr( t n l:Hl l'l'Pll· 
rlcr I h<' l l l  11 1 1 1 1  a 11 :wt 101 1  nf I ro1· < ·r  was l ll'rntght .  
'J hi' r'frr• 1 1 l l  Jml�P hr·l r l  t hn t. t hr goorl<i \\'l'l'I' 
.,i .1 1 1 l 1 1 r r l  frnurl n l ent ly h11I 1 1 01 t'd o 1 1 J < 11 1sly. 11 1 1 11  
t hr• • l cf, .nrl11 1 1t h11 v l 1 1 g  l 1 1 11 1�ht t h rm hr11111 lldf' 
w l 1 Ia1111t IJJJlkr• nr t h r> fl': t l l r l ,  l h f' pl:1 J 1 1l l lf>1 
l'111lld llf>I l'l'f'fl\'PI'; 1 1 11 r l  11 '" n l l r ' I  \\ ll R !'I'll 
, j r  1 1  r l  for t hi' <) •fp 1 1 r J : i  1 1 t .  'I lw •'llBf' 1n11:1 
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brought before the supreme court, and tha t 
court supported the decision of the cireuit 
judge. and held that it was a case of frnml. 
and not of felony er larceny, and tba t tbe 
finding of the jury and the testimony e«tab­
lislled the fact that t h e  defendnnt purch:l 'C'•1 
without notice of the fraud ; that altllou,_'1 
as between the original parties to the con­
tract, the sale was Yoi<l in con,.,eq•wnte nf th•• 
fraud, yet if that original fr:1 u1lulent pm­
chaser afterwards sold the goods to a bona 
fide purchaser without notice of the frawl. 
the property passed. and the court would pro­
tect him in the possession thereof. Alt hou:!h 
tl.lis decides the whole ca e which wa, 
brought up for examination, the court also lay 
down the general principles of law as appli­
cable to cases of stolen property-that if the 
goods were taken feloniously no title passed 
from the owners arnl t h <'Y m h �ht pur:<lll' :1 11  l 
take their properly w llereYer fomal ; t hat 
such is the law in England unless the gn"d" 
are sold fairly in marlcet overt. and th:t t 
haYing no such market here, the sale ea n 
ha>e no other effect than mere priYatc salt•s 
in Engla nd. Ju dC'ciding tit<' case last UJPn­
tioned, t he supreme court cite that or l':ll'k 'l' 
Y. Patrick. 5 '.rerw It. 71,, as hl'i11g ill fa••ll' 
of the defend�111t ; wbicll is the same ease 
ci ted by the coun cl for the pla intiff<: in enor 
on the argument of the qnc-:tiou. In I'/nl,cr 
v. Pat r ic:I;:, the gomls had hPcn frau1l11h•ntl.1· 
obt a i ned of the defendant :11111 11a wut•ll to t he 
pla i n t i ff for a Yal uable co11sideratio11. with­
out notic>e of tile fraud. After till' t·1m1· i..:ti .. n 
of the c.tfrnde1-, t he defc>nd:lllt oh ta i 11ul J1<>. -
session of his goods. but hy wh at lllL':l lls tires 
not appear. The pla i n t i ff l>rougllt a u  :t<.'tion 
for their recovery, n ud it  was <>ontend<'d that 
be, al though an inno<'ent. p:i w n<'C'. l'uul1l nPt 
recoYer. a he deri Y1"l t it ll' t h 1·1111�1t a r rn u• l .  
a11tl w n s  likE: lt rw1·s1m tleriYi11g t i t l L'  fr1 1 1 1 1  : 1  
felon. n u t  Lord Kl'll)'Oll t hotw;ht r i t e  (':l.S\'S 
tl i<:tin�uishahle. anti t hl' Jll�1 i n t i ll' ha<l a 1·1•1·­
nil't. A motion to sl't aside t Ill' Ycr11i•·t wn s  
tkuied. :t tHl t lw cnnrt held t ha t  the sta tu te t>f 
:!l J kn. \" I I I .  c'. :!1, did not extend t o  l':l "P:'I 
of framl. hut only to a fC'louiou::i t n kin.�. H�· 
tha t ;t ai nt<' t h• •  ownN of stoll'll prnpt•rty wns 
cn t i t h• t l  to rpst i t n t inn upon t he e1n11· ktion of 
the f't'lon. Hut ns thnt st a t nlc did not. a pply 
To a fra u1l n!Pnt oht a i n l ng of g-11n1ls. the' 01\lll'l' 
wa s nol r n t l t l l'tl to l'C's t l t 1 1 t l o n  a n d t h<' q111•s­
t l1111 " :i s  Owu, say Olli' suJ H'l'lll<' c•nurt in c·o1 1 1 -
mc 11tlng upon t hn t  c>asc, 1mrl'f�· : ll  c•1 1m11 1 1rn 
l:tll'. :1 1 1 <1 t h<' l 1 1 1 1ot•f'Jlt Jl:I Wl l<'<' w:1 s :t l l •lll'Ccl 
to rc>cm·pr ng:1 l nst t he OWll<'l'. .\ l t hnn ;::h In t h!' 
s t : 1 t t•1 1 1P11 t  111' t h n t  t':l Sl' i t  Is  �:t l r l  t h 1 1 1  i t  t lot>s 
not :1 1 1 1 11 · : 1 1· hy wh:t l 1 1 1 1•a 1 1 s  t I l l '  iJpJ'pnda 1 1 t  oh· 
t :t I 11  i i  f l w JI  > P�slnn nl' I he i;:-00<1,_, Y"l l 
t h i n k  ll Is f '\' l d<'nt fro 1 1 1  t he> nplnln11  111' t l w 
r·o11rl J h:t t t l w  nf1'1•111IPI' \\' : tH J 11'11�1 .. · 1 1 t 1  ti for t hP 
r rn 1 11l n m l 1·111 11· i <' l r'<I ; n m l t l t:t l t h1•1·p 1 1 pon t h<' 
r •o11r t ) Jpforf' whom hf' \\':IS t rlP1l, :1 ll':t l'rlt•r l 
n• t l t n t lnu to t h•• ow1wr, 11 1 1 < 1  l h l Yll'W of t lw 
< ':t"<' l 11•c·o11wH f l tl' l t lnl'<' J 11 1 p<1rl : 1 1 1 t ,  l t1•1•n tt><P 
l hr •  11111 1 1 1  IJlll'!ll ln11 to wlt l < ' l t  t hf '  :1 t l c>11 t l • Hl ol' 
t l w (, J ng'H lw1wh H!'l'rtlM t 1 1 h:t 1 P  hl'1·11 r•:t l l ed, 
Oru l'a l  fro m  
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was whPtlier the statute of 21 Hen. VIII. ex-
teuded to the case oL' goods obtained by
fraud, so that restitution might be awarded to
the owner upon couvietion; for if it did not,
then the defendant had no right to the pos-
session, and it was still in the plaintiff to
wlioni th(^y had been pawned. For this rea-
son it appe.'U's to me that the case is of little
weight in settling the question on either side.
It is insisted by the plaintiffs in error, that
tlie same principles should apply equally to the
cases of property obtained by fraud or felony,
so far as innocent parties are concerned, and
that the statute merging the civil action in
the felony only applies as between the felon
and the original owner of the property, and
not to third persons. The courts, however,
in England and in this country, have thought
they saw some reasonable distinction be-
tween those cases; and that the doctrine re-
lating to the fraudulent acquisition of prop-
erty, was not applicable to the felonious tak-
ing of it. But recently, in the English court
of common pleas, in the case of Sampliu v.
.Vddy, Chief Justice Best virtually held that
no such distinction existed. Our supreme
court in adverting to that case in Mowry v.
Walsh, S Cow. 2i0, thint the opinion of Chief
.lustice Best, "certainly at variance with the
settled principles of law." This shows at
least, that there is a difference of opinion
among sound lawyers on that point; and 1
must confess that it appears to my mind very
difficult to draw a satisfactory distinction be-
tween the two cases: either the original own-
er sliould be entitled to his property in both,
or an Innocent vendee or party should be pro-
tected as well in the one instance as the
other.
The other case cited by the chief justice,
is that of Andrew v. Dieterich, 14 Wend. 32,
decided in lS3.j; and is the first case in which
the question as to the felonious acquisition
of property came directly before the court.
It was an action of replevin. The facts were,
that one Simmons purchased of the plainliff
a quantity of carpeting, for which he was
to pay cash as soon as it was measured and
the quantity ascertained; it was sent to
him; after which, instead of paying for it,
he absconded. Previous to absconding, he
applied to the defendant who was an auc-
tioneer of household furniture to sell his fur-
niture, and obtained on it an advance of
.?350, and gave the key of his house to the
defendant. After the carpeting had been
three weeks on the floor of the house, the de-
fendant removed it and the other things to
his auction room. The plaintiff demanded it,
and the defendant refused to deliver it up
unless his lien was discharged, upon which
the suit was brought. Justice Oakley, of the
superior court, on the trial, charged the jury
that the defendant was entitled to a verdict,
if they found there had been a complete de-
livery of the property by the plaintiff to
Simmons; and that when the defendant
made the advance and took possession of it
by way of pledge he was ignorant of any
circumstances which ought to have put him
on his guard as to the maimer in which Sim-
mons had obtained it from the plaintitT; and
that if they found such a delivery by the
plaintiff to Simmons, the plaintiff could not
recover on the ground that the property had
been feloniously obtained. The jury found
for the defendant. By this charge, the law
was given to the jury, and they passed upon
it, as it had been under.stood to have been
settled by the previous decisions. But the
cause having been brought to the supreme
court, on exceptions taken to the judge's
charge, that court reversed the jtidgment on
the ground that the goods were obtained un-
der false pretences, which was made felony
by statute. This was one of the first cases
decided under that law for converting civil
remedies into criminal prosecutions, the ef-
fect of which was to convict a man of a
felony in the eye of the world in a civil
action, to which he was not a party, and
wliere he had no opportunity of making his
defence. The extension of this questionable
policy so much at variance with the common
law whicli holds every man innocent until
legally convicted, shows the necessity of com-
ing back to the principle of the English
courts, and of requiring a conviction of the
offender before the prosecution of these civil
remedies should be permitted, much less
encouraged. In giving their opinion, the su-
preme court to some extent affirm the law
as it was before held, and say that "a fraud-
ulent purchaser acquires no title as against
the seller, but as possession is prima facie
evidence of property, where the vendor has
delivered possession of his goods with intent
not only that the possession, but the prop-
erty shall pass, a bona fide purchaser from
a fraudulent vendee shall hold the goods in
preference to the owner." With all due defer-
ence to the opinion of the able judges of that
court, I have understood the law to be a
little different from that by them stated;
that as between the original owner of the
goods, and a subsequent bona fide purchaser
from a fraudulent vendee, it is not made a
question whether the owner delivered the
goods with the intent that the possession or
the property should pass; and that in cases
where the delivery was merely conditional
as between the original parties to the con-
tract, as where the payment is to be made
simultaneously with the delivery, but is
omitted or evaded by the purchaser on ob-
taining the delivery of the goods, although
there the delivery is merely conditional, and
the non-payment is an act of fraud entering
into the original agreement, and rendering
the whole contract void as between the buyer
and the seller, yet as to a subsequent inno-
cent purchaser from that vendee, it is not
so; for if the owner indiscreetly parts with
the possession to the vendee, he cannot aft-
erwards reclaim the goods to the prejudice
of the rights of subsequent bona fide pur-
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lUG IIT� L .  "!'OLEN GOO JJ8. 1 1  
was whether the statute or 21  Hen. VIII. ex­
tended to tile case or goods obtained by 
fraud, so that restitution might be a warlll'd to 
t be owner upon conYiction; for if it dill not, 
then the dPfcndant had no right to the pos 
:-;ession, and it was still i n  the plaiutilI to 
\\'horn thPy h:i d been pawned. For this rea­
son it appenrs to me that the case is of liltle 
weight in settling the question on either side. 
It i ins' sted by the plaintiffs in error, that 
the same principles should apply equally to the 
cases or property ol>tained by fraud or felony, 
so fa r as innocent parties are concerned, and 
that the statute merging the civil adion in 
the felony only applies as between the fplon 
.1 nd the original owner of the pro1wrty. and 
not to third persons. The courts. boweYer, 
in Engl:ind and in thi · country, h:n-e t hought 
they saw some reasonable distinction be­
hYP<'ll t hose cases; and that the doctrine re­
lating to the fraudulent acquisition of vrop­
crty, "·as not applicable to the felonious tak­
ing of it. But recently, in the English court 
of common pleas, in the case of Samplin v. 
Addy, Chief Justice Best virtually held that 
no such distinction existed. Our supreme 
court in adverting to that case in Mowry v. 
Walsh, S Cow. '.2-±0, think the opinion of Chie f  
.Justice Best, '\:ertainly at variance with the 
settled principles of law." This shows at 
least, that there i s  a diITerence of opinion 
among sound lawyers o n  that point;  and 1 
must confess that it appears t<> my mind very 
difficult to draw a satisfactory distinction be­
tween the two cases : either the original own­
er should be entitled to his property in both, 
or an innocent vendee or party should be pro­
tected as well in the one instance as the 
other. 
The other case cited by the chief justice, 
is that of Anclrew v. Dieterich, H l'i'end. 3'.2, 
decided in 1833; and is the first case in which 
the question as to the felonious acquisition 
of I)l'Operty came directly before the court. 
It was an action of replevin. The facts wl're, 
that one Simmons purchased of the plaintiff 
a quantity of carpeting, for which he was 
to pay cash as soon as i t  was measured and 
the quantity ascertained ; it was sent to 
him; after which, instead of paying for it, 
he absconded. Previous to absconding, he 
applied to the defendant who was an auc­
t ioneer of household furniture to sell his fur­
niture, and obtained on it an advance of 
�3;)0, and gave the key of his house to t he 
defendant. After the carpeting had bL•Pn 
three weeks on the floor of the house. the de­
fendant removed it and the other things to 
his auction room. The plaintifI demanded it, 
and the defendant refused to deli>er it up 
unless bis lien was di scharged. upon which 
the suit was brought. Justice Oakley, of  the 
superior court. on the trial. charged the jury 
that tbe defendant was entitled to a verdict, 
if they found there had been a complete de­
livery of tbe property by the plaintiff to 
Simmons; and that when the df.'fendant 
matle the ad Y;HH:e and tnok [)Os<;c>. sion of it  
D 1g 1t1Le<1 by 
TE RNET A CH VE 
, b y  way o r  pleclge he w:i s ignorant o f  :inr 
circumstanC'es whieh ought to h:we put hin. 
on his guard as to the ma nllf.'l' in whil'!1 �i.11 
111ons bad obtained it from the plaintiff; anil 
that if they found su<'h a deli Hl',\' by tlu• 
plaintiff to Simmons, the plaintiff could not 
recover on the ground that the property hacl 
been feloniously obtained. The jury fonn<l 
for the defendant. By this charge, the l:l\\ 
was given to the jury, ancl they passe<l up011 
it, :i s it hall bl'en unclerstoo<l to haw• be,.11 
settled by the p1·eyious !lecbions. But tlw 
('ause h:wing been brought to the supremP 
court. on Pxc·etitions ta kPn to the j mJgp's 
charge, that court ren•rsed t!Je judgment 011 
the ground that the ,goncls were obtained un­
der false pretences, which was made felony 
by statute. This was one of the first cases 
cleci<letl under that law for corwertiug civil 
remedies into criminal prosecutions, the ef­
fect of which was to C< nYil't a man of a 
ftolony in the eye of the world in a civil 
action, to which be was not a party, ancl 
where he hacl no ovportuuity of making- bis 
defence. The extension of this questionabl<' 
policy so much at variance with the col.llmon 
law which holds every man innocent until 
le.:..ally con>icted, shows the necessity of com­
ing back to the principle of the English 
courts, and of requiring a conviction of the 
offencler before the prosecution of these ciYil 
rel.lledies should be permitted. much less 
encouraged. In giving theil' opinion, the "n 
preme court to some extent affirm the law 
as it was before held, and say that "a fraucl­
ulent pu rchaser acquires no title as agnm,.;t 
the seller, but as possession is prima faci<' 
evidence of property, where the venclor has 
delivered possession of bis goods with intent 
not onl .1· that the possession, but the prop­
Nty shall pass, a bona fide purcba-;er from 
a fraudulent vendee shall hold the goods in 
preference to the owner." With all due defer­
ence to the opinion of the able judges of that 
comt. I have understood the law to be a 
little different from that by them stated ; 
chat :is betwPen the origiual owner of the 
goods. and a subsequent bona fide purchaser 
from a franclnlent >en lee>, it is not made a 
question "·hether the owner deli>erecl the 
goods 'Yith the intent that thP posses:-:ion or 
the property should pas" : '.llltl that in case-; 
where the delivery was merely corn1itional 
as between the ori.giual varties to thL <·on­
tract, as where the vay ment is to be ru:ule 
simulta neously with the delivery, but is 
omitted or eYaded by the purchaser on ob­
taining the deli>ery of the goorls. although 
there the ddi>ery is merel;v t'PIHlitional. antl 
the non-pa� ment is an act of fr:rnd eutc>ring 
into the ori.�inal a.g-reemen t. :ind renrlering­
the whole contract >oitl as between the hnyer 
and the seller, yet as to a subsequent inno­
cent purchaser from th·rt Ypnr1ee. it is not 
so; for if the owner ind iscreetly parts with 
the possession to the ven<lee. he cannot '1 ft­
erwards red.aim the goods to the prejn J1ee 
of the rights of sub,-;eqnent bnua IMP im:·-
O rigi a l  from 
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chasers or creditors of his debtor; for where
one or the other of innocent persons must
suffer, the law imposes the penalty upon him
by whose fault the necessity exists.
An auctioneer, does not claim the goods as
his own, or assimie any right in or over or
to dispose of the same as his own ijroperty.
It is true he has a special interest in goods
sent to him to be sold, and a lien on them,
or their pi-oceeds, for the charges of sale, his
commission, and the auction duty payable
to the state; he may sue the buyer for the
purchase money; and is responsible to the
vendee for the fulfilment of the contract of
sale unless he discloses the name of his prin-
cipal at the time of sale; yet, for all other
purposes, he is the mere agent for the trans-
mission of goods from one set of traders to
another. It appears to me unjust to charge
him with the value of the goods sold in a
case like the present; though I admit that
if he had received notice that the property
he was about to sell did not belong to his
principal, and notwithstanding such notice
he proceeded to sell, he ought to be held
responsible to the real owner for the value
of the property, or the amount of sales, as
such owner might elect. In crimiual cases
it is the scienter, or the intent, which con-
stitutes the crime; and can it be just or
equitable in a civil action to place an inno-
cent man, an agent, one who is admitted to
have acted without Icuowledge or evil in-
tent, in a worse situation than one who Is
arraigned for a criminal violation of the
laws of his country? And to excuse the one
from punishment if he has unwittingly or
unintentionally violated those laws; and at
the same time to mulct in damages the other
for a technical illegal taking of another's
property. It is not the fact that the law
regard.s the intent only in strictly criminal
cases, for the question of fraud at the com-
mon law depends upon the motive. So If
a person buys goods of another against whom
he knows there is a judgment, and does not
do it to defeat a creditor's execution, it will
not affect his purchase.
All the cited cases, and which I have pre-
viously examined, show that there was a
demand made before suit brought. In this
case, it is not pretended that before Ihis suit
was Instituted there was any demand what-
ever made, the claimant rcsling alone ujion
the legal principle that the sale was a con-
voi-slon. I am satlsllcd, however, that a
formal deniaml should have been made on
those auctlnneers before this suit was
brought; and that It sliould never be permit-
ted that a person wUa comes Innocenlly Into
the mere custody uf property, without cliilm-
Iiig any title to It In his own riglil, and who
by virtue of a public odlce conCcrreil ujuin
biin by the Kovorninent of the country acts
merely as agent for tlie sale of that prop-
erty, and Is known as such to the world,
Mli'iuld be lipid liable lo respond In damages
to the person who may afterwards prove lo
be the owner, without having at least the
opportunity of settling with his aavor.<iary,
or of paying the amoimt claimed without
being charged with the additional penalt.v
of the costs of a suit.
I am still further satisfied, even allowing
for the sake of argument that such formal
demand had been made, that the plaintilTs
in error, under circumstances like those ex-
hibited in the present case, should not bo
held liable; and the more especially so when
the person who claims to be the owner, does
not show that he has taken any pains, by
advertisement or otherwise, to caution the
community that the property in question has
been feloniously taken from him; but per-
mits them to receive it from the felon, and
to pass it away to other hands, without the
slightest intimation that the title does not
accompany the possession in that as in all
other cases. What reason can there be, that
the principle which the courts have with so
much justice adopted with reference to stolen
bills of exchange and promissor.v notes,
sliould not be applied to other personal prop-
erty, equally the subject of mercantile trans-
actions'/ Why not here as in the cases of
those evidences of debt, hold the claimant
bound to exercise due diligence in giving
the public, notice of his loss; and leave the
fact of proper diligence on his side, and of
due caution on that of the defendant, for a
jui-y to determine from all the circumstances
of the case? Is it because in the case of
bills of exchange and promissory notes, the
endorsement passes the title? Then e<iually
effective is the possession of goods to evi-
dence the title in all cases, except where
the com-ts have interposed, and held inno-
cent parties liable because they had d<uio that
which they believed was legal and right; and
had no moans of knowing to the contrary
but by that Information.
It is also urged on the part of the plain-
tiffs in error, and with strong reason for Its
support, that although possession may not
always be conclusive evidence of property
In merchandize, yet when merchandize is
abroad In a foreign country, the exigen-
cy of commerce requires that possession
should be considered as conclusive evidence
of proport.v in all cases, where the purchaser
acts in good faith, and without notice that
the goods do not belong to him who Is in
the possession of the same. This It would
Bcem should be the rule, as the title of per-
sonal property passes by the delivery; and
In two thirds or even three fourllis of all that
Is pa.ssed Ihrdugli the millions of hands Vwtli
In this country ami in lOurope, no other mode
of passing the title Is used. The public In-
terest demtiiids that such a rule slionUl be
adopted, or public notice sIxMild be required
In ill! cases of the loss by felony of iiersonal
I)roi)erty. Otherwise, I cinnot divest my
mind of the Klioiig Impression which It has
received, that a blow will be struck at the
commercial lulercsis and pr(i.s|)erity of our
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chasers or creditors of his debtor ; for where 
one or the other of innocent persons must 
utier. the law imposes the penalty upon him 
by WhJse fault tbe necessity exists. 
An auctioneer, does not claim the goods as 
his own, or assume any right in or over or 
to dispose of the same as his own property. 
It is true he bas a special i nterest in goods 
sent to b im to be sold, and a lien on them, 
or their pi·oceeds, for t h e  cha rges of sale, his 
commission, and the auction duty payable 
to the state; he may sue the buyer for the 
pm-chase money ; and is respon ible to the 
vendee for the fulfilment of the contract of 
sale unless he discloses the name of his prin­
cipal at the time of sale; yet, for all other 
purposes, be is the mere agent for the trans­
mission of goods from one set of traders to 
another. It appears to me unjust to charge 
him with the value of the goods sold in a 
case like the present ; though I admit that 
if b e  had received notice that the property 
he was about to sell did not belong to bis 
principal, and notwithstanding such notice 
he proceeded to sell, be ought to be held 
responsible to the real owner for the value 
of the property, 01· the amount of sales, as 
such owner might elect. In criminal cases 
it i t he scienter, or the intent, which con­
stitutes the crime; and can it be just or 
equitable in a civil action to place an inno­
cent man, an agent. one who i s  admitted to 
lrn'l"e acted withoul l-i1owledge or evil in­
tent, in a worse situation tban one who Is 
arrai.:;ned for a criminal violation o f  the 
laws of bis count1·y ? And to excuse the one 
from puni ·hment i f  he has unwitti ngly or 
uni ntentionally v iolated those laws; and at 
the same time to mulct in damages the other 
for a technknl illegal taking of anotller's 
property. It i- not the fact that tile law 
i·e:::anls the i n tent only in strictly criminal 
c:.i :-:es, for the q n rsti o n of fraud at the "Om­
mo11 Jaw d<'1'<'1Hls upon the motive. • o i f  
n l•l' l'son buys goo11s o f  another against w hom 
h P  knows there is a j udgment, and does not 
do it to defeat a cre1litor's exceution. it wJII  
not n !Tcct his purchase. 
All the dt1•cl mscs, nnrl which I baye pre­
v iously exa u 1 i 1 1eil, ::;ho1Y t h a t  there wa s a 
<J,.rn:i nrl made before RUit brou�ht. I n t h is 
1 ·  1 e, It I s  11ot pretPtulr1l thnt brfnre t hi s ::;ult  
\\ :i  l u  tl tutt>d tllerc was any <lema n1 l w h at­
' \  tr 1 u; 1 d c•, t he <'l n l m :i n t  rl'sl I n .�  a l one upon 
th.-. ll'�: i l  pr!Jwlpll' I hat t h e rsalc was :l c·on­
v• r Inn. I a 1 1 1  r:1 I btle•l, howPver, t ha t  a 
f11r11 111  dem• 1 11 1 Hhoulcl ha YI' br'Pll m:11Jr nn 
t i  0 !' fi llC'! i 1 1 J 1 l'l'l'H IJPf!ll'C t h i "I  :;;nit \\':IS 
b1·nu •h t ;  a w l  t h a t  I t  Rhuulcl  11<'\'l'r h P  pPrmlt­
t 1 •1 l t h at n J t"r:on ' ho c·o111Ps l 1 1noc1•11 l l y I n t o  
t hP 11w1·1• 1 • 1 1  Indy of prnpc>1·ty, w l t h11 11 t c - 1 : 1 1 1 1 1-
l n ' n uy t l l l1> t o  I I  In his own rig-h t ,  1 1 1 1 < 1  \\' ho 
I i� v i rtue• of' u J ll l l il iP 1 1l 1 1 1•e <'nnl'errl'd 1 1 p1 1 1 1  
IJ i lll hy l )lf' gOYl'l"l l l l lPll t of t he «o l l t l t l',\" :tl'f. 
1 1 1{'1' •l y II fll-:f' l l t  for 1 hP Bille o f  t hn t J!l'OJI· 
< rty, n ru l  I lomwn ne s11rh t o  t bt• worlrl, 
1 1 1 1 ld Ir hPl c l l l 1 1 h l .-.  t <1 !'<' pone!  In c l : u 1 1 11grs 
to th 111 1 011 w ho mny :i ft r rw:irds pr11\·1• I r •  
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be the owner, without having at lenst t he 
opportunity of settling with bis aaver·ary. 
or of paying the amount claimed without 
being charged with the additional penalty 
of the costs of a suit. 
I am still further satisfied. even allowini:­
for tlle sake of argument that such formal 
demand had been made, that the pla i n t i f >' 
in error, under circumstances like those ex­
hibited in the present case, should not be 
held liable; and the more e pecially so when 
the person who claims to be the owner, does 
not show that he has taken any pain , by 
advertisement or otherwise, to caution the 
community that the property in question bas 
been feloniously taken from him; but per­
mits t hem to receive it from the felon. antl 
to pass it away to other bands. wit hout the 
sl ightest intimation that t he ti tle does not 
accompany the possession in that as in :ill 
other ca es. What reason can there be, that 
the principle which the courts llave w i l b  so 
much justice adopted with refrrcnce to tolen 
bills of exchange and promi ssory notes. 
should not be applied to other personal prop· 
erty, equally the ubject of me1·c:mtile t rans­
actions? Why not here a in the ca c vf 
those e1 itlences of debt, hold the claimant 
bound to exercise due dil igence in g-iving­
the public, notice of bis los ; and lea'l"e the 
fact of proper diligence on his side, and of 
due caulion on that of the defendant, for a 
jury to determine from all the circumst:1 11CC'S 
of the case ? Is it because in the cnsc or 
bills of exchange ann prom issory notes. t he 
endorsement passes t he ti t l e '! ThC'n C'<Junlly 
ffective i s  the po session of goods to eYl­
dcnce tbe title in all cas , exrept whC're 
the courts have interposed, and llehl inno­
cent parties liable because they bnd done t i. lat 
wbich they believed "·as lC'ga l and ri;:hl ; and 
I.lad no means of know ing to the cont ra ry 
but by tbat i n form:lt ion.  
It is also urged on t he part of the ])Jnin­
t i f ,; in error, and with slrcmg reason for i ts 
su pport, th at althoup:h pos>i<'ssiou mny not 
always be concl usive C'v iokne<' or property 
in merehnnd ize. yet when 111C'rchaudi7.e is 
:tbrnntl lu lt forei ;::n co untry, t he C''i.lg-c11-
cy nC com merce rec1ui rc::; l h::tt po.·spssiort  
shoul<l lle consiclcrC'd a s  c·ond n sl ve eviiklll'l' 
of p ropl'rty in al l e:1 :cs, wlll're lhe purd1:iser 
nets in �ood fa i t h .  and w i t h out no t ! !'<' t h:lt 
the �oods do not lwlnni;: to h i  111 w hn ls i 1 1  
t he 1 ms;:icssion of t h P s n  me. 'l'lt is I t  wouh l 
Hl'<'Tll should be l h !' nil<', ns t h <' t i t l e' o!' 11er· 
son:tl prnpc> rt y p:lsRPS by t lw c l l'l l n•ry ; n ncl  
In t w o t h i rc l:'I  o r  <'\"Pn t h n•c fn urt l ts  of all  t h: i t  
Is J l:lHHt•d t h row h t he m l l l !nns or hn 11 c l'I hoth 
111 t h l >1  1·nn 1 1 l ry :1 11cl In fGUl'llJlC', 11n nf h<'l' nirHle 
nf 11nssi 11� I he t l ! IP IR l lll<'d. ThP p1 1hlic• 111 
( l 'rl'St c lC ' l l l :l l l f l R  t hn t  such ll rtllP hi10 1 1 l d  !Jc 
nrlo p! Pd ,  or pn hlk 1 1 o f lrC' J'lhn 1 1 l d  )Jp l'P q l l l rrd 
I n  a l l  ( ' ; \  PS of t h e  lm�s h�· 1'1 ' 10 11y or )lC'l'HOJl!ll 
proJll'rf.\'. Ot!Jc >rwlsr, J P:111 11nt dh·<'st my 
1 1 1 1 1 1 < 1  or f hr> i;t ron� l m prP� tlnn wh ll' h It h o s  
n•<'f ' l\' r • c l ,  t h:i t n h lo w w i l l  hi• l' t 1" 1 1 1 ·k a l  t h<' 
('O l l l l l lt'l'l 'i:J ) l n f (•J'C•b t S  l l l l c l  pro ')H'l' i t �  Of 11111' 
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state, the extent of the evil effects of which
it will be difficult to conceive. All who are
in the least acquainttMl with the commercial
relations of our country know that they are
very extensive and important both with Eng-
land and France and other counti'ies, amount-
ing to many millions of dollars in the course
of a year. SuiJpose for an Instance, that a
man in either of those European countries
should obtain goods by felony — for there are
bad men all over the world— and consign
them to a mercantile house in New York,
one of the most respectable firms in that city,
with directions to sell on his account and
remit him the proceeds; and they, without
any knowledge of the manner in which the
goods have been obtained, receive and dis-
pose of the same, and remit the avails as
directed; and that some months after comes
another person and claims those goods as
his property, and In order to be parallel with
the case under advisement, without saying a
syllable to those merchants in New York,
and without ever having given any notice
to the world of his loss, he commences an
action of trover against them. Would this
or any other court hold them liable in that
action? or would not a sense of justice and
equity revolt at such a proposition? If sucb
an action should be sustained, and a recovery
had against such tirm under such circumstan-
ces, no mercantile commission house could
thereafter exist in the city of New York.
Baltimore, so far as this question is affected,
is a foreign city, and the state of Maryland a
foreign state. The several states of the Union,
it is true, have confederated for their mutual
safety and good government, but in all mat-
ters which relate to their internal police, legis-
lative and judicial, they are as much foreign
to each other as if situated on either side of
the Atlantic; and therefore, in determining
this important question, it should be done
with a reference to the effect it is to have
upon our foreign commercial relations. As
I have before remarked, there has been no
case, like the present, judicially determined
by this court. Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend.
2G7, was not the case of property sent to an
agent to be disposed of, and the proceeds
remitted, but was the case of property con-
verted here by a principal, between which
two cases there is, in my judgment, a wide
distinction, and involves the same principle
as that of Everett v. Coffin, 6 Wend. 605.
Having thus passed through with such an
examination as I have deemed it my duty to
give this matter, I have to add that the rule,
as attempted to be established on the part
of the defendant in error, is in my opinion
too broad. Although I admit that the gov-
ernment is bound to assist the rightful own-
er of property in recovering the possession of
it when it has been unjustly or feloniously
taken from him; yet I insist that this should
not be at the expense of an innocent person,
without some notice, and especially in the
present case, where the defendant in error
kept the offender In his employment, in
which he was at the time of the felony, al-
though he had no charge of the goods; that,
however, only serves to free him from a
breach of trust, and is introduced for the
purpose of showing it was a felony. The
principle applies here with great force, that
where one of two innocent parties must suf-
fer, the law will impose the penalty upon
him by whose fault the necessity exists.
The defendant in error kept the felon in his
employment, placed confidence in him, and
the strong probability is that but for the fa-
cilities which his employment in that store
afforded him, the felony would never have
been committed. At the civil law, when
things were damaged or stolen by any of
the servants belonging to a ship or an inn,
the master of the ship or inn was held lia-
ble to pay double the value of the goods so
damaged or stolen to the person sustaining
the loss; but when the damage or theft was
done by a stranger, or by persons unknown,
the master was simply obliged to make good
the loss. The reason for this important dis-
tinction is very evident. The master had
in the fii'St instance placed those servants
there, and reposed confidence in them,
which was a voluntary act on his part, and
he should therefore answer for the wrong
he had done the community by employing
improper persons, as, in most cases, the ex-
ercise of an ordinary degree of caution
would have enabled him to have become ac-
quainted with the character and habits of
his employees; but in the second instance,
the master had not employed the person
who committed the injury, or at least the
fact that he had done so could not legally
be brought home to him, still as the goods
had been deposited with him, they should
be forthcoming, or he should pay their val-
ue, but no damages as in the first instance
for the wrong he had done society by keep-
ing about him untrustworthy servants. The
application of this principle to the case in
hand may be made with much facility and
correctness. Although I fully assent to the
legal propositions, that no title passes
where a felon sells stolen goods even to an
innocent purchaser, and that the owner is
entitled to take his goods wherever he can
find them, yet I can by no means assent to
the inference sought to be drawn from those
propositions: that an innocent agent who is
not a purchaser, who claims no title to the
goods in himself, but merely acts as a pub-
lic auctioneer in disposing of them at a pub-
lic and open sale, and under a public notice
that he will do so, — who has paid over the
proceeds of that sale, and delivered the
property to the vendees before any notice or
knowledge of the felony, and without any
facts or circumstances to put him on his
guard, and without any previous demand
having been made upon him,— is liable in an
action for the value thereof to the owner.
For these several reasons, I think the judg-
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RIG IIT� I N  STOLEN G OODS. 1" •) 
state, the extent o f  the cYil effects of which 
it will be difficult to couceive. All who are 
in the least acquainted with the commercial 
relations of om· country know that they arc 
very extensive and important both with Eng­
land and France an<l other countries, amount­
ing to many millions of dollars in the course 
of a yea1·. Suppose for an instance, that a 
man in either of those European countries 
should obtain goods by felony-for there are 
bad men all over the world-and consign 
them to a mercantile house in New York, 
one of the most respectable firms in that city, 
with directions to sell on his account and 
rnmit him the proceeds; and they, withol1t 
any knowledge of the manner in which the 
goods have been obtained, receive and dis­
pose of the same, and remit the avails as 
directed; and that some months after comes 
another person and claims those goods as 
his property, and in order to be parallel with 
the case under advisement, without saying a 
syllable to those merchants in New York. 
and without ever having given any notice 
to the world of his loS'.3, be com mences an 
action of trover against them. "\Vould this 
or any other court bold them liable in that 
action ? or would not a sense of justice and 
equity revolt at such a proposition? If such 
an action should be sustained, and a recovery 
had against such firm under such circumstan­
ces, no mercantile commission house could 
thereafter exist in the city of New York. 
Baltimore, so far as this question is affected, 
is a foreign city, and the state of Maryland a 
foreign state. The several states of the Union, 
it is true, have confederated for their mutual 
safety and good government, but in all mat­
ters which relate to their i nternal police, legis­
lative and j u dicial, they are as much foreign 
to each other as if situated on either side of 
the Atlantic; and therefore, in determining 
this im portant question, it should be done 
with a reference to the effect it is to have 
upon our foreign commercial relations. As 
I have before remarked, there has been no 
case, like the present, j udicially determined 
by this court. Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend. 
2G7, was not the case of property sent to an 
agent to be disposed of, and the proceeds 
remitted, but was the case of property con­
verted here by a principal, between which 
two cases there is, in my judgment, a wide 
distinction, and i nvolves the same principle 
as that of Everett v. Coffin, 6 Wend. 605. 
Having thus passed through with such an 
examination as I have deemed it my duty to 
give this matter, I have to add that the rnle, 
as attempted to be established on the part 
of the defendant in error, is in my opinion 
too broad. Although I admit that the gov­
ernment is bound to assist the rightful own­
er of property i n  recovering the possession of 
it when it has been unj ustly or feloniously 
taken from him ; yet I insist that this should 
not be at the expense of an innocent person, 
without some notice, and especially in the 
present case, where the defendant in error 
'i 
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kept the offender In hls employment, in 
which he was at the time of the felony, al­
though he had no charge of the goods; that, 
however, only serves to free him from a 
breach of trust, and is introduced for the 
purpose of showing it was a felony. The 
principle applies here with great force, that 
where one of two innocent parties must suf­
fer, the law will impose the penalty upon 
him by whose fault the necessity exists. 
The defendant in error kept the felon in bis 
employment, placed confidence in him, and 
the strong probability i s  that but for the fa­
cilities which his employment in that store 
afforded him, the felony would never ba'l'e 
been committed. A t  the civil law, when 
things were damaged or stolen by any of 
the servants belonging to a ship or an inn, 
the master of the ship or inn was held lia­
ble to pay double the value of the goods so 
damaged or stolen to the person sustaining 
the loss; but when the damage or theft was 
done by a stranger, or by persons unknown. 
the master was simply obliged to make good 
the loss. The reason for this important dis­
tinction is very evident. The master bad 
i n  the first instance placed those servants 
there, and reposed confidence in them, 
which was a voluntary act o n  bis part, and 
he should therefore answer for the wrong 
be bad done the community by employin� 
improper persons, as, i n  most cases, the ex­
ercise o f  an ordinary degree of caution 
would have enabled him to have become ac­
quainted with the character and habits ot 
his employees; but i n  the second in stance, 
the master had not employed the person 
who committed the injury, or at least the 
fact that he bad done so could not legally 
be brought home to him, still as the goods 
bad been deposited with him, they should 
be forthcoming, or be should pay their val­
ue, but no damages as in the first instance 
for the wrong he had done society by keep­
ing about h i m  untrustworthy servants. The 
application of this principle to the case in 
hand may be made with much facility and 
correctness. Although I fully assent to the 
legal propositions, that no title pas:;es 
where a felon sells stolen goods even to an 
innocent purchaser, and that the owner is 
entitled to take his goods wherever he can 
find them, yet I can by no means assent to 
the inference sought to be drawn from those 
propositions :  that a n  innocent agent who is 
not a purchaser, who claims no title to the 
good in hi mself, but merely acts as a pub­
lic auctioneer in disposing of them at a pub­
lic and open sale, and under a public notiee 
that he will do so,-who bas paid over the 
proceeds of that sale, and delivered thl' 
property to the vendees before any notice or 
knowledge of the felony, and without an�­
facts or circumstances to put him on bh: 
guard. and without any previous demand 
having been made upon him,-is liable in an 
action for the value thereof to the owner. 
For tl.Jcse several reasons, I think the jull;?-
u n  1 0 1  tr m 
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incnt of the supreme court shouUl be re-
versed.
By Senator VERPLANCK. TUe decision
of this court last year, in the case of Saltus
y. Everett. 20 Wend. 2G7, aclinowledged and
confirmed the principle, that the owner of
personal property cannot be divested of his
rights, unless by his own act or his own as-
sent; and that it is no defense against such
a superior and original title for a subse-
quent possessor, that he honestly purchased
the goods in the course of trade from a per-
son not authorized to sell them, though oth-
erwise in lawful possession. In applying
this doctrine to the present case, the follow-
ing questions arise: The plaintiff below
seeks to recover the value of his goods, not
from one having them in possession and re-
fusing to deliver them, or from one who sold
for his own benefit, or otherwise converted
them to his own use, but from auctioneers
who received the goods without knowledge
that they had been stolen, sold them and
transmitted the proceeds to their supposed
owner, who was in fact the felonious taker
of the property. Are these innocent sellers
liable to the true owner for the amount of
his loss, or must his remedy be limited to
following the goods themselves, and recov-
ering them or their value from the person
actually in possession under a defective
title?
The principle of the decision in Saltus v.
Everett, and of the authorities on which it
rests, apply with equal force to the present
case. The policy of our law is to make
every man look to the character of those
with whom he deals, and who are respon-
sible for the title of property in the articles
bought and sold. If he does not do this, he
must take the consequent risk. The sanie
considerations of public policy apply to him
who sells as the agent of anotlier. as to him
who buys; both of them are to look to the
cluiractcr of the person with whom they
deal. If in this they are negligent, or have
Ijeen deceived, (hoy must take the conse-
quences whenever their rights come into
conflict with those of any innocent sufferer
l)y the act of the same guilty third party.
-Xccordlngly the doctrine of our decisions is,
tli.Tt the original and true owner of move-
able property, who has not by his own act
or assent given a color of title or an ap-
parent right of sale to another, may recover
ihe value of those goods fi-oinnny one liavliig
llioni In jKissesHlon and refusing to deliver
Ihem up, or who has api>lled Uicni to his
own use, or has In any other way converted
them, I. c. has chiinged the substance of the
tilings In <|uestion. their churactor, use or
ownership, to the Injury of the real owner.
The ground of the action used for the piu'-
poNe In not the nclujil possession of the
moveables, luit some wrongful act relating
to llieni: a tortious refiiHul to deliver
them, n torlloiis taking, or else their wrong-
ful conversion; which last is presumed up-
on the refusal to give them up. and which
is proved by a sale without authority.
According to Lord Coke, in the oldest lead-
ing case on this head, which still preserves
its authority, Isaac v. Clark. 1 Bulst. 312,
"there must be an act done to convert one
thing into another," and a converting into
money by sale has always been held to be
within this definition. The very recent Eng-
lish case. Peer v. Humphrey, 2 Adol. & E.
495, recognizes this same doctrine.
In the argument before us, it was very
strongly urged that a rule of law, thus char-
ging mere agents, would work great public
injury as well as private iuiuslice; as it
would extend to common carriers, ship mas-
ters and others, through whose hands goods
feloniously or wrongfully obtained might
pass. There may be some cases going to
that length, but they are not, in my judg-
ment, within the principle or the policy of
the rule, nor are they included in the older
decisions, as, for instance, in the one just
cited from Bulstrode. I cannot think the
law charges one who had accidentally a
temporary possession of goods without claim
of proiJerty, and with which he has parted
before demand. It requires a wrongful tak-
ing or conversion of the thing itself to make
the transaction tortious. The auctioneers
who have sold the goods now in question
have made such an unauthorized conversion,
and must be answerable for the value. In
tills instance the rule falls hardly upon in-
nocent and honorable men: but looliing to
general considerations of legal policy, I can-
not conceive a more salutary regulation
than that of obliging the auctiiuieer to look
well to the title of the goods which ho sells,
and in case of feloniously obtained proper-
ty, to hold him responsible to the buyer or
the true owner, as the one or the other ma.v
happen to suffer. Were our law otherwise
in this respect, it would alTord a facility for
the sale of stolen or feloniously obtained
goods, which could be remedied in no way
so effectually as by a statute regulating
sales at auction, on the principles of tlie
law as we now hold it.
2. It has lieen maintained with great abil-
ity lliat the rule llius stated, though admit-
ted to be true as to goods tortiously obtain-
ed, does not ajiply to goods feloniously tak-
en, and tliat damages for the conversion
of such goods can be recovered only after
conviction of the feh)n, and only from the
person convening or refusing to deliver the
goods after that time. In the present case,
the felon was convicted, but the conversion
and sale had taken place before the convic-
tion. This gnunid was probably not taken
before the supreme court, as It Is not no-
ticed In the opinion dellveri"d In th;it court.
1 am not (lullo clear whether this may not
be the existing law of lOngland, and wheth-
<'r an acll'in like the i)resent coidd at any
time be maliilalned there. By the undent
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
7:
37
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/u
c2
.a
rk
:/1
39
60
/t
90
86
js
3p
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
PH E LDIIX A R Y  COX ' J DERA.TIOXS. 
ment of the supreme court shoulc.l be re­
Yersed. 
B" Senator YERPLANCK. The decision 
of {his court last year, in the case of ::>altus 
'- E\·erett. �O Wend. �uT, ackno"·ledged and 
coufirmed the principle, that the owner of 
personnl propert�· cannot be diYested of bis 
ri::hts. unless by bis own act or bis own as­
sent ; and that it  i s  no defense against such 
a su11erior and ori.�inal title for a snbse­
•JUent possessor. that be honestly purc·based 
t he ;::-11mls in the course of trade from a per­
::>on not autborized to sell tbern. tbougb otb­
L'rwise in lawful possession. In applying 
this d ictrine to the present ca e, the follow­
ing questions arise : The plaintiff below 
seeks to recover tbe value of bis goods, not 
from one having tbem in possession and re­
fusing to deliver them. or from one who sold 
fur his own bene fit. or otherwise converted 
them to his own use. but from auct ioneers 
who receiYed tbe good without lmowiedge 
that they h:id been stolen, sold them and 
transmitted tbe proceeds to their supposed 
owner, who was in fact the felonious taker 
of tbe property. Are tllese innocent sellers 
liable to the true owner for the amount of 
his loss, or must bis remec.ly be li mited to 
fullowing the goods themselves, and recov­
ering them or their value from the person 
actua lly in possession under a defective 
ti ti<· ?  
The princi vle o f  the decision i n  8a l l  us v. 
E \  e1·ctt. and of the autborities on wh ich i t  
1·ests, apply will! equal force to the prPscnt 
case. Tlle pol ic·� of our law is to make 
every ma n  look to the charac te r o f  t hose 
with whom he deal , and who are respon­
sil•le fnr the t i t le of property i n  the art ides 
hou::ht and sold. I C  he does not do this, be 
must take the consequent risl,. Tile sn mc 
<'ODSi<\erations O( )lllhlic poJic'y apply to h i m 
who s!'lls as t he agent of ano lhl''" as to h i m  
wh11 hnys ;  11oth of them arc to look to t he 
<'h:tl':wtrl' of t he pc·n;on w i t h  whom t he) 
ll <'a l .  If  i n  t h i s t l t<'r :l l'e nr�li;.:C'n t.  or h:WC' 
l 11•t•n 1l 1•1·e iYP1l. t l tP,r l l l llSt t a ke th<' COllH(' 
<J\lt'll<'f'S \Y hC'l lPYel' t lt l' i l' l'igh t s  C'Olll<' i n t o  
1·011flic·t wi t h  t ltos(' o f  a 11r iu noeent s l l f'fl'rer 
hy the ar·t of t ltr i;a mc ;.:n i l ly t h il'fl pa rty. 
.\ r•1•01'f l l 11gly t !tr < lol'l rl 11e o f  OU!' ck<' isin1 1 s  Is ,  
t I m  t t h <�  or ig I n:i I :1 1 1 11  t rnr ow 11er of n w v  e 
a h l  • p1·operf )·, who h a s  not by his o w n  net 
01· a s. P i l l  gh· .. 1 1  a 1·11l or of t i t le or a n  : l JJ·  
• 1m·e1 1 t right or 1<n lr t o  a 1 1n t l 1P I'. may l'l'<'OH'r 
t h " \' n l l ll' of t h osf' goncls fl'u111 :1 1 1y 01w h a v i n g 
1 h C'In 1 1 1  1 u 1si;1•i;sion 11 11 <1  re fusing t o  1 J ,.l h<'r 
t h••IJI 1 1 p, < ll' w ho has a pplJC'd l hC'm t o  h l :-1  
o w 1 1  nse, 0 1· h a s  I n  n i l ,\  ol h<'r WU,\ 1•011 q•1·t ed 
t h t >lll,  I . '" h a s  <'1 1 : 1 1 1g•·•l t l l f '  s11hst: 1 111•p of t hr 
t h l 1 1 g  1 11 q 1 1e t lo1 1 , t lw l r  d rn r: w t rr. Ill-IP or 
0 \\'111'1' h i p, t11  1 1 1  . .  l 1 1J 1 1 rr nf f i ll'  1'1• 1 1 !  1 1 \\ 111'1' 
'l' l w  g1·ou111l  of I hi' : u ' l  1011  l l l'P<I f111• I h1• J il l i '· 
pu •· I not t h •• f l l ' I  u n i  1 10 l'<'SS!nn n f  t h <' 
1 1 1 1 1 \ • •: i l il• , l int  1'1 1 1 1 1" \\T<111 g l 1 1 I  : l f ' f  n·l a t t n g 
t o  1 1 11• 1 1 1 : II t o r l l • 1 1 1  n•t1 1  :1 1 I n  < I P l l \ 1 •1' 
t hPll l ,  : 1  l • 1 rt l n u t :i ld 1 1 g , or 1•le<' t l wlr \\"1'< 111 �· 
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fu! conversion; which l a  t i pr<:'sumed up­
on the refusal to give them up. and which 
is proved by a sale w i thout authority. 
According to Lo1·d Coke, i n  the Olde t lead­
ing case on this head, which still preserves 
its authority, Isaac v. Clark, 1 Buist. 31�. 
"there must be an act done to conYert one 
thing into another," and a converting into 
money by sale bas always been held to be 
witbin this definition. The very recent Eng­
l ish case, Peer v. Humphrey, 2 Ado!. & B. 
-±9:>, recognizes this same doctrine. 
In the argument before us, it was very 
strongly urged that a rule of law. thus char­
;riug mere agents, would "·ork great public 
injury as "·ell as private injus t ice ; as it 
woulU extenc.l to common carriers, ship mas­
ters and others, through whose hands goods 
feloniously or wrongfully obtained might 
pass. There may be some c:1ses going to 
that lengtb, but they are uot, in my j udg­
ment. within the principle or the i)OJicy of 
the rule, nor are they included in the older 
decisions. as, for instance, in th<' one just 
c i ted from Bulstrode. I cannot think the 
law charges one who had accidentally a 
temporary pos,ession of guo1ls w i thout claim 
of property, and with whkh he bas parted 
before demand. It requires a wrongful tak­
ing or conversion of t h e  thing itsd f to make 
tbe transaction tortious. The auctionrers 
who have sold the goocls now in q 1ws t ion 
h a \- e  maclc surh :in un:1 11 t  horizel1 eoUYNsill!l. 
and must be answera hie for t h e Y :l l uc. I u  
I his i ns lance the rule falls hnnl l �- upnn in­
noc·ent ancl honorable men ; but look ing to 
;.:-c1wr:1 l c·o 1hillera t ions of ll'zal 11oli<'y, I l':l ll­
not enncciYe a mor(' s:1 l u t :i ry n·::: ul:t ti on 
tita n that of obl iging t h<' :l \11:t 101wer to loo!' 
well to t he t i t l e of the goo d s  w h kh h<' i<<'lls, 
:1 1 1 11 in l':lse of feloniously oli t a i n e1l prnpcr­
t). to hohl h i m  n• 11onsil>le to t h e>  Ln1y l'r 01· 
t he t rnc ownl'l'. as th one or t l w other rn:1y 
ha11prn t o suffer. "'e re ou r law ot herwise 
in t h is rrspl'C'I . it wou ld a ff1ml a fac i l i t )· for 
t he Rn Ir uf stolen o r fplnn ionsly olltn i nC'cl 
g-001 1:-:.  " h i<•h l'onlcl be l'l'l \\t'<liP1l in no wn�· 
so cffel't 1 1 : 1 l l� as b) a s t a t u t e'  l'l'gu la t i n g 
snlC's n t  n m·t ion. on t l tr prl nl'ipl<:'S or t l 1l' 
lnw a� ''e now hold it. 
:?. I t  h:11-1 hrP ll  m: 1 i 1 1 t : 1 i nccl ,y i t h  .�rrat ahil­
l t y  t hn l t hP l ' l l lP t h us s t : 1 t t• 1 l ,  t hough a d 1 1 1 l t ­
I C'd t o  he ( I'll<' : 1 1-1  t n  gun < l s  t o rt iu1 1sl .1 nht :1 i 1 1 ·  
<' < 1 ,  1loC':-: n o t  : 1 ppl�- I n  goods l'C'1 1 1 1 1 in1 1r< l ,\' t a k­
' n. : 1 1 1 1 1  t h a t  c lnm:t;.:-<'s for t l 11• t'Oll \ l'l':<l n 1 1  
of :-: 1 1 1  h ;.:nml:-1 c·a n bl' 1·r1·n Yt' l '< ' < l only :1 f l 1 • r  
1•0 1 1 Yld lu1 1  o f  t h C'  felon, : l t l < l  O l l i )  f1·n 1 1 1  t l l l '  
1 11•1·sn11 c•nn n• rt i n ;:: or rcfu:-:lng t o  t ll ' lh Pr t hp 
;.«1nds n l' l < ' I' l h : 1 t t l 1 1 1 l' I n  t he> p 1·ci;1• 1 1 t < ' : I S<', 
I hi' fl ' lnll  W : I H  <'Oll Y k l l•1l, hil t t Ill' 1•1 1 1 1 n•r:-:ln11 
1 1 1 1 i l  i;nh• h: 1 1 l  t n l  en pl : H ·c• hl'fnrr t h !' 1•011 v l1'­
t ln1 1. ' l'hb J:rn 11 1 1 <1 wn:-1 111·nha hlJ nnt t : i l\l'll 
J ipron• t he• 1< 1 1 1n·rmr c·n1nt , ns It IH n o t  no· 
t l<-rrl I n  t h !' n p l 1 1 l n 1 1  d1•l l 1 Pn•d 1 1 1  t hn l  1•1 1 1 1 r t . 
1 :1 1 1 1  not qui t !' 1 ' 11 • 1 1r  w l 11•t l 1 1 •r  t h l11 l l l : l J not 
1 11 •  t h <' 1•. i�t l n i:  law nf J·: n i.: l n n d ,  n n d \\ hrt h-· 
f'I' 1 1 1 1  1 l f ' t l 1 1 1 1  I l k!'  t h !' flr<'KP l l l  rnnld al n n y  
1 1 1 1 11• h e  1 1 1 11 l n l : 1 l 11!'<l t lwre. H J  t l w a 1 11'1 P 1 1 l  
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niimiion law a pei'son robbed could regain
his property only by an appeal of larceny
nfter conviction. The statute, 21 Hen.
VIII., gave the party robbed a right to im-
mediate restitution after conviction. Sever-
al decisions upon the act gave it a construc-
tion in conformity with the old law of ap-
peal. It was strictly held that the civil ac-
tion was merged in the felony. After con-
viction of the felon, the stolen goods could
be reclaimed even if sold in marliet overt,
and whoever sold them after that date was
deemed a tortious converter. But it has
been expressly decided that the owner who
liad prosecuted the thief to conviction, can-
not recover the value of his goods from one
who bought them from the thief, and sold
them again before conviction, even with no-
tice. 2 Term R. 750. In the words of Chief
Justice Best, In another case (Simpson v.
\\'oodhert, 2 Car. & P. 41): "The law is
(his: you must do your duty to the public
Iiefore you seek a benefit to yourself; and
tlien there is no necessity for a civil action.
'l.'he decisions, says he, go not only to the
case of an action against the felon, but also
against persons who derive title under him.
If such actions could be maintained, there
would be no criminal prosecutions." The
authority of these and similar decisions has
been much shalien, and certainly much nar-
I'owed in their application, by the case of
Peer v. Humphrey, 2 Adol. & E. 495, de-
cided in 1S35. There the court of king's
bench held, that in trover for oxen felo-
niously sold by a servant, their value might
be recovered from the bona fide purchaser
who had sold them again before conviction.
In this case the authority and reasoning of
Lord Kenyon in 2 Term R. 750, were over-
ruled by his successor, the present Chief
.Tustice Deniuan.
But in my opinion, we are not called upon
to reconcile these cases, or to decide between
them, for whatever may be the law of Eng-
land, it is quite clear that these peculiar ex-
ceptions to the genei-al principle of the law, ob-
taining on special grounds of policy, have no
application within this state. Not only has the
foundation of the doctrine been removed by
the abolition of appeals of felony and of the
former statutoi'y provision of restitution, but
a contrary doctrine ha.s been expressly substi-
tuted. The English law established the uni-
versal rule that the felony excluded or sus-
pended the civil suit until after conviction.
Our Revised Statutes enact thus (part 3, c. 4,
tit. 1): "The right of any person injured by
felony, shall not in any case be merged in
such felony or be in any manner affected
tliereby." The first part of the section may.
perhaps, by a strict construction, be confined
to the action against the felon himself, which
was formerly held to be merged in the felony;
but the concluding words have no force or
effect unless they extend to cases like the
present. Chief Justice Best, as just cited,
says: "The decisions go not only to the case
of an action again.st the felon, but also against
persons claiming under iiim." As the action
against the felon is restored by the first part
of the section, so tliat against persons claim-
ing under him must be comprehended under
the final words: "the rights of any pereon in-
jured by any felony, shall not be in any man-
ner affected thereby." The abrogation of the
whole policy of the English law on this head,
removes the only exception before known to
the general right of the real owner to follow
his property and recover its value in any
hands whatever. But we need not rest merely
on the general terms of this enactment. The
whole policy of the statute of restitution up-
on which the English decisions stand, has
been altered in our statute. Instead of requir-
ing a conviction before stolen goods are re-
stored, lest (as Hale and Blackstone say) "fel-
onies should be made up and healed," our Re-
vised Statutes direct that "upon receiving sat-
isfactory proof of the title of any owner, the
magistrate who shall take the examination of
an accused person, may order the same to be
delivered to such owner." And again: "If
stolen property shall come into the custody of
any magistrate, upon satisfactory proof of the
title of any owner thereof, it shall be deliv-
ered to him." Finally, the English statute is
in substance re-enacted, with this remarkable
addition: "If the property shall not before
have been delivered to the owner." These
several provisions, taken in connection with
the abolition of appeals of felony and of the
merger of the civil remedy in the criminal
prosecution, shew, I think, conclusively, that
the English doctrine on this head, even in the
more limited sense as laid down by Chief Jus-
tice Denman, has no application in this state.
If this view of the subject be correct, our
own legislation here affoi'ds another instance
of the gradually but increasing respect for the
rights of original ownership against all other
claims (even that of an innocent and appar-
ently lawful possessor), which has marked the
advance of civilized life. Chancellor Kent (2
Kent, Comm. 320) has drawn a striking and
philosophical outline of this advance. He has
sliewn how, in the earlier ages of the Roman,
the German, and the English law, the rights
of the first proprietor of things moveable,
when divested of his possession, had little
preference over that of any other possessor un-
der color of right; and how the respect for the
rights of property kept on increasing in effi-
cacy with social improvement and the corre-
sponding advance of the law, from rudeness
to refinement.
3. It has also been urged before us that
where merchandise is abroad iu a foreign
state, the necessities of commerce require that
possession shall be regarded as conclusive evi-
dence of property in respect to a purchaser
who acts in good faith. It has also been ar-
gued that the cause of action arising in Mary-
land, where the goods were sold, tlie decision
of this cause might be governed or modified by
the law of that state. The law of England,
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common law a person robbed could regain 
his property only by an appeal of larceny 
after conviction. Tbe statute, 21 Hen. 
Y U L ,  gave tbe party rol.Jbed a rigllt to im­
mediate restitution after conviction. Sever­
al decisions upon the act gave it a construc­
tion in conformity with the old law of ap­
peal. It  was strictly held that the civil ac­
tion was merged in the felony. After con­
viction of the felon, the stolen goods could 
be reclaimed even if  sold in market overt, 
and whoever sold them after that date was 
<1eemed a tortious converter. But it bas 
been expressly decided that the owner who 
had prosecuted the thie f  to conviction, can­
not recover the value of his goods from one 
who bought them from the thief, and sold 
them again before conviction, even with no­
t ice. :::! Term R. 750. In the words of Chief 
Justice Best, in another case (Simpson v. 
\Ynodhcrt, 2 Car. & P. 41) : "'l'be law is 
t his:  you must do your duty to the public 
l >cfore you seek a benefit to yourself; and 
1 hen there is no necessity for a civil action. 
The decisions, says he, go not only to the 
case of an action against the felon, but also 
aµ;ainst persons who derive title under hiD.l. 
If such actions could be maintained, there 
would be no criD.linal prosecutions." The 
authority of these and similar decisions has 
been much shaken, and certainly much nar­
rowed in their application. by the case o f  
Peer v .  Humphrey, 2 Ado!. & E. 403, de­
cided in 1833. There the court of king's 
bench held, that in t�ver for oxen felo­
uiou ly sold by a sen·ant, their value might 
be recovered from the bona fide purchaser 
who bad sold them again before conviction. 
In this case the authority and reasoning of 
Lord Kenyon in 2 Term R. 750, were over­
ruled by bis successor, the present Chief 
Justice Denman. 
But in my opinion. we are not called upon 
to reconcile these cases, or to decide between 
them, for whatever may be tbe law of Eng­
land, it is quite clear that these peculiar ex­
ceptions to the general principle of the law, ob­
taining on special grouncls of policy, have no 
application within tllis state. Not only bas the 
foundation of the doctrine been removed by 
the abolition of appeals of felony and of tile 
former statutory provision of restitution, but 
a contrary doctrine bas been expressly substi­
tuted. The English law established the uni­
,·ersal rule that the felony excluded or sus­
veuded the civil suit until after conviction. 
Our Ilevised Statutes enact thus (part 3, c. 4, 
tit. 1) : "The right of any person injured by 
felony, shall not in any case be merged in 
such felony or be in any manner a ffected 
thereby." The first part of the section may, 
perhaps, by a strict construction, be confined 
to the :::.ction against the felon himself, which 
was formerly held to be merged in the felony ; 
but tbe concluding words have no force or 
effect unless they extend to cases like the 
pre ent. Chief Justice Best, as just cited, 
says: "'.rbe decisions go not only to the case 
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o f  an action against the felon, hut also against 
persons claimiug under him." As the ac1 ion 
against the felon is restol'ed by tbe fil'St vart 
of tbe section, so that against persons claim­
ing under him must l.Je cowprehended under 
the final words:  "the rights of any person in­
jured by any felony. shall not be in any man­
ner aJiected thereby." The abrogation of t he 
whole policy of the English law on this bead, 
removes the only exception before known to 
tbe general right of the real owner to follow 
bis property and recover its value in any 
bands whatever. But we need not rest merely 
on the general terms of this enactment. The 
whole policy of tbe statute of restitution up­
on which the English decisions stand, bas 
been altered in our statute. Instead of requir­
ing a conviction before stolen goods are re­
stored, lest (as Hale and Blackstone say) "fel­
onies should be D.lade up and healed," our Re­
v ised Statutes direct that "upon receiving sat­
isfactory proof of the title of any owner, the 
magistrate who shall take the examination of 
an accused person, may order the same to be 
delivered to such owner." And again: "If 
stolen property shall come into the custody of 
any magistrate, upon satisfactory proof of the 
title of any owner thereof, it shall be deliv­
ered to him." Finally, the English tatute is 
in substance re-enacted, with this rem::ukable 
addition: "If tbe property shall not before 
have been delivered to tile owner." These 
several provisions, taken in connection with 
the abolition of appeals of felony and of the 
merger of the civil remedy in the criminal 
prosecution, shew, I think, conclusively, that 
the English doctrine on this bead, even in the 
more limited sense as laid down by Chief Jus­
tice Denman, bas no application in this state. 
I f  this view of the subject be correct, our 
own legislation here a ffords another instance 
of the gradually but increasing respect for the 
rights of original ownership against all other 
claims (e>en that of an innocent ::r nd appal'­
ently lawful possessor), which bas marked tbe 
advance of civilized life. Chancellor I�ent (2 
Kent, Comm. 320) bas drawn a striking and 
philosophical outline of this advance. He bas 
shewn bow, in the earlier ages of the Roman, 
the German, and the English law, the iigbts 
of the first proprietor of things moveable, 
when divested of bis possession, hacl little 
preference over that of any other po,;sessor un­
der color of right;  and how the respect for the 
rights of property kept on increasing in effi­
cacy with social improvement and the corre­
sponding advance of the law, from rudenes,; 
to refinement. 
3. It bas also been urged before us that 
where merchandise is abroacl in a foreign 
state, the necessities of commerce require that 
possession shall be regarded as conclusive evi­
dence of property in respect to a purchaser 
who acts in good faith. It bas also been ar­
gued tba t thC' cause of action ru·ising in :\Iary­
land, where the goods were solcl, the decision 
of this cause might be governed or modified by 
the law of that state. The la'" of England, 
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as well as that of all those states where the
common law forms the ground work of the
local jm-isprudence, considers all pereonal ac-
tions, whether ex contractu or ex delicto,
wherever the cause of action arose, as tran-
sitory, and subject to the law of the jurisdic-
tion under which the parties are Utigant. It
is a principle of the same law, peiTading the
jm-isprudence of almost all civilized countries,
that "moveables are governed by the law of the
domieil of the owner." Lord Loughborough
has stated the rule thus: "It is a clear prop-
osition tliat personal property has no locality,"
which paradoxically sounding maxim he ex-
plains to mean, that personal property "is sub-
ject to the law which governs the person of
the owner, both in respect to its disposition
and its transmission." 2 H. Bl. 690. Our
American decisions of interconfederated law
(if I may use the phrase), fully sustain this
principle. In cases of foreign contiacts, the
law of the place of contract is recognized as to
the force and effect of the contract itself; be-
cause it is presumed to enter into the consid-
eration of the parties, to fonu a part of the
bargain, and to interpret its language and
meaning. In other respects, rights as to per-
sonal property are seldom governed by the lex
rei sita;, or that of the jurisdiction whore it
may accidentally be. whilst the owner dwells
and the suit is brought elsewhere. Now, this
is not a case of contract, but a question of
ownei-ship and conversion. The same nile,
therefore, must be applied to the sale of these
goods in Baltimore as if they had been sold
in Albany. There may possibly be cases where
the same reasons of justice and policy which
give authority in our courts to the foreign lex
loci contractus may give similar weight to the
lex rei sitie, so as to make the foreign law of
the temporary locality of the moveables, vary
that of the owner's domieil. The extent or the
limitations of such exceptions to the general
law we are not now called upon to decide.
We have no evidence that the local law of
Slaryland differs as to this matter from our
own. The naked fact, that the goods were
sold in another state, can have no effect to
change or vary those rights of personal prop-
perty which are prescribed by that which, in
this case, is alike the law of the owner's dom-
ieil, and of the jmisdiction In which he as-
serts these rights. The judgment of the su-
preme court should be affirmed.
On the question being put. Shall this judg-
ment be reversed? the members of the court
divided as follows:
In the athnu.itive— Senators FURMAN,
HAWKINS, HULL, MAYNARD, WORKS
-5.
In the negative— THE CHANCELLOR, and
Senators CLARK, EDWARDS, HUNT, HUN-
TER, .TONES, H. A. LIVINGSTON, NICHO-
LAS, PAIGE, PECK, POWERS, SKINNER.
SPRAKER, STERLING, VERPLANCK,
WAGER— 16.
Whereupon the judgment of the supreme
coiurt was affirmed.
J.
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as well as that of all those states where the 
common law forms the ground work of the 
local jurisprudence, considers all personal ac­
tions, whether ex contractu or ex delicto, 
wherever the cause of action arose, as tran­
sitory, and subject to the law of the j urisdic­
tion under which the parties are litigant. It 
is a principle of the sarue law, pervading the 
jurisprudence of almost all civilized countries, 
that "moveables are governed by the law of the 
domicil of the owner." Lord Loughborough 
has stated the rule thus: "It is a clear prop­
osition that personal property has no locality," 
which paradoxically sounding ruaxim he ex­
plains to mean, that personal property "is sub­
ject to the law which governs the person of 
the owner, both in respect to its disposition 
and its transmission." 2 H. Bl. 690. Our 
American decisions of interconfederated law 
(if I ruay u ·e the phrase), fully sustain this 
principle. In cases of foreign contracts, the 
law of the place of contract is recognized as to 
the force and effect of the contract itself; be­
cause it is presumed to enter into the consid­
eration of the parties. to form a part of the 
bargain, and to i nterpret its language and 
meaning. In other respects, rights as to per­
sonal property are seldom governed by the lex 
rei sitre, or that of the jurisdiction where it  
may aceidentally be, whilst the owner dwells 
a nd tbe suit is brought elsewhere. Now, this 
is not a case of contract, but a question of 
ownership and conversion. The same rnle, 
therefore, must be applied to the sale o.f these 
D i g itizea by 
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goods i n  Baltimore as i f  they bad been sold 
in Albany. There may possibly be eases where 
the same reasons of justice and policy which 
give authority in our courts to the foreign lex 
loci contractus may give similar weight to the 
lex rei sitre, so as to make the foreign law of 
the temporary locality of the moveables, vary 
that of the owner's domicil. The extent or the 
limitations of such exceptions to the general 
law we are not now called upon to decide. 
We have no evidence that the local law of 
:Maryland differs as to this matter from our 
own. The naked fact, that the goods were 
sold in another state, can have no effect to 
change or vary those rights of personal prop­
perty which are prescribed by that which, in 
this case, is alike the law of the owner's dom­
icil. and of the jurisdiction in which he as­
se1'ts these rights. The judgment of the su­
preme court should be affinned. 
On the question being put, Shall this judg­
ment be reversed ?  the members of the court 
divided as follows : 
I n  the affirmative- Senators FURMAN, 
HA 'IYK INS, HULL, MAYNARD, WORK 
-5. 
In the negative-THE CHANCELLOR, and 
Senators CLARK, E D W  A.RDS, JIUNT. HUN­
TEI:., .JONES, H. A. LIYINGSTON, N ICHO­
LAS. PAIGE, PECK, POWERS, SKINNER, 
SPRAKER, STEHLING, VERPLANCK, 
WAGER-16. 
Whereupon the judgment of the supreme 
court was affirmed. 
J. 
O ri i r  I fror 1 
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GRIFFITH V. FOWLER.
(18 Vt. 390.)
Supreme Court of Vermont. Windsor. Jiily
Term. 1846
Trespass for tiiking a shearing machine.
The case was stibiuitted upon a statement of
tacts, agreed to by the parties, from which it
appeared, that in 1836 the defendant, beinir
the owner of the machine in question, lent
it to one Freeman, to use in his business as
a clothier, who was to pay a yearly rent tliere-
for, and in whose possession it remained un-
til the year 1841, when it was sold at sheriffs
sale, on execution, as the property of Free-
man, and one Iliclimond became the pur-
chaser; that Riclimond, in .Tanuary, 1842,
sold the machine to the plaintiff, wlio at the
same time purchased of Freeman the build-
ing, in which the macliine was situated, and
took possession tliereof; and that the defend-
ant, in rel)ruary, 1842, took the machine
from the plaintiff's possession, claiming it as
his property. The value of the machine was
admitted to be fifty (iollars. Upon tliese facts
the countycourt,— Hebakd, J., presiding, —
rendered judgment for the defendant. Ex-
ceptions by plaintiff.
Tracy & Converse, for plaintiff. /. S.
Marcy, for defendant.
KEDFIELD, J. The only question re-
served in this case is, whether a title to per-
sonal property, acquired by purchase at sher-
iff's sale, is alasolute and indefeasible against
all the world, or whether such sale only con-
veys the title of tlie debtor.
There has long been an opinion, very gen-
eral, I think, in this state, not only among
the profession, but the people, that a pur-
chaser at sheriff's sale acquires a good title,
witliout reference to that of the debtor, that
such a sale, like one in market ocert in Eng-
land, conveys an absolute title. But, upon
examination, I am satisfied that this opinion
acts upon no good basis.
So far as can now be ascertained, this opin-
ion, in this state, rests mainly upon a dictum
in the case of Heacock v. Walker, 1 Tyl. 338.
There are many reasons, why this dictum
should not be regarded, if the matter were
strictly res Integra. It was a declaration of
the chief justice in chaigingthe jury. Cases
were then tried by the jury at tlie bar of this
court, as matter of riglit, and in course, and
before the law of the case had been discussed
and settled by the court. In all tliese respects
these trials differed essentially from jury tri-
als at the bar of the higher courts in West-
minster Hall. Such trials, there, being only
matter of favor, granted in tlie most iuiport-
ant cases, and after the law of the cases has
been fully discussed, and settled by the court.
The law given to the jury, in the two cases,
will of course partake sometliing of the char-
acter of the respective form and deliberation
of the trials. Under our former practice, law
laid down in tlie course of a jury trial, un-
less when questions were reserved and far-
GEiF.rEus.ruop. — 5
ther dist'ussed upon motions for new trials,
was not much esteemed, even when it was
upim the very point in dispute. But espe-
cially, the dicta of the judge, who tried the
case, and who must, of necessity, somewhat
amplify the bare text of the law, in order to
show the jury the reason upon which it was
based, could not be esteemed, as anything
more than the hastily formed opinion of the
judge — mere argument, to satisfy some jios-
sible. or apprehended, doubt of the jury in
regaid to the soundness of the main proposi-
tion laid down. Such was the dictum re-
ferred to. That, which was said of Chief
Justice Tilghman, of Pennsylvania, is un-
doubtedly good praise, when said of any
judge; — "He made no dicta, and he
*393 ^regarded none." There are sullicient
reasons, why the dictum should not be
regarded, if the thing were new. And we
do not esteem the long standing of the
dictum of any importance, unless it can be
shown, that it has thus grown into a gener-
ally received and established law, or usage;
which, we think, is not the case in regard to
this. For this court has, within the last ten
years, repeatedly held, that a sheriff's sale
was of no validity to pass any but the title
of the debtor, when no actual delivery of the
thing sold was made by the sheriff, at the
time of sale. Austin v. Tilden et al., 14 Vt.
325. Boynton v. Kelsey, Caledonia County,
l.So6. S. P., l^amoiUe County, 1841. Since
the first of these cases was decided, tlie
main question, involved in this case, has
been considered doubtful in this state, and
we now feel at liberty to decide it, as we
think the law should be, that is, as it is set-
tled at common law.
But the idea, that some analogy existed
between a sheriff's sale and a sale in market
overt is certainly not peculiar to the late
Chief Justice Tyler. This opinion seems at
one time to have prevailed in Westminster
Hall, to some extent, at least; for in tlie case
of Farrant v. Thompson, 5 B. & A. 82(3, [7
E. C. L. 449,] wliich was decided in the
King's Bench in 1822, nearly 20 years later
than that of Ileacoek v. Walker, one of the
points raised in the trial of the case before
Chief Justice Abbott was, that the title of
the purchaser, being acquired at sheriff's sale,
was good against all the world, tlie same as
•that of a purchaser in market ocert. This
point was overruled, and a verdict passed
for the plaintiff, but with leave to move to
set it aside, and to enter a nonsuit, upon
this same ground, with one other. This
point was expressly argued by Sir James
Scarlet, — who was certainly one of the most
eminent counsel, and one of the most dis-
criminating men of modern times, — in the
King's Bench, and was decided by the court
not to be w ell taken. Since that time I do
not find, that the question has been raised
there.
It seems to be considered in Massachusetts,
and in New York, and in many of the other
states, that nothing, analogous to markets
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MAR KET O VEH.T IN TIIE UN I T E D  STATES. 17 
GRI FFITH v. FOWLER. 
(18 Vt. 390.) 
Supreme Court of Vermont. Windsor. Jilly 
Term. lR-J� 
Trespass for taking a shearing machi n e. 
fhe case was submit Led upon a statement of 
facts, agreed to by the parLies, from w h ic�1 it 
appeared , that in 1836 the defendant, bemg 
t he o w ner of the machine in q uestion , lent 
it to one F reeman, to use in his business as 
a cloth ier, who was to pay a yearly rent there­
for, and i n  whose poS!'WSSion it  remained u n ­
t i l  t h e  year 1841,  w hen it was sold at sheriff's 
sale, on execution, as the property of F ree­
man, and one Uichmond beca me the pur­
chaser; that Richmond, i n  .fanuary, 1842, 
sold the mach i n e  Lo the p l a i nti ff , w h o  at the 
same time purchased of Freeman the bui ld­
i ng. in w h ich the mach ine was si tuated , and 
took possession thereof; and that the defend­
ant, in Fehruary, 1842, took the machine 
from the plainti ff's possession , clai mi ng it  as 
his property. The value of the mach i ne was 
adm itted to be fi fty dollars. Upon these fads 
the con nty court,-HEBARD, J . ,  presidi n g,­
rentlered judgm ent for the defendant. Ex· 
cepti ons by plaintiff. 
Tracy & Converse, for plai ntiff. J. S. 
Marcy, for defendant. 
REDFIELD, J. The only question re­
served in this case is,  w hether a title to per­
sonal property, acquired by p u rchase at sher­
iff's sale, is absolute and indefeasible agai nst 
all the world, or whether such sale only con­
veys the title of the debto r .  
There has long been an opi nion , very gen­
eral, I think , in this state, not only among 
the profession, but the prople, that a pn r­
chaser at sheriff's sale acqui res a good t i t le, 
w ithout reference to that of the debtor, that 
such a sale, like one in market overt in Eng­
land, conv eys an absol ute title. Hut,  upon 
exa m i nation, I a m  sat isfied that this opinion 
acts upon no good basis. 
So far as can now be ascertained , t h is opin­
ion, in this state, rests ma i nly upon a dictum 
in the case of Heacock v. Walker, 1 Tyl . 338. 
There are many reasons , w hy this dictum 
shou ld not be regarded , if the matter were 
sLri ctly res integra . It was a declaration of 
the chief ju stice in charging the j u ry. Cases 
were then tried by the j u ry at the bar of this 
cou rt, as matter of right, and in cou rse , and 
before the law of the case had been discussE'.d 
and settled by the court. In all these respecls 
these trials d i ffered essenLially from j u ry tri­
als at the bar of the higher courts in West­
w r n ster Hall.  Such trials, there, be i ng on ly 
matter of favor, granted i n  the most i m port­
ant cases, and after th e  law of the cases has 
been fully discussed, and settled by the co11 1 t .  
The law gi ven to t h e  j ury , i n  the t w o  cases, 
will  of cou rse partake something of the char­
acter of tbe respecti ve form and deliberat10n 
of the trials. Under o u r  former practice, Jaw 
laid down in the cou rse of a j u ry trial, u n­
less w hen question s were reserved and far-
GJU.F. PEHi!· PHOP.-2 
TE NET ARCH VE 
ther d iscussed upon motions for new trials, 
was not m uch esteemed, even whe n it was 
upon the very point in d ispute. B u t  espe­
cially, the dicta of the judge, who tried the 
case, and who must, of necessity, somewhat 
a m p l i f.l' the bare text of Lhe Jaw, in onler to 
show lhe j u ry the reason upon which it was 
based , could not be esteemed, as any thing 
more than the hasti ly formed opinion or thP 
j udge-mere argument, to sati s fy some pvs­
sible. or apprehernlecl, douht of the jmy i n  
reganl to the soundness of the m a i n  proposi­
tion laid down. S uch was the dictn111 re­
ferred to. That, which was said of Chief 
Justice Ti lghman, of Pen nsyl vania, i s  u n ­
doubtedly good praise, when said of any 
j u clge ;- " H e  made no dir;ta, and he 
*393 *rrg-ar<led none. " There are su!licient 
reason s, why the dictnm should not be 
regard ed , i f  the th i n g were new. A n d  we 
do not esteem the long stan d i ng of the 
dictum of any importance, u nless it can be 
shown, that i t  has th us gro w n  i nto a gen er­
ally received a n d  established law, or 1 1 s; 1 ge ; 
w h i c h ,  we t h i n k ,  is not the case i n  regard to 
this. For this court 11as, w ithin the last ten 
years, repeated ly held, that a sheriff' s sale 
was of no validity to pass any but the Litle 
of the debtor, when no actual deli very of the 
thing sold was made by the sheriff, at the 
t im e of sale. A u st i n  v. Tilden et a l . ,  1 4  Vt. 
3�5. Boy n ton v .  Kelsey, Caledonia Couuty, 
1036. S. P . ,  Lamo i l le Cou nty, HHl . ..... ince 
the first of these cases was decidrd, t he 
main q u estion, in volved in th is case, bas 
been considered doubtful in this state, anll 
we no w feel at li berty to decide it, as we 
thrnk the Jaw shou l d  be, that is, as it 1s set­
tled at common law. 
But the idea, that some anal ogy ex i sted 
between a sheriff's sale and a sale in 11w1 /;et 
o vert is certai n ly not pecul iar to the late 
Chief J usl ice '.ryler. T h i s  opinion seems at 
one t i m e  to have prevailetl in Westmi nster 
Hal l ,  to some extent, at least ; for in the case 
of l<' arrant v.  Thom pson , 5 13. & A. ti:.lli, [7 
E. C. L. 449,] w h ich was decided in t i le 
K i ng's Bench i n  1822, nearly 20 ) ears later 
than that of Heacock v. ·walker, one of the 
points raised in the trial of the c.ise hefure 
Cbief Justice Abbott was, that tlw !1t le  of 
the pu rchaser, being· acq u 1 red at sh�ri ff ' s  :,ale, 
w as good agai nst all the worhl, the same as 
•that of a pu rchaser in market ocert. T h is 
poi n t  was overrnled, and a verd ict passed 
for the plaintiff, but with leave to move to 
set it aside, and to en ter a nonsuit, upon 
this same ground, with one otl.ier. This 
point was expressly a rg ued by Sir J ames 
Scarlet,-who was cer ta i n ly one of the most 
e m i nent counsel, and one of the most dis­
crim inat i ng men of modern t imes,-in the 
King's Bench, and was decided by the court 
not to be well taken. Si nce th at time I <.lo 
not find, that the question bas been raised 
there. 
It seems to be cons idered i n  Massach usetts, 
and in :New York. and in many of the other 
slates, that nothing, analogous to marl;,[:; 
...... r .::i. r . f. , , 
U N IV E R S ITY OF CA FO R N  A 
IS
prelijNuxart considerations.
ooert in England, exists in this country.
Dame v. Baldwin, 8 Mass. 518. Wlieel-
wriglit V. Depeyster, 1 Jolins. 480. 2 Kent
324, and cases there cited. Nothing of that
kind, surely, exists in tliis state, unless it be
a sheriff's sale. And if the practice of hold-
ing sales in market overt conclusive upon
the title existed in any of the states,
*it would be readily known. I con- *394
elude, therefore, that Chancellor Kent
is well founded in his opinion when he af-
firms, that the law of markets overt does not
exist in this country. lb.
It seems probable to me, that the idea of
the conclusiveness of a sheriff's sale upon the
title is derived from the effect of sales under
condemnations in the exchequer, for viola-
tions of the excise or revenue laws, and sales
in prize cases, in the Admiralty courts, eitlier
provisionally, or after condemnation. Hut
these cases bear but a slight analogy to
sheriffs sales in this country, or in England.
Those sales are strictly judicial, and are
merely carrying into specific execution a de-
cree of tlie court in rem, which, by univer-
sal consent, binds tl.e whole world.
.Soniettiing very similar to this exists, in
practice, in those countries, whirh are gov-
erned by the civil law; which is the tact in
one of the American states, and in the prov-
inces of Canada, and in most, if not all, the
continental states of Europe. The projierty,
or what is claimed to be the properly, of the
debtor is seized and libelled for sale, and a
general monition served, notifying all liaving
adversary claims to interi>ose them before the
Court, by a certain day limited. In this re-
spect the proceedings are similar to proceed-
ings in prize courts, and in all other courts
pro- ceding iw rem. If no claim is interposed,
the pioperty is condemned, by default, and
sold; if sucli claims are made, tlicy are con-
te>ted, and settled by the judgment of the
court, and the rights of properly in the thing
aie thus conclusively settled before the sale.
i5ul with us nothing of this character ex-
ists in regard to sheriff's sales. Even the
right to summon a jury to inquire info con-
flicting claims de bene e«ve, as it is called in
England, and in the American states, where
it exists, has never been resorted to in this
state. And in England, where such a pro-
ceeding is common, — Impey 153; Dalton 146;
Farr et al. v. Newman et al., 4 T. R. tJ21, — ■
it does not avail the sheriff, even, except to
excuse him from exemplary damages. Lat-
kow v. Earner, 2 H. Bl. 437. Glossop v.
Pole, 3 M. & S. 175. It is plain, then, that
a sheriff's sale is not a judicial sale. Jf it
were, no action could be brought against the
sheriff, for selling upon execution property
not belonging to the debtor.
With us an excution is defined to be the
putting one in possession of that, which he
has already acquired bv judgment of
*395 law. *Co. Lit. 154 (7,"(Tlioiiias' Ed.
405.) But the judgment is of a sum
in gross "to be levied of the goods and chat-
tels of the del)tor," which the sheriff is to
flnil at liis peril. The sale upon the execu-
tion is only a transfer, by ojieration of law,
of what the debtor might iiiniself transfer.
It is a principle of the law of property, as
old as the Institutes of .lustinian. Utnemo
plus juris in alium transferre potest, quam
ipse habet.
Tlie comparison of slieriff's sales to the
sale of goods lost, or estrays, in pursuance of
statutory provisions, which exist in many of
the stales, does not, in my opinion, at all
hold good. Those sales undoubtedly transfer
the title to the thing, as against all claims of
antecedent property in any one, if the stat-
utory provisions are strictly complied with;
but that is in the nature of a forfeiture, arul
is strictly a proceeding in rem, wherein the
linder of the lost goods is constituted the
tribunal of condemnation.
There being, then, no ground, upon which
we thiidc we shall be justified in giving to a
sherilt's sale the effect to convey to the pur-
chaser any greater title, than that of the
debtor, the judgment of the court below is
allirmed.
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
7:
37
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/u
c2
.a
rk
:/1
39
60
/t
90
86
js
3p
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
PRELUllX �\. RY CON' IDERATTOX . 
overt i n  England, exists in this  co n nt ry. 
Da m e v. Baluwin, 8 Mass. 518. Wheel­
wright v .  Depeyster, 1 Johns. 4 0. 2 Kent 
324, and cases there cited. Xothing of that 
kind, su rely, exists in this state, unless it be 
a sheriff's sale. A.ntl if the practice of hold­
i n g  sales in market overt concl u s i \'e upon 
the title existed in any of the states, 
*it would be read ily k n o w n .  I con- *394 
cl uue, therefore, that Chancellor Ken t, 
is well founded i n  h i s  opi n ion when he af­
firms, that t he law of markets overt does not 
e"Xist i n  this counln'. lb.  
It  serms prouabie to m e, that the idea of 
the conclus i \·eness of a shPriff's sale upon the 
title is deri ved from the effect of sales u nder 
condemnations i n  the excheq u er, for viola­
t ions of the e"Xcise or re\ enue laws, and sales 
in prizP cases, i n  the _\.dm i ralty cou rts, either 
pt'O\'i iona lly , or a!Ler condemnation.  But 
t l 1ese casPs bear but a slight an alogy to 
� heri ff's sales in t hi s cou ntry, or in Engl and. 
'l'hose sales are st ricLly fuclieial, a ncl are 
merely ca rry i ng i n to specific execution a de­
cree of the co u rt in rem, w h ic h .  by u n iver­
sal consent, binds tl :e whole world. 
:-;omething very similar to thi exists, i n  
practice, in tho-;e countries, w hkh are gov­
erned by the c i Y i l  l a w ;  wh ich is  the fact i n  
one of tha A merica n states, a n d  i n  t h e  prov­
i nces of Canada, and i n  mo�t. if not a l l ,  t he 
con t i n e ntal states of Eu rope. The p roperty, 
or what is cla i med to be the propeny. of the 
th·btur is srized an<! l i belled for salr. and a 
l!t' l l '  rnl 11101 1 i t10n St'rved, notifying all having 
a i l , Pr",ll'Y claims to interpose t lH'm before the 
c11 1 1rt, by a certa in day l i l ll iled . In this re­
spect the p roceed i ngs are sim ilar io proceed­
i n gs i n  prize courts, and i n  all  oth e1 courts 
pro e:ell i ng i1� rem . If no claitn is interposed, 
the p1 operty is ('Ondem ned, by defau l t, ,  and 
sol d ;  if such clai ms ani made. they are con­
te,..t1•d, and sellletl by the j u1lgment of the 
t·o1 1 1  t, an1I  the rights of properly in the thing 
at e ti.us cuncl 1 1si vely settled before the sale. 
B 1 1 t  with us nut,h i n g  of this character ex­
ists in reg· irJ to sheriff's sales. Even the 
D i g itized by 
I JTE RNET A R C H  VE 
right to su mmon a j ury to inyuire into con­
tlictin g claims de be11e es,e, as it  is called i n  
E 1Jglaml , and i n  the American statP , where 
it rxists. has never ueen resorted to in this 
state. } .. ntl i n  E ngland, wlwre such a pro­
ceedi ng is common,-Im pey 153 ; Dalton 146 ;  
Farr et al .  v. Xewman et ; 1 1 . ,  4 T .  R. ()2 1.­
it does not ava i l  the sheriff, even, e"XCe]'t to 
excuse him from exemplary cl a 1 1 1 : ige . Lat­
kow v. Eamer, 2 II .  Bl. 437. Ulossop v .  
Polr, 3 M. & S. 175. It is  plai n ,  then, thnt 
a sheriff's i;ale is not a j udicial sale. Jf it 
wrre, no action eould be hro 1 1g ht agai nst the 
sheriff, for sel l i ng u pon execution property 
not belonging to the debtor. 
With u an excution is defined to br the 
putti n g one in possession of that, which ho 
has al ready acqu ired by j utlgment of 
*395 l a w .  *Co. Lit.  154 a, (Tho1 1 1as' Ed. 
405.) But the j udgment is of a sum 
in gross " t o  be IP\'ied of the gootls and chat­
tels of the debtor. •· which t he sheriff is to 
fi nd at bis peri l . The sale upon the execu­
tion is o n ly a transfer, b�· opPrat i on of law, 
of w hat the debtor might h i mspl f t ransfer. 
It is a principle of th<' la w of property, as 
old as the I nsti tutes of .J rn;t i nian . Ut nem.o 
plus juri in alium transftrre poti:st, fJlta lll 
ip e h abef. 
The comparison of sheri ff's sales to t he 
sale of goo1ls lost. or estrays, in  pursu ant'e of 
stat 1Jtory proY isw ns, w hich exist i n  many of 
the states, tloes not,  in my opinion.  at all 
hold l?<>otl. Those sale u ndoubtt•lll.r t1 a ns fl•r 
the title to the Lhi ng, as agamst all  clai n1s  of 
antecedent p roperty in a ny one, if the ::;tat­
utory prov isions are st ridly complied \\ 1 t h ; 
but that. is in the nat u re of a forfei tu re, au1l  
is strictly a proceeding in re m ,  w here i n the 
I i  nder of the Jost goods is constituletl the 
tri bu nal of condemnation. 
There being. the n ,  no ground , upon w h ich 
we t h i n k  we shall be j usti l1ed in giving to a 
sheritl's sale t.he effect to convey to the p u r­
chaser any greater title, than that of the 
debtor, the judgment of the court below is 
alfirmed. 
Ori ra l  tr n 
U N I  f E R  S I  FO N 
CONFUSION OF GOODS.
I'J
GATES V. RIFLE BOOM CO.
(38 N. W. 245, 70 Mich. 309.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. May 18, 1888.
Error to circuit court, Bay county; S. M.
Green, Judge.
Samuel G. M. Gates brought an action of
trover and conversion of a certain quantity
of wliite pine saw-logs against the Rifie
Boom Company. Judgment for defendant.
Plaintiff brings error.
Holmes & Collins, for appellant. Hanchett
& Stark, for appellee.
MORSE, J. The plaintiff, in his lumbering
operations, in 1882 cut over the line upon the
adjoining land of Rust Bros. & Co., aud there-
by secured and marked as his own about
135,000 feet of logs belonging to the latter.
These logs were mixed with the other logs
of pkiiutiff, and banked on the west branch
of the Rifle river. They were not nm out
tlie following spring, but remained in the roll-
way during the summer and fall of 1883. In
tliat year Rust Bros. & Co. sent some scalers
where the plaintiff's logs were, who selected
(lut, as best they could, logs of the same
(luality as those taken from the Rust lauds
by plaintiff, and about the same quantity,
and marked them with the stamp of Rust
Bros. & Co. Sucli logs then bore two brands,
tlie mark of plaintiff, "C. O. W.," and the
Rust mark, "7 R. 7." Under the usual con-
tract by plaintiff with the defendant boom
company these logs, intermingled with other
logs of the plaintiff, were driven down the
stream in the summer of 1SS4. and received
in the defendant's boom. The defendant was
notified by Rust Bros. & Co. not to deliver
the logs with the double marks upon them
to plaintiff. The boom company thereupon
delivered the double-marked logs, about l.j.3-
000 feet, to Rust Bros. & Co., who, finding
that more w'ere marked by their scalers than
they were entitled to, returned to plaintiff
20.590 feet of the same. The plaintiff', after
demanding these logs of the boom company,
and after its refusal to deliver them, brought
this suit in trover in the circuit court for the
county of Bay. The cause was there tried
liefore a jury, and verdict and judgment
passed for the defendant. The plaintiff in
this court assigns as error the following in-
stnictions given by the coiu-t: "If the plain-
tiff cut the logs innocently, supposing them
to be upon his own land, and mixed them
with his own so tliat they could not bo
identified, and after they became mixed with
liis own, so that the logs cut from Rust Bros.
>V: Co.'s lands could not be identified, then
Rust Bros. & Co. had the right to select
from the common mass a quantity of an aver-
age quality of their own, equal to the quan-
tity taken from their land." And also, in
the same connection, after having stated the
rule as to willful trespasses, instructing the
jury further as follows: "But a different rule
prevails where a party innocently mingles
his property with that of another, and wliere
it is undistinguishable, aud where the general
quality and character of tlie property is the
same, as in the case of the same kind of
logs, white pine, if you please, aud of the
same general quality as near as may be.
There, if the logs are confused, neither party
loses his own. B'oth parties have a right to
their own, and neither party being able to
distinguish his own, the i^arty whose prop-
erty has been mingled with another's prop-
erty by the act of that other party may take
so much of the common mass as he has
in it."
It was claimed by the plaintiff upon the
trial, and he so testified, that the logs taken
by Rust Bros. & Co. were of greater value
in quality than those cut by him from their
lauds. The quantity cut by him on the Rust
hinds was not claimed to be less than the
quantity taken by Rust Bros. & Co. It there-
fore became material to ascertain, upon the
trial, whether the plaintiff was a willful tres-
passer, or cut the logs innocently, in good
faith, believing that he was within the lines
of his own land. The court instructed the
jury as to the dift'erence between a willful
and an unintentional trespass, stating to
them, in substance, that if the trespass was a
willful one, if Gates knew he was cutting
the logs of Rust Bros. & Co., and so, know-
ing them not to be his, intermingled them
with his own that they could not be dis-
tinguished. Rust Bros. & Co. had a right to
take more than their own, and if, in order to
get all that belonged to them, and without
intending to take more than belonged to
them, they did take a better quality of logs
than they had lost, if they did not make the
selection with that view, the plaintiff could
not reco\'er for such excess in quality; but
if the plaintiff cut the logs, and marked and
mingled them with his own, in good faith,
believing them to be his own, then, if Rust
Bros. & Co. took more than they were en-
titled to, the plaintiff might recover the ex-
cess. The counsel for the plaintiff very ably
and forcibly contended in the argument here
that if the plaintiff was innocent of any
wrong, he was entitled to recover in this ac-
tion, if Rust Bros. & Co. took no more logs
in quality or quantity than were cut upon
their lands, the difference between the value
of the logs and the value of the standing tim-
ber, that Ivust Bros. & Co. could claim no
more than the value of the stumpage. He
argues that if Rust Bros. & Co., under the
same circum.stauces, had sued the plaintiff
in trover for the value of the timber so cut,
the measure of damages would have been the
value of the stumpage. and that they could
not have recovered what they obtained in
this suit, the value of the logs, representing
not only the value of the standing timber,
but also the worth of the labor of plaintiff
added thereto. Citing Ayres v. Hubbard, 57
Mich. 322, 23 N. W. Rep. 829. The object of
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CONF U�ION OF G OOD:-;. J �) 
GATES v. RI FLE B00:\1 CO. 
(38 �. W. 245, 70 Mich. 309.) 
Supreme Court of Midi igan. May 18. 188 . 
Er"ror to circuit court, Bay county ; S. M. 
Green, Judge. 
�amuel G. M. Gates brought an action of 
trover and conver ion of a certai n  quantity 
nf white pine saw-logs against tbe Rifle 
Boom Co111pany. Judgment for defendant. 
Plaintiff ··Jrings error. 
Holmes & Collins, for appellant. Hanchett 
& :-;tark, for appellee. 
:'IIOTISE, J. The plaintiff, in his lumbering 
opernrions, in 1882 cut over the line upon the 
atljoining land of Rust Bros. & Co., and there­
b�· secured and marked as his own about 
1:.::1,000 feet of logs belonging to tbe latter. 
Tllese logs were mLxed with the other logs 
of plaintiff, and banked on the west branch 
of tile I itle ri>er. They were not run out 
the following spring, but remained in tile roll­
way during the summer and fall of 18 3. I n  
that year Rust Bros. & Co. sent some scalen; 
where the plaintiff's logs were, who selected 
onr. as best tlley <:oukl, logs of the same 
qual ity as tllose taken from the Rust lands 
by plaintiff, and about the same quantity, 
and marked them with the stamp of Rust 
llro . & Co. Suell logs then bore two brands, 
tile mark of plaintiff, "C. 0. W.," and the 
nust mark, "7 R. 7." Under t lle usual con­
tract by plaintiff witll the defendant boom 
1 ·ompan�· these logs, intermingled with other 
Jo�" of the plaintiff, were dri'l"en down the 
�tream in the summer of J SS-!. and recei'l"ed 
in the defendant's boom. The defendant was 
notified by Ru>;t Bros. & Co. not to cleli'l"er 
the logs with the double marks upon them 
to plaintiff. The boom company thereupon 
delivered the double-marked logs, about 133-
noo feet, to Rust Bros. & Co., who. finding 
t 11at more were marked by their scalers tbau 
they were entitled to, returned to plaintiff 
20.:i90 feet of the same. The plaintiff, after 
demanding these logs of the boom company, 
and after its refusal to deli>er them, brought 
this suit in trover in the circuit court for the 
county of Bay. The cause was there tried 
hefore a jury, and verdict and j udgment 
passed for the defendant. The plaintiff i n  
1 his court assigns a s  error tbe following in­
>:tructions gi'l"en by the court : "If tlle plaiu­
t i ff cut the logs innocently, supposing tllem 
to be upon his own laud, and mixed them 
\\' i tb his own so tllat they could not I.Jc 
i1lrntified, and after they became mixed with 
his own, so that the logs cut from Rust Bros. 
& Co.'s lands could not be identified, then 
nu t Bros. & Co. had the right to select 
fnom the common mass a quantity of an aver­
age quality of their own, equal to the quan­
t i ty taken from their land." And also, i n  
the same connection, after having stated the 
rule as to willful trespa >;C . instructing the 
jury further as follows : "But a di fferent rule 
[ 
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prevails where a party in nocently m i u;..:lt·s 
bis property witb that of another, and where 
iL is undistinguishable, and where tbe ;..:l'ncral 
qunlity and character of the proper!�· is the 
same, as i n  the case of tlle same kiu<I of 
logos, white pine, i f  you please, anrl of t lle 
same general quality as near as way 1.Je. 
'l'here, if the logs are confu�ecl, nei tller party 
loses his 'Jwn.  Doth partie1'l have a right to 
their own, and neither party being al.Jle to 
distinguish bis own, the party whose prop­
erty has been mingled with another's prop­
erty by the act of that other varty may take 
so much of tbe common wuss as lie llas 
in it!' 
I t  was claimed by the plaintiff upon the 
trial, and be so testified, that tlle logs taken 
by Rust Bros. & Co. were of greater value 
in quality tllan those cut by him from their 
lands. Tbe quantity cut by him on tlle ltust 
lands was not daimed to be less than the 
quantity taken by Ru t Bros. & Co. It  there 
fore bemme material to ascertain,  upou the 
trial. whether the plaintiff was a willful tres­
passer. or cut the logs i nnoceutly, in good 
fa ith, l>eliering- that he was within the lines 
of his own land. The court instructell t ile 
jury as to tlle difference between a wi llful 
and an unintentional trespass, stat iu� to 
them, in substance, that if the trespass was a 
willful one, if Gates knew lie was cuttin:.: 
t be logs of Hust Bros. & Co., and so, know­
ing t bem not to be his, intermingled thew 
w ith bis o\\·u tbat they could not be dis­
ti nguished, Rust Bros. & Co. had a ri.:.:ht to 
take more tban their own, and if, in onler to 
get all that belonged to them, and without 
intending to take more than belonged to 
them, they did take a better quality of logs 
than they had lost, if they did not make the 
�election with that view, the plaintiff could 
not recoYer for sucb excess in quality ; but 
if tbe plaintiff cut tbe logs, and marked and 
mingled them with bis own. in good faith. 
bel ieving tllcm to be his own, then, if  Rust 
Bros. & Co. took more tllau they were en­
titled to. the plaintiff might reco'l"er tlle ex­
cess. The counsel for t be plaintiff very ably 
and forcibly contended in the argument here 
that i f  the plaintiff was innocent of any 
wrong, he was entitled to recover in this ac­
tion, if Rust Bros. & Co. took no more logs 
in quality or quantity tbau were cut upon 
t heir lands, the difference between the Yalue 
of tbe logs and tlle value of tlle staudin.g tim­
ber, that Rust Bros. & Co. could cla i m  no 
more tbau the value of the stumpage. Ile 
argues that if  Rust Bros. & Co., under the 
>;ame circumstances, bad sued the pla intiff 
in tro'l"er for the 'l"alue of the timber so cut. 
the measure of damages would ha'l"e been the 
'l"alue of the stumpag-e. and that they could 
not ba•e recovered wllat tlley obtained i n  
this suit, tbe value o f  the log , representing 
not only the value of the standing timber, 
but also the worth of the labor of plaintiff 
added thereto. Citing Ayres v. Hubbard, 57 
�Iicb. 322, 23 N. W. Rep. 829. The object of 
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the law being, in both cases, to enable the
party, deprived of his property to receive
compensation therefor, he asks, "Why should
the man who strictly follows the law, and
adopts a legal course of procedure" to obtain
his property be in a worse position, and re-
ceive less than he who uses force or strategy
to recover possession of his proi^erty? He
claims that in this case the plaintiff added
innocently to the value of this timber the
cost of cutting and initting in the loss, which
was the sum of $2.2j per thousand feet, and
also the value of the driving and booming
charges. He estimates this value at over
?;300. But in the first place it seems to me
that this amount, the value of the plaintiff's
labor and expenses upon the logs, could not
be recovered in an action of trover. The
logs were still the proj^erty of Itust Bros. &
Co. The trespasser, however innocent, could
acquire no ijroperty in these logs, nor could
he acquire a lien upon them for such labor
and expense. The conversion of trees into
saw-logs by a trespasser does not change
the title to the property, nor destroy the
identity of the same. The owner of the land
is the owner of the logs, and the trespasser
has no title to them. Theiofore when he
regains his own, he has converted no property
of the trespasser to his own use. Stephen-
son v. Little, 10 Mich. 433; Final v. Backus,
18 Mich. 218-232; Mining Co. v. Hertin, 37
Mich. 337; Arpln v. Burch, G8 Wis. 610, 32
N. W. 681; Winchester v. Craig, 33 Mich.
20."5; Grant v. Smith, 26 Mich. 201; Tuttle v.
White. 4G Mich. 4SD, 9 N. W. 528. In
tlie case of Mining Co. v. Uertin, 37 Mich.
.337, the trespasser sought to recover in a
special count in assunijjslt for the value of
his labor expended in cutting the wood. In
this case. If any action would lie for the
labor of cutting the logs and the expense of
getting them into the stream and down to
the boom it would seem that the plaint! PC's
remedy would be lik a.^snmpsit. But in the
ciise above referred to It was lield that he
could not recover the benellt of bis labor at
all. There can be no doubt that the rule is
well settled In this state that if Uust Bros.
& Co. had taken possession of these logs
Willie they were lying upon their lands, they
would have been entitled to them as they
were, and that no claim could have been
made against them by the plaintiff for the
labor and expense of cutting them. The
Identity of the timber woiilil not then have
been dest -oyed, and the subseciuent Inler-
nilngling of these logs with the logs of plain-
tiff, ailhougli innocently <Ione, could not
change tho rights of the owners. The evi-
dence Hhows that between the time Unst
Bros. & (Ui. discovered the trcsp.'iss and the
time they took i)ohrchhIou of the logs by
uinrklng llicni, no 1,'ilior or money was ex-
pended l)y tlie plnlntin' \ipon lliein. There-
fore It follows tlial MH this case stood, the
plaintiff had no claim upon Uust Brow.
& Co. that lie could enforce In (his fwlion,
unless they took possession of a better qual-
ity of logs than he cut upon their premises
and the same amount or more in quantity,
and his trespass and intermingling of tlie
property was innocently doUe. And the court
was right in his interpretation of the law as
to innocent trespassers. The seeming injus-
tice pointed out in the argument of the plain-
tiff's counsel is not an injustice, but the re-
sult of the election of the owner to take less
than he is by the law entitled to. The own-
er of standing timber is not only entitled to
the timber, but he has a right to it as it is,
and to lieep it uncut if he so desires. No
man, however innocently he may do it, can
go upon his land and convert the standing
trees into logs and charge him for the labor
thus expended against his will, and perhaps
against his real benefit. He may i)refer to
have the timber to stand, and if left standing
a few years may bring him immense profit.
Such instances have not been rare in the his-
tory of pine timber in this state. The sup-
posed euliaucemcnt of his i)ropcrty by the
labor of the trespasser may thus turn out to
be a positive injury. There is no injii.<tice
In holding that the trespasser must lose the
labor he has expended in converting another's
trees into logs. Such trespasses, though cas-
u.al and not willful, are ordinarily, as was
the trespass in this lase, the result of negli-
gence upon the part of the trespasser, and
there is no good reason why he should be
recompensed for labor and expenses incuri-ed
in the trespass when it might have been
avoided by proper diligence. The owner has
the right to reclaim his logs, but If he sees
fit to bring an action of trespass or trover in-
stead of regaining his property he volunta-
rily puts himself within the rule of damages
prevailing in such actions, and thereby elects
to receive only a just and fair comiiensation
for his piMi)crly as it was before the trespass-
er inleriiu'ddlcd with it. The trespasser can-
not comi]l:un of this, neither can he complain
If he elects to take his property If he can
find it. As was well said in Mining Co. v.
Hertin, supra: "Nothing could more encour-
age carelessness than tho acceptance of the
principle that one who by mistake performs
labor upon the projierty of another should
lose nothing by his error."
Tiie further and only question In the I'ase is
the all"gc(l ei-ror of the circuit judge In reject-
ing the oiler of the plaiuliff to piove by Harvey
I'arker that while said I'arker was foreman
for Ihc plaiiitilT. and was at work on the Sn-
acro tract adjoining the lOacre tract dalmeil
by Bust Bros, it Co., and before all of tho logs
hail been hauled from tho strip of real eslali'
In dispute in this ca.se, said McTavish and
Cales then being at the camp. McTavish.
wlille there, made no complaint or object Ion
as to where they were culling; made no
claim that plaintiff and his men hud com-
niilled a trespass; and In answer to a question
by said r.-iiKcr, after (Jules li;id gone away.
.McTavish said the line plaiiil ilf's men had cul
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PR E Lllll :N"AHY C O X SIDER ATIONS. 
the law being, i n  both cases, to enable the 
party, deprived of his property to receive 
compensation therefor, he asks, "Why should 
the man who strictly follows the law, and 
adopts a legal course of procedure" to obtain 
his property be i n  a worse position, and re­
ceive less than he who uses force or strategy 
to recover possession of his property "? He 
claims that in this case the plaintiff added 
innocently to the value of this timber the 
cost of cutting and putting in the logs, which 
was the sum of $2.25 per thousand feet, and 
also the value of the driving and booming 
charges. He estimates this value at over 
$300. But in the first place it seems to me 
that this amount, the value of the plaintiff's 
labor and expenses upon the logs, could not 
be recovered in an action of troYer. The 
logs were still the pro11erty of Hust Bros. & 
Co. The trespasser, however innocent, could 
acquire no property in these logs, nor could 
he acquire a lien upon them for such labor 
and expense. The conversion of trees into 
saw-logs by a trespasser does not change 
the t i tle to the property, nor dest roy the 
identity of the same. Tbe owner of the land 
is the owner of the logs, and the trespasser 
bas no title to them. Therefore when be 
regains his own, be bas converted no property 
of the t respasser to his o'Yn use. Stephen­
son v. Li t tle, 10 l\Iich. 433 ; Final v. Backus, 
1 ;.'.Iicb. 218-232 ; �lining Co. v. Hertin, 37 
:\ Iicb. 337 ; A rpin v. Burch, GS Wis. 610, 32 
• '. W. 681 ; W inchester v. Craig, 33 Mich. 
'.?O:i; Grant v. Smi t h, 26 i\Iicb. 201 ; Tuttle v. 
W hite, -!G :.\Iicb. 483, 9 N. W. 528. I n  
t he case of i\I ining Co. v .  IIerl in ,  37 :.\Ucb. 
337. the trespasser sought to recover in a 
sp('tinl f'onnt in a�snmpsit for the \'alue of 
his lahor expencletl in cutting t be wood. I n  
thi. c·asc, i f  any act ion would l ie  for t h  
la!Jor of cu l l i ng t he logs ancl the e�q1cnsc or 
get t ing tbem into t he st ream aud cltHY n to 
tile boom it  would sel'm that the plai u t i f'C's 
rPmecly woulcl be in assumpsi t. But in t he 
case> above rcferrcc1 lo it was held t hat he 
< 'Ol ll<l not rec:oYel' tbe heue!it Of bis Jal.Jot" : l t  
a ll . There can be no doubt that the rule is 
w ell selt le<l In t h is sta t e  t ba l  i l' Hust lll'os. 
& Co. had take11  poi>scssion of these logs 
while t hey were ly ing- n rion t he i r  J:1. 1 1 1 ls, t h0y 
wuulrl ha YC' hern r11 l i t l cd to t hem as t h("y 
were. and t hat 1 10 c·la i m cont d  ha,·e !Jccn 
nrnrle against them hy t hr pla i n t l fC  for thC' 
Jn hor a nd cx pensP of c.•11  l l  i ng- I l 1rm. The 
h len t l l) of t he t l mhrr would nol t hen IH\\l' 
hrPn clrsl ·oy<'d, : 1 1 1 r l  t h<> suhsel j l lent  ln t rr· 
1u l ni;:l l n� of I hi•sr lni.:s wll  ll I he logs of p l. t l n­
l l fl', n l l houi.: l t  i n nr w< ' t 1 t ly done, could not 
1 ' 1 111 11gr·  the 1 lµ- J 1 ts  ol' t he ow11PrR. 'l'he evl­
c lr nc·c· 11hows t hn t hrt Wern t l w  t l me H ust 
nroff. ,1,: Co. rl l 1•0\"Pl'rrl t hr t n "  pa ss n n r l  I hr 
I I me l lwy t ook pnsHC'sslo n ol' I he logs hy 
mnl'ld n v  t hr m, nn lnhnr or ntOlll'Y wa s <'X 
prn rkd hy l h!l p ln l 1 1 t l ff upon t hrm. 'l'lwn .. 
fore It fnllr11VH t hut  ns tb l11 rni<r stoorl thr 
plain I lfT lmrl no rl:a l rn np nn J l ni;t J lt'r iH. 
, · Cn. l l m 1 hf' l'lllllrl r · 1 1  fr1n'I' l t 1  I his tl l ' I  1011,  
D i gitized: by 
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1 unless they took possession of a better qua! 
ity of logs than he cut upon their premise· 
and the same amount or more in quantity, 
and bis t respass and intermingling of the 
property was innocently done. Aull the court 
was right i n  his interpretation of the law as 
to innocent trespassers. The seeming inju -
tice pointed out in the argument of the plain· 
tiff's counsel is not an injustice, but the re­
sult of the election of the owner to take le s 
than he is by the law entitled to. The own­
er of standing timber i s  not only entitled to 
the timber, but he has a right t o  it as it is. 
a nd to keep it uncut if he so desires. �o 
man, however innocently he may do it, can 
go upon bis land a nd convert the standing 
trees into logs and charge him for the labor 
thus expended against his will. and pet h:lps 
ai,.:ainst h is  real benefit. He may prefer to 
b�we the timber to stand, and if left tauding 
a few years may bring him immense profit. 
Such instances haYe not been rare in the hi'­
tory of pine t i  miler in t h is stn Le. The i1p­
posed enh:incement of bis property by t be 
labor of the trespasser may thu turn out to 
be a positive injury. There is no injnHke 
i u  hold in :.:: that the trespa ser must lose t he 
labor he has expended in converting- a 1wt hl'r· , 
trees into logs. Such t respasses, t hough ca·­
ual and not willful. are ordinarily, as wn 
the trespass in this case, the result of ne.:.::li­
g nre upon the part of t he t respasser. and 
t here is uo goocl reason why be should be 
recompen eel for la uor an cl ex pen es inc:Ul'l'l'<l 
in the trespass when it might have llrl' ll 
avoided by proper di l ig-ence. Tile owner has 
the right to reclaim his logs, but if he see 
fit to bring an action or trespass or t rover in­
stead oC rcgai n i ng his property be voluntn 
rily pnt h im-elf wi lb in the rule or da m:t;.:e, 
prevai l ing in uch act ions. and t h ereby elect 
to rec:ci1•c onlr a just and fa ir compensation 
for h is pr,1ppr(f as it  was before t he trespns"­
er i n l C'l'l lH't l r l lecl 'Y i l il it. Tl.le trespas ·er l':tn 
not compl:l in of t h is, neither can be complai1 1  
I C  h e  clcc:t s to take his propcrl.\' I f  h e  can 
find it. .\ s 'Yns well said in l\l i n i ng o. Y .  
J i crt in. supra : "::s'ot hing could more ent•onr­
a;.:e c:n r lcssness 1 ha n th acccpt:l lll'<' of the 
1 1ri neiple t hat on who by mista lte verCorm,; 
labor upon th property ot anot her sbo11l1l 
Jose not h i ng by his error." 
The L'mt lier au<l only quest ion tu t he <':1se Is 
t he nl l-.';.:('d cl'ror or Ule ci rcu it J m lgl' i n  r('.i<'C 'I 
ing t he ol'l't•r or t he plaintiff to p1·ov(• hy l l:u·wy 
l 'arkC' t" that  w l l i l  iml(l  l 'n rk C'r \\ :lH for<'111 : 1 1 1  
for t he pla i n t i ff, a n ( !  \\ :1:-1 at  work o n  t hC' :--1 1 
:\C're t met adjoi n i ng t i ll' JO :wre t r:wt <'l: t inwr l  
hy H ust BroH. & l 'o.,  : 1 1 1d h1•1'ore n l l  o l' ( ht' lo;.:1-1 
h:H l hrrn hnu lcd fro 1 1 1  I l l<' strip of n'al rst: i l 1 ' 
In cl ls1 1 1 1 f  1 1 1  t h lA rasr, sn id l\h:T:wbh a w l  
C : 11 I Ps l hl'l l  hr'ing nl  t h<' 1 ·n mp. l <'' l':n isb, 
'"hlle t hcrt', 1 11:1 1IP 110 co1 1 1 pl : 1  In l or olJ.lret Inn 
as t o  " h  'l'l' t lwy w ' I '  1 · 1 1 t t 1 1 1 � ;  m:u l ' un 
l'la l m  t ha t  1 1 ln i 1 1 ! 1 ll' 1 1ud bis J l l l ' J I  hue !  ('Ol l l-
1 1 1 i t l C ' cl  u t rrspass ; u n c l In n nHWl'l' t o n qnrsl lnn 
h,r sn l r l J ' :i l'l,rr, aflrr 1 : n l < 's l t : a r l  pme n w:t� . 
�[c'l'111i�l1 •.: t i r l  t hP 1 1 1 11'  pl : 1 1 1 1 l l ff's 1 1 1t •u h:i c l  l ' l l (  
� r r t 
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to was all right. And in sustaining the de-
fendant's objection to the fulluwing question
to the said Harvey Parlier: "Did yoii have
any tallc with MoTavish about the line to
which you had cut?" the counsel for the
(jhiintiff claims that this evidence was material
and competent as bearing upon the good faith
of the plaintiff in cutting the timber; that it
does not appear from the verdict of the jury
whether they found such trespass willful or
not. It was conceded that Rust Bros. & Co.
took about the quantity of logs they were en-
titled to, but if they took a much better qual-
ity, as plaintiff claimed they did. and the tres-
pass was found by the jury to have been an
innocent one, the plaintiff's counsel claims that
there should have been and probably would
have been a verdict in his favor for the value
of the excess in quality so fallen. In deter-
mining the competency and materiality of the
proposed proof it will be necessary to enter
somewhat into the facts of the trespass. Mc-
Tavisb was a land-looker, and a woodsman
and general foreman, looking after the differ-
ent lumber camps of Rust Bros. & Co., and
looking after trespasses committed upon their
lands, but not having any authority to locate or
agree upon the boundaries of such lands. The
plaintiff called upon McTavish, before he did
any cutting, and asked him if he would go
with him and see if they could not locate the
line between his land and that of Rust Bros.
& Co. He does not state that he supposed Mc-
Tavish had any authority to locate the line.
He says: "I had known him a good many
years, and knew him as a man in the employ
of the Rusts." "Question. You knew he was
their agent and their woodsman? Answer. I
believed him to be a good land-looker. I ask-
ed him if he would go with me and see if we
could locate the line between 28 and 29 north,
of the quarter post. He said he knew where
the south section corner of the section was.
We will go there and see if we can find it."
They went up into the woods, and undertook
to run out the line. They disagree somewhat
in their testimony. As they were pacing on
the supposed line the plaintiff did some blazing.
McTavish testified that he foi'bade this blaz-
ing, saying to Gates that there was no telling
whether they were right or not, as they were
running the line out with a pocket compass.
He says: "I told Mr. Gates at the time that
there was timber enough along the line, who-
ever lumbered there first, to have that line es-
tablished by a surveyor, and he made the re-
mark then that that line would be just a guide
for him when he went in there again to know
about where he was;" and they agreed that
it should be surveyed before it was lumbered.
Gates testified that he blazed the line they
ran out. That at one point McTavish said:
"I don't know, we may not be just right here,
and perhaps you hadn't better blaze." I siiys:
"It will be a guide to us to know where we
have come, and .1 will continue the blazing
until you get to the corner." That McTavish
said that he was satisfied that was the right
line, and said further: "That line is as correct
a line as we can get through here; but as tim-
ber is thick on the line down below between
you and Rust you ought to have a surveyor
run a compass course from this corner to this
quarter post to be sure, as I have dodged a
little in traveling north. We have come as
straight as we could." To this. Gates says, he
assented. No line, however, was run by a
surveyor until after the cutting. Harvey
Parker was the foreman of the plaintiff. Mc-
Tavish was asked, on cross-examination, if he
did not have a conversation with Parker about
this line, and answered that he did not re-
member it, but said that he stayed one night
at his camps and presumed he told Parker
that the plaintiff had cut to the line that he
and Gates ran. Denied ever stating to him
that the cutting was all right, or that they had
the right line. This conversation, if any was
had, was after the cutting of the logs. The
offered evidence of Parker was rejected at
first by the court upon the ground that it was
not competent because it took place after the
cutting. Parker afterwards testified that at
the time of the talk the timber was all cut off
of this strip belonging to the Rusts, and that
some of the logs had been taken off; that
Gates was not present when the conversation
took place; and there was no evidence offered
to show that Gates ever knew of the talk.
Thereupon the court ruled that it was not ma-
terial. We think the court did not err in the
ruling. McTavish had no authority to bind
the Rusts, and what he might have said after
the trespass was committed could have no
bearing upon the question of the good faith of
the plaintiff, especially when there was no evi-
dence that Gates was informed of what Mc-
Tavish said. Nor was it admissible as im-
peaching testimony not being material to the
issue.
The judgment of the court below must there-
fore be affirmed, with costs.
SHERWOOD, C. J., and CHAMPLIN and
LOXG, JJ., concurred. CAMPBELL, J., did
not sit.
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t o  was all right. And in sm:taining the de­
fernlant's objection to the follo\Ying question 
to the said IIarvey Parker : "Did you have 
any talk with l\IcTavish about the line to 
\Vhich you had cut ?'' the counsel for the 
plaintiCi' claims that this evidence was material 
and competent as bearing upon the good fa'ith 
o( the plaintiff in cutting tbe timber; that it 
tloes not appear from the verd ict oC tile jury 
"·hether they found such trespass \Villful or 
not. It was cone ded that Rust Bros. & Co. 
took: about the quautity of logs they were en­
titl d to, but if they took a much better qual­
ity, as plaintiCi' claimed they did, and tbe tres­
pass was found by the jury to have been an 
innocent one, the plaintiff's counsel claims that 
there should bave been and probably would 
have been a verdict in bis favor for the value 
of the excess in quality so taken. In deter­
mining the competency and materiality of the 
vroposed proof it will be necessary to enter 
somewhat into the facts of tbe trespass. l\Ic­
Tavisb was a land-looker, and a woodsman 
and general foreman, looking after the differ­
ent lumber camps of Rust B ros. & Co., and 
look ing after trespasses committed upon their 
lands, but not having any authority to locate or 
agree upon the boundaries of such lands. Tbe 
plaintiff called upon l\IcTavish, before be did 
any cutting, and asked him if he would go 
witll bim and see if they could not locate the 
line between his land and that of Rust Bros. 
& Co. He does not state that be supposed i\Ic­
T:wisb bad any auth01ity to locate the line. 
He says: "I bad known him a good many 
years, and knew him as a man in the employ 
of the Rusts." "Question. You knew he was 
their agent and tbeir woodsman ? Answer. I 
believed him to be a good land-looker. I ask­
ed him if he would go with me and see if we 
could locate the line between 28 and 29 north, 
of the quarter post. He said he knew where 
the south section corner of the section was. 
"'e will go there and see if we can find it." 
They went up into the woods. and undertook 
to run out the line. They disagree somewhat 
in their testimony. As they were pacing on 
the supposed line the pla intiff did some blazing. 
"\Ic:Tavish testified that he forbade this blaz­
ing-. :::aying to Gates that there wns no telling 
whether t hey were right or not, as they were 
running the line out with a pocket compnss. 
He says : "I told l\Ir. Gates at the time that 
there -was timber enough along the line, Vlho­
e•er lumbered there first, to b:lYe 1 bat line es­
tablished by a surveyor, and he made the re­
mm·k then that that line would be just a guide 
for him when be went in there again to know 
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about where be was;" and they agreed that 
it Rhoulcl be surveyed before it was luwl Jerctl. 
Gates testified that be blazed the line they 
ran out. That at one point McTav isb sa id: 
"I don't know, we may not be j ust right here, 
and perhaps you hadn't better blaze." I says : 
"It will be a guide to us to know where we 
have come, and . I  will continue the blazing 
until you get to the corner." That MeTavish 
said that he was satisfied that was the right 
line, and said further: "That line is as corre<'t 
a line as we can get through here ; but as tim­
ber is thick on the line clown below between 
you and Rust you ought to have a surYeyor 
run a compass course from this corner to this 
quarter post to be sure, as I have dodged a 
little i n  travel ing north. We have come as 
straight as we could . "  To this, Gates says, be 
assented. No line, however, was run by a 
surveyor until after the cutting. Harvey 
Parker was the foreman of the plaintiff. l\Ic­
Tavisb was a ked, on cross-examination, if be 
did not have a conversation with Parker about 
this line. and answered that be did not re­
member it, but said that be stayed one night 
at bis camps and presumed be told Parker 
that the plaintiff bad cut to the line that be 
nnd Gates ran. Denied ever stating to him 
that the cutting was all right, or that they bad 
the right li ne. This conversation, i f  any was 
had, was after the cutting of the logs. The 
offered evidence of Parker was rejected a t  
first by the court upon the ground that it was 
not competent because it took place after tbe 
cutting. Parker afterwards testified that at 
the time of the talk the t imber was all cut off 
of this strip belonging to the R usts, and that 
some of the logs had been taken off; that 
Gates was not present when the conversation 
took place; and there was no evidence offered 
to show that Gates ever knew of the talk. 
Thereupon the court ruled that it was not ma­
terial. \\e think the court did not err in tbe 
ruling. l\lcTavisb bad no authority to bind 
the Husts, and what be might have said after 
the trespass was committed could ba•e no 
bearing upon the question of the good faith of 
the plaintiff, especially Vlben there ·\Yas no evi­
dence that Gates was informed of what �Ic­
Tavisb said. Nor was it admissible as im­
peaching testimony not being material to the 
issue. 
Tbe j udgment of the court below must there­
fore be affirmed, with costs. 
SHERWOOD, C. J., and CHAMPLIN and 
LONG, JJ., roncurred. CAl\IPBELL, J., did 
not sit. 
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PRELIJSiUXARY CONSIDERATIONS.
WOOD et al v. PACKER.
(17 Fed. 650.)
CSrcuit Court, D. New Jersey. July 14, 18S3.
In equity.
F. C. Lowtlioip, Jr., for complainant.
James Bucbanan, for defendant.
XIXOX, J. This action is brouglit against
tlie defendant for infringing certain reissned
letters patent, No. t>,3(JS, dated August 31,
ISSO. Tlie Delaware Coal & Ice Company
was the owner of the original patent. No. 73,-
684, and brought suit in this court against the
same defendant for their infringement. It
was found, upon examination, that although
the patentee in his specifications stated the
nature of his invention to consist in the fun-
nel-shaped month attached to the cart, in com-
bination with the chute and valve, he had
failed to make any claim for such combina-
tion; and as none of the separate constitu-
ents, as set forth in the thiee claims, were
new, the court was obliged to hold that the
defendant was not shown to have infringed
anything claimed in the complainant's pat-
ent. Since then the original patent has been
surrendered, and a reissue obtained, with
quite a dilforent statement of the inventor's
claims. They are as follows: (1) The com-
bination of the body of a coal cart with a
sliding extension chute, substantially as and
for the purpose set forth; C2) the combina-
tion of the body of a coal cart aud the outlet,
having a gate or valve, with a sliding exten-
sion chute, adapted to the said outlet, sub-
stantially as specihed.
The answer sets up three defenses: (1)
That the reissue is void because the combina-
tion claimed is an expansion of the original;
(2) want of novelty in the patent; (3) non-
infi iiigement.
The second is tlie only one of these de-
fenses which seems to have merit, or which
has been the occasion of any serious or ex-
tendwl inquiiT- Do the spei'illcations and
claims of the patent as reissued indicate in-
venlion on the part of the patenteeV The
patent is for a combination, the constituents
of wliich are staled In the claims above (piot-
ed. There Is no dilTerence, In fact, between
the claims, except that the second has one
element which Is not named In the first, to-
wlt. the outlet, having a gate or valve, and
which Is tlic means of communication be-
tween the lirst and third const llueiita of the
comliliiatinn. its iibsenco gives much force
to the argument of the learned counsel of the
dereiKlaiit, that the tlrst claim Is void be-
cauKc the parts are old, and there Is no de-
pendence OP co-operntlon In their action
wlien^by any new result Is obtained. A mere
nKgrcgnllnii tif old things Is not pntentable,
and. in the si-nsc nf the patent law. Is not a
coinbliinllon. In a conibhuitlon. tlii> element-
nl parts must be so united that they will div
fiendiMlly <iMipi']iilc and produce sniiic new
and useful result. A coal cart is not novel,
nor is the chute for conducting coal from the
cart to the place of its destination. These
two instrumentalities are aggregated in the
lirst claim; but no mechanism is suggested
whereby the coal can be got out of the cart
and into the chute. The complainant (Wood)
testifies as a witness that it can bo acconi-
plislied by tlie use of a man with a sliovel.
This is probably true; but it is difficult to
see how the inventive factilty is put in ex-
ercise by any such arrangements. It is not
necessary, however, to dwell upon this view
of the case, because the entire reissue will
not be avoided on account of the existence
of one void claim. See Carlton v. BoUee. 17
Wall. 403.
The constituents of the second claim of the
reissue are (1) the cart or wagon; (2) the out-
let, with a gate or valve; and (3) the sliding
extension chute. The patentee was asked
whether he thought any of these elements,
separated from the others, was novel, iCoin.
Rec. 28, 20,) and replied, "I do not think tliey
are, but only in combination."
The case is then pi-esented here wliich was
considered by the supreme court in Hailes v.
Van Wormer, 20 Wall. 308. and in which Mr.
Justice Strong, speaking for the whole court.
sMid: •'.Ml the devices of which tlie alleged
combination is made are confesseiUy old. No
claim is made for any one of them singly as
an independent invention. It must be con-
ceded thiit a new combination, if it produces
new and useful results, is patentalile, though
all the constituents of the combination were
well known aud in common use before the
conibinatidu was made. But the results must
be a product of the combination, and not a
mere aggregate of several results, each the
complete product of one of the combined ele-
ments. • * » Merely bringing old devices
into juxtaposition and then allowing each to
work out its own effect, without the produc-
tion of sonietliing novel, is not Invention."
The ([ucslion, then, is in regard to the sec-
ond claim of the compl;iinant's reissue: Is
it a patennble combination, producing new
and useful results, or Is it a mere aggrega-
tion of old elements, each working out alone
Its single individual effect?
It Is not a question of easy solution, for -It
re(iuires us to lind tlie exceedingly delicate
lino whicli divides patentability from slnii)Ie
inechanli'nl skill, or to i.sccrtnin the ditfcr-
enco between real Invention and a double
tise or aiipllcatlon of Hoiiictliing that has ex-
isted before. Mr. Curtis, in section 11 of his
tre.'itlse on the Law of I'litcnts, In discussing
this subject, says: "The subject-matter of a
supposed Invention Is new, in the sense of the
patent law, wlii-n It Is siibstrinllally dItVcrent
from wli.'it has gone before it; and this siib-
Ntanllal difference. In ca.s(« where other an-
alogotis ()r similar things have b<'en prevlou.s-
ly known or useil. Is one measure of the sulll-
cleney i>( Invention to support a i)atent. our
courts liave, In truth, witliout always using
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\YOOD et al v. PACKER. 
(17 Fe<l. G;:iO.) 
Circuit Court, D. Kew Jersey. July 14, 1883. 
In equity. 
F. c. Lowthorp, Jr., for com plai nant. 
James Buchanan, for defen<lant. 
XL 'OX, J. This action is  brought a.gai n  t 
the defenda nt for infring:iug certain reissued 
lettet s patent, No. v,::ms. d ated August ;n, 
1 ''.-)lt. The Delaware Coal & Ice Company 
was the owner of the original patent, Xo. 73,­
Li -!. and brought suit in this com-t against the 
same llefendant for their infringe!lleut. It 
was found, upon exalll ination, that although 
the patentee i n  llis specificat ions state<l the 
nature of bis inYention to consist in the fun­
nel-sha ve<l mouth attached to tlle cart, in com­
bination witll the chute aml vah·e, he bad 
f:1 ile<I to make any claim fut· su1.·b coml.Jina­
tion; and a s  none of the sep•u:tte cons t i t u­
ents. as set forth in the l hl\•e chl ims, were 
new. the <'ourt was obliged to llold that the 
clr fPH1l:rnt was uot shown to have infringed 
auytli i m:: cla inwll i n  the compla i n ant's pat­
ent. :-;incc t hen t he origi na l patent bas been 
su n·<•n<IPJ"t'tl. a u cl  a reissue ol.Jtaiued. with 
<Jllill' a ll ilfrrent statement of the inventor's 
1•l a i 1 11,.:. They arc a follows : (1 \ l'he ! 'Olll­
liilla t ion of t he 1Jocly of a coal ea rt with a 
slid i ng extpm; ion c·hute. snhstantial ly as a n d 
fnr t h'-' J>11rpvsl' set fortll : 1:.!l  the <'omlJiua­
t i on ot' t l1P hn<ly of a c·oal ea r t  a nd the out let, 
havin� a :::itt> or va h·e, wit!J a :<lidi11g- exten­
sion c·huk, :Hl:tplt>cl to t he ::;ahl ou t let. sub­
stantially a:< spcc· i l ie<l. 
'l'ht' answ<:'r sl'ts up t h ree defenses: (1) 
That t he rei,.::-:ue is void hee:i use t he combina­
tion f'lai1 11•'•l is a n  Px p:1 11sion of till' ori ::ina l ; 
{:.!J w:wt or novelty iu thl' pa tl•l l l ;  (3) oon­
i 1 1 f1 i 1 1::emeut. 
'J'lll' sP1·111Hl is t h P  only 0ne of t hese d<'­
fen,.:ps wh i d 1 seems to have merit, or " h icb 
has lH·,. 1 1  ! 111 ·  ot'<':l,.,!on of any serious n r  ex· 
t P1 1 t l 1 ·1l i 1 1111 1 i ry. l ln t h t• s pp1 • i 1k:i t inn!l a n d 
<'l n i ms of l hP pa t .. 11t as l'l'issuetl i l ltl iea tl' in­
,·cu t i o1 1  on the pa rt of t h e  pa l l' l l ll'<''! The 
p:1 t < 't 11  Is for a c•omhina t lon, t h1• 1'01 1,.: t l t twnts 
ol' \\ ldC'11 :HP s t a t t•tl in t he c · la i m s  :tho\ l' qt11•t 
l '<I 'I h<'l'P I s no d i ff<'l't'lH"l'. in fact. ht t WPl'll 
t I t  • d:i i 11 1 s. < "-...:1·Ppt t hat tltP Sl'C'ntHI has one 
f ' l < • 1 1 H• 1 1 t  w l i i d 1  Is nnt ua me<l In t l w 1 l rst, tn­
w i t .  t h <' 111 1 l lN. hav l n� a �n l !• or ,· a h'•". : t 1 1cl 
whl< 'l 1  ii. t : 11 1 1 1 1 · :1 ns of r·n111 1 1 1 1 1 11l1•a 1 lnll hr­
t w1 I'll 1 h, .  l 1 r::.1 :i nd t h htl 1 ·01 1 · t i l t1t'lll>< o f  t h P 
1�011 1 hl 1 111 t l < 1 l l .  1 1 1>  n hsP111·e gi Y<'S 1 1 1 111•h f<1r1 ·<' 
t o  t h . fl J'l,: l l llll ' l l l or f h l' IP!ll"ltt'd f'fl l l l l  1 > )  or l h 0. 
1 l Pflol l  l 1 1 1 1t, t l ln t t hf' llr .1 c ·ln l m l s  void l tl'­
••11 11 • • t h , .  p11 r l 11 :i r<' nl cl , :incl l hPrC ls 1 1 < 1  r l i•-
1 •11<l 1 1 1n• 111• 1•n 11p1 rn t lnn In t l u•lr :wt lon 
Wll f 'l"o•hy fi ll)' 111'\\' n•i111 l l  I� 11hlnl l11 · r l  A I l l < ' !"<' 
l lJ:;'l.!l'<'l.nt l l n11  nr 1Jlrl t h i ngs IR not. pn t l'n t n hh ' ,  
n u d .  ht  1 1 11 111•11 <' of t h" p:t l f' n t  l 1 1 w, I 1 1. , 1  : 1  
<'n1 t 1 h l 1 1 n l lo11, 1 1 1 n <'otl l h l 1 1 : 1 t l1 1 1 1 ,  l ht>  l'lf' l lH' l l l  
111 p:i 1·1 11 mt1HI  h . - i; u  n 1 1 l l Prl  ! h a t  t h  ." w i l l  d i ·  
J "• 1 1 1 l 1 •1 1 t l y "" 0) 1"1'11 1 "  n n r l  p r11rl 1 1 1·p 1 1 1 1 1 1  tl<'W 
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and useful re ult. A coal cart i s  not no\"'el, 
not· is the chute for conducting coal from the 
cart to the pla�e of its de tination. T!Je:.;e 
two i nstruruentalitie- are aggregated in t Lo 
Jirst clai m ;  but no mecha nism is uggl'stl·d 
whereby t he coal can be got out of tlw �-a rr 
a nd into the chute. The complainant tW o•lll )  
tes t i fies a s  a witness that i t  ca n b e  a1..:um­
plished by the use of a lll::tn with a shovel. 
This is proba bly true; but it is d itlicult to 
see bow the i nventiYe faculty is put in ex­
ercise by auy such a rrangeruents. It is not 
necessary, however, to dwell upon this view 
of the ca e, because the entire reissue w i l l  
n o t  b e  avoided on account o f  the exi·teuce 
or one void claim. See l'arlton v. Bokce, li 
Wall. -±li:l. 
The constituents of tlle second claim of the 
reis ue arc (1) the ca.rt or wa�on ; (�) tile out­
let, w i t h  a �ate or valve ; a ntl (:�) the s l iding 
extension chute. The patentee wa �lskPd 
whl't hct· he thong-ht any of t he e elements. 
sPp:1 r:i ted from t he ot hers. was novel , 1 l'nm. 
Hee. :28, 29,) aml replied, "l do not think t hl'y 
a re. but only i n  coUlhinalion." 
'!'he case i then presented hC'r<' whit-h wa,; 
cousidered by the supreme court i n  Ha i lt's ,. _ 
Yan "\Yormer, 20 "\Yall .  au'. and iu whk lt :.\Ir. 
Justice Strong, s1waking- for tlle whule comt. 
s:1 11l : " 'A l l  t h<' tll'Ykes of whil' i 1  t he a l ll.';.:t'd 
combination i s  made at·e confesl:'l'll iy oltl \u 
cln.im is made foi· any one uf t hem s i n�!� as 
an intlepcmlent ill\·ent ion. It must be con 
ceded th:i t a ne w combination, if it produces 
l!PW a ud usef11 l  results. i:.< li:ltl'llta hk'. t hon:::h 
all t h e  cous t i t 1tL•nt,; or t he c omliiua t ion \n're 
wel l kllo w n  autl in common use hl'fore the 
L 1mltiuat w11 was mntlc. Hut t he l'L':.<nlts must 
be a prud11ct of the cum hiua t i on. : 1 u1l llot a 
lll ' l'I' :l:;.gregatC Of SeH'l';l l l'l'><\llts. l':tl'Jl the 
1·11111plete i1roduct of one of  the n11 1 1 hi 11L�l cle-
111ents. • • * :.\lerei�' hrinp;iu;.: old dt' \" il•t•s 
i nto jtL\.l;t pnsition a nd t h 1'11 allo w i n:: l':l <"h to 
worl, out i i ,.:  own l'ffed . w i l 11 11 1 1 t  t ll l '  prutllll·­
t ioH o f  SOllll'th i ug llOYel. i:.; not i l lYent ion." 
Th" q1 11 s1 i 1 1 1 1 .  t l ll'll. is in re!!':l l'd to t h1.• Sl'•'· 
01111 1•l:t i lll of t he l'Ol1l)ll:1 i 11anl's l"C'i:.<sllf': ] s  
1 t  a J l:l ll' l l :I hll' 1·omhi u:1 t iou.  )lrmlu..iu:: 111•w 
a nd usl'll!I rc,.:nJts. lll' il'l i t  a t l ll'l'l' a ;.:,.::11· ::: 1 ·  
t lon O f  oh] cll'llll'll(S, e:tl'h \\'orJ;: in;.: Oil\ : t ! O lll' 
i ts  si u;.:lc hHliv i t lual effr•<·t 1 
I t  ls not n qtll'st !on of easy solnt Inn, fnr i t  
l"C't \ lli l'l'S 11S t o  l i 1 11 i  tliP C \ !'l'!' t l lu;;ly tll'l iul l 1' 
l l lw w l l k h  1\ 1\·itll's p:t t 1 ·1 1 ':i h l l i t y  frn111 :- i 1 1 1 pll' 
t t 1Pl'i1 : 1 1 1 1"a l skill ,  or to :. �1·c rt n i 11 t hl' tl iff1•r­
en<'l' h1•t Wl't'n n•:tl l l l\'<'llt l.m :1 1ul  n dn11l 1 lp  
tlSI' nt' app l i t-a tlnit of snnw t h i u;.: t ha t  h a s  1 •X· 
l s l ! 't\ 1 1!'1'< 1!'!', ;\ [ t', { 'url l'-' ,  i l l  ,.:1•1 •t io1 1  1J O f  h i �  
t r1 'ri t isP oll t ill' La w o f  1 ':1 1 1 • 1 1 1>< ,  I l l  1l l:1 · 1 1,,.sl1 1;.: 
t h i ,.:  su h,l <'< ' I .  !': 1� s :  "'l'h1• ::.nl oj"d tn a t t " r  • If  : t  
1'11 1 1 f l11�1·d i l t 1 1• 1 1 t  l n 1 1  I s  1 1 1 '"" 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 •  s t ' l ! !W  1 1 1' t i n• 
p11 t , . 1 1 t  l : t \\', w h1•11  ii Is stt l >Ht a 1 1 t l :t l l .1· d ilt'Pn• n t  
f rn t l l  w h : 1 t  1 1 : 1 !1  golt<' I H' l"Orl' I t : : t 1 1 d  t h i s  t -Hlh· 
Hl:t l l l l n l  d l li'1·11 • 1 1 < '<', in <'11St'1' \\ 1 11'1'1' ot hPI' : l l l ·  
: 1 logo11s 1 1r 11 l 1 1 1 l l : t r  t h l n "s h:l \'l' h!'t ' l l  pr1•\'io11s· 
l,v l\ lw\\' n or 1 1�<'1 1 .  It! mw t 1 1 <'ai-t1 1 C' of t l 11• � l l f ll· 
rl< · 1 11•y nt' l ! l \'<' l l t lon lo H l l pport 1 1  f >H ( l' l l l .  • 1 1 1 1' 
< 'n t 1 rt H hn Y<', In l rnl h, w i t h o u t  n l wn � t! m d 1 1g 
- . .  _. . .  m 
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the samo terms, applied the same tests of the
sufflcieucy of iuveiitiou which the Englisli
authorities exhibit iu dotormining wliether al-
leged inventions of various kinds possess the
necessary element of novelty; that is to say,
in detennining this question, the ch.iracter of
tlie result, and not the apparent amount of
skill, ingenuity, or thought exercised, has been
examined; and if the result has been sul>
stantially different from what had been ef-
fected before, the invention has been pro-
nounced entitled to a patent."
If all improvements upon existing organ-
isms were patentable, there would be no
doubt about sustaining at once the complain-
ant's patent. But sometimes better results
are produced by mere mechanical skill, with-
out the exercise of invention. The law does
not extend to or cover such cases (Smith v.
Nichols, 21 Wall. 118), nor where the change
is only in degree, and not new. Guidet v.
Brooklin, 105 U. S. 552; McMurray v. Miller,
IG Fed. 471.
The complainant's patent is undoubtedly a
great improvement upon everything that went
before it. The invention of William Bell (let-
ters patent No. 14.301, granted Febniary 26,
1S5()) was set up by the defendant as an an-
ticipation, and it certainly contains valuable
suggestions. His dumping wagon, however,
could not be used for delivering coal in cellar
windows, but only for dumping it into pave-
ment vault-holes, where they happened to
exist in front of houses, at a proper distance
from the edge of the pavement, and it seems
to lack adjustability for doing even this suc-
cessfully.
The evidence shows that Richard Hammell,
a respectable citizen of Chambersburg, was
formerly engaged in the coal business in
Lambertville, New Jersey, and that as early
as 1SG3 he was in the habit of using chutes in
delivering coal from a wagon into a cellar.
He thinks that he introduced the double or
sliding chutes in the fall of 1805, and contin-
ued to use them for 10 years. The narrow
end of one passed into the wider end of the
other. He used the double chutes when the
distance for delivery was too far for the
single. When the distance was greater than
the single chute, they pushed them one into
the other to adjust the length. When the
distance was still greater, they had chutes
that would reach any house. The longest
single chute was 10 feet; by combining them
they could reach 24 feet, or moie, if nece.s-
sary. When more than one was used, they
carried a light trestle to support them in the
middle. « * * They had half a do/.en such
chutes, and when they had occasion put them
together.
Peter C. HofC was also in the coal business
in Lambertville, in the spring of 1867, and
has continued therein ever since. He used
chutes of different lengths, made tapering,
and growing smaller to the end, which went
into the cellar. The lower end would rest on
the cellar window, or the place made to put
in the coal. He used more than one at a
time, but not frequently. He generally had
three chutes, — one about 7 feet long, one
about 12. and the other about 14 feet. Then
if the place to put the coal in was 10 feet
from the line of the street, he would use two
chutes, would shove the small end of the one
into the larger end of the other, with a trestle
under where the connection was, and also
a prop by the Avagon, — being a seat, board, or
something similar,— in order to hold it up to
let the coal run into the cellar. He used the
14-feet chute and the 7-feet together in that
way, which was about the longest distance
he ever used the chute. But in all these
cases the coal was shoveled fi-om the wagon
Into the chutes, which were not attached to
the wagon in any way. This testimony ex-
hibits the state of the art when the complain-
ant appeared with his improvement. He has
not very largely exercised the inventive facul-
ty in what he has done. His combination is
so simple that it seems wonderful that other
persons did not think of it. But they did
not, and if it has effected any new and useful
result the law protects him in its exclusive
use. The evidence reveals that by his com-
bination of old instrumentalities a load of
coal can be emptied from a cart into a cellar
•without the agency of a man using a shovel.
This is a new result, worthy of the notice of
the law, and it is the duty of the court to
give to the patentee the benefit of his inven-
tion.
A decree must be entered for the complain-
ant, and a reference made for an account.
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PA T E N TS. 
t Ile same terms, applied the same tests of the 
sufficieucy of invention which the English 
authorit ies exhibit in detrrmining wbetber al­
leged inventions of various l•inds possess tbe 
nec<'ssnry element of novelty; that is to say, 
in dete1111 ini11g this question, the chnracter o·f 
t he result, an() not tbe apparent amount of 
skill, ingenuity, or tbougllt exrrcised, has been 
examined; and if the result bas been sub­
stantially different Crom what had been ef­
fected before, tbe invention bas been pro-. 
nounced entitled to a patent." 
If all im provements upon existing organ­
isms wc1·e patentable, there would be no 
doubt about sustaining at once the complain­
ant's patent. But sometimes better results 
are pro<l uced by mere mechanical skill, with­
out the exercise of invention. The law does 
not extend to or cover such cases (Smith v. 
:Nichole;, 21 ·wall. 1 18) ,  nor where the change 
is only in degree, and not new. Guidet v. 
Brooklin, 105 U. S. 552 ; McMurray v. Miller, 
16 Fed. 471. 
The complainant's patent is undoubtedly a 
great improvement upon everything tbat went 
hefore it. The invention of vVilliam Bell (let­
ters patent No. 14,301, granted February 2G, 
185G) was set up by the defendant as an an­
ticipation, and it certainly contains valuable 
suggestions. His dumping wagon, however, 
c ·ould not be used for delivering coal in cellar 
windows, but only for dumping it into pave­
ment vault-boles, where they happened to 
0xist in front of houses, at a proper distance 
from the edge of the paveruent, and it seems 
to lack adjustability for doing even this suc­
cessfully. 
The evidence shows that Richard Hammell, 
a respectable citizen of Obambei;sburg, was 
formerly engaged i n  the coal business in 
Lambertville, New Jersey, and that as early 
as 1SG3 be was in the habit of using chutes in 
del ivering coal from a wagon into a cellar. 
He thinks that he introduced the double o r  
sliding chutes i n  t h e  fall of  18G5, and contin­
ued to use tbem for 10 years. The narrow 
end of one passed into the wider end of the 
other. He used the double chutes when the 
distance for delivery was too far for the 
single. When the distance was greater tha n 
the single chute, they pushed tbem one into 
the other to adjust the length. Wben the 
D i  itize'l by 
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distance was still grea ter, t hey bad cl1utes 
that would reach any house. The longest 
single cl\ule was 1G feet ; by comllining tbPu1 
they could reach 2-± feet, or mol'e, if neces 
sary. \V!Jcn more than one was used, they 
carried a lig!JL trestle to support them in thP 
middle. ''' * * They bad baH a <loze n sud1 
chutes, and when they had occasion put tLem 
together. 
Peter 0. Iloff was also in the coal business 
in Lambertville, in the spring of 1867, anrl 
has conti nued therein e"Ver since. He uscu 
chutes of different lengths, made tapering, 
and growing smaller to the end, which went 
into the cellar. The lower end would rest on 
the cellar window, or the place made to put 
in the coa l.  He used more than one at a 
time, but not frequently. He generally bad 
three chutes,-one about 7 feet long, one 
about 12, and the other about 14 feet. Then 
i f  the place to put the coal in was 10 feet 
from the line of the street, be would use t wo 
chutes, would shove the small end of the one 
into the la rger end of the other, with a trestle 
under where the connection was, and also 
a prop by the wagon.-beiug a seat, board, or 
something simila r,-in order to bold it up to 
let the coal n m  into the cellar. He used the 
14-feet chute and the 7-feet together in that 
way, which was about the longest distance 
he e"Ver u::;ed tbe chute. But in all these 
cases tile coal was shoveled from the wag-on 
into the chutes, wh ich were not attached to 
tbe wagon in any way. This testimony ex­
hilJits the state of the art when the complain­
ant appeared w i th his impro"Vement. He has 
not very largely exercised the inventive facul­
ty in what he bas done. His combination is 
so simple that it seems wonderful that other 
persons did not think of it. But they clicl 
not, and if it has e£'.'ected any new and useful 
result the law protects him in its exclusive 
u�c. The e"Vidence reveals that by bis com­
b i nation of old instrumentalities a load of 
coal can be emptied from a cart into a cellar 
without the agency of a man using a shovel. 
This is  a new result, worthy of the notice of 
the law, and it is tbe duty of the court to 
give to the patentee the benefit of his inven­
tion. 
A decree must be entered for tbe complain­
ant, and a reference made for an account. 
O ri g ira l  frcm 
UN IVE R S ITY OF CALIFORNIP.. 
24
PRELIMIXAHT CONSIDERATIONS.
DRUMMOND et al. v. VENABLE et al.
(26 Fed. 243.)
Circuit Court, X. D. Illinois. Not. 9, 1SS5.
In equity.
Cobinn & Tliacher, for complaiuants. Of-
field & Towle, for defendants.
BLODGETT, J. This is a suit for infiinge-
ment of patent Xo. 200,133, issued Februaiy
12, ISTS, to James T. Drummond, for "an im-
provement in marliing plug tobacco." The
patentee in his specifications says: "The ob-
ject of my invention is to mark plug tobacco
in such a manner that the retail dealer can
cut the lump into smaller plugs, or pieces of
equal and definite sizes, and at the same time
the -wrapper will be secured to the filling
liy means of the marks or indentations. My
invention consists in making the plug of to^
bacco with a series of indented lines upon its
face or faces, which are arranged so as to
space off the surface of the plug into subdi-
visions of uniform and definite size and
weight, whereby they become guides in cut-
ting up the plug for retail sales, and which
also serve to more firmly secure the wrapper
to the filling, so as to prevent the starling of
Ihe former from the latter. It is customary
in the manufacture of tobacco to make plugs
that weigh one pound. Plug tobacco is mostly
retailed in pieces of one or two ounces in
weight. It is more expensive to make up
small plugs of these sizes, and conseciuently
it is desirable to manufacture tobacco in large
lumps, and let the retailer cut them up as he
sells them. But the seller e-\periencos great
inconvenience in cutting the plugs into pieces
of just the desired quantity: hence guides
:ire desirable to enable the dealer to cut from
a large plug exactly an ounce, or two ounces,
or any definite quantity, consisting of the
imit of sale, or some nniltiple thereof. • • *
ShiMild any other unit of sale be adopted, or
should the plug be of different size, the size
of the subdivisions should be varied corre-
sjiondingly; but the marks are always placed
so as to serve as accurate guides in cutting
up the large lump. The lines may also be
made in each face of the plug, and in fact this
is desirable lu securing the additional func-
tion of the indentations hereinafter specified."
The claim of the patent is: "As a new article
of niaruifactme, a plug of tobacco, one or Iioth
faces of which are inaiked off by Indented
linc.i. wlildi serve to secure the wnippor to llio
tilling, and also as guides for cutting uj) the
plug Into Ruinll pieces of definite size and
weight, suliHtantinlly as and for the pur-
IK)se set forth;"
The defendant makes tobacco plugs of the
same size and general appearance as the com-
plainants, with creases stamped or impressed
upon the face of the plug at uniform distances
from each other, so that these creases serve
as guides in cutting up the plug in measured
parts for retailing. The defenses are (1) the
want of novelty; and (2) that the defendants
do not infringe.
Jlucli of the testimony put into the record
bears upon the question whether the complain-
ant was or was not the first to invent and
manufacture tobacco plugs marked with in-
dentations to serve as guides for cutting the
plug into measured quantities. This testi-
mony is conflicting and contradictory, and,
did I feel compelled to dispose of the case
upon it, would require careful anaylsis and
criticism; but I am satisfied from the proof
tliat there is nothing new in this device.
The proof shows that cakes had been made
by bakers for many years before the alleged
date of this invention, marked off with in-
dented lines to show how to cut the same in
measured quantities or pieces for retail. The
same practice had been adopted in the manu-
facture of chocolate, for the purpose of di-
viding it into measured pieces for retail; and
also in the manufacture of candies. 1 take it.
very few men who are as old as I am, and
whose early expeiionce was in the eastern
states, will fail to remember the gingerbi-ead
peddler, with his cards of gingerbread lined
off in spaces where he was in the h.-ibit of
breaking or cutting it off for the purpose of
retailing it to the boys around his stand; and
with this fact in reniembrauce it seems to
me it could hardly be invention to simply
mark a plug of tobacco so it could be cut off
in equal and measured quantities.
The record also shows a patent issued to
.Tames Spratt, February 24, 1S74, for an "im-
provement in pressing te.as for use," which
consisted in pressing the tea leaves into a
solid cake with indentations, so that the
quantity needed for use at one time could bo
readily broken off. .\ftor this device h.ad been
applied to dllTercnt kinds of goods so as to in-
dl<ate measiu'cd (luantltles. there could hardly
be any invention in apjilying it to tobacco. But
it is claimed there is an element of utility in
these indentations, as applied to tobacco plugs,
because It Is said they serve to fasten the
wrapjier more firndy to the plug. The proof
shows this claim of utility is, at least, doubt-
ful; but even If fully supi)orte<l by the proof.
It is manifestly incidental, and Is not the
main punwise of the indentation.
I llieref<ire feel comiielled to hold tliiti patent
void, for want of novelty, and shall disndss
the bill for want of ciiulty.
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PR E LihlIX.A.RY CON IDE H.A.TIONS. 
DRC�DlOXD et al. v. YEX.d..BLE et al. 
(26 Fed. 243.) 
Circuit Court, X. D. lllinois. Xo¥. 9, 1 3. 
In equity. 
Coburn & Thacher, for complainants. Of­
fielll & Towle, for defendants. 
DLODG ETT, J. Tbi is a uit for infringe­
ment of patent Xo. 200,133, i sued February 
12, 1 '"· to James T. Drummond, for "an im-
11ro¥ement in marking plug tobacco. "  The 
patentee in his specifications says: ''The ob­
ject of my invention is to mark plug tobacco 
i n  �uch a manner that tile retail dealer can 
cut the Jump into smaller plugs. or pieces of 
equal and definite sizes, and at the same time 
tbe wrapper wi l l  be secured to the fi lling 
hy means of t be ma rks or indentation . ;\ly 
in•ention consists in making the plug of t� 
hacco with a se1ies of i nclented l i nes upon its 
face or face<:, which are a rranged so as to 
space olI the surface of the plug into suhdi­
Yisions or uniform and definite size and 
wf'i:,:ht. w h ereby they become guides i n  ut­
t i u g  up tbe plug for retail sales, a nd 'vbich 
also serve to more firmly secure the wrapper 
to the filling, so a to prevent the ta rt i ng of 
1 he former from the latter. l t  is custo ma ry 
in the manufacture of tobacco to make plu,!t' 
that wd,!th one pound. Plug tobacco is mos t ly 
rctaile!l in pieces of one or two ounces in 
w<·ig-ht. It is more expcnsiYe to make up 
"1uall plu:.:s of these size:s, a nd c:onsequcntly 
i t i · 1lesira llle to manufacture tobacco in large 
lu11111s, anc1 Jet the retailer cut them up a he 
sell tbl'm. But the seller experience· great 
1 1H·o nn•11iC"nre in cutting the plu,!ts into pi0c•es 
ol' j ust t he desi red quanti t � : he nce gui<l  s 
a re de:-irahle to enable the cll':1lcr to c·nt from 
a lar:::e pin;.: 1 '. xa<:t ly an ouuc·c, or two oum·cs, 
•ir :111y 1ll'li nite qua n t it y. consbtiu;.: of the 
un t of sa le, or som<• m u l t iple t hereof. • "' 
Shnnhl any other u n i t  of sale be a1lop t01l ,  or 
shonlll the 11lug be of clifft>rent size. the size 
of t h<> Rul irl ivisions Rhould be Yaried <'01Te­
s1x•11d i1 1�l� ; but the mark::; are alwnp; 11J:11·l•cl 
:-11 a s  to !it·1·ve as accurate guides in cut t ing 
1111 the Jnq:e lump. The li ne.'! may n l so he 
111:111,. in r:wh fac·e of the plug, n nrl in fad th is 
is d1 ·sl r:J I •IP l 11 !'c<·m·i ng t lw a dcl i I io11n l runc­
t 1<1 1 1  of t h<' .i 1 1 1 !Pntat in11s hl'J'Pi ll:t ftl'J' sp!'c•ifll'd." 
'I'll" .. 1: 1 1 1 1 1  of t hr pn t f 'JJ( i s :  ".\s a 11cw :ntldc 
of 11m 1 1u t'11t·1 1 1 n>, n ph1g of toh:t<'<'O, one or h o t h  
f;wP. <>f wh ich a re mnrl\1'd off h y  l m lP1 1 1 c1 l 
1 1 111•1;1, whl1 h Sf'f\"C to !'f'<'lll'I' t l1 1• wr:tpp1•r to I hr 
1 1 1 1 ,n �. 1 1 1 1 11 also ns g11id" for r•ut t i n;.: up t lH' 
ping l 1 1 t n  1;1111111 pl"''C'S o f  dcllnltc i;lze nncl 
w"lt:ht, s11hst111 1tlnlly llH uud for the pur­
JKJ l' B<'l forth." 
D il] itize by 
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Tl.Je clefenclant makes tobacco plu:::s o f  tile 
same ize and general appearance a� the com­
plainant , with creases ta mped or :wprcssed 
upon the face of the plug at uniform cli ·tance· 
from each other, so that these crease· serve 
as guides in cutting up the plug in measured 
part for reta il ing. The defenses are (1) the 
want of nor-elty; a nd (2) that the defendants 
do not i nfringe. 
;\luch of the te timony put into the record 
beal' upon the question whether the corn11Jaiu­
ant was or was not the first to invent and 
manufacture tobacco plugs marked with in­
dent ations to seHe a guide for cutting the 
plug into mea ured quantities. Thi te·ti­
mony is confl icting and contradictory, nml, 
did I feel compelled to di  pose of tile case 
upon it, would require careful anaylsis and 
critici m ;  but I am sati fied from the pl'nof 
that there is nothing new in thi  deY iec. 
Tile proof shows that cal;:e bad been made 
by baker for many year before the a lleged 
date of this invention, marh:ed otr with in­
dented l ine to show how to cut the �ame in 
mea ured quantitie or pieces for retail. The 
same practice had been adopted in tbe ma m1-
facture of chocolate, for the pmpose of di­
viding it  into measured piece for reta i l ;  and 
also in the manufacture of candie.. 1 take it. 
>ery few men who a re as old as I am. and 
whose ea rly expcricnee w:l in the eastern 
states, will fail to remember the gingc l'llrcad 
peddler, with bis cal'dS oC gingel'bl'ead li ned 
off in s11aces wllere he was in the I.Jabil of 
brea king or cutting it of[ for the pur110.e of 
reta il ing it to the l1oys a rournl his sta nd ; a nd 
with tllis fact in rememhr:rnce it ::;eems to 
me it could hardly be inYention to sim 11ly 
marl;: a plug of tolln cco so it could be cut ot'I' 
in equal a nd nwasurell qua n t i ties. 
Tb<.> record also :-;hom:; n pn tent Issued to 
.Tames �11ratl, Fchrunry �4. 1"14, for an "' im­
prm cmcnt i n  pre.�si 11::: t0ns for use," whicll 
consisted in prci::sing t he ten k•aye,:; in1o a 
sol id cake with indent ations, so tbn t the 
quantity n0cded for use a l  one t im� c'<iul<l lw 
readi ly broken oIT. .\ ft pr this devk'e hail lwe11 
appl ied to rl l fi'el'cnt l;: inch:i of ;::oorls so as to i n ·  
dic·:i te mra::;ured quant i tle:>. 1 h<'re cnulrl h:1 nllr 
be any lnyentlon in :l ]IJllying It to tohacc•o. Uut 
it is cla i 11w1l t here Is :rn l'lemcnt ot' u t i l i t y  i n  
these i t11lc11ta tions, ns a ppl ied t o  toh1wco plugs. 
l lcl':11 HC It I,:; snill 1 h 1•y Sl'l'Y<' 1o f:t st c·n t l w 
w1·n 11pc•1· more llrmly 1n t lw plug. Thi.' 1 n·nnf 
shows t his <'lalm of u t i l i t y  I:;, at lu1�t. dnuht ­
ful ; hut 1·,·pn If ful ly su11pnrtrd hy t ill' J1!'onf, 
it h1 m:t n l ft>;;tly l nd1lc•1 1 1:t l .  :1 1 111 Ii; not t he 
ma in pu rpose of t he" l n r lP1 1 l n t h l ll. 
I t hen•t'r11·c frl'I c•o 1 1 1 1 11'iil'd to bold 1 l t 1'1 pa 1 l'nt 
void, for wa nt of nn \ l'l t y, nnd bh:t l l  dlsntiMI 
the hill for want of equity. 
O ri i r  - 1  fr� 1 
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PHILLIPS et al. v. RISSER et al.
(26 Fed. 308.)
District Oourt, N. D. Illinois. June 29, 1885.
In equity.
Burnett & Burnett, for complainants.
Poirce & Fisher, for defendants.
BLODGETT, J. By this bill complainants
charge defendants with the infringement of
reissued letters patent No. 4,212, issued to
complainant, December 20, 1870, for "an im-
provement in wagon and car unloading ap-
paratus," the original patent, No. 83,405,
having been issued to Noah Swicliard, Oc-
tolier 13, 1868. The leading feature in the
device is the arrangement of two tilting
bars with a platform in such manner that
the wheels of the wagon or car to be unload-
ed can be brought to rest on these bars,
when, by tilting the bars, the body of the
vehicle is tipped to such an angle as to
cause the contents to slide or be dumped
out by its own gravity. The defenses inter-
jiosed are: (1) That the patent is void for
want of novelty; (2) that the defendants do
not infringe; (3) that the reissued patent
is for a difCereut invention from that de-
scribed in the original, and is such an en-
largement of the specifications and claims
of the original patent as to make the reissue
void.
The .proof shows a number of devices, pri-
or to that covered by this patent, for unload-
ing cars or trucks by tilting the platform
on which they stand so as to cause the con-
tents of the car to slide out or be dumiied
into a bin or chute; but from the proof I
conclude that Swickard was the first to pro-
duce a device by which the wagon was tip-
ped or thrown into an inclined position, by
means of vibrating bars or rails, which oper-
ated in connection with a fixed or stationary
platform; and this arrangement seems to be
particularly adapted to dumps for unloading
bulk grain from wagons drawn by teams,
as the team can pass readily upon the fixed
platform, the wheels being so guided as to
be brought to rest upon the rails or bars
forming part of the vibrating platform.
Most, if not all, the prior devices seem to
have been specially adapted to unloading
the contents of cars or trucks run upon rail-
road tracks or tram-ways; but it is notice-
able that Swickard specially states that his
invention Is to be used for unloading wagons
or cars, although he only shows it in use
as arranged for unloading wagons. But it
is suggested that if it is applicable to the
unloading of cars it must be radically chan-
ged; that, while an ordinary farm wagon
stands upon wheels at such height that a
sufficient Inclination can be obtained by
dropping the hind end down until the rear
axle strikes the fixed platform, the much
.';uialler wheels of a car would cause the
axle to strike the fixed platform before the
requisite Inclination was secured. It is,
however, undoubtedly true that the mere
suggestion of this patentee that his machine
can be used "for unloading wagons or cars"
would not invalidate it as a wagon unloader,
even if it should require inventive genius
to adapt it to the unloading of cars; tliat
is, it may not be used to unload cars, as the
word "car" is commonly used, in contradis-
tinction to "wagon," yet it may cover a
valid device for unloading a wagon, and
would be valid if it is applicable to one
use, even if it is not applicable to all the
uses suggested by the inventor. The proof,
therefore, shows that there is some advan-
tage in using these tilting rails instead of a
tilting platform. I am of the opinion that
defense of want of novelty is not made out,
although I feel compelled to say that in my
estimation there is much reason for doubt-
ing whether it requires anything more than
mere mechanical skill to adapt the older
devices to the unloading of wagons. The
patent, at least, must be construed to stand
upon a very narrow basis.
As before stated, the original patent show-
ed two platforms; that is, a fixed platform,
A, and a vibrating or tilting platform, work-
ing in slots in the fixed platform, the pivoted
balance bars being tied together at their for-
ward end by a cross-board, which rested up-
on the fixed platform when the movable one
was level with the fixed one, so that the
vibrating or tilting bars could not move or
act independently of each other, but must
raise or lower at the same time. The cross-
board or plank, C, also acted as a stop to
keep the forward ends of the tilting rails
from dropping below the fixed platform,
while, by the arrangement of the keys, E,
E, they held the rear ends of the tilting plat-
form in place until the wagon was drawn
onto them, when, by means of a lever, these
supporting keys were withdrawn, and by a
slight effort, or the weight of the operator,
the rear end of the movable platform was
dropped to an angle required to slide the
load from the wagon. Each of these tilting
rails also contains a self-acting dog, G,
which was intended to act as a check to pre-
vent the wagon from running back after it
had been drawn upon the platform; and, in
order to guide the wagon onto the tilting
platform, the lid of the hopper was made
long enough to reach from inside to inside
of the rail, and raised a couple of inches
above the platform, so that it would serve to
guide the wheels onto the tilting rails.
There was also fixed to the forward ends
of these tilting bars a bar or hook, which
was intended to prevent the front end of
the movable platform from rising higher
than should be required to secure the neces-
sary slope of the wagon for causing the load
to slide out.
The claims of the original patent were:
"(1) The slotted platform, A. in combination
with the pivoted balance bars, B, B, board,
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PAT.E X T . 
PHILLIPS et al. v. RISSER et al. 
(26 Fed. 308.) 
District Oourt, N. D. Illinois. June 29, 1885. 
In equity. 
Burnett & Burnett. for complainants. 
Peirce & Fisher, for defendants. 
BLODGETT, J. By this bill complainants 
charge defendants with the infringement of 
reissued letters patent No. 4,212, issued to 
complainant, December 20, 1870, for "an im­
prcn·ement in wagon and car unloading ap­
paratus," the original patent, No. 83,403, 
ha1'ing been issued to Noah Swickard, Oc­
toher 13. 1868. The leading feature i n  the 
device i s  the arrangement o f  two tilting 
ba rs with a platform i n  such manner that 
the wheels of the wagon or car to be unload­
ed ca n be brought to rest on these bars, 
wlten. by tilting the bars, the body of the 
vehicle is tipped to such an angle as to 
cause the contents to slide or be dumped 
out by its own gravity. The defenses inter­
posed are :  (1) That the patent is void for 
w a n t  of novelty; (2) that the defendants do 
not infringe ; (3) that the reissued patent 
i!' for a different invention from that de­
seribed in the original, and is such an en­
la rg-ement of the specifications and claims 
of the original patent as to make the reissue 
\Oid. 
The proof shows a number of devices, pri­
or to ihat covered by this patent, for unload­
i ng cars or trucks by tilting the platform 
o n  which they stand so as to cause the con­
tents of the car to slide out or be dunmed 
into a bin or chute ; but Crom the proof I 
conclude that Swickard was the first to pro­
duce a device by which the wagon was tip­
ped or thrown i nto a n  inclined position, by 
means o f  vibrating bars or rails, which oper­
ated in connection with a fixed or stationary 
1 1latform ; and this arrangement seems to be 
particularly adapted t o  dumps for unloading 
hulk grai n  from wagons drawn by teams, 
as t he team can pass readily upon the fixeu 
lJlatform. the wheels being so guided as to 
he brought to rest upon the rails or bars 
forming- part of the vibrating platform. 
:\lost. if not all, the prior devices seem to 
h�n-e been specially adapted to unloall i n.� 
t i le contents of cars or trucks run upon rail­
road tracks or tram-ways ;  but it is notice­
able that Swickard specially states tllat his 
i n vention is to be used for unloall i ng wagons 
or cars, although he only shows it i n  use 
as arranged for unloading wagons. But i t  
is sug:rested that i f  i t  i s  applicable t o  the 
unloading of cars it must be radically chan­
;.:etl : that, while an ordinary farm wagon 
stands upon wheels at such heigllt that a 
ufficient i nclination can be obtained by 
1l ropping the hind end down until the ren r 
axle sti·ikes the fixed platform, the much 
su1aller wheels of a car would cause t h e  
\I 'I. l e  t o  strike the fixed platform lJefore the 
c . .  ·--
N E R N .:  T A R CHIVE 
requisite Inclination was secured. It is, 
llo wever, undoubtedly true that the mere 
suggestion of this patentee that his mac:hine 
can be used "for unloading wagons or cars" 
would not invalidate it as a wagon unloader, 
even if it should require inventive genius 
to adapt i t  to the unloading of cars; t h: i t  
is, i t  may n o t  b e  used t o  unload cars, a s  tile 
word "car" is commonly used, in contradis­
tinction to "wagon," yet it may cover a 
valid device for unloading a wagon, a n d  
would be valid if i t  i s  applicable to o n e  
use, even i f  i t  i s  not applicable t o  a l l  t h e  
ui:;cs suggested b y  the inventor. The proof, 
t herefore, shows that there is some advan­
tage in using these tilting rails instead of a 
tilting platform. I am of the opinion that 
defense of want of noYelty is not made out, 
alt hough I feel compelled to say that in my 
estimation there is much reason for doubt­
ing whether it requires anything more than 
mere mechanical skill to adapt the olller 
devices to the unloading of wagons. The 
patent, at least, must be construed to stand 
upon a Yery narrow basis. 
As before slatecl, the original patent show­
ed two platfor ms; that is, a fixed platform, 
A, and a vibrating or tilting platform, work­
ing i n  slots in the fixed platform, the pivoted 
balance bars being tied together at their for­
ward end by a cross-board, which rested up­
on the fixed platform wllen the movalJle one 
was level with the fixed one, so t h a.t tile 
vibrating or til ling bars could not move or 
act independently of each other, but must 
raise or lower at the same ti me. The cross­
board or plank, C, also acted as a stop to 
keep the forward ends of the tilting r:1 ils 
from dropping below the fixed platform, 
while. by the arrangement of the keys, E. 
E, tlley held the rear ends of the tilting plat­
form i n  place until the wagon was drawn 
onto them, when, by means of a lever, these 
supporting keys were withdrawn, and by a 
slight effort, or the weight of the opera.tor, 
the rear end of t h e  movable platform was 
dropped to au angle required to slide the 
load from t he \Yagon. EaC'h of tllese tilting 
rails also contains a self-acting clog. G, 
which was intended to act as a check to pre­
•ent the wairon from running back after it 
llad been dra..,·n upon the platform ; au1l , i n  
order t o  guitle t h e  wagon onto the tilting 
platform, the lid of the hopper was mn1le 
long- enough to reach from inside to in !'ltle 
of the rail, and raised a couple of itwhes 
ahove the platform. so that i t  would serve to 
guide the wllcels onto the tilting rails. 
There wa!' also fixed to the forward crnls 
of t hese tilting bars a bar or hook, which 
was intended to pre>ent the front end of 
the movalJle platform from rising hig-her 
than should be required to secure the neces­
sary slope of the wagon for causing the load 
to slide out. 
The claims of the original patent were: 
"(1) The slotted platform, A. i n  combination 
w it h  the pi rnteu balance !Jars, B, B, board, 
1 I I  I I 
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C, end-bars, I, I, and stops, H, H. all con-
structed and operating substantially as and
for the purposes herein set forth. (2) The
pivoted balance bars, B, B, provided with
one or more self-acting dogs, G, in combina-
tion with the spring toggle keys, E, E, and
key, F, all constructed and operating as and
for the purposes herein set forth. (3) The
arrangement of the slotted platform, A, bal-
ance bars, B, B, and lid, D, to the hopper,
substantially for the purposes set forth."
It will be seen that the first claim is for
the combination of these two platforms, the
one fixed and the other capable of the tilt-
ing motion described, with the cross-board
which tied the forward ends of the tilting
rails together, and the hooks or end-bars
which limited the height to which the for-
ward end of the tilting platform could rise.
The second claim is for the tilting bars, pro-
vided with one or more self-acting dogs, in
combination with the keys, by which the i
rear of the tilting platform was held in
place while the wagon was being drawn
onto it; wliile the third claim is for the two
platforms and lid of the hopper arranged so
as to act as a wheel-guide.
The patent as reissued contains seven
claims, and the infringement in this case is
charged as to tlie first, fifth, sixth, and
seventh claims. These claims, as to which
infringement is charged, are as follows: "(1)
The lilting platform, B, in combination with
plalform or floor, A, as and for the purposes
set forth. ♦ ♦ * (5) The combination of
platforms, A and B, with a stop device. I,
for the purpose set forth. (G) The combina-
tion of platforms, A and B, with a receiving
bin or chute, C, operated substantially as de-
sci'ibod, for the purpose set forth. (7) The
combination of platforms, A and B, with lid,
D, for the purposes sot forth."
It is conceded that the defendants have
constructed grain dumps with lilting rails,
each pivoted and working independently of
the other, substantially like llio defendants'
Model A, In evidence in this case, with some
variation as to the mode of locking or stop-
ping the rear cud of the rails in place, and
one dump, like the defendant.*?' Model B,
in which, as will be seen, the forward ends
of the lilting rails are tied together by a
cross-plank; and the first (nieslion I propose
to consider as to (his branch of the case Is
whether these dumps constructed by the de-
fendants Infringe either of these claims of
the reissued patent.
Till! lli-st claim of the reissue Is for the
tilling iilalform, B, In combination wlfli the
llxed plalform or floor, A. In the siteclflca-
tlona of the reissue It Is snld Hit? tilling plat-
form Ih no onnstrucled "as that Its forward
end Hliall rest uiion the slallonary pl.'ilforiTi."
It must be obvious to any one who studies
the opernllou of Ihese devices thnt some
way innst be provided for holding the for-
ward end of the movable platform ho that
It will not fall below the llxed platform.
The specifications of the reissue give no in-
structions as to how the forward end of the
tilting platform is to be constructed, so that
it shall rest on the stationary platform; but
the drawings show a cross-board which ties
the forward ends of the two pivoted bars
together, and this cross-board, when those
forward ends drop to the level of the fixed
platform, must rest on the fixed platform,
and thus hold the movable platform level
with the fixed platform. This mode of con-
struction is clearly shown in Fig. 2 of the
reissue drawing. It may, as I think, be cor-
rectly said that this mode of construction
shown in the drawings is only one mode,
and does not limit the patentee to that mode
of construction only; that is, he may, by the
reissued patent, use any mode of construc-
tion by which the forward end of the mov-
able platform is made to rest on the fixed
platform. The rails of defendants' dumps
constructed according to Exhibit A rest upon
a cross-timber fastened under the stationary
platform; while the dump constructed ac-
cording to Exhibit B shows the forward ends
of the rails tied to.getlier, so that the cro.ss-
board rests on the stationary platform. It
seems to me, therefore, that the dumps of
the defendant infringe this first claim; that
is, they use the fixed and tilting platform
acting together substantially as in the reis-
sue, because tliese two pivoted rails working
in their respective slots, when restin.g upon
their front and rear bearings, fo'rm a plat-
form, and when a wa.gon is driven upon them
it stands luacticall.v upon a platform com-
posed of these two rails and the bearing up-
on which tliey rest. When the keys or locks
of the rear ends of these rails are removed,
then the platform can be tilted, and thereby
the wagon put at such an angle as to dis-
charge its load. The tie-bar shown In the
defendants' dump, B, and in the drawing, is
really inoi)erative and performs no function,
if some other rest for the forward ends of
the bar is provided, because tlie.se bars work-
ing in their slot are all that are needed to
hold the four wlu'cls of the wagon, and arc
practically a platform of themselves, without
regard to n tie-board or cross-board connect-
ing their forward end.
The fifth claim is for the combination of
the platr<u'ms. .A and B, with the stop device
or hook, l)y whi<'h the platform is prevented
from tilting further than is necess'ary to un-
load the wagon. The defendants do not use
this slop device, and tlierefore do not In-
fringe this combination.
The sl.xtli cl:ilm Is fiu' the combination of
the platforms, .\ and B, with the receiving
bin or chule. As 1 shall have sonielliing to
say about this claim In cunsldering the va-
lidity of this relssiu", I will only say, In pass-
ing, lh;il no sjjeelal form of receiving bin or
dinle Is shown or described In the specifica-
tions. The very Idea of dumping or unload-
ing the conlenis of a wagon dv car presup-
poses that the contents are to be dumped
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PHELDll � _UtY co_ · , 1 D ERATIOS . 
C, end-ba rs, I, I, and stops. EI. H ,  all  con­
structed and opera t ing substa ntia lly as a n d 
for the purposes herein set forth. (2) The 
pivoted bala nce bars, B. B. pro•ided with 
one o r  more self-acting dogs, G, in combina ­
tion with t he sprin.; toggle keys, E, E. and 
key, F, a l l  const ructed and operating as and 
for the purposes herein set forth. (3) The 
arra ngement of the slotted platform, A. bal­
a nc-e l iars. B, B, and l id, D, to the bopper, 
sul1st.:1 1 1t inlly for the pu rposes set forth ." 
I t  wi l l IJe seen that the first cla im is for 
t he c-ornl1 ination of these two platforms, the 
one fixed a nd the other ca pable of the tilt­
ing motio n described, with the cross-board 
which t ied the forward ends of the tilting 
rails tog:et her, and tlle hooks or end-bars 
whieh l i mited the height to which the for­
ward end of the tilti ng plat form could rise. 
The scc-oud cla i m  i s  for the t i lting bars, pro­
vided with one or more self-acting dog . in 1 
combi nat ion with t he keys, by which the 
rear of the ti lt ing platform was held i n  
p ince w h i l e  the war::on w a s  being drawn 
onto i t ; " h ile tile thinl cla i m i s  for the two 
platforms and lid of the hopper arra nged so 
a s  to :wt a s  a wllecl-gnide. 
Tile patent a s  reissued conta i ns se1en 
cla ims , a n d the infringement i n  th i s case is 
chn r;:::-e<l a s  to the first. fifth, sixth, and 
seventh claims. These clai ms. a s  t o  which 
in fr i n ;:::-e ment i s  cha rged, a re as follows : "{l)  
Thi' t i ll ing platform, B, in co mbination with 
plat form o r  floor, A, a s  and for the p m·poses 
set forth. • • • (3) The combination of 
pla tformR, A and B, with a stop device. I ,  
for t h e  purpose set forth. (G) The combina­
t ion or pla t forms. A and B, w i t h  a rc>ceiving 
!Jiu or ehute, C, opera ted substantially as de­
S(' rihP1 l . for tile pmposc set forth . (7) The 
c·omhi 11n t ion of plat forms. A and B, with lid, 
D, for t he p urpose>,;; spt forth " 
It is <'oncedctl that the clefemln nts h::i.ve 
co nstrn<"t rcl gra i n  dumpi:; w it h t i lting mi ls, 
ra <'11  p i \· otcd a lH l  worki ng in1lc>11cndcntly of 
1hP <' 1 h 1  r, subst a n t i a l ly like t he clcfrnda nts' 
::'1Irnl1·l A, I n  evi clcnc't? iu thiR case, w i t h sonH' 
Y:nin l ion as to the mocle or locking or stop 
ping 1 he rrn r <'IHl of tll<' ra i l s i 11 plac-r. an1 l  
o n e  cl u mp, l i ke the clcfencla n tR' !\Io<lcl B ,  
I n  whi f '! 1 ,  n s  w i l l  h e  S<'cn, t he fo rwa rd <' J H l s  
nf f h P t i l l i 11g ra i l s a rP t i ccl t n�c>1 hc r  h y  ll 
<Toss- plnn l• ; and th<' fi rst qll<'!l l lo n  I propnsc I l o  ronsirlr>r as t o  t h is hr:l ll<'h of t h<' 1·n s<.' Is 1 
whPl 1 1 1 ·1· 1 hPsf> r l 11 111ps c·nns1 rncte1l hy t l H' 1 lP- 1 
fr • 1 1 1 l : i 1 1 t f:  l 11 fri ng-I' Plt h r r  of t hc-sc dn l 1 1 1 s  of 
1 he 1'<'11<. tlt 'd pa I l' ll I .  
'l"ht• Il l-st dnim of t he rclRsne is for t hC' 
t l l t i 1 1 g  pl11 t fo r11 1 ,  H, I n c·n 111 hl1 111 ! 1011 w i t1i t h<' 
l l X P<i pla I f"o rm or floor, ,\, I n  l lw " J H'< ' iflen 
1 101 111 of l l H •  l'PiSSlll' it IH 1-111 1 1 1  t ill ' 1 1 1 1 i n ;:  pl n 1  
f1 1nn I f!  Im r •nnhl l'l l r ' l l 'd ''l l H  1 hn t l t H  J'o1· wn 1·d 
1 11 d  1:1l ln l l  1 · 1  I 1 1 po1 1 ! l w st n 1 lnnn rs pln t l'orm " 
I t  1 1 1 1 1R1  1 11'  ohl' l n t 1 E1  I n  : 1 1 1 y  olll' who Htt 1 r l l < 'H 
t lw 0 1 11 111 l l • 1u  o l'  l l l f '  ·1 !  ""''lr1''4 l hn t  0401nc• 
\\"llY Hl ltKI t u •  11r11r ldr•rl fnr hnl r l l ng- t h<' f11r­
Wll nl l ' l t r l  of t h1• 1 1 1 ( 1\"n hi!' pl11 I f"or1 1 1  i;n I h;1 t 
I t  w i l l  not fa l l  l u •low t he J I X Pr l  pl n l frirm. 
D i g itizea: by 
INTER NET A R CHIVE 
The specifieations o f  the reissue give no in­
strnctions as to bow the forward end of the 
t i lting platform i s  to be constructed, so that 
i t  s ha l l  rest on tile stationary platform ; but 
the dra w ings show a cross-boa rd which ties 
the fon1ard ends of the t\1·11 piYoted hn1" 
together. a nd this cross-boa rtl. \Yben these 
fonva nl ends drop to the leYel of the fixed 
i1I a t fnnu. m ust rest on the fixed platform . 
and t h us bold the mo>able pl atform Jen·! 
with the fixed platform. Thb mode of con­
struction is cle::t rly hown in Fig. 2 of the 
reissue dra v\'ing. I t  may, a s  I t hi nk, be cor­
rectly sa id t ha t  this mode of construction 
sho\\"n i n  the drawing. is only one mode, 
and cloes not limit the pa ten tee to that mode 
of con truction only ; that is, he may, by the 
reissued pa tent, use any motle of construc­
t ion by w hich t he forward end of the UJOY­
ahle platform is macle to rest on t he lixl'cl 
pla tform. '.f he ra i l s of tlc>fcmlants' dumps 
cou tructecl a ccor{li ng to Exhibit A re t upou 
a cross-ti mber fa tened under t ile tation:UT 
pla tform ; while the clump constructed ae­
corrli ng to Exhibit B shows the forward enus 
of t h  ' ra i l  tieu tog-ei.lle1·. so that the cross­
boa rd rests on the sta t ionary iilatform. Jt 
sec111s to me, therC'forc. t h a t  the d u mps of 
the clef�nda nt i n fringe t h i s  first da i m :  that 
is, thes use t he fixed and t ilt i ng pln trnrm 
ac t i ng together substa ntia l ly as in tlfr reis­
sue, because- tllese two piYott'll rails "'orking 
in thPir rcspectiYe slots. w hL'll rcstiu;.: upt>ll 
t h eir front and rear bearings, fo'1·1 1 1  a p l a t­
form, and WhC'n n wagon i • 1 ll"in•n upon them 
i t  stands 1H·actkn lly upon a 1 1!: 1 t fonn L'nm­
posecl of t lwsc hYo ra ils anu t l w lwa riu:.: 1111· 
on which t lwy rest. '\\' h e n  t he- keys or \ 1 1eks 
of 1 hc rear cuds of these r:1 i l ,; are remoYcd. 
1 lwu t he plat form ca u be t i l ll'<l .  and t hcreb)· 
t i le wa ;.:on irnt at srn It a n a n g-le as h> ,fo,. 
diarge its load. The t i l'·har ,.;hown I n  the 
cll'f1·ndants' d u mp, H ,  n 1 11l in the tl ra w i n;.: . i s  
real ly inopcrn tiyc a n d pcrfo1· 1 1 1 s  n t1  fUlll.'t iou, 
i f' some other re-st !°<II" t i le fnrwnrd cn1\:< of 
t h C' ha t· is p1·m i<ktl. lit'e:1 usc t hese ba rs work­
i 1 1 g  in t hC' i t· slot a re all 1 h a l  a rc uceded to 
hold 1 h t• t'on r w lwds or 1 lw w:1 ;.:<lll. a nrl a re 
Jll":ldil':t J IJ :1. pla t form of t l t l ' l llSl'(H'S, wlth•'llt 
rcg:1 1·c1 to n t ie-boa rel or crnss· ho:u·tl l'01lllCl.'t­
l u l-'(  t ll l ' i t· fonvar1l eull. 
'l'hc fi ft h dai1 1 1  is for 1h l' <'l lll lhina tlon of 
t he pla 1 forms. A n nr l  R. wi 1 h t he stop 1kY ll't> 
or hook, hy w h ich 1 hr pl:l 1 fot" l l l  IH prl'YClll<.'il 
from t i l t i ng fnrt h<'I" t l t:i n !,;  1 l <'1'<'�S:1 ry to llU· 
lnn <l t hC' wn �< l ll . Tlw d1•fr111 l n 1 1 1 s  r ln not \Isl' 
t l t l s  �tnp i!P' icr, :i nd l h1° rl• l'orc 110 nnt in 
Cri ng!' 1 h ! s  c·n m hi 1 1 a t lo11 .  
' l 'hl'  sh t h  d:1 i 1 1 1  ls fnr t h <' r•n1u hinn t lon of 
l hP pla ! fm·ms, .\ nn rl H, w i t h  1 h l '  l'<'1 °, . l r h 1 �  
1 1 1 1 1  o r  1'11 11 1< ' .  \ ;1  I s h n  1 1  h:n <' sn11 1  . .  t ! t i n g- to 
�:1 .1· : i hn11 t  t h lH <'ln l 1 1 1  1 1 1 r •1 1 1 1 s l d l ' l ' i 1 1g- I l ic V:t· 
l l c l l t �· of t h l H  r1 • li;,..111', I \\' I l l 1 1 1 1 1 .1 .-ny, 1 11 1 u1i;i;­
l 1 1 !!, t hn l  un i<Jll 'dn l fn rl ! l  o l' '"'<'<'l 1 l 1 1 g- hln or 
c· l t t t 1 P  Is shnwu or 1\coi;c·rl l u  d In 1 1 11• SJll'f " i lka· 
1 101 11'. ' 1 ' 1 1 1 •  \ C'ry l < Jp;J or d 1 1 1 1 1 p l 1 1 i.:  I l l' 1 1 1 i lo: 1 r l ­
l 11 i:  l h<' c•nt t l l ' l l ! H  of n \\ :1�011  ot'  1 ' : 1 1' pn•snp 
J IOHl'l'I t hat t h e C'Ol 1 1 1 ' 1 1 tS Ill'(' 1 o  he d t l l l l [ l > ' I )  
.::. r . . . , ,  trar 1 
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into some receptacle; and it may well be
doubted whetlier this claim is not too vague
and uncertain to be upheld.
The seventh claim is for the combination of
the platforms A and B, with the hopper lid,
D. This lid, D, as has been said, is arranged
to act as a guide to run the wagon wheels
upon the rails, and, as defendants use no
such device, but h:ive dropped their vibrat-
ing rails a slight distance below the surface
of the fixed platform, so as to make sure of
lunning the wheels upon the vibrating rails,
the.v do not infringe this combination, their
wheel guide being different from that pro-
vided in the patent. I therefore conclude
that the defendants' dumps infringe the first
claim of this reissued patent.
I now come to consider the validity of this
reissue. It will be noticed that this reissue
was apiilied for and made more than two
years after tlie issue of the original patent,
and the defendants insist that this case is
by that fact brought within the cases of
.Tames v. CampbelU and Miller v. Bridgeport
Brass Co. 2 Complainants Insist, however
that the clainis of the reissue are but a re-
statement of the claims of the original pat-
ent. A comparison of the original with the
reissued patent shows that the specifications
have been much amplified, and, to some ex-
tent, new elements are introduced into them.
For instance, in the original patent it is said:
"A planli: or board, C, is secured to the front
end of such bars, so that they cannot work
independently or separate from each other,
but must raise and lower at the same time."
In the reissue it is said: "A tilting platform.
B, so constructed as that its forward end
shall rest upon the stationary platform, while
the rear end, consisting of beams or bars, B,
shall play within the openings or slots form-
ed in the floor, so that, when required, the
rear end of the platform may descend below
the line of the floor." Here we have, as it
seems to me, a radical departure from the
mode of construction indicated by the origi-
nal patent. The original imtent required
imperatively that the forward ends of these
tilting bars should be fastened together so
that they could not work independently or
separate from each other, but must raise
or lower at the same time. By omitting
this element from the reissue, the paten-
tees have caused their device to cover a
device which would not be covered by their
original patent. Neither the claims of the
original patent, nor the specifications, seem
to anticipate any other form of construc-
tion tlian one in which the vibrating bars
should be fastened together at their for-
ward ends, so that they could not operate
1 Fed. Cas. No. 2,361.
2 Fed. Cas. No. 9,563.
indoi)endently or separate from each other.
By the reissue all that seems to be required
is that some rest or stop shall be provided
to pi'event the forward ends of the vibrating
rails from falling below the level of the fixed
platform, and, as I have already said, the
defendants so construct their dump that the
forward ends of the vibrating rails rest upon
a timber fastened to the under side of the
fixed platform. Here is a new invention or
different invention described and claimed
from that described and claimed in the origi-
nal patent. The original patent claimed a
vibrating i>latform of a peculiar construc-
tion, with certain elements in it. The re-
issue claims a different vibrating platform,
with less elements in it, and describes a
vibrating platform not covered by the origi-
nal specifications or claims.
As. in considering the question of infringe-
ment, I have held that the defendants only
infringe the first claim of the reissue, it may
not be necessary to consider the validity of
the fifth, sixth, and seventh claims of this
reissue; but I can hardly forbear the passing
remark that the sixth claim of the reissue,
which is for the combination of the two
platforms with the receiving bin or chute,
seems to me to be a most unwarrantable en-
largement and expansion of the original pat-
ent. The original patent contained no sug-
gestion or description of a receiving bin or
chute. The only possible allusion to it is the
mention of the lid to the hopper; and yet,
by the sixth claim of this reissue, an ele-
ment which is not in the original patent, ei-
ther by description or claim, is made one of
the elements of a combination. It therefore
seems to me that this reissued patent must
be held void, as being for an invention not
described in or covered by the original pat-
ent. This patentee could not, by this reis-
sue, add new features or omit old features,
especially after the lapse of so much time
from the issue of the original patent.
The proof in the case shows quite conclu-
sively that, at or about the time of the issue
of this original patent, this kind of dumps
or devices for unloading wagons came Into
use, especially at elevators and coru-shelling
warehouses at railroad stations, and it was
found by practical expeiience that two pivot-
ed rails so arranged that the wagon could
be driven upon them, with proper stops to
hold them in ijlace. and a device for the re-
leasing of the stop when ready to dump, was
all that was necessary for the purpose, and
Sypes, McGrath. and other inventors entered
the field with this simpler form of dump,
whereupon plaintiff sought and obtained this
reissue in order to cover this less compli-
cated construction which others had intro-
duced and proved useful.
This bill is dismissed for want of equity.
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into some receptacle; and it may well be 
douhtcd whet her this claim is not too \':lguc 
and uncertain to be upheld. 
'l'he seYenth clairu is for the combi nalion of 
ti.Jc platforms A and B, with the hopper lirl. 
D. Thi::; licl, D, as has been said, is arranged 
t o  :1l't as a guide to run t he wagon wheels 
ni1un t he rails, and, as dci'Pnclants use no 
s neh device, but llave droppe1l their vibrnt­
i n.� rn i ls a sligllt distance below the surface 
or th<> fixed platform, so as to make sure of 
1·unning the wheels upon ti le v i brating rails, 
t hey 110 not infringe t llis combination, their 
wht•t>l guide b<'ing different from that pro­
vided in the patent. I therefore conclude 
that the 1l c>fernl au ts' <l umps i ufri uge the first 
da i 1 11 of this reissued pateut. 
I now come to consider the validity of this 
1·0issn0. It  will  be notitell that this rl'issue 
was ap pliecl for aud made rnore tha n t wo 
yC'a rs a rtC'r the issue of tbe o r igi ual patent, 
aucl the defendants insist tha t this c·ase is 
by t llat fact brought within the cases oE 
.James v. Campbel11 and l\Iiller v. Bridgeport 
B rass Co. 2 Complainants insist, however 
th at the cla ims of the reissue a re hut a l'l'­
sta tement or' the clairns of the original i1at­
eut. A comparison of the original w itb the 
reissued patent shows that the specifica tiorn; 
have been much a m pl ified, ancl, to some ex­
tent, new elements are i ntroduced into them. 
For instance, in the original patent i t  is saicl : 
''A. plank or boarcl, C, is secured to the front 
end of such bars, so that they cannot work 
independently or separate from each other, 
but must raise and lower at the same tirne." 
J u t11e reissue it i s  sai d : "A tilt ing platform. 
B, SO ('Onstructed as that ils forward C'!ltl 
!':hall rest upon the stationary platform, while 
the rear encl. consisting of beaws or bars, B, 
shall play within the openings or slots form­
ed i n  the floor, so that, when required, the 
rear end of the platform may descend below 
the line of the floor." Here we have, �ls it 
seems to me, a radical departure from tlle 
mode of construction ind icated by the origi­
nal pa t ent.  The original patent required 
impernti vely that t he forward ends of these 
tilting bars should be fastened together so 
that they could not work indepenclently o r  
separate from each ot her, b u t  must raise 
or lower at the same ti me. B y  omitt i ng 
t llis element from t h e  reissue, the paten­
tees have caused theit· device to cover a 
device which would not be covered by their 
original patent. Neither the clnims of the 
original patent, nor the specifications, seem 
to ant itir)ate any other form of construc­
t ion than one in w h ich the vibrating bars 
should be fastened together at their for­
ward ends, so that they could not operate 
1 Fed. Cas. No. 2,361. 
2 Fed. Cas. No. 9,563. 
D 1 g 1t1zect by 
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independen t ly o r  separate from each other. 
By tlle reissue all tbat sec111s to lie requi rerl 
is tllat some rest 01· stop shall !Je lJrLJ\'i•led 
to prevent the forward ends or t he vi!Jratiug 
ra ils from falling below the level of tlle fixed 
platforrn, and, as I have already said, thr> 
defendants !':O construct their d u m p  tllat tht· 
forward ends of the vibrating rails rest upuu 
a tiruber fastened to the under side of tlle 
fixecl pla tfonu. Here is a new invention 01· 
d i ffcrent i n veu lion destri bPtl a.rnl cla i mer! 
from that described all(] dai1 1wd i n  the origi­
ual patent. The origi nal patent daillletl a 
YilJra ting platform or a pe<·uliar construc­
tion, with tertain elemeuts in it.  The re­
issue da ims a different vibrating platforrn, 
with less elements in it,  and describes a 
vibrating platform not covered by the origi­
nal specifications or cla ims. 
As. iu considering the question of infringe­
ment, I have he I cl that the tlefendants only 
infringe the first cla i m  of tlle reissue, i t  rna�· 
not be ncct'S>':l !'Y to consider the Yalidity uf 
the fi fth,  sixth, and se\'enth daims of this 
reissue ; but I can harrlly forbear the passing 
remark that the sixth claim of the reissue, 
which is for the combination of the twu 
platforms with the receiving bin or chute, 
seems to me to be a most u nwarrantable en­
largement and expansion of the original pat­
ent. The original patent conta i necl no sug­
gestion or description of a receiving b i n  or 
chute. The only possible allusion to it  is the 
mention of the lid to the hopper; and yet, 
by the sixth cla i m  of this reissue, an ele­
ment which is not i n  tlle original patent, ei­
ther by description o r  claim, is maile one or 
the elements of a comlJination. I t  therefore 
seems to me that this reissued patent must 
he held void, as being for a u  i nvention not 
rll'scribed i n  or covered by the original pat­
ent. This patentee could not, by this rei::;­
sue. add new features or omit old features, 
espetially after the lapse of so much time 
from the issue of the original patent. 
Th<' proof in th<' case shows quite conclu· 
sil ely t hat, at or about the time of the issue 
of this origi nal patent, this kincl of dumps 
or deYices for unloa1ling wa.�ons came into 
use, espec ially at eleYn tors a 011 coru-sllel l ing 
warehouses at ra i l roa1l sta tions. a n d  it wa:; 
found !Jy practieal ex1wriP11<·t· tllat t\YO pivot­
ed rails so a rrangeu that the �-a�on could 
be driven upon them, with proper stops to 
hold them in pla('P. and a device for tlle re­
leasing of tbe sto1i when really to dump, wa,.; 
a l l  that was necessary for the purpose. ancl 
Sypes, :\IcGratll. and other i n ventors enteretl 
the field w i t h  this sirnpler form of dump, 
whereupon plaintiff sought and obtaine1l this 
reissue in orcler to cover this less compli­
cated construction which others bad intro­
duced and proved useful. 
This bill i s  dismissed for want of equity. 
O rigmal from 
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BARTLETTE v. CRITTENDEN et al.
(Fed. Cas. No. 1,082, 4 McLean, 3(X).l
Circuit Court, D. Ohio. July Term, 1S47.
[In equity. Bill by R. M. Bartlette to re-
strain A. P. Crittenden and others from in-
fritigement of copyright Injunction grant-
ed.]
Mr. Walker, for complainant. Storer &
iJwynn, for defendants.
OPINION OF THE COURT. This is an
application to enjoin the defendants from
printing, publishing, or selling a work de-
nominated "An inductive and practical sys-
tem of double-entry book-keeping, on an en-
tirely new plan," on the ground that a mate-
rial part of the manuscript, and the arrange-
ment, were the work of the complainant, and
were pirated from him by the defendants.
It appears that the complainant for twelve
years has been engaged in teaching the art
nf book-keeping, in the city of Cincinnati and
other places. That he had reduced to writ-
ing the system he taught, on separate cards
for the convenience of imparting instruction
to his pupils; and that he permitted his stu-
dents to copy these cards, with the view to
their own advantage and to enable them to
instruct others. That .Touathan Jones, being
(lualified in the school of the complainant, as
a teacher, and having copied the manuscripts
of the complainant, engaged, in counection
with him. to leach a commercial school in St.
Louis. AVhile thus engaged, A. F. Critten-
den, one of the defendants, entered the school
at St. Louis as a student, and was permitted
to copy the manuscripts of the complainant,
in the possession of Jones; and from those
manuscripts, with certain alterations, he
made up the first ninety-two pages of the
book, under the above title, which was pub-
lished in Philadelphia, in connection with his
brother, by E. C. & J. Biddle, two of the de-
fendants, In the present year. The answers
of the defendants either deny the allegations
of the bill, or do not admit them, and call for
proof of the facts stated. On this motion
for an Injunction the merits of the case have
been discussed, with much research and abil-
It.v.
This application is made under the 9lh sec-
tion of the act of congress of the ;{d of Feb-
ruary, 18;{1, [4 Stat. 488.] which provides,
that "any person or persons who slinll print
or publish any manuscript whali'ver, without
the consent ni' the author or legal proiiriclor
lirst oblalned, etc., shall be liable to KUITer
ami pay to the author or proprietor, all dam-
ages opca.sloned l.v such Injury," etc. And
power la given to gnint an Injuiictlim to ro-
BtT.'iln the publlcMlloii. The llrst secllon of
the net of the .'UMh of .Inne, IS.'M, |4 Slat. p.
7"8, c. ir>7,] recpilres all di'eds or lnslninu>nts
In writing for the trniisfor or nsHlgniiii'nl of
ro|iy-rlglilH, to be ndinowlrdged and record-
ed. At common law, liicli'pcnilenlly of tlie
NtJitute, I have no doubt, the niiilior of a
manuscript might obtain redress against one
who had surreptitiously got possession of it.
And on general equitable principles, I see no
objection to reUef being also given, under like
circumstances, by a court of chancery. But
this is a proceeding under the statute.
The defendants contend that the complain-
ant, by suffering copies of his manuscripts to
be taken, abandoned them to the public. The
principle is the same, it is alleged, in regaril
to copy-rights and patents. And that a con-
sent or permission of the author to use the
manuscripts, is as fatal to his exchtsive right,
as the consent of the inventor to use the
thing invented. Kundell v. Murray, [Saund-
ers v. Smith,] 3 Mylne & C. 711, 7L*S, 730, 73."'>;
Millar v. Taylor, 4 Bm-rows, 186, [2303;] Bar-
field V. Nicholson, 2 Sim. & S. 1. To show
the analogy between copy-right and patents,
the defendants cited Whittemore v. Cutter,
[Case No. 17,G01;] Melius v. Sillsbee, [Id. 9,-
404,] in which the question considered was.
did the inventor suffe^ the thing patented to
go into public use without objection '.' Wal-
cot V. Walker, 7 Ves. 1; Piatt v. Button, 19
Ves. 448; Wyeth v. Stone, 1 Story, 273, Fed.
Cas. No. 18,107.
The 7th section of the act of the 3d of
March, 18.39, [5 Stat. 3.54,] declares that a
purchaser from the inventor of the thing
invented, before a patent is obtained, shall
continue to enjoy the same right after the
obtainment of the patent as before it; and
that such sale sliall not invalidate the pat-
ent, unless there has been an abandonment,
or the pm'cliase has bwn made more than
two years before the application for the pat-
ent Before this act a sale of the right
would have been an abandonment to the
public by the inventor. The decisions, there-
fore, referred to, do not apply to cases aris-
ing under this statute. A sale of the right
is not an abandonment if made within two
years before the application for a patent, as
the law now stands; and it may be a mat-
ter of some ditliculty, witliin tJie above lim-
itation of two years, to determine what act
shall amount to an abandonment. Where
the act is accompanied by a declaration, to
that eri'ect there can be no doubt; but if a
sale be not an aliandonnu-nt, a mere acq\iies-
cence In the tise of the Invention would
seem not to be. Within the two years, to
constitute an abandonment, the Intention to
do so nmst be exiircssini or neci'ssaril.v im-
plied from the facts and clrcuiiis(:inces of
the ease. It Is a question of Inleiillon, as
to the extent of the lici-nse, of which we
nmst Judge, as we are t~all(Hl to do In other
cases. But the limitation of two y<'ars does
not apply In this case, should a copy-right
be considered In i>rlnciple Idenllcal Willi an
InvenlJon of a machine, n.s nu>re than two
years have elapsed since copies of the coin-
])lalnant'8 manuscripts were taken with his
consent
The question arises upon the farls staled,
and MMisI 111- decided on general juMncipli's.
In llie lirst pl:ice, there was no coiisenl of
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BA.RTLETTE v. CRITTEXDEX et al. 
(Feri. Cas. Xo. 1,0 2, 4 McLean, 300.) 
Circuit Court, D. Ohio. July Term, 1 47. 
[In equity. Bill by R. 1\1. Bartlette to re­
strain A. F. Crittenden and others from in­
frifigcruent of copyright. Injunction grant­
ed.] 
>Ir. "\Talker, for complainant. Storer & 
• �wynn, for defendants. 
OPI:-..'IOX OF THE COURT. This Is an 
application to enjoin the defendants from 
printing, publishing, or selling a work de­
nominated ''An inductiv-e and practical sys­
tem of double-entry book-keeping, on an en­
tirely new plan," on the ground that a mate­
rial part of the manuscript, and the arrange­
ment, were the work of the compla inant.  and 
were pirated from him by the defendants. 
It appears that the complainant for twelve 
yrars has been engaged in teaching thP art 
of hook-keeping, in the city of Cincinnati and 
other place::. That he had redueed to writ­
ing the sy tern he taught, on separate cards 
for the conv-enience of imparting in truction 
to his pupils ; and that be permitted bi stu­
!lentc:: to copy these cards, with the view to 
their own advantage and to enable them to 
inst ruct others. That .Jonathan Jones, being 
•1nalified in t he school of the complainant, as 
a teacher, and having copied the manuscripts 
of t he comp'ainant,  cn�agcd, i n  connection 
\Yifh him . to tl'ach a commercial school in Rt. 
Louis. "\\"hile thus engaged, A. F. Crit ten­
d ·n. one of the defendants, entered the school 
at :St. Louis as a student, and was p<'rmitted 
to c"PY the manuscripts of the com pla i n:rn t. 
in the poc::se. sion of Jones ; a nd from those 
ma unscripts, w i t h  certain altrrationc::, ht> 
made up the firc::t ninety-two p:igrs or the 
honk. under t h l'  a bov-e t i tle, wllich wa - pub­
Ii lted In Philadclvbia, in connection wit h hie;  
brotlH'r, !Jy K C. & J. Biddle, two of t he de­
fr111lants. in the present yt>ar. Thr a nswers 
of the tlefe11 1l:rnts eithPr dt>ny t ht> allP�a t ions 
of tht> bill, or do not allruit thrm, and call for 
11roof of the facts stnted. On th is mot ion 
for an ! r 1 j 11 1 1<'tlon the mrrlts or t hr c·asr have 
l1PPO 1J lscussrcl, with much research n n cl ahll­
l t �· .  
Thi.  a)lplic-a llon Is marl c  under t h e  !l t h  R<'C­
t l on of 1 h•' act ot coni.:rPss of t he :M of l•'Ph­
r11a ry, 18:1 1 ,  [4 i-;tnt. .1:1s.1 whil'h prn,· i l lPs, 
t li a t  "n n '' ""r:::on or pPrsons who shnll p r i n t  
o" pnhli It : 1 1n· 111a nmwrlpt wh:tf PVPr, wit hout 
t ht '  1·1>111wnt • • I  l it!'.' Hltl hnr or !Pt!a l prop rll'lnr 
llr t •ihl n  l rn·rl,  f ' lr . . sht• 1 1  h<' J in hh' to 1r n t 1 1•r 
nn• l  pny In 1 hi' 11 1 1 t  I t 1 1r or 1wnprirtnr, n i l  cla 1 1 1 ·  
a g-c>s or'•'ll 111111•1! I y i;nf'h i n.fur.r," Pie. ,\ 1 u l  
J l f >Wl r l 'I  i.:l\·1·11 to  i:ra 1 1 1  nn l 11 j 1 1 1wl l 1 1 1 1  t n  l'• ·· 
11 t ral 1 1  t h" p11hl lr•11 t ln n .  'l'hr th· t llPP1 !nn o f  
t h1 •  1trt or tl t" :ll l l h  o f  .1 1 1 1 1 1 ._ 1 s:1 1 ,  1 1  �ta t .  11. 
i� . r.. Hi7,] r1·q 11 l rP a l l  d1·l'fl8 or In  t runwnts 
I n  wrl t l n i.:  for t h l' t rn n  f r r  or ns�li::1 1 1 1 1 t • 1 1 I  of 
<'Op� rli;hl , to  l u• 11 dtnnwl1•it i.:1•d :i nd r1 1·11rrl­
•d. A t  1·1 1 1 1 1 1 11011 l a w, l t1 1 l • · r 11 •ml 1•11 f 1 .,. of t l l P  
1Jl 1 \ ll <',  I huv1• n n  rlonht, 1 hl' : i 1 1 1 h1 1r of n 
D i g ltize by 
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manu cript might obtain redress against one 
"·I.lo had surreptitiou ly got po es ion of it. 
And on general equitable principles, I see no 
objection to relief being also giv-en, under Jikl' 
circum tances, by a court of chancery. But 
this is  a proceeding under t ile t a t ut e. 
The defendants contend that the cop;plaiu­
ant, by suffering copies of bis  manusl'ript-< to 
be taken, abandoned them to the public. Thl' 
principle is the same, it is alleged, in regard 
to copy-rights and patent . And t ha t  a con­
sent or permission of the author to use tile 
manuscripts, is as fa tal  to his exclu ive right, 
a the consent of the inventor to use the 
ti.Jing invented. Rundell v-. ::\Iurray, [Saund­
ers v. Smi th,] 3 ).!ylne & C. 711, 7:::!8,  730, 73;} ; 
:\Iillar v. Taylor, 4 BW'rows, 186, [:::!303 ;] Bar­
field v. Nicholson, 2 Sim . ..,. S. 1. To show 
the analogy between copy-ri;::ht and patent . 
the defendants cited "'hittemore v. Cutter, 
[Ca e Xo. 17,601 ;] Mellus v-. illc::hee, [Td. 9.-
404,] in which the que tion ronc::i1lrrru was. 
did the inv-entor suffer;: the th in:: pa trntetl to 
go into public usr w ithout oh} ·l'l inu ·! \\"al 
cot v. -n·alk<'r. 7 Yrs. 1 ;  Platt v-. Button. IP 
Yes. 448; \\�·eth v. tone, 1 tory, 2i3, Fed. 
Cas. No. 1 ,107. 
The 7th section of the act of the :1tl or 
) farch. 1 839, [5 t a t. ?'i4,) clednrt>s t h a t  a 
plll'Ch:lSC'r from the inventor Of the> thing 
i nv rnted, before a pnt<'nt is ohtn inrd . shall  
continue to enjoy tile same right after tbe 
obta inment o f  the patent as before It; a n d  
that such sn le sh:1 l l  not  inYalitlate t he )lat­
ent, unless t here bas been an aban don nH'n t. 
or the pm·chase bas bren mncle morl' than 
two yenrs before tbe application for tlte pat­
ent Before this act, a s:ile or t i.le right 
would have been an abaudonment to t he 
pulJl ic by tbe invrntor. The decisions, t here­
fore, re ferred to, do not a pply to c:1c::<'s :uic::­
ing under this sta tute. A salt> of t hl' right 
is not an abandon mC'nt, if made w i t h i n  two 
year lJcfore tb applicn t inn for n pa t t•nt . a· 
the Jaw now st:l ll < ls ;  and it may be u. mat­
t<'r of some di t lkult y, w i t h i n  t h e  abon' l im­
itation of t " o  J< : trs, to ck t c•rmint> w h a t  :ll't 
shnl l n mnunt to :in ah:1 ndonml• 1 1 t .  \\ lwrc 
t l te nt·t is acromp:i nird lty a < icl'l:t r:lt ion, to 
t h a t  pffpc•t, t here C':l n he no dnuht; hut If a 
H:l l P  l ie not : 1 n  a h:i ndon nwn t, u mrrr 11('1111i<'H· 
Cl'll< 'l' In t h e  11se of 1 l tl' l n vt>n tlon wonl d  
Kl'l ' l l l  not to bl'. "\Yl t h l t 1  t h<' t wo yr:1rs, t o  
constll11tl' n n  nh:t ndonmPn t ,  t he l n t Pnl iun to 
rln :;o IT ll lSl hl' l' - J lt'l'SSl"t l or I H 'C•"'R:I  ri l�· 1 11 1 ·  
pl il'd from t h e  fael::: an< l  rln·11 1 1 1><t 1 1 111·1•s ot 
t he !':tsc. I t  Is a q u c•><t inn o f  i 1 1 1 < -1 1 t io11 ,  n� 
t o  t bP !':\tPnt of t h<' l lri>11sr, o r  " h kh W C'  
m u s t  jud�c. a1-1 w o  : t rr <':1 1 1 1-.I t o  d o  1 1 1  1 1t h1·r 
('!ISl'!l. Hut t hf' l l m l t n t lon nr t wo �-l'ill'S d m H 
not apply In t h l� c·ast>, sh11 1 1 l c l  n ropy·riJ:"ht 
h1• !'1 1 1 1sld<'n°d 111 prl nr.lph• ldP11 t lr-:i l w i t h  nn 
hl\'<'l l t l n n  or a lll:t<'h l l l l', ns 111 111'1' t h a n  t wo 
� l ':l l'S h:t n' Plrq1s1·cl sinn' r•oplt  H of t h< ' C'Olll· 
pl:i lnn nl't.1 1 1 1n 1 1 11i;cripts wt•n• l!Jl,,.11  w i t h  hi� 
('O i l  •I'll  t. 
'l'lw r t l l<'. 1 1 1111 :iri s<'� upon t hr fn rt 11  Kl : 1 1 < ·d, 
n ml 1 1 1 1 1  ... t I 11• c l 1•1 · i c l "d on J."f 'l l •  ·r:t I prl 111· 1  p l i ·s. 
In t h l '  nr t pl:11·P, f h<'l'<' wnt. no 1·nnst• n t  or 
O r i  i r- I fr 
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the complainant, that his manuscripts should
be printed. That thoy were not prepared
for the press is admitted. They were with-
out index or preface, although, as alleged,
they may have contained the substantial
parts of the complninant's system, which,
in due time, he intended to print. Copies
of the manuscripts were taken for the bene-
fit of his pupils, and to enable them to teach
others. This, from the facts and circum-
stances of the case, seems to have been the
extent of the complainant's consent. It is
contended that this is an abandonment to
the public, and is as much a publication as
printing the manuscripts. That printing is
only one mode of publication, which may be
done as well by multiplying manuscript
copies. This is not denied, but the inquiry
is, does such a publication constitute an
abandonment? The complainant is no doubt
bound by this consent, and no court can af-
ford him any aid in modifying or withdraw-
ing it. The students of Bartlette, who made
these copies, have a right to them and to
their use as originally intended. But they
have no right to a use which was not in
the contemplation of the complainant and of
themselves, when the consent was first
given. Nor can they, by suffering others
to copy the manuscripts, give a greater li-
cense than was vested in themselves. In
England, if .an invention be pirated and
given to the public, it prevents an inventor
from obtaining a patent. But this is not
the construction of our laws. If an invent-
or of a machine sell it or acquiesce in its
public use, not within the limitation of the
two years, he forfeits his rights. He must
be diligent in making known and asserting
his right, where it has surreptitiously got
into the possession of anotlier, or he aban-
dons it. This was the settled rule before
the act of 1839, and it woidd seem that cases
which do not come within the provisions of
that act, must be governed by the old rule.
No length of time, where the invention does
not go into public use, can invalidate the
right of the inventor. He may take his
own time to perfect his discovery, and apply
for a patent. And the same principle ap-
plies to the manuscripts of an author. If
he permit copies to be taken for the gratifi-
cation of his friends, he does not authorize
those friends to print them for general use.
This is the author's right, ifrom which arises
the high motive of pecuniary profit and liter-
ary reputation. When the inventor consents
to the construction and use of his machine,
he yields the whole value of his invention.
But an author's manusci-ipts are very dif-
ferent from a machine. As manuscripts, in
modern times, they are not and can not be
of general use. Popular lectures may be
taken do\Vn verbatim, and the person taking
them down has a right to their use. He-
may in this way perpetuate the instruction
ho receives, but he may not print them.
The lectm-er designed to Instruct his hearers,
and not the public at large. Any use, there-
fore, of the lectures, which shoidd operate
injurioasly to the lecturer, would be a fraud
upon him for which the law would give him
redress. He can not claim a vested right
in the ideas he communicates, but the words
and sentences in which they are clothed be-
long to him.
It is contended that the manuscripts axe
incomplete, and if published in their present
state, could not be protected by a copy-right.
That an unfinished manuscript or book,
which gives only a part of the thing intend-
ed to be written or published, can be of no
value, and if printed no relief could be
given, as no damage would be done. That
the parts of a machine, in the process of
consti-uetion, if pirated, would give no right
to an injunction by the inventor. If the
manuscript or machine referred to consisted
of a mere fragment, which embodied no
principle and pointed to no design, the pi-
racy of it would afford no ground of relief.
But such is not the character of complain-
ant's manuscripts. They may not be com-
plete for publication. Some explanatory
notes may be wanting, to assist the reader
in comprehending the system. This in-
formation was communicated by lectures,
and for the pm-poses of instruction in that
mode, the notes were unnecessary. But the
cards contain the frame work of the system.
The substratum is there, and so exemplified
as to show the principle upon which it is
constructed. That it was valuable, is shown,
from the fact of the cards having been used
by the defendants in teaching the system,
and in publishing them as they have done.
The facts show the piracy beyond all
doubt, and that it was done under euxum-
stauces which admit of little or no mitiga-
tion. The cards, as they well knew, had
been, for a number of years, and were then
being used by the complainant to instruct
pupils. They had learned all they knew on
the subject from the complainant. They
probably knew that he intended to publish
his plan. But this would, to some extent,
at least, supersede the necessity of personal
instruction. In disregard of these considera-
tions, and of the obligations the defendants
owed to the complainant, the publication was
made.
The coiu-t will allow an injunction unless
a satisfactory arrangement shall be made
between the parties.
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the complainant, that his manuscripts should 
be printed. That they were not IJreparcd 
for the press is adm itted. They were with­
out index or preface, although, as alleged, 
they may have contained the substantial 
parts of the complninant's system, which, 
in due time, he in tended to print Copies 
of the manuscripts we1·e taken for the bene­
fit of his pupils, and to enable them to teach 
others. 'l'his, from the facts and circum­
stances of the case, seems to have been the 
extent of the complainant's consent. It is 
contended that this is an abandonment to 
the public, and is as much a publication as 
printing the manuscripts. That printing is 
only one mode of publication, which may be 
done as well by multiplying m anuscri p t  
copies. This i s  n o t  denied, b u t  the inquiry 
is, does such a publication constitute a n  
abandonment ?  The complai nant i s  n o  doubt 
bound by this consent, and no court can af­
ford him any aid in modifying or withdraw­
ing it. The students o f  Bartlette, who made 
these copies, have a right to them and to 
their use as origi)lally intended. But they 
have no right to a use which was not i n  
the contemplation o f  the complainant and of 
themselveS', when the consent was first 
given. Nor can they, by suffering others 
to copy the manuscripts, give a greater li­
cense than was vested in themselves. In 
Eng-land, if .an invention be pirated and 
gi\'"en to the public, i t  prevents a n  inventor 
from obtain ing a patent But this is not 
the construction of our laws. If an invent­
or of a machine sell it or acquiesce in its 
public use, not within the limit ation of the 
two years, he forfeits his rights. He must 
be diligent in making known and asserting 
his right, where it has surreptitiously got 
into the possession of. anoth1>r, or hP, eban­
dons it. This was the settled rule before 
tile act of 1839, and it would seem that cases 
which do not come within the provisions of 
that act, must be governed by the old rule. 
No length of time, where the invention does 
not go into public use, can invalidate the 
right of the inventor. He may take bis 
own time to perfect bis discovery, and apply 
fot· a patent. And the same principle ap­
plies to the manuscripts of an author. If 
he permit copies to be taken for the gratifi­
cation of his friends, b e  does not authorize 
those friends to print them for general use. 
This is the author's right, from which arises 
the high motive of pecuniary profit and li ter­
ary reputa tion. When the inventor consent s  
to the construction and use of bis machine, 
he yields the whole value of his invention. 
But an author's manuscripts are very dif­
ferent from a machine. As manuscripts, i n  
modern times·, they are not and can not be 
D 1 itiz. by 
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o t  general use. Popular lectures may bt> 
taken down verbatim, and the person tald u:.: 
tilem down bas a. right to theil' use. II•  
may in this way perpetuate the instl'Uctio11 
be receives, bnt he may not print th• 1 1 1 .  
The lec turer designed to instruct his llearen., 
and not the public at large. Any use, there­
fore, of the lectures, which should operate 
injuriously to the lecturer, would be a. fraud 
upon h i m  for which the law would give hirn 
redress. He can not claim a vested right 
in the ideas he communicates, but the words 
and sentences in which they are clothed bl.� 
long to him. 
It is contended that the ma nuscripts are 
incomplete, and if published in their present 
state, could not be protected by a copy-right. 
That an unfinished manuscript or book, 
which gives only a part of the thing intend­
ed to be written or published, can be of no 
value, and if printed no relief could be 
given, as n o  damage would be done. That 
the parts of a machine, in the process or 
construction, i f  p irated, would give no right 
to a n  injunction by the i n ventor. If the 
manuscript or machine referred to consisLe<l 
of a mere fragment, which embodied no 
priO(;i ple and pointed to no design, the pi­
racy or it would afford no ground of relit:f. 
But such is not the character of complaiu­
a n t's manuscripts. Tht>y may not be com 
plete for publication. Some explanatory 
notes ma.y be wanting, to assist the readPr 
in comprehending the system. This in­
formation was communicated by lectures, 
and for the purposes of instruction in that 
mocie, the notes were unnecessary. But the 
cards contain the frame work of the system. 
The substratum is there, and so exemplifieu 
as to show the principle upon which it is 
constructed. That it was valuable, is shown, 
from t ile fact o f  the cards having been used 
by the defendants in teaching the system, 
and in publishing them as they have done. 
The facts show the piracy beyond :1 11 
doubt, and that it was done under drcmu­
stances which admit of little or no mitiga­
tion. The cards, as they well knew, had 
been, for a number of years, and were then 
being used by the complainant to instruct 
pupils. They ha.d learned all they knew on 
the subject from the complainant. They 
probably knew that be i n tended to pulJlish 
his plan. But this would, to some exteut, 
at least, supersede the neces5ity of personal 
instruction. In disregard of these cou:,;idera­
tions, and of the obligations the defendants 
o'Yed to the complainant, the publicat1on was 
made. 
The court will allow an injunction unless 
a satisfactory arrangement shall be made 
between the parties. 
Ori g i r:a l  from 
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I'KELIMIXAHY COXSIDERxVTIONS.
CELLULOID MANUFG CO. v. CELLO-
MTE MANEF'G CO.
(32 Fed. 04.)
Circuit Court, D. New Jersey. July 12, 1S87.
Motion for preliiuinai-y injunction.
Rowland Cox, for the motion. John R.
Bennett, contra.
BRADLEY. J. The bill of complaint in
this ca.se states that the complainant was
incorporated under the laws of New York
in 1871, and has ever since that time used
its corpni-ate name in carrying on its busi-
ness of the manufacture and sale of various
compounds of pyroxyline, adapted to dif-
ferent uses and purpcses. and that its name
has become of sreat consecpience in the good-
will of its business, its standing, and the
reputation of its goods; that, in order to
designate its said manufactured product, and
to distinguisli it from similar compounds
manufactured by others, the complainant,
from tlie first, adopted and used the word
"celluloid," which had never been used be-
fore, except to a limited extent by Isaiah
S. and John W. Hyatt, by whom the word
was coined, and who were engaged in the
same manufacture at Albany, Xow Yorli. and
used tlie word as a trade-mark; and when
complainant was incorporated the said lly-
atts entered into its employ, and assigned to
it all tlieir rights relating to the business,
good-will, and trade-mark; and complain-
ant has ever since used the word "celluloid"
as its trade-mark, by impressing or stamp-
ing it into the surface of the articles made
from the manufactured product, whereby it
has acquired a high reputation as denoting
complainant's manufacture, and indicating
goods of superior <iuality, as comi)ared with
like goods sold by other parties under the
names of chrolithion, lignoid, p.nsbosene, etc.;
tliat in 1873 complainant caused said word
"celluloid" to be registered as a trade-mark
In the United States patent-oflice, under the
act in such case made and provided, and
again registered in 1883, under the subso-
qncnt act. The bill then complains that the
defendant. In order to deprive the complain-
ant of lis business and its rights, and to cre-
ate an unfair competition, since the lirst day
of Jantiary, 188(i, has adojited the name of
Cellonlte Manufacturing Compan.v. with In-
tent that it should be mistaken for com-
plainant's name, and Intends to use It In
ilie trnnsa<'llon of business similar to that of
the com|il!ilii:int; that Ihc simllarlly of names
will embarrass an<l obstruct the liusiness of
the complainants, cause confusion and mls-
tiiUe, divert complainant's custom, reduce
lis .sales, and deceive the public; tli.-it the
defendant has connnr-nced to erect works on
nn extensive scale f'>r (lie niiinufacture of a
compound f)f pyroxyllne, to be put ou sale
under the name of "cellonlte," a name purely
arbitrary, and adopted to enable the defend-
ant to sell the article as complainant's prod-
uce; that the corporators who formed the
defendant company had previously been en-
gaged in the manufacture of pyroxyline com-
pounds under the name of "pasbosene," "lig-
noid." "chrolithion," etc., but selected the
new name, "cellonlte," in order to trade upon
the complainant's reputation, and to sell its
product as the complainant's, and intends to
.stamp its goods with the word "cellonlte,"
in imitation of the stamp on complainant's
goods, in order to sell them as complainant's
manufacture. The bill prays an injunction
to prevent the defendant from using the word
"cellonite." or an.v imitation of the word
"celluloid." The allegations of the bill are
verified by affidavits and exhibits.
The defendant has fi'.ed an answer. In which
it denies that the complainant lias any right
to the exclusive use of the word "celluloid:"
alleges that many companies use it In i^eir
names, as "Celluloid Brush Company," " cel-
luloid Collar & ('nff Company." etc., which
liave been allowed by complainant without
dbjection. It admits the selection and use of
the word by the coniplainant. but denies any
exclusive right to the use of it. because it has
become a part of the Ihiglisli language to
designate the substance celluloid, and the
impression of the word on the articles manu-
factured by complainant merely indicates the
substance of which they are composed. It
denies th.it the word "cellonite" was adopted
for the purpose of imitating the name of
complainant, or the name stamped on the
complainant's goods. It avers tliat the word
was adopted as far back as 18s;?. and has
been continuously used ever since, not to
imitate the word "celUilold." but selected as
better describing the exact nature of the
pyroxyline compound used by the defendant;
the same being a compound of the well-
known substances cellulose and nitre, "cel-
lonite" being merely a compound derivutive
of those two words; that the defendant aban-
doned the use of the words "pasbosene," "lig-
noid," etc., because those words gave no In-
formallon as to the chemical constituents of
the conijiounds designated by them. It al-
leges that it has for four years been engaged
In maniifacluriiig and selling goods marked
"Oellonile," and until now no attempt h.is
been made to IntiM-l'ere with It. To show thai
the word "celluloid" is a word of common
use. the answer dies various patents an<l
books, (but all sulisiNiueiit to 1873,) also the
rules of the patenldllice as to the classes of
invendons. In which one of llie sub ilasses
is "Celluloid."
The only verl Heat Ion of the answer Is the
oalli of J. R. France, an olllcer of the com
pany, who swears that the contenis are trin'.
so fiir as they are within his knowlcdgi'; and.
so far !is stated on Inforiiialioii .'iiid bellrr.
he believes them to be true.
The answer virtually admits that the cor-
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30 Pff ELDH X A B Y  CO.NS I D E R ATIOXS. 
CELLCLOID :'IIA :\l'F"G CO. '· C'E LLO­
:\ lTE :'l l A :\ l."F'G CO. 
(32 Fed. 94.) 
Circuit Court, D. Kew Jersey. July 12, 1887. 
:'llotion for preli m inary injunction. 
Howland Cox, for the motion. John R. 
Bennett. contra. 
BRADLEY. J. The bi ll of complaint in 
this case states that the complainant was 
incorp mlted under the laws of Xew York 
in 1� Tl .  and has ever since that t ime used 
its corporate name in carrying on its busi­
ness of the manufacture and sale of various 
compounds of pyroxyline, adapted to dif­
ferent uses and purposes. and that its name 
ha become of great consequence i n  the good­
\Yill of i t s  busi ness, its standing, and the 
reputation of its goods; that .  i n  order to 
designate its sa id m a n u factu red product . and 
to disti nguish i t from similar compounds 
1 1 1 a  nn fn ctm·c'll by others. the complainant, 
fro1u the first, adopted and used the word 
"eelluloirl." ·1yhich bad never been used be­
fore, cxc<:>pt to a lim ited extent by Isaiah 
R and .John \Y. H .vatt. by whom t he worn 
was coined, and who \Yere engageu in the 
a me manufacture at A l bnn:r .  ?\Tew York. n nr l  
usetl t he word a s  a trade-mark; and when 
cnmpla iua nt was incorporated the said l l y­
a t ts entered into its employ. and assigned to 
i t  all  their rights relating to the busines , 
g-o, ,c l-will ,  and trade- m a r k ;  a n d  complain­
ant ha.;; e,·er since used t h e  word "cellu loid.' 
ns its trade-marl;:, by i m pressing or sta mp­
i ng- it into the surface of the a rticles ma<1e 
fram t he mnnufac t u recl product, whereby it 
has acquired a h i gh reputa tion as rknoling 
e•implainanl'. manufacture, and i n dica t i ng 
.�onds of superior qual ity, as compared w i t h  
l i ke goods sold b�· other pa rt ics under the 
n a mes of chrol ith ion , J i g-noid, p::isbosene, etc. ; 
tl tn t in 1 7:3 compln i n a n t  c:a us d sa id worcl 
"c·Pl l n loic l" tn br n•;.;ist ered as n trnde- rnnrk 
i n  the Uuitecl S 1 n tes pa l en t-nffic·e. under t h e 
act in st1C'h case mnde and p ro v i ded, and 
: 1 :.:-:i i n  re�ist rred i i i  1 88:3, 1 1m1er t he su bs0-
q 1w 1 1 t  : l <'t. '!'he bi l l  1 hrn compla ins tlrn t t h <:> 
<IPl'<' 1Hlant,  in nrcler to clepri ve the compl n l n ­
:i 1 1 t  of i t s  busin<'ss : ind its rights, aml to c·rc­
a t r  nn unfa i r  competi tion, sin<' the fit"t clay 
nl' . J a n 1 1 :ny. J SSn, h:is ; 1 1 lnp l e1l t h e name of 
r ' . .  I J <mlte \ f : 1 1 1 1 1 fac·tnri 1 1g- f 'om11n1 1.\'. w i t h  i n­
t 1• 1 1 t  1 l 1 a 1  i l  shnnld lw mi st:t k<:>n for rom­
pla l n a n t ' s  nn roe, a 1 1 1 l  lnl PnrlH to use It In 
t i ll' t l'll l lS : l ! 'l loll Of hnsi n�s Hi l l l i l n r  to t ha t  Of 
1 1 1 . .  ron 1 1 1pln l w 1 1 1 t ; t h a t  t l 1 1 ·  s l 1 1 1 l l n r l l .r o r  nam 'A 
will rrnh:1 1Tass and ol ist rm·t t hr hnslnrss ol' 
1 1 1" r-01n phi l n11 n t  . r ·n nAc con l uslon a nd mis 
t : i k• '. d l \'Pr t ro11 1 pln l n11 u t 't1 c · 1 1s tnm, rcd111•p 
1 1 '1  f::t !l ''I, :1 1 1 1 1  drf'1•h'I '  1 1 1 1 '  puhl lr;  t h n t  l h r 
<I ·fr. 1 1 1 l n 1 1 t  I I ; 1 >1  C 'll f l l l l l l ' l l ! 'l ' ! I  t o  Cl"Ol'f Wlll')(S  nn 
1 1 1 1  P X: l • ' I I  I H• 1'<'1 1 ] 1 •  for t l l f ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 f:i r t u rr o f  n 
c•o11 1 p11 1 1 1 1 r l  of pyrox.rl lnr, to he 1 1 1 1 t  on i<:l lP 
1 1 t1 r l ••r t l w n n mc of "c•rl lon i t t>," 11 nnm p u rcl.v 
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a rbitrary, and adopted to enable t h e  defend­
a nt to sell the article as complniunnt's prod­
uce; that the corporators who formed tile 
defendant company had previously been e11-
;raged in the manufacture of pyroxyline com­
pounds under the name of "pasbosene," "lie:­
noi cl." "cbrolitbion." etc., but selected t 1 1e 
new name, "cellonite," in order to trade upon 
the complainant's reputation, and to sell its 
product as the complainant's, and i ntends to 
stamp its goods w i t h  the word "cellonite," 
i n  i m itation of the . tamp on complainant'· 
goods. i n  order to sel l them as compla inant's 
manufacture. The bill prays an injunction 
to prevent the defendant from using the word 
'·cellonite," or any i mitation of the word 
"celluloid." The allegations of t he bi l l  :ire 
>erified by affidavits and exhibits. 
Tl1e defendant bas filed an an·wer, in which 
i t  denie' tbat the complainant bas any right 
to t he exclusive use o( the word "celluloid :" 
al leg� that many companie. u e i t  in Lueit· 
names, a "Celluloid Brush Company," · ·eJ­
lnloicl Collar & Cuff Compnnr," etc . . which 
h:i.\e been a llowed by compla i n a n t  witl 1ont  
ob.iection. It  adm i ts t he sf'lcction and u of 
the word by the compl a i n a n t .  l rn t  denies any 
exclusive right to the use of i t. because i t  bas 
become a part of the Englisl1 langn nge tn 
designate the sub ta nce celluloid. a nd t h e  
impression of the word o u  the a rticles manu­
factu red by compl:1 i n n n t  m<:>rely i n d i cates t h e  
sub. tn nee of wh ich they nr compos<:><l . I t  
denies t h a t  t h e  word "cellon ik'' ,;-as ndopt<:>d 
for t h e  purpose of i m i t a t i n g  t he na me of 
compJ;1 i n a n t. or t h e na m i>  , ta mped on the> 
compla ina nt's goods. It :wcrs t ha t  t he word 
was a dopt ed a far bacJ;: as l �'<l. nurl b a s  
been con t inuously used en't' sinl'<:>, not t o  
i mi ! a te the word ' "cel l n lni < l ."  but selected a s  
bet t e r  describing t h e  ex:1d na ture of t he 
pyroxyl i ne compound u etl by t h e  defrn ila n t ; 
the a me b<:>ing a compon nd of thl' wcll ­
known substnnce cel l u lose a n d  n i t1·<:>. "<'el· 
louite" bei ng m rely a componnll df>r i rn l i v e  
of thMC t 1vo word ; that t h l' defenda nt aban­
doncL l I he m1C ot' 1 be words "pn .;;bos<:>ue," • ·J i�­
noid , " <'IC'., bc(·au·e t bo:>e words �:we no In­
forma t ion as t o  t he chemical conl'll i t u ents o f  
t h r  com pou ncl R ck!'iignu t<:>rl b y  t h e m .  I t  al­
l e.�cs t lia t it  has l'or t'o11r  yrn rs been cn;rngp1l 
in 1 1 1 n 1 1 u fa d u r i 1 1 :.:  : 1 ucl  sC'l l ing goods m:1rkC'1 l 
.. 'pl lo n i t c>," a n< l  u n t i l  now no a t t t' lll J lf  has 
hPen ttin t le to J n t or ('0re w i l lJ i t .  'l'n 8how t l t: \ I 
Uw word · ·cel l u l o i d "  i s  a word or l'o11 1 1 non 
llHL', t he nn s\\ ('l" <'i l l'" Y:l rlons pn l r 1 1 t s  a w l  
boolu;, ( !m t  a l l  s 1 1hsc'q 1 1 r 1 1 l  t o  l l'l7:l. l n l sn t lw 
rnlcs or I be p: 1 ' I ' l l t onke ns t o  t he Cl:ISSC'S of 
i l l 1 P 1 1 t ln1 11"1 ,  i n  wh lc ·b O l l C' nt t l ll' J:mh d:lsHNi 
i!l " '( 'P i l 1 1 10 i c J ."  
'!'he oll  IJ \'Cl'l lku f l on o r  t ht• ::i llR \\'l'l' Is t hr 
0: 1 1  h of .1 . R .  l•' rn n c ·e. a n  o01 < '< 'r of I he com 
p:1 11,r, who swc:11·s t ha t  t h e• c·o 1 1 t ctl lt!  n 1·c t.r1 1r. 
HIJ fn r 1 \ '\  l l H'.V n rc w i t h i n  h l :-1  lrnnwlP<lgt • ;  a n d ,  
s o  f a r  ns Rt :t l f'll o n  l t 1 fcl1'11 1 : 1 l lnn n n d  hcllPf, 
be IJl'li<'YNI t l iem In he t ru . 
'!'he nuiswer v l r t un l l y a d m i ts Umt the cor-
Ori ;J i ra l  fror-. 
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Ijorators of tho defoiulant bad been engaged,
before the formation of the defendant com-
pany, in tlie same manufacture, and had call-
ed their produce, "pasbosene," "lignoid," etc.;
and that they adopted the word "cellonite,"
instead of those designated, for the reason,
as the answer says, that it is more expressive
of the constituents, cellulose and nitre. This
is a somewhat singular explanation. The ter-
Hjination "ite," in chemistry, has a technical
application nothing to do with the word
"nitre;" and, notwithstanding the denial of
tlie answer, (which, however, cannot be re-
garded as verified by oath,) the inference
strongly pvesses itself that the name was
ailoptcd on account of its similarity to "cel-
luloid." as the complainant charges.
In alleging that the word "cellonite' has
been used by the defendant since 1883, the ue-
fendant, which was not incorijorated until
May, ISSO, identifies itself with the previous
association, shown by the affidavits to have
licen called the "Merchants' Manufacturing
I 'niupany," composed of the same corpora-
I'irs. who abandoned the old name, and as-
sumed the new one, for some purpose or
I'lher. The explanation given for so doing is
not entirely satisfactory. Here are two lacts
slanding side by side: First, the fact that the
I'elluloid Jlanufacturing Company, — an old,
well-established concern,— is doing a large
and prosperous business, with a good-will
resulting from many years of successful ef-
fort, and calls the product of its manufacture
"celluloid," which has become such a popu-
lar designation that, as the defendant says, it
has become incorporated in the English lan-
guage; secondly, the fact that the Merchants'
Manufacturing Company, which prodiiees
substantially the same article, and calls it by
different names, "pasbosene," "lignoid," etc.,
(with what success we are not told,) sudden-
ly changes its name to that of Cellonite Man-
ufacturing Company, and calls its produce
••cellonite." It will take a great deal of ex-
planation to convince any man of ordinary
business experience that this change of name
was not adopted for the purpose of imitating
tliat of the old, successful company.
It is the object of the law relating to trade-
marks to prevent one man from unfairly
stealing away another's business and good-
will. Fair competition in business is legiti-
mate, and promotes the public good; but
an unfair appropriation of another's business,
liy using his name or trade-mark, or an imi-
tation thereof calculated to deceive the pub-
lic, or in any other way, is .iustly punishable
by damages, and will be enjoined by a court
of equity. The question before me is wheth-
er the law has been violated in the present
case.
First. As to the imitation of the complain-
ant's name. The fact that both are coi-po-
rate names is of no consequence in this con-
nection. They are the business names by
which the parties are known, and are to De
dealt with precisely as if they were tho names
of private firms or partnerships. Tlio de-
fendant's name was of Its own choosing, and,
if an unlawful imitation of the complain-
ant's, is subject to the same rules of law as
if it were the name of an unincorporated
firm or company. It is not Identical with the
complainant's name. That would be too
gross an invasion of the complainant's right.
Similarity, not identity, is the usual recourse
when one party seeks to benefit himself by
the good name of another. What simiiaruy
is sufficient to effect the object has to be
determined in each case by its own circum-
stances. We may say, generally, that a sim-
ilarity which would be likely to deceive or
mislead an ordinary unsuspecting customer is
obnoxious to the law. .Judged by this stand-
ard, it seems to me that, considering the na-
ture and circumstance.s of this case, the name
"Cellonite Manufacturing Company" is suffi-
ciently similar to that of the "Celluloid Manu-
facturing Company" to amount to an In-
fringement of the complainant's trade name.
The distinguishing words in both names are
rather unusual ones, but supposed to have
the same sense. Their general similarity,
added to the identity of tho other parts of
the names, makes a whole which is calculat-
ed to mislead.
Secondly. As to the complainant's alleged
right to the exclusive use of the word "cel-
luloid" as a trade-mark, and the defendant's
alleged imitation thereof. On this branch
of the case, the defendant strenuously con-
tends that the word "celluloid" is a word
of common use as an appellative, to desig-
nate the substance celluloid, and cannot,
therefore, be a trade-mark; and. secondly,
if it is a trade-mark the defendant does not
infringe it by the use of the word "cellonite."
As to the first point, it is undoubtedly true,
as a general rule, that a word merely de-
scriptive of the article to which it is ap-
plied cannot be used as a trade-mark.
Everybody has a right to use the common
appellatives of the language, and to ap-
ply them to the things denoted by them.
A dealer in flour cannot adopt the word
"flour" as his trade-mark, and prevent oth-
ers from applying it to their packages of
flour. I am satisfied from the evidence ad-
duced before me that the word "celluloid"
has become the most commonly used name
of the substance which both parties manu-
facture, and, if the rule referred to were of
universal application, the position of the de-
fendant would be imassailable. But the spe-
cial ca.se before me is this: The complain-
ant's assignors, the Hyatts, coined and
adopted the word when it was unknown, and
made it their trade-mark, and the complain-
ant is assignee of all the rights of the Hy-
atts. When the word was coined and adopt-
ed, it was clearly a good trade-mark. The
question is whether the subsequent use of It
by the public, as a common appellative of
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porators of t he defendant had been engageu, 
IJefore the formation of Ule defeu dant com­
pany. in the same manufacture, and had call­
ed their pro<l uce, "11a<;boscne," ''lignoi d," etc. ; 
a n d  that they adopted the word "cellonite," 
instead of those designated, for the reason, 
as tile answer says, that it is more expressive 
of the constit uents. cellulo�e aucl nitre. T'his 
is a sorue1Ylrnt singular explana tion. The ter­
l1�inat ion ' " ite," in chemistry, bas a technical 
applicatiou nothing to do with the word 
"n itre;" and, notwithsta nding the denial of 
the answer, (which, however, cannot be re­
gardecl as verified by oath,) the i nference 
:strongly pl'esses itself that the name was 
ai1opted on account of its similarity to "cel­
l u lnill." ns the complainant charges. 
In al le�ing that the word "cel lonite ' has 
been m<'ll lly the defendan t  since J SS3, tbe ue­
f Pnc1an t, wllirh was not i ncorporated until  
:\lay, lSSl.i. identifies itself with the previous 
a s-;ocia tiou, shown by the affid:wi ts to have 
heen called the "Merchants' Ma nufacturing 
( 'ompany," composed of the same corpora­
tur . who abandoned the old name, and as­
i;umed the new one, for some purpose or 
ut her. Tl.le explanation given for so doiug is 
not entirely satisfactory. Here are t w o tacts 
s t a nding side b y  side: First. the fact that the 
l'cl luloid i\Ianufacturing Compan.r,-an ol<l, 
well-establisllcd conC'crn,-is doing a la rge 
aud prosperous business, with a good-will 
resulting- from many years of successful ef­
fort. and calls the product of its manufacture 
"celluloid," which has become such a popu­
lar designation that, a.s the defendant says, it 
has become i ncorporated in the En�lish lan­
guage; secondly, tile fact that the ;'.Iercbants' 
"'.\Innufactmin.g Company, which produces 
snbsta ntia l l y  the same article, and calls i t  by 
c1ifferent na mes. "pasbosene,'' "Jignoid," etc., 
(with what success we are not told,) suduen­
ly changes its name to that of Cellonite l\Ian­
nfacturing Company. and calls its produce 
"L•ellonite." It will  take a great deal of ex­
planation to convince any man of ordinary 
business experience that this change of name 
\\'as not adopted for tile purpose of imitating 
tllat of the old, successful company. 
It is the object of the law relating to tr:H1P­
marks to prevent one man from unfa irly 
stea ling away anot her's busi ness and good­
\\' ill. Fair competition in busi ness is legiti­
mate, and promotes the public good; but 
nn unfair appropria tion of another's business, 
I i�· using 'his name 01· trade-mark, or an imi­
tation thereof calculated to deceive the pub­
li c, or i n  any other way, is j ustly punishable 
hy damap;es. and will be enjoined hy a conrt 
of equity. The question before me is whetb­
PL' the law has been violated in the pre:scnt 
case. 
First. As to the imitation of the complain­
aut"s name. The fact that both are corpo­
rate names is of no consequence in this con­
nection. '.rhey are the business names by 
which the parties are known, and are to IJC 
D 1g 1t1zed by 
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dealt w i t h  precisely a s  i f  they were the n a me's 
of private firms or partnerships. The de­
fenclant's name was of its own choosing, an<1, 
if a n  unlawful imitation of the complain­
ant's, is subject t o  the same rules of law as 
if it were the name of an unincorporated 
firm or company. It is not identical with the 
complainant's name. That would be too 
gross an invasion of t h e  complainant's right. 
Similarity, not identity, is the main! recourse 
when one party seeks to benefit himself by 
the good name of another. What si111i 1:tr1 lY 
is sufficient to effect the object has to !Je 
determined i n  each case by i ts own circum­
stances. We may say, generally, that a sim­
ilarity which would be likely to deceive or 
mislead an ordinary unsuspecting customer is 
obnoxious to the law. Judged by this stand­
ard, it seems to me that, considering the na­
ture and circumstances of this case, the name 
"Cellouite l\Ianufacturing Company" is suffi· 
ciently simi lar to that of the "Celluloid l\Ianu­
facturing Company" to amount to an In­
fringement of the complainant's trade name. 
The distinguishing words in both name arc 
rather unusual ones, but supposed to have 
the same sense. Their general simi lari ly, 
added to the identity of the other parts of 
the na mes, makes a whole which is calculat­
ed to mislead. 
Secondly. As to the complainant's a l legec1 
right to the exclusive use of the word "cel­
luloid" a s  a trade-mark, and the defendant 's 
a lleged i mitation thereof. On this branch 
of the case, the defendant strenuously con­
tends that the word "celluloid" is a wor<l 
of common use a s  a n  appellative, to deRi.!!­
nate the substance celluloid, and l'U nnot. 
t herefore, be a trade-mark ; and. R<'concll�·. 
if it is a trade-mark the defenda n t  c1oc" not 
i n fringe i t  by the use of the word '"cellonite." 
As to the first poi nt.  it is undoubtedly trne. 
a s  a general rule, that a word merely de­
scriptive of the a rtiele to whirh it is ap­
plied cannot be uf<ed a s  a trade-mark. 
Everybody bas a right to use the common 
appcl latives of the language. and t o  a p­
ply 1.bem to the things denoted by them. 
A dealer i n  flour cannot adopt the word 
"flour" as his trade-ma rk. and prevent o t h­
ers from applying it to t heir packages of 
flour. I am satisfied from the evidence ad­
duced before me t h a t  the word "celluloid'' 
bas become the moRt commonly usecl name 
o f  the substance which both parties ma nu­
facture, and, if the rule referred to '"ere of 
u niversal application, the position of the de­
fendant would be unassailable. But the spP­
cial case before me is this : The complain­
ant's a ssignors, the Hyatts, coined and 
adopted the word when it was unknown, and 
made it their trade-mark, and the complain­
ant i s  assignee o f  all  the rights of the Hy­
atts. When t lle word was coined and adopt­
ed, it was clearly a good trade-mark. The 
question is whetller the subsequent use of 1t 
by the public, a s  a common a ppellative of 
O rig ir-a l  from 
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the substance manufactured, can take away
the complainant's right It seems to me
that It cannot.
As a common appellative, the public has a
right to use the word for all purposes of
designating the ai-ticle or product, except
one, — it cannot use it as a trade-mark, or in
the way that a ti-ade-mark is used, by apply-
ing it to and stamping it upon the articles.
The complainant alone can do this, and any
other person doing it will infringe the com-
plainant's right. Perhaps the defendant
would have a right to advertise that it man-
ufactures celluloid. But this use of the
word is very different from using it as a
trade-mark stamped upon its goods. It is
the latter use which the complainant claims
to have an exclusive right in; and, if it has
such right, (which it seems to me it has,)
then such a use by the defendant of the
word "celluloid" itself, or of any colorable
imitation of it, would be an invasion of the
complainant's right. As a trade-mark it in-
dicates that the article bearing it is the
product of the complaiuanfs manufacture.
If another party uses it in that way, it in-
dicates a falsehood, and is a fraud on the
public, and an injury to the complainant.
The essence of the law of trade-marks is
that one man has no right to palm off, as
the goods or manufacture of another, tliose
that are not his. This is done by using that
other's trade mark, or adopting any other
means or device to create the impression
that goods exhibited for sale are the product
of that other person's manufacture when
they are not so.
Tlie subject is well Illustrated by the case
of McAndrew v. liassott, 4 Do Gex, J. & S.
380. The plaintiffs produced a new article
of liquorice, and stamped the sticks with the
word '■.\natolia," some of the juice from
which they were made being brought from
-Vuatdlia, in Turkey. The article becoming
very popular, the defendants stamped their
liqucu'ice sticks with the same word. Being
sued for violation of plaintiffs' trade-mark,
one of their defenses was that no poison has
a right to adopt as a trade-mark a common
word, like the name of a comitry where the
article is produced. _I»rd Chancellor West-
bury said: "Tliat argument is merely the
repetition of the fallacy which I have fre-
quently had occasion to expose. Projjcrty
In the word, for all puri)iises, caiiMnl e.\ist;
but property In that word, as applied by way
of stamp upon n particular vendible, as a
stick of li(|U(irice. does exist the moment the
article goes Into the market so stamped, and
there obtains acceptance and reputjitlon,
whereby the stamp gets currency as an In-
illc nlloM of superior qunllly, or of smne other
clrcuinslaiice which renders tlic article so
Htanqied n<i-eplabl(' to the |)ubllc." Page
Another case throwing light on the sub-
ject Is Hint of Hinder Machine Miunifg Co.
V. Wilson, 3 App. Cas. 376. There the de-
fendant, a manufacturer and vendor of sew-
ing-machines, inserted in his price-list, among
other articles for sale, the "Singer Sewing-
Machine," and sold machines by that name,
but having his own trade-mark upon them.
The plaintiff sued him on the ground that
by a Singer sewing-machine was understood
in the community a sewing-machine made
by Singer, the inventor, or by the plain-
tiff, his assignee and successor in business.
The plaintiff contended, therefore, that the
advertisement was a fraud on the public,
and an invasion of its exclusive right to
the name "Singer." The defendant contend-
ed that the terms "Singer Sewing-Machine"
meant a paiticular kind of machine, (which
he described,) irrespective of who manufac-
tured it; that the wo-d "Singer" had come
to be descriptive in its character, and would
not have the effect attributed to it by the
plaintiff. The judges who delivered opin-
ions in the case, held that if the use of the
name "Singer" gave the public to under-
stand that the defendant sold machines
made by the plaintiff, it was a wrong done
to the plaintiff; but that if the name had
come into common use as a name of a par-
ticular kind of machine, irrespective of the
maker, the defendant had a right to use it
in his advertisements in that sense, using
his own trademark on the article itself;
and it was held by all the judges that it
was a matter to bo determined by evidence
whether the use of the name in the adver-
tisement had the one effect or the other.
This, it will be observed, was a case of
advertising, and not of imitating a trade-
mark. Still, if it had the same effect, it
was held to be equally culpable. The case
does not decide that, if the word "Singer"
had been the plaintilT's trade-mark, any
cliange in its use would have affected such
trade-mark, but does decide that an exten-
sion of its use might render the word harm-
less in an advertisement.
The defendant's counsel in the present
case placed great reliance on the decision In
Cloth Co. V. Cloth Co., 11 H. L. Cas. 5-23.
After carefully reading that case, I do not
see that it necessarily governs tlie present.
No (juostlon was made as to the names of
the companies. The trademark there was a
large circular label slanipi^l upon the cloth,
containing, witiiln Its clrcuniference, the
name of the former company which carried
on the iuanufact\u-e. and the places where It
had biHMi carried on. thus: "Crockett Inter-
national Leather ("lolh Company. Newark, N.
.!.. U. S. A.; West Ham, Ksscx. England."
Within the circle were, Ilrst, the figure of an
eagle. dls|ilayed, under the word "10.\celslor."
and then certain annoiuicements In large
type, as follows: "Crockett & Co. Tanned
Ix-.ither Cloth; i)alent(Hl .lan'y 24, '58. .1. U.
& C. P. Crockett. iMnMUfiicluicrs." The court
held this label to 1)e p.nlly tnidi> murk and
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the substance manufactured, can take away 
the complainant's right. It seems to me 
that it cannot. 
As a common appellative, the public has a 
right t o  use the word for al l  purposes of 
designating the article or product, except 
one,-it cannot use it as a trade-mark, or in 
the way that a b:ade-mark is used, by apply­
ing it to and stamping it upon the articles. 
The complainant a lone can do this, and any 
other person doing it will infringe the com­
plainant's right. Perhaps the defendant 
would ha1e a right to ad1ertise that it man­
ufactures celluloid. But this use of the 
word is very different from using it as a 
trade-mark stamped upon its goods. It is 
the latter use which the complainant claims 
to ha1e an exclusive right in;  and, if  it has 
such right, (which it seems to me it has,) 
then such a use by the defendant of the 
word "celluloid" i tself, or of any colorable 
imitation of it, would be an in1asion of the 
compla ina nt's right. As a trade-mark it in­
dicates that the article bearing it is the 
product of the complainant's manufacture. 
I f  another pa rty uses it in that way, it in­
dicates a falsehood, and is a fraud on the 
pulJlic. and an mjury to the compla ina nt. 
The p·sence of tbe law of trade-marks is 
that one man has no right to palm off, a s  
t ile goods o r  manufncture of anot her. those 
tha t are not his. This i s  done by u s i n g  that 
other's trade- mark, or adopting auy o t her 
mea ns or device to create the impression 
that goods exhibited for sale are the procluct 
of that other person's manufa c t ure when 
they a re not so. 
T'he subject is well i l lustrntecl by the case 
Of :\le.Andrew v. J-msset t ,  4 De G ex, J. & S. 
:380. '£he plainti ffs in·ocl ucccl a. ne'v art icle 
or l i q uorice, and stamped the st icks w i t h  the 
word .. A natolia," snme of t lJC jn ice from 
whkb t hey were made being brought from 
A natolia., in TurJ;:ey. The article becoming 
Yery popular, the defendants s t amped their 
l i q uoriee sticks with the sa m word. Bei n g  
sn�l for 1iolat ion o f  plainti ffs' trade-marl;:, 
onr or 1 hc i r  dcfe1:ses was l h a l  no person has 
n ri�ht to adopt as a ! racle-mn rk a com mon 
wcml.  l i ke t b e name of a cou n try w h crl' ti le 
: i r t i r  I P  i s  p rnd u<'ecl .  Lorcl hn tl l'e l ln r  \Yest­
l l u r.1 :·m i d :  ' ''fh a l  a rg- n m P n l  is ll lC'rPl y the 
1·pp< ' l i l ion of the fn l l:1 c-y wh ic·h I hnv fr -
q l l l'l l t  l y  h n d  oc<': t slou to < ' '> J H lSC. PropPrly 
In l he word, for a l l  pnrposcs, l':l nnot  c•x ist ; 
l m l  pro pcrty In t hat word, as n p p l l Pd hy ' ay 
or i; l a 1 1 1 p  upon tt pn rt lruhu· vencl lhlc. nR a 
st lPI\ of l i r p1nriC'C', !frws P X i s t  ( ! JP 1110 11 1c>11 ( t he 
a rl idr. p u· s  in lo t he m a rk l Ro sl n m pC'1 1 .  n nc l  
1 """" oht a l t JH nrerpt : i  ncc• n 1 1 < 1 r •pu l a  L iou,  
w l 11·r«hy thr s t r t m p  gPI H r11 1TP1w�· n s  an iu­
r l lr · 1 1  t lnn of s u perior q 1 1: t l l t y, or of iwme ot het• 
r • lr1 · 1 1 1 1 1. t 1 1 1w,. wh!Ph rP ndNH t ht> tlrl l rlc so 
Hf: 1 1 1 1 pNI n t·r·pptnh!P t o  1 1 1<' p 1 1 hl l r." l 'H g"C 
:1 .... l i  
,\ 1 11 1 t lwr c n H r  l h rnwl n i:  l igh t nn l h c im h­
jP<'I IR t h1 1 t  of Hl 1 1 1-{cr \l 1whl 1 1P  \ l t 1 1 1 1 1 r"� ro. 
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v. Wilson, 3 App. Cas. 376. There the de­
fendant, a manufact urer and vendor of sew­
ing-machines, inserted in his price-list, a mong 
other articles for sale, the "Singer Sewing­
:\Iacbine," and sold machines by that name. 
but ha1ing his own trade-mark upon them. 
The plaintiff sued him on the ground that 
by a Singer sewing-machine was understood 
in the community a sewing-machine wade 
by Singer, the inventor, or by the pla.in­
tifl', his assignee and successor in business. 
The plaintiff contended, therefore, that the 
adYertisement was a ftaud on the public, 
and an in1asion of its exclusi1e right to 
the name "Singer." The defendant contend­
ed that the terms "Singer Sewing-}!achiue" 
mea n t  a particular kind of machine, (which 
be descri becl ,) irrespective of who manufac­
tured it ; that the wo"d "Singer" had come 
to be descripti1e in its character, and would 
not have the effect attributed to it by the 
plaintiff. The j udges who delivered op in­
ions in the ease, held that i f  the use o f  the 
name ''Singer" gave the public to under­
sta nd that the defendant sold machi nes 
made by the pla i u t ifl, it wa.s a wrong Jone 
to t he pla i n t i ff ;  but t llat if  the na me had 
come into common use a s  a name or a par­
ticula r kind of machine, irrespcetiYc of tbe 
maker, tbe defendant had a rio-ht to u�c it 
in his advertisements in that sense. using 
his own trade-mark on tbe article i I self; 
and it was held by all th judges that it 
was a mat ter to be determined by evhtence 
whet her t he use of the name in the :l th-er­
tisement had tb<' one effect or the other. 
This, it will be obserYed, was a em;e of 
advertising-, and not of imitntin,g- a tra de­
ma rk. Still, if  it had the s:1 m e  effcd, i t  
was held to b e  eq nn l l y  culpable. Th case 
does not decide t hat. if tile word ' 'Si ngt'r" 
h a d  been the pla intiff's trade-mn 1·l;:, n u y  
cha ng-c in its use would bave a lTeC'ted snch 
tra dc-11 1a l'l;:, but docs decide t hat n n  t'X l<'n­
sion or its use might render the word h;lnn­
IC'i':R in an ad\'erlisernent. 
The dcfen <l:l nl 's toun cl in t he 11rcsc1 1t  
east' plaecd great relia nce ou t he decision i n  
Cini h Co. v. l ot l l  Cn., 1 1  1 1 .  L .  CaR. 5'.!3. 
A f't <'I' ear Cnlly rend i ng t i.int case, l do not 
s<'P t h a t  il  necessari ly goyerus the pn'l't ll l .  
No q u est ion was m:11lc a s  to the u n n 1 e•s o r  
t he ·011 1 lla n i es. 'l'he t rade- m a rk Un're \\ as a 
la r�e C'in•nl:u- J n l 1l'l s t a 1 n pcd upon t h e cloth,  
eou t n i n l ng, w i Ul lu i t s c:ircnrnt'ercnce, tJ1  • 
name or t h  form r company wbkh currie>1l 
on the manufn ct 11re. and the 11 lnel's where it 
ha d I H'1:'11 1·:11-rlrd 0 1 1 .  t lrns : "C'rockC'l t l t 1 I Pr-
1 1:1 f l ona l LC'n l h cr <.1 lo t l l  omnnny, Ncwnrk. "I. 
.r ., U.  S. . ; West l lnm, lDsl'C 'X,  JCngland." 
W l l hl n  t he C'lrC'le wer , 1\n;t, the flgm·e of an 
r:igle. cllsplnyrcl, under the word " l�xcelslor," 
u nr l  t h en c·t•rt a l n :1 0 11ou 11rr1U<"llL'l ln l:u-::r 
t ,rpc>, ns follo\\'ti: ·•  'rocl{elt & Oo. 'T'n nn<'1l 
L t>n l l 11•r 'lot h ;  pa t 0 n l ro  .l u n 'y 2-1, '58. ,J . lt. 
& c. 1 '.  Oro<'kcl t ,  l\ l n 1 1 t 1 fnl ' ( w·et'R." 'l'ht' court 
hPld t l i i H  l n hPI lo l >< l  1 u 1 1 ·t l .\' t rn r l P  1 1 1 n 1·l;: a uc l  
Ori g i r-a l  frorn 
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partly advci-tisemcnt; and, as tlio elutli was
not patented, and J. R. & C. P. Croekett were
not the niannfactureis, the court was inclined
to agree with flic lord chancellor that Uicse
statements invalidated the label as a trade-
mark; but Lords Cranworth and Kiiigsdown
preferred to place their decision against the
plaintiff on the fn-ound that the defendants'
label did not infringe it. They pointed out
dUToronces in figure, and showed that the an-
nouuccmonts were different; and the defend-
ants' announcement being "Leather cloth,
manufactured by their manager, late with J.
K. & C. P. Crockett & Co.," without any ref-
erence to a patent, Lord Kingsdowu said:
"The leather cloth, of which the man\itacture
was first invented or inti'oduced into the
country by the Crocketts, was not the subject
of any patent. The defendants had the
right to manufacture the same article, and to
represent it as the same with the article
manufactured by the Crocketts; and, If the
article had acquired in the market the name
of Crocketts' leather cloth, not as expressing
the maker of the particular specimen, but as
<lescribiug the nature of the article by whom-
soever made, they had a right in that sense
to manufacture Crocketts' leather cloth, and
to sell it by that name. On the other hand,
they had no right, directly or indirectly, to
represent that the article which they sold
was manufactured by the Crocketts or by
any person to whom the Crocketts had as-
signed their business or their rights. They
had no right to do this, either by positive
statement, or by adopting the trade-mark of
Crockett & Co., or of the plaintiffs to whom
the Crocketts had assigned it, or by using a
trade-mark so nearly resembling that of the
plaintiff as to be calculated to mislead incau-
tious purchasers."
It seems to me that the true doctrine could
not be more happily expressed than is here
done by Lord Kingsdown. There is nothing
in the case, nor in the opinions of any of the
judges, adverse to the claim of the complain-
ant.
There Is a case in the New York Reports
(Solchow V. Baker, 93 N. Y. 50) which comes
very near to that now under consideration.
That was the case of "sliced animals," and
other "sliced" objects, being a term used by
the plaintiff as a trade-mark to designate cer-
tain puzzles manufactured and sold by them,
in which pictiu-es of animals, etc., on card-
board, were sliced up in pieces, and the puz-
zle was to put the pieces together and make
the animal. The label "Sliced Animals,"
etc., was used by the plaintiffs on all boxes
of these goods sold by them. The defend-
ants infringed, and the question was wheth-
er this Ivind of designation could avail as a
trade-mark. Judge Eapallo, in delivering the
opinion of the court, after reviewing many
cases on the subject, concludes as follows:
"Our conclusion is that where a manufac-
turer has invented a new name, consisting
OHIF.PEnS.PKOP. — 3
either of a new word or a word or words in
comnum use, which he has applied for the
first time to his own manufacture, or to an
article manufactm'ed by him, to distinguisli
it from those manufactured and sold by oth-
ers, and the name thus adopted is not generic
or descriptive of the article, its qualities, in-
gredients, or characteristics, but is arbitrary
or fanciful, and is not used merely to den<]te
grade or quality, he is entitled to be protect-
ed in the use of that name, notwithstanding
that it has become so generally known thai
it has been adopted by the public as the ordi-
nary appellation of the article."
This case is so directly in point that it
seems unnecessary to look further. I think
it perfectly clear, as matter of law, that the
complainant is entitled to the exclusive use
of the word "celluloid" as a trade-mark.
The only question remaining to be consid-
ered, therefore, is whether the defendant, by
the use of the word "cellonite," as a trade-
mark, or impression upon its goods as a
trade-mark, does or will infringe the trade-
mark of the complainant. Is the word "cel-
lonite" sufficiently like the word "celluloid,"
when stamped upon the manufactured arti-
cles, to deceive incautious purchasers, and to
lead them to suppose that they are purchas-
ing the products of the same manufacturers as
when they purchased articles marked "cellu-
loid?" I ihink this question must be answered
in the affirmative. I think that, under the cir-
cumstances of the ease, the word "cellonite" is
sutficiently like the word "celluloid" to pro-
duce the mischief which is within the prov-
ince of the law. I say, unde: the circumstan-
ces of the case. By that X mean the previ-
ous nomenclature applied to the articles as
manufactured by different persons. The com-
plainant has always stamped its goods with
the word "celluloid." Other manufacturers
have called the product as manufactured
by them by names quite unlike this, as "pas-
bosene," "lignoid," "chrolithion," etc.; so that
a wide difference in designation and mark-
ing has existed between the complainant's
goods and those of all others. The adoption
now of a word and mark so nearly like the
complainant's as "cellonite" cannot fail, it
seems to me, to mislead ordinary purchasers,
and to deceive the public.
The defendant, however, sets up two
grounds of defense against the application
for an injunction outside of the merits of the
case: First, that the complainant has acqui-
esced in the use of the word "celluloid" in the
names of a great number of other companies,
several of which are enumerated In the an-
swer, such as the "Cellidoid Brush Com-
pany," the "Celluloid Collar & Cuff Com-
pany," and the like; and, by such acquies-
cence, has lost any right to complain of such
use by other companies. But it is obvious
that such special names, indicating confine-
ment to a particular branch of the ti'ade, are
wholly unlike the complainant's general
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pa rtly aclYcl'tisemcn t ;  and, as t he cloth was 
not patented ,  and J. R. & C. P. Crocl;:elt were 
not the manufacturers. the comt was inclin.:d 
to agree with t ile lord chancellor that tl1t>se 
statements innliclated the label as a trade­
mark ; but Lords Crnnworth and Kiugsdown 
preferred to place their decision against the 
plaintiff on tllc ground that the defendants' 
label did not infringe it. They pointed out 
d ifferences In figure, and showed that tbe an­
nonnccmcnt s were diITerent; and the defend­
ants' announcernen t being "Lea thcr cloth, 
manufactured by their manager, late with J. 
R & C. P. Crockett & Co.," without any ref­
erence to a patent, Lord Kingsdown sa i d :  
''The leatller cloth, o f  which the manufacture 
was first invented or introduced into the 
country by the Crocketts, was not the subject 
of any patent. The defendants bad the 
right to manufactme the same article, and to 
represent it as the same with the article 
manufactured by the Crocketts ; anll, if the 
article had acquired in the market the name 
of Crocketts' leathet· cloth, not as expressing 
the maker of the particular specimen, but as 
llescribing the nature of the article by whom­
soeYer made. they had a right in that sense 
to manufacture Crocketts' leather cloth, and 
to sell it by that nam�. On the other hand, 
t hey had no right, directly or ind irectly, to 
represen t  that . the article which they sold 
was manufactured by the Crocketts or by 
any person to whom the Crocketts had as­
signed their business or their rights. They 
llad no right to do this, either by positive 
:statement, or by adopting the trade-mark of 
Crockett & Co., or of the plaintiffs to whom 
the Crocketts bad assigned it, or by using a 
trade-mark so nearly resembling that of the 
plaintiff as to be calculated to mislead incau­
tious purchasers." 
It seems to me that the true doctrine could 
not be more happily expressed than is here 
done by Lord Kingsdown. There is nothing 
i n  t he case, nor in the opinions of any of the 
j udges, adverse to the claim of the complain­
ant. 
There i s  a case in the New York R eports 
(Selchow v. Baker, 93 N. Y. 5D) which comes 
very near to that now under consideration. 
That was the case of "sliced animals," and 
other "sliced" objects, being a term used by 
1 he plaintiff as a trade-mark to designate cer­
t ain puzzles manufactured and sold by them, 
in which pictures of ani mals, etc., on card­
board, were sliced up in pieces, and the puz­
zle was to put the pieces together and make 
the animal. The label "Sliced Animals," 
etc., was used by the plaintiffs on all boxes 
of the e goods sold by them. The defend­
ants infringed, and the question was wheth­
er this kind o f  designation could avail as a 
trade-mark. Judge Rapallo, in delivering the 
opinion of the court, after reviewing many 
cases on the subject, concludes as follows : 
"Our conclusion is that where a manufac­
turer has invented a new name, consisting 
r. m F .  PEns. Pno r. -3 
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eitllcr of a new word or a word or words in 
common use, which he has applied for the 
first time to bis own manufacture, o r  to an 
arl ide manufactured by h im, to distinguish 
it from those manufactured and sold by otll 
ers, and the name thus adopted i s  not generic· 
or d0scriptive of the article, its qualities, in 
grcLl i ents, or characteristics, but is arhitrary 
or fanciful, and is not used merely to dPnote 
grade or quality, he is entitled to be prott>d 
ed in the use of that name, notwithstandin.� 
that it has become so genera lly known tlw t 
it bas been adopted by the public as the onli­
nary appellation of the article." 
This case is so directly in point that it 
seems unnecessary to look further. I think 
it perfectly clear, as matter of law, that the 
complainant is entitled to the exclusive use 
of the word "celluloid" as a trade-mark. 
The only question remaining to be consid­
ered, therefore, is whether the defendant, ur 
the use o f  the word "cellonite," as a trade­
mark, or impression upon its goods as a 
trade-mark, does or will infring-c the trade­
mark of the complainant. Is the word '"cel­
lonite" sufficiently like the word "celluloid," 
when stamped upon the manufactured arti­
cles, to deceive incautious purchasers, and to 
lead them to suppose that they are purchas­
ing the products of the same ma nufactmers as 
when they purchased articles marked ''cellu­
lohl ?" I i hink this question must be answered 
in the affirm ative. I think that, u nder the <"ir­
cumstauces of the case, the word "cellonite" ii; 
sufficiently like the word "celluloid" to pro· 
duce the m ischief which is within the prov­
ince of the law. I say. under the circumstan­
ces of the case. By that I mean the preYi­
ous nomenclatme appl ied to the articles a>; 
manufactmed by different persons. The com­
plainant bas always stamped its goods with 
the 'Yord "celluloid." Other manufacturers 
have called the product as manufactured 
by them by names quite unlike tbi�. as "pas­
bosene," "lignoid," "chrolithiou," etc. ; so that 
a wide difference i n  designation and mark­
ing bas existed between the complainant's 
goods and those of all others. The adoption 
now of a word and mark so nearly like t he 
complainant's as "cellonite" cannot fail. i t  
seems to me, to mislead ordinary purchasers, 
and to deceive the public. 
The clefendant, however, sets up two 
grounds of defense against the applicat i on 
for an injunction outside of the me1its of the 
case : First, that the complainant has acqui­
esced in the use of the word "celluloid" i n  the 
names of a great number of other companies, 
several of which are enumerated in th e  an­
swer, such as the "Celluloid Brush Com­
pany," the "Cel luloid Collar & Cuff Com­
pany," and the like; and, by such acquie;<­
cence, bas lost any right to complain o f  >:<neh 
use by other companies. But it i s  obvious 
that such special names, indicating co nfine­
ment to a particular branch of the trade. are 
wllolly unlike the complainant's general 
Orig 1 r-a l from 
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name of "Celluloid Manufacturing Company."
Besides this, it is altogether probable, as we
gather from one of the affidavits, that these
branch companies are mostly licensees of the
complainant, and very properly use the word
"celluloid" in their names. We think that
this defense cannot justly prevail.
The other is of somewhat the same charac-
ter,— supposed laches and acquiescence on
the part of the complainant, in allowing the
defendants themselves, for three or four
years prior to the suit, to use the word "cel-
lonite," stamped on their articles of manu-
facture, and in their business name. How
the defendant could have done this before Its
own existence is ditlicult to understand. But,
suppose it is meant that it was done by the
corporators and predecessors of the defend-
ant, there is no proof that it ever came to
the knowledge of the complainant; and the
fact that the previous name used under the
former corporate organization was tliat of the
"Jierchants' Manufacturing Company" is suf-
ficient to alford the complainant prima facie
ground of excuse for not having leanied of
the alleged use of the word "cellouite," if it
ever was used. I do not think that either
of those defenses can- avail the defendant.
My conclusion is that the complainant, as
the case now stands, is, in strictness, entitled
to an injunction to restrain the dcloudant
from using the name "Cellonite Manufactur-
ing Company," or any other name substan-
tially like that of the complainant; and from
using the word "cellonite" as a trade-mark
or otherwise, upon the goods which it may
manufacture or sell, or any other word sub-
stantially similar to the word "celluloid," the
trade-mark of the complainant.
But my groat reluctance to grant a pre-
liminary injunction for suppressing the use
of a business name, or of a ti'ade-mark, in
i any case in which the matter in issue is a
! subject for fair discussion, and admits of
I some doubt in the consideration of its facts,
I induces me to withhold the order for the
I present, on condition that the defendant will
I agree to be ready to submit the cause for
i final hearing at the next stated term of the
court, which commences on the fourth Tues-
day of September. It is possible that addi-
tional evidence, or a fuller verification of the
allegations of the answer, may so modify the
facts of the case presented for consideration
as to lead to a ihange of views on the ques-
tion of infringement, or of excuse therefor.
At all events, it will be more satisfactory not
to render judgment in the case until the de-
fendant has been fully hoard, and when it
would have a right of immediate appeal.
Should the defendant not be ready for a hear-
ing at the time indicated, the present motion
may be renewed without additional argument,
or the complainant may take such other course
as it shall be advised.
At the September term no further evidence
was offered, and an order for injunction was
granted without opposition.
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name or "Celluloid �lanufacturing Company." 
Besilles t h i s, it is altogether probable, as we 
gather from one of the affidavits, that these 
branch companies are mostly licensees of the 
complainant, and very properly use the word 
"celluloid" in their names. We think that 
this defense cannot justly prevail. 
The other is of somewhat the same charac­
ter,-supposed !aches and acquiescence on 
the part of the complainant, in allowing the 
defendants themselves, for three or four 
years prior to the suit, to use tbe word "cel­
lonite,'" tamped on their article of manu­
factme. and in their bu iness name. How 
the uefentlant could have done thi before its 
own exi tence is difficult to understand. But, 
suppo e it i meant that it was done by the 
corporators and predece sors of the defentl­
ant, t heL"e i no proof that it ever cnwe to 
the knowledge of the compla inant; and the 
fact tbat the preYious name used under tbe 
former corporate organization was lliat of the 
")1erchant ' :;\lanufactuL"ing Uompnny" i suf­
ficient to aliord the complainant prima facie 
ground of excuse for not haying learned or 
the al leged use of the word "cellouite," if it 
ever was used. I do not thinl� that either 
of the e defen es can avail t he defendant. 
)Jy conclu ion is that tlJe cntllJll: t iuaut . as 
tLe ca ·e now tands, is, in strictne ·s. entitled 
t o  au injuuctioo w re train t he detenclant 
from u iog the name "Cellonite �Ianu factur­
in:.: Company," or any other name substan­
t ial ly like that of the complainant;  and from 
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using the "l'ord "cellonite" as a trade-mark 
or otherwise, upon the goods which it may 
manufacture or sell, or any other word sub­
stantially similar to the word "celluloid," the 
trade-mark of the complainant. 
But my great reluctance to grant a pre­
liminary injunction for suppressing the use 
of a business name, or of a trade-mark, in 
a ny case in "l'hich the matter i n  is ue is a 
subject for fair discussion, and admits of 
some doubt in the consideration of its fact,;. 
induces me to withhold the order fo1· the 
pre·ent, on condition that the defendant will 
agree to be ready to submit the cause for 
final bearing at the nert stated term of the 
comt, which commences on the fourth Tues­
day of September. It is possible that addi­
tional evidence, or a fuller verification of the 
allegatious of the answer, may so m0tlify the 
facts of the ca e presented for con ideration 
•t to lead to a change of view on the ques-
' tion of infringement, or of excuse therefor. 
At all events, it will be more satisfactory not 
to render j udg-ment in the <'n e until the de­
fendant bas 1.Jcen fully beard, and when it 
woulcl bave a right of immediate appeal. 
f<hould the defendant not be ready for a hear­
ing: at the time indicated, the pre ent motion 
may be renewed wit hout additional argumen t .  
o r  the compla inant may take such other course 
as it sball be adYi ed. 
At the September term no further evidence 
was oITere� 1 and nn order for injunction wns grant('(] wimo ut opposition. 
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MITCHELL V. GILE.
(12 N. H. 390.)
Superior Court of New Hampshire. Hillsboi^
ough. Uec. Term, 1841.
Assumpsit by one Mitchell against one Gile,
oue of the charges being for ten cords of
wood sold and delivered. It appeared on the
(rial that plaintiff had on his land a lot of
st';\^oned \vood, of which defendant wished to
borrow a portion in order to complete a boat
load. Plaintiff gave him permission to take
what he wanted for the purpose, and, as de-
fendant proposed to cut some wood from his
land near plaintiff's it was agreed that the lat-
ter should have of it as much as defendant
might taiie of plaintiff's wood. Defendant ac-
cordingly took ten cords of plaintiff's wood,
:md plaintiff afterwards demanded a like
iiuantity of defendant, which, however, the
latter neglected to deliver. Defendant object-
ed that this evidence did not support the dec-
laration, and that plaintiff should have declar-
ed on the original contract.
Bowman & Porter, for plaintiff. S. D. Bell,
for defendant.
GILCHRIST, J. There is a class of cases
where it is unnecessary to declare upon the
.special contract which the parties may have
made. Where oue party agrees to do a cer-
tain thing, and the other party agrees to pay
a ;*uni of money, and the thing or duty is per-
formed, but the other party refuses to pay the
money, an action lies for the money, because
a debt has accrued, and nothing remains to be
doue but to pay it. ITjere seems to be no rea-
son in such a case why a general count should
not be sufficient for the recovery of the money
due. The plaintiff's claim does not then sound
in damages, but is for a definite sum. Such
is the principle recognized in Bank of Colum-
bia V. Patterson's Adm'r, 7 Cranch, 303; 'SVil-
liams V. Sherman, 7 Wend. 109; Jewell v.
Schroeppel, 4 Cow. 564; Bolton v. Dickinson,
10 Mass. 287; Sheldon v. Cox, 3 Bam. & C.
4i:o, and in the cases generally, whenever the
point is adverted to.
There is another class of cases, where the
only remedy for the plaintiff is by an action
on the special agreement, because it still re-
mains open and unresoinded. In general,
where goods ai'e sold to be paid for wholly or
in part by other goods, or by the defendant's
labor, or otherwise than in money, the action
must be on the agreement, and for a breach
of it, and not for goods sold and delivered.
And this is especially the case unless there be
a sum of money due the paintiff on the con-
tract, and that part of it which is for some-
thing else than money has been performed by
the defendant, so that there is nothing to be
tlone which can be the subject of future liti-
gation. In such case perhaps the plaintiff"
may declare that tbe defendant was indebted
to him in a sum of money for goods sold and
delivered to him In exchange. But in a case
tried before Jlr. Justice Buller, where the dec-
laration was for goods sold and delivered, and
the contract proved was, that the goods should
be paid for partly in money and partly in but-
tons, the plaintiff was nonsuited, for not de-
claring on the special agreement. Harris v.
Fowie, cited in the case of Barbe v. Parker,
1 H. Bl. 287. There is also an old case on
this point in Palmer's Reports, 3G4, Brigs'
Case, where one in possession of land prom-
ised to make a lease of It, and took a tine for
the lease, after which, and before the lease
was made, he was evicted from the land. It
was held that debt did not lie to recover the
money paid for the fine; and the principle of
the decision seems to have been, that the con-
tract to make the lease being still subsisting,
the plaintiff should have sued upon that con-
tract. And the authorities are nearly uniform,
that where goods are delivered on a special
agreement, a mere fafiure to perform, by the
defendant, does not rescind the agi'eement;
but it is still executory and subsisting, and
the remedy is by an action upon it. Raymond
V. Bearuard, 12 Johns. 274; Jennings v. Camp,
13 Johns. 94; Clark v. Smith, 14 Johns. 32t;:
Robertson v. Lynch, 18 Johns. 451; Dubois
v. Canal Co., 4 Wend. 289; Talver v. West,
Holt, 178. And in Weston v. Downes, 1
Doug. 23, the court expressly held, that if a
contract be rescinded, an action for money had
and received will lie for money paid under it;
but if the contract be broken, this action will
not lie, but an action for a breach of the con-
tract must be brought. This principle is fully
recognized in Towers v. Barrett, 1 Term K.
133, and in Davis v. Street, 1 Car. & P. 18.
Opposed to the general current both of the
English and American authorities on this point,
are the intimations and the reasoning of Mr.
Justice Cowen, in the case of Clark v. Fair-
field, 22 Wend. 522. He expresses the opin-
ion that the cases will justify the position,
that though the compensation for the goods,
or other thing advanced, is to be rendered in
services, or some other specific thing, if the
party promising to render be in default, in-
debitatus assumpsit will lie for the price of the
thing advanced. He admits that this position
goes beyond any direct adjudication in Eng-
land, although he thinks it may be maintained
by the principle of many cases there, and that
it is just that in such a case a general count
should be maintained. He cites, with appro-
bation, the case of Way v. Wakefield, 7 Vt.
223, 228. where Mr. Justice Collamer says,
that "whenever there are goods sold, work
doue, or money passed, whatever stipulations
may have be4n made about the price, or mode,
or time of payment, if the terms have trans-
pired so that money has become due, the gen-
eral count may be maintained." The action
was for harness sold, to be paid for in lum-
ber at a specified time. There being a de-
fault in payment, the court allowed the gen-
eral count for harness sold. Mr. Justice Cow-
en admits that "the learned judge certainly
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SA LE,'. 
l\1 I TCtIE L L  v. G I LE. 
(12 N. H. 390.) 
Superior Court of rew Hampshire. Hill sbor­
ough. Dec. Term, lSU .  
A sumpsit b y  one :.\fitchell against o n e  Gile, 
one of the cha rges being for ten cords of 
woo<l sold and delivered. It appeared on the 
trial that vlainti!I had on his land a lot of 
se;lc'Soue<l woo<l, of which defendant wished to 
borrow a portion in order to complete a boat 
load. PlaiutiIT gave him permission to take 
wh;lt he w:mted for the purpose, and, as de­
fcmlant prov ed to cut some wood from his 
land near plaintilI"s it  was agreed that the lat­
ter ·! inul<l have of it as much as defendant 
migbt take of plaintiff"s wood. Defendant ac­
cc m lingly took ten cords of plaintiff"s wood, 
a ud plaiutift' afterwards demanded a like 
•J mrntity of defendant, which, however, the 
latter neglected t o  deliver. Dt:!fendant object­
cu that thi evidence did not supp01t tbe dec­
laration, and that plaintiff should have declar­
ed on the 01iginal contract. 
Bowman & Poiter, for plaintiff. S. D. Bell, 
for defendant. 
t; l LCHRIST, J. There is a class of cases 
\\"here it is u nnecessary to declare upon the 
sriecial contract which the parties may have 
made. ·where one party agrees to do a cer- 1 
tain thing, and the other party agrees to pay 
a �um of money, and tbt:! thing or duty is per­
formed. but the other party refuses to pay the 
money. an action lies for the money, because ' 
a clebt bas accrued, and nothing remains to be 
rloue but to pay it. There seems to be no rea­
sc>n in such a case why a general count should 
not be sufficient for the recovery of the money 
due. The plaintiff's claim does not then sound 
in damages, but is for a definite sum. uch 
i the principle recognized in Bank of Colum­
bia v. Patterson's Adm"r, 7 Crancb, 303; Wil­
liam v. Sherman, 7 Wend. 109; Jewell v. 
t'cbroeppel, 4 Cow. 564; l<'elton v. Dickinson, 
10 :.\!ass. 287 ; Sheldon v. Cox, 3 Barn. & C. 
4:!0, and in the cases generally, whenever the 
point is adverted to. 
There is another class of cases, where the 
only remedy for the plaintiff is by an action 
on the special agreement, because it still re­
mains open an<l unrescinded. In genera l,  
where goods are sol<l to be paid for wholly o r  
in part b y  other goods, or b y  t h e  defendant"s 
lahc>r. or otherwise than in money, the action 
mu.-t be on the agreement, and for a breach 
of it, and not for goods sold and delivered. 
And this is especia lly the case unle there be 
a sum o f  money due the paintiff on the con-
t r·u:t, and that part of it wbicb is for some­
t h ing el e than money bas been performed by 
tried before l\Ir. Justice Buller, where th<' dec­
laration was for goods sold and delivered, an<l 
the contract proved was, that the goods sllou ill  
be paid for partly i n  money and pattly in but­
tons. the plaintiff was nonsuitcd, for not de­
claring on tbe special agreement. IIa rris v. 
Fowle, ·ited in the case of Barbe v. Parker, 
1 II. Bl. 287. There is also an old case on 
this point in Palmer's Rep01is, 3G4, Brigs' 
Case, where one in possession of land prom­
ised to make a lease of it, and took a line for 
the lease, afler which, and before the leas<• 
was made, lie was evicted from the land. I t  
was held that debt did not lie to reco\•er thl• 
money paid for the fine; and the principle o f  
t h e  decision seems to have been, that the con­
tract to make the lease being still subsisting, 
the plaintiff should have sued upon that con­
tract. And the authorities are nearly uniform, 
that where goods are delivered on a special 
agn•cment, a mere failure to perform, hy tht 
defenclnnt, does not rescind the agi·eement : 
but it is still executory and subsisting. and 
the reme<ly is by an action upon it. Rnymoncl 
v. Bearnard, 12 Johns. 27-1 ; Jennings v. Camp. 
13 Johns. 94 ; Clark v. Smith, 14 Johns. 3�t i :  
llobettson v .  Lynch, 1 8  Johns. 431 ; Dubois 
v. Canal Co., 4 Wend. 28!); Talver v. West. 
Holt, 178. And in Weston v. Downes, 1 
Doug. 23, the court expressly heltl, that if a 
contract be resci nded, an action for money hatl 
and received will lie for money paid under i t ;  
but i f  the contract be broken, this action will 
not lie, but an act.ion for a breach of the con­
tract must be brought. This principle L..; fully 
recognized in Towers v. Barrett, 1 Term I \ .  
133, a nd i n  Davis v.  Sh·eet, 1 Car. & l '. 11..,. 
Opposed to the general current both of t l w  
English and Amelican authorities on this point. 
are the intimations and the reasoning of :.\fr. 
Ju tice Cowen, in the case of Clark v. Fair­
tielll, 22 Wend. 522. Ile expresse the opin­
ion that the cases will justify the position, 
that though the compen...<-ation for the good:;, 
or otller thing advanced, is to be rendered in 
services, or some other specific tlling, i (  U1e 
party promising to render be in default.  in­
debitatus assumpsit will lie for the price of the 
thing advanced. He admits that this po::;ition 
goes beyond any direct adjudication in Eng­
land, althong-h he tbinlrn it may be maintained 
by the principle of many cases there, and that 
it  is just that i n  such a case a general count 
should be maintained. He cites, with appro­
bation, the case of 'Vay v. Wakefield, 7 Yt. 
223, 22 . where :.\Ir. Justice Collamer says, 
that ''whenever there are goods sold, worl;: 
done, or money passed, whatever tipulations 
may have be�n made about the price, or mode, 
or time of payment, if the terms ha>e t rans­
pired so that money has become due, the gen­
eral count may be maintained." The action 
"·as for harness solcl. to be paid for in lum­
be1· at a specified time. There being a de­
fault in payment, the court al lowed the gen-
t be defenda nt, so that t here is nothing to be 
\l1111e "·bicb can be the subj ect of future liti­
gntion. I n  such case perhaps the plaintiff 
may declare that the defendant was i ndebted 
to him in a sum of money for good sold ancl 
dcli\·ered to him in exchange. But i n  a case 
ral count for harness sold. :.\Ir . . J u stice Cow-
1 en admits that "the learned judge certainly 
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did not cite any direct authority for thus ap-
plying the rule," and we are not aware that
any authority exists for such an application
of it. To the rule, as above stated, there
may, perhaps, be no objection. The question
in cases of such a character always is, wheth-
er the money has become due; and if no more
be meant than that a general count will lie,
where a contract has been performed, and has
resulted in an obligation to pay money, then
we assent to the correctness of the position.
Of the propriety of the application of the rule
to the facts in the case of Way v. ^'akefield,
we may be permitted, respectfully, to express
a doubt. It is true that a general count may
sometimes be maintained, where tlie goods
were to be paid for by other goods. Of this
character is the ease of Forsyth v. .Tcrvis, 1
Staikie, 437. The plaintiff sold the defendant
a gun for foity-Bve guineas, and agreed to
take of the defendant a gun, in part payment,
at the price of thirty guineas. Lord Ellen-
borough held that as here was a sjile of goods.
to be paid for in part by other goods at a
stipulated price, upon tbe refus;il of the pur-
chaser to pay for them in that mode, a con-
tract resulted to pay for tliem in money, and
that the forty-five guineas might be recoveretl
under a count for goods sold. This case has
evei-y characteristic of a sale. The plaintiff
sold the gun for a spec'ifled i)rice; the defend-
ant agreed to give, in part payment, another
gun for a stipulated price, and was bomid ei-
ther to deliver the gun or pay its price. .\s he
refused to deliver the gun, a decision that he
was indebted to the plaintilT for its price ac-
cords with the general tone of the authorities.
In relation to the case of Clark v. Fairchild, it
Is al.so to be remarked, that in the sul)se<iuent
case of Ladue v. Seymour. '_M Wend. GL', Mr.
JiLstice Bronson says, that where there is a
subsisting special contract between the par-
ties in relation to the thing done, all the cases
agree that the contract nuist control, and that
the remedy Is. In general, upon that, nnd not
ui>>n the comMii>n coimts In assmnpsll.
But apart from authority, and from teclinlc-
nl reasoning depending upun authority for
much of It.s force. It Is proper that the form
of the remedy should be adapte<i to the actual
state of facts. In no otlii-r mode of declailiig
can the proper rule of damages be applied,
where tliere has been a brea<'h of a special
contract. If goods arc sold and dellvereil, the
price, or value, at Ihe time of the transaction,
la the inenHure of damages, mdess Ihero be
something showing a dilferent Intention by
the parties. The i)laliitllT' l« eiilllled to the
value of the goods he has parted with, at Ihe
time, nnd to nothing more; nor can the de-
fenilnnt bo coijipelled to pay more than the
value at the time he received llieni. Both par-
lies act with reference to Ihi- valiii- at Ihe Ihne
of the tmnsiiellon. lint where a party ngiecs,
but negleelH to di'llver goods at n Npeellled
time, the daningce for the Don-fullllment of
BUch an agreement arc to be calculated accord-
ing to their value at the time they should
have been delivered. If the articles have fall-
en in price, the defendant will be entitled to
the benefit of such a change in the market; if
they had risen, the increase in value will be-
long to tlie plaintiff. There is, therefore, a
substantial reason why the rights of both par-
ties can be better secured, by declaring spe-
cially upon a breach for the non-fulfilment of
a contract to deliver goods, than by declaring
upon the general count; and this reason prob-
ably has had its effect in causing the forms of
the remedy to be kept distinct. I/eigh v.
Patersou, S Taunt. 5-10; Gainsford v. Cannll,
2 Barn. & C. G24; Shaw v. Nudd, S Pick. !>.
If. where goods are sold to be paid for oth-
erwise thau in money, and the vendee neglects
to perform, an action must be brought on the
special agreement, there is a still stronger rea-
son for adopting the same form of the rem-
edy where the goods are not sold, but ex-
changed. In the former case, the goods are
at least sold; and so far the evidence sup-
ports the declaration. But the latter case has
no feature in common with a contract, neces-
sary to support a count for goods sold and
delivered. Xow the traiisaction between tliose
parties was, properly speaking, an agreement
for an exchange of goods, and not for a sale.
Blackstoue says (2 Comm. 44G), "If it be a
commutation of goods for goods, it is more
properly an exchange; if it be a transferring
of goods for money, it is called a sale." Here
the defendant agreed to deliver to the plaintiff
as much wood as he received of him. This
agreement the defendant failed to perform.
There is. then, a breach of the special agree-
ment, and there is nothing else. The injury
sustained by the plaintilT is to be compensated
by a recovery of damages for the breach.
There is nothing in the case that shows a SJile
of the wood by either party to the other; nor
can tlie transaction he considered a sitle. with-
out a disregard of all the authorities wliicli
distinguish actions sounding In damages i'(U' a
bieaeh of contracts, from actions to recover n
definite sum as the purchase money for goods
sold.
Nor is the case altered by the fact that no
suit could be maintained without a demand.
The w<x)d was to be delivered to the pl.iinlllT
at such time as he should desire v It. The
plaintilT would have a right to the perform-
ance of the agreement whenever he should no-
tify the defendant that he deslrcfl the wood.
There could be no breach of the agreement by
the defeiidiiin tuitii after this notice; and a re-
fustil to deliver \v;is a breach, for which an
action Is malntainalile. That a demanil, in a
given case. Is necessary before a suit can be
malnlaliied on ii specljil conlract, by no means
proves that the ileniand alters tlie form of thi'
remedy to which the pliiinllfr Is entitled. II
might as well bi' said, thai liec.'iiise an ;ielioti
on a Kj)er'lnl oinlrinl could not be miilnliilncd
until a given period had elapsed, therefore the
Inpsc of time altered the renin of the remedy.
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did not cite any d irect authority for thus ap­
plying the rule," and we are not aware that 
any authority exists for such an application 
of it. To the rule. a above stated, there 
may, perhaps, be no objection. The question 
in cases of such a character always is, wheth­
er the money has become due; and i! no more 
be meant than that a general count will lie, 
where a contract has been performed. and bas 
resultt•i.l in an olJJigation to pay money, then 
we a - ent to the conectuess of the position. 
Of the propriety of the avplica tiou of the rnle 
to the facts in the case of '"a� v. 'Yahefield. 
we may be permitted, respect fully. to exprcs­
a doubt. It is true that a general count may 
sometimes be m<t inta i net1, where the guut1s 
were tu be paid for by other good.. Uf this 
character is the ca.e of For yth Y . .  h'n· is,  1 
Starkie, 4:H. Tbe 11lai ntitr • old the tkfentlaut 
a gun for forty-tfre guineas. · anu agn·ed to 
take of the defendant a gun, in part payment. 
at  the price of thirty guin1:as. Lonl Ellc>n­
borougll behl that as here wa a sale of Q:oous. 
to be pa id for i n  part by other gool1s at a 
·tipulated price, upon the refu,;al of the pur­
chaser to pay for them in that mode. a t-on­
t ract resul t c1 l  to pay for them in moue�'. a nd 
that the forty-ffre gui nea u1ight be n'<!oven'•l 
under a count for goods sold. T h is case has 
every eh:lr:wtcristic of a i:: t lP. The plaintiff 
sold the gun for a ::>ped licil price ; t he defend­
ant agreed to g i,·e. in part pa� ment. another 
gnu for a st ipulnte<1 price. nm! wns hound ei-
1 lwr to dcli\·er the gun or pa� its price . ,\ he 
rrfuscd to delh·er t he irun. a decision t ha t  he 
was i ndebted to the pl a i n t i ff for it pri<"e ac­
c·onls with the ::encral toue of the authorit ies. 
J n  rl'la t ion to t h •' e:tsP of 'lnrl' \". Fairehild . it 
b :tb11 to hr rP111:11·h•l. that in the sul iseqnc>nt 
mse of L:tdnc , .. S•'.\'1 1 10 1 1 1-. :.! I \\ Pll<i. ti:!, :\Ir. 
.J nst i<'c• l lr11n�"Oll sa�·s. I h:tt wlwn• t lu•n• is a 
i:;nl!sist ing spc>ci: i l  t•11nl r:td lletwe>t'll t hP par­
ti <'s i 1 1  1·l' i :tt  i1JU tu the• t h i n g 1lonc>. al l  t lw f ' : tsps 
:1::1<'1· t hat tlw c·n ntr:wt must eont rnl. UJHI t h a t  
t hP IPl 11 1·1Jy i s .  I n  g<'rwrnl.  1 1 111111 t ha t .  n n d  not 
1 1 )101 1  I J1 1 •  1'0111 1 1 1011 l'Ol 1 n ( .;  i l l :tSSllll ) 1'4 1 1 .  
Bnt  1 1 ) 1 : 1 1'1 frolll : 1 1 1 t hmity,  · 1 1 1 1 1  from tP<'1 1 1 1 i<'­
Ul rPa;;1111lng' dl')l<'ll< l i nA' 1 1 1 11 n : 1 1 1 t horil .1 f•n· 
1 1 1 1wh of i t s  fm·r·<', it Ii:; pr11) 1!'I' t h : l l  t he t unn 
of t hro l'f'lll l'd.1· :;honhl 1 11• arl11 ) 1 IP<i  t n  l ht• :ll'! nal 
f'IH I ••  of f:l!'fl:<, I 11 llfl ot l u •r mod!' nt' d1•1'1n 1  i 11 g  
r·1 1 1 1  t l1t' 1irn1wr n1ll' n f  rl:1 1 1 1 :1g ..  s I ii •  n pp l l 1•d 
wh"l'" 1 1 1 1 '1'<' h:t lu Pn a hri •:tl 'h o l'  :1  i-J t•'<i:il 
<'nl l l t :wt. If g1""' ' a n• sold : t l lc l  r l 1 • l ln•t'J '! I .  t h< '  
prk<', o r  va h11•, n t  1 1 ,r• 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 f  t h< ' t 1:1 n�:11 ' t ln11, 
I t hi' l l l l �I ttrP of d:11 1 1 : 1 g1•s, l l l l l<'Sli t 1 1 1 • n •  h1• 
'<Jll lt'l hlni: RhnwhtA' :i  d i l l 1 • 11 • 1 1 t  i 1 1 1 1 • 1 1 t to1 1  l ty 
1 1 1" pn rt lr•!I, 'l 'l u •  pl:i l t i t l ll i 1 • 1 1 t i 1 J . . c l  f n  t l w  
\ l! l llP I ] (  t lJI' J.(O• idll h l '  hll!I ) ll l l'l t•d wllh,  :I t l h 1• 
t l 1 1u•, nml 1 1 1  11nt h l 1 1 g  1 1 1 1 11· . . ; nor c11 1 1  tll<' dt .. 
l 1 ·wl:1 1 1 t  he 1·0111 1 t<'ll1 ·d tn J ll l .1 1 1 1nn• lh11 1 1  f h P  
nl lm• :i i ! hf' tlll lC' "" t'(•1 1 ·h· 1 ·d 1 1 11 1 1 1 .  l loth par· 
11 . .  s al'! wi t h  r"t " t •  llf'f' 10 1 1 1 1 •  \'11 h1<• nt f hP t l nw 
or th•! t ni 1 111111•l l 1J1 1 ,  l : l l l  l\ hl'IP I I  pn rfy llJ,:1 • l R, 
hut nq:;h r-1.H t u  d<'l l\· < ' r  g1J1 11 I : i i  11 1:<1 wf 'i tkd 
thm•, t hf' d11 11111g1'E! (, ,, . f lu• 11011 f 1 1 l flh 111•1 1 f  n f  
l:!Uf'h Ul l  UJ; l'l'l'llll'llt Ul'I' t o  lw 1·11 lr1 1 l 1 1 t 1·d l l l 'l'fll ' f l· 
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ing to their value at the time they should 
have been delivered. If the articles haYe fall­
en in price, the defendant w i l l  be entitled to 
the benefit of such a cha nge in tbe market; i f  
they had risen. t b e  increase i n  value w i l l  be­
long to the plaintiff. There i , therefore, a 
substantial reason wh3· the rights of both par­
ties can be better secured, by declaring spe­
cially upon a breach for tbe non-fulfilment of 
a contl'act to deliver gont1s, than by declaring­
upon the ;::-eneral count ; and this ren.son prob­
ably has bad its effect in causing tbe forms of 
the remedy to be kept distinct. Lei�b '· 
Paterson, S Taunt. 340; Gainsford v. CtUT<lll,  
:t Barn. & C. 6�-l; Shaw v. Nudd, 8 Pick. n. 
I L  wh ere> ;::nu(1S are sold to be paid for oth 
erwise tban in moue� . and the veudee neglect -
to 1 1rrform, a n  act ion must be brou�ht nu the 
spcdal agreement. there i s  a stil l  tron�cr rea­
son for a dopting tile same form of the rem­
edy where the goods are not sold, but ex­
«ha nged. In the former caSl'. the goods are 
at least sold; a nl1 so far t he e>itleuce sup­
port the dl.'l.'laration. But t lie Iat ler C':l. <' ha� 
no feature in common with a contract, nc ·e:::;­
sar�· to sn11port a count for goods sold an<I 
1lC'li l erc(L �ow th<> t ra nsact ion l>etween tho:;e 
pa rt ies was. prn1,crly s11eaking-, au a.:::-reenwnt 
for an excha ng-e of goods. null not fur a sak'. 
Black. tone says (2 Comm. -Hen. " I r  it be a 
commutation of gO<l<1s for goods. it i5' nw1·r 
pr• 11rrly an ex<'ha n�e ; if it he a t rnu<:fl'tTin :.:: 
of ;.:oot1s for 111on<'y, it is calkcl a ·ale." I ll'l'<' 
th<' defenda nt agrc>ell to deliver to the pla i ttt i f  
a. much wood a::; lte received of him. This 
agrrement thl' defC'ndaut fnilccl to pc>rfo 1 n 1 .  
ThC're is. then. a breach o f  t h e  s11ecial a ;.:rce­
mcnt. a 11<1 thNe is not h ing C'll't'. 'l'lle i nj u ry 
i:;ustai nc>d hy the pla int i ff is t o  h<' compc>ns:ltecl 
by a n·1"wery of dauingcs fo1· the hn•adi. 
'l'hrn' ls not hmg in t he case t ha t showi:; a ��l i e  
o r  till' wom1 l >y c>i thc>r pa r t y  to t h e  other ; 1101· 
l':tll the' t rn n,.;:wtiou be t'Ol1Ridcret1 a sail' . with ·· 
out a ( 1 isrl·g: 1nl or al l  t he authorities \\ hil'h 
r l i st i 1 1;.:11i.·h ad inns :::nmuling In damag,•s for a 
1 11· .. :wli  of t'<mt r:wts, from actions to rc•'"\Tr :i 
c l 1 · t i 1 1 i t P  1:< 1 1 1 1 1  as t he irnrl'linsc moner for ;.:•1nc1s 
�olcl . 
.i\M is t lw rasr a l t ered lly the fact t l 1:t t no 
suit t·nn lil  lw m:1h1t:1 inccl wit hout a t111111:1 u1 1 .  
The wo d \\ : ts  to  hi' <h'l iYC' l'l'd to the 1 1l:t lnt i tf 
at s11C'l1 t i nw as lw sh1111hl deRlrc It.  'l'lw 
pln i 1 1 t t fl'  wo11lrl h:t\'<' :i 1·lght to t h e p<'rform· 
: 1 1 1  ... • nf t hi' : t '.'l'l'<'l lH  I l l  \1 hrne\'Pl' hl' shnul1l no· 
t i t)· t ile' clrfl'llda n t  thn t  he dl'1:<il'Pcl t he' \\'notl .  
'l'lwn• <'1 1 1 1 ! 1 1  he 110 hrl':l<'h of th<' : 1 g 1·t•1•111  .. t t t  h�· 
f l w  dl'f1 · 1 1 c lant u n t i l  1 f f p1• t his  not lcP; a m l  :i 1 "  
f11«:1 I to r ! f ' ! l \'Pl'  \\ as :1 hrP:t<'h, fnr " hl1•lt a 1 1  
:wt lnn I s  ma l1 1 t : l in:t l il1•. Tha t n c Jp1 1 1 :1 1 1 1 l ,  in :1 
g i n·n c•:1 i;1·, I� 1 1 1·<'<'!!i<:1 ry lt<'[ore a snit  •·a n h" 
1 1 1 1 t l 1 1 f , 1 h 11•d n i l  :t :::pr'<'l:t l 1'1 111l r:ll't ,  hy Ill• 11 11·: 1 1 1-; 
1 11'"\ <'S t 1 111 t t h1• d1•111n 1 1 1  I n 1 1  PrN Uw fonll nf t l w  
t l ' l l ll'd.\' tn 11·h ft 'l1 1 1 11• pl11 l 1 1 t l fl'  IH c>1 1 t i t l<'d. I t  
mli:ht  I I" \\ 1 · 1 1  h" t<:tld. f h:1 t hl'<'l l l t1:<P : 1 1 1  : 1  . . t 1 n 1 1  
011  n "lll' l ' l l l l  1• n 1 1 f 1 : i r • f  < 'n11 ld 1 1 1 1 1  he m:t l 11 t : 1hwd 
1 1 1 1 t ! !  ' 1  J:h •·ll 1 11 •d1 1d hnd c l :t ps<>rl, t hl'l'<'f1 1n •  f lw 
l11 pi-1· nf 1 11 1 1 £ '  : t l t ! ' l l'd t hl' form o r  t he n•1 1 1  . .  dy.  
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Undoubtedly, a demand and refusal may, in
some cases, have this effect, but tlie result
does not necessarily follow because the de-
luand must be made.
The opinion of the court Is, that the plain-
tiff has misconceived his remedy, and that thl3
action cannot be maintained.
riaintiS nonsuit.
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riidoubtedly, a demand and refusal may, in 
::.ome cases, have this effect, but the result 
does not necessarily follow because the de­
mand must be made . 
• 
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by 
RCHIVE 
The opinion o t  the court ls, that the plain­
tiff has misconceived his remedy, and that thls 
action cannot be maintained. 
Plaintiff nonsuit. 
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SAXES.
MAT.LORY V. WILLIS.
(4 N. Y. 76.)
Court of Appeals of New York. 1850.
Replevin for seventy-five bnrrels of flour.
The plaintiffs had contracted with the de-
fendant, Christopher Willis, to deliver at the
Hopeton Mills a quautitj- of good morchaut-
able wheat to be niauufactuied into Horn' on
the followins terms: For every four liiishols
and til'toen pounds of wheat, Christopher Wil-
lis was to deliver one hundred and niuety-
srx poimds of supertiue tlour, packed in bar-
rels to be furnished by the plaintiffs. Said
Willis was to guarantee the inspection of the
flour, and if scratched, to pay all losses sus-
tained thercb.v. The plaintiffs were to have
all the otTals, or feed, etc.; the said Willis
to store the same imtil sold. The plaintiffs
were to pay sixteen cents for each barrel so
manufactured, and if they made one shilling
net profit on every barrel, they were to pay
said Willis two cents per barrel extra.
The plaintiffs delivered thirty -two thou-
sand live hundred and eifrhty-six bushels and
four poinids of wheat at the Hopeton Mills,
and received seven thousand six hundred
and sixty-seven barrels and one hundred
and lifly-six pounds of flour, pursuant to the
asrcemeut. They brousrht this action of re-
plevin against Christopher Willis and Charles
P. Willis, to recover the sun'lus of seventy-
five barrels still due under tlie contract. The
defen<lai)t insisted that the tide to the wheat
passed to Willis by force of the delivery un-
der the contract, and that, thererore. the
I)laintiffs could not recover the flour niaim-
I'actured from the same wheat. Judgment
was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs by
Pratt. .1., and aflirmed by the general term.
The defendants brought this appeal.
J. S. Glover, for appellants. S. H. Wells,
for respondents.
IIIKLBUT. J. If the contract was one of
bailment, and If by a proper construction of
It the defendants were entitled to the surplus
flour, I tliinlc the burden would have rested
on them of showing that the article In (pies,
floii was such sunilus, after the i)laluliffs
had establlslieil that It was the produce of
their wheat; .so that taking the most favor-
able view for the defendants, there was no
error In point of law In this bianeli of the
decision at llie circuit, which would entitle
them to <>xcep(, and the only nuestion fur our
(leclslon Is, whether the contract and tlw de-
livery under It nmoinited to n sale or a hail-
UKTit of the wlii'.MtV
The (lefend.'inlH refer us to that part of the
contract wlilcli binds them to deliver a bjir-
rel of siiperflni' (lour and to guarantee its In-
spi'i'tlon. for I'very four and one-fourth bush-
els of wheat, which It la allegc<l, If the pl.-iln-
tlffs' construction Is to pn-vall. Is not only
an unrraHMiiiihle and hard contract for the
(lefcndanlH, but Is altogelher Incotislslent
with the notion of a bailment; for it is ask-
ed, if it were not a sale, why should the de-
fendants guarantee that the flom- should bear
inspection, or why shoidd they agree for a
certain quantity of wheat to deliver a bar.
rel of floiu-? It may be remarked in answer
to this, that the defendants being experi-
enced millers must be deemed to have con-
tracted with a knowledge of the quantity
of wheat required to yield a barrel of floiu"
and as the plaintiffs were obliged by the con-
tract to deliver good merchantable wheat,
it seems but reasonable that the defendants
should have been required so to manufactiue
it, as that the flour would bear inspection;
that these provisions must be viewed in the
connection in which they stand, and receive
a construction which shall make them har-
monize with the whole expression of the
contract between the parties; and that tak-
ing the whole agreement into view, they
seem to have been inserted at the sugges-
tion of the plaintiffs, for the puipose. in
part, at least, of causing a skillful and pru-
dent mauufacture of the wheat into flour;
and even if they were employed to define
the quantity of flour to be returned, the.v
woxUd not overl)ear the other provisions of
the agreement, which import very clearly an
tindcrstanding between the parties that the
identical wheat which was delivered by the
plaintiffs should be maimfactured into flour
for their benefit; that they were to pay for
the work a stipulated price in money, and
to receive the manufacttuvd article, together
with the olTals or feed, which should come
from the wheat. The language of the agree-
ment will hardly bear a different construc-
tion. The plaintiffs by its terms were to de-
liver wheat to be manufactured into flour,
which Willis agreed to do— i. e., ho agreed to
manufacture the wheat so to be delivered
into flour. But this provision would be en-
tirely out of place in an exchange of wheat
for llotu*. The plaintiffs were to furnish the
barrels in which it was to be packed; thus
providing every material for the completion
of the work, and leaving nothing for Willis
to do Viut to perform the proper labor of a
inanufacturcM'. The plaintiff's were moreover
to have all I lie offals or feed, etc.; not such
n quantity of offals as would proceed from
like quantity of other wheat, but the offals
or feed — I. e., such as should come of grind-
ing the very wheat delivered to the miller,
who was also to store the feed until the
plaintiffs could sell It. And In case Willis
performed on his part, I. e., in case he man-
ufactured the wheat so delivi-red into flour,
with the requisite skill and prudence, the
plaintiffs were to pay him at tlie nite of six-
teen cents, or In a certain contingency eight-
een c<>nl8 per barrel, as a compensation for
the labor of luanufaclure. Proper effect can-
not bo given to these provisions of the agree-
ment, without treating It as a contract by the
defenil.'intH to manufacture the plainliIVs'
wheat into flour, to deliver to them the spe-
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38 SALES. 
MALLORY v. WILLIS. 
(4 N. Y. 76.) 
Court of Appeals of New York. 1850. 
Replevin for seventy-five barrels of flour. 
The plaintiffs had contracted with the de­
fendant, Christopher Willis, to deliver at the 
Ropeton i\lilis a quantity of good merchant­
able wheat to be manufactured into flour on 
the following term : For every four bushels 
aml fifteen pounds of wheat, Christopher Wil­
l i s  wa to deliver one humlred and ninety­
si:X'. pounds of superiine fiour. packed in bar­
rels to be furnished by the plaintiffs. Said 
Willis was to guarantee the inspection of the 
flour. and if scratched. to pay all los e sus­
tninetl thereby. The pla intiffs were to have 
all  t he olial . or feed. etc. ; the sa i d  Willi  
to stor the same until sold. The plaintiffs 
were t pay sixteen cents for each barrel so 
!llanufactu l'ed, and if they made one shilling 
net profit on every barrel, they wei·e to pay 
said Willi hvo cent per barrel extra. 
The pla in tiffs deliverell t h irty-two thou­
sand fin' lrnntl red a rn l  eight y-six bushel, and 
four pomllls of wheat at t lle Ilopeton )I ills. 
aurl recei ved even thous:l llll six h un d red 
and sixty-seven barrels a nd one h u nurell 
aull fi f t y-six ponntls o r  fiom', llUl'suant to the 
ag-n•ement. They brought t h is action of re­
ple•in against Clu:i top.Iler Vl'illis and Charles 
P. W il l i  , to recover the surplus of seventy­
five hal'l'els sti l l  due undet· thc- contract. The 
clefeucl a n t  insist d t ha t  ti.le t it le to the wbC'at 
passed to Willis by force of t he del i ver) un­
der t he con t rac t . n nrl thn t .  l l tere!'ore. the 
pla intiffs coulu not rec:o,·c1· t he flou r n m nu-
. ract nred l'rom th same wlw11t .  .Judgment 
"·as rendered in f:lvor oC t he plaintiffs by 
P ra t t, .J . ,  and a ffirmed by the general t rrn. 
The d feudants brought this appea l .  
.J. � .  Glover, for appe lla nts. S.  ll. Wells, 
for l'Pi'lponrlrnts. 
l l f ' l U,BUT, J. Ir the co n t rn rt was one of 
hn i l 1 1 1e1 1t ,  and 11' by a 1wope1· <'on :;;t rndion of 
i t  t h" rlefen<l a n t s  were en t i t led to the sm·ph1� 
Oom-. I l ll in!· t he burden woul d lrnve r<.>stecl 
on t lwm o! :;;howln:r t lm t  t he nrticl<.> In q11 <'R· 
1 ! 1 1 1 1  was sud1 imrplus, n fl er t he plalut l l'fs 
hm l c>Rtn hllshrrl t h11 t ll w11s t Ill' prnc11H 'I.' of 
t l l! 'i r  wlwn t ;  sn t hn l tnklo;: t h e most t'a vor­
a hlr Y l<'W fnr ! h r c l ef ndn n t :;;, t h e-re- was no 
PJTnr In poi n t  or lnw In t h is hl'!l lH'h or t h e 
dr r · l slnn n t  r h l' rirr•11lt.  w h ll'h would <' 1 1 1 i l le 
l hl ' l l l  l o  r •xc·Ppt,  11 1 1rl t h e onl �· q l H'Rt lon Cor 011r  
r l<'rltdon l t1 ,  wlJr • t  h r r  t lw c ·ont  rnct n nd t )IP cl!' 
J h· , ,1·r u nr lP I' I I  11 11101 1 1 1 t rrl t o  a �nl" or n l ln l l -
1111 I I  t o f  t f t p  W h t  n I � 
Thr•  r l P l'r•u d n n t -.  l'f 'fc>r 1 1� to thnt nnrt of t h e 
ro 1 1 t r11Pt w h lr•h hl 1 1 r h-1  t l w m  t o rl r ·l l v rr n hn r 
n• I •1f HllJ l"1'1l 1 1 1 •  u .. 1 1 r  nnd to 1" 1 1n nu1tPr t t.  I n· 
"l •P•· t lon, rnr l '\ 'PI')' rnur nnd 011r- fo11rt h h11Hb 
rl. nf wht>n l .  whlrh It  IR n l lr�NI, t r  tlw pl:t ln 
t l fl'H' rnm l nwt lon IH to prl'vll f l ,  IR uot o n l y  
n n  u nrrn nnn hll' n nc l h n rr l  rm1l r11rl ror t h o 
rl frnrlu nt -1, hut 11:1 11 l t r•�<'l hr.r t 1 1rnnHIHl rnt 
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with the notion o f  a bailment; for i t  i s  a k­
ed, if it were not a sale, why should the de­
fendants guarantee that the flour should bear 
inspection, or why should they agree for a 
certain quantity of wheat to deliver a bar. 
rel of flour? It may be remarked in an "Wer 
to this, that the defendants being experi­
enced millers must be deemed to have cou­
tracted with a knowledge of the quantity 
of wheat required to yield a barrel of fiolll' ; 
aud as the plaintiffs were obliged b)' the con­
tract to deliver goocl merchantable wheat, 
it seems but reasonable that the defendants 
should have been requi red so to manufacture 
it, as that the flour would bea1· inspection ; 
tllat these provisions must be viewed in the 
conucctiou in which they stand. and receive 
a coustruction which shall make them har­
monize with the whole expression of the 
contract bctwPeU the parties : aud that tal�­
ing the whole agreement into view. t hey 
seem to have been inserted at th sug�e�­
tion of the plaintiffs, for the pmpose. i n  
part. at least, o f  causing a skill ful a nd pru­
dent manufnctm·e o·e the wheat into ticmr; 
and even if t hey were employed to detiue 
the quantity oC fiour to be returned. t h('�· 
would not overbear the other proYisions or 
the agreement, which import v<.'r.f clearly au 
unucrsta n cl i ug between t he p:Htics that the 
i t lcu t ica l wbeat which was deliYC'red bv t il e  
vln int iffs shouhl be ma nnfa ctured into
' 
flour 
for their benefit ;  that t hey were to pay for 
t h e worl{ a sl ipulat c>d price in money, :l u cl 
to receive the manufact ured article, together 
wit h the offa l s  or f ed. which llould c:ornc 
Crom the ''" lwnt. '.!.'he l n uguag-e of t he agree­
ment will  hnr1l ly bea r a cliffl'r nt constru '­
tion. The plaint iffs by its term \Yere to de-· 
l i Yer whrat to be mauufactnred into fiour. 
w h k h  ·w i llis a greed to do-i. e., h agreed to 
m;urnfnct me t he wheat so to be deliver d 
into flour. But t h i s  provision would lw en 
t i rc-ly out oC plaee in n n exchange or wbc:l l 
for !lour. 'l'he l)la i n t i ff· were to furnish t ltc 
hnnels in \\lt ich it waf; to be pad;:ed : t 1 1 1 1s  
J l l ' C l\" i t l ing- CYl'l'Y mat eri ;\ l for t he' t•nmpleti�rn 
o f  t he work . n uu kav iu;.r nothing for \Y l l l i s  
to do but t o  perform t he proper labor oC a 
m a n n fal'tUrPI'. 'l'h e  pla i n t i fi's were- morc-<wer 
to h:n e a l l  l l ll' off:ll or feed . elc. ; not uch 
n qnn n l i t .1' or ofl'a l s  as would proc<'Nl fro11 1 
l llw qunu l U y  or ot her wl.J<.>at, but the o!'f:ilA 
o r  ft>l'd-1. e., s11eh as should come ot' gri n<l  
I ng t l tc v ery wh at del i vered to t i le m i ller, 
who wnH n l so to st ore- t h e  feed until I ll<' 
pla i n t i ffs <'Ol l l < l  sell I t .  A nd tn rn se \Y l l l i s 
pc>rfornwrl 011  h IH pa rt . I .  e.,  I n  c:i se he m:1 1 1  
1 1r:wt 1 1 rr1l t ll l '  whc-n t RO d<>i h·p1·rd 1 1 1 tn llnnr. 
wit h t h <' 1•pq 1 1 l s i l <' Rk l l l  n o d  1 11·n <IP1t('r. l ht• 
pln l n l l l 'l'H \H'l'C' l o  pny h i m  nt the  rn te ot' �1\'.· 
! Prl \  !'r 1 l l R, 01· I n  :\  l'C'r l a i n  conH1 1�rnl '.\' elg-llt· 
""11 <'Nl l H  1w1· hn rrl'l , a s  a cn111 1wnl'la l l o11 l'or 
t he Jol.Jor o r  1 1 1 n n 1 1 1'1l\'1 1 u·p, Pl'O))(.'l' erect rllll· 
nnl h gh'en to tb RO provisions of the l1Jn'C'<'-
11 1Pn l , w l t ho11t t rrn.t lng It RS n cont met hy l h r 
drfC"orln n t R  to m n n u rnrt nrr t h e  pln int i fl's' 
wlwnt l u to flo\11', to del lV<'l' to th 11 1  l l Jl' "I '� 
Or' g i r =- 1  frn r  ..
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cific proceeds, at least to the extent mention-
ed in the contract, and to receive in satisfac-
tion for the worlv tlie' stipidated price pei
barrel. Oonti-acts of tliis sort, which havo
received a different construction, will be
found to. have differed very materially from
the present in their terms, as will be seen by
a brief reference to the leading cases.
In Buffum v. Merry, 3 Masou. 478, Fed.
Cas. No. 2,112, the plaintiff owned two thou-
sand nine hundred pomids of cotton yarn,
and agreed to let one Hutchinson take it at
the price of sixty-five cents per pound, and
he was to pay the plaiutiff the amount in
plaids, at fifteen cents per yard. H. was to
use the plaintiff's yarn in making the waii)
of the plaids, and to use for filling other yarn
of as good a quality. Under this contract
the yarn was delivered to H., who failed
without having manufactured it iuto plaids,
and assigned it with other property for the
benefit of his creditors. The question was
whether the property in the yarn passed to
H. by the delivery: and Story, J., said that
it did; holding that It was not a contract
whereby the specific yarn was to be manu-
factm'ed into cloth, wholly for the plaintiff's
account and at his expense, and nothing but
his yarn was to be used for the purpose.
That in such a case the property might not
have changed; but here the cloth was to
be made of other yarn as well as the plain-
tiff's. The whole cloth when made was not
to be delivered to him, but so much only as
at fifteen cents per yard would pay for the
plaintiff's yam at sixty-five cents per poimd.
That this was a sale of the yarn at a speci-
fied price, to be paid for in plaids at a sped
fied price. See, also, Story, Bailm. § 283;
Jones, Bailm. p. 102.
In Ewing v. French. 1 Blackf. 3.53, the
plaintiff delivered a quantity of wheat to the
defendants, at their mill, to be exchanged
for flour. The wheat was thrown by the de-
fendants into their common stock, and the
mill was subsequently destroyed by fire. The
court held this to be a contract of exchange,
or a sale of the wheat to be paid for in flour;
that from the moment the defendants receiv-
ed the wheat they became liable for the
flour; that the wheat itself was not to be
returned, nor the identical flour manufac-
tured from it. And this was very well, for
the contract was, by Its express terms, one
of exchange.
In Smith v. Clark, 21 Wend. 83, one Hub-
bard owned a flouring-mill. and the plaintiffs
agreed with him to deliver wheat at his mill,
■and he agreed that for four bushels and fifty-
five pounds of wheat which should be receiv-
ed, he would deliver the plaintiffs one barrel
of supei-flne flom-, warranted to boar inspec-
tion. Here was nothing which imported a
delivery of wheat for the purpose of being
manufactured, nor any agreement to make it
iuto flom- and to receive a compensation for
so doing, at a certain price per barrel; and
it is obvious that Hubbard might have deliv-
ered any flour of the quaUty stipulated for,
in satisfaction of the contract. Hence it was
held that the delivei-y of the wheat under
this agi'eement amounted to an exchange of
the wheat for flour, and that Hubbard on re-
ceiving the wheat became indebted to the
plaintiffs.
In Norton v. Woodruff, 2 N. Y. 153, the
defendant agreed to "take" wheat and to
"give" them one barrel of superfine flour for
eveiT four bushels and thirty-six pounds of
wheat; but here also there was the absence
of a delivery for the purpose of being manu-
factured; no compensation was agi-eed to be
given to the miller for his work, there was
nothing about oft'als, and nothing about the
wheat owner's furnishing baiTels in which
to pack the flour. On the contrary, the mil-
ler in this case was to fiu-nish the barrels.
This court gave proper effect to the language
of this contract by holding, that the miller,
by agreeing to take wheat and give floiu' in
retmm, had bargained for an exchange of
wheat for flour; that any flour of the quality
described in the contract would have an-
swered its requirements, and that the prop-
erty of the wheat passed upon its delivery.
But in the ease under review. Willis con-
tracted to manufacture the wheat delivered,
and to receive compensation for his labor.
The flour, by which was intended the prod-
uce of the manufacture, was to be delivered
to the plaintifTs in their own barrels, and the
offals were to be kept in store as their prop-
erty. These features give a character to this
contract so materially different from that
which is borne by the agreements which have
received a judicial construction in the cases
referred to, that with the fullest concurrence
in the justice of those decisions, it may be
held that the defendants were bailees and
not pm-chasers of the plaintiffs' wheat, and
bound to restore its proceeds to them. I am,
therefore, of opinion that the judgment ol
the supreme court ought to be affirmed.
JEWETT. .T., also delivered an opinion in
favor of affirming the judgment.
RUGGLES, GARDINER, PRATT, and
TAYLOR, JJ., concurred.
BRONSON, C. J., and HARRIS, J., dis-
sented.
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NA TURE A N D  D I ST I N C T I ON • .  
cific proceeds, at least to the extent mention­
ed in the contract, and to receive in sati fac­
tion for the worl{ the · sti pulated price pc1 
barrel. Contracts of this sort, which havo 
received a different construction, will be 
found to. have differed very materially from 
the present in their terms. as will be seen by 
a brief reference to the leading cases. 
In Buffum v. Merry, 3 �fasou, 478, Feil. 
Cas. No. 2,112, the plaintiff owned two thou­
sand nine hundreu pounds of cotton yarn, 
anu agreed tc let one Hutchinson take it at 
the price of sixty-five cents per pound, and 
he was to pay the plaintiff the amount in 
11laids, at fifteen cents per yard. H. was to 
use the plaintiff's yarn in making the wa11) 
of the plaids, and to use for filling other yarn 
of as good a quality. Under this contract 
the yarn was delivered to II., who failed 
without haying- manufactured it into plaids, 
and assigned it with other property for the 
benefit of his creditors. The question was 
whether the property in the yarn passed to 
H.  by the delivery; and Story, J., said tllat 
it did; holding that it was not a contract 
whereby the specific yarn was to be manu­
factured into clot h, wholly for the plaintiff's 
account and at his expem;e. and notlling but 
his yarn was to be used for the purpose. 
That in such a case the property migllt not 
have changed ; but here the cloth was to 
be made of other yarn as well as the plain­
tiff's. The wholo cloth when madl' was not 
to be delivered to him. but so much only as 
at fi fteen cents per yard would pay for the 
plaintiff's yarn at sixty-five cents per pound. 
That this was a sale of the yarn at a speci­
fied price, to be paid for in plaitls at a speci. 
tied price. See, also, Story, Bailrn. § 283 ; 
Jones, Bailm. p. 102. 
In Ewing v. French. 1 Blackf. 353, the 
plaintiff delivered a quantity of wheat to the 
tlefenclants, at their mill. to be exchang-eu 
for fl.our. The wheat was thrown by the de· 
fendants into their common stock, and the 
mill was subsequently destroyed by fire. The 
comt held this to be a contract of exchange, 
or a sale of the wheat to be paid for in fl.our ; 
that from the moment the defendants receiv­
Nl the wbeat they became liable for the 
flolll' ; that the wbeat itself was not to be 
returned, nor the identical fl.our manufac­
tw·ed from it. And this was very well, for 
tbe contract was, by its express terms, one 
of exchange. 
In Smith v. Clark, 21 Wend. 83, one .Hub­
hard owned a flouring-mill. and the plaintitIB 
agreed with him to deliver wheat at bis mill, 
and be agreed that for four bushels and fi fty. 
five pounds of wheat which should be receiv­
ed, be would deliver the plaintiffs one barrel 
D i  itiz by 
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o f  superfine flom', warranted to h<'ar ins1icc·­
tion. Here 'ms nothin� wl.licl.l iwportell a 
delivery of wheat for the pmpuse of !Jcin� 
manufactured, nor any agreement to wake it 
into fiom· and to recei\·e a compensation for 
so doing. at a certain price per barrel ; and 
it is obYious that liubbard might llave deliv­
ered any flom· of the quality stipulated fur, 
in satisfaction of the contract. Hence it was 
held that the delivery of the wheat unrlc1· 
this agreement amounted to an excha nge or 
the wheat for fl.our, and that Ilubbard on re­
ceiving the wheat became indebted to Ute 
plaintiffs. 
In Norton v. Woodruff, 2 N. Y. 153, the 
defendant agreed to "take" wheat and to  
"give" them one barrel of superfine fl.our for 
every four bushels and thirty-six pounds or 
whea t ;  but here also there was the absence 
of a deliYery for the purpose of being mam1-
facturecl, no compensation was agreed tu he 
given to the miller for bis work. there was 
nothing about offals, and nothing about the 
wheat owner's furnishing barrels in which 
to pack the flour. On the contrary, tlle mil­
ler in this case was to flu·nish the barrels. 
This court g-ave !)roper effect to tlle lanc:ua::.l· 
of this contract by boltliQg, that ti.le miller, 
by agreeing to take "·beat and g-ive fl.om· in 
return. hall bargained for an excb.1ng-e or 
wheat for fl.om ;  that any fl.our of the qua lity  
clescribecl in the contract would l.l�n·e an­
swered its requirements, and that the prnp­
ertr of the wheat passed upon its lleliver�·. 
But in the case under revie"·· "'illis con­
tracted to manufacture the wheat deliverell . 
and to receive compensation for his labor. 
The fl.our, by which was intenclcd the prod­
uce of the manufacture, was to be Llel h-ercd 
to the plaintiffs in their own barrels. and t he 
offals were to be kept in store as their prov­
erty. These features give a character to this 
contract so materially different from that 
which is borne by the agreements wbicll have 
received a jrnlicial construction in the cases 
referred to, that with the fnllPst concurrence 
in the justice of those decisions. it may he 
held that the defendants were bn ilees ancl 
not purchasers of the plaintiffs' wl.leat. and 
bound to restore its proct>etls to them. I am. 
therefore, of opinion that the judgrnent ol 
the supreme comt ought to be affirmed. 
JEWETT . .T., also delivered an opinion In 
favor of affirming the jud�ment. 
RUGGLES, GARDI:NER. PR.A.TT, and 
TAYLOR, JJ., concurred. 
BRONSON, 0. J., and HARRIS, J., dis­
sented. 
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SALES.
HARKXESS V. RUSSELL & CO.
(7 Sup. Ct 51, 118 U. S. 663.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Not. 8,
1S8G.
Appeal from the supreme court of the ter-
ritory of Utah.
The facts fully appear in the following
statement by Mr. Justice BRADLEY:
This was an appeal from the supreme
court of Utah. The action was brought in
the district court for Weber county, to re-
cover the value of two sto.am-eugines and
boilers, and a portable saw-mill connected
with each engine. A jury being waived, the
court found the fncts, and I'eudered judg-
ment for the plaintiff. Uussell & Co. The
plaintiff is an Ohio corporation, and by its
agent in Idaho, on the second of October,
1SS2. agreed with a partnership firm by the
name of Phelan & Ferguson, residents of
Idaho, to sell to thcni the said engines, boil-
ers, and saw-mills for the price of !fi.9S8,
nearly all of which was secured by certain
promissory notes, which severally contained
the terms of the agreement between the par-
ties. One of the notes (the others being in
the same form) ,was as follows, to- wit:
"Salt Lake City, October 2, 1SS2. On or be-
fore the first day of Jlay, 1SS3. for value re-
ceived in one sixteen-horse portable engine,
No. 1,020, and one portable sawmill. No.
128, all complete, bought of L. I'.. .Mattison,
agent of Russell & Co., we, or eitlior of us,
promise to pay to the order of Russell &
Co., Massillon, Ohio. ?,300, payable at Wells,
Fargo & Co.'s bank. Salt Lake City, Utah
Territory, with ten per cent, interest per an-
num from October 1, 1882. until paid, and
reasonable attorney's fees, or any costs that
ma.v be paid or incurred In any action or pro-
ceeding instituted for the collection of this
note or enforcenicnt of this covenant. The
express condition of this transaction is such
that the inie, ownorslilp. or jxwsession of
said engine and sawinlll does not ]);iss from
the said Russell & Co. until this note an<l In-
terest shall have been paid In full, and tlie
said Russell & Co. or his agent has full i)i>w-
er to declare this note due, and lake posses-
sion of salt! engine and saw-mill when they
maj' deem themselves Insecure even before
the maturity of this note; and It Is furtlier
agreed by the makers hereof that If said
note Is not paid nt maturity, that the jntcrost
shall bo two per cent, per nionlli from ma-
turity hi'teof tin paid, both before and after
Judgiiir-nt, If any shoulil be rcnilfi-cil. In
case sntd «awinlll nntl engine shall be taken
back. Il\iHsell »K: Co. may sell the same at
public or priv.'ite sale wllhoul notice, or they
may. wllhout sale, Indorse the true value of
the property on tliN note, and we agree to
p.iy on the note any balance duo thereon,
after such Indorsement, ns damages and
rental for said machinery. As to this debt
we waive the right (o exempt, or claim as
exempt, any property, real or personiil. we
now own, or may hereafter acquire, by vir-
tue of any homestead or exemption law.
state or federal, now in force, or that here-
after may be enacted. P. O., Oxford, Oneida
County, Idaho territory. $300. Phelan &
Ferguson." Some of the notes were given
for the price of one of the engines with its
accompanying boiler and mill, and the others
for the price of the other. Some of the notes
were paid; and the present suit was brought
on those that were not paid. The property
was delivered to Phelan & Ferguson on the
execution of the notes, and subsequently
they sold it to the defendant Harkuess, in
part payment of a debt due from them to
him and one Langsdorf. The defendant, at
the time of the sale to him. knew that the
purchase price of the property had not been
paid to the plaintiff, and that the plaintilT
claimed title thereto until such payment was
made. The unpaid notes given for each en-
gine and mill exceeded in amount the value
of such engine and mill when the action was
commenced.
The territory of Idaho has a law relating
to chattel mortgages [act of January 12,
1875], requiring that every such mortgage
shall set out cert:iin particulars as to par-
ties, time, amount, etc., with an affidavit at-
tached that it is bona fide, and made with-
out any design to defraud and delay cred-
itors; and requiring the mortgage and affi-
davit to be recorded in the county where the
mortgagor lives, and in that where the prop-
erty is located; and it is declared that no
chattel mortgage shall be valid (except as
between the parties thereto) without com-
pliance wllh these requisites, unless the
mortgagee shall have actual possession of
the property mortgaged. In the present case
no affidavit was attached to the notes, nor
were they recorded.
The court found that it was the intention
of Phelan & Ferguson and of Russell it
Co. that the title to the said property should
not pass from Itiissell & Co. until all the
notes were paid. Upon those facts the court
found, as conclusions of law, that the ti'ans-
action between Phelan & Ferguson an<l Rus-
sell & Co. was a conditional or executory
sale, and not an absolute sale with a lien
reserved, and that the title did not pass to
Phelan & Ferguson, or from them to the de-
fendjuit. and gave Judgnu^nt for the plain-
tilT. The supreme court of the territory nf-
flrined this Judgment. 7 Pac. 86."). This ap-
peal was taken from that Judgment.
Parley I-. Williams, (James N. Kimball and
Abbot R. Ileywood, on the brief.) for appel-
lant. Charles W. liennett, for appellee.
Mr. Justice RRAPLEY, after stating the
facts as above reported, delivered the opin-
ion of the court.
The (Irst question to be considered Is
whether the Iransacllon In question was a
conditional sale or a mortgage; that Is,
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40 SALE , 
HARKXE S '· RUS ELL & CO. 
(7 Sup. Ct. 51. 11 U. S. 663.) 
upreme Court of the 
1 
nited States. Xo\. 8, 
G. 
.Appeal from the supreme court of the ter­
ritory of Utah. 
The facts fully appear i n  the following 
statement by :\lr. Justice BHA.DLE Y :  
Thi was a n  appeal from the upreme 
court of lJtah . The action was brought i n  
tl.Je dist rict court for Weber county, t o  re­
co•e1· the •alne of two steam-engines and 
boiler-, and a portable saw-mill connected 
with each engine. .A j ury being wai•etl, the 
comt found the f:l ct.:;, and rendered judg­
ment for the plai ntiff, Russell & Co. Tl.Je 
plaintiff is  an 01.Jio corporation, and by its 
al!ent in Idaho, on the second of October, 
1 ":.!. agl'eed with a part ner hip firm by the 
name of Phelan & Fergu on, resident of 
hl:.lho. to sell to them the said engi ne,, boi l­
e1·-· and aw-mills for the price of $ !.9 
ne>:irly all of which wa ccured by eertai n 
pl'om isso r.r notes . wl.Jith se•era lly con ta i ned 
the terms of the agreement between tile par­
ti<'S. One of tile notes (the otl.Jers l.leiug i n  
the same form) w a  a fol low s, to- w i t :  
" "n i t  Lake it.r. October 2 .  l'i '.!.  n or be­
fo re the fi r  t day of :\fay, 1 "";t for 'a 1 ne re­
<'•·i n•rl in one six teen-horse portable engine, 
_ -o. 1 .o�c. a nd one portahl snw m i l l, o. 
1:.!, ,  a l l  (•omp!Ptl'. l iou::-ht of L. n \ l atti on, 
a::-rnt of HussC'll & o., we, or e> i t lwr of us, 
prom i. e to pay to the order of n ussl'l l & 
< ·n .. \I:l ssil lon, Oh io. �:lOO, payable a t  Wells, 
Fa rgo & Co.'s bank. �alt Lal•<' ity, Utah 
Territory, with ten per cent i ntt're t per a n­
num from October 1, 1 R:.!. until  pa i c l ,  a ncl 
rl':l !';<rna hie a ttornt'y's fec•s, or tlll) c·nst s t hat 
1 1 1ay hi' pn i 1l or in•·tnTl'cl ln an y adinn or pro­
<"l'Pcl i u;.:- i nsl i t  11 t<'• l for t hr C'Ol lt><'I ion of t hi,; 
nol P  or enfo1·ceml'nt o f  1 h is c·n1·p1 1 : 1nt  Till' 
P.XJll'PSS C'Ondi t iou of this t ra ns:l!' t ion 1s such 
t hat t he> lnie, o w nl'rship. or pnssl'sslon of 
�;n it] eur:-iur and saw 11 1 i l l  olnrs nnt pass fl'OJU 
thl' !:a i•l  H n ssC>ll _.. Co. n n t i l  t h is note allfl in­
tPl'<'Sl sha l l  h:ne lwrn palcl In  full,  : i ncl the 
snl•l  J : nssi•ll & Co. or h i ·  a_gcnt h a s  fu l l  pow­
Pl' to dP<'l:trr t h i s  nnll• 1 l 11P, nncl t nk<' pos<:1•s­
sln11 nf s<i ld Pll::in<' a n d :rn w- 11 1 1 1 1  1Yhf'11 t h  •y 
mny 1 ]  .. , . 1n i lu•111 sl'ln·s 1 1 1  p1·11rr P\'1' 1 1  lwl'on• 
thf> 1 1 1 : i t 1 1 1' 1 t y  of t h i s  nnt< ' :  and It  Is f 1 1 r t h Pt' 
11 i; n  ,.rJ hy lhr m n lu•rs hPn•nl' t h n t  I f  :-:a i d  
11n l P  Is not pnld :i t 11111 l 1 1 rl t y ,  t h :1 t t l w  i l o t L 'l'Pfit 
Rh: i ll I H• f wo Jll'I' ,. , I l l .  J I"" 1 1 1011 t h  from lll:t·  
t 1 1 1·1 t r  h••rPnf t i l l  pn l t l ,  ! 101 h l 1 1 •fo1·c· nnd :1 rt .. r 
J 1 1 t l�rn,.1 1 l ,  I f 11 1 1 �· r;honld t o.. 1•1 • 1 1d1 ·1·•••l. I n  
1·a l' n td  sn w m i l l  1111 tl  "1 11-:lnP Rhn l l  I ll' l ll l,1•n 
l l: I C 'I , 1 : 1 1  I ' l l  , · l 'n, 1 1 1 11 y Rl ' l l  f hr• 1<:1 1 1 11' nt 
1 1 1 1 l i l 1 1• o r  prh n t •• n lf' w l t h 1 1 1 1 1  1 1011<·"· nr l hl';I' 
1 1 1 1 1.\', \l l t ho u l  Rll ll', h 1 1 l<1r .,, t l o<' t n u• 1 11 h 1P nf 
1 l u• pr• 1 1 11• r ty on t h is 11111•',  1 1 1 1 1 1  """ :t l.:f"• '< '  1 o  
Jlll Y •Ill t h1• nn1 <• : 1 1 1 y  h:i l n n <'<' tl llf' t hi • f"f'O ll, 
11 flrr 11rh l ndnr c111• · 11 I ,  llEI r 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 �1·s n n d  
rP11 t 11 l for : 1 1 1 1  1 1111 • · h l 1 1 1 ·r.v . .\ s t n  t h l!! rl l'l1t 
wr• wn l 1· .. l l lf• right I n  < 'X<'llt Jll , or r - 111 1 1 1 1  :1s 
,. ••lllpl ,  n 1 1 y  prnp1 • 1 · 1y.  rf'll I or ) IPf'RnlJ • i l ""' 
D i g 1t1zed by 
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now own, o r  may hereafter acquire. by • i r· 
tue of any homestead or exemption law, 
state or federal, now i n  force, or that here­
after may be enacted. P. 0., Oxford, Oneida 
County, Idaho territory. $300. Phelan & 
Ferguson." Some of the notes were given 
for the price of one of the engines with it 
accompanying boiler and mill, and the others 
for the price of the other. Some of the notes 
were pa id;  and the pre ent suit was brought 
on those that were not pa i d. The property 
wa deli•ered to rhel a n  & Ferguson on the 
execution of the notes, and subsequently 
they old it to the defendant Harkness. in 
part payment of a debt due from them to 
I.Jim and one Langsdorf. The defendan t , at 
the time of the sale to h i m, knew that t h e  
purchase price of t h e  property had not been 
paid to the pla int iff. and that the pla i nt i ff 
claimed title thereto until such pa yment "·as 
made. The unpaid note gi'len for ea ·h en­
gine and mill exceeded in amount the \:line 
of such engine and mill when the action was 
commenced. 
Tile territory of Idaho llas a la'" relating 
to chattel mortgages [act of Ja nua1·y 12, 
1 73], requiri ng that every such mortgage 
hall set out certa i n particulars a to pa r­
t ies, time. amount, tc., with an affidav i t  a t­
tached that it is l.lona fide, a nd made w i t h ­
out a ny dPsign to de fraud a nd delay cre\1-
itors; and r qui r i ng- the mortgage and affi­
da•it to be recorded in the county where tbe 
mortg-a.::-or l i ve , and in th at where the prop­
erty is lorat d; a nd it i declared t h a t  no 
chattel mortgage shall be valid (cxcrpt a, 
between the partie t hereto) witho u t  com­
plia nce w i t h  these requ isites. unless the 
mortgagee shall  hn ve nctual possession ot' 
the proper(� mortga::-ecl. In the present case 
no a ll icl:n it was a t t :wllcd to the notes, 1101· 
" C'rc they rC'c·o rded. 
'1.'hl' rnm·t foul\\l tha t it was the i n t P n ! io11  
o f  l 'hC'la n  & Ferguson and of Russ\'! ! ,. 
Co. that th t i t l e  to the s:1 i d  proper!)' :>hould 
not pal'ls from n nssC'll  & o. unt il n i l  t h \'  
notl's WC'I'<' pai1l.  l'pon these facts t h e  rourt 
fnuncl, :lS C'OIWlnsi11t18 O f  Jaw, t h a t  t hl' 1 1':1 1 18 
act ion hct wr\'n l 'hrln n & Fer_gu son a 11 11  H us-
8<'11 & <'o. was :l ro1Hl i t ionnl  01· ext'1· u t n1·�· 
"nlr, a n1l  not an a h"11l nte snlP w i t h  a l l l'n 
rpsrnNl ,  n 111l thnt t l H' ti t l e cli1l not pnss t n  
I ' h1•l:1 1 1  & l•'1•1·i:nson. n r  from t hl'm to f h e>  lie>· 
f1•1 1 1 l 1 1 1 1 t .  : i n r l  ;;:t i"!' j 1 1 d ·�11ll'nt for t h\' pln ln­
t i fl'. Thi' :s11pl'P11 1 1� 1·0 1 1 rl o f  t hC' tNTit ory n f­
fl rn1l r l  t h l i; l 1 1 1 lg111P1 1 t ,  7 l':l!'. �n� •. 'J'hls n p· 
1 w:i l  11 ll t n k1 • 1 1  fl'o 111  t h ·tt .1 1 1d•!1JH'lll. 
l 'al'ii\\' r ,. " l ll l :t mR, (.Tn lllPH �- K i rn h n l l  : i n d  
J\ hhnt I {  I I c•�· woncl ,  on f h r  hri<'f,) for : 1  ppc>l­
ln n t. Cha rif'� " H1 n n et t ,  for apprllPP. 
,\I r  . . l 11Rt lre 1 \ JL\ J l l .1'. Y, n ft r r  H t n t fn� 1 h <' 
f:1 d 1:1  nR 11hn1· .. r1•porf 1•d, t ll'I I Vc>rril t he opl n 
!11 1 1  or I h•• 1 · 1 1 1 1  l'f . 
'l ' hl' ll l'l�f q 1 1 1 •Rt Inn t n  hi' 1•1 1 1 1 sl d rrl'1 I I s  
wlwf l l l 'I' t i u• 1 1·: 1 1 1 :1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1  J n  q 11 Pi; f inn 11· n1-1 : i  
1•11 1 1 d l l l 1 1 1 1 : 1 I  tmlf'  or :I 1 1 u 1 1·t g:1gl' ; t h: 1 I  Is,  
l.. , ,  I fro m  
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wlictlior it was a more agreoinont to sell up-
"u a condition to be performed, or an abso-
lute sale, with a reservation of a lien or
mortgage to secure the purchase money. If
it WHS the latler, it is conceded that the lien
or mortgage was void as against third per-
sons, because not verified by affidavit, and
not recorded as required by the law of Ida-
ho. But, so far as words and the express in-
tent of the parties can go, it is perfectly evi-
dent that it was not an absolute sale, but
only an agreement to sell upon condition
that the purchasers should pay their notes
at maturity. The language is: "The express
condition of this transaction is such that the
title * * * does not pass * * * until
this note and interest shall have been paid
in full." If the vendees should fail in this,
or if the vendors should deem themselves in-
secure before the maturity of the notes, the
latter were authorized to repossess them-
selves of the machinery, and credit the then
value of it, or the proceeds of it if they
should sell it, upon the unpaid notes. If
this did not pay the notes, the balance was.
still to be paid by the makers by way of
"damages and rental for said macliinery."
This stipulation was strictly in accordance
with the rule of damages in such cases. Up-
on an agreement to sell, if the purchaser
fails to execute his contract, the true meas-
ure of damages for its breach is the differ-
ence between the price of the goods agreed
on and their value at the time of the breach
or trial, which may fairly be stipulated to
be the price they bring on a resnlo. It can-
not be said, therefore, that the stipulations
of the contract were inconsistent with or re-
pugnant to what the parties declared their
intention to be, namely, to make an ex-
ecutory and conditional contract of sale.
Such contracts are well known In the law
and often recognized; and, when free from
any fraudulent intent, are not repugnant to
.Tuy principle of justice or equity, even
thnugli possession of the property be given
to the proposed purchaser. The rule is for-
mulated in the text-books and in many ad-
.iudged cases.
In Lord Blackburn's Treatise on the Con-
tnict of Sale, published 40 years ago, two
rules are laid. down as established. (1) That
where, by the agreement, the vendor is to do
anything to the goods before delivery, it is a
condition precedent to the vesting of the
property; (2) that where anytliing remains
to be done to the goods for ascertaining the
price, such as weighing, testing, etc., this is
a condition precedent to the transfer of the
property. Blackb. Sales, 152. And it is sub-
sequently added that "the parties may indi-
cate an intention, by their agreement, to
make any condition precedent to the vesting
of the property; and. If they do so, their in-
tention is fulfilled." Blackb. Sales, 167.
Mr. Beniamin, in his Treatise on Sales of
Personal Property, adds to the two formu-
lated rules of Lord Blackburn a third rule,
which is supported by many authorities, to-
wit: (3) "Where the buyer is by the con-
tract bound to do anything as a condition,
either precedent or concurrent, on which the
passing of the property depends, the prop-
erty will not pass until the condition be ful-
filled, even though the goods may have been
actually delivered into the possession of the
buyer." Benj. Sales (2d Ed.) 236; Id. (3d
Ed.) § 320. The author cites for this propo-
sition Bishop V. Stillito, 2 Barn. & Aid. 329,
note a; Brandt v. Bowlby, 2 Barn. & Adol.
932; Barrow v. Coles (Lord Ellenborough) 3
Camp. 92; Swain v. Sliepherd (Baron
Parke) 1 Sloody & R. 223; Mires v. Solebay,
2 Mod. 243.
In the last case, decided in the time of
Charles II., one Alston took sheep to pas-
ture for a certain time, with an agreement
that if, at the end of that time, he should
13ay the owner a certain sum, he should have
tlie sheep. Before tlie time expired the own-
er sold them to another person; and it was
held that the sale was valid, and that the
agreement to sell the sheep to Alston, if he
would pay for them at a certain day, did not
amount to a sale, but only to an agreement.
The other cases were instances of sales of
goods to be paid for in cash or securities on
delivery. It was held that the sales were
conditional only, and that the vendors were
entitled to retake the goods, even after de-
livery, if the condition was not performed;
the delivery being considered as conditional.
This often happens in cases of sales by auc-
tion, when certain terms of payment are pre-
scribed, with a condition that, if they are
not complied with, the goods may be resold
for account of the buyer, who is to account
for any deficiency between the second sale
and the first. Such was the case of Lamond
V. Duvall, 9 Q. B. 1030; and many more
cases could be cited.
In Ex parte Crawcour, L. R. 9 Ch. Div.
419, certain furniture dealers let Robertson
have a lot of furniture upon his paying £10,
In cash and signing an agreement to pay £5
per month (for which notes were given) un-
til the whole price of the furniture should be
paid; and when all the installments were
paid, and not before, the furniture was to be
the propert.v of Robertson; but, if he failed
to pay any of the installments, the owners
were authorized to take possession of the
property, and all prior payments actually
made were to be forfeited. The court of ap-
peals held that the property did not pass by
this agreement, and could not be taken as
Robertson's property by his trustee under a
liquidation proceeding. The same conclu-
sion was reached in the stibsequent case of
Crawcour v. Salter, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 30.
In these cases, it is true, support of the
transaction was sought from a custom
which prevails in the places where the trans-
actions took place, of hotel-keepers holding
their furniture on hire. But they show that
the intent of the parties will be recognized
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wlu:tl1er it was n mNe agrccmC'nt to sell up­
ou u condition to be performed, or an abso­
lute sale, with a reservation or a lien or 
1 1 1ortguge to secure the purC'l1ase money. If  
it wa .;; the latt er, it is conceded that the lien 
o r  mortgage was void as against third per­
sons. hecause not Ycrified by aCfidavit, and 
not recorded as require<l by the law of Ida­
ho. But, so far as words and the express in­
tent of the parties can go, it is perfectly evi­
rlent that it wa not an absolute sale, but 
only an agreement to sell upon condition 
that the purchasers should pay their notes 
at maturity. The language is: "The express 
con<lition of this transaction is  such that the 
t i t le * * • does not pass * • • until 
this note and interest shall have been paid 
in full." If  the vendees should fail i n  this, 
or if  the >endors shoul<l deem themselves in­
iwcure before the maturity of the notes, the 
latter were authorized to repossess them­
sPl>es of the machi nery, and credit the then 
Yalue of it, or the proceeds of it if they 
should sell it, upon the uupaid notes. If  
this did not pay the notes. the balance was 
still to be paid by the makers by way of 
"clamages and rental for said machinery." 
This stipulation was strlctly in accordance 
with the rule of damages in such cases. Up­
on an agreement to sell, if  the purchaser 
fails to execute his contract, the true meas­
ure of damages for its breach is the di ffer­
ence between the price of the goods agreed 
on a nd their value at the time of the breach 
or trial, which may fairly be stipulated to 
be the price they bring on a resale. It can­
not be said, therefore, that the stipulations 
of the contract were inconsistent with or re­
llllgnant to what the parties declared their 
intention to be. namely, to make an ex­
ccutory a n d  conditional contract of sale. 
Such contracts are well known in the law 
and often recognized ; and, when free from 
any fraudulent intent, are not repugnant to 
a ny principle of j ustice or equity, even 
thou�h possession of the property be given 
tn the proposed purchaser. The rule is for­
mulated in the text-books and in many a<l­
.i1H1;::er1 easel'. 
In Lord Blackburn's Treatise on the Con­
tract of ::;ale, published 40 years ago, two 
rnles are laid down as established. (1) That 
where. by th<' agreement. the ><'ndor is to do 
nnything to the goorls before dcli>ery. it is a 
condition precedent to the vesting of the 
property ; (2) that where a nything rema ins 
to be done to the goods for ascertaining the 
price, such as weighing, testing. etc., this is 
a condition precedent to the tram:fer of tlle 
property. Blackb. Sales, 152. And it is sub­
sequently added that "the parties may indi­
c-nte an intention, by their agreement, to 
make any condition precedent to tbe >esting 
nf the property ; and. i f  they do so, their in­
tf'ntion is fulfilled." mackb. Sales, 1G7. 
\Ir. Benjamin, in his Treatise on Sales of 
Pi:>r.;;onal Property, adds to the two formu­
la terl rules of Lord Blackburn a third rule, 
C. • .:i .  ·--
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which ls supported b y  many autboritiC!S, to­
wit : (3) "Where the buyer is by the con­
tract bound to do anything as a conditiou, 
either precedent or concurrent, on which the 
passing of the property depends, the prop­
erty will not pass until tbe condition be ful­
fillccl, even though the goods may have been 
actually del ivered i nto the possession of the 
buyer." Benj. Sales (2d Ed.) 236; Id. (:�d 
Eel.) § 320. The author cites for this propo­
sition Bishop v. Stillito, 2 Barn. & Aid. 3�!J. 
note a; Brandt v. Bow lby, 2 Barn. & Ado!. 
932 ; Barrow v. Coles (Lord Ellenborough) 3 
Camp. 92; Swain v. Shepherd (Bnron 
Parke) 1 l\Ioody & R .  223 ; l\1ires v.  Solebay, 
2 Mod. 243. 
I n  the last case, decided i n  the time of 
Charles I I., one Alston took sheep to pas­
ture for a certain time, with an agreement 
that if, at the end of that time, be should 
pay the owner a certa i n  sum, he should ba ve 
the sheep. Before the time expired the own­
er sold them to a nother person ;  and it was 
held that the sale "·as nt l id. and that the 
agreement to sell the sheep to Alston, if he 
would pay for them at a certain day, did not 
amount to a sale, but only to an agreement. 
The other cases were instances of sales of 
goods to be paid for in cash or securities on 
clelin�ry. It was held that the sales were 
co1Hl i  lional only, and that the vendors were 
entitled to retake the goods, even after cle­
livery, if the condition 'vas not performed ; 
the delivery being considered as conditional. 
This often happens i n  cases o f  sales by auc­
tion, when certain terms cf payment are pre­
scribed, with a condition that, if they are 
not complied with, the goods may be resold 
for account of tbe buyer, who is to account 
for any deficiency between the second sale 
and tile first. Suell was the ca sc of Lamond 
v. Du>all, 9 Q. B .  1030; and many more 
cases could be cited. 
In Ex parte Crawcour, L. R. 9 Ch. Di-v. 
419, certain furniture dealers let Robertson 
have a lot of furniture upon !Jis paying £10, 
in cash and si�ning an agn'emcnt to pay £5 
per month (for "·bich notes were giYen) un­
til tile whole price of the furniture should be 
paid ; a nd when all the installments were 
pa id, and not before. the furniture was to be 
the property of Robertson: but, if be failed 
to pay any of the installments, the owners 
were authorized to take possession of the 
property, a nd all prior payments actually 
made were to be forfeited. The court o f  ap­
peals held that the property did not pass by 
this agreement, and could not be taken as 
Robertson's property by his trustee under a 
liquidation proceed ing. The same condn­
sion was reached in the subsequent case of 
Crawcour v. Salter, L. R. 18 Cb. Div. 30. 
In these cases, it is true. support of the 
tran!'nc-tion was sought from a custom 
which preYailg in the places where the trans­
actions took pl-lee, of hotel-k<>epers holding 
their furniture on hire. But they show tha� 
the intent of the parties wlll be reco�nized 
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and sanctioned where it is not contrary to
the policy of the law. This policy, in Eng-
land, is declared by statute. It has long
been a provision of the English bankrupt
laws, beginning with 21 Jae I. c. 19, that if
any person becoming bankrupt has in his
possession, order, or disposition, by consent
of the owner, any goods or chattels of which
he is the reputed owner, or takes upon him-
self the sale, alteration, or disposition there-
of as owner, such goods are to be sold for
the benefit of his creditors. This law has
had the effect of preventing or defeating con-
ditional sales accompanied by voluntary de-
livery of possession, except in cases like
those before referred to; so that very few
decisions are to be found in the English
books directly in point on the question under
consideration. The following case presents
a fair illustration of the English law as
based upon the statutes of bankruptcy. In
Horn V. Baker, 9 East, 215, the owner of a
term in a distillery, and of the apparatus
and utensils emploj-ed therein, demised the
same to J. & S. in consideration of an an-
nuity to be paid to the owner and his wife
during their several lives, and upon their
death the lessees to have the liberty of
purcliasiug the residue of the term, and the
apparatus and utensils, with a proviso for
re-entry if the annuity should at any time be
two mouths in arrear. The annuity having
become in arrear for that period, instead of
making entry for condition broken, the wife
and administrator of the owner brought suit
to recover the anours, which was stopped
by the bankruptcy of J. & S. The question
then arose whether the utensils passed to
the assignees of J. & S. under the baulirupt
act, as being in their possession, order, and
disposition as reputed owuei's; and the court
held that they did; but that, if there had
been a ui?age in the trade of letting utensils
with a distillery, the case would have admit-
ted a different consideration, since such a
custom might have rebutted tlie presumption
of ownership arising from the possession
and apparent order and disposition of the
goods. Tills case was followed in llolroyd
V. Gwynne, 2 Taunt. 1711.
This presumption of property In a I)Mnk-
nipt arising from his possession and repiitod
ownership becaiue so deeply imbcdilcd in the
English law th.-it in process of time many per-
sons In the profeshilon, not adverting to its
origin in the st.atute of bankruptcy, were led
to regard It as a doctrine of the CDininon law;
and hence In srunc Htates In this country.
whore no such slalnto e.xists, the priniiples of
the staltito have lieon followed, and condi-
tional sali'S of the Kind now under considera-
tion hnvc been ccindemned either as being
fraudulent and void as against enMlilors, or iia
nmoiinliiig. In elTect, to alisulule sales with o
reserved lien or mortgnge to secure the pay-
ment of the piiieliMse uKiiiey. This view in
li.nsed on the notion iluil sueli wiles are not al-
lowed by law, and that the intent of the piir-
, ties, however honestly formed, cannot legally
be carried out. The insufficiency of this argu-
' menf is demonstrated by the fact that condi-
! tional sales are admissible in several acknowl-
edged cases, and therefore there cannot be
any rule of law against them as such. They
may sometimes be used as a cover for fraud;
I and, when this is charged, all the circum-
I stances of the case, this included, will be
1 open for the consideration of a jury. Where
no fraud is intended, but the honest purpose
of the iMrties is that the vcudee shall not
have the ownership of the goods until he has
paid for them, there is no general principle of
law to prevent their purpose from having
effect.
In this country, in states where no such
; statute as the English act referred to Is in
force, many decisions have been rendered sus-
taining conditional sales accompanied by deliv-
ery of possession, both as between the parties
themselves and as to third persons.
In Ilussey v. Thornton, 4 JIass. 40t (decided
in ISOS). where goods were delivered on board
of a vessel for the vendee upon an agreement
for a sale, subject to the condition that the
goods sliould remain the property of the ven-
dors until they received security for payment,
it was held (Chief .Tuslico I'arsons delivering
the opinion) that the property did not pass,
and that the goods could not be attached by
the creditors of the vendee.
This case was followed in 1822 by that of
Marston v. Baldwin, 17 Mass. 600, which
was replevin against a sheriff for taking goods
: which the plaintiff had agreed to soli to one
Holt, the defendant iu the attachment; but
by the agreement tlie prcipcrty was not to
vest in Holt until, he should pay $100 (part of
the iirice) which condition was not performed,
tliough the goods were delivered. Holt had
paid ^7o, which the plaintiff did not tender
back. The court held that it was sufficient
, for the plaintiff to be ready to repay the
1 money when he should be requested, and a
verdict for the plaintiff was sustained.
I In Barrett v. I'lltchard, 2 Pick. 512, the
court said: "It is Impossilile to raise a doubt
as to the Intention of the parties in tills case,
for it is expressly stipulated that "the wool,
before manufaettu'ed, after being manufac-
tured, or In any stage of manufacturing, shall
be the projierty of the plaintiff until the price
be paid.' It Is dilllcult to Imagine any good
reason why this agreement should not bind
the parties. • » • 'phe case from Taun-
ton (llolroyd V. Gwynne) was a case of a con-
ditional sale; but the condition was void as
agiilnst the poliey of the statute 21 .Tac. I. c.
IS), § 11. It would nut have changed the de-
cision In that ca.se If there had been no sale;
for, by that sl.'itule. If the true owner of
goods and chjillels suiters another to exercise
such control and miinagemeiit over them as
to give hliu tlie appenrance of being the real
owner, and he becomes li.'inl;r\ii)l, Ihe goods
and ih.'illels shall be trealed ;in his property,
and shidl be assigned by the commissioners
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4.! 'A.LE · .  
and sanctioned where it i s  not contrary t o  1 
the policy of the law. This policy, in Eng­
land, is declared by statute. It has long 
been a pro>i ion of tile English bankrupt 
laws, beginning with 21 Jae. I. c. 19, that if 
any person becoming bankrupt bas i n  his 
pos.ession, order, or disposition. by con eut 
of the owner, any goods or chattels of which 
he is the reputed ow ner, or takes upon llim­
self the sale. alteration, or disposition t here­
of as O\YUcr, such goods are to be sold for 
the benefit of his creditors. This law bas 
hatl tlle eilect of preYeu ti u� or defeat ing con­
ditional sales accompanied by >Oluntary de­
livery of possession, exce!lt in case like 
those before referred to; so that Yery few 
decisions are to be found in the Engli h 
books di rectly in point on the question under 
consideration. The following case presents 
a fair ill ustration of the Eugli h law a 
based upon the statutes of ban.kruptt'J . I u  
llorn v. llaker, 9 East, 2i::i, the owner o f  a 
term in a distillery, and of the apparatu' 
and utensils employed therein. demised t he 
same to J. & ::3. i n  con:ideration of an an­
nuity to be paid to the ow ner and his w i fe 
du ring their sen?ral Ii Yes. and u11on till ir 
dc·ath the lessees to haYe the lihPrtJ of 
purchasing the residue of the term, and tlle 
apparatus and utensils, with a proviso fo1· 
re entry if the annuity sllould at any t i me be 
t wo months in arrear. The a nnuity h:l \ in.� 
ilef'ome in arrear for that period, instead o f  
uia kin� entry for condition broken, the w i fe 
and adwinistrntor of the owner brou;:ht suit 
to rccuYer tlle arrears, wllich was stopped 
by the baukniptcy of J. & S. 'l'lle q ucstion 
then arose wllether the utensils 11assl' c l t o  
the assi�nces o f  J .  & . under the bankrupt 
act, as bl'in;: in their 11osscssion. order, anti 
dispusitiou as reputed owners; an1l the court 
bcld that they did ; but that. if lllL't'C' lta<l 
bcl'n a us·1g-e iu the trade ol' l<:>t liug utensils 
with a 1l i s t illery, the rnsc would ban� : i 1 l 1 1 1 1 t­
tc1l a different consi1lcra tinn, since• such n 
<0:11sl11J 1 1  rnig'ht have rl'hll U l'tl I he> prl's11 1 1 1pl  inn 
o f  ownership arisi Ilg' from I he 1111ss1•ssln11 
and np1i:11·,.nt order nu<l cli:;pos l t in 1 1 of t he' 
gornl s. Th is case was followed in l l 1 1l r11yd 
v. f;w_ym11•, :.! Taunt. l 71 i. 
ThlR Jl l'P. 1 1mpt lnn of pt'<• JlNfy in n han lc­
r11pt n rl. Ing from his po:-�1·s!lin11 11 1 1 1 1  l'l' J l l l l l'd 
<JWllPl'Rh!p he�:a 111e sn rlr!'ply l m lwddl'tl 1 1 1  t h" 
Eni.:I I. 11 l:i ;\ 1 1m t In l ll"""""s of t i  llll' 11111 1 1.\' J ll'l"· 
sr.i1s In t h,. profc•ss!on, 11111 11 1 l n•rt ! t 1g t o  l t!'I 
•wlgln 1 1 1  t l11• s tn t u! P  or h11 1 1 k rnpt1·y, w1• r,. !Pd 
1o n g1 1 n l It a 11 doct ri ne nf t lw 1-.1 1 1 1 1 1011  lnw ; 
l l JHI  ) I  ll l'C i l l  1!01111� l! t ll t l' 1 1 1  t h l 1·1 1 11 1 1t l)0, 
\\ lt"l'l' 110 s1wh Hl11 t 11 l l'  l'X I I , t ill' pr! 1 1d ph:s of 
l l w l n l 1 1t 1 hll\'I' l11•r1 1  f11 lhn\·1·d, 11 11'1 1·!\11 d l ·  
t lonn l !!:I ll's o f  t lw l, l11d lllJ\\' 1 1 1 1 1 l r •r •'•)II ld1 •rn ­
t Inn h:l\ I' i ll'L'll 1� • 1 1dl'1111wtl <'l t hr•r 11 l u · lni; 
fr11 w l 11 l< " 1 1 t  n 1 1d void 1111 ngu l n  t 1'1t'< l l l o1 , or : 111 
n 1 111111 1 1 t l 11i:. h1 1'111-ct, t ,,  11 1 1  < •l 1 1 t 1 n lt•s wit h n 
J'I' r•J'\ 1•d l l  • 1 1  •1r l l l • J I  I J:llj.;i' t ' I  I I l l'!' 1 1 1 1 '  pny­
llJl'llt  of t l 1 1• p 11r< 'l 1 1 1 •' l l l • J IH ')'. Thi \'I•·" Is 
l >:t 1•11 1 1 1 1  l l 11• 1111t ( 1 1 1 1  I 11:1 I l f l 'h a 11•11 II n• ll•Jt 11 1-
l,,\\ <'I I hy J:i w, 11 11d t h a t  l hl '  l 1 1 t 1  1it "' 1 1 1 1 '  1 •: 1 1·-
D ig itizEO by 
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ties, howe>er honestly rormed, cannot legally 
be carried out The insufficiency of this argu­
ment is demonstrated by the fact that condi­
tional sales are admissible in several ackuo,vl­
edged ca ·es, and therefore there cannot be 
any rule of law against thE!m as such. They 
may sometimes be used as a co>er for fraud ; 
and, wlleu tbis is charged, all tbe circum­
stances of the case, this included, will be 
open for the consideration of a jury. \Ylle1«• 
uo fl'nud is intended, but the llonest purpose 
of the parties is tbn t the veudee :;ball not 
lrnYe the ownership of the goods until  he llas 
paid for thew, there is no general principle of 
law to pre>eut their purpo e from haYing 
effect. 
In this country, in states where no such 
statute as tile Engli 11 act referred to is iu 
force. many decisions h�l\'e been rendered su ·­
tai nin;r conditional s.'lles accompanied by deli>­
ery o( pos:;es:;iou, both as bet"·eeu the partie· 
tllew.-ch·es and as to third per ou . 
In l l u�sey Y. Thoruton, 4 :\!ass. 4Q.! (decided 
i u  l'-ll"). where goods were deli\•ered on board 
of a ' csscl for tbe >endee upon an agreement 
for a "ale. subject to the condition that the 
goods ,..11, uld remain the property of the >en­
dors until  tbey recci\·ed security for payment, 
it was held (Chief .Justice P:usons delivering 
the opiniou) that tlle property did not pas . 
and that the goods could not be attached b,Y 
the crellitors of the Yendee. 
Tllis case was fol lowed in 1 2'2 by that of 
:\fa rstou '. Bald win. li :\I:l ·s. GOO, whiel1 
w:1s l'<'l'leYiu a �aiu,;t a :;heriti for tnkiu;r goolls 
" hich the pla intiff llad agreed to sell to one 
llolt. the defendaut in the attachm!'nt ; but 
by the agreement the 111·111wrty was not to 
wst in Holt until he should pay $100 (part of 
the prke) which co111l i t iou was uot performed. 
thou:.:11 the ;rood:; \n•1·e dC'liYe1·l'tl. Holt hail  
pail! .;;,;, which the pl:1 i u t i ff  did not teuder 
l >aclc The court bel< l that it " as :;utlid1•11t 
for the )1la i 11 l i fC  to I.Jc ready to repay t h l'  
mntl l'Y "·hen h e  shn11hl ht' l'l' <!llt'slcd, and a 
Yt' l'llict for the pin in ti ff was :;ustn iued. 
1 1 1 Ha rrett Y. l 'rit l 'l 1n r< l ,  ::! l'il'k. 5 1 :.!, t h P 
1·011rt sn i 1 l :  " I t  is l 11 11x1s::;il1Je to rnii;l' n clonbt 
as to t i ll• i 1 1 lP1 1t i 1 1 1 1  of ! ht• pa rt i t•:-> in t h is !':ts,•, 
for I t  ls ex pn•ssl,1· :;! i pnla t l'd t h a t  ' t he w1111J , 
licfol'l' 111:1 1 1ul":11 '1 11rc>1l. a ft l'l' hel nA" 111a 1111f:11·­
t 1 1n· 1 I ,  nr I n  :1 1 1y sta ;.:c• nl' m: 1 1 1 11fnc·t m·I J1g, sha l l  
he t hl' prnpPrty of 1h l'  pla i u t i fl' 111 1 1 1 !  t he pri<-1' 
lw pa id.'  l l  Is d l llh-11 1 1  to ! 1 1 1:1gi 1 1P a 1 1 y  gootid 
r11a1«11 1  why t his !IJ.:l'l'Pll ll' nl . :;l10uld not hind 
t ht• p:i rl IPS. • • • 'l'he <'llSC' fl'!llll '1':1 1 1 1 1-
tnn ( lf 1 1l royd Y. 1 : \\ � 1 1 1 1 1 •) \\ :ts a <':tse of a t.'0 1 1 ·  
d l t l 111111l a lp ;  hu t t hl' 1·1 1 1 1 1 l i t ion wns volrl as 
n i.:: t l rn•t t hC' pol i<'y of t h1• s t :1 t 1 1 t 11 :.! l  .Jue. I.  c.  
l !l, § 1 I .  1 1 w111 1 l i l  11111 ha n• l ' i 1a 1 1 ).:l'tl the l l t" 
rlslon 1 1 1  t h:1 t  r•:isC' II' l l 1 r >n• hn r l  h<'t'll no snit• ; 
for, hy l ha l  R t a t 1 1 l 1•,  I I' t l 1 1� 1 1 · 11p O\\'tll!l' 111" 
i.;<M1rls !l l ld d111 l t Pl. :>Ull l't'il :1 1 10 1 111'1' In 1•xc1-cb1• 
s11d1 co11l l�•l nnd ma 11 1 1i;Pl l l l' l l t  O\'l'r t ht• m a:� 
I "  gin• him t hr :l l 'l l"li l': l lll'I� of hr•i 1 1 ;;  t ht• n·al 
" " 1 1 1 11'. 11 1 1 < 1  lw hr•1·01w1i; ha 11 k n 1 p l .  t hi• g1111d:-l 
n 11 r l  r ·h:i t t l '!. '-h:t l l lw t r1•11 l 1 ·d a� hi p1•1 1 p1 •r 1�· .  
n 1 1r l  i;h: ! l l  1 11 •  : i s1<li.;1wd hy 1 1 11 ·  1·11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 " i 1 1 1 1t•r 
O ri i r  - 1  frr r1 
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for the benefit of liis cierlitors. The case of
Horn V. Bilker, 9 East. i;i5, also turned on
the same point, and nothing in either of tlu'se
eases has any bearing on the present (lucs-
tion."
In Coggill V. Hartford & N. H. R. Co., :{
CJra.v, .545, the rights of a bona fide purcliaser
from one in possession under a conditional
sale of goods were specificall.y discussed, and
tlie court held, in an able opinion delivered by
Mr. Justice Bigelow, that a sale and delivery
of goods on condition that the title shall not
vest in the vendee until payment of the price
passes no title until the condition is perform-
ed, and the vendor, if guilty of no laches, may
reclaim the jiroperty, even from one who
has piu'chiised from his vendee in good faith,
and without notice. The learned .iustice com-
menced his opinion in the following terms:
"It has long been the settled rule of law in
this commonwealth that a sale and delivery
of goods on condition that the property is not
to vest until the purchase money is paid or
secured, does not pa.ss the title to the vendee.
and that the vendor, in case the condition is
not fulfilled, has a right to repossess him-
self of the goods, both against the vendee and
against his creditors claiming to hold tnem
under attachments." He then addresses him-
self to a consideration of the rights of a bona
fide purchaser from the vendee, purchasing
without notice of the condition on which the
latter holds the goods in his possession; and
he concludes that they are no greater than
those of a creditor. He says: "All the cases
turn on the principle that the compliance with
the conditions of sale and delivery is, by the
terms of the contract, precedent to the trans-
fer of the property from the vendor to the
vendee. The vendee in such cases acquires
no property in the goods. He is only a bailee
for a specific piu-pose. The delivery which in
ordinary cases passes the title to the vendee
mugt take effect according to the agreement
of the parties, and can operate to vest the
property only when the contingency contem-
plated by the contract arises. The vendee,
therefore, in such cases, having no title to
the property, can pass none to others. He
has only a bare right of iwssession. and those
who claim under him, either as creditors or
purchasers, can acquire no higher or better
title. Such is the necessary result of carry-
ing into effect the intention of the parties to
a conditional sale and delivery. Any other
rule would be equivalent to the denial of the
validity of such contracts. But they certainly
violate no rule of law, nor are they contrary
to sound policy."
This case was followed in Sargent v. Jlet-
caif, 5 Gray, oOG; Deshon v. Bigelow. 8 Gray,
159; Whitney v. Eaton, 15 Gray, 225; Hir-
schorn v. Canney, 98 Mass. 149; and Chase
v. ingalls, 122 Mass. 381; and is believed to
express the settled law of Massachusetts.
The same doctrine prevails in Connecticut,
and was sustained in an able and learned opin-
ion of Chief .Justice Williams, in the ease of
Forbes v. Marsh, 15 Conn. 384 (decided in
lS4oj, in w'hicli the principal authorities are
reviewed. The decision in this case was fol-
lowed in the subsequent case of Hart v. Car-
penter, 24 Conn. 427, where the question arose
upon the claim of a bona fide purchaser.
In New York the law is the same, at least
so far as relates to the vendee in a conditional
sale and to his creditors; though there has
been some diversity of opinion in its application
to bona fide purchasers from such vendee.
As early as 1S22, in the case of Haggerty
V. Palmer, G Johns. Ch. 437, where an auc-
tioneer had delivered to the purchaser goods
sold at auction, it being one of the conditions
of sale that indorsed notes should be given in
payment, which the purchaser failed to give,
Chancellor Kent held that it was a condi-
tional sale and delivery, and gave no title
which the vendee could transfer to an as-
signee for the benefit of creditors; and he said
that the cases under the English bankrupt
act did not apply here. The chancellor re-
ma iked, however, that "if the goods had been
fairly sold by P. [the conditional vendee], or
if the proceeds had been actually appropriated
by the assignees before notice of this suit
and of the injunction, the remedy would have
been gone."
In Strong v. Taylor, 2 Hill, 32G, Nelson,
C. J., pronomicing the opinion, it was held to
be a conditional sale w-here the agreement
was to sell a canal-boat for a certain sum, to
be paid in freighting flour and wheat, as di-
rected by the vendor, he to have half the
freight until paid in full, with interest. Be-
fore the money was all paid the boat was
seized under an execution against the vendee;
and, in a suit by the vendor against the sher-
iff, a verdict was found for the plaintiff, un-
der the instruction of the court, and was sus-
tained in banc upon the authority of the
Ma.sisachusetts case of Barrett v. Pritchard,
2 I'ick. 512.
In Herring v. Hoppock, 15 N. Y. 409, the
same doctrine was followed. In that case
there was an agreement in writing for the
sale of an iron safe, which was delivered to
the vendee, and a note at six mouths given
therefor; but it was expressly understood
that no title was to pass until the note was
paid; and if not paid. Herring, the vendor,
was authorized to retake the safe, and collect
all reasonable charges for its use. The sher-
iff levied on the safe as the propert.v of
the vendee, with notice of the plaintiff's claim.
The court of appeals held that the title did
not pa.ss out of Herring. Paige, J., said:
"Whenever there is a condition precedent at-
tached to a contract of sale which is not waiv-
ed by an absolute and unconditional delivery,
no title passes to the vendee until he performs
the condition or the seller waives it." Com-
stock, J., said that, if the question were new,
it might be more in accordance with the an-
alogies of the law to regard the writing giv-
en on the sale as a mere security for the debt
in the nature of a personal mortgage; but he
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for the benefit o f  h i s  creditors. The case o f  
Horn v .  Baker, 9 ICa t, :.!l::i, also turned 011 
the same point, and not hing in either of t hese 
C'ascs bas any bearing on the present qtws­
tion." 
I n  Coggill v. Ilartrorcl & K. H. R. Co., :� 
r� ra y ,  �-!:i, the rights of a bona fide purchaser 
from one in pnsscs:-.ion und r a conditional 
. :tie of goo1ls were s11ecifi<·a l ly tliscussed, and 
the court 11elcl, in an able opi n io n  deli vered by 
\lr . .  lustiee Bigelow, that a sale and del iYery 
nf goocls on cornlition tbat t he title shall not 
,·est in the ,·cndee u n t i l  payment of the price 
pas 1" no title until the condit ion is perform­
Nl. a ncl the ven1lor, i f  guilty of no I:whes, may 
recla i m  the property, eYen from one wlto 
bas purchased from his vcntlee in goocl fa ith . 
and witltout not ice. The lcarnetl just ice c·o !ll· 
1ne1wed h i s  o p i n io n  ·in the fol lowing terms:  
"It  I m :;; long been the sett led rnle of law in 
this commonwealth that a sail' and deli Yery 
of goods on cond ition tlrn t the property is not 
to vest until the purcba e money is paid o r  
securetl, does not pai<s the title t o  t h e  venclee. 
and tlrnt the vendor, in case the condition is 
uot fultillecl, bas a right to reposse�s him­
-<elf of the goocls. both a.:::a i ust the ventlee a nd 
a,.:ainst bis crcclitors cla im ing to hold mem 
under attachments." Ile then addresses bim­
self to a consideration of t h e  rights of a bona 
fide pmcllaser from the vendee, purchas i ng 
without notice of t b e  condition on wbicb the 
latter bolds the goods in bis posses:;;ion ; aJ) ( l  
b e  concludes tba t they are n o  greater lhau 
those of a creditor. H e  says: "All the cases 
turn on the pri nciple tbat tl1e comvliance witb 
the com1 i t ions of sale a nd deli>etT is, by the 
terms o f  the contract. pr�cedeut to the tra ns­
f Pr of tbe property from the >endor to the 
vendee. The vendee in sucb cases acquires 
no property in the goods. He is only a bailee 
for a specific pmpose. The delivery which i n  
ortli11a r�· cases passes t h e  title to t b e  venclee 
lllll$ t  take effect according to the agreerncut 
of the parties, and can operate to >est the 
property only when the contingency contcm­
platecl by tbe contract arises. The vendee, 
therefore, i n  such cases, having no title to 
the property, can pass none to others. Ile 
has only a bare right of possession. ancl those 
wbn cla i m  under him, either a.s creditors or 
purchasers, can acquire no higher or better 
title. Sucb is tbe neces:;ary result of earry­
i u;; into effect the intention or the parties to 
a condi t ional sale and deliYery. Any other 
rule would be equivalent to the denial of the 
Ya lidity of sucb contracts. But t hey certainly 
violate no rnle o f  law, nor are they contrary 
to SOOD!l polit:y." 
Th.is case was followed i n  Sargent v.  :.\Iet­
calf, 5 Gray, 30G; Deshon v. Bigelow. 8 Gray, 
15il; Whitney v. Eaton, 15 G ray, :!25 ; H i r­
schorn v. Canney, 98 Mass. H9; and Cha e 
v. Inga lls, 1:!2 :.\lass. 381; and is believed to 
express the settled law of :.\Ias$achusetts. 
Tbe same doctrine prevails in Connecticut, 
and was sustained in an able and learned opin­
ion of Chief .Justice 'Y illi:1m . i n  the <:a e of 
[ 
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Forbes v. :.\Larsh, 15 Conn. 384 (cleci<le1l i n  
l&!:�J. i n  wliiC'h the principal a u thoritiPs an· 
reviewed. The decision iu t h is c:ts<' was ful­
Iowecl in the sullsequent ca.-c of H a r• v. Car­
penter, 2-! Cunu. 4:!7, wllerc the <1uestion a rose 
upon the cl aim of a bona ficle pur<'hn ser. 
I n  ;\Tew York the law is the sawe, at least 
so far as relatC's to the vcndec in a conditional 
sale a nd to his creditor:;; ; though there I.Jal" 
been some diversity of cpinion in its applim tion 
to bona ficle pur<"hasers from sneh Yendee. 
As early as 1 "22. in the c·a,.;e of Hag;ert�· 
'" Palme1" G Johns. Cb. 4 :17, where a u  auc­
tioneer had cleliYerecl to ti le purchase!' goods 
�olcl at auction, it being one of the conditions 
of sale that iuclorsecl notes should be giYen i n  
payment, which the purchaser failed t o  give, 
Cha ncellor Kent held that it was a couui­
tional sa le and cleliyery, anc1 gaYe no title 
''"hicb the ve111lce coulcl transfer to a n  as­
si.gnee for t he hePefit of cred itors; and be saicl 
that  the casps un1ler the gnglish ban lanpt 
ad dicl not apply here. The chancellor re­
marked. however, that " i f  the goods b a ll bePn 
fairly sold by P. [tbe conditional vendee], o r  
if the p roceeds h a d  been actually appropriated 
hy the assignees before notice of this suit 
and oC the inj unction, the remedy would ha l'e 
bet>n gone." 
In Strong v. Taylor, 2 H i l l ,  32G, Xebon, 
C. J.,  pronouncing the opinion, it was held to 
be a condit ional f.ale where tlte agreement 
'"a s lo sl'll a. canal-boat for a certa i n  sum, to 
be paid in freighting flour ancl \Yheat. a s  <li­
rected by the vendor, he to ba Ye half the 
freight until paid in full, '"ith i nterest. Be­
fore the money was a ll paid the boat was 
seized under an execution against t he veudee ; 
a nd, i n  a suit by the venclor a:;:aiust the �ber­
iff, a vcrtlict was founcl for t he plaintiff, un­
<1cr the instruction of the court, and was sus-
1ai necl in bane upon the authority of the 
:'llas�a<·husetts case o f  Barrett >. Pritchartl, 
:! l ' ick. ;:;12. 
I n  Herring v. IIoppock, 15 N. Y. 400, the 
�amP (loctrine was followed. I n  that case 
there was an agreement in writing for the 
sale o f  a n  iron safe, which was deliYe red to 
the venclee. and a note a t  six montl1s given 
therefor; but it "·as exprc,:,.ly umlerstoocl 
that no title was to pass until  the note wa::; 
paitl ; and if not pa id.  Herring, the vendor. 
"-'::IS aut horizt>d to 1 etake the safe, and collect 
a l l  rea sonable <'barge,,; rnr its use. The sher­
iff leYied on the ,afe as the property o f  
t h e  vendee, witb notice o f  t h e  plaintiff's rla.illl . 
The court of a1111eal s  held that the title dhl 
not pa�s out of Herring. Paige, .J. ,  said : 
" \Y llenever there is a eoucl i t ion p recedent at­
tached to a contract of sale which is not wah·­
etl by an absolute and unconditional delivery, 
no t it le passes to the >enclee until be performs 
the condition or the seller waive: it." Cow­
stod::, J ., said that, i f  the question were new, 
it ruigbt be more i n  accordance with the an­
alogies of the Ia w t o  regard t he writing .:::h·­
cn on t be �all' as a !llere �ecuritr for tlle 11t•llt 
in the na ture of a pen;unal lllot tgage; but be 
Jir3 1  from 
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considered the law aa having been settled by
the previous cases, and the court unanimously
concurred in the decision.
In the cases of Smith v. Lynes, a N. Y.
41, and Wait v. Green, 35 Barb. .">S5, on ap-
peal, 36 N. y. 556, it was held that a bona
lide purchaser, without notice from a vendee
who is in possession under a conditional sale,
will be protected as against the original ven-
dor. These cases were reviewed, and, we
think, substantially overruled, in the subse-
quent case of Ballard v. Burgett, 40 N. Y.
314, in which separate elaborate opinions were
delivered by .Tudges Grover and Lott This
decision was concurred in by Chief Judge
Hunt, and Judges Woodruff, Mason, and Dan-
iels; Judges James and Murray dissenting.
In that case Ballard agreed to sell to one
France a yoke of oxen for a price agreed on,
but the contract had the condition "that the
oxen were to remain the property of Ballard
until they should be iiaid for." The oxen were
delivered to France, and he subsequently sold
them to the defendant Burgett, who purchtised
and received them without notice that the
plaintiff had any claim to them. The court
sustained Ballard's claim; and subsociuent
cases in New York are in harmony witu this
decision. See Cole v. Mann, 62 N. Y. 1;
Bean v. Edge, 84 X. Y. 510.
We do not perceive that the ease of Dows
v. Kidder, 84 N. Y. 121, is adverse to the
ruling in Ballard v. Burgelt. There, al-
though the I'l.Tintifl's slipulated that the title
to the corn should not pass until payment
of the price (which was to be cash, the
same day), yet they indorsed and delivered
to the purchaser the evidence of title, name-
ly, the weigher's return, to enable him to
take out the bUl of lading in his own name,
and use it in raising funds to pay the plain-
tiff. The purchaser misappropriated the
funds, and did not pay for the corn. Here
the intent of both parlies was that the pur-
chaser might dispose of the corn, and he
was merely the trustee of the i)1alntlff. In-
vested by him with the legal title. Of
course, the Innocent party who pnrch.ascd
the corn from the first purchasor was not
bound by the equities between him and the
plaint IIT."
The later case of Parker v. Baxter, SO N.
Y. ."iSli, was precisely similar to Dows v.
Kidder; and the same principle was In-
volved In Farwell v. Importers' & Traders'
Bank, !Mi N. Y. 4,s;j, where the plalnlilT de-
livered his own note to n broker to get It
discounted, .•ind the l.-itter pledged It as col-
lateral for a loan made to himself. The
legal title paHsivI; and althoiigli. ;is biv
tween the plain) III' and the broUer, the for-
mer was the owner of the note and Its pro-
coefls. yet that was an ei|ulty which was
lint blndluK on the Innocent hcilder.
The decisions In Maine, New Hampshire,
and Vermont are understood to be siilislaii-
tlally to the same clTect as those of Massa-
cliiiMelfH and New York; lluingh by recent
statutes in Maine and Vermont, as also in
Iowa, where the same ruling prevailed, it is
declared in effect that no agreements that
personal property, bargained and delivered
to another, shall remain the property of the
vendor, shall be valid against third persons
without notice. George v. Stubbs, 26 .Me.
243; Sawyer v. Fisher, 32 Me. 28; Brown
V. Haynes, 52 Me. 578; Boynton v. Libby,
62 Me. 253; Rogers v. AVhitehouse, 71 Me.
222; Sargent v. Gile, S X. H. 325; McFar-
land V. Farmer, 42 N. H. 386; King v.
Bates, 57 X. H. 446; Hefflin v. Bell, 30 Vt.
134; Armington v. Houston, 38 Vt. 448;
Fales V. lioberts, 38 Vt. 503; Duncans v.
Stone, 45 Vt. 123; Moseley v. Shattuck, 43
Iowa. 540; Thorpe v. Fowler, 57 Iowa, 541.
11 X. W. 3.
The same view of the law has been taken
in several other states. In Xew Jersey, in
the case of Cole v. Berry, 42 X. J. Law, 30S,
it was held that a contract for the sale of a
sewing-machine to be delivered and paid for
by installments, and to remain the property
of the vendor until paid for, was a condi-
tional sale, and gave the vendee no title un-
til the condition was performed; and the
cases are very fully discussed and distin-
guished.
In Penn.sylvania the law is understood to
be somewhat different. It is thus summar-
ized by Judge Depue, in the opinion deliv-
ered in Cole V. Berry, 42 N. J. Law, 314,
where he says: "In Pennsylvania a distinc-
tion is taken between delivery under a bail-
ment, with an option in the bailee to pur-
chase at a named price, and a delivery un-
der a contract of sale containing a reserva-
tion of title in the vendor until the contract
price be paid; it being held that in the for-
mer instance projierty does not pass as in
favor of creditors and purchasers of the
bailee, but that in the latter instance deliv-
ery to the vendee subjects the property to
execution at the suit of his creditors, and
makes It transferable to bona fide pur-
chasers. Chamberlain v. Smith, 44 Pa. St.
431; Bose v. Story, 1 Pa. St. ino; Martin v.
Mathiot, 14 Serg. & U. 214; Ilaak v. Lin-
derman, 64 Pa. St. 400." But, as the learn-
ed .indge adds: "This distinction Is discred-
ited by the great weight of atithority. which
jiuts ])ossesslon under a conditional con-
tnict of sale and possession under a bail-
ment on the same footing,— liable to be as-
sailed by creditors and purchasers for actual
fraud, but not fraudulent per se."
In this connection, see the case of Cop-
land v. Bosquet. 4 Wash. C. C. 5SH, Fed.
Cas. No. 3.212, where Mr. Justice Washing-
ton and Judge Peters (the former delivering
the opinion of the court) sustained a condl-
llon.'il sale and delivery against a i)ur<li;iser
from the vendee, who claimed to be a bona
tide purchaser wllliout notice.
In Dlilo tho validity of conditional sales ac-
compiinled by delivery of possession Is fully
Hustalned. The latest reported cuse bronghl
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.1.l .ES. 
considercc the law as having been settled hr 
the pre>iou cases, and the court unanimously 
concu:Ted in the decision. 
In the cases of Smith v. Lyne , 5 N. Y. 
H. and Wait v. Green, 35 Barb. 3 -, on ap­
peal,  36 N. Y. 556, it  was held tha t a bona. 
tide purcha er, without notice from a venclee 
who i in po session under a conditional sale, 
will be protected as against the original >en­
clor. Thrse cases were reviewed, and. we 
think, sub tantially overruled, i n  the subse­
<]nent ca e of Ballard v. Burgett, 40 N .  Y. 
314. in which sepa rate elaborate opinions were 
deli>ered by .Judges G ro>er and Lott. This 
tle<'i ion "·as concurrecl in by Chief Judge 
Hunt, a nd Judges Woodruff, :'.Jason, and Dan­
iel ; Judges James and :'.Iurray dissenting. 
In that case Ballard agreed to sell to one 
France a yoke of oxen for a price agreed on, 
but the contract had the condition ' ' that the 
oxen were to remain the property of Ballard 
until they should be paid for." The oxen were 
deli•ered to France, and he subsequently solll 
them to the defendant Burgett, who purcha ed 
aml receiYell them without notice tll•lL the 
pla inti ff llad any claim to them. The court 
sustai ned Ballard· claim; and subsequent 
r·a. e in Xew York are in harmony with this 
cled�ion. See Cole v. :'.Iann, 62 N. Y. 1 ;  
Bean >. Edge, 84 X. Y. 510. 
Ire do not perceive that the ca e of Dows 
v. Kidder, 84 N. Y. 121 .  is acl vers to the 
rulin;! in Ballard >. Rm-gel t.  '!'here, al­
thn 1'-'h the l 'l:t intifJs :<t i 1m la lccl t hat t he t itle 
tn t h e corn houlcl not pass until payment 
o f  t be price (whic h  "·as to be cash, tb 
:::a nl(> day),  ret they i rnl or. cd aod delh·ered 
t o  the purcba er tbe eYidenec or tit!  . name­
ly, the weigher's retum, to enable him to 
tal•r out the bill o f  Jading in his own name, 
a n 1 l  u se i t  in raising funds to pay t h e p la i n­
t i ff. The 11Urchaser mis:1 ppro[lria t cl t he 
f11111ls. an d dirl not pn�· for t hr corn. l I C're 
t h r i n t Pnt of lJotb p:1 1·t ic•s was t hat t h C' pur­
,.h:i sl'r ml ;::ht dispose of t he corn, n ncl he 
wn <>  rnPn•ly t he trustee or the 1 i ln l n t 1 rr, l n­
"•'sle<l hy h i m  w l 1 h  t he le;.:a l t i l lC'. or 
<'t• nrse, t h e  l nnOP<'llt 11 a i·ty w ho 111 1rc·has cl 
t he N•l'n from the llr<>l pn r< ·h ai'iC'r wns not 
hitt1rnl hy t lw equ l l i Ps between him am! t he 
pla l 11 1 1 1r. 
Th" l n l • •r cnse of r:1 rl1rr \". H:i .· t P1". 8G N. 
Y. ;;s1;, wa s prrC'lsply H l 1 1 1 l l n r  t o  l >ows \", 
K i<ltln; a 11 1 l  t hr :;n nw prlnd]>h• wns I n­
' . ,) \ ,.d in Fa rw<'l l  v. I 11 1p1 1r( Prs' ,1,;; 'l'rad"rH' 
B, 1 11 1 , :11 1 , Y. ·I '!, w h , . n• l h1•  pl n l n t i ll' i i l'-
l h  t•n•rl hi n\\ n not r to :1 l i rnl 1 ·r  l o  gPl I t 
d i  t•o111 1 t ed, n u t !  1 1 11• l n t f c•r pll'dg 1•il i t  : 111  <01 1l­
n t 1•rnl for :1  lnn 11 mud . .  lo h l 1 1 1 � 1•l f. ' I  lw 
1 1  ,.:n I t i  I I t •  p:tR""" ; n 111 1 n 1 1  hon i: h. : 1 H  l w­
t W t  1'11 t h• •  J1l 1 1 i 1 1 t l ll a 1 1 t l  l h 1• l irol,l'r, t hc• l n r­
lnl' l' \\ :t 8 t lw n\\'llf•r o l  l hl' 111 11 1• : 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 11  pro• 
c'<'c<I , yl'I I hat wns 11 11 1•1 1 1 1 1 l y  wh lf' h \\ : t t!  
1 1  I l 1lr11l l n l{  nn l h  • hrnm· . . 1 1 1  h11ld 1•r. 
Th•• 1k1•I Inns In .\l n l r1I', • ··· w I l n m pHhlrl', 
n n<I  \'.-. r111 o n l  1 ir1•  1 1 111J p1• toot! tn hi' H 1 1 hH l :i n ­
t l n l l \' 1 11 t h •• 811 1 1 lf' 1 ffu•I 1 1s t hoi;p of ;\ l n flRll· 
•h1 1  1 1 8 : 1 1 1 11 • - , . ,,. Y"rl ; l ho 1 1 � h  l iy 1·1·1 ·1•1 1 1  
D ig it ize:tl by 
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�tatutes i n  :'.la.ine and 'Vermont, as also i n  
Iow·a, where tbe same ruling preva iled, i t  is 
decl:u-ed i n  effect that no agreeme n t  t ha t  
personal property, bargained a n d  delivered 
to anot her, shall remain t he property of the 
vendor, shnll be valid aga.inst tllird per.ons 
w ithout notice. G eorge v.  Stubbs, 2U �k. 
243; awyer v. Fisher, 32 1\le. �8; Bro\\ 11 
v. Hayne , 52 :Jle. 57 ; Boynton v. Lib by . 
62 j\le. 2:J3; Rogers v. \\hitehouse, 71 1\le. 
2�2; Sargent v. Gile, S �. H. 323; :\lcU'ar­
land v. Farmer, 42 N. H. 386; King v.  
Bates, 57 X. H .  446; Heffiin v .  Bell,  30 Vt.  
134 ; Armington v. Houston, 38 Vt. 44 ; 
Fa.Jes v. Hoberts, 38 Yt. 303 ; Duncans >. 
Stone, 45 Vt. 123 ; Moseley v. Sllattuck, 43 
Iowa . 340 ; Thorpe v. Fow ler, 57 Iowa, 54 1 .  
1 1  N .  W .  3. 
The sa m e  view of tbe law bas been taken 
in se Yeral olber states. In New J e rsey, in 
the ca e of Cole v. Berry, 42 N. J. La w, 30 ', 
i t  was held t h a t  a contract for t he s:'.11 o f  a 
ewing-mnC'hine to be deli vered a n d  paid for 
by insta llments, and to remain the propert�· 
or the >endor nntil  paid for, was a co1Hli­
t ional sale, ancl gave the vendee n o  t i tle un­
til t i le co nd i t ion was performed ; and thP 
cases are very fully discu sed and d i st i n­
guislwtl .  
I n  Pennsylvania the l a w  i s  understood to 
be omewbat different. It is thus summ ar­
i zed by J ud ge Depue, in tbe opinion del i > ­
erecl in Cole v .  Berry, 42 N .  J. Law, 31-1. 
"·here he says: "In Pennsylvania a distinc­
t ion is tal;:cn between delivery unller a bail­
ment. witb an option i n  tbe bailee to irnr­
cbase at a named price, and a del i very un­
der a contract of sale contn i n in ;;t  a reserYa· 
t ion of title in tlle >endor u n t i l  the contr:l< 't 
price be pa i d ;  it being held that iu the for­
mrr instanee property doc not pass ns i n  
fayor o f  cred i t ors and purchasers o r  t h1' 
ba ilC'C', hut that i n  the l a t ter iust :rncc d<'l iY-
ry to t h e vendC'c subjects the i1rop r t )'  to 
c:-.: erul lon a t  the sui t of his cn•ll itors, a ucl  
rnah0s i t  t rans1'cr: 1 h l c  to bona fi cle pnr­
C'ha :<P rs. l ' lla mllcrh 1 i n  v.  S m i t h , 44 Pa. �t. 
4:' 1 ; Hnsr Y .  Rt ol'y, 1 Pa . Rt. 1!10 ; �l :ul ln Y. 
'.:\ I n t hiot , 1 1  f:\cr�. ,. I t .  :! H ;  Ha a k  v. Li n­
t!Pr ma n .  l i l J 'a .  Rt. lnfl.'' Bnt,  ns the lC'nrn-
0tl j 111l;.:c ntlds: "This d i stinet ion I s  discrt'1\-
11 .. c1 hy t h!' �real w!'i�ht of a n l horit�·. wh kh 
1 1 11 I H  1111ssrsslot1 urnlrr a conclit lonnl cnn-
1 r:wt ol' snlc nnrl pnssc'sslnn under a llu i l · 
nwnt on t hr sn m c  fnot i n �.-llnhlc to ht' ns­
sa i l l' c l  hJ C'l'C'1 l i lors a nd 1rnrdrnscrs for u d u n l  
fru ucl .  hut nnl f1':1 1 1 1 l n lr n l  per SP." 
I n  l h l s co1 1 11r1·t lnn, seC' t he case or Cop· 
l n n r l  Y. Hnsq 11ct . 4 \YnHh. C. C. i1SS, F'c1l . 
<'as. No. :l,:! I '..! , w ll!'re '.\ ! J". .l 1 1Hli<'I' \\a .-hln� 
Ion :11111  .l 1 1c li;t> l '<'l t•1·s ( t he fnrnwr c lP l l 1·prin� 
1 1 11' opin ion n f  t h<' cou rl)  s11st n i 111•tl :i 1•nndl  
I Inna I sn IP n 1 1 1 1  drl I 1 Pry n l.'.:t i n s t  a pure ·  I l a  H<'I' 
from I hi' n•111I C'I', " h o rlnl nw1l to he u lmun 
l l d l '  pur1'11:1Hf'l' wi t hout not lC"e. 
I n  f l hl n t h e vn l h l l l y  of cond i t i onal Hn lC'H : 1r 
ro 1 1 1pa 1 1 l <'d h�· i 1  . .  1 1 \  1 I'.\' or pnssc>ssln11 i s  f u l l y  
. 11 1 : 1 1 1 1 1 • 1 1 .  ' l 'h1 ·  l : 1 i < 'Hl n•pm l c·d <'1 14!' 1 J ro11, h l  
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to our attention is tliat of Call v. Seymour,
40 Ohio St. G70, wliicli arose upon a written
contract contained in several promissoi-j-
notes given for installments of the purchase
money of a machine, and resembling very
much the contract in the case now under
considefatiou. Following the note, and as
a part of the same document, is this condi-
tion: "The express conditions of the sale
and purchase of the separator and horse-
power for which this note is given, is such
. that the title, ownership, or possession does
not pass from the said Seymour, Sabiu &
Co. until this note, witli interest, is paid in
full. The said Seymour, Sabin & Co. have
full power to declare this note due, and
talie possession of said separator and horse-
power, at any time they may deem this
note insecure, even before the maturity of
the note, and to sell the said machine at
public or private sale, the proceeds to be ap-
plied upon the unpaid balance of the pur-
chase price." The machine was seized un-
der an attachment issued against the ven-
dee, and the action was brought by the ven-
dor against the constable who served the
attachment. The case was fully argued,
and the authorities pro and eon duly consid-
ered by the court, which sustained the con-
dition expressed In the contract, and af-
firmed the judgment for the plaintiff. See,
also, Sanders v. Keber, 28 Ohio St. C30.
The same law prevails in Indiana. Shire-
man V. Jackson, 14 Ind. 459; Dunbar v.
Rawles, 28 Ind. 225; Bradshaw v. War-
ner, 54 Ind. 58; Hodson v. Waiiier, 60
Ind. 214; McGirr v. Sell, Id. 249. The same
in Michigan. Whitney v. McConnoll, 29
Mich. 12; Smith v. Lozo, 42 Mich. G, 3 N.
W. 227; Marquette Manuf'g Co. v. Jeffery,
49 Mich. 283, 13 N. W. 592. The same in
Missouri. Ridgeway v. Kennedy, 52 Mo.
24; Wangler v. Franlslin, 70 Mo. G.j9; Sum-
ner V. Cottey, 71 JIo. 121. The same in Al-
abama. Fairbanlis v. Eurelia. 67 Ala. 109;
Sumner v. Woods, Id. 139. The same in
several other states. For a very elaborate
collection of cases on the subject, see Mr.
Bennett's note to Benj. Sales (4th Ed.) §
320, pp. 329-33G; and Mr. Freeman's note
to Kanaga v. Taylor, 70 Am. Dec. 62, 7 Ohio
St. 134. It is unnecessary to quote further
from the decisions. The quotations al-
ready made show the grounds and reasons
of the rule.
The law has been held differently in Illi-
nois, and very nearly in conformity with
the English decisions under the operation
of the banlirupt law. The doctrine of the
supreme court of that state is that if a per-
son agrees to sell to another a chattel on
condition that the price shall be paid within
a certain time, retaining the title in himself
in the mean time, and delivers the chattel
to the vendee so as to clothe him with the
apparent ownership, a bona tide purcluiser,
or an execution creditor of the latter, is en-
titled to protection as against tlie claim of
the original vendor. Brundage v. Camp,
21 111. 330; McCormick v. Hadden, 37 111.
370; Murch v. Wright, 46 111. 488; Michigan
Cent. R. Co. v. Phillips, GO 111. 190; Lucas
V. Campbell, 88 111. 447; Van Duzor v. Al-
len, 90 111. 499. Perhaps the statute of Illi-
nois on the subject of chattel mortgages has
influenced some of these decisions. This
statute declares that "no mortgage, trust
deed, or other conveyance of personal proiJ-
erty having the effect of a mortgage or lieu
upon such property, is valid as against the
rights and interests of any third person, un-
less tlie possession thereof be delivered to
and remain with the grantee, or the instru-
ment provide that the possession of the
property may remain with the grantor, and
the instrument be acknowledged and re-
corded." It has been supposed that this
statute indicates a rule of public policy con-
demning secret liens and reservations of
title on the part of vendors, and making
void all agreements for such liens or reser-
vations unless registered in the manner re-
quired for chattel mortgages. At all events,
the doctrine above referred to has become
a rule of property in Illinois, and we have
felt bound to observe It as such.
In the ease of Hervey v. Rhode Island
Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 6G4, where a
Rhode Island company leased to certain
Illinois railroad contractors a locomotive en-
gine and tender at a certain rent, payable at
stated times during the ensuing year, with
an agreement that, if the rent was duly
paid, the engine and tender should become
the property of the lessees, and possession
was delivered to them, this court, being sat-
isfied that the transaction was a conditional
sale, and that, by the law of Illinois, the
reservation of title by the lessors was void
as against third persons unless the agree-
ment was recorded (which It was not in
proper time), decided that a levy and sale of
the property in Illinois, under a judgmenc
against the lessees, were valid, and that the
locomotive works could not reclaim it. Mr.
Justice Davis, delivering the opinion of the
court, said: "It was decided by this court
in Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307, and 7
Wall. 139, that the liability of property to
be sold under legal process issuing from the
courts of the state where it is situated, must
be determined by the law there, rather than
that of the jurisdiction where the owner
lives. These decisions rest on the ground
that every state has the right to reguliite
the transfer of property within its limits.
and that whoever sends property to it im-
pliedly submits to the regulations concern-
ing its transfer in force there, although a
different rule of transfer prevails in the ju-
risdiction where he resides. * • « The
policy of the law in Illinois will not permit
the owner of personal property to sell it,
either absolutely or conditionally, and still
contiuue in possession of it. Possession is
one of the strongest evidences of title to
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to our attention is that of Call v. Seymour, 
40 Ohio St. 670, which arose upon a written 
contract contained in several promissory 
notes given fo1· installments of the purchase 
money of a machine, and resembling very 
much the contract in the case now under 
considetation. Following the note, and as 
a part o f  the same document, is this condi­
tion: "The express conditions of the sale 
:llld purcllase or tlle separator and llorse­
po"·er for w hicll this note is given, is such 
that the title, ownership, or possession does 
not pass from the said Seymour, Sabin & 
C'o. until this note, with interest, is paid i n  
full. The said Seymour, Sabin & Co. have 
full power to declare this note due, and 
take possession of said separator and horse­
power, at any time they may deem this 
note insecure, even before the maturity of 
the note, and to sell the said machine at 
public or private sale, the proceeds to be ap­
plied upon the unpaid balance of the pur­
l'hase price." The machine was seizeu un­
der an attachment issued against the ven­
dee, and the action was brought by the ven­
dor against the constable who serveu the 
attachment. The case was fully argued, 
and the authorities pro and con duly consid­
ered by the court, which sustained the con­
uition expressed i n  the contract, and af­
firmed the j udgment for the plaintiff. See, 
also, Sanders v. Keber, 28 Ohio St. 630. 
The same law prevails in Indiana. Shire­
man v. Jackson, 14 Ind. 459; Dunbar v. 
Rawles, 28 Ind. 225; Bradshaw v. War­
ner, 54 Ind. 58 ; Hodson v. Warner, 60 
I nd. 214; McGirr v. Sell, Id. 249. The same 
in l\lichigan. W hitney v. McConnell, 29 
:\Iich. 12 ; Smith v. Lozo, 42 l\lich. 6, 3 N. 
W. 227 ; Marquette l\lanuf'g Co. v. Jefiery, 
49 Mich. 283, 13 N. W. 592. The same i n  
)Iissouri. Ridgeway v. Kennedy, 52 )lo. 
24 ; Wangler v. Franklin,  70 )lo. G39; Sum­
ner v. Cottey, 71 )fo. 121. The same in Al­
abama. Fairbanks v. Eureka. 67 Ala. 109; 
Sumner v. \\'oods, Id. 139. The same i n  
several other states. For a very elaborate 
collection of cases on the subject, see l\lr. 
Bennett's note to Benj. Sales (4th Ed.) § 
:120, pp. 329-336; and Mr. Freeman's note 
to Kanaga v. Taylor, 70 Am. Dec. 62, 7 Ohio 
St. 134. It is unnecessary to quote further 
from the decisions. The quotations al­
ready made show the grounds and reasons 
of the rule. 
The law has been held differently in Illi­
nois, and very nearly in conformity with 
the English decisions under the operation 
of the bankrupt law. The doctrine of the 
supreme court of that state is that if a per­
son agrees to sell to another a chattel on 
condition that the price shall be paid within 
a certain time, retaining the title in himself 
in the mean time. and delivers the chattel 
to the vendee so as to clothe him with the 
apparent ownersllip. a bona fide purchaser, 
or an execution creditor of the latter, is en­
titled to protection as against the claim of 
[ 
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the original vendor. Brundage v. Cawp, 
21 Ill. 330; McCormick v. Hadden, 37 Ill. 
370; Murch v. W1·ight, 46 Ill.  488 ; 1liclligan 
Cent. R. Co. v. Phillips, GO Ill. 100 ; Lucas 
v.  Campbell, 88 Ill. 447 ; Van Duzor v. Al­
len, 90 Ill. 490. Perhaps the statute of Illi­
nois on the subject o f  chattel mortgages has 
influenced some of these decisions. 'l'his 
statute declares that "no mortga;.;e. tru,.;t 
deed, or other conveyance of personal prop­
erty having the effect of a mortgage or lieu 
upon such pr0perty, is 'l"alid as against tlw 
rights and interest s  of any third person. un­
less the possession thereof be deliYerell to 
and remain with the grantee, or the instru­
ment provide that the possession of the 
property may remain w ith the grantor, · anll 
the instrument be acknowledged anu re­
corded." It has been supposed that this 
statute indicates a rule of public policy con­
demning secret liens and reservations of 
title on the part of vendors, and makin;:: 
void all agreements for such liens or reser­
vations unless registered in the manner re­
quired for chattel mortgages. At all events, 
the doctrine above referred to has become 
a rule of property in Illinois, and we ha'l"e 
felt bound to obser'l"e it as such. 
In the case of Hervey v. Rhode Island 
Locomotive Works, 93 U .  S. 6G4, \\'here a 
Rhode Island company leased to certain 
Illinois railroad contractors a locomotiYe en­
gine and tender at a certain rent, payable at 
stated times during the ensuing year, with 
an agreement that, if the rent was duly 
paid, the engine and tender should become 
the property of the lessees, and possession 
was delivered to them, this court, being sat­
isfied that the transaction was a conditional 
sale, and that, by the law of Illinois, tlle 
reservation of title by the lessors was voill 
as against third persons unless the agree­
ment was recorded ("·hich it "·as not i n  
proper time), decided that a levy aml sale of 
the property in Illinois, um1er a j uugmenc 
against the lessees, were valid, and that tile 
locomotive works could not reclaim it. :\Ir. 
Justice Davis, delivering the opinion of the 
court, s�1id:  "It was decided by this court 
in Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307, and 7 
Wall. 139, that the liability of property to 
be sold under legal process issuing from the 
courts of the state where it is  situated, must 
be determined by the law there, rather thau 
that of the jurisdiction where tbe ownN 
lh·es. These decisions rest on the grou u(1 
that every state has the right to re!:;ulate 
the transfer of property within its lim its. 
and that whoeYer sends property to it im­
pliedly submits to the regulations concern­
ing its transfer in force there, althou�h a 
different rule of transfer prevails in the ju­
risdiction where he resides. * * * The 
policy of the law in Illinois will not permit 
the owner of personal property to sell it. 
either absolutely or conditionally, and still 
continue in posse sion of it. Po. >'e"sic n i s  
one of t ll e  strongest eYidem:es o f  r i t Jt .. t•l 
• .  ig1 r . t, _ , -.  
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this class of property, and cannot be right-
fully separated from the title, except in the
manner pointed out by ilie statute. The
courts of Illinois say that to suffer, without
notice to the world, the real ownership to be
in one person, and the ostensible ownership
in another, gives a false credit to the latter,
and in this way works an injury to third
persons. Accordingly, the actual owner of
personal property creating an interest in an-
other to whom it is delivered, if desirous of
preserving a lien on it, must comply with
the provisions of the chattel mortgage act.
Rev. St. 111. 1874, 711, 712." The Illinois
cases are then referred to by the learned
justice to show the precise condition of the
law of that state on the subject under con-
sideration.
The case of Ilervey v. Rhode Island Ix)C0-
niotive Worl<s is relied on by the aiipolhmts
in the pre.sent case as a decision in their
favor; but this is not a correct conelr.sion.
for it is apparent that the only points de-
cided in that case were — First, tliat it was
to be governed by the law of Illinois, the
place where the property was situated; sec-
ondly, that by the law of Illinois tlie agree-
ment for continuing the title of the property
in the vendors after its delivery to the ven-
dees, whereby the latter became the osten-
sible owners, was void as against third per-
sons. This is all that was decided, and it
does not aid the appellants, unless they can
show that the law as held in Illinois, con-
trary to the great weight of authority in
England and this country, is that which
should govern the present case. Aivl this
we think they cannot do. We do not mean
to say that the Illinois doctrine is not sup-
ported l)y some decisions in other states.
There arc such decisions; but they are few
in numl)er compared with those in wliich it
Is held that conditional sales are valid and
lawful as well against third persons as
against the jKirtics to the contract.
The api)ellants, liowever, rely with much
coMlldence on the decision of this court In
Heryford v. Davis. 102 U. S. 23ri, a case
coming from Missouri, where tlie law al-
lows and sustains condltioiuil sales. Hut
we do not think that this case, any more
than that of Ilervey v. Rhode Island l/oco-
motlve Works, will be found to support
their views. 'J'lie whole question In Hery-
ford v. Davis was as to the const rur^t ion of
the contr;ict. This was In the form of a
lease, but It contained provisions so Ir-
reconcilable with the Idea of Its being real-
ly a lease, and so deinonstrjible that It was
an absolute sale with a reservation of a
mortgage lion, that the latter lntcr|iretallon
was glviMi to It by the court. This Inter-
pri'tallon rendered II obnoxious to the Htat-
ule iif Missouri requiring mortgages of per-
sonal property to be rciorded in order to be
valid ns airalnsl third iiersoim. It was con-
<'eded by the lourl. in the opinion delivered
by Mr. ,IUHllce Strong, that If the ngrei--
ment had really amounted to a lease, with
an agreement for a conditional sale, the
claim of the vendors would have been valid.
The first two or three sentences of the opin-
ion furnish a key to the whole effect of the
decision. Mr. Justice Strong says: "Tlie
correct determination of this case depends
altogether upon the construction that must
be given to the contract between the .Tack-
son & Shai-p Company and the railroad com-
pany, against which the defendants below
recovered their judgment and obtained tiieir
execution. If that contract was a mere
lease of the cars to the railroad company, or
if it was only a conditional sale, which did
not pass the ownership until the condition
should be performed, the property was not
subject to levy and sale under execution at
tlie suit of the defendant against the com-
pany. But if, on the other hand, the title
passed by the contract, and what was re-
served by the Jackson & Sharp Company
was a lien or security for the payment of
the price, or what is called sometimes a
mortgage back to the vendors, the ears were
subject to levy and sale as the property of
the railroad company." The whole residue
of the opinion is occupied with the discus-
sion of the true construction of the con-
tract; and, as we have stated, the conclu-
sion was reached tliat it was not really a
lease nor a conditional sale, but an absolute
sale, with the reservation of a lien or se-
curity for the payment of the price. This
ended the case; for, thus interpreted, the
instrument inured as a mortgage in favor of
the vendors, and ouglit to Iiave been record-
ed in order to protect them against third
persons.
But whatever tlie law may be with regard
to a bona tide purchaser from the vendee in
a conditional sale, there is a circumstance
In the present case whicli makes it clear of
all dilHculty. The appellant in the present
case was not a bona fide purchaser without
notice. The court below find that, at llie
time of and prior to the sale, he knew the
purclijise price of the propert.v had not been
paid, and that Russell & Co. claimed title
tliereto until such payment was made. Un-
der such circumstances. It is almost the
unauiiiious opinion of all the courts that he
cannot hold the jiroijcrty as against the true
owners; but as the rulings of this court
have been, as we thiidv, somewhat misun-
derstood, wo have thought it proper to ex-
amine the subject with some care, and to
state whiit we regard as the general rule
of law where II Is not affected by local stat-
utes or local decisions to the contrary.
It Is onl.v necessary to add that there Is
nothing either In the statute or adjudged
law of Idaho to prevent. In this case, the oii-
oration of the genei'al rule, which we consid-
er to be eslablislicd liy overwhelming au-
thority, nninely, that, In the ab.senco of
fraud, an agrcenu'nt for a conditional sale Is
g(K)d and valid as well against third persons
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16 SALE . 
t his clas of property. and cannot be right­
t'ully eparated from the t i tle. except in the 
manner pointed out by t he tatute. Tbe 
courts of Ill inois say that to suffer, w ithout 
notice to the world, the real ownership to be 
in one person, and the ostensible ownership 
in another. gives a false credit to the latter, 
ancl in thi way work a n  injury to third 
person�. Accordingly, the actual owner of 
per.onal property creating an interest in an­
other to whom it i delivered, if de.irou of 
pre. ening a l ien on it, must comply with 
the proY i s i ons of the chattel mortgage act. 
Ile• . ..:t. Il l. 1 74. 711,  7 1 '.!."  The Ill inoi 
ca.cs are then referred to by the learned 
ju tice to how the precise condition of the 
la"· of that state on the subject under con­
siclera t i  on. 
The case of Het·vey v. Rhode I s l a n d  Loco­
moth·e 'Yorl;:s is rel ied on by the a ppel lant 
i n  the pre ent case a s  a decision in their 
faYor ; ln1t thi i not a correct concll'. ion, 
for i t  i n pparent tllat the only poin t s  de­
cided in that case were-Fir t. that it was 
to be go,·erned by the law of I l l i noi , tile 
place where the property was ituated ;  sec­
ondly. t hat by the law of I l linoi the a11:ree­
mc11t  for con ti nuing t he t i t le of t he property 
in t he YCn(lor aftet· it deli \'ery to t he Yen­
<lees. whereby the lat ter became t h  o 'ten-
il.ile owners, wa void as a�aio t third per­
sons. Thi is all thnt was decided. and i t  
dues not :l i d  the a p pellants. unle s t hey can 
show t h a t  t he law ns held i n  I l l inois. con­
trary to t he g-reat wei�ht of aut hori t y  in 
Endanu and t h is co unt r:r. i. t ha t  wh ich 
l.!ould govern the pre cu
"
t en e. A nd  this 
we t h i n k  t hey cannot do. W do not ll \C'n n 
to say t h a t  t he I llinoi s doC't rine is not s11 1 )­
pu1·ted hy >'nme de<"isions in ot l lC't' . t a t cs. 
Tlwn> n l"l' s twh cl C'cision s ;  but t hey :ire few 
in 1 1 1 1 1 11 l 1e1· c·ompa 1·e> 1 l  w i t h  1 hose in w h kh i t  
i .  he> l r l  t hn t  c·on <l i t innnl  i;a l es arc \ ll l ic l  and 
l a \\·fnl n s  wdl :1 :::a i nst t h i rd l)(>l'sons a 
n i.: n i 1 1 >' t  t he pa rt iPs to t he con t ra c t .  
T h P  a p p e> l l : m t s, ho \\·<'Y<'l', rc•ly w i t h m urh 
c·o 1 1 t ldl'll<'c on t h <' c lPd sion of t h is 1·1 1 1 1 1·1 I n  
l l <'l" ,\'fnl'll \". H I  i>'. J O:! 1 R :!:{�>, a <":ll'C' 
c·orn i n g  from '.\ J L·>'u11ri .  w he>rC' t i ll' J a w  a l ·  
lows : i n c l  s11st : i i 1 1 s  ('on t l i t lo n n l  i;; i lrl'l. H n t  
WP clo not t h i 1 1 l\ t h n t  t h is <•nsc>, : 1 1 1 �  lll<ll "C' 
l h:1 1 1  t h n t  of l l Pn ry 1·. J : h m l r  I sl : 1 n c l  J ,c wo 
1 1 1 1 1 1  h <' ""11 rl,s, w i l l  hr J'onnrl  t o  1rn ppo1·J 
t hr l r  YlPW!'l. The whole qu st lon In I l ery­
ford \", J la v l s W:lf< :I' l o  t he C'OJls( !'ll< 't ion of 
t h•• c·••nl r: 1 1 · 1 . T h i s  wn s In t h e fo1· 1 1 1  of a 
IPn. • ' .  1 11 1 1  It 1·011 t n l 11rd 1 1 1·01· l slo1 1s  i<o lr­
i'r'f'r t l l •'l l : i l 1 l < '  w i t h  t l H' h l l 'l l or I t s  l u • l 1 1 r.:: l'ell l· 
l .1· n l < 'n  "· n n rJ ''° r lP1 1 101 1<;l r: 1hl<' 1 h n t  It w n �  
11 11  n l 1s11l 1 1 ( P  1<11 11 '  w i t h  a Jf'H' f"Y nt lnn nr a 
rnnJI J?:t J.:1• l l<'n, t h at l h 1 •  l a l t <' r  l 1 1 t  .. r1 11· . .  1 : 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1  
\I'll !-I i.: l l  , . 1 1  t n I t  hy t lw 1•011 r t ,  'l'h l!'< 1 n t Pr· 
1 1n ·t n t l1 1 1 1  n·1 1 1 l <'r1·d t i  nh11 1 1  · lnllt< to l lw >;fat  
l l lP  , ,f  .\llH nl lrJ n•q 1 1 l rl 1 t J,:  l l l l lrl j!:l�l'l! or JH'I' 
11 1 11 1 1 p 1 1 11 11 · 1· 1 1· 1 .. 1 1 1 •  r1·1 1 1n l 1 ·d 111 ol'df ' i  In 1 1 1 • 
1 :1 l l d : 1 "4  1 1i.:a l u  I l l i l rd l 1"''1<1 1J 11!.  I I  11 11 1 ·1 1 1 1-
' "' """ l >,1 I hr• • 0 1 1 rl ,  1 1 1  t hf '  1 1 p l 1 1 l o 1 1  r lPl l l"Pn•d 
1 .,1 ' I r· . 1 1 1  f i, ., , · t n 1 1 1 1o: .  1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 r  t h l' :11: n·P· 
D i g itiZE!l by 
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ment had really amounted to a lease, with 
an agreement for a conditional sale, the 
claim of the vendors woulcl have been valid. 
The first two or three sentences of the opin­
ion furni h a key to the whole effect of the 
decision. :L\Ir. Justice Strong says : "T11e 
correct determination of this case depends 
altogether upon the construction that must 
be given to the contract between t he Jack­
son & Sharp Company and the rai lroad com­
pany, against which the defendants below 
recovered their j udgment a n d  obtaiue 1 t heir 
execut ion. I f  that contract wa a mere 
lease of the cars to t he railroad company, or 
i f  it was only a conditional ale,  which did 
not pass the ow ner hip u n t i l  the c:onclition 
should l>e performed, the property "·a s  not 
subject to levy and sale under execut ion a t  
t he suit of the defendant against t he corn-
' pany. But if, on the other hand, the title 
pa sea by the contract, and what was re­
s�rvecl by the Jackson & harp Com pany 
was a lien or ecurity for the payment ot 
I he price, or what is called sometimes a 
mortgage back to the vendors, the cars were 
ubje t to' levy :lnd sale as the property of 
the railrond com pa n y." The w hole r sidu 
of t he opinion is occu pi ed w i t h  th cliscu -
sion of the true const rnction or the con­
tract; and, as \Ye haYe t a led, the onclu-
ion wa reached t i.la t it wa not really n 
lease nor a co uc1 i l ioua l sa l . but a u  a bso lute 
sale.  with t he re·e nation o f  a lieu or se­
curity for the paym nt or t he price. 'rl l is 
ended the ca e ;  for, thu' i nterpret d, the 
i n s t ruID nt i n u red �1 a.  mort �nge in favor o l  
t he vendo rs. and o u g h t  t o  ha 1e bL•en record-
d in ol'ller to prot ct t h e m  ag:i i u  l t hird 
pe r o n  . 
H n t  w hate,·e1· the l a w  m:<y be \Y i t h  rega.rtl 
to a bon a fide p u rdiaser from t h e Yen<l<'e i n  
a ('Ornlit innnl s n l  , t he1· i' a. cir ·um:o;t a m ·l' 
i n  t he pres<'nt  C':l s , w hil'h m n l;:es it  c l  n r  ul' 
n i l  c1 i t lk 1 1 1 t y .  'l'hc npp l l a u l  i n  t h  pr sent  
case \\':ts not a. bona fide purcltascr w i ll10i1t  
uol il'e. 'l'hc court be l o w  f ind l h n t .  at t h e 
t i m e of a n c 1  }lrior to t h e snl  , be J, u ('W t ile 
) l l l l'C'h: tse price of t he ))l'O[lel' t y  l l n c l  l lO l  b<'Cll 
pnic1, and t i. la t H ussell  ,. •o. cla i med t i l le 
t hc > 1 ·dn n n l l l  Stlt'h pay ml'nt  was m n c l e. Un­
cl<'r i;1wh C'irc n m s ! :u1c:es. it is a l mo s t  t h <' 
n 1 1 : 1 n 1 1 1 1n1 1s o p i 1 1 in1 1  ol' n l l  t h  ro n rl s  t h : l l  hi' 
1·n nnnl hold t he J l l'n f H' l' I }  as n g- a i n i:; (  t h e> u·ne 
n11 1wrs ; hut as 1 1 1 <'  1·1 1 l i n;;-s or ( h is eourt 
l • : 11P l l('en, :ll'l " (' t h ink,  so m e w h a t  m isun­
dt>rst ooc l ,  we hn\ < '  t hou�h ! i t  p1·0 11l'r to ex­
n m i r w l h<' snhkc•I \\ I t h  so me a re, :rncl  I n  
s l :l t l '  \ \  h:r t \\t' l'l'g':ll'd 1 18 t h  g'Cll C'r:l l l'l l l l' 
nf 1 : 1 \\ \\ hl' l'e I I  Is not ll l1'C<'l t•d h�· Jnr: 1 l s t : t t -
1 1 l r1' nr ln<'n l I l l'<'!. Inns to t he co n t m ry. 
f l  I "'  011 1 ,1 nr1•pssnry to n r l d t ha t  ! h r.re is 
1 1 1 1 t h l 1 1 i.- P l l h0r In t h e s t : 1 t 1 1 1  or n d j u c l g-e> cl  
1 : 1 \\ 1 1 1' l d n ho lo 1 1 1·r1 0 11 t ,  I n  t hi R rn s<\ t lJe o p  
1 ' 1": 1 1 1 0 1 1  of l hr l:Pl 1!'1': 1 l  !'I l l ', \\ hid1  WI' 1·011sld 
1•r t n  i >P Pst : rhl l"'h< ' r l  hy 01e1·w l w l m l u g- 1 1 11  
t hnrl l ,\ , 1 1 1 1 1 r w l,\' , l hn l ,  l u  t he n l >Hrnrp o f  
lr11 1 1 r l ,  1 1 1 1  ugrPP 1 1 1 1 • 1 1 t  for : i  cn ml l l l o n n l  sil l <' l s  
•onr l u n r l  1 11 1 1 1 !  U H  we'll ni;a l n s t  t h l l'd [ 1( ' 1'80 l 1 A  
� r-
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47
;is Mj-'alnst the parties to the transaction;
and the further rule, that a bailee of per-
sonal property cannot convey the title, or
subject it to execution for his own debts.
until the condition on which the agreement
to sell was made, has been performed.
The judgment of the supreme court of the
territory of Utah is affirmed.
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a s  against the parties to the transaction ; 
and tbe further rule, that a bailee of per­
sonal property cannot convey the title, or 
subject it to execution for his own debts, 
D i g 1t1zed by 
I TE RNET A R C H  V E  
until the condition o n  which the agreement 
to sell was made, bas been performed. 
The judgment of the supreme court of the 
territory of Utah is affirmed. 
Origi n-a·I from 
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WOOD v. BOYNTON et al.
(25 N. W. Rep. 42, 64 Wis. 265.)
Supreme Court of "Wisconsin. Oct. 13, 1S85.
Appeal from circuit court, Milwaukee
county.
Johnson, Rietbrock & Halsey, for appel-
lant. N. S. Murphey, for respondents.
TAYLOR, J. Tliis action was brought in
the circuit court for Milwaukee county to
recover the possession of an uucut diaiuoud
of the alleged value of $1,000. The case was
ti-ied in the circuit court, and after hearing
all the evidence in the case, the learned cir-
cuit judge directed the jurj' to find a verdict
for the defendants. The plaintiff excepted
to such instruction, and, after a verdict was
rendered for the defendants, moved for a
new trial upon the minutes of the judge.
The motion was den'.ed, and the plaintiff
duly excepted, and after judgment was en-
tered in favor of the defendants, appealed to
this court. The defendants are partners in
the jewelry business. On tlie trial it ap-
peared that on and before the tweuty-eiglith
of December, 18S:{, the plaiulilT was the own-
er of and in the possession of a small stone
of the nature and value of which she was
ignorant; that on that day she sold it to one
of tlie defendants for the sum of one dollar.
Afterwards It was ascertained that the stone
was a rough diamond, and of the value of
aliout !i;7(X). After learning tliis fact the
plaintiff tendered the defendants the one dol-
lar, and ton cents as interest, and demanded
a return of the stone to her. The defend-
ants refused to deliver it, and therefore she
commeiiced this action.
Tlie plaintiff tcstilicd to the circumstances
attending the sale of the stone to Mr. Samuel
H. Boyiiloii, as follows: "The lirst time
Hoynton .saw (hat stone he was talking about
buying the topaz, or whatever it is. In Sep-
tember or October. I went into his store to
get a little pin mondrd. and I liad It In a
small box,— llie pin.- a small eai-iiiig; * * •
tills stone, and a broken slcove-bullon were
in the box. Mr. Roynton turned to give mo
a cliei'U for my pin. I thought I would ask
him what the stone was. and I took It out
of the bo.\ and asked him to j)li':ise tell iiie
what that was. lie look It In Ills hand and
Koomofl some time Inoking al ir. I told him
I luid been told II was a lojiaz, and he .said
It might be. He says, 'I would buy this;
would you sell it?' I told him I did not
know but what I woulil. What would It be
worth'/ And ho said ho did not know; he
would give nio n dollar and keep It ns .-i
HiM-clnieii, and I told him I would not
soil It; and It was cerlalnly pn^tty to look
at. Ho iiskrd me where I found It, and I
lolil lilin In l')iiL'li'. lie ii.x|«>il about how
far out, and I said right In the village, niid
I wont out. Aflorwnrds, and iibouf the
twoiily-i'Ighlh of December, I neoiled money
pretty badly, and thought every dollar would
help, and I took it back to Mr. Boynton and
told him I had brought back the topaz, and
he says, 'Well, yes; what did I offer you for
it?' and I says, "One dollar;' and he stepped
to the change drawer and gave me the dol-
lar, and I went out." In another part of her
testimony she says: "Before I sold the stone
I had no knowledge whatever that it was a
diamond. I told him that I had been ad-
vised that it was probably a topaz, and he
said probably it was. The stone was about
the size of a canaiy bird's egg, nearly the
shape of an egg, — worn pointed at one end;
it was nearly stiaw color,— a little darker.''
She also testified that before this action was
commenced she tendered the defeudants
?1.10, and demanded the return of the stone,
which they refused. This is substantially
all the evidence of what took place at and
before the sale to the defendants, as testi-
tied to by the plaintiff herself. She pro-
duced no other witness on that point.
The evidence on the part of the defendant
is not veiy different from the version given
by the plaintiff, and certainly is not more
favorable to the plaintiff'. Mr. Samuel B.
Boynton, the defemlant to whom the stone
was sold, testified that at the time he bought
this stone, he had never seen an uucut dia-
mond; had seen cut diamonds, but they are
quite different from the uucut ones; "he
had no idea this was a diamond, and it never
entered his brain at the lime." Considerable
evidence was given as to what took place
after the sale and purchase, but that evi-
dence has very little if any bearing, upon
tlie main point in the case.
This evidence clearly shows that the plain-
tiff' sold tliP stone in question to the defeud-
ants, and delivered it to them in December,
l.S^i, for a consideration of one dollar. The
title to the stone passed by the sale and de-
liveiy to the defendants. How has that title
been divested and again vested in the iilain-
tiff? The contention of the learned counsel
for the appellant is tliat tlio title became
vested in the plaintiff by tJie tender to the
Boynlons of tlie purcliaso money with luter-
esi, and a demand of a rot urn of the stone
to her. Unless sucli tender and demand re-
vosled the tide in the appellant, she cannot
niainlaiii her action. The only queslion In
\ the ca.se Is wliether there was anything In
the sale wlilcli eiilitled tlie vendor (the ap-
pellant) to reseind the sale and so revest the
title In her. The only reasons we know of
for rescinding a s;ilo and revesting the title
In the vender so I hat he may maintain an
action at law for the recovery of the posses-
sion against his vendee are (1) that the ven-
dee was gtillty of some fraud In iirocuriiig a
sale to be made to him; ('J) (hat there was a
nilslnke made by the vendor In delivering an
article whii'li was not the .'irlicle sold.— a
mislnke in f.Mct as to the Identity of the thing
Hohl Willi 111!' thing il("llvpred iijion the sale.
This Inst Is mil In reallly a reseisslou of the
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WOOD v. BOYX'l'ON et al. 
(25 N. W. Rep. 42, 64 Wis. 265.) 
Supreme Cvurt of 'Yisconsin. Oct. 13, 1 83. 
Appeal 
county. 
from circuit court, M i l waukee 
Johnson, Rietbrock & Halsey, for appel­
lant. N. S. M urphey, for respondents. 
pretty badly, and thought every dollar would 
help, and I took it back to ?.Ir. Boynton and 
told h i m  I bad brought back the topaz, and 
Ile says, 'Well, yes; what did I offer you for 
i t ?' and I says, ·one dollar;' and he stepped 
to the change drawer and gave me the dol­
lar, and I went out." In anot her part of Iler 
testi lllony she says: "Before I sold the stune 
I bad no knon-ledge whatever that it wa a 
diamond. I told him t h at I bad been ad­
vised that it was probably a topaz. and he 
said probably it was. Tile stone wa about 
the size of a canary bird's egg, nearl y t h e  
hape of an egg,-worn pointed a t  one end ; 
it 11·as nearly st1 aw color,-a l i ttle <la rker." 
She also test ified that before this act ilm was 
commenced Ile tendered tile defendant 
$1. 10, and demanded the retum of tile stone, 
I wh ich they refused. This is substantia l!�' 
all t he e\ idence of '' hat took place at aud 
TAYLOR, J. This action wa brought i n  
t h e  circuit court for :u uwaukee connty t o  
recoYer t he }Josse i o n  of a n  u.icut d iawoud 
of the alleged value of $ 1 ,000. The C':lse was 
trieu i n  the circuit court. and a ft er 11ea ring 
a l l the eYidence iu t he case, the leal'llell cir­
cuit judge directed the jury to find a verdict 
for the defenua nt . The pla i nti ff excepted 
to such in trnctiou, a nd, after a verd ict was 
rendered for the defendants, moved for a 
new tri�1 1 upon the minutes of t he j llllge. 
The mot ion wa den' ed, and the pla in t i ff 
uulr excepted, and after jntlgment was en­
tered in fa '\"or of the defeuua ut , app1 ·a lctl  to 
tllis court. 'l'ht• defendant are partner i n  , 
t i.le jewelry lm�ine s. On the trial il ap­
peared t h a t  on a n d befure the t wemy -eigh th 
of DeC'ember, 1. ·1. the plaintiff was t he 0 1\'n­
er of a nt i in t he po�session of a sma ll stoue 
nf t he nature alll l value of which sh' was 
igno1 a 1 1  t; that on that <lay she sold it  to one 
oJ' t hL· lll'fc1u la nt for ti.le sum of one dollar. 
.\ ftPrwa nls it was ascertained t hat the stone 
was a i·ou�ll din monrl , a n d  of t he Yalue of 
a l 111ut .:10 0. Aft er lea rn ing t h i s  !':wt tile 
pl a i n t i ff tendered t be <le Cemln n t s  t l 1r t1 1 1 c  clol­
Ja r, anu tl'o cen t s a i nterest . ancl  c lcu1a mle11 
a r<'turn of t he tone to lll'r. ThL' 11efen<1 
:i n t s  refusecl tn clf.>l iver it,  and therl'for :-:ht• 
1 ·11mm e1wc><l t h i s :wt ion. 
The plai n t i ff te,..t i tit·d to t he cir<'umstn nees 
n 1 t Pncl i 1 1g t h e snlP n f the slol l(' to � T r. 8n 1 1 1 Ul' l  
H. Hny 1 1 t o 11 .  a s  fol lows: ' ''!'be !in;t  I i mc 
Bn�· 1 1 t o 1 1  snw t ha t  iH 011e he wn t a l k i n g  n lnut 
l 1 11yi11g t he t n1 111z, or what ever it  is, in 8ep­
l l ' 1 1 1hcr or < kt ol w r. I w1 nt in t o h i s  store t o  
;.:c>t a J i t t l!' pin nwnclr>c l .  : incl  I h a r t  I t  I n  n. 
�1 1111 1 !  l mX' .  -t l 1 e pin. a s111 : 1 l l  n r-ri 1 1i.: ; • • • 
t h i s  st "nl', a w l  n hroken sll'P l"l'· hut t u 1 1  wer(� 
Ill l h P I JOX. �f r. f \oyn l nll l l l l' l !PI] (O g i \•e Ill(' 
a d1c > 1 • lr for 11 1r 1 i i 1 1 .  I t hought r w1 1 1 1 l r l  nsk 
h i m  11 hnl l hr> H l n ll!' w:is, awl I t onk I t  out 
. ,r 1 h l' 11.. : 1 U1 !  :i  l,• ·t l  h i m t o  ph•:i!'<• ! < 'I I 1 1 1 1 •  
wh11 1 t l i:i l w111:1. I I t "  tool' i t  1 1 1  h i ,.;  hand a nd 
N••emrcl Romr t l n11• Jnnk l ng Il l I I .  l told him 
l h11 rl hr>1·11  t nlrl It 11 1111 a t o p:i z ,  n 11 c l  lw sn i c l  
I t  m i ght hr. f l  C'  i;:iyi;, • r \\nll l < I  h11y t hlfl;  
wo1 1ld )"• Jll 1w l l  II '!' I 1old hl 1 1 1  I did 1 10!  
I 1 1ow h u t  whn l I W•11 J l d .  \\'hn t w111 1 l c l  I t  hP 
wnrt h �  ,\ 1 1 1 1  I t "  1m l c l hi' did not J, n o w ;  he! 
wou l d � h  1• 11w a dolln r 11 1 1 1 1  kr11•p I t  n H  :1  
1 u •• ·h11 1 • 1 1 ,  0 1 1 1 !  I t qlc l him 1 would not 
••II I t ;  n n d  It \1 1 1 '1  • · • •rt : t l 1 1 fy prl'l t �  t o  Inn)· 
:i l.  J i n 11 I If 1 1 1 1 •  11 Ji , .n•  I f 1 11 1 1 u l  I t ,  : ind 1 
t nld 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1  1•: 1 1� 1. .. I I P  al'!.• d a h1 1 1 1 t  how 
f:t r rou t ,  u nr l  I : i l r l  r l� h t  In l h•• Y l l l l l J.:c-, 11 1 1 r l  
I \\'<•nt n1 1 t . ,\ ft• •rw n n l  , :1 1 1 < 1  a h1 1 1 1 t  t l w 
t W N t t y 1 1 lgJ 1 t h  nr l 1! •« 1 1 1 1 1 hc>1", I l lP<11 l o•d l l l <llH'Y 
D i g itiz by 
I NTE R ·JET A R C H IV E  
I before tile sale t o  t he defendants, as testi­
fied to by the pla i ntiff her-elf. She pro­
cluee<l no other witness on t ba t point. 
The evidence on the part of t ile defendant 
is not very different from the version gi\·en 
lly tile i1 la i ntiff, and certa inly is not more 
fa 'l"ornble to the pla i n t i ff. :tlir. Samuel B. 
Boynton, the defen1 la ut to whom t h<' stone 
wa s sold, testified that at tile t i me he boug-ht 
t lli • ston e, be had 1Hwei· seen ; 1 n  Ulll'Ut <li:l· 
ruonct ; bad seen cnt d iamonds, but t U <'Y a re 
quite diITercnt from the uncut ones: ··be 
had no iclea this w a a d i amond, :-ind it Ill'\ er 
Pntered bis bra i n  at tbe l i me." Consic l l':\ ble 
eYidence was given as t o  what took place 
a fter t he sale and purchase, but t ha l eYi-
1 c 1Pnce h: 1s  Yel'Y l ittle i f  any bearing, upon 
t h e main point in tbe c:ase. 
This C'\' i<lence clea rly shows that tile pla in­
t i ff sold t il e  stone i n  q uestion to t he defenct­
:int!'>, and clel iveretl it  t o  tht'm i n  D<'CC'mbC'r. 
l S':�. fur a considen1 t io n  of one dol la r. The 
t i t IP  to the stone J lll ssed by t he :;;a l e : 1 11 cl  1lc­
li n·ry t o t he clekn d a u t s. I l t rn  h a s  t ha t t i t l e 
l u •(• 11  < l h  estcd au\). again Y t'Sll't l  i n  th e pl:i in­
t i ff ?  The con t ent ion o f  t ile k:1r1w1l <· nun. el 
for t h e :l l)fl<'l l n n t. i s  t ba t  t he t i t le hN·a me 
\'PStl'11 i n  t he pla i n t i ff' by the t t'mler to t he 
Bo.1 1 1 1 01 1:<:  or t he llll l'd l:l SC l l l <lll('� w i t h  i n tcr­
f 's t ,  a n t i  :l rkmand 1 1f  n rt'l 111·n o f  t ilt' stone 
l 1 t  her. Un less snd1 t < •mlt or and dem :t 1 11 l n·­
Yc>st p1J t h e t i t l e  i n  t l w  a ppplla n t ,  sill' c•a n no t  
1 1 1 n i 11ta i 11 h e r  aet io11.  'l'hc only I J ll<'st iou I n 
t he c-:tsl' Is whPl l11'r t h ere wa:4 a n r t l l i n � i n  
O w  sail' wh lPh C'1 1 t l t lc>tl t he \"<'tHlor ( t h <' :ip­
pdl:t nt) to rcsrin<l  t l l<' sn le n nd ao rel'eSL t he 
t i t  le 1 1 1  l 1 f'I'. '!'Ire> on ly r nson$ we kuow of 
for !'l's< i 1 1 1 1 l ng a ::inlr : r n d  rcv<'s t l ng- t he t i t le 
1 I n  t h<' n•n1kr so t hn t  he may mainta i n  a n  
:w l l on n t. J a w  fot· t h  rceovery o r  the posst •s-
111011 n �n l nst. h i s  vc>rnlcr nrc (l) t hn t  1 he V<'ll­
clrC' wn H g-nllty of 11om frn lHl Jn proeu 1·t 11 � a. 
tm lf' to I le 1 1 1n c le  t o  h i m ; (2) l h:i t t here w n s  a 
n !l s t 11 k f' m n c l c  hy t h e \' Pndor In dC'l l r Prln� n n  
:irt li · l f '  w l t l f ' ! 1 w:is 11nt t h e n r l l l '!P snl c l , a 
1 1 1 l "l l a l\ ( •  1 1 1  f. 1 d  a >1  t o  t i re lrlcn t i t�· of t i ll'  t hi n g 
sn l < I  w i t h  t h r t h i n ·• c lP l l 1•P1'Pt i 1 1 pnn t l1 r >  s:i l<'. 
'l ' hls J: 1 1H IH nnt In n·:i l l t  .\' 11 l'P�• 1-<slnn of the 
O ri q i r :=d  frc r1 
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sale niaflo, as tlie thing delivered was uot
the thiuj; sold, and uo title ever passed to
the vendee by such delivery.
In this case, ujjon the plaintiff's own evi-
dence, there can be no just ground for al-
leging that she was induced to make the sale
.she did by any fraud or unfair dealmgs on
the part of Mr. Boynton. Both were en-
tirely ignorant at the time of the character
of the stone and of its intrinsic value. Mr.
Boynton was not an expert in uncut dia-
monds, and had made no examination of the
stone, except to take it in his hand and look
at it before he made the offer of one dollar,
which was refused at the time, and after-
\\ards accepted without any comment or
further examination made by Mr. Boynton.
The appellant had the stone in her posses-
sion for a long time, and it appears from her
own statement that she had made some in-
quii-y as to its nature and qualities. If she
chose to sell it without further investigation
as to its intrinsic value to a person who was
guilty of no fraud or unfairness which in-
duced her to sell it for a small sum, she can-
not repudiate the sale because it is after-
wards ascertained that she made a bad bar-
gain. Kennedy v. Panama, etc., Mail Co.,
L. R. 2 Q. B. 5S0. There is no pretense of
any mistake as to the identity of the thing
sold. It was produced by the plaintiff and
exhibited to the vendee before the sale was
made, and the thing sold was delivered to
the vendee when the purchase price was
paid. Kennedy v. Panama, etc.. Mail Co.,
supra, 587; Street v. Blay, 2 Barn. & Adol.
456; Gompertz v. Bartlett, 2 El. & Bl. S49;
Gurney v. Womersley, 4 El. & Bl. 133; Ship's
Case, 2 De G., J. & S. 544. Suppose the ap-
pellant had produced the stone, and said she
had been told that it was a diamond, and
she believed it was, but had no knowledge
herself as to its character or value, and Jlr.
Boynton had given her ?500 for it, could he
have rescinded the sale if it had turned out
to be a topaz or any other stone of very
small value? Could Mr. Boynton have re-
scinded the sale on the ground of mistake?
Clearly not, nor could he rescind it on the
ground that there had been a breach of
warranty, because there was no warranty,
nor could he rescind it on the ground of
fraud, unless he could show that she falsely
declared that she had been told it was a dia-
mond, or, if she had been so told, still she
knew it was not a diamond. See Street v.
Blay, supra.
GRIF. PERS. PROP. — 4
It is urged, with a good deal of earnest-
ness, on the itart of the counsel for the appel-
lant that, because it has turned out that
the stone was immen.sely more valuable than
the parties at the time of the sale supposed
it was, such fact alone is a ground for the
rescission of the sale, and that fact was evi-
dence of fraud on the part of the vendee.
^V'hether inadequacy of price is to be re-
ceived as evidence of fraud, even in a suit
in equity to avoid a sale, depends upon the
facts known to the parties at the time the
sale is made. When this sale was made the
value of the thing sold was open to the in-
vestigation of both parties, neither knew its
intrinsic value, and, so far as the evidence
in this case shows, both supposed that the
price paid was adequate. How can fraud be
predicated upon such a sale, even though
after-investigation showed that the intrinsic
value of the thing sold was hundreds of
times greater than the price paid? It cer-
tainly shows no such fraud as would author-
ize the vendor to rescind the contract and
bring an action at law to recover the posses-
sion of the thing sold. Whether that fact
would have any influence in an action in
equity to avoid the sale we need not consid-
er. See Stettheimer v. Killip, 75 N. Y. 287;
Etting V. Bank of U. S., 11 Wheat. 59.
We can find nothing in the evidence from
which it could be justly inferred that Mr.
Boynton, at the time he offered the plaintiff
one dollar for the stone, had any knowledge
of the real value of the stone, or that he en-
tertained even a belief that the stone was
a diamond. It cannot, therefore, be said
that thei'e was a suppression of knowledge
on the part of the defendant as to the value
of the stone which a court of equity might
seize upon to avoid the sale. The following
cases show that, in the absence of fraud or
warranty, the value of the property sold, as
compared with the price paid, is no ground
for a rescission of a sale. Wheat v. Cross,
31 Md. 99; Lambert v. Heath, 15 Mees. & W.
487; Bi-j-ant v. Pember, 45 Vt. 487; Kuel-
kamp V. Hidding, 31 Wis. 503-511. How-
ever unfortunate the plaintiff may have been
in selling this valuable stone for a mere
nominal sum, she has failed entirely to make
out a case either of fraud or mistake in the
sale such as will entitle her to a rescission of
such sale so as to recover the property sold
in an action at law.
The judgment of the circuit court is af-
firmed.
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F ORMATION OF T H E  C O N T H A CT-ESSE N T I A LS. 
sale made>, as the ti.ting deli ''ercll was not 
the t hing sold, and no title ever passed to 
the vendce by su ·h delivery. 
lu this case, upon the plaintiff's own evi­
dence, there can be no just ground for al­
leging that she was induced to make tbe sale 
she did by any fraud or unfail" dealings on 
tile part of .i)f r. Boynton. Both were en­
t i rely ignorant at the time of the character 
of tbe stone and of its intrinsic value. Mr. 
Boyntou was not an expert in uncut dia­
momls, and bad made no examination uf tile 
,.;lone, except to take it in his hand and look 
at it before he made the offer of one dollar, 
which was refused at the time, and after­
wards accepted without any comment or 
furtller examinaUon made by Mr. Boynton. 
Tbe appellant had tbe stone in her posses­
sion for a long time, and it appears from her 
own statement that she had made some in­
quiry as to its nature and qualities. If she 
cbo e to sell it without further investigation 
as to its intrinsic value to a person who was 
guilty of no fraud or unfairness which in­
<luced her to sell it for a small sum, sbe can­
not repudiate tbe sale because it is after­
wards ascerta ined that she made a bad bar­
gain. Kennedy v. Panama, etc., Mail Co., 
L. R. 2 Q. B.  580. There is no pretense of 
any mistake as to the identity of the thing 
sold. It  was produced by the plaintiff and 
exhibited to the vendee before the sale was 
made, and the thing sold was delivered to 
the vendee when the purchase price was 
paid. Kennedy v. Panama, etc., i\Iail Co . . 
::;upra, 587; Street v. Blay, 2 Barn. & Ado! . 
456; Gompertz v. Bartlett, 2 El.  & Bl. 8-!U ; 
Gurney v. Womersley, 4 El. & Bl. 133; Ship's 
Case, 2 De G., J. & S. 54-!. Suppose tbe ap­
pellant had produced tbe stone, and said she 
had been told that it was a diamond. and 
she believed it was, but had no knowledge 
herself as to its character or value, and Mr. 
Boynton bad given her $300 for it, could be 
have rescinded the sale if it bad turned out 
to be a topaz or any other stone of very 
small value?  Could Mr. Boynton have re­
scinded the sale on the ground of mistake? 
Clearly not, nor could he rescind it on tbe 
ground tbat there had been a breach of 
warranty, because there was no warranty, 
nor could be rescind it on the ground of 
fraud, unless be could show that sbe falsely 
declared that she bad been told it was a dia­
mond, or, if she bad been so told, still sbe 
knew it was not a diamond. See Street v. 
Blay, supra. 
GRIF. PERS. PROP.-4 
D i g 1t1ze-ct by 
JTE RNET ARCH VE 
I t  i s  urged, with a good deal o f  earnest­
ness, on the part of the cou nsel for the apvd­
lant that, l>ecause it has turned out tllat 
the stone was immensely more valuable ti.tau 
the parties at the time of the sale sup1ius1•<1 
it was, such fact alone is a grouncl for the 
rescission of tbe sale, and that ract was C\'l· 
dence of fraud on the part of the vendee. 
Whether inadequacy of price is to l>c l"P­
ceived as evidence of fraud, even i n  a �m i t  
i n  equity to avoid a sale, depends upon ( l ie 
facts known to the parties at ti.le time t11e 
sale is rnacle. When this sale was matle the 
value of the thing sold was open to tile in­
vestigation of both parties, neither knew its 
intrinsic value, and, so far as the evidence 
in this case shows. both supposed that the 
price paicl was adequate. How can fraud be 
predicated upon such a sale, even though 
after-investigation showed that tbe intrin ·ic 
value of the thing solcl was hundreus of 
times greater than tbe price paid ? It cer­
tainly shows no such fraud as would author­
ize the vendor to rescind tile contract ancl 
bring an action at law to recover the posses­
sion of the thing sold. Whether that fact 
would have any influence in an action in 
equity to avoid the sale we need not consid­
er. See Stettbeimer v. Killip, 75 N. Y. 287; 
Etling v. Bank of U. S., 11 Wbeat. 59. 
We can find nothing in the evidence from 
which it could be justly inferred that :\Ir. 
Boynton, at the time be offered the plaintiff 
one dollar for the stone, bad any knowledge 
of the real value of the stone, or that he en­
tertained even a belief that the stone wa::; 
a diamond. It cannot, therefore, be said 
that there was a suppression of knowledge 
on the part of tbe defendant as to the value 
of the stone which a court of equity might 
seize upon to avoid the sale. The following 
cases show that, in the absence of fraud or 
warranty, the value of the property solcl, as 
compared with tbe price paid, is no ground 
for a rescission of a sale. Wheat v. Cross, 
31 i\Id. 99 ; Lambert v. Heath, 15 :\fees. & "Vi'. 
487; Bryant v. Pember, 45 Vt. 487; Kuel­
kamp v. Ridding, 31 Wis. 503-511. How­
ever unfortunate the plaintiff may have been 
in selling this valuable stone for a mere 
nominal sum, sbe bas failed entirely to make 
out a case either of fraud or m istake in the 
sale such as will entitle her to  a rescission of 
such sale so as to recover tbe property sold 
in an action at law. 
The judgment of the circuit court is af­
firmed. 
O rig ill'a l  from 
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SHERWOOD V. WALKER et al.
(33 N. W. 919, 66 Mich. 568.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. July 7, 1887. I
Error to circuit court, Wayne county; Jen- I
nison. Judge.
C. J. Reilly. for plaintiff. Wm. AiUman,
Jr., (D. C. Holbrook, of counsel,) for de-
fendants and appellants.
MORSE. J. Replevin for a cow. Suit
commenced in justice's court; judgment for
plaintiff; appealed to circuit court of Wayne
county, and verdict and judgment for plain-
tiff in that court. The defendants bring
error, and set out 25 assignments of the
same.
The main controversy depends upon the
construction of a contract for the sale of
the cow. The plaintiff claims that the ti-
tle passed, and bases his action upon such ;
claim. The defendants contend that the con-
tract was executory, and by its terms no I
title to the animal was acquired by plain-
tiff. The defendants reside at Detroit, but \
are in business at Walkerville. Ontario, and
have a farm at Greenfield, in Wayne county, I
upon which were some blooded cnttle sup-
posed to he barren as breeders. The Walk-
ers are importers and breeders of polled
.Angus cattle. The plaint ilT is a l>anker liv- j
Ing at Plymouth, in Wayne county. He call- I
ed upon tlie defendants at Walkerville for j
the purcliase of some of their stock, but ;
found none there that suited hiiu. Meeting
one of the defendants afterwards, he was
Informed tliat they had a few head upon this
GreiMiiiold farm. He was asked to go out
and look at them, with the statement at
the time lliat tliey were probaI)Iy liarren.
and wimUl not breed. >rny 5. ISSd, jilaintlff
went out to Greenfield, and saw the cattle.
\ few days thereafter, he called upon one of
the defendants with the view of purchasing
a cow. known ns "Rose 2d of Aberlone."
.\fter coiisidciiilile talk. It was agreed that
defendnnls would telephone Sherwood at his
home In I'lynioiith In reference to the price.
The second morning after tills talk he was
called up by telephone, and the terms of the
sale were finally agreed tipon. He was to
pny live and une-hnlf cents per pound, live
weight, fifty pounds shrlnknge. He was
imUed how he Intended to take the cow
lionie. iind replied that be might ship her
from King's cattle-yard. He requested de-
fendnnls to confirm Die sale In writing,
whiih they did by sending hini the following
letter: "\Vnlker%llle, May 1.1. IKSfi. T. 0.
Sherwood, President, etc.— Denr Sir: We
eiinllrm snle to you of t'le cow Uose 2d of
Aberlone, lot .""ifl of our I'atnlogue. at five
and a linlf cents per pound, less fifty itounds
HhrlnU. We Inclose herewith order on Mr.
Graham for th" cow. You might leave
clieck Willi him. or mail to ns here, as you
pri'fer. Yours, truly. Illrnni Walker &
Sons." The order upon Graham inclosed In
the letter read as follows: "Walkerville,
May 15, ISSG. George Graham: You will
please deliver at King's cattle-yard to Mr.
T. C. Sherwood, Plymouth, the cow Rose
2d of Aberlone, lot 5(5 of our catalogue.
Send halter with the cow, and have her
weighed. Yours, truly, Hiram Walker &
Sons." On the twenty-first of the same
mouth the plaintiff went to defendants'
farm at Greenfield, and presented the order
and letter to Graham, who informed him
that the defendants had instructed him not
to deliver the cow. Soon after, the plain-
tiff tendered to Hiram Walker, one of the
defendants, $80, and demanded the cow.
Walker refused to take the money or deliver
the cow. The plaintiff then instituted this
suit. After he had secured possession of
the cow under the writ of replevin, the
plaintiff caused her to be weighed by the
constable who served the writ, at a place
other than King's cattle-yard. She weighed
1,420 pounds.
When the plaintiff, upon the trial in the
circuit court, had submitted his proofs show-
ing the above transaction, defendants moved
to strike out and exclude the testimony from
the case, for the reason that it was irrelevant
and did not tend to show that the title to
the cow passed, and that it showed that the
contract of sale was merely executory. The
court refused the motion, and an exception
was taken. The defendants then introduced
evidence tending to show that at the time
of the alleged sale it was believed by both
the plaintiff and themselves that the cow
was barren and would not breed: that she
cost .$S50, and if not barren would be worth
from $750 to $1,000: 11i:it after the date of
the letter, and tlie order to Graliam. the de-
fendants were informed by said (?raham
that in his judgment the cow was with
calf, and therefore they instructed him not
to deliver her to plnintilT. and on the twen-
tieth of May, ISSti. telcgrai)hed to the plain-
tiff what Graham thought about the cow be-
ing witli calf, and that consequently they
could not sell her The cow had a calf in
the month of October following. On the
nineteenth of May. the plaintiff wrote Gra-
ham as follows: "Plymo\ith, May li). 18S(>.
Mr. George Graham. Greenfield— Dear Sir:
I liave bought Uose or Lucy from Mr. Walk-
er, and will be there for her Friday morning,
nine or ten o'clock. Do not water her in the
morning. Yours, etc., T. C. Sherwood."
I'liilntlff explained the mention of the two
cows In this letter by testifying that, when
he wrote this letter, the ord("r and let-
ter of defendants were at his house, and,
writing In a hurry, and being uncertain as
to the name of the cow, and not wishing his
cow watered, he thought It would do no
harm lo name them both, as his bill of sale
would show which one he had purchased.
PliilntllT niso t(>stlfied that he asked defend-
anlH to give him a price on the balance of
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50 SA LES. 
SHERWOOD v. WALKER et al. 
(33 N. W. 919, 66 Mich. 568.) 
Supreme Court of Michigan. July 7, 1887. 
Error to circuit court, Wayne county; Jen­
nison, Judge. 
C. J. Reilly. for plaintiff. Wm. Aikman, 
Jr., (D. C. Holbrook, of counsel,) for de­
fendants and appellants. 
�IOR. E. J. Replevin for a cow. Suit 
commenced i n  justice's court ; judgment for 
pla intiff; appealed to circuit court of 'Wayne 
county, and verdict and judgment for plain­
tiff in that court. The defendants bring 
error, and set out 25 assignments of the 
same. 
The main cont ro>ersy depends upon the 
con truction of a contract for the sale of 
the cow. The plaintiff claims that the ti­
tle passed. and ba.es his action upon such 
claim. The defl'ndants contend that the con­
tract wa executor�- . and by it 1 erm no 1 
t itle to the animal was acqui red by plain­
t i ff. The defend:rnts re. ide at Detroit. but ' 
are in bu iuess at ""a lkcrville. Ontario, and 
ha•e a farm at Greenfield. in Wayne county, 
npon w h i <' h  were some hlooded enttl" sup­
posrcl to he barren as hrc>Cd('rs. The \Ya lk­
er>; a re i mporte>rs and breeders of polled 
A n.!?u. c·attl<>. 'f he> pl n int iff is a ha nh:er liv­
l n �  at Plymouth. in Wayne county. IIe call­
<•11 upon the d e> fencl:l ut s  at \\a l lrervill e for 
thP purC"hase of gome of their stock. but 
fnn nrl uone there t ha t  suite>d him. }Ieeting 
<>ll•' of the> defenrln nts afterwards. be was 
i n fnn111>1l that tht>y had a fc>\Y head upon this 
< ; r .. ,,nlii•ld fa rm . IJP wa s :tsk<'<l In goo out 
a w l  l1 1nk at t h rm, with t hc state>ment at 
th<' 1 i m "  t l iat t h <!y wC're proha hly harrl'n. 
and wo11lcl not hrr .. c l  '.\! n y  '1. l ,'St i .  plainti fr  
wPnt 1111t 10  <; rc>rnlirlrl . an<l sn w t h r cattle. 
A rrw rl:iy-. t h erPnfter. ht' rn l l c>cl upon one of 
1 h "  rl<' fPtHlll nts with the> ;irw of purc·hasl n::­
:t < "nw. l01r1 \\' l1 n s ' "Hose> :!rl of .\ hrrlonC' ." 
A f t n  i•nns!dl'r:thl<' t n l k ,  It wnR n i: reC'd t h a t  
clrfrndnn l ,.:  woul!l  t Pl<'p hnnP , herwood n t  his 
h11nw 111 l ' l y 111n11 t h  I n l'Pfc>n•tlf'C' to t he> prlrt' . 
'l'hP :<•·••flfld 11H1r1 1 f n i:  n fl <'r t h l :< t n l k  he> wns 
• ·n l f f · c l  lt f l h.1· tPl•• 1 1hmw. :i ncl t h P t e rms of t h e> 
snh· W<'I'!' f l nn l l y  n �n·,.d npon. I T c W;l s t o  
p:1 y t in• 11 1 1 1 1  1 1111•-l111 l f  1 ·P11 f �  pf'r po1111rl, ! in• 
WPli.:h t ,  f i f t y  pn1 1 1 1 r l :<  Mhrlr1 k n ,;P. Hr W l l R  
: i qf,,.rf ht• \\" tu• l 1 1 t P 1Hi <'rl t o  t a ke• t h r C'O\V 
h111 1w. :i ncl l'P J1 l l1·rl t h a t  lw 1 1 1 1 ,;ht Hhlp hrr 
frolll 1\: l ni.:' 1•u t t l <•-yn n l .  l l r• rl'l] tl<'li1 <'• 1 cl!'· 
fr•n d n n t s  t o  1 •0111 lrm t h l' 11 1£' In wri t i n g, 
w h l <-h '1 111'.\" r l ld hy P 1 1 1 l l 1 1J.:' h i m  t he> fnl lnwlng 
f r>t t Pr : '1 \\'11 1 1  .. n· ll l•'. .\luy I ii. I ll.  'l' <;. 
Hhf>l'\\ nnr l ,  l 'rr·-f l l 1·11 t. Pi t'. T l Plll' Hlr: \\'r> 
'"1 11 ll r1 1 1  i;n l" l o  �·1rn nf p,..  <•nw l tnR<' :!cl nf 
,\ hl'rl11111', Int lifl nr n11r rn t n lnJ.:'1 1<', 1 1 !  fin� 
u m l n hn t r  r-Pnt 1 11•r p1111 1 1 r l ,  lr•ss fi ft y pn1 1 11d� 
hrl nlc .  \\',. 1 1 1<'111 " h1·tl'Wi l h  nnli •r  o n  \I r. 
c : rn hn m  t n r t h •· row. \'nu m t i.: h t  IPll \'1' 
<'111·..Jc w i t h  h l 1 1 1 ,  or 1 1111 1 1  tn llR h1•n•, us yon 
pr••f<'r. ' 01 1 1• I r 1 1 ly.  1 1 l rn 111 \Vn 1 1, ..  r &. 
D i g 1t1zect by 
INTE RNET A R C H  VE 
Sons.'' The order upon Graham inclosed I n  
the letter read as follow : "Walkerville, 
hlay 15, 1886. George Graham :  You will 
please deliver at King's cattle-yard to Mr. 
T. C. Sherwood, Plymouth, the cow Rose 
2d of .Aberlone, lot 5U of our catalogue. 
end baiter with the cow, and have her 
weighed. Yours, truly, H iram Walker & 
Sons."' On the twenty-first of the same 
month the plaintiff went to defenda nts' 
farm at Greenfield, and presented the order 
and letter to Gra ham, who informed h i m  
that the defendants had instructed him not 
to deliver the cow. Soon after, the plain­
tiff tendered to Hiram Walker, one of the 
defendants, $ 0, and demanded tbe cow. 
"\Yalker refused to take the money or deliver 
the cow. The pla intiff then instituted this 
uit. After be bad secured possession of 
the cow under the writ of re11le,·iu.  the 
plaintiff cau<>ed her to be weighed by tbe 
consta hle who ser;ed the writ, a t  a place 
other than King's cattle-yard. She weighed 
1,420 pounds. 
When the plaintiff, upon the tria l In th,, 
circuit court, had submitted bis proofs show­
ing the above tran action. defenda nts mo'l"ed 
to strike out a nd exclude tbe testimony from 
the case, for the reason t h a t  it w�1 irrclC'Yant 
and did not tend to sbow that thl' title t o  
t he cow pas ed. and that i t  sbowed t ba t  t h  
contract of sale wns m rely executor�·. The 
court refused the motion. a nd an C'xeept ion 
was takC'n. 'l'be defend a n t s  t b en i n t rndnced 
evidence tending to sbow ti.la t  at t he t i nw 
of the> alleged sale it wa believed by bnt h 
tbe plaintiff and themselves t h a t  t h e  c•ow 
was barren n n d  woulcl not breed : tha t she 
C'OSt $<'10. and if not barren won!Ll he wort h 
from $7n0 to $ 1 .000: t h:1 t n fter t he date of 
the IC'! t C'r. and tbe order to Gra ham. the de 
fend:rn t s  werC' i nformC'd by said Gra h a m  
t hn 1  in his judg-meut thc cow was w i t h 
calf, a n d  t hC're fore thC'y iostruct ecl h i m  not 
to dcl i \·er her to pla inti ff, a nd on tbe twen­
t iP.lh of :\lay, 18Hl. te>lcgrnphed to the plai n 
1ifl' whn t Graham thought about the row hl'­
ln g wit h cal r. and thn t consequently t h e.I' 
ronlcl not sell ber 'l'hc cow had a call' i n  
t hl' month of October following. On t lw 
n hwt Cl'll l h or l\Iny, th pln ln!lff wrote C1 r:1 
h n m  ns fol lows: "I'lymon t h , �Jay 19, lR�G. 
� I r  t;('ol'g'C' C:r:1 hnm. C. rcc> n fiC'h l J )ea r Rlr:  
1 hav<' honi:ht Hosp or J ,\l<'Y from M r. W11 1 l�­
c>r, n l l £ 1  w i l l  he there for hC'r Frltln.v mor n i n g-, 
1 1 1 11<' or trn o'clorlc Do not w a t er her I n  t h e 
1 1 1 1 1r1 1 l 11i.:. Yours, e t c•.,  'l'. C. hcrwood.' ' 
l ' l: l i n t l lf e'\ pln l rwd t h l' mention or t h C' two 
rnw1-1 in t hi R  h•ttrr hy t C'Rt l fy l n i;:  t hnl,  when 
lw wrnt P  t h lR ldt C'r, t he orclr1· a nd lC't · 
t c r  nr i l rfcn d a n t R  were a t  hlR honRc, a nrl .  
wrl t l 1 1i.: In n hu rry, a n d hc>l ni;: 11 n1•erta i n  1u1 
t n  1 h r nn mc of t he> cow, n ncl not w l1-1hlng his 
''"" w:i I rrc>d, hf' t honi;:ht It wonlrl do no 
h11 r1 1 1  t n 1111 11w t lwm hot h. n ii  bis hill of sale> 
wn11 lrl Hhow whkh one hr l rnd purchnRerl. 
l 'l n l n t l fl' n l Ro t r1-1t t n Prl t h n t  hr a1-1l<<'d defcnd­
: 1 1 1 t H  I n  i.:lvP h l 1 1 1  11 pric'c nu t h e> haln nc·e or 
'w' l  l _, J I  I I I  U I  
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their herd at Greenfield, as a friend thousUt
of buyiuK some, and rocoived a letter dated
May 17, 1SS6, in which they named the price
of five cattle, including Lucy, at $90, and
Rose 2d at $80. When he received the let-
ter he called defendants up by telephone,
and asked them why they put Rose 2d in
the list, as he had already purchased her.
They replied that they knew he had, but
thought it would make no difference if plain-
tiff and his friend concluded to take the
whole herd.
The foregoing is the substance of all the
testimony in the case.
The circuit judge instructed the jury that
if they believed the defendants, when they
sent the order and letter to plaintiff, meant
to. pass the title to the cow, and that the
cow was intended to be delivered to plain-
tiff, it did not matter whether the cow was
weighed at any particular place, or by any
particular person; and if the cow was weigh-
ed afterwards, as Sherwood testified, such
weighing would be a sufficient compliance
with the order. If they believed that de-
fendants intended to pass the title by the
\\riting, it did not matter whether the cow
was weighed before or after suit brought,
and the plaintiff would be entitled to recov-
er. The defendants submitted a number of
requests which were refused. The sub-
stance of them was that the cow was never
delivered to plaintiff, and the title to her
did not pass by the letter and order; and
that under the contract, as evidenced by
these writings, the title did not pass until
the cow was weighed and her price there-
by determined; and that, if the defendants
only agreed to sell a cow that would not
breed, then the barrenness of the cow was
a condition precedent to passing title, and
plaintiff cannot recover. The court also
charged the jury that it was immaterial
whether the cow was with calf or not. It
will therefore be seen that the defendants
claim that, as a matter of law, the title to
this cow did not pass, and that the circuit
judge erred in submitting the case to the
jury, to be determined by them, upon the
intent of the parties as to whether or not
the title passed with the sending of the let-
ter and order by the defendants to the plain-
tiff.
This question as to the passing of title is
fraught with difficulties, and not always
easy of solution. An examination of the
multitude of cases bearing upon this subject,
with their infinite variety of facts, and at
least apparent conflict of law, ofttimes tends
to confuse rather than to enlighten the mind
of the inquirer. It is best, therefore, to con-
sider always, in cases of this kind, the gen-
eral principles of the law, and then apply
them as best we may to the facts of the
ease in hand.
The cow being worth over $.50, the con-
tract of sale, in order to be valid, must be
one where the purchaser has received or ac-
j cepted a part of the goods, or given some-
1 thing in earnest, or in part payment, or
[ where the seller has signed some note or
I memorandum in writing. How. St. § 61S0.
; Here there was no actual delivery, nor any-
thing given in payment or in earnest, but
there was a sufficient memorandum signed
by the defendants to take the case out of
the statute, if the matter contained in such
memorandum is sufficient to constitute a
completed sale. It is evident from the let-
ter that the payment of the purchase price
was not intended as a condition precedent
to the passing of the title. Mr. Sherwood
is given his choice to pay the money to
Graham at King's cattle-yards, or to send
check by mail.
Nor can there be any trouble about the
delivery. The order instructed Graham to
deliver the cow, upon presentation of the
order, at such cattle-yards. But the price
of the cow was not determined upon to a
certainty. Before this could be ascertained,
from the terms of the contract, the cow had
to be weighed; and, by the order inclosed
with the letter, Graham was instructed to
have her weighed. If the cow had been
weighed, and this letter had stated, upon
such weight, the express and exact price
of the animal, there can be no doubt but
the cow would have passed with the sending
and receipt of the letter and order by the
plaintiff. Payment was not to be a coneur-
I rent act with the delivery, and therein this
! case differs from Case v. Dewey, 55 Mich.
j lie, 20 N. W. 817, and 21 N. W. 911. Also.
j in that case, there was no written memo-
i randum of the sale, and a delivery was nec-
essary to ijass the title of the sheep; and
I it was held that such delivery could only
be made by a surrender of the possession to
the vendee, and an acceptance by him. De-
livery by an actual transfer of the property
from the vendor to the vendee, in a case like
the ijresent, where the article can easily be
so transferred by a manual act, is usually
the most significant fact in the transaction
to show the intent of the parties to pass the
title, but it never has been held conclusive.
Neither the actual delivery, nor the absence
of such delivery, will control the case, where
the intent of the parties is clear and mani-
fest that the matter of deliver.y was not a
condition precedent to the passing of the
title, or that the delivery did not cairy with
it the absolute title. The title may pass, if
the parties so agree, where the statute of
frauds does not interpose without delivery,
and property may be delivered with the un-
derstanding that the title shall not pass
until some condition is performed.
And whether the parties intended the ti-
tle should pass before deliveiy or not is
generally a question of fact to be deter-
mined by the jury. In the case at bar the
question of the intent of the parties was
suV)mitted to the jury. This submission was
ri.uht, unless from the reading of the letter
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FOR\L\TlON OF THE CONTRACT-Et;SE N T I ALS. 5 1  
their herd a t  Greenfield, a s  a friend thougllt 
of buying- some, and l'C'C'eived a letter dated 
�Iay 17, 1886, in which lhey named tbe price 
of five cattle, including Lucy, at $90, and 
Rose 2d at $ 0. When be received the let­
ter be called defendants up by telephone, 
and asked them why they put Rose 2d in 
the list, as be bad already purchased her. 
They replied that they knew be bad, but 
thought it would make no difference if plain­
tiff and bis friend conc·luded to take the 
whole herd. 
Tbe foregoing is the �ubstance of all the 
test imony in the case. 
The circuit judge instructed tbe jury that 
if they believed the defendants, when they 
sent the order and letter to plaintiff, meant 
to . pass the title to the CO\V, and that the 
cow was intended to be delivered to plain­
tiff. it did not matter wt>P.tber the cow was 
\Yeigbed at any particular place, or by any 
particular person ; and if the cow was weigb­
eu afterwards, as Sherwood testified. such 
u·eigbing would be a sufficient compliance 
with tbe order. If they believed that de­
fendants intended to pass the title by the 
writing, it did not matter whether the cow 
was weighed before or after suit brought, 
and the plaintiff would be entitled to recov­
er. The defendants submitted a number of 
requests which were refused. The sub­
stance of them was tbat the cow was never 
delivered to plaintiff, and the title to ber 
did not pa ss by the letter and order; and 
that under the contract, as evidenced by 
these writings. the title did not pass until 
the cow was weighed and her price there­
by determi ned ; and that, if the defendants 
only agreed to sell a cow that would not 
breed, then the barrenness of the cow was 
a condition precedent to passing title, and 
plaintiff cannot recover. The court also 
charged the jury that \t was immaterial 
whether the cow was with calf or not. It 
\\"ill therefore be seen that the defendants 
claim that, as a matter of law, the title to 
this cow did not pass, and that the circuit 
judge erred in submitting the case to tbe 
j ury, to be determined by them, upon the 
intent of the parties as to whether or not 
the title passed with the sending of the let­
ter and order by the defendants to the plain­
tiff'. 
This question as to the passing of title is 
fraught with difficulties, and not always 
easy of solution. An exa mination of the 
multitude of cases bearing upon this subject, 
with their infinite variety of facts, and at 
lea t apparent conflict of law, ofttimes tends 
to confuse rather than to enlighten the mind 
ot the inquirer. It is  best, therefore, to con­
:;;ider always, in cases of this kind, the gen­
'1"11 principles of the law, and then apply 
them as best we may to the facts of the 
ease in baud. 
The cow being worth over $50, the con­
tract of sale, in ordrr to be >alid, must be 
one where the purcha er has re«Ci>ed or ar-
D 
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cepted a part o f  the goods, or given some­
thing in earnest, or in part payment, or 
where the seller bas signed some note or 
memorandum in writing. How. St. § 61 G. 
Here there was no actual delivery, nor any­
thing given in payment or in earnest, but 
there was a sufficient memorandum signed 
by the defendants to take the case out of 
the statute, if the matter contained in such 
memorandum is sufficient to constitute a 
completed sale. It is evident from the let· 
ter that the payment of the purchase price 
was not intended as a condition precedent 
to the passing of the title. �fr. Sherwood 
is given his choice to pay the money to 
Graham at King's cattle-yards, or to send 
check by mail. 
Nor can there be any trouble about the 
delivery. The order instructed Graham to 
deliver the cow, upon presentation of the 
order. at such cattle-yards. But the price 
of the cow was not determined upon to a 
certainty. Before this could be ascertained, 
from the terms of the contract, the cow bad 
to be weighed ; and, by the order in closed 
with the letter, Graham was instrncted to 
have her weighed. If the cow had been 
weighed, and this letter bad stated, upon 
such weight, the express and exact price 
of the animal, there can be no doubt but 
the cow would have passed with tbe sending 
and receipt of the letter and order by the 
plaintiff. Payment was not to be a concur­
rent act with the delivery, and therein tbi:;; 
case differs from Case v. Dewey, 55 :\Iicb. 
llG, 20 N. W. 817, and 21 N.  W. 911. Also. 
in that case, there was no written memo­
randum of the sale, and a delivery was nec­
essary to pass the title of the sheep; and 
it was held that such delivery could only 
be made by a surrender of the possession to 
the venclee, and an acceptance by him. De­
li>ery by an actual transfer of the property 
from the >endor to tbe vendee, in a case like 
the present, where the article can easily be 
so transferred by a manual act, is usually 
the most significant fact in the transaction 
to show tbe intent of the parties to pass the 
title, but it  never has been held conclusive. 
Xeitber the actual deli>ery, nor the absence 
of such delivery, will control the case, where 
the intent of the parties is clear and mani­
feRt that the matter of deli>ery was not a 
condition precedent to the passing of the 
title, or that the delivery did not catTy with 
it the absolute title. Tbe title mar pass, if 
the parties so agree, where the statute of 
frauds does not interpose without delivery, 
and property may be deli>ered with the un­
derstanding that the title shall not pass 
until some condition is performed. 
And whether the parties intended the ti­
tle should pass before delivery or not is 
generally a question of fact to be deter­
mined by the jury. In the case at bar the 
question of the intent of the parties was 
:;;ubmitted to the jury. This submission was 
rig-ht, unless from the reading of the letter 
) r f r 
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and the order, and all the facts of the oral
bargaining of the parties, it is perfectly
clear, as a matter of law. that the intent of
the parties was that the cow should be
weighed, and the price thereby accurately
determined, before she should become the
propeity of the plaintiff. I do not think
that the intent of the parties in this case is
a matter of law, but one of fact. The
weighing of the cow was not a matter that
needed the presence or any act of the de-
fendants, or any agent of theirs, to be well
or accurately done. It could make no dif-
ference where or when she was weighed, if
the same was done upon correct scales, and
by a competent person. There is no pre-
tense but what her weight was fairly ascer-
tained by the plaintiff. The cow was spe-
ciQcally designated by this writing, and her
delivery ordered, and it cannot be said, in my
opinion, that the defendants intended that
the weighing of the animal should be done
before the delivery even, or the passing of
the title, Tlie order to Graham is to deliver
her, and then follows the instruction, not
that he shall weigh her himself, or weigh
her, or even have her weighed, before de-
livery, but simply, "Send liiilter with the
cow, and have her weighed."
It is evident to my mind that they had
perfect confidence in the integrity and re-
sponsibility of the plaintiff, and that they
considered the sale perfected and completed
when they mailed the letter and order to
plaintiff. They did not intend to place any
conditions precedent in the way, either of
payment of the price, or the weighing of
the cow, before the passing of the title.
Tliey cared not whether the money was paid
to (iniliam, or sent to them afterwards, or
whetlier the cow was weighed before or
after slie passed into tlie actual manual
grasp of the plaintiff. Tlie refusal to deliver
the cow grew entirely out of the fact that,
before the plaintiff culled upon Graham for
her, they di.scovered she was not barren, and
therefore of greater value tli.-m tliey had
sold her for.
The following cases In this court supi)ort
the Instruction of the court below as to tlie
Intent of the piirtles governing and con-
trolling llie (iiiesllon of a completed sale,
and the passing of tide: Llngham v, Kg-
gleston, "7 Mich, .'!2I: WilkliiHon v. Holiday,
D:1 Mlih. lisr,; Grant v. Xb-rcliant.s' & Manu-
fa<-tnrers' Hank, :i."> Midi. .")U"; rarpenler v.
Gralinm. 12 Mich. l!»l, :t N. W, 1)71; Brewer
v. Salt Ass'n, 47 Mich. ,-.:tl. 11 N. \V. :!7ll;
Whitcomb V. Whllney. 24 Mich. 48(1; Byles
V. Coll.T. r,\ .Mlih. 1. lit N. W, .'•(V.; Scolten
V. Sutler, 37 Mich. .V_'7, .VfJ; I»n<ey Lumber
Co. V. Lnne, .".S .Mich. .VJO, 525, 25 N, \V,
5IVS; ,Ienl<liiMon v, Monroe, (il Midi. l,".l, 2.S
N, W, <»::!.
It nppinrH from tlu> riTonl that both i>ar-
ttoM HUppoNcd tills cow WHH barren and
would not breed, mid she wiis stild by the
pound for :in liiHlgnltliiint hiiiii as coiniinri'd
with her real value if a breeder. She was
evidently sold and purchased on the relation
of her value for beef, unless the plaintiff
had learned of her true condition, and con-
cealed such knowledge from the defendants.
Before the plaintiff secured possession of
the animal, the defendants learned that she
was with calf, and therefore of great value,
and undertook to rescind the sale by re-
fusing to deliver her. The question arises
whether they had a right to do so. The
circuit judge nded that this fact did not
avoid tlie sale and it made no difference
whether she was barren or not. I am of the
opinion that the court erred in this holding.
I know that this is a close question, and
the dividing line between the adjudicated
cases is not easily discerned. But it must
be considered as well settled that a iiarty
who has given an apparent consent to a con-
tract of sale may refuse to execute it, or he
ma.v avoid it after it has been completed,
if Uie assent was founded, or the contract
made, upon the mistake of a material fact,
— such as the subject-matter of the sale, the
price, or some collateral fact materiall.v in-
ducing the agreement; and this can be done
wlien the mistake is mutual, 1 Benj. Sales,
§§ 605, (iOC; Leake, Cent. 339; Story, Sales,
(4th Ed.) §§ 377, 14S. See, also, Cutts v.
Guild, 57 N. Y, 229; Harvey v, Harris, 112
Jlass. 32; Gardner v. I.jine, 9 Allen, 492, 12
Allen, 44; Huthmachor v. Harris" Adin'i's,
3S Pa, St, 491; Byers v. Chapin, 28 Ohio St.
300; Gibson v, I'elkie, 37 Mich. 380, and
cases cited; Allen v. Hammond, 11 Pet. 03-
71.
If there is a difference or misapprehension
as to the substance of the thing bargainod
for; if the thing actually delivered or re-
ceived is diffeient in sulistance from the
thing bargained for, and intended to he sold,
—then there is no contract; but if it be only
a dilTerence in some ipiality or accident,
even though the mistake ma.v have been the
actuating motive to the purchaser or seller,
or both of them, yet the contract remains
Iiiiiding. "The dilliculty in every case is to
(leleniiine whether the mistake or misap-
lirehension is as to the substance of the
whole contract, going, as It were, to the root
of the matter, or only to some point, even
though a material point, an error as tn
which does not, affect the substance of tlie
whole consideration." Kennedy v. ranaiii:i.
etc.. Mall Co., L. U. 2 Q. B. .580, ,587, It has
been held. In accordance with the prlncliiles
above stated, tlint where a horse Is bought
under the bcllet' that he is sound, and bolli
vendor and vendee honestly believe hliii to
be sound, the imreliaser nuisl stand by his
bargain, and pay the full price, unless there
was u wnnanly.
It HeeniH to me, however. In the case made
by this r rd, thai the mistake or niisjiii-
prehensloii of the parties went to the whole
siibstani'e of the agreement. If the eow
was II bleeder, she was worth at least !f7,">0;
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and the order, and all the facts of the oral 
bargaining of the parties, it  is perfectly 
clear, as a matter of law, that the intent of 
the parties was that the cow should be 
weighed, and the price thereby accurately 
determined, before she should become the 
property of the plaintiff. I do not think 
that the intent of the parties in this case i s  
a matter of law, but one o f  fact. The 
weighing of the cow was not a matter that 
needed the presence or any act of the de­
fendants, or any agent of theirs, to be well 
or accurately done. It could make no dif­
ference where or when she was weighed. i f  
the ame was done upou correct scales, and 
by a competent person. 'l'here i s  no pre­
tense but what her weight was fairly ascer­
tai ned by the plaintiff. The cow wa spe­
cifically de ignated by this writing. antl her 
delivery ordered, and i t  cannot be saicl. in my 
opinion, that the defendants intended t ba t 
the weighing of the animal hould b done 
before the deli>ery even, or the pas ing of 
the title. Tbe order to Graham is to deliver 
her, and then follow the in t ruction, not 
that he ha l l  weigh her h i mself, or weigh 
her, or even have b r w ighl•d, before de­
l iv ry, but imply. ", nd halter with the 
cow, and have her weighed." 
I t  i evident to my mind that they bad 
perf ct confidence i n  1 bc i ntegrity and r -
spon ibil it y of the plaint iff, and that tb0y 
con i dererl the sale perfected and completed 
wh n t he:r mailed t h Jet ter a.utl order to 
pla intiff. They did not int t>ncl to pla ·e auy 
c·on 1l i tion precedent in the way, ei t her of 
pnymeul of t h e price, o r  the wei gh i ng of 
t he tmv, be fore t he pass i n l.\'  of the ti tle. 
Tl l<'r c-r1 r>d not wh thcr the money wn. paid 
to U ra ha m ,  or eut to t hem afterwnnl , or 
whet hcl' the cow was wcigbeu hefore or 
a fl r r  she> pa ssed i nto t he a c t uri I ma n ual 
gr-nsp of t he pl a i nt i ff. 'l'hc refusa l to c leli YC'I' 
t lw c·o w ;,.:rPW e nl I r  ly o u t  of t b  fad t ha t , 
hf'fol'C t b<" pla i n t i f  c·a l l <'cl u pon G rahn l 1 l  for 
hc>r, t h<'y c l i sr·oYerccl shl• was not hl\ l'l'l'll. n nc l  
1 J wrc · fnre o f  grcn l Pl' Y:'\ l ue t han th£'� ha c l  
NOid } J<'l' fOl' 
'J'h fol low l n � c·n s!'s 1 1 1 this rnu rt �11111Hwt 
1 h<' inf'<t rucl ion or the court h l i 1 w as t o I ii!' 
l n t c - n t or t h e p11 rl ir11 �°' ' t' 1 1 i 1 1 ;.:  a n c l  con 
t rol l ln� t h e q npsl fon of n c·01 1 1 p l < ' t c•d im !C', 
nnrl t hr J !:ti;s l u �  of t l t l C ' :  IA 1 1 !!ha 11 1  ' · 1•:;.:­
l:lrst on. :.!7 :'lf i<'h. :l:.! I ;  "' l l k l nson \ J l n l i c la ) , 
:1:1 \r ic h ;1<.,r;; ( ; m nt \ .  \J .. rdin n t s' & \ ! : 1 1 1 u­
fa 1'1 1 1 1"Pl's0 Ha nk,  :;,; � l l r -h .-1:.!7 ; f ': t q H • J l i f'I' v. 
l ! l'nh:1 1 1 1 ,  I :.!  \l l<'li. 1 ! 1 1 , :1  '\ '"· !)7 1 ;  Brl'W<'I' 
v .  Hn l t  \ ><>< ' 1 1 ,  17 \l lf ' l 1  . . . : 1 1 .  1 1  r-. \\ . :l7n; 
\\'h l t c·n1 1 1h ' .  \\ l i l t 1 1 1 •y , :!I \1 11 '!1 .  IHI \ ;  J ly l t•>< 
'" ( 'n l l N, ;, i \J lrh I,  l ! I '\. W :11 i . 1 ;  Sc•n t t < ' l l  
v. s 1 1 t 1 Pr, :n \ 1 1 "1 1 .  !i:.!7, ;,:1:.: ; 1 1 111·<'�' r,11 1 1 1 1 1  . .  r 
C';o. Y J .n II<', . ,� \ l i e h. o 1:.!0, r1::!�1, 2�> �. \\' 
;,n'\ ; . I P n l  l n <1n 11 ' \l o 1 1 rnc > , C l  i\1 1< ' 1 1 I .ti .  :.!S 
w nn:1 
J t  f! J l f !l lt l f rl l l l l  I J i t •  l°l ' f 'f l l'd f h H f  hnt h J lll l'• 
l J f 'M l l f l ) Jl l. pr) f h l!J < ' f l \\ \HIM hll l ' lr ' J I  a 1 1t l  
w 1 1 1 1 l t l  I H 1 I  hrrP r l ,  11 1 1 c l  R l w  \U I M r<nl r l  1 1.1 t h " 
)1fl l l l l l l  fnr : i n l 1 1 !< l g 1 1 l l l i 'H 1 1 I  s 1 1 1 1 1  ;1 c•n 1 1 1 p1 1 1·f'tl 
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with her real 'Value i f  a breeder. She was 
e'l"idently sold and purchased on the relation 
of her value for beef, unless the plaintiff 
had learned of her true condition, and con­
cealed such knowledge from the defendants. 
Before the plaintiff secured possession o f  
t h e  animal, t h e  defendants leamed that she 
was with calf, and t herefore of O'reat value. 
and undertook to rescind the sale by rc-­
fu ing to deliver her. The question arises 
whether t hey bad a right to do so. The 
circuit j udge ruled that this fact did not 
avoid the sale and it made no difference 
'IYhether she was barren or not. I am of the 
opinion that the court erred i n  t h is holdi ng. 
I know that this is a close question. and 
the dividing l i ne between the acl,i nrlicated 
cases is not easily discerned. But it m ust 
be considered a s  well settled that a party 
who has given an a pparent consent to a con­
tract of sale may refuse to execute it. or lle 
may avoid it a fter it has been complctel1, 
if the assent ·was founded, or the contract 
made. upon the m i  take of a material fact, 
-such as the subject-ma t t e r  of the a le, tlle 
price, or some collateral fact materially in­
d ucing the agree men t ;  and this ca n be l l one 
w llen the mi talrn i m utual.  1 Benj. f'a les. 
�§ 605. GOU; Leak , Cont. 339; tory. Sales. 
(-±th Eu.) §§ 377, 14 . See, a l  o. Cutts 'I". 
G uild, 57 N. Y.  220; Haxvey v.  Harris, 1 1 2  
Hass. 32 ; G a rd ner 'I" .  Lan , 9 Al len . 4J12, 1 2  
A l len, 44 ; Ilutbmacber v .  Ifarri ' .Ad m ' r:;. 
3 Pa. t. 491 ; Byers v. Chapin, 2 Ohio t .  
300; G ibson v. Pelkie, 3 7  Mi h .  380. ancl 
cases cited ; Allen v.  Hammond, 11 Pet. G:J-
71. 
If t here i a d i ITerenc or misa pprehensiou 
as to t he sub t a uce of th t b i ug bnrga i nec l 
for; if tile t h ing actaa lly delivered or re­
ceived is d i ITet 0nt i n  sub l a nce from th 
t h i ng l ln 1·,;:a i nc>d for, a ncl i n t ncled to be sold. 
-then t here is no co n t rn ct ;  but LC it be o nl y 
a differcnc in some qu a l ity or ::iccidl' l ll .  
even t hough t i\ mi t a ke may have been th1 •  
actuntin;z mot iv to the purchns r or seller, 
o r  bot h  o f  t l 1cm, yet the cont ract remn i n R 
h i 1 1 1 l i n;z. "'l'b c l i l lkulty in ev ry ca e iR t o  
ch•t <'rrn inl' wll0l hcr the mi f't :1 k or mis:i p­
J ll'<' hc•nio;ion is as to the su bst a 1H'C' of tlw 
w hole co n t ract, go l u g, as lt w re, lo lbe root 
o r t h  mn t t r1·, or only to some poi nt, C' l' l l  
t hongh a 111:1 l c1·ia I 11oi nt, an rrnr i t s  1 n 
wh i · l l  C loe. not :i 1T0ct t h e suMt a nc or t h 1 • 
whole ('0 11S lc l  rn l lon." r nn dy \1. Pa n n 1 1 1 : 1 , 
rt<' .. �fnll  Co., J,. H. 2 Q. B. nRO, !i 7. It ha s 
hrcn l wlc l ,  I n  aC'rm«l n nce w it h th pri nc•!pl "s 
1ihon• ><t : l l <'i l . t h n t  w l wrc a bo rs Is bo11.�l 1 1  
1 1 1 1 f lr1· I I H '  hel lC'I' tha t b e  1:-i sou n d ,  a n d  h o t  h 
" n c l or 11 1Hl  v0nc lc>C' ho neRl l y he l l cy h i m  t u  
h s01 1 1H I ,  t hr pnrrh:1 scr mu s t s t n n d  by h ! R  
hn r,.:n l n ,  n 1 1d J l: l .\ t he ful l  prlc , u n i  s s  1 h PJ'l' 
WHA II Wl\ IT:i l l l ) .  
T t  �rc·m>< I n  nw, hoWC' YPr, J n  l lw cn se m a i l < '  
h J  t h i s  l'<'<'Ol'c l .  t h a t  t hf' 1 1 1 I H l :t k !' or m hm p  
J l l 'Phf'lll' l 1 1 1 1  ot' I l i P  pn 1·( I P H  1 1  l ' l l  I l o  t h e> whnlc'  
s 1 1 l 1s l : i 1 w, .  nl'  l l w : t )!J'c•r rn r o 1 1 I .  I f' l l H'  ( ' C l\V 
\\' : I S  fl  i l l'f 'l 'df 'l , l' l l f •  W : I ><  11 01·t h :i t IC'l\ AI  !ji7:1f l ;  
Or' � i r =- 1  fr r--
U rN IV E R S IT'f O F  CALI FOR N lA 
FOUMATION OF THE CONTRACT— ESSENTIALS.
o
3
if larren, she was worth not over ?80. The
parties would not have made the contract of
sale except upon the understandiuj.' and be-
lief that she was incapable of breeding, and
of no use as a cow. It is true she is now
the identical animal that they thought her
to be when the contract was made; there is
no mistake as to the identity of the creature.
Yet the mistake was not of the mere quality
of the animal, but went to *,he very nature
of the thing. A barren cow is substantially
a different creature than a breeding one.
There is as much difference between them
for all purposes of use as there is between
an ox and a cow that is capable of breeding
and giving milk. If the mutual mistake had
simply related to the fact whether she was
with calf or not for one season, then it might
have been a good sale, but the mistake af-
fected the character of the animal for all
time, and for her present and ultimate use.
She was not in fact the animal, or the kind
of animal the defendants intended to sell or
the plaintiff to buy. She was not a barren
cow, and, if this fact had been known, there
would have been no contract. The mistake
affected the substance of the whole consid-
eration, and it must be considei'ed that
there was no contract to sell or sale of the
cow as she actually was. The thing sold
and bought had in fact no existence. She
was sold as a beef creature would be sold;
she is in fact a breeding cow, and a valua-
ble one. The court should have instructed
the jury that if they found that the cow
was sold, or contracted to be sold, upon the
understanding of both parties that she was
ban-en, and useless for the purpose of
breeding, and that in fact she was not bar-
ren, but capable of breeding, then the de-
fendants had a right to rescind, and to re-
fuse to deliver, and the verdict should be in
their favor.
The judgment of the court below must be
reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs
of this court to defendants.
CAMPBELL, C. J., and CHAMPLIN, J.,
concurred.
SHERWOOD, J., delivered a dissenting
opinion.
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FU H M A T lON OF THE CO N T B. ACT-E!::i ENTIALS. 
tr harren, she> was worth not over $80. The 
varties woul<l not h:n·e made the rontract of 
sale except upon tlle understanclin_g and \Je­
licf t hat she was incapable of breeding, an<l 
of no use as a cow. It  is true she is now 
the identical animal that they thought her 
to be when the contract was made ; there is 
no mistake as to the identity of the creature. 
Yet the mistake was not of the mere quality 
of the animal, l1ut went to t;be very nature 
of the thing. A b:i.rren cow is substantially 
a different creature than a breeding one. 
There is as much difference between them 
for all purposes of use as there is between 
an ox and a cow that is capable of breeding 
n.nd giving milk. If the mutual mistake bad 
simply related to the fact whether she was 
with en.If or not for one season, then it  might 
have \Jeen a good sale, but th� mistake af­
fected the character of the animal for all 
t ime, and for her present and ultimate use. 
f'be was not in  fact the animal, or the kind 
or animal the defendants intended to sell or 
the plaintiff to buy. She was not a barren 
cow, and, if this fact had been known, there 
would have been no contract. The mistake 
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affected the substance o f  the whole consid­
eration, and it must be consi<lere<l th:i t 
there was no contract to sell or sale of thP 
cow ns she actually was. The thin� sul1l 
and bought had in fact no existence. l:lhe 
was sold as a beef creature would be sold ; 
she is in fact a breeding cow, and a Yalna­
ble one. The court should haYe instrucle<l 
the jury that if they found that the cow 
was sold, or contracted to be sold, upon the 
understanding of both parties that she waR 
barren, and useless for the purpose of 
breeding, a nd that in  fact she was not bar­
ren, but capable of breed ing, then the de­
fendants had a right to rescind, a nd to re­
fuse to deliver, and the verdict should be in 
tbeil" favor. 
The judgment of the court below must be 
reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs 
of this court to defendants. 
CAMPBELL, C. J., and CHAMPLIN, J., 
concurred. 
SHERWOOD, J., delivered a dissenting 
opinion. 
O rigi �al from 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFOR N IA 
54
SALES.
REDPATH et al. v. BROWN et al.
(39 N. W. 51, 71 Mich. 258.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. July 11, 18S8.
Error to circuit court, Wayne county; Cor-
nelius J. ReiUy, Judge.
Replevin brought by Ellis W. Redpath,
Leonidas H. Redpath, and Newtou H. Red-
path against William Brown and Catherine
M. Jones, to recover possession of certain
merchandise, boots and shoes, sold by plain-
tiffs to the tirm of Jones Bros, between Au-
gust 31, ISSG, and Xoveniber 5, ISSli. The
case in the court below, upon the part of the
plaintiffs, was prosecuted upon the theoiy
that they were entitled to recover on three
distinct grounds: First, that they had been
induced to sell the goods in question to Jones
Bros, by reason of false representations made
by Joues Bros, with reference to their finan-
cial responsibility to commercial agencies,
which representations had been communicat-
ed to plaintitts with a view to enable them
to purchase goods from plaintiffs on credit;
second, that, at the time that they made the
purchases of the goods in question, it was
their intention not to pay for the same; third,
that the 'fausfer of the possession and title
of the goods in question, purchased by Jones
Bros., was the consummation of a fraudu-
lent scheme entered into at the time the goods
were purchased, and effected by means of
the assignment made to defendant Brown,
and a chattel mortgage executed to defend-
ant Jones. It appears that prior to March
31, 188(i, the firm of Jones Bros, referred to
were couductiug a small business on Jefl'er-
son avenue, In the city of Detroit, and about
that time decided to enlarge their business,
and remove to a more commodious store on
Michigan avenue. With such object and pur-
pose lu view, one of the firm visited Boston
for the purpose of purchasing goods upon
credit; and wliile there made oue of the
statements relied upon in this case to John
W. Ilalght, an employ^ of the American Boot
& .Slioe Reporting Company, as a basis for
credit tliey Intended to ask of the subscrib-
ers to such agency. The statement is. In sub-
stance, as follows: Capital In business, ,f:!,-
2fK): total Indelilednoss, less than ?100; rent,
,$840; sales for the year ISK.'., ,'j;,''.,l()0; moved
to this store Man'li. 188U; when spring goods
are In, which we have bought, will make our
stock about .fr.,(KK); and our IndcbliMlness. $1,-
SfK). Do their own work. Moans ;ill in the
business. This firm contlntied to do business
until January 111, 1S.S7, when Ihey made an
nssignnieiit for the bcnidt of (heir creditors
to (lereniliint Brown. Previous to the execu-
tion of this assignment, the tlrm executed to
defendant Catherine M. Jones, who Is their
sister, n chattel mortgngc for $'J,(MH) cover-
ing their entire slock of l)o<ils and shoes.
This clialtel mortgage purports to have been
executed January (1, 1887, but was not tiled
witli tlu? city clerk of the city of Detroit un-
til January H), 1.H.H7, (he same day the as-
sigumentwas executed. Credits for the goods
sold were gianted on the strength of such
statement, and one made February 4, 1SS4,
to the National Shoe & Leather Exchange,
which is, in substance, as follows: Capital,
Januaiy 1, 1SS4, $2,250; stock insured for
$1,500; outstandiug accounts, ?100; owe for
goods, $171.14. Have no borrowed money;
no chattel mortgages or judgments. Claim a
business was done last year of ?5,069; that
they are worth $2,200 above all Uabilities,
It appeared, at the time they executed their
assignment, January 19, 1S87, that their total
assets were as follows: Stock, $5,345; fur-
niture and fixtures, $225; findings, $20; book-
accounts, $193.50; while their liabilities ag-
gregated $7,430.03. During the interval be-
tween March 31, 18S6. and January 19, 1SS7,
the expeut,es of the firm's business were about
$2,050.50; thus showing that there should
have been on hand, January 19, 1887, of the
original stock of ,$3,200, $1,200, in addition
to all the stock they had acquired in the meas
time. But. instead of there being a surplus
over liabilities, there was a deficit of $2,000.
The firm's books showed that, between the
above dates, they bad purchased goods to the
amount of $13,609.27, and had paid thereon
$6,880.41; and they claimed to have borrowed
$2,000 of a sister, which they had put into
the business. This state of affairs would re-
fjuire them to account for the following:
Stock at time statement was made. . $ 3,200 00
Stock purchased since then 13.669 37
Cash borrowed 2,000 00
$18,869 37
Payments as above $6,886 41
Expeusos ^,056 60
8,942 91
Which would leave goods on
hand $ 9,926 46
There was evidence also to show that at
the time of making the statement, in March,
1886. they owed their sister over $1,000. The
chattel mortgage given by the firm to the
defendant Catherine M. Jones was executed
i;! days before the assignment, but was not
filed until the day the assigmuent was made.
It also ap)ieared that, after the assignment,
the assignee went Into possession, retaining
the Jones Bros., luul a clerk whom they had
employed. No change was made lu the
signs. The business was finally transferred
to Calherlne M. Jones; she taking the stock
lu payment of her chattel mortgage, and pay-
ing the balance In cash, Jones Bros, acting
as her agent In the transaction. On paying
the rent, (he a.sslgnee had taken a receipt
reserving 'he rights of the Jones Bros, to re-
tain the store iniiler the lease. The assignee
In Ills accomit stated thai he had cash on
hand $8,S5.32, but In that account he credited
himself with the sum of $1,960.38, paid on
tho Catherine M. Jones mortgage; but the
bill of sale of the stock showed that It was
only $l,r)ir).('>,'t; and, as she was to pay $2.
367.78 for the stock, It left a balance of
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REDP A.TH et al. v. BflOWX et al. 
(39 X. W. 51, 71 Mich. 258.) 
Supreme Court of )Iichigan. July 11. 1 
Error to circuit court, Wayne county ; Cor­
nelius J. Reilly, Jud!!e. 
Heple>in brought by Ellis W. Redpath, 
Leonicla H. Redpath, and Xewton H. Red­
path against �Yilliam Bro,Yn and Catherine 
)1. .Jones. to reco\·er J)OS>"es. ion of certain 
merchantli e. boot and shoes, old by plain­
t iffs to the ti rm of Jone Bro . betwe<.>n Au­
gust 31, 1 U, and XoYewber 5, 1 ''iG. The 
case in the court below. upon the part of the 
plaintiff , was prosecutetl upon the tl.leory 
that they were entitled to reco\"er on three 
distinct g-rountls: Fir t. that they bad been 
induC'cd to sell the good· in question to Jones 
Bros. by reason of fal e representations made 
by .Tones Bros. with reference to their finan­
cial responsibility to commercial agencies. 
which representation had been communicat­
ed to plaintiff· with a view to enable them 
to pun· ha e good from plaintiffs on cretlit ; 
second. that. at the time that they wade t he 
pw·chases of the goods in question. it wa • 
their intention not to pay for the ,ame; third, 
that the 1 rausfer of the possession and title 
of t he :.roorL in question. pmchascd by Jones 
Bros. . was the consummation of a fraudu 
lent ,d1ewe entered into at the time the :.roods 
were purcha ed. and effected by means or 
the assi!!nment made to tkfendant Brown, 
antl a chat tel morti:;:age executed to defend­
ant .Tones. It llJ111Cllrs that prior to )larch 
:n. p ;-.;r;, the firm of Jones Ilro . referred to 
were c·o111 luct in� a sma ll business 011 .Te!Ter­
son a \·eune, in t he cit y of Detroit, and about 
that time cleci1led to <>nlar�e their business, 
and l'"lllo\"e to a more eo111m<11lin11s store on 
�Ikhi::an avenue. \Yi t h  ·ueh o hJl't't nud pu1» 
po,.;t• i n  view, one or the firm visitl•tl Hoi.;ton 
for t Ile purpose of 1mrellnsin;..: ;.:nods upon 
en•1 l i t ;  and " hi lr tlll'I'<' miul <> one of the 
statP111<'11t s  relietl 11pu11 In t h is casl' to .Tohu 
"'· I la !;.:ht, 11 11 ctllplo� e of t he A merlntn Hoot 
& :-<hnP H <'JH>rt i n;..: C'ompan�" as n hnsis for 
t·n·< l l t  t lwr ln t PTHled to aslc of the subst·rlh· 
1>rs to sudi a i.:cn<'y. 'l'he stntenwnt Is, In i.;nh· 
sl:t lH'I" as follows : Cn pllnl In l lushwss, ::;: 1,­
:.!11 1 1 :  t o tal l n dPht e1h1Pss, less than � t oo ;  n• n t ,  
� I l l ;  AAll'f! for 1 1 11 • � ellr 1 .SS:i, .::!, 100 ; ll lO\'l'cl 
to t l il:i st nr<' .\! 1 1rd1,  1 ss1 ; ;  when �prin;..: i.;nm l s  
nr1' I n ,  w l i l<'li '' '' hn ve hought, w i l l  nml, 1• nul" 
tnr·k 1 1 h111 1t ,:>,non; um! our l ot!Phti•t l n , .  · , � I .· 
�oo. l >o t 1 1 c l r  o w n  worlc. ;'\l 1·n 11s a l l  1 1 1  t he 
hll 1 1 11•, 9. 'f'hl f irm c•n11 t lr1 1 11'i l In du h11slr1f 'SI! 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1  .r11 n11a ry l t t, 1 7, w lw11  t h ••.r 1rn11 1 , .  1 1 1 1  
: 1 ssli.:1 1 1 1 w 111  fnr t ht• hr >rwll t o f  t hPlr 1'l'<'< l l l 11 1 R  
1 1 1  d1 • t 1 • 1 1 1 l11 nl l lruwn . l 'n·v lnt1H t n  t l w <'Xt'<'l l· 
1 11 1 1 1  nl I hi 11 li.:11 1 11 1·11 1 ,  t lw fi rm " 1•1·1 1f  pd t 1 1  
do>f1'11dtml r ':i t  l 1 1 ·ri 1 1 1  .\ ! ,  . T  011<•!!, who IH  t l w l r  
HI  ' l l 'r, II di:r t ld morlgllJ.:P fnl' , :.! ,fl(IO <'O\'PI'• 
l 1 1 J.:  t l1 1 • lr i·nt lr•• t or•I• nf hu11IB 1 1 1 1 1 1  ahrn·s. 
Thi rl111 l t d  111or t gni;1• p11rp11rt to hnn• 1 11 •1 • 1 1  
f 'Jlt•1·11 t 1 11  .11111111 1 1)'  I i ,  I S7, hu t \\II nnt llh·d 
WllJr t J 11•  dly l'! Prl nf t l w Ci t y  or 1 11 t roll 1 1 1 1 • 
Ill .J ;1 1 1 1m ry l ! l, I i, t l u• 611 1111 •  d11y 1 1 11• 1111 
D i !;; tize by 
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sign men t was executed. Credits for the goocls 
old were granted on the strength of such 
statement, and one made February 4, 1SS4, 
to the Xational Shoe & Leather Exchange, 
which is, in substance, as follows: Capital, 
January l ,  1 84, $2,250; stock insured for 
.'l,300; outstanding accounts, $100; owe for 
goods, $171.H. Ila\"e no borrowed money ; 
no chattel monga,rns or judgments. Claim a. 
business was dune last year of $5,069; that 
they are worth $2,200 above all liabilities. 
It ;ppeared, at the time they executed their 
assignment, January 19, 1887, that their total 
a ·sets were as follows:  Stock, $5.343; fur­
uiture and fixtures, $22.3; finding , $20; book­
uccounts. $193.50; while their liabilitie" ag­
;;regated $7.430.G3. During the interval be­
tween )larch 31, 18 6, and January 19, 1 7, 
the expen,,es of the firm's business were about 
$2,0.3U.50; thus showing that there should 
ha""e been on band, January 19, 1887, of the 
ori;.rinal stock of $3,200, $1,200, in addition 
to all the stock they bad acquired in the mean 
t ime. But. instead of there being a surplus 
O\"er liabilities, there was a deficit of $2,000. 
The firm's books showed that, between the 
abo\"e dates, they had purchased good to the 
amount of $13.669.27, and l.lad paid thereon 
$6. S!i.41 ; and they claimed to have borrowed 
$2,000 of a sister, which they bad put into 
the business. This state of acrairs would re­
'1llire them to account ror the following: 
• tock nt time statement was mnde . •  $ 3,200 00 
�lo<'k purchased since then . . . . . . . .  13.669 37 
Cash horro\\ cd . . . . .  • . • . • • • • • • • . . 2,000 00 
$1 ,869 37 
Pnymcuts ns above . • • • •  $6. 6 41 
Bx11l·n�cs . . . . . . . • • • • • • -,0.36 oo 
.042 91 
-n'bich would leave goods on 
hnod . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $ 9.926 46 
There was e\"ldence also to show that at  
the t hrn:.' of makinA" the ta t c ment. in '.\larch, 
1 8Sti. t hey owed t heir sister oYer $1,000. The 
C'l1:1 f f el 11101·1�age given by the firm to t he 
1lc ft>nclaut. Ct1therine l\I. Jones wns executed 
1 :1 1I:1ys before t lle asslgumcnt, but wns not 
filed uut l l  t he clny the assignmcnt was m:1 1le. 
H n lso appPnrccl t hat, after t h e  n>:sli::n1 1 1en t ,  
t he nllslgtwe went Into posst>sslou, ret a i n i ng 
th• .l ou •s Hrns., a nd a cl rl;: whom t he� had 
e111y1loyc1l. i\o change wns mnde In the 
i;lg11". ' l  he ln 1sl11css was llnnlly tm usfern�d 
to C 'nt lwrlne l\I . . Jones; she In king the stoi:k 
In p11y111ent or her chnt tel mort gage, nu<I p:iy­
l n g  t lw h:tln nce In cash, .fonl'S Uros. a c t l 11� 
n s  hPI' 11i;1• n t  In t he lra nsa<'l lun. Ou pu yin i:: 
f hl' l'Pn l ,  t hl' assl/.:nee h:HI  t a krn n l'P•·Pl)lt 
rf'lll'l'\' l ni; ' I re 1 lg h t :-1  or t i ll' .J nlleH Urns. t o  n·­
faln t l w t on' 1 1 11dl'r t he IP:t sl'. The l!Hsl ;:: m•c 
In hi 1 1 r1•01 1 1 1 t  sf: l 1 1•rl t h :t t  111• h11 <l l':tsh on 
h n r u l  ::;s�:i :l:.!, hut I n  t hn t  an n11 1 1 t  he l'l'l'1 l i l l'1l 
hi 1 111wlf w i t h  t he N11111  of $ 1 ,\ltio.:IS, pultl on 
, t lw c ':1 t IH'rlue M .  .Tonc:-1 111nrt i;11.i.:t• ;  b u t  t he 
hill  of RlllC Of tht• Htod showed thnt I t  was 
011 ly $ Ui 1:1.ll.1 ;  n 11cl, n11 r:ll w wnH to pay �· :.!, 
:1ni.i8 for t h1• stork, It IPft  u hn la m·1• 111' 
O r  1 i I' I Fro r 1 
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FOIJMATIOX OF THE CONTUACT— ESSENTIALS.
:>S22.15 reccivej from tliat source. The retail
sales amounted to l^TOS.TS, making tlie total
cash receipts .fl,610.90, while the total ex-
penses were ¥291.83; showing $1,319.07, in-
stead of $885.32, to be accounted for by the
assignee. At the close of the testimony, the
court took the case from the jui'y, and or-
dered a judgment in money In favor of tlie
defendants jointly. Plaintiffs bring error.
Dickinson, Thm-ber & Hosmer and Elliott
G. Stevenson, for appellants. E. T. Wood,
for appellees.
CAMPBELL, J. Plaintiffs sued in replevin
to get back certain goods which they claimed
had been obtained from them fraudulently by
a firm doing business as Jones Bros. These
goods vere sold at various times, upon the
faith of representations of solvency; and
plaintiffs claimed the facts showed that the
purchasers had obtained the property with a
purpose of cheating their creditors. Brown
was the assignee of that firm, and Catherine
M. Jones had purchased most of the assigned
stock, paying for it partly by a chattel mort-
gage, the good faith of which was attacked,
and partly otherwise. The dealings of the
defendants were claimed not to entitle them
to stand in any better position than their
vendors. Upon the trial the court let in proof
of a series of representations of business con-
dition which indicated solvency and healthy
business, and further testimony claimed to
show either that these representations were
untrue, or else that goods had been disposed
of in some fraudulent way, which it is in-
sisted tended to the direction of a fraudulent
scheme to get goods, and make away with
them, without paying for them. It is claimed
that the assignee's accounts show tampering
with the assets, and that the chattel mort-
gage was not in good faith. After receiving
the testimony, the circuit judge niled that no
fraud was made out, and took the case from
the jury, and ordered a judgment in money in
favor of defendants jointly. We do not see
any foundation for such a joint money re-
covery. Defendants had no joint interest in
the property replevied, so far as the recoi'd
shows. But we think the case should have
gone to the jury on the facts. There was
peitinent testimony upon the question of
fraud. If the transactions involved the per-
petration of continuous frauds on plaintiffs,
they had a right, as against their vendees, to
rescind, and an equal right as against other
persons colluding with them to carry out their
schemes. If there was any testimony tend-
ing appreciably to show fraud, the weight of
it was a question of fact for the jury. De-
fendants introduced no testimony; and, had
they done so, it would have required the same
treatment. The question before us is not
what we might ourselves have inferred from
the facts in evidence. We have no means
of knowing that these facts would have per-
suaded the jm-y that any fraud was commit-
ted, or that all the doubts, if any, might not
be cleared up. For anything we; know, the
fii-m may have given out for want of business
capacity and experience. We do not propose
to make any comments, or express any sus-
picions. All that we do is to say that we
think the case was a proper one for the jury
to consider. It is not necessary, in order to
prove fraudulent purchases, to show defend-
ants' complicity in the original scheme. If
there was a scheme. They may be unable to
hold the goods without being guilty of actual
dishonesty. Had they gone into proof, the
verdict might have been favorable; but,
without testimony on their side, we cannot
say that the jury would have found against
plaintiffs. The judgment must be reversed,
with costs, and a new trial granted.
The other justices concurred.
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F O I U I ATIO,N" OF TIIE co4 T lL\ CT-E�...; .E \  TI A.LS. 5.; 
$ 22.15 recch·eu froin that source. The retail 
sales amounted to $7GS.75, making the total 
cash receipts $ 1,610.00, while the total ex­
}Jenses were $201.83 ; showing $1 ,319.07, in­
stead of $883.32, to be accounted for by the 
assignee. At the close of the testimony, the 
court took the case from the jury, and or­
dered a judgment in money In favor of the 
defenda nts jointly. Plaintiffs bring error. 
Dickinson, Thurber & Hosmer and Elliott 
G. Stevenson, for appellants. E. T. Wood, 
for appellees. 
CAMPBELL, J. Plaintiffs sued in replevin 
to get back certain goods which they claimed 
had been obtained from them fraudulently by 
a firm doing business as Jones Bros. These 
goods were sold at various times, upon the 
faith of representations of solvency ; and 
plaintiffs claimed the facts showed that the 
purchasers had obtained the property with a 
purpose of cheating their creditors. Brown 
was the assignee of that firm, and Catherine 
M. Jones had purchased most of the assigned 
stock, paying for it partly by a chattel mort­
gage, the good faith of which was attacked, 
and partly otherwise. The dealings of the 
defendants were claimed not to entitle them 
to stand in any better position than their 
vendors. Upon the trial the court let in proof 
of a series of representations of business con­
dition which indicated solvency and healthy 
business, and further testimony claimed to 
show either that these representations were 
untrue, or else 'that goods had been disposed 
of in some fraudulent way, which it is in­
sisted tended to the direction of a fraudulent 
scheme to get goods, and make away with 
them, without paying for them. It is claimed 
that the assignee's accounts show tampering 
with the assets, and that the chattel mort­
gage was not in good faith. After receiving 
the testimony, the circuit judge ruled that no 
D1g1t1.z by 
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fraud was made out, and took the case from 
the jury, and ordered a judgmnnt i11 money in 
favor of defendants jointly. We do not see 
any foundation for such a joint money re 
covery. Defendants had no joint interest in 
the prope1ty replevied, so far as tlle reconl 
shows. But we think the case should llan� 
gone to the jury on the facts. There was 
pertinent testimony upon the question or 
fraud. If the transactions involved tile per­
petration of continuous frauds on plaintiffs. 
they bad a right, as against their vendees, tu 
rescind, and an equal right as against otller 
persons colluding with thew to carry out tbeir 
schemes. If there was any testimony tenJ 
ing appreciably to show fraud, the wcighll of 
it was a question of fact for the jury. De­
fendants introduced no testimony ; and, bad 
they done so, it would have required the same 
treatment. The question before us is not 
what we :night ourselves have inferred from 
the facts in evidence. We have no means 
of knowing that these facts would have per­
suaded the j ury that any fraud was commit­
ted, or that all the doubts, if any, might not 
be cleared up. For anything w� know, the 
firm may have given out for want of busines" 
capacity and experience. We do not propuse 
to make any comments, or express any su�­
p1c1ons. All that we do is to say that "·e 
think the case was a proper one for the jmy 
to consider. It is not necessary, in order to 
prove fraudulent purchases, to show defeuc1-
ants' complicity in the origi nal scheme, i f  
there was a scheme. They may be unable tu 
hold the goods without being guilty of actual 
dishonesty. Hat! they gone into proof, tile 
verdict might have been favorable ; but, 
without testimony on their side, we cannot 
say that the jury would have found against 
plaintiffs. The judgment must be reversed, 
with costs, and a new trial granted. 
The other justices concurred. 
O rigin3 1  from 
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SALES.
POLHILL y. WALTER.
(3 Barn. & Adol. 122.)
Court of King's Bench. Hilary Term, 1832.
Declaration stated, in the first count, that
J. B. Fox, at Pernambuco, according to the
usage of merchants, drew a bill of excbause,
dated the 23d of April, 1S29, upon Edward
Ilancorne, requesting him, sixty days after
sight thereof, to pay Messrs. Turner, Brade,
and Co., or order, £140. 16s. Sd. value re-
ceived, for Mr. Robert Lott; that afterwards
the defendant, well knowing the premises,
did falsely, fraudulently, and deceitfully rep-
x-esent and pretend that he was duly author-
ized by Hancorne to accept the said bill of
exchange according to the usage of mer-
chants, on behalf and by the procuration of
Hancorne, to whom the same was directed
as aforesaid, and did then and there falsely
and fraudulently pretend to accept the same
by the procuration of Hancorne; that the
.said bill of exchange was indorsed over, and
bj' various indorsements came to the plain-
tiff, of which the defendant had notice; tliat
the plaintiCl", relying upon the said pretend-
ed acceptance, and believing that the de-
fendant had authority from Hancorne so to
accept the bill on his behalf, and in consid-
eration thereof, and of the indorsement, and
of the delivery of the bill to him the plain-
tilT, received and took from tlie last iudors-
ers the bill as and for payment of the sum
of money in the bill specilied, for certain
goods and merchandizes of the plaintiff sold
to the indorsers; that when the bill became
due, it was presented to Hancorne for pay-
ment, but that he, Hancorne, did not nor
would pay the same, whereupon the plain-
tiff brought an action against Hancorne as
the supposed acceptor thereof; and that by
reason of the premises, and the said false
rejiresentation and pretence of the defend-
ant, the plaintiff not only lost the sum of
money In the bill of exchange mentioned,
which has not yet been i>aid. but also ex-
IKudcd a large sum, to wit, £42. 7s., In un-
successfully suing Hancorne, and also paid
£17 to him as his costs. The second count,
after slating the dniwlng of the bill accord-
ing to the custom of meri-liants, by Fox, as
In the first count, alleged that the defendant,
well knowing the premises, did falsely and
decellfidly represent and pretend that he,
the defendant, was duly authorized by Han-
I'orne to accept the bill according to the
.said usage and custom of merchants, on be-
luilf and by the procuratlmi of Hancorne, to
whom the same was (ilrcK'ted, and did ac-
ci'pt the HHMie in writing under pretence of
the procm-ntlon nforcsald; that by various
lndr)rNemeiitN the bill cnine to the plaltitllT;
Hint he, the plaliitllT, relying on the said
prctende<l prociiriitinn and nuthr>rlty of Han-
corne, and In consideration thereof, and of
the said arceptance, received and took the
bill ns anil for payment of n sum of money
In the bill Hpe<-llled, In respect of goods sold
by the plaintiff. The count then stated the
presentment of the bill to Hancorne and his
refusal to pay, and averred that it became
and was the duty of the defendant to pay
the sum in the bill specified, as the acceptor
thereof, but that he haa refused. There was
a similar allegation of special damage as in
the first count. Plea, not guilty. A.t the
trial before Lord Tenterden, C. J., at the
London sittings after Hilary term, 1S31, it
appeared in evidence that the defendant had
formerly been in partnership with Hancorne,
but was not so at the time of the present
transaction. The latter, however, still kept
a counting-house on the premises where the
defendant carried on business. The bill of
exchange drawn upon Hancorne was, in
June, 1820, left for acceptance at that place,
and, afterwards, a l)anker's clerk, accompa-
nied by a Mr. Armlield, then a partner in
the house of the payees, called for the bill.
The defendant stated that Hancorne was
out of town, and would not return for a
week or ten days, and that it had better be
presented again. This the clerk refused,
and said it would be protested. Armfield
then represented to the defendant that ex-
pense would be ineuiTed by the protest, and
assured him that it was all correct; where-
upon the defendant, acting upon that assur-
ance, accepted it per procuration of Mr. Han-
corne. After this acceptance, it was in-
dorsed over by the payees. On the return of
Hancorne, he expressed his regret at the ac-
ceptance, and refused to pay tlie bill. The
plaintiff sued him, and, on the defendant
appearing and stating the above circumstan-
ces, was nonsuited. The present action was
brought to recover the amount of the bill,
and tlie costs incurred in that action, amount-
ing in (he whole to flOO. The defendant's
counsel contended that as there was no fraud-
ulent or deceitful Intention on the part of
the defendant, he was not answerable. Ix)rd
Tenterden was of lliat opinion, but left It to
the jury to del ermine wliether there was
such fraudident intent or not; and directed
them to find for the defendant If they thought
there was no fraud, ollierwise for the pl.iin-
tilT; giving the plaintiff leave to enter a
verdict for the sum of £100 If the court should
be of ojiinion that he was entitled thereto.
The Jury found a verdict for tlie defendant.
In the ensuing Faster term .Sir .lames Scar-
lett obtained a rule idsl, according to the
leave reserved, against which In the last
term cause was shown by
Mr. Campbell and F. Kelly. Sir .Taines
Scarlett and Mr. Lloyd, contra.
LOKD TKXTIOKDKN, C. .T., now delivered
the Juilgment of the cmn't.
In this case, In whli'li the defendant ob-
tained n verdict on the trial before me at
the sittings after Hilary term, a rule nisi
was obtained to enter a verdict for thi' plaln-
llff, and cause was shown during the last
term. The declaiatlon eontnlne<l two counts:
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56 SALES. 
POLHILL v. \\ALTER. 
(3 Barn. & A.dol. 122.) 
Cou rt  of King's Bench. Hilary Term, 1832. 
Declaration stated, in the first count, that 
J. B. Fox, at Pernambuco. according to t he 
u age of merchants, drew a bill  of exchange, 
dated the 23d of April, 1 29, upon Ed"·ard 
I Iaucorne, requesting him, sixty days after 
sig!Jt thereof, to pay Messrs. Turner, Brade, 
and Co., or order, £140. 16s. 8d. value re­
ceived, for :L\Ir. Robert Lott; that a fterwards 
the defendant, well knowing the premises, 
did falsely, fraudulently, and deceitfully rep­
re-ent and pretend that he was duly a uthor­
ized by Haucorne to accept t he said bill  of 
exchange according to t he \1sage of mer­
chants, on behalf and by tl.le procuration of 
Ilancorne. to whom tl.le same was d irecteu 
as a fore aid, and did then and there falsely 
and fraudulently pretend to accept the same 
by the pt·ocurution of Hancorne; that the 
. aid bill of exchange was indorsed over, and 
by •arious indorsements came to the plain­
t i f'J'., of which the defenclnnt had notice; that 
the plaintiIT, relying upon the said pretend­
ed acceptance, and believing t llat the de­
fendant had authority from Hancorne so to 
ac<'ept the bill on bis behal f, and in consid­
eration thereof, and of the indorsement, and 
of the deli 1ery of the bill to him the plain­
t i ff, received and took from the last indors­
er tbe bill as and for payment of the sum 
of money in the bill speci fied, for certain 
goods ancl merchandize o.r the plaintiff sold 
to t he indo1"e1·s ; that when the bill beca me 
due, it was pre·entPd to Ifaucorne for pay­
ment, but that he, Tiancorne, did not nor 
woultl pay t he sa m . whereupon t he plain-
1 i ll'  b1·ouA'ht an n et iou against I I n ncorne a s  
t b e  . uppo. ed acTeptor th 'reo f ;  anc1 1 hat by 
rea son of tbe premises, n oel t he :;aid false 
I' presentation ancl 1n·etence or t h e  defend­
a n t ,  the plaintiff not onl.r lost t he sum of 
111011 y in the bi II uf exd1:rnge m n l ioncd, 
whic'h IJas not yet hl'en ) ' : l i c l ,  h11t a lso ex­
pended a large sum, to w l l, £42. 7s., in uu­
su<"cessfully ·uing- l l n ucorne, a n l l  also paid 
£1 T to him as his co ts. The sp1·0111l count, 
a ft l'I' i:;t.'l ! l ug th e dmwln,;::- or the h i l l  nc·cor1l­
i 11 g  to the custom or men·h:t n ts, hy I<'ox, ns 
In t l w fin;I  C'oun!, n l l c;.::<'cl t ha t  th d •fcndnnt, 
WPll  l<nn\l l 11 ;.;- l lw premises, d ic l  fn lscly and 
"' '''"l ! l'1 1 1 l y  rPpn�;i<' n l  nncJ  pret <'ml l hn t  he, 
t hP dl'f1•11 dn n t ,  wn1-1 d u l y 1111t borlzecl hy I Ian­
' " ' 1'11 · to ncrPJJt t h P h i l l  nc·cord l n ;.:: to t he 
said 1 1sag" Ill}(} c•u 'tnm o f  111rr<"ha 1 1 l A, on be­
! 1:i l r  a nd h�· t h • proc·1 1 m l lo 1 1 of l i a n r01·11e, to 
wl101T1 l h r! 1-1n1111• WllB 1Hrr<'tf'd, 1u11 J  d i d  ar 
••r•pl l l w 11 111" In w r l l l u g  1 1 1 1c !Pr prrt en<'r nf 
l h •• l "'"' ' l l l':i t lon n fn n •f'n lrl ; l hn t  hy \ 11 t' lo111-1 
lndu1 1 • 1 1 1 , . l l l R  I l l ! '  h i l l  1•1 1nw t o  l lw pl:1l n l l n' ; 
t lm t  l w, l l w pl n l n t l ff, l'P l ) h l '• on ! l w  Rn l c l  
) l rf•lr-1u l r '< ]  fll'IJ!'l l l n t ln 1 1  H i id ll l l l hnl' l l y  o f  1 1 1111· 
1·n1·11,.,  nn rl I n  <'n n11l<l,.. m l lnn t hPr<'nr, n n d or 
l h r• l'n l r l  11rP1•p(fl l1<'!', n·r1·lvpd 11 1 1 d  t onk f h r 
h l l l  111:1 n n d  for p11ym<•n l nr 11 sum or 1 1 101 1  y 
I n  l hl' h i l l  HfH•dllPcl, In n·1-1111•rl nr �IJOl lH Hn ]d 
D i g itized by 
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b y  the plaintiff. The count then state<l the 
presentment of the bill to Hancorne and bis 
refusal to pay, and averred that it became 
and was the duty of the defendant to pay 
the sum in the bill specified, as the acceptor 
thereof, but that he baa refused. There was 
a similar allegation or special damage as in 
the first count. Plea, not guilty. .\t the 
trial before Lord Tenterden, C. J., at the 
London sittings after Hilary term, 1831, it 
appeared in evidence that the defendant bad 
formerly been in partnership with Hancorne, 
but was not so a t  the t ime of the present 
transaction. The latter, however, still kept 
a count ing-house on the premises where the 
defendant carried on business. The bill of 
exchange drawn upon Hancorne was, in 
June, 18W, left for acceptance at t hat place, 
and, a fte!:wards, a banker's clerk, accompa­
nied by a Mr. Armfield, then a partner in 
the house of tbe payees, called .for the bill. 
The defendant stated that Hancorne was 
out of town, and would not return for a 
week or ten days, and that it had better be 
presented again. This the clerk refused, 
a nd said it would be protested. Armfield 
then represented to the defendant that ex­
pense would be incurred by the prote t, a n d  
assured bim that it was al l  correct ; where­
upon the defendant, acting upon that assur­
ance, accepted it per procuration of l\Ir. Han­
corne. After t h i s  acceptance, it  was in­
dorsed over by tbe payees. On the return of 
Hancorne, be xpres ed bis regret at the ac­
ceptance, and refu ed to pay the bi ll.  The 
plaintilr sued him, a nd, on the defendnnt 
a ppearing and stating the above circumstan­
ces, was nonsuited. The present action was 
broug-ht to recover the a mount of the bil l ,  
and the costs incurr d i n that action, amount­
ing in the whole to £ 1 96. The defendant's 
coun,el contended t h a t  a there was no fraud­
ulent or deceitful intention on t lie part of 
t he defendant, be wa not answerabl . Lord 
Teuterclen wa s or t hat opinion, but left it to 
the j u ry t o  clC'I C'rm ine whether t h ere was 
such fra udulent intent or not ; a n d  d i rected 
t hem to fincl for the d fcn d a n t  if they t hought 
there was no frn ud, o l b  rwise for the 11\n iu­
till' ;  g-! Y l n J?  t l le p la i n l l ll' leave to cnt r a 
verdiC't J'or t he sum of £196 I f  the court shou l d  
be o f  opin ion t hn t  hC' w a s  en I i  l lc t l  t l le1·c 1 0. 
The j ury fou n c l  n Yer<l ict for t l i e  dcfcnrl :rn t .  
I n  th!' cmsu ing l<Jnsl r i f'l'Il:l Sir  .J : 1 1ncs Hc·11 r­
lP! t oht n i n  cl a rulC' n i sl,  :lCC'Onl l n ;.:- t o  1 he 
lea Ye r!'HC' rYed ,  a ga i nst " h kh i n  t he laRt 
term c-:111sC' w:\!'! Rhow 1 1 hy 
\! 1-. Cn mphell 11 1 1 d  l•'. Kel ly. • i r  .la i n  s 
fknrlcl t a ud l\ l r. Lloycl,  co1 1 t 1·a. 
LO H D  'l'l•lN'l'M ! t ] ) l•l :N. . .J ., now d e l i vered 
Ute jmlgmcn t or ( h e.' C'O\ll 't .  
In t h i H  C'llHC, ln w h l<"h l hf' dcfC'n r l n n t  o h  
t a h 1 1 '< l 11 \ e rr l l d 0 1 1  l lw l d a l  hefore m ut 
1 l w  Hf l l  l1 1gH n f l Pr T r l ln 1·y ( P ri l l, n l'l l l <' 1 1 lsl 
wn1-1 oh!11 h1Prl l o  en I er n verd ict  for t he pl:l l n  
t i n', H JH I  c·:i 1 1!'l<' wn s Hl low11  \ l 1 1 l'l n ;;: t h e l : i l'l l  
1 <'1·111 Tiu•  dp1•l : i rn l lo11 C'onln t ned t wo C'O l l J J lt -1 :  
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The first stated, that a foreign bill of ex-
change was drawn on a person of the name
of Hancorne, and that the defendant falsely,
fiaudulcntly, and deceitfully did represent
and pretend that he was duly authorized to
accept the bill by the procuration, and on
behalf of Hancorne, and did falsely and
fiauduleutly pretend to accept the same by
tlie procuration of Hancorne. It then pro-
ceeded to allege several indorsements of tlie
bill, and that the plaintiff, relying on the
pretended acceptance, and believing that the
defendant had authority from Hancorne to
accept, received tlie bill from the last in-
dorsee in discharge of a debt; that the bill
was dishonoured, and that the plaintiff
brought an unsuccessful action against
Hancorne. The second count contained a
similar statement of the false representa-
tion by the defendant, and that he accepted
the bill in writing under pretence of the
procuration from Hancorne; and then pro-
ceeded to describe the indorsements to the
plaintiff, and the dishonour of the bill, and
alleged, that thereupon it became and was
the duty of the defendant to pay the bill as
the acceptor thereof, but that he had not
done so.
On the trial it appeared, that when the bill
was presented for acceptance by a person
named Armfield, who was one of the payees
of the bill, Hancorne was absent; and that
the defendant, who lived in the same house
with him, was induced to write on the bill
an acceptance as by the procuration of Han-
corne, Armfield assuring him that the bill
was perfectly regular, and the defendant
fully believing that the acceptance would
be sanctioned, and the bill paid at maturity,
by the drawee. It was afterwards passed
into the plaintiff's hands, and being dishon-
oured when due, an action was brought
against Hancorne; the defendant was called
as a witness on the trial of that action, and
he negativing any authority from Hanconie,
the plaintiff was nonsuited. I left to the
jury the question of deceit and fraud in
the defendant, as a question of fact on the
evidence, and the jury having negatived all
fraud, the defendant had a verdict, liberty
being reserved to the plaintiff to move to
enter a verdict, if the court should think the
action maintainable notwithstanding that
finding.
On the argument, two points were made
by the plaintiff's counsel. It was contend-
ed, in the first place, that although the de-
fendant was not guilty of any fraud or de-
ceit, he might be made liable as acceptor of
the bill; that the second count was applica-
ble to th.at view of the case; and that, after
rejecting the allegations of fraud and false-
hood in that count. It contained a suflicient
.statement of a cause of action against him,
as acceptor. But we are clearly of opinion
that the defendant cannot be made respon-
silile in that character. It is enough to say
ti.:it no one can be liable as acceptor but the
person to whom the bill is addressed, unless
> he be an acceptor for honour, which the de-
fendant certainly was not.
This distinguishes the present case from
that of a pretended agent, making a promis-
sory note (referred to in Mr. Roscoe's Digest
of the Law of Bills of Exchange, note 9, p.
47,) or purchasing goods in the name of a
supposed principal. And, indeed. It may
well be doubted if the defendant, by writ-
ing this acceptance, entered into any con-
tract or warranty at all, that he had author-
ity to do so; and if he did, it would be an
insuperable objection to an action as on a
contract by this plaintiff, that at all events
there was no contract with, or warranty to,
him.
It was in the next place contended that
the allegation of falsehood and fraud in the
first count was supported by the evidence;
and that, in order to maintain this species
of action, it is not necessary to prove that
the false representation was made from a
corrupt motive of gain to the defendant, or
a wicked motive of injury to the plaintiff:
it was said to be enough if a representation
is made which the party making it knows to
be untrue, and which is intended by him, or
which, from the mode in which it is made,
is calculated, to induce another to act on
the faith of it, in such way as that he may
incur damage, and that damage is actually
incurred. A wilful falsehood of such a na-
ture was contended to be. In the legal sense
of the word, a fraud; and for this position
was cited the case of Foster v. Charles, 6
Bing. 396, 7 Bing. 105, which was twice un-
der the consideration of the court of com-
mon pleas, and to which may be added the
recent case of Corbet v. Brown, 8 Bing. 33.
The prlncii)le of these cases appears to us
to be well founded, and to apply to the pres-
ent.
It is true that there the representation was
made immediately to the plaintiff, and was
Intended by the defendant to Induce the
plaintiff to do the pct which caused him
damage. Here, the representation is made
to all to whom the bill may be offered in the
course of circulation, and Is, In fact, intend-
ed to be made to all, and the plaintiff is one
of those; and the defendant must be taken
to have Intendetl, that all such persons
should give credit to the acceptance, and
thereby act upon the faith of that repre-
sentation, because that. In the ordinary
course of business, is its natural and neces-
sary result.
If, then, the defendant, when he wrote the
acceptance, and, thereby In substance, rep-
resented that he had authority from the
drawee to make It, knew that he had no
such authority, (and upon the evidence there
can be no doubt that he did,) the representa-
tion was untrue to his knowledge, and we
think that an action will lie against him by
the plaintiff for the damage sustained in
consequence.
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
7:
37
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/u
c2
.a
rk
:/1
39
60
/t
90
86
js
3p
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
FORMA T I O N  m.., Tlrn C O N TH.ACT-ES�.KN TI ALS. 
The first stated, that a foreign blll of ex­
change was dra wn on a person of the name 
of Hancorne, and that the defendant falsely, 
fraudulently, and deceitfully did represent 
and pretend that he was duly authorized to 
accept the bill by the procuration, and o n  
behalf of Hancorne, and did falsely and 
fraudulently pretend t o  accept the same by 
tlJe procuration of Hancorne. It then pro­
ceeded to allege several indorsements of tlJe 
bill, and that the plaintiff, relying on the 
p retended acccpta.nce, and belie1"ing that the 
defendant bad authority from Hancorne to 
a.ccept, received the bill from the last in­
dorsee in discharge of a debt;  that the bill 
wa d ishonoured, and that the plaintiff 
brought a n  unsuccessful action against 
Hancorne. The second count contained a 
similar statement of the false representa­
tion by the defendant, and that he accepted 
the bill in writing under pretence of the 
procuration from Hancorne; and then p ro­
ceeded to describe the indorsements to the 
plaintiff, and tbe dishonour of the bill, and 
alleged, that thereupon it became and was 
the duty of the defendant to pay tile bill as 
the accepto1· thereof, but that he had not 
done so. 
On the trial it appeared, that when the bill 
was presented for acceptance by a person 
named Armfield, who was one of the payees 
of the bill, Hancorne was absen t ;  and that 
the defendant, who lived in the same house 
with him, was induced to write on the bill 
an acceptance as by the procuration of Han­
corne, Armfield assuring h i m  that the bill 
was perfectly regular, and the defenda nt 
fully believing that the acceptance would 
be sanctioned, and the bill paid at maturity, 
by the drawee. It was afterwards passed 
into the plaintiff's bands, and being dishon­
oured when due, an action was brought 
against Hancorne; the defendant was called 
as a witness on the trial of that a.ction, and 
he negativing any authority from Hancorne, 
the plaintiff was nonsuited. I left to tile 
jury the question of deceit and fraud i n  
the defendant, as a question o f  fact o n  the 
Hidence, and the jury having negatived all 
fraud, the defendant bad a verdict, liberty 
being reserved to the plaintirf to mo,-e to 
enter a verdict, if the court should think the 
action mainta inable notwithstanding that 
finding. 
On the argument, two points were made 
by the plaintiff's counsel. It was contend­
ed, in the first place, that although the de­
fendant was not guilty of any fraud or de­
ceit. be might be made liable as acceptor of 
the bill ; that the second count was applica­
ble to that view of the case; and that, after 
rejecting the allegations of fraud and false­
hoo·d in that count, it contained a sufficient 
statement of a cause of action against him, 
as acceptor. But we are clearly of opinion 
that the defendant cannot be made respon­
siblP in that character. It is enough to say 
that no one cau be liable as acceptor but the 
D 
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person to whom tbe bill i s  addressed, unll!SS 
he be an acceptor for honour, which the de­
fendant certainly was not. 
This distinguishes the present case from 
that of a pretended agent, making a promis­
sory note (referred to in Mr. Roscoe's Digest 
of the Law of Bills of Exchange, note 9, p. 
47,) or purchasing goods in the name of a 
supposed principal. And, indeed, it may 
well be doubted if the defendant, by writ­
ing this acceptance, entered into any con­
ti·act or warranty at all, that he bad author­
ity to do so ; and if Iw did, it would be an 
insuperable objection to an action as on a 
contract by this plaintiff, that at all events 
there was no contract with, or warranty to, 
him. 
It was i n  the next place contended that 
the allegation of falsehood and fraud in the 
first count was supported by the evidence; 
and that, i n  order to maintain this species 
of action, it is not necessary to prove that 
the false represent ation was made from a 
corrupt motive of gain to the defendant, or 
a wicked motive of injury to the plaintiff: 
i t  was said to be enough if a representation 
i s  made which the party making it knows to 
be untrne, and which is intended by him, 01· 
which, from the mode in which i t  i s  made, 
is calculated, to induce another to act on 
the faith of it, in such way as that he may 
incur damage, and that damage is actually 
incurred. A wil ful falsehood of such a na­
ture was contended to be, in the legal sense 
of the word, a fraud; and for this position 
was cited the case of Foster v. Charles, 6 
Bing. 396, 7 Bing. 105, which was twice un­
der the consideration of the court of com­
mon pleas, and to which may be acldecl the 
recent case of Corbet v. Brown, 8 Bing. 33. 
The principle of these cases appears to us 
to be well founded, and to apply to the pres­
ent. 
It is true that there the representation was 
made im mediately to the plaintiff, and was 
intended by the defenda nt to induce the 
plaintiff to do tbe ::i ct which caused him 
damage. Here, the representation is made 
to all to whom the bill may be offered in the 
course of circulation, and is, in fact, intend­
ed to be made to all, and the plaintiff is one 
of those; and the defendant must be taken 
to have intended, that all such persons 
should give credit to the acceptance, ancl 
thereby act upon the faith of that repre­
sentation, because that, in the ordinary 
course of business, is its natural a nd neces­
sary result. 
If, then, tbe defendant, when he wrote the 
acceptance, and, thereby in substance. rep­
resented that he bad authority from the 
drawee to make it, lrnew that be bad no 
such authority, (and upon the evidence there 
can be no doubt that he did,) the representa­
tion was untrue to bis knowledge, and we 
think that an action will lie again�t him by 
the plaintiff for the damage sustained in 
consequence. 
O r1g1 P.a l from 
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If the defendant had had good reason to be-
lieve his representation to be true, as, for
Instance, if he had acted upon a power of
attorney which he supposed to be genuine,
but which was, in fact, a forgery, he would
iave incurred no liability, for he would
have made no statement which he knew to
be false: a case very different from the pres-
ent, in which it is clear that he stated what
he knew to be untrue, though with no cor-
rupt motive.
It is of the greatest importance in all trans-
actions, that the tnith should be strictly ad-
hered to. In the present case, the defend-
ant no doubt believed that the acceptance
would be ratified, and the bill paid wheu
due, and if he had done no more than to
make a statement of that belief, according
to the strict truth, by a memorandum ap-
pended to the bill, he would have been
blameless. But then the bill would never
have circulated as an accepted bill, and it
was only in consequence of the false state-
ment of the defendant that he actually had
authority to accept, that the bill gained its
credit, and the plaintiff sustained a loss.
For these reasons we are of opinion that the
rule should be made absolute to enter a ver-
dict for the plaintifE.
Rule absolute.
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I f  the defendant bad bad good reason to be­
lieve his representation to be true, as, for 
in tance, if he had acted upon a power of 
attorney which he supposed to be genuine, 
but which was, in fact, a forgery, he would 
)lave incurred no liability. for he would 
have made no statement which he knew to 
be false: a case very diCferent from the pres­
ent, in which it is clear that be stated what 
be knew to be untrue, though with no cor­
rupt motive. 
It i of the greatest importance in all trans­
action , that the truth should be strictly ad­
hered to. In the present case, the defend­
ant no doubt believed that the acceptance 
D i g 1t1zed by 
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would be ratified, and the bill paid when 
due, and if he had done no more than to 
make a statement of that belief, accordin;; 
to the strict truth, by a memorandum ap­
pended to the bill, he would have been 
blamele . But then the bill would nevt>r 
have circulated as an accepted bill, and it 
was only in consequence of the fa! e sta tt:>­
ment of the defendant that h e  .actually h:t1l 
authority to accept, that the bill gained it' 
credit, and the plaintiff sustained a los . 
For these reasons we are of opinion that the 
rule hould be made absolute to enter a ver­
dict for the plaintiff. 
Rule absolute. 
Oru �a l  fr 
O F  CA FO N 
FOHMATION OF THE CONTIIACT— ESSENTIALS.
DERRY et al. v. PEEK.
(L. R. 14 App. Cas. 337.)
House of Lords. July 1, 18S9.
Appeal from court of appeal.
Action on the case brought by Sir Henry
William Peek asainst William Deny, chair-
inaii, and J. C. Wakefield, M. M. Moore, J.
Pothvvick, and S. J. Wilde, four of the direct-
oi-.s of the Plymouth, Devonport & District
'I'ramways Company, for damages for alleged
fraudulent misrepresentations of defendants
wliereby plaintiff was Induced to take shares |
in the company. The company was incorpo- 1
rated in 18S2 by special act (4.") & 40 Vict. c. ]
mil), which provided, inter alia, that the cars i
used on the tramways might be moved by i
animal power, and, with the consent of the
l)oaid of trade, by steam or any mechanical i
power, for fixed periods, and subject to the
regulation of the board. The tramways act [
of 1870 (.33 & 34 Vict. c. 78) provides that all i
cars used on any tramway shall be moved by
the power prescribed by the special act, and, I
where no such power is prescribed, by ani-
mal power only. In 1SS3 the defendants, as
directors of the company, issued a prospectus
containing the following paragraph: "One
great feature of the undertaking, to which
considerable importance should be attached,
is that, by the special act of parliament ob-
tained, the company has the right to use
steam or mechanical motive power, instead of
horses; and it Is fully expected that, by
means of this, a considerable saving will re-
sult in the working expenses of the line, as
compared with other tramways worked by
horses." Plaintiff, relying upon the repre-
sentation of the right of the company to use
steam or mechanical power, took shares in
I he compan.v. Subsequently the board of
trade refused to consent to the use of steam
or other mechanical power, except on certain
portions of the tramways, the result of which
was that the company was wound up. Plain-
tiff brought this action of deceit. At the
trial, before Stirling, J., the action was dis-
missed; but, on appeal to the court of ap-
peal, the decision below was reversed. De-
fendants appealed from the judgment of the
court of appeal.
Sir Horace Davey, Q. C, and Mr. Moul-
ton, Q. C. (M. Muir Mackenzie, with them),
for appellants. Mr. Bompas, Q. C, and Mr.
Byrne, Q. G. (Mr. PatuUo, with them), for
respondent.
Lord HERSCHELL. My lords, in the
statement of claim in this action the respond-
ent, who is the plaintiff, alleges that the ap-
pellants made, in a prospectus issued by
them, certain statements which were untrue;
that they well knew that the facts were not
as stated in the prospectus, and made the
representations fraudulently, and with the
view to induce the plaintiff to take shares in
the company. "This action is one which is
conuuonly called an action of 'deceit' a mere
common-law action." This is the description
of it given by Cotton, L. J., in delivering judg-
ment. I think it important that it should be
borne in mind that such an action differs es-
sentially from one brotight to obtain rescis-
sion of a contract on the ground of misrepre-
sentation of a material fact. The principles
which govern the two actions differ widely.
Where rescission is claimed it is only neces-
sary to prove that there was misrepresenta-
tion. Then, however honestly It may have
been made, however free from blame the
person who made it, the contract, having
been obtained by misrepresentation, cannot
stand. In an action of deceit, on the con-
trary, it is not enough to establish misrepre-
sentation alone. It is conceded on all hands
that something more must be proved to cast
liability upon the defendant, though it has
been a matter of controversy what addition-
al elements are requisite. I lay stress upon
this, because observations made by learned
judges in actions for rescission have been cit-
ed, and much relied upon at the bar by coun-
sel for the respondent. Care must obviously
be obsen-ed in applying the language used in
relation to such actions to an action of deceit.
Even if the scope of the language used ex-
tend beyond the particular action which was
being dealt with, it must be remembered that
the learned judges were not engaged in de-
termining what is necessary to support an
action of deceit, or in discriminating with
nicety the elements which enter into it.
There is another class of actions which I
must refer to also for the purpose of putting
it aside. I mean those cases w'here a per-
son within whose special province it lay to
know a particular fact has given an errone-
ous answer to an inquiry made with regard
to it by a person desirous of ascertaining the
fact for the purpose of determining his course
accordingly, and has been held bound to make
good the assurance he has given. Burrowes
V. Ivock. 10 Ves. 470, may be cited as an ex-
ample, where a trustee had been asked by
an intended lender, upon the security of a
trust fund, whether notice of any prior in-
cumbrance upon the fund /had been given to
him. In cases like this, i^'has been said that
the circumstance that the answer was hon-
estly made, in the belief ,ihat it was true, af-
fords no defense to the action. Lord Sel-
borne pointed out in Brownlie v. Campbell, L.
B. 5 App. Cas. 035, that these cases were In
an altogether different category from actions
to recover damages for false representation,
such as we are now dealing with.
One other observation I have to make be-
fore proceeding to consider the law which
has been laid down by the learned judges in
the court of appeal in the case before your
lordships. "An action of deceit is a common-
law action, and mtist be decided on the same
principles, whether it be brought in the chan-
cery division or any of the common-law di-
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DERRY et al. v .  PEEK. 
(L. R. 14 App. Cas. 337.) 
House of Lords. July 1, 1889. 
Appeal from court of appeal. 
Action on the case brought by Sir Henry 
William P<.'ek against William Derry, cha ir­
man. ancl .J. C. "'akefield, M. l\l. l\Ioore, J. 
Pethwick, and S. J. \Vilcle, four of the direct­
ors o C  the Plymouth, Devonport & District 
Tramways Company, for damages for alleged 
fra ncl ulcnt 111 isrepreseutations of defendants 
w l w rcby plaiutiIT was induced to take shares 
iu the company. The company was i ncorpo­
rated in 1882 by special act (-!:> & 4G Viet. c. 
l :itl), which provided, inter alia, that the cars 
nsccl on the tramways might be moved by 
animal powc1·, and, with the consent of the 
hoanl or trade, by steam or any mechanica 1 
power. for fixed periods, and subject to the 
reg-ulation of the board. The tramways act 
of 1870 (33 & 3-! Viet. c .  7, ) provilles that all 
cars used on any tramway shall be moved by 
the power prescribed by the special act, anrl, 
where no such power is prescribed, by ani­
mal power only. In 188.'l the defendants. as 
directors of the company, issued a prospectus 
containing the following paragraph : "One 
grea t feature of the undertaking, to which 
considerable importance should be attached, 
is that, by the special act of parliament ob­
tained, the company bas the right to use 
steam or mechanical motive power, i nstead of 
horses; and i t  is  fully expected that, by 
means of this, a considerable saving will re­
sult i n  the working expenses of the line, as 
compared with other tramways worked by 
horses." Plaintiff, relying upon the repre- 1 
entation of the right of the company to use 
:;;team or mechanical power, took shares in 
the company. Subsequently the board o f  
trade refused to consent t o  t h e  u s e  o f  steam 
or other mechanical power, except on certain 
portions of the tramways, the result of whieh 
was that the company was wound up. Plain­
tiff brought this action of deceit. At the 
trial, before Stirling, J., the action was dis­
missed ; but, on appeal to the court of ap­
peal, the decision below was reversed. De­
fendants appealed from the judgment of the 
court of appeal. 
Sir Horace Davey, Q. C., and ?.Ir. i\loul­
ton, Q. C. (l\1. i\Iuir Mackenzie, with them), 
for appellants. l\lr. Bompas, Q. C., and i\fr. 
Byrne, Q. C. (Mr. Patullo, with them), for 
respondent. 
Lord HER SCHELL. My lords, in the 
statement of claim in this action the respond­
ent, who is the plaintiff, alleges that the ap­
pellants made, in a prospectus issued by 
them, certain statements which were untrue; 
that they well knew that the facts were not 
as stated in the prospectus, and made the 
representations fraudulently, and with the 
view to induce the plaintiff to take shares in 
the company. "This action is one which is 
[, ,  I Ll.C ..... DY 
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commonly called a n  action o f  'deceit' a men• 
common-law action." This is the description 
of it given by Cotton, L. J., in deliYcring ju1l;.:· 
ment. I think it important that it should be 
borne in mind that such an action diffrrs es­
sentially from one brought to obtain resf"is­
sion of a contract on the ground of misn•pre­
sentation of a material fad. '.fhe prinr·ivlcs 
which govern the two actions diITer widel�» 
"'here rescission is claimed it is only neces­
sary to vrove that there was misrcpres<>nta­
t ion. Tl.Jen, however honestly It may ha\e 
been made, however free from blame the 
person who made it, the contract, baying 
been obtained by misrepresentation, cannot 
stand. In an action of deceit, on the con­
trary, it is not enough to establish misrepre­
:;;entation a.lone. It is conceded on all bands 
that something more must be proved to cast 
liability upon the defendant, though it bas 
ueen a matter of controversy what addition­
al elements a.re requisite. I lay stress upon 
this, beeau:;;e observations made by learned 
judges in actions for rescission ba.>e been cit­
ed, and much relied upon at the bar by coun­
sel for the respondent. Care must obviou ly 
l>e obse1Ted in applying the language usel1 in 
relation to such actions to an action of deceit. 
E\en if the scope of the language used ex­
tend beyond the particular action wbieb was 
being dealt with. it must be remembered that 
the learned judges were not engaged in de­
termining what is necessary to support an 
action or deceit, or in discriminating with 
nicety the elements which enter into it. 
There i s  a nother class of actions which I 
must refer to also for the purpose of puttint: 
it aside. I mean those cases where a per­
son within whose special province it Jay to 
know a particular fact bas gi\en a n  errone­
ous answer to an inquiry made with regard 
to it by a person desirous of ascertaining the 
fact for the purpose of determ ining bis course 
:ieeordingly, and bas been held bound to make 
good the assmance be bas given. Burrowe,.; 
v. J,ock, 10 Ves. -±70, may be cited as an ex­
ample, where a trustee bad been asked by 
an intended lender, upon the security of a 
trust fnnd, whet!Jer uotke or any prior in­
cumbrance upon tile funcl had been gi>en to 
biru. I n  cases like this. it) has been sai<1 that 
the circumstance that tile answer ,-.. as hon­
estly made, in the beliet that it was uue. af­
fords uo defeuse to the action. Lord Sel­
borne pointed out in Brownlie v. Campllell, L. 
R. 5 App. Cas. H:J;:J, that these cases were i n  
an altogether different category from actions 
to reco\er damages for false representation, 
such as we are now dealing with. 
One other observation I have to make be­
fore proceeding to consider the law which 
bas been laid down by the learne<l j udges i n  
the court o f  appeal i n  the case before your 
lordships. "An action of deceit is a common­
law action, and must be decided on the same 
principle , whether it be brought in tbe chan­
cery divi ion or any of tbe common-law d i ·  
Ori g i n:a l  from 
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visions; there being, in my opinion, no sucli
thing as an equitable action for deceit." This
was the language of Cotton, L. J., in Ark-
wright T. Xewbold, 17 Ch. Div. oOl. It was
adopted by Lord Blackburn in Smith v. Chad-
wick, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 193, and is not, I
think, open to dispute.
In the com-t below, Cotton, L. J., said:
"What, in my opinion, is a correct statement
of the law, is this: that where a man makes
a statement to be acted upon by others which
is false, and which is known by him to be
false, or is made by him recklessly, or with-
out care whether it is true or false,— that is.
without any reasonable ground for believing
it to be true, — he is liable in an action of de-
ceit, at the suit of any one to whom it was
addressed, or any one of the class to whom
it was addressed, and who was materially in-
duced by the misstatement to do an act to
his prejudice." About much that is here
stated there cannot, I think, be two opinions.
But when the learned lord justice six^aks of
a statement made recklessly, or without care
■whether it is true or false,— that is, without
any reasonable ground for believing it to be
ti-ue,— I find myself, with all respect, unable
to agree that these are convertible e.Kpros-
sions. To make a statement careless whetli-
er it be true or false, and therefore without
any real belief in its truth, appears to me to
be an essentially different thing from making,
through want of care, a false statement, which
is nevertheless honestly believed to be true;
and it is surely conceivable that a man may
believe that what he .stales is the fact, though
he has been so ■wanting in care that the
court may think that there were no stilli-
cient grounds to warrant his belief. I shall
liave to consider hereafter whether the want
of reasonable ground for believing the state-
ment made is sufliclent to supiwrt an action
of deceit. I am only concerned for the mo-
ment to point out that It does not follow tJiat
it is so because there is authority for saying
that: a statement made recklessly, without
caring whether it be true or false, affords
sufficient foundation for such an action.
That the learned lord justice thought that, if
a false statement were made wiUiout ri'ason-
ablo ground for believing it to be true, an ac-
tion of deceit would lie, is clear from a suhso-
nuont passage in his judgment, lie .says lliat
when statements are made in a prospectus
like the present, to be circulated among per-
sons In order to induce them to lake sliares,
"there Is a duty cu.st upon the director or oth-
er person whip makes those BtuteMients lo lake
care that there are no expressions hi lliein
which In fact are r.ilao; to tjike can? that he
has ri'nsonable siciiujd for the material .>iiale-
inenls which are contained In that docu-
ment which he prepares and clrculatcH for
the very purpose of Its lielng acted upon by
others." Tlie learned Judge proceeds lo say:
"Although, In my opitiloii. It Is not nei'esHjiry
that there should be what I should call fraud,
yet in these actions, according to my view
of the law, there must be a departure from
duty; that is to say, an untrue statement
made, ■without any reasonable ground foi
believing that statement to be true; and. in
my opinion, when a man makes an untrut
statement, with an intention that it shall
be acted upon, without any reasonable
ground for believing that statement to be
true, he makes a default in a duty which was
thrown upon him from the position he has
taken upon himself, and he violates the right
which those to whom he makes the statement
have to have true statements only made to
them."
No^w, I have first to remark on these ob-
servations that the alleged "right" must
surely be here stated too widely, if it is in-
tended to refer to a legal right, the violation
of w-hich may give rise to an action for dam-
ages. For, if there be a right to have true
statements only made, this will render liable
to an action those who make untrue state-
ments, however innocently. This cannot
have been meant. I think it must have been
intended to make the statement of tlie right
correspond ■with that of the alleged duty, the
departure from which is said to be making
an untrue statement without any reasonable
ground for believing it to be true. I have
further to observe that the lord justice dis-
tinctly says that, if there be such a depart-
ure from duty, an action of deceit can be
maintained, though there be not what he
should call fraud. I shall have by and by to
consider the discussions which have arisen
as to the difference between tlie popular un-
derstanding of the word "fraud" and the in-
tcrju'etation given to it by lawyers, which
have led to the use of such expressions as
"legal fraud," or "fraud in law;" but I may
state at once that, in my opiuion, without
proof of fraud no action of deceit is main-
tainable. When I examine the cases which
have been decided upon this branch of the
law, I shall endeavor to show that there is
abundant authority to warrant this proposi-
tion.
I return now to the judgments delivered
in the court of appeal. Sir .Tames llMiiiien
says: "I take the law to be that if a man
takes upon himself to assert a thing to be
true which he does not know to be true, and
has no reasonable ground to believe to be
tr\u', in order to induce another to act upon
the assertion, who does so act, and Is there-
by dainMille<l, the person so d:imnilied Is
entitled lo niainlaln an action for deceit."
Again, Lopes, L. .7., st;i!es what, in his opin-
ion. Is the result of the cases. I will not
trouble your lordships with iiuoting the first
three proposliinns which he lays down, al-
though I do not feel sure th;it the third Is
distinct from. :ind not ralhei- an Instance of.
the case dealt with by the second proposi-
tion. Hut he says that a person making n
false stJilemenl, inlended to be in fact relied
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·; 1. 10ns ; tbere being. in my opinion. no ucb 
tbing as an equitable action for deceit." Tbis 
was tbe language o f  Cotton, L. J.,  in Arl•­
wright 'I" .  �ewbold, 17 Ch. Div. 301. It was 
adopted by Lord Blackburn i n  Smith v. Chad­
wick, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 1U3, and not, I 
think, open to dispute. 
In the court below, Cotton, L. J., sa id:  
""\Yhat, in my opinion, is a correct statement 
of the Jaw, i tbi : that where a man makes 
a statement to be acted upon by others wbicb 
is false, and which is known by him to be 
fa! e, or i s  made by him recklessly, or with­
out care whether i t  i true or false,-that is, 
without any reasonable ground for believing 
it  to be true,-he is liable in an action of de­
ceit, at the suit of any one to whom it was 
audressed, or any one of the clas to whom 
it ·was addre eel, and who was materia lly in­
duced by the mi sta tement to do an act to 
his prejudice." About much that i here 
stated there cannot, I think, be two opinions. 
But when the learned lord justice peak- of 
a tatement made reckle ly, or without c-are 
� hether it is true or fah;e,-that i , without 
any reasonable grouncl for believing it to be 
true,-! find m�·-elf, with all respect, una ble 
to agree that these are convertible cxprcs­
"'ions. To make a tateroent careles wbeU1-
er it be true or false, and therefore w ithout 
a ny real belief in its tru\b. appe:us to me to 
be an essentially di ITerent thi n� from making, 
throug-h want of care. a false statement, which 
is neverthc!Pss bone t l y  believed to be true; 
and it is surely conl'ch"able that a man may 
I 11•lil·H! that \T hat be statl'S i t he fact. thon�h 
he lias been so wautin� in c·are that the 
c·ourt may tlnnl;: that there wPn' no su!h 
clent grounds to warrant bis l)elief. I shall 
ha\'e to cvn,.ider hereafter " bet her the wa n t 
of n•a,.ona.hle �round for believing tile sta l e· 
ment macle is su.tlident to :-;11pport au :tl'�ion 
ol' deceit. I am only coneerned for the rno-
111e11t to 11ol 1 1t out 11..iat It clors uot follow t ha t  
i t  I s  s o  bc'c·nuse there i s  authority ror :-rny iug 
Iha t a statement maue rel'ldcl'd� . wl t houl 
l':tl'ing whether It be true or fa lse, nlfonls 
su1lldcut fuumlat ion for i:;ucll 11 1 1  U<'tiou. 
TIJat the learned lord J us t ir•e t hought t h a t, I C  
a fnls<! sta!P111cut \n•rr 1 11a llP w l !hout n•asou· 
nhlc A'l'ollllll for bdll'Y lng It lo be true, nu a c· 
t 11111 o1' clPt'l'l t would 11 • ls d1•n r from a s11 i lsP· 
• l l lPl ll  passage In b l� J 11clg111<'11t. I l e  ::;ay,; t h: 1 !  
wh1•11 stn t1•111ent-� nre mncle I n  11 J 1 t"<1sp1•1•t u..i 
l11• 1• th<' pn•se11t, t o  hr clrrul:t t<'<l n1 1 101 1i; J ll'I'· 
8'11 1  1 1 1  onl< 'r  In lnd u<'c l lll'm to t a kP ::>h:t n·:-1, 
"! 111'1'1' I a d u t y  <'Hilt upon t hP 1l l rl'<'t or or 1 1 th·  
.- • r  J I rilon w ho mnl,1•s t ho <' ti!11 ! 1 ·1 11l't1t · t o t a l,1• 
• ll l'f' t b n t  f111•r1: : in•  1 1 11 l!.."l: J l l'l'�slnns it1  l l l0 ' 1 11 
\\' hl<'h I 11 fll d arr fu I I'; ln ht ke <'rt I'<• I hu t h<' 
1111, 1···a 011 : 1 1 1 1  • i;:1 ..  u111l for t h e  1 1 1 n t 1•rl: 1 1  1 1 1 t c'-
111cnt whl<'h n n• ro1 1 1 ll l 111·1 I  l t 1  t hn! d<wll· 
111Pnt w h lC'l1 Ill' J ll'l'fllll'l'I! :1 1 1 r l  1•ln· 1 1 l:1 t 1•H r"r 
t hr> very purpn r of It hf'!n • ncll"I  upon hy 
.-.th• t ," Tiu• I• 11n11•!1 j t11lg1� 1 1 1·1ic1·Pd lo 1111 y :  
",\ ! t hough,  I n  Ill) npl11lu11,  I t  I s  not 11 1 •  '<' : i ry 
t h ul th •n• hu11hl lie w hu l I tiho11 ld l':t ll fruud, 
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yet in these actions, according to my vie"" nt 
of t h e  l a w ,  there mu t 1.Je a departure froru ·.­
duty; tbat is to say, au untrue stntement :1, b 
made, without any roosonable ground fot :ru� 
believing that statement to be true ; and. in S11dl 
my opinion, when a ro a n  make:> an uutrm It 
statement, with an intention t bat it s h a l l  iadl 
be acteu upon, witbout any re:tso11;1 lilc 5\ll 
ground for believing that tatement to be er 
true, be makes a default in a duty which was me 
t hrown upon him from the position Ile Ila!' !!'J 
taken upon himself, and he violates the right 
which those to whom be makes the tatement ,; 
have to have true statements only made to 
them." 
Xow. I have first to rC"mnrk on these ob­
servations that the alleged "right" must 
smely be here sta ted too wiclely, if it is in­
tended to refer to a legal rigbt, tbe violation 
of which may give rise to an action for dam­
ages. For, i f  there be a right t o  have true 
statement only made, this will rende r liable 
to an action those who mal•e untrue tate­
ments, however innocently. Thi cannot 
ha.ve been meant. I think i t  mu t have been 
intended to make tbe tatemeut of the right 
correspond with that of the a lleged duty, the 
departure from which i sa id to be makin.:!; 
an untrue tatement without a ny reasonable 
ground for believing it to be true. I have 
further to ob erve that t he lord j ustice dis­
tinctly says that, if there be such a depa rt-
ur from duty, a u  action of deceit can be 
mainta ined, though there be not what he 
shoulcl call fraud. I b a l l  have by and hr lo 
·ousider the di ·cu sion which have arisen 
as to the difference betwe<>n the popular uu-
dcri-tandiug of the word " fra.utl" and t he in­
terpretation given to it by la wyers. whkb 
h:tYl' led to t he us or nch expr�sions as 
"11•;.:a l fra ud," or "fraud in la w ;" but I may 
state at once that. in my opinion, wi thout 
proof or fraud no adion or deceit ls mn i u­
tainabl . When I exa m i ne tile c·n ses wbicll 
h:we been decidC"Cl upon this brnnch or the 
l : i" , l i:: hn 11  end Pa \'Or to show t hn t t l1Ne is 
nl 11111da11t :rnt horily to wnrrnnt t hil:l proposi­
t ion . 
J rPt urn now to t h e jucl;::ments dcli \•cre1 l 
I n  ! I ll' ('llll l't or :l ! l JH':1 1 .  � i i' . r :unes l l:tlll l;.'11  
l'<nys: " ! l : t k C"  t i l l' law to hl' t h n t  I C  a 111n11 
t : t l•es 1 1pn11 h i lllsl' l l' t o  a ssl'l't a 1 ll l n g'  to be 
t ri ll' wh ic-h ht' c lnp-; n11t know to lH' I t'll('. nn1l  
l i: i..i  IHI l'l':l ..,nll!l Ult• �l'l l l l lltl to l)l'l i1•\'(' to lH· 
t l' llf'. In or1h•r In i 1 1 1 l 1 1n' : 1 1 111! hc'r to :l t't upon 
t lw : 1 H'<'l'l l 1 1n,  whn doe's :-« 1  net , : 1 1 1 <1 ls t hl"l'l'­
h�· d: 1 1 J 1 1 i i ll<'d, t hi' pprson so tla 1 1111 1 t1Pcl Is 
1•1 1 t ll lt-d In 11 1: i l 1 1 t :t ln 0 11 :ll'l lon for ckc·l'll .'' 
.\ gn l n , 1 .nJH'!<, L . . 1 ., !< t : l t Ps \\'h:t ! ,  I n  h i s  opl 1 1  
11111,  I s  t h · l'< 's1 1 l l  nf l h !' <':I I'S. I \\ l 1 l  not 
lr1111hlP yo111· lonl �h ip'l \\ llh q1111t i n ;:: ! h t' llrst 
t hl'l 'l' propos l t 1 1 1 1 1  wh kh lw lay s down, 11 J­
t h11111-: h J do 1 111! fl'<'I tllll " I '  t h at t h !' t h ird I s  
di t l 1 1 <'1 fr11 1 1 1 .  : 1 1 1 < 1  n"t r:1t hl•1· : i n l nsl:1 1 11·p or, 
t h e• 1•11 1• d1•:1lt w i t h  hy t h1• sc•c•nt l l l  propoHI 
t lnn. B u t  lw s:1� t h a t  : i  1wrsn11 m n ldttK a 
t:11 c i;t:ttl'l lll'll t ,  l 1 1 t P 11 1 1l• d  tu I.Jc lu fuel rel l t•ll 
0 r 1 i r- ! Fro r 1 
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m by the person to whom it is uiailo, may bo
<ue(l Ijy the person damaged thereby, "fourth-
y, if it is untrue in fact, but beheved to be
;rue, but without any reasonable ground for
■iueh belief."
It will thus be scon that all the learned
judges concurred in thinking that it was suf-
acient to prove that the representations made
were not in accordance with fact, and that
the person making them had no reasonable
ground for believing them. They did not
treat the absence of such reasonable gi-ound
as evidence merely that the stiitements were
made recklessly, careless whether they were
true or false, and without belief that they
were true; but they adopted as the test of
liability, not the existence of belief in the
truth of the assertions made, but whether
the belief in them was founded upon any rea-
sonable gi'oimds. It will bo seen, further,
that the court did not puiiiort to be estab-
lishing any new dcclrine. They deemed that
ithey were only following the cases already
decided, and that the proposition which they
concurred in laying down was establislied
by prior authorities. Indeed, Lopes, L. J.,
expressly states the law in this respect to be
well settled. This renders a close and critical
'examination of the earlier authorities nec-
' essary.
I need go no further back than the leading
case of Pasley v. Freeman, 2 Smith, Lead.
Gas. 94. If it was not there for the firet
time held that an action of deceit would lie
in respect of fraudulent representations
against a person not a party to a contract in-
duced by them, the law was, at all events,
not so well settled but that a distinguished
judge, Grose, J., differing from his brethren
on the bench, held that such an action was
not maintainable. BuUer, J., who held that
the action lay, adopted In relation to it the
language of Croke, J., in Baily v. Merrell, 3
Bulst. 95, who said: "Fraud without dam-
age, or damage without fraud, gives no
cause of action, but where these two do con-
cur * * * an action lies." In reviewing
the case of Crosse v. Gardner, Carth. 90,
he says: "Knowledge of the falsehood of the
thing asserted is fraud and deceit;" and,
further, after pointing out that in Risney v.
Selby, 1 Salk. 211, the judgment proceeded
wholly on the gi'ound that the defendant
knew what he asserted to be false, he adds:
"The assertion alone will not maintain the
action, but the plaintiff must go on to prove
that it was false, and that the defendant
knew It to be so;" the latter words being
specially emphasized. Kenyon, C. J., said:
"The plaintiffs applied to the defendant, tell-
ing him that they were going to deal with
Falch. and desired to be informed of his cred-
it, when the defendant fraudulently, and
knowing it to be otlierwise, and with .a d(^
sign to deceive the plaintiffs, made the false
affirmation stated on the record, by which
they sustained damage. Can a doubt be
entertained for a moment but that Is injuri-
ous to the plaintiffs'.'" In this case it was
evidently considered that fraud was the basis
of Iho action, and that such fraud might
consist in making a statement known to be
false. Haycraft v. Creasy, 2 East, 92, was
again an action in respect of a false affirma-
tion made by the defendant to the plaintiff
about the credit of a third party whom the
plaintiff was about to tnist. The words com-
plained of were: "I can assiu-e you of my
own knowledge that you may credit Miss R.
to any amount with perfect safety." All the
judges were agre(Ml that fraud was of the
essence of the action, but they differed in
their view of the conclusion to be drawn
from the facts. Lord Kenyon thought that
fraud had been proved, because the defendant
stated that to be true within his own knowl-
edge which he did not know to be true. The
other judges, thinking that the defendant's
words vouching his own knowledge were no
more than a strong expression of opinion,
inasmuch as a statement concerning the cred-
it of another can be no more than a mat-
ter of opinion, and that he did believe the
lady's credit to be what he represented, held
that the action would not lie. It is beside
the present purpose to inquire which view of
the facts was the more sound. Upon the law
there was no difference of opinion. It is a
distinct decision that knowledge of the falsity
of the affirmation made is essential to the
maintenance of the action, and that belief
in its truth affords a defense.
I may pass now to Foster v. Charles, 7
Bing. 105. It was there contended that the
defendant was not liable, even though the
rei^resentation he made was false to his
knowledge, because he had no intention of
defrauding or injuring the plaintiff. This
contention was not upheld by the court.
Tindal, C. J., saying: "It is a fi-aud in 'aw
if a party makes representations which he
knows to be false, and injury ensues, al-
though the motives from which the repre-
sentations proceeded may not have been bad.''
This is the first of the cases in which I have
met with the expression "fraud in law." It
was manifestly used in relation to the argu-
ment that the defendant was not actuated
by a desire to defraud or injure the persou
to whom the representation was made. The
popular use of the word "fraud" perliaps
involves generally the conception of such a
motive as one of its elements. But I do not
think the chief justice intended to indicate
any doubt that the act which he character-
ized as a fraud in law was in truth fraudu-
lent as a matter of fact also. Willfully to
tell a falsehood, intending that another shall
be led to act upon it as if it were the truth,
may well be termed fraudulent, whatever
the motive which induces it, though it be
neither gain to the person making the a.«-
sertion nor injury to the person to whom it
is made.
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m by tbe person to whom it is made, may be 
med by tbe person damage(! thereby, "fourtll­
t y, if it is untrue in fact. but believed to be 
r .rue, but without any reasonable ground for 
�·1ch belief." 
It will tbus be seen tbat all the learnetl 
judges concurred in thinking that it was suf­
ficient to prove that the representations made 
were not in accordance with fact, and that 
the person making them bad no reasonable 
,ground for bel ieving them. They did not 
treat the absence of such reasonable ground 
as evidence merely that the st.atements were 
made recklessly, careless whether they were 
true or false, and without belief that they 
were true; but they adopted as the test of 
liability, not the existence of belief in the 
truth of the assertions mad·e, but whether 
the belief in them was founded upou any rea­
-sonable grounds. It will b� seen, further, 
that the court did not purport to be estab­
lishing any new doctrine. They clecmc<l that 
1tbey were only following the cases already 
decided, and that the proposition which they 
concurred in laying down was es ta blisheu 
l by prior authorities. Indeed, Lopes, L. J., 
expressly states the Ia w in this respect to be 
well settled. This renders a close and critical 
I ! Examination of the earlier authorities nec-1 essary. 
I need go no further back than the leading 
• case of Pasley v. Freeman, 2 Smith, Lead. 
1 Cas. 94. If it was not there for the first 
time held that an actioil of deceit would lie 
in respect of fra.udult>.nt representations 
against a person not a party to a contract in­
duced by them, the Jaw was, at all events, 
not so well settled but that a distinguished 
judge, Grose, J., differing from his brethren 
on the bench, held that such an action was 
not maintainable. Buller, J., who held that 
the action lay, adopted in relation to it the 
language of Croke, J., in Baily v. Menell, 3 
Buist. 95, who said :  "Fraud without dam­
age, or damage without fraud, gives no 
cause of action, but where these two do con­
cur * * * an action lies." In reviewing 
the case of Crosse v. Gardner, earth. 90, 
he says: "Knowledge of the falsehood of the 
thing asserted is fraud and deceit;" and, 
further, after pointing out that in Risney v. 
Selby, 1 Salk. 211, the judgment proceeded 
wholly on the ground that the defendant 
knew what he asserted to be false. he adds: 
' "fhe assertion alone will not maintain the 
action, but the plaintiff must go on to prove 
that it was false, and that the defendant 
knew it to be so;" the latter words being 
specially emphasized. Kenyon, C. J., sai<l : 
'"The plaintiffs applied to the defendant, tell­
i ng him that they were going to deal witb 
Falch, and desired to be informed of his cred­
it, when the defendant fraudulently, and 
knowing it to be otherwise, and with a de­
sign to deceive the plaintiff , made the false 
affirmation stated on the record, by which 
they sustaineu damage. Can a doubt be 
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entertained for a momcut but tllat l s  injuri­
ous to the plaintit'fs '!'' In tllis case it was 
eYiclently considered that fraud was the basis 
of the action, and that such fraud might 
consist in maldng a statement known to be 
false. Haycraft v. Creasy, 2 East, 92, was 
again an action in respect of a false affirma­
tion made by the defendant to the plaintiff 
about the credit of a third party whom the 
plainti([ was about to trust. The words c·o111-
plained of were: "I can assure you of llly 
own knowledge thn t you may credit l\Iiss n .  
to any amount with perfect safety." A l l  the 
j nclges were agrec>(l that fraud was of the 
essence of tile action, but they differed in 
their view of the conclusion to be drawn 
from the facts. Lord Kenyon thought tha t 
fraud had been proved, because the defendant 
stated that to be true within his own kno"·l­
edge which he did not know to be true. The 
other judges, thinking that the defendant"s 
words vouching his own knowledge were no 
more than a strong expression of opinion, 
inasmuch as a statement concerning the cred­
it of another can be no more than a mat­
ter of opinion, and that he did believe the 
lady's credit to be what he represented, held 
that the action would not lie. It is beside 
the present purpose to inquire which view of 
the facts was the more sound. Upon the law 
there was no di fference of opinion. It is a 
distinct decision that knowledge of the falsity 
of the affirmation made is essential to till.' 
maintenance of the action, and that belief 
in its truth affords a defense. 
I may pass now to Foster v. Charles, T 
Bing. 105. It was there contended that the 
defendant was not liable, even though the 
representation be made was false to his 
knowledge, because be had no intention of 
defrauding or injuring the plaintiff. This 
contention was not uplleld by the coun. 
Tindal, C. J., saying: "It is a fraud in 1aw 
if  a party makes representations which he 
lrnows to be false, and inj ury ensues, al­
though the moti"res from which the l"l'Jlr"­
sentations proceeded may not have been bail. ., 
This is the first of the C'ases in wllich I ha>e 
met with the e:q,ression "fraud i n  law." It 
was manifestly used in relation to the argu­
ment that the defendant was not actuated 
by a desire to defraud or inj ure the person 
to whom the representation was made. The 
popular use of the ''ord "fraud" perhaps 
involves generally the conception of such a 
motive as one of its elements. But I do not 
think the chief j ustice intended to imli1·ate 
any doubt that the act which be character­
ized as a fraud in law \Tas in truth framlu­
lent as a matter of fa.ct also. Willfully to 
tell a falsehood, intending that another -;llall 
be led to act upon it as if it were the truth, 
may well be termed fraudulent, Tl"hatcn�r 
the motive which induces it, though it be 
neither gain to the person making the a�­
sertion nor injury to the per::>on to whom it 
is made. 
O rigi n-a l  from 
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Foster v. Charles. 7 Bin^. 105, was fol-
lowed in Corbett v. Brown, S Bins. 33, and
shortly afterwards in rolliill v. Walter, 3
Barn. & Adol. 114. The learned counsel for
tlie respondent placed great reliance on this
case, because, although the jury had nega-
tived the existence of fraud in fact, the de-
fendant was nevertheless held liable. It is
plain, however, that all that was meant by
this finding of the jury was that the dofend-
ant was not actuated by any corrupt or im-
proper motive, for Lord Tentcrden says: "It
was contended that, * • * in order to
maintain this species of action, it is not nec-
essary to prove that the false representation
was made from a corrupt motive of gain to
the defendant or a wicked motive of injury
to the plaintiff. It was said to be enough if
a representation is made which the party
making it knows to be untrue, and which
is intended by him, or which from the
mode in which it is made is calculated, to
induce another to act on the faith of it
in such a way as that he may incur dam-
age, and that damage Is actually incurred.
A willful falseliood of such a nature was
contended to be, in the legal sense of the
word, a fraud, and for this position was cit-
ed Foster v. Charles, 7 Biug. 105, lo which
may be added the recent case of C'.irbett v.
Brown. S Biug. 33. T)ip priuciiilo nf those
cases appears to be well founded, and to ap-
ply to the present."
In a later case of Crawshay v. Thompson,
4 .Man. &. G. 357, Maule, .1.. explains IV.lhill
v. Walter, 3 Barn. & Adol. Ill, thus: "If a
wrong be done by a false representation of
a party who knows such representation to
be false, the law will Infer an intention to
Injure. That is the effect of rolhill v. Wal-
ter." In the same case, Cresswell, J., de-
lines "fraud iu law" In terms which have
been often quoted. "The cases," ho says,
"may be considered to establish the prin-
ciple that fraud In law consists in knowingly
asserting that which Is false In fact to the
Injury of another."
In .Mocns v. lleyworlh, 10 Mors. & W. 157,
wlilch was devilled in the same year as Craw-
shay v. Thompson, 4 Man. & G. 357, Ix)rd
Ablngcr having suggested that an action of
fraud might bo maintained where no moral
blame was to be linpnied, Parke, B., said:
"To support that count [viz., n comit for
fraudulent repre«ent(itlon] It was essential
to provi- that the defendnnlN, knowingly,
[and I observe that this word Is euipliaNJi'.ed,]
by words or artH, nmde such a repriHcnta-
tion an U stated In (he third count, relative
fo tho Invoice of these (jonds, as tliry knew to
l)o untrue."
The next ense In tho series (Taylor v. Ash-
ton, II M iVr W. 401) Is line which strikes
iiif as lii'lng of gn-at liiip"rlance. It was an
nctl<in lironght ngiiliist directors of a bunk
for frniidiileiil I'eiiri'Hi'UlatliiiiH ns to lt« iif-
fairs, whereby the plaintiff \mih Induci-d to
tnkc sliuroM. 'J'he Jury found the defendanls
not guilty of fraud, but expressed the opin-
ion that they had been guilty of gross neg-
ligence. Exception was taken to the mode in
which the case was left to the jury, and it
was contended that their verdict was suffi-
cient to render the defendants liable. Parke,
B., however, in delivering the opinion of the
court, said: "It is insisted that even that
[viz., the gross negligence which the jury
had found], accompanied with a damage to
the plaintiff in conseiiuence of that gross neg-
ligence, would be sufficient to give him a
right of action. From this proposition we
I entirely dissent, because we are of opinion
I that, independently of any contract between
! the parties, no one can be made responsible
! for a representation of tJiis kind unless it be
\ fraudulently made. * * * But then it was
i said that, in order to constitute that fraud,
j it was not necessary to show that the de-
I fendauts knew the fact they stated to be un-
ti'ue; that it was enough that the fact was
untrue, if they communicated that fact for a
deceitful purpose; and to that proposition
tlie court is prepared to assent. It is not
, necessary to show that the defendants knew
the facts to be untrue; if they stated a fact
which was untrue for a fra\idulent purpose,
; they at the same time not believing that fact
i to be true, in that case it would be both a
I legal and moral fraud."
Now, it is impossible to conceive a more
j emphatic declaration than this: that, to su])-
1 port an action of deceit, fraud must be
proved, and that nothing less than fraud will
do. I can find no trace of the idea that it
wouUl sulUce if it were shown th.at the de-
fend.'uus had not reasonable grounds for be-
lieving the statements they made. It) is
i diflicult to understand how the defendants
j could, in the case on wliich I am cominent-
I ing, have been guilty of gross negligence in
making the statements they did, if they had
: reasonable grounds for believing them to be
t true, or if they had taken care that they had
reasonable grounds for making them.
I All the cases I have hitherto referred to
I were in courts of first instance. But in
Kvans v. Collins, 5 Q. B. SOI, 820, they were
I reviewed by the exchcciuer chamber. The
I judgment of the court was delivered by Tin-
j dal, C. .1. After staling the (juestion at issue
j to be "whether a statement or representation
wldch Is false in fact, but not known to be
I so by tlic party making it, but, on the con-
j irary, made honestly, and in the full belief
, that It was true, affords a ground of action,"
he proceeds to say: "The current of Hie a\i-
tliorities, from Pasley v. Freeman, 2 Smitli,
I Lead. Cas. 1)4, downwards, has laid down
I the general rule of l;iw to be tliat fraud must
concur with the false sintement In order to
give u ground of action." Is It not clear
that the coin-t considered that fraud was
ahNeiit If the statement was "made honestly,
and In the full belief that It was true?"
In Kvans v. lOdnionds, 13 C. B. 777, .Alaule,
I .T„ expressed an Important opinion, often
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l\l,ter '· Cha rles. 7 Bin�. 10.1. wns fol­
lowed in Corbett '· Brown. s Din:.:. J:l. and 
borly afterward- in l't l. ill '. ""a lter, 3 
Darn. & ..l.dol. 114. The learnetl counsel for 
the re pondent placed great reliance on this 
case. because. althou�h the jury hall ne�a­
ti>ed tile existence of fraud in fact, the de­
fewlaut was nen�rtlleles- lleld lia hie. It i 
pla in, howe>er. that all that was meant by 
tlli · tintling of the jury was tha t the tlt•fentl­
ant was not acrnatetl by any t'mTupt or im­
proper moti>e. for Lord Teutel'llen says: "It 
wa;; contended that, • • • in order to 
maintain tllis species of al'lion, it is not nec­
e::;ary to prt1ve that the fal"'e repl'l·seutation 
was made from a corrupt motive of :.:a in to 
tile tlefentlant or a w icl;.l'd woth·e of i ujur�· 
to the plaintiff. It was said to be enou:.:h i f  
a representation i mailc whicll t h e.>  party 
making it know to be untrue. an<l w h ich 
is intend(.'{} by him. or which from the 
mode in which i t  b w:ule is l':t kulate1l,  tu 
indn�e auotber to act on the faith of it 
in -.uch a way a that he may i ncur dam­
n �t'. and that tlama:.:e is actually incun-etl. 
A willful falst'hooli of snl'h a nature was 
con tl'n•l•�1l to lie, in the lt•;al sense of the 
worrl, n fra ud. aud for t lJis positi11u wa"' cit­
c1l Fo .. ter " Charle., 7 llin:.:. lO:i, �" which 
may Ul' addc>u the rt>t:C'nt case of <• •tltt•t t ' .  
Ik11\\"ll, fling. 3a. Th<' prindpl" nf t hr�c> 
ca�cs apJ•lars to be well founded, :mu to ap­
J•l .1· to t hl' pn ..'Scnt. ' 
I n  :l later case of Crawshay v. Tho11 1 pson. 
·I -'Inn . ..\ G. :3:i7, :.\I:tuh>, .r . .  l'.·pla ins l 'ulhi ll 
'"· Walter, 3 r.aru. ,1,;, Adol. 11 1 ,  t h u s :  " I f  a 
\\Tnn:.: hL' dnne br a fabe rcpn·srntation of 
a party who knows -<11"11 rep1·C'sl'1 1 t n t in11 to 
he fal c. tilt' law will  Infer n n  l n t l'nt ion to 
l njurC'. Tl1a t Is thl' l'lkd of l'olhll l  ' \Ynl 
tl'r." Jn the . a m " ell sl', C n sswPll, .T . ,  dl'· 
i l 1w ''fr:nul In law" in t Pnn. w hlPh haye 
b •·n oft 11 qu1•tcd. "'l'he ··n --rs," hl• ,.:a ys , 
"mny I ii' <'"ll ·ltl red to •' t n hl l sh 1 11 1· 1 '1"111· 
l'l J l l • ·  th:11 frn u d  I n law 1·on bl: In Irno w l 11glr 
a l'rt h1g- t 1 1 : 1 t  \\  ll lt >h I. fn l. P In fad to t he 
I nj u ry < • f  n n ulli••1'." 
T u  \lnl'U \", I I • •� \\ Ol'l h ,  JO :.\fl'f'S. & \Y, 1 :i7, 
w h l• h wn d• ·h lcil In tlw i-ia 1 1 1.--• ,1 P11 1· n s  < 'rn w-
11lmy >. 'l'hnlllp 0111  <J � I a n . ,\ I : . �::;;, f ;<>l"d 
.\ hh1 L:l'l' h n y l u g  1 1 i;g1 t rd thnt 11 11 n«t l1 1 1 1 o f  
fr11 1 1 1 l  m i g h t  l.Jl' rn n l 1 1 t a l t1 1 · l l  w h 1•rp 1 10 1 1 1nml 
l 1l11 1 1w wn to be l 1 1 1 p u 1 u l ,  l 'a rli•', H . , i;n ! d :  
"'J'O ll J IJI011 1 hll t < ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  [ \  17.., 1 1  <'<Hii l !  ror 
fr11 m l 1 1 ! Pnt r . . pr<• • ·ntn t l r•n l It 11 11 '" . ,  n t l : 1 l  
to p1 0\ • t ha t  t h " d t > fl 'llflt 1 1 1 t  , 1. 1 10\\ l 1 1 gly,  
( n u r l  I ob ' n  • t h. i t  t h l " 1 11 i i  1 1 •1 1 1 plu 1 I?. •  i i , )  
h �  \1<1r1 l or lit t , m n t l • ·  U•'h 1 1  r1•pr1 • 1 1 t 11· 
t lo11  n I tnt l'll I n  dw t h l rrl 1•01 1 1 1 t ,  rl'h1 t h•c 
tn t h e hi\ ul 1• •>C t h  c guorl , n t l•"Y Im••\\' t o  
111• lll ltrUt'. "  
'l'h 1 1 1  t r•n • I n  t h e ••rl •!! fTnylor ,. , •' h· 
101 1 , 1 1  t. . • \\' H I ! ) IH 1 11 1 1  whll ' l 1  t rl l'"H 
l•ll' 1114 hr• l u  • of 1:r• nt i l l ' ! " ' '  l 1 1 1 1 1  e, I t  \\ II 11 11  
111 1 11111  l1 1 011i.:hl n ·n l n  t • l l r• • t or o f  n h 1 1 1 1  
for r 1 , 11 1 1 1 1 1 111 1 t >1 ll'• 1 • 1 1 1 11 1 11 1 1 1  n h >  I t  n f  
f,1 h  , W hl'I f U� t l H J 1l /l l l l t l ff  I\ 11  f r l illl•'eil I n  
t n l • hn ro • 'I Ill' J u ry "11 1 1 1 1 1  l lw r l t 'f1 nr lu n ta 
D i  itiz by 
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not guilty or fraud. but expressed the opin- • 
ion that they had been guilty of �ross neg­
l igence. Exception was taken to t he mode in 
which the ca e was left to the j w-y, and i t  
was contended that their verdict wa uffi. 
cient to render t h e  defendants liable. Parke, 
B . .  howe>er, in delivering the opinion of the 
court, sa id: "It i s  in isted that even that "" 
[>iz., the gross negligence which the j ury wi! 
had found]. accompanied with a dama "'e to 3 
tile plaintiff i n  cousequence of that gross neg- .n 
l igence. would be sufficient to give h i m  a 
right of action. From this proposition we rbl 
entirely dissent, be<':rnse we are of opinion 
tllat, independently of any contract between 
the parties. no one can be maul' respon ·ible 
for a repre entation of this kincl unless it be 
fraullulently made. • • • But t hen it was 
said tbat, in order to con titute that fraud, 
it was not neces ary to show that the de­
fendants knew the fact they taled to be un­
true; that it wa enough that the fact was 
untrue. if  they communicated that fact for a 
1leccitful purpose; and to t hat proposition 
the court i prepared to a ent. It is not 
1 1 11..'Cessary to how that the defendants knew 
1 he facts to be untrue; if they staled a fact 
\Yhich wa untrue for a fra rn l ulent 1n1rpose. 
they at the same time not bl'l ie>ing that fact 
to be true. in t hat l'ase it \YOultl IJe both n 
legal aud moral fraud." 
Now, it is impossible to conceive a more 
<'lll llha t ic declaration t h a n  t h i s :  thnt, to .llJl· 
port a u  action of dece it . frautl must tic 
J • run·d. and that nothin.� less !ban fr:ual \Y il l  
do. I ea n find no traee of the itka t ha t  it 
wonlll sullke if it were :.;howu that thl' de­
fp111l:1 1 1 t s  had not rc>asouaule grounds for be­
l ic 1· ing- t he statl'mcn t s they m a de. I ll  i� 
dillk111t  to lllHl er:.<t :l l Hl bow the <ll•fe1Hl:l u t s  
i t•u nltl.  in  the l'ase on "hich I am com ment­
in_:.:. ha 1 e IJeen ,guilty of gross ne�lil!<'ll l' i u  
1 1 1a k i 1 1g- the stateme n t s  they did, I f  t hey hatl 
rt•a:.;onalt le grounds for Ut'lil'Ying t hem to ))e 
l l'\ll'. u t• if  thf')" had t a l•cn 1..·nre that t hl'y bad 
r<'a sn11n ltlp ;.:-rou nds for m a ki n:.: t h em. 
\. I I  t h l' l';tsrs I h:l\ h i t herto referrc>cl to 
w crt> I n  co n rts of fi rst i n s t a m•e. But In 
Ernns '" Col l i ns, r; Q. H. MH, S:.!0, the)' Wl'l'f' 
r1·1 i1• wf '1 l by the exehl'qncr d1 : 1 1nher. 'l'he 
1 j 1 1d;;11w11t  of l h <' l'o 1 1 1· t  wns deli Yerecl br Tin­
dal,  U . . I .  Aftl'r :.;l : 1 t l 1 1g the !llll'st i on a t  iss11P 
t 1 1  h .. " w hPt hcr a :> t a l l• t 1 1e 1 1 t or l'<'Jll'l'Nl'l l l : t l inn 
\\' h lf'h ls fals<' In l': t o  t, h 1 1 t  not k 1 1n w 1 1  to he 
i,.1 1 hy t h1• part.r m a l; i ng i t ,  b u t ,  on t ill' l'l ' l l·  
t t'a l'.\', mad!' botwsl ly, :t nd i n  t he full  helii•f 
t ha t  II \\'II -< t nll', : t llurd:.; :t grn11 1 1d  nf : t l' l inn," 
! 11•  J l l"llf'f'f ds tn sa y :  '"l'Jw l' l l l'rl' l l t  o r  t ill' a 1 1-
l hurl 1 ii•!-J, l ro m  l 'as)p�· v. l•'rct• 1 11 :1 1 1, :.! :-> m l t h .  
I .Pa d ,  1 '111'.1, !l l ,  dn11 1 1 w a rcls, h:ts l : 1 h l  down 
fht •  J;• ·m• rn l  l'llll' o l' 1 1 1 w t n  ht• t ha t  fr:1 11cl  m u�t 
1•01 1 1 · 1 1r  11  I th 1 1 11• fal C' 1< t n t l'llll'lll I n  ordl'r to 
girt•  1 1  i.;r1 1 1 1 1 1 d  of :t1•t lo1 1 " I s  I t  not 1'11•ar 
1 h1 1 t t h1 ·  ' " ' 1 1 rt 1·0 1 1 slc ll'l'l '<l  t ha t f'r: 1 1 1 d  was 
n i t  1 · 111  If 1 1 11• to l : 1 l f ' 1 1 1 1 • 1 1 t  \\ : ts " m n d 1 '  hont•st ly,  
nnrl  I n  1 1 11· 1 1 1 1 1  I H'll f ' f  t h n t  I t  W:IS t n w 'I" 
I I n  t;\ :1 1 1!1 1·, Md mond�. t :i C. H. 777, :\ l a u\I', . I , ,  l'. ( l l'l'H 'Pd un I m port a n t  upln lou, o f t en 
O ri . .  I I I  
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(juoteil, which has beou thought to carry the
law further than the previous authorities,
though I do not think it really does so. He
said; "If a uiau having no knowledge what-
ever on the subject takes upon himself to
represent a certain state of facts to exist,
he does so at his peril, and if it be done
either with a view to secure some benefit to
himself, or to deceive a third person, he is
in law- guilty of a fraud, for he takes upon
himself to warrant his own belief of the
truth of that which he so asserts. Although
the person making the representation may
have no knowledge of its falsehood, the rep-
resentation may still have been fraudulently
made." The foundation of this proposition
manifestly is that a person making any
statement which he intends another to act
upon must be taken to warrant his belief
in its truth. Any person making such a
statement must always be aware that the
person to whom it is made will understand,
if not that he who makes it knows, yet at
li'ast that he believes, it to be true; and, if
he has no such belief, he is as much guilty
of fraud as if he had made any other rep-
resentation which he knew to be false or did
not believe to be true.
I now arrive at the earliest case in which
I find the suggestion that an untrue state-
ment, made without reasonable ground for
believing It, will support an action for de-
ceit. In Bank v. Addie, L. R. 1 H. L. Sc.
145, 162, the lord president told the jury
"that, if a case should occur of directors
taking upon themselves to put forth in their
report statements of importance in regard
to the affairs of the bank, false in them-
selves, and which they did not believe, or
had no reasonable ground to believe, to be
true, that would be a misrepresentation and
deceit." Exceptions having been taken to
this direction without avail in the court of
sessions. Lord Chelmsford, in this house,
said: "I agree in the propriety of this in-
terlocutor. In the argument upon this ex-
cei^tion the case was put of an honest be-
lief being entertained by the directors of
the reasonableness of which it was said the
jury, upon this direction, would have to
judge. But supposing a person makes an
untrue statement, which he asserts to be
the result of a bona fide belief in its truth,
how can the bona fides be tested except by
considering the grounds of such belief?
And if an untrue statement is made found-
ed upon a belief which is destitute of all
reasonable grounds, or which the least in-
quiry would immediately correct, I do not
see that it is not fairly and correctly char-
acterized as misrepresentation and deceit."
I think there is here some confusion be-
tween that which is evidence of fraud and
that which constitutes it. A consideration
of the grounds of belief is no doubt an im-
portant aid in ascertaining whether the be-
lief was really entertained. A man's mere
assertion that he believed the statement he
made to be true is not accepted as conclu-
sive proof that he did so. There may be
such an absence of reasonal)le ground for
his belief as, in spite of his assertion, to
carry conviction to the mind that he had
not really the belief which he alleges. If
the learned lord intended to go further, as
apparently he did, and to say that, though
the belief was really entertained, yet, if
there were no reasonable grounds for it, the
person making the statement was guilty of
fraud in the same way as if he had known
what he stated to be false, I say, with all
respect, that the previous authorities afford
no warrant for the view that an action of
deceit would lie under such circumstances.
A man who forms his belief carelessly, or is
unreasonably credulous, may be blame-
worthy when he makes a representation on
which another is to act; but he is not, in
my opinion, "fraudulent" in the sense in
which that word was used in all the cases
from Pasley v. Freeman, 2 Smith, Lead.
Cas. 94, down to that with which I am
now dealing. Even when the expression
"fraud in law" has been employed, there
has always been present, and regarded as
an essential element, that the deception was
willful, either because the untrue statement
was known to be untrue, or because belief
in it was asserted without such belief exist-
ing. I have made these remarks with the
more confidence because they appear to me
to have the high sanction of Lord Cran-
worth. In delivering his opinion in the
same case he said: "I confess that my opin-
ion was that in what his lordship [the lord
president] thus stated he went beyond what
principle warrants. If persons in the situa-
tion of directors of a bank make statements
as to the condition of its affairs which they
bona fide believe to be true, I cannot think
they can be guilty of fraud because other
persons think, or the court thinks, or your
lordships think, that there was no sufficient
ground to warrant the opinion which they
had formed. If a little more care and cau-
tion must have led the directors to a conclu-
sion different from that which they put
forth, this may afford strong evidence to
show that they did not really believe in
the truth of what they stated, and so that
they were guilty of fraud. But this would
be the consequence, not of their having stat-
ed as true what they had not reasonable
ground to believe to be true, but of their
having stated as true what they did not be-
lieve to be true." Sir James Hannen, in
his judgment below, seeks to limit the ap-
plication of what Lord Cranworth says to
cases where the statement made is a matter
of opinion only. With all deference, I do
not think it was intended to be or can be
so limited. The direction which he was con-
sidering, and which he thought went beyond
what true principle warranted, had relation
to making false statements of importance
in regard to the affairs of the bank.
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quoted, which has beeu thought to carry the 
law further than the previous authorities, 
though I do not think it really does so. He 
;;a i d :  "If a man haviug no knowledge what­
ever on the subject takes upon himself to 
represent a certain state of facts to exist, 
lle does so at his peril, and i f  it be done 
either with a view to secure some benefit to 
himself, or to deceive a third person, be i s  
i n  l a w  guilty of a fraud, for b e  takes upon 
h i mself to warrant his own belief of the 
truth of that which he so asserts. Although 
the person making the representation may 
have no knowledge of its falsehood, the rep­
resentation may still have been fraudulently 
made." The foundation of this proposition 
manifestly is that a person making any 
statement which he intends another to act 
upon must be taken to warrant bis belief 
in its truth. Any person making such a 
statement must always be aware that the 
person to whom it is made will understand, 
if not that he who makes it knows, yet at 
!Past that he believes, i t  to be true ; and, i f  
he bas no such belief, h e  is as much guilty 
of fraud as if he bad made any other rep­
resentation which be knew to be false or did 
not believe to be true. 
I now arrive at the earliest case in which 
I find the suggestion that an untrue state­
ment, made without reasonable ground for 
believing it, will support an action for de­
ceit. In Bank v. Addie, L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 
145, 162, the lord president told the jury 
"that, if a case should occur of directors 
taking upon themselves to put forth in their 
report statements of importance in regard 
to the affairs of the bank, false in tbem-
elves, and which they did not believe, or 
bad no reasonable ground to believe, to be 
true, that would be a misrepresentation and 
·1eceit." Exceptions having been taken to 
this direction without avail in the court of 
sessions, Lord Chelmsford, in this house, 
said : "I agree in the propriety of this in­
terlocutor. In the argument upon this ex­
ception the case was put of an honest be­
lief being entertained by the di rectors of 
the reasonableness of which it was said the 
jury, upon this direction, would have to 
judge. But supposing a person makes an 
untrue statement, which he asserts to be 
the result of a bona fide belief i n  its truth, 
how can the bona tides be tested except by 
considering the grounds of such belief? 
And i f  an untrue statement i s  made found­
ed upon a belief which i destitute of all 
reasonable grounds, or which the least in­
quiry would immediately correct, I do not 
see that it is not fairly and correctly char­
acterized as mi srepresentation and deceit." 
I think there is here some confusion be­
t ween that which is evidence of fraud and 
that �Yhich constitutes it. A consideration 
of the grounds of belief i s  no doubt an im­
portant aid in ascertaining whether the be­
lief was really entertained. A man's mere 
as ertion that he believed the statement he 
D . ::r · �·-- -r 
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made to be true i s  not accepted as conclu­
sive proof that he did so. 'fhere may be 
such an absence of reasonable grouncl for 
his belief as, in spite of his assertion, to 
carry conviction to the mind that he had 
not really the belief which he alleges. I f  
the lea.med lorcl intended to g o  further, a s  
apparently h e  did, a n d  t o  say tbat, though \ the belief was really entertained, yet, i f  
there were n o  reasonable grounds for it, the 
person making the statement was guilty of 
fraud in the same way as if he had known 
what he stated to be false, I say, with all 
respect, that the previous authorities afford 
no warrant for the view that an action of 
deceit would lie under such circu mstances. 
A man who forms his belief carelessly, or i s  
unreasonably credulous, may b e  blame­
worthy when he makes a representation on 
which another is to act; but he is not, in 
my opinion, "fraudulent" in the sense in 
which that word was used in all the cases 
from Pasley v. Freeman, 2 Smith, Lead. 
Cas. 94, down to that with which I am 
now dealing. Even when the expression 
"fraud in law" has been employed, there 
has always been present, and regarded as 
an essential element, that the deception was 
willful, either because the untrue statement 
was known to be untrue, or because belief 
in i t  was asserted without such belief exist­
ing. I have made these remarks with the 
more confidence because they appear to me 
to have the high sanction of Lord Cran­
worth. In delivering his opinion in the 
same case he sa i d :  "I confess that my opin­
ion was that in what his lordship [the lord 
president] thus stated he went beyond what 
principle warrants. If persons in the situa-1 tion of d irectors of a bank make statements 
as to the condition of its affairs which they 
bona fide believe to be true, I cannot think 
they can be guilty o f  fraud because other 
persons think, or the court thinks, or your 
lordships think, that there was no sufficient 
ground to warrant the opinion which they 
had formed. If a little more cai·e and cau­
tion rn ust have led the d irectors to a cone! u-/ sion different from that which they put 
I forth, this may afford strong evidence to 
I show that they did not really believe i n  t h e  truth o f  what they stated, a n d  so that 
they were guilty of fraud. But this would 
be the consequence, not of their having stat­
ed as true what they had not reasonable 
ground to belie�e to be true, but of their 
• having stated as true what they did not be­
lieve to be true." Sir James Hannen, in 
his judgment below, seeks to limit the ap­
plication of what Lord Cramvorth says to 
cases where the statement made is a matter 
of opinion only. With all deference, I do 
not think it was intended to be or can be 
so lim ited. The di rection which he was con­
sidering, and which he thought went beyond 
what true principle warranted, bad relation 
to making false statements of importance 
in regard to the affairs of the bank. 
- · · ::r · r  . f, _ ,  l 
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When this is borne in mind, and the words
which follow those quoted by Sir James
Hannen are looked at, it becomes to my
mind obvious that Lord Cranworth did not
use the words, "the opinion which they had
formed," as meaning auythins different from
"the belief which they entertained." The
opinions expressed bj' Lord Cairns in two
well-known cases have been cited as tliough
they supported the view that an action of
deceit might be maintained without any
fraud on the part of the person sued. I do
not think that they bear any such construc-
tion. In the case of Mining Co. v. Smith,
L. R. 4 H. L. 04, 79, he said: "If persons
take upon themselves to make assertions as
to which they are ignorant whether they are
true or untrue, they must, in a civil point ot
view, be held as responsible as if they had
asserted that which they knew to bo untrue."
This must mean that the persons refi'rred
to were conscious, when making the asser-
tion, that they were ignorant whether it was
true or untrue; for. if not. it might be said
of any one who innocently makes a false
statement. He must be ignorant that it Is
untrue, for otherwise he would not make it
innocently. He must be ignorant tliat it is
true, for by the hypothesis it is false. Con-
struing the language of Lord Cairns in the
sense I have indicated, it is no more than
an adoption of the opinion expressed by
Maule, J., in Evans v. Edmonds, 13 0. X:.
777. It is a case of the represeiitatiou «f
a person's belief in a fact when lie is con-
scious tliat he knows not whetlior it be
true or false, and when he has tlierefore no
such belief. When Lord Cairns speaks of
It as not being frauil in the more invidious
sense, he refers, 1 think, only to the fact
that there was no intention to cheat or In-
jure. In I'eek v. CJurney, L. K. (5 II. L. 377,
4t)!J, tlie same learned lord, after alluding to
the clrcunistaMce that the defendants had
been aciiuitted of fraud upon the criminal
<-harge, and thai there was a great deal to
show that they were laliciring under the
InipresHlon that the concern had In It the
elenicnlR of a prolltnbic conimerc'lal under-
taking, proceeds to say: "They may be ab-
Holved from any charge of a willful design
or motive to nilsh'ad or defraud the public.
Hut, In a civil proc'c-edlng of this kind, all
timt your lordships have tn examine Is I he
i|ui-Htlon, was there or was there not nils-
repreHi'nlallon In point of fact? If there
wnH, however. Iiowever innocent the mo-
tive may liavi- been, your lonlslilps will be
obliged to arrive nl ilie ccinNi'ipn'iiees which
properly would rr'Hull from what was doiH'."
Id the cnse tlii-n under conHlderatlon It was
clenr thnt. If there had been a fiilse Hlate-
nieiit of fad. It lind U-en knowhiKly made.
I/ord CnlriiM <'erl»lidy cnuld not have meant
thlil III an nclloii of d< It the only qui'stlon
to be I'oMHlilered wnti whelher or not there
xrnn inlHri'pre»enijillon In point of fuel. All
thnt he there pointed out wan tlinl In KUch
a case motive was immaterial; that it
mattered not that there was no design to
mislead or defraud the public if a false rep-
resentation were knowingly made. It was
therefore but an affirmation of the law laid
down in Foster v. Charles, 7 Bing. 105, Pol-
hill V. Walter, 3 Barn. & Adol. 114, and
other cases I have already referred to.
I come now to very recent cases. In .Weir
V. Bell, 3 Exch. Div. 238, Lord Bramwell
vigorously criticised the expression "legal
fraud," and indicated a very decided opinion
that an action founded on fraud could not
be sustained except by the jjroof of fraud
in fact. I have already given my reasons
for thinking tliat, until recent times, at all
events, the judges who spoke of fraud in
law did not mean to exclude the existence
of fraud in fact, but only of an intention to
defraud or injure.
In the same case Cotton, L. J., stated the
law in much the same way as he did in the
i present case, treating "recklessly" as equiv-
I alent to "without any reasonable ground for
believing" the statements made. But the
same learned judge, in Arkwright v. New-
bold, 17 Ch. Div. 301, laid down the law
somewhat differently, for he said: "In an
action of deceit the representation to found
the action must not be innocent; that is
to say, it must be made either with knowl-
edge of its being false, or with a reckless
disregard as to whether it is or is not
true." And his exposition of the law was
substantially the same in Edgington v. Fitz-
maurice, 29 Ch. Div. 4o!). In this latter
case Bowen, L. J., delined what the plain-
tiff must prove in addition to the falsity
of the statement, as "secondly, that it was
false to the knowledge of the defendants,
or that they made it not caring whether
It was true or false."
It only remains to notice the case of Smith v.
Chailwi.k, 2o Ch. Div. 27. 44, 1)7. The late
master of the rolls there said: "A man may is-
sue a prospectus or nitike any other statement
to induce another to enter Into a contract, be-
lieving that his slatenient is true, and not
Inteinling to deceive; but he may through
ear("lessnes8 have made slateiiients whiih
are not true, and which he ought to have
known were not true, and If he does so he
Is liable in an action for deceit. He can-
not be allowed to escape merely because
he had good inlentlons, and did not Intend
to defraud." This, like everything else that
fell from thnt learned judge, is worthy of
ri'Mpi'clfnl consldenillon. With the last seii-
leiH'e I quite agree, but 1 cannot assent to
the doctrine (hat a false statement made
through carelessness, and which ought to
have been known to be untrue, of Itself
renders the person who makes It liable to
nn action for deceit. This does not seem
lo nie by any means necessarily to amount
to fraud, without which the action will
not. In my opinion, lie.
It must be remeinliered thai it was not
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When this is borne in mind, and the words 
which follow tho e quoted by dr James 
Hannen are looked at, i t  become to my 
minJ ob>ious that Lord Crauworth did not 
use the words, "the opinion which the)· had 
formed," as meaning anything- different from 
''the belief which they entertained." The 
oprn1on expressed by Lord ai l'll in two 
well-know n  cases ha>e been cited a tl.w ugh 
t hey supported the >iew that an action of 
deceit might be ma in ta ined without any 
fraud o n  the part o f  t h e  person sued. I do 
11ot thi nk tha t they bear any ·uch con'truc­
t ion. In t he case of :\li ning Co. Y. � m i t ll, 
L. n. 4 II. L. t.H, TO, he sa i ll :  " I C  persons 
take upon them elYe to make assertions a· 
to which they are ignorant whether they are 
true ur untrue, they must. in a c i \· i l  poi n t or 
Yiew. ue lleld as re ·ponsible as if they had 
a sserte1l t liat which they knew to lJ' untl'Ul'." 
This mu t m ea n  that the person ref Prred 
to were con. cious. when making the asser­
t ion, that rlieJ were ignora n t  whet her it was 
t rue or untrue ; for. if not. it might be said 
of anJ· one who iauoceutl�· makes a false 
sratement. He must be ignora n t that i t  Is 
untrue. for otherwise he \Youhl 11ot makl' it 
innocently. Ile must be iguorant t ha t  it i 
t rue. for by the hypothesis it is false. '011-
struiu� the lan::rnage of Lord Cai ms In t he 
sen-<' I ha \·e i ml kated , it  i. no mo1· than 
an adoption of t he opinion CXi't·es cd by 
:\ l a u l c  . .T., i n  EY:llls '" Edmonds, 1:3 C. J.. 
, 1 1 .  I t  is a ease of the rejlresc n l at tuu vt 
a 11crson's liclicf in a fact w hen he is con­
sdu11s 1 hat Ill' li:uows not " hl'I hPI' it he 
t l'lh' or fa lse , a a<l when he ha s l lh· rl'f11 1·e llll 
such lJclit•f "'heu Lnrd 'a i n1 s sp1•a ks of 
it ns not l wi 1 1 �  fr:t 11 1 l  ill t h <' mo l't' i 1 1 \·id lous 
se l l .  c•, 1 1 1· n•fcrs. I t h iuJ;:, onl y to t h<' fnct 
t hat l lwn• was uo 1 1 1 tcn tion to <'111•:11 or In· 
j u n•. Jn 1 •, ... 1;: ,. 1 ; u rncy, L. n.  ti I ! . J ,, :177, 
l lY. 1, ti ... s:1 111  • li·a rnrd lorcl, a ft e r  a l h1th ni: t o  
l hl' ' l n·1 1 1 1 1,.1H11 c·p t h a t  ! h t• !lt•fl't 1 d a 1 1 t s  luHl  
l tr - 1 • 1 1  a1·1 1 1 1 i t t l 'd o f  fraud 1 1 1 1 1111  t lw 1·rl m i 1 1a l  
< ' 1 1ar;.:1!, a n c l  t h a t  t hcr1! w a s  n gn•at clPal tn 
8h11\\' t ha t  t h1•y Wl'l'l' l : 1 l o 1 1 rl1 1g- 11 nc1Pr t he 
l m pn· 11111  t 1 1 1 1 t  t lw con•·<'rl l  hnil In i t t he 
1 • 1 1 ° 1 1 1 1  I l l  f l f  :l )ll'lll\ l : l hlt• C'Olll l lll 'l'l'l : t l  l l l l d t'J'• 
t u l  l 1 1g, p ro1·1•l'dB t o  a y :  '"I h11y m a y  1 1 1 •  : th· 
1 1h'1 d fr11 1 1 1  a n y  1 •ha rg1• of 1 1  \\ l l lf 1 1 l  dt 'l<\i:n 
or 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 \· 1 · l r1 1 1 1 l ,.lP:1d or d 1 'i r: 1 1 1d 1 lu•  p11 l ol ll' . 
1 : 1 1 t ,  1 1 1  11 rh I I  pr< u 'Pl'd l n g  nt' t h i s  ld 1 1 d ,  n i l  
1 h11 t .)·1 1 1 1 r  lori l 11h l p  h11r1•  t 1 1  1 • x 1 1 m l l 1 1 •  h 1  l h 1!  
' I l l" t lr 1 1 1 ,  wae t l 1erro or wu t lu•n• 11111  mh�· 
1 1  pr•' . . 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1  111  p11 l 1 1 l  of tu••t '! 1 r  1 1  . . .  rp 
\\II , h1 1\\ 1 •\ Pr, l111\1 1•\'1•r l 1 1 1 u 11 •P11t  t hl' 1 1 10· 
l \' 1 •  1 1 1 1 1y 1111 \ •'  ht l ' l l ,  1 11 1 r  lord h l J t  " I ll hi' 
• 1hllJ,:l'fl t o  11r r h "  nt 1 h• •  """ 1 ' ll l • ' l l• '" \I h l i • h 
pr11 1 11•rly \\ O ult l l'l l! f l l t  from w ha t \\: I S  dn11 1 • ,"  
1 11 l lw en · t h • 11 11 n<1, .r •'< 1 1 1  l 1 l • · 1·11 l l1 1 1 1  I t  \1 1 1 11  
, l • • n r  t l tnt,  I r  t h l'r<' h n < I  1 11 c u  1 1  fn l ,,  t :i t 1 ' -
1 1 1 , , 1 1 t  or fo r t ,  I t  lu1<l  h 1 •Pll 1' 1 1rt\\ l 1 1i:;ly 11111d1•. 
1 ,1Jr<I f'o l l  1 1  • ••rt 11 l 1 1 I )  1 ·n 1 1 h l  ll(lt htl \ •' 1 1 1 1 •: 1 1 1 t  
t l1 n t  1 1 1  1 1 1 1  11ct l11n < J t  <l••  • • I t  t l 11•  1 1 1 1 ly q 1 1 1 •Ht l1 1 1 1  
'" I I  ' 011Mltl 1  r,.,, wni1 \\ II• t l 1•  r o r  n o t  t h • r 1  • 
wu 1 1 1 IMt•'Jtt•  1•11 tn t 1t 11 1  h• 1 1ol 1 1 t  . ,r  fn•·t. ·' 1 1  
1 lin t '"' l h l'r" JiQl n t e • I  0111  \\II t h 11 1 1 11 1 1 1 ' 1 1  
by 
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a case motive was immaterial; that i t  
mattered not that t here was n o  de:sign to 
m islead or dt>fra ud the public if a. fa! e rep­
resentation were knowingly made. It w a s  
therefore but a n  affirmation of t h e  l a w  l a i d  
tlow n  i n Foster v.  Cha rles, 7 Bing. 105, Pol­
hill v. \\alter, 3 Barn. & Ado!. 114, and 
other cases I have a lready referred to . 
I come now to very recent ca es. In \Yeir 
v. Bell , 3 Exch. D iv. '.!38, Lord Bra m w e l l  
''i�urously crit icised the expression "lega l 
fraud," a nd indica ted a very decided opinion 
that a n  action fouUlled on fra.ud coultl not 
be sust:1ined except by the proof of fraud 
in fact. I ha ,·e a l ready giYen my reasou 
for thi nking that, unlil recent times. a.t a ll 
eYents. the j udges who �poke of fraud i n  
l a w  d i d  not m e a n  to exclude the existence 
of fra uu in fact, !Jut only of a n intention to 
defraud or inj ure. 
In the same case Cotton, L. J., stated the 
l a w  in much the same way a he dill in the 
l 'l'l'sent case. treating "recklessly" a equiv­
a lent to "w ill.lout a ny rea sonable ground for 
believ ing" the state ment m:1de. But the 
au1c len l'lled j u dge, in Arkwright v. Xew­
bold, 17 Cb. D i v. 301, laid down tile l:l\Y 
so me w ha t  differently, for Ile said : " I n  a u  
action of deceit the representa t ion t o  fou u tl 
the action must not be innocent ; that is 
to say, it must b made eit her w i t h  knowl­
edge or its being" fa l ·e, 01· w i th a reckless 
disregard as to w h et her it is OL' is not 
t rne." A nll h i s  expo·ilion of the law was 
suhsla ntin lly the sa me in Edgington Y. l�itz­
m au riC' '. ::?9 Ch. Div. 4;)}). In this latter 
1·a s BO\\' n, L. J .. d tined w but the 1)1:1 iu­
t i!T must prove i n  addition to tbe fa lsit y 
nl' t he stat 'm ent, as "secondly, t i.la t  it wa s 
false to th ' lrnn wlt'll;.:e or lbe defenda nts, 
or t h a t  tla•y m:Hle it not t•a r i ng wbetlwr 
it was t rue or false." 
1 t  only rema ins to not ice t he <':l e of Smi t h  Y. 
hath\ kk, :.!O C'h. DiY. :!7, .J...!, li7. The l:tte 
111astl'r of tl1e rolls l her said : "A rnnn m;1y is· 
i-;tw a 111·ospect u or mnke a ny other st a l!'nwn t 
t o  h11l11l'C nnolh r to enter i nto a t'ontrnct, be­
l lP Y i n ;.: t h n l his slat  •menl is t rue, :HHI not 
i n l 1•1 1d i 1 1;.: to clC'<·1•h e; hut hi' 111:1y t h ro11gh 
1 c•n rPh•ssnc>ss hll \ e made s t a t eme n t s  w h k h  
n r1 •  nnt t rue, a n d  w h ich h e  oug-h t to h a v e 
lrn11\1 1 1  \\ l're unl l l'llC', n n d  If Ill' t i nes S<l he 
I s  l i : 1  l 1 IP I n  nn ndlon for l ll•c•eil. l ie c·:1 n -
1 1 0 1  h 1 •  : 1 1 11 1\\ e d  lo esC': l pe l l ll'l'el y  llf.'l':l\ISC 
lw h n t l  ;.:ond l n h• n t lnrn�. nrnl d ill not l n t c>ud 
to d P frn m l " 'l'hls, I l k C'Y!'ry l h lng else t h n t  
r . .  1 1  f n 1 1 1 1  t h n  t IP11 r1wd J nd;.:P, i s  worthy or 
r1 •i<1 11·1· t r 1 1 l  1·111 1sli ll ' l': l l  ion. \\ I (  h the la,.;I sPn­
l 1 • 1 u ·p I ' l l l i l l ' n ;.: 1·P1\ hut I c•a n not ass •ut to 
t ht '  d 1 11 ' 1 1·l11P t hn t  n f: l l >lc' s l :t t l' l l l r n t  matlc 
t h rough 1·11 n•lpssnPHS. : 1 m l  w h ich ought t o  
hll\'l' ht•l'fl lrnn\\ 1 1  t o  he U n t rue, O f  ltsp\f 
n•1 1 1 h•rH t h l' 1 wr,.,nn who ma kes It l lnhle to 
11 11  ac:t lnn ror < I P<'c l l .  ' l ' h l H  !lnet1 not HPcm 
to nw hy 1 1 1 1}  1 1 w:1 11H 11 !'r1'1-1sn rily to amnuut 
In fra n r l .  w i l hn11t  \\ h lf'11  l lw nd lnn w i l l  
u n i ,  1 1 1  In)' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ,  1 1 1 •  
I t  1 1 1 1 1  I 1 11'  l'l'l l l f' l l l l ll'l'l'd ! l m t  l l  W l l S  not 
Jn::1  1 ti 1  11 o rn  
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requisite for Sir George Jessel in Smith v.
Chiulwiek, 20 Ch. Div. 27, 44, U7, to form
.in opinion whether a statement carelessly
made, but honestly believed, could be the
foundation of an action of deceit. The de-
cision did not turn on any such point. The
conclusion at which he arrived is expressed
in these terms: "On the whole, I have come
to the conclusion that this, although in some
respects inaccurate, and in some respects
not altogether free from imputation of
carelessness, was a fair, honest, and bo-
na tide statement on the part of the de-
fendants, and by no means exposes them to
an action for deceit." I may further note
that in the same case Lindley, L. J., said:
"The plaintiff has to prove— First, that the
misrepresentation was made to him; sec-
ondly, he must prove that it was false;
thirdly, that it was false to the knowledge
of the defendants, or, at all events, that
they did not believe the truth of it." This
appears to be a different statement of the
law from that which I have just criticised,
and one much more in accord with the prior
decisions.
The case of Smith v. Chadwick was car-
ried to your lordships' house. L. E. 9 App.
Cas. 187, 190. Lord Selborne thus laid down
the law. "I conceive that, in an action of
deceit, it is the duty of the plaintiff to es-
tablish two things: First, actual fraud,
which is to be judged of by the nature and
character of the representations made, con-
sidered with reference to the object for
which they were made, the knowledge or
means of knowledge of the person making
them, and the intention which the law justly
imputes to every man to produce those con-
sequences which are the natural result of
his acts; and, secondly, he must establish
that this fraud was an inducing cause to the
contract." It will be noticed that the noble
and learned lord regards the proof of actual
fraud as essential. All the other matters to
which he refers are elements to be consider-
ed in determining whether such fraud has
been established. Lord Blackburn indicated
that, although he nearly agreed with the
master of the rolls, the learned judge had
not quite stated what he conceived to be the
law. He did not point out precisely how far
he differed, but it is impossible to read his
judgment in this case, or in that of Brownlie
V. Campbell, L. R. 5 App. Cas. 925, without
seeing that in his opinion proof of actual
fraud or of a willful deception was requisite.
Having now drawn attention, I believe, to
all the cases having a material bearing upon
the question under consideration, I proceed
to state briefly the conclusions to which I
have been led. I think the authorities es-
tablish the following propositions: First. In
order to sustain an action of deceit, there
must be proof of fraud, and nothing short of
that will suflice. Secondly. Fraud is proved
when it is shown that a false representation
has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without
GUIF.rEltS.PROP. — 5
belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless
whether it be true or false. Although I have
treated the second and third as distinct
cases, I think the third is but an instance of
the second; for one who makes a statement
under such circumstances can have no real
belief in the truth of what he states. To
prevent a false statement being fraudulent,
thei-e must, I think, always be an honest be-
lief in its truth. And this probably covers
the whole ground, for one who knowingly
alleges that which is false haa obviously no
such honest belief. Thirdly. If fraud be
proved, the motive of the person guilty of
it is immaterial. It matters not that there
was no intention to cheat or injure the per-
son to whom the statement was made.
I think these propositions embrace all that
can be supported by decided cases from the
time of Fasley v. Freeman, 2 Smith, Lead.
Cas. 94. down to Bank v. Addle, L. R. 1 H.
L. Sc. 145, in 1867, when the first suggestion
is to be found that belief in the truth of what
he has stated will not suffice to absolve the
defeudaut if his belief be based on no rea-
sonable grounds. I have shown that this
view was at once dissented from by Lord
Cranworth, so that there was at the outset
as much authority against it as for it. And
I have met with no further assertion of Lord
Chelmsford's view until the case of Weir v.
Bell, 3 Exch. Div. 238, where it seems to be
involved in Lord Justice Cotton's enunciation
of the law of deceit. But no reason is there
given in support of the view; it is treated as
established law. The dictum of the late mas-
ter of the rolls that a false statement, made
through carelessness, which the person mak-
ing it ought to have known to be untrue,
would sustain an action of deceit, carried
the matter still further. But that such an
action could be maintained notwithstanding
an honest belief that the statement made
was true, if there were no reasonable grounds
for the belief, was, I think, for the first time
decided in the case now under appeal.
In my opinion, making a false statement
through want of care falls far short of, and
is a very different thing from, fraud, and the
same may be said of a false representation
honestly believed, though on insufiieient
grounds. Indeed, Cotton, L. J., himself indi-
cated, in the words I have already quoted,
that he should not call it fraud. But the
whole current of authorities, with which I
have so long detained your lordships, shows
to my mind conclusively that fraud is es-
sential to found an action of deceit, and that
it cannot be maintained where the acts prov-
ed cannot properly be so termed. And the
case of Taylor v. Ashton, 11 Mees. & W.
401, appears to me to be in direct conflict
with the dictum of Sir George Jessel, and in-
consistent with the view taken by the learn-
ed judges in the court below. I observe that
Sir Frederick Pollock, in his able work on
Torts (page 243, note), referring, I presume,
to the dicta of Cotton, L. J., and Sir George
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reqn Lite for Sir George JessC'I in Smith v. 
Chadwick, 20 Ch. Div. 27, 44, G7, to form 
an opinion whether a statement carelessly 
made, but honestly believed, could be the 
foundation of an action of deceit. The de­
cision did not turn on any sucb point. The 
conclusion at which be arrived is expressed 
in these terms:  "On the whole, I have come 
to the conclusion that this, although in some 
respects inaccurate, and in some respects 
not altogether free from imputation of 
carelessness, was a fair, honest, and bo­
na fide statement on the part of the de­
fendants, and by no means exposes them to 
an action for deceit." I may further note 
that in tbe same case Lindley, L. J., sa id: 
"The plaintiff has to prove-First, that the 
misrepresentation was made to him ; sec­
ondly, be must prove that it was false ; 
thirdly, that i t  was false to the knowledge 
of the defendants, or, at all events, that 
they did not believe the truth of it." This 
appears to be a different statement of the 
law from that which I bave just criticised, 
and one much more in accord with the prior 
decisions. 
The case of Smith v.  Chadwick was car­
ried to your lordships' house. L. R. 9 App. 
Oas. 187, 190. Lord Selborne thus laid down 
the law. "I conceive that, in an action of 
deceit, it is the duty of the plaintiff to es­
tablish two things : First, actual fraud, 
which is to be judged of by the nature and 
character of the representations made, con­
sidered with reference to the object for 
which tbey were made, the knowledge or 
means of knowledge of the person making 
them, and the intention which tbe law j ustly 
imputes to every man to produce those con­
sequences which are the natural result of 
his acts; and, secondly, he must establish 
that this fraud was an inducing cause to the 
contract." It will be noticed that the noble 
and learned lord regards the proof of actual 
fraud as essential. All the other matters to 
which be refers are elements to be consider­
ed in determining whether such fraud bas 
been established. Lord Blackburn indicated 
that, although he nearly agreed with the 
master of the rolls, the learned judge bad 
not quite stated what be conceived to be the 
law. He did not point out precisely bow far 
be differed, but it is impossible to read bis 
judgment in tbis case, or in that of Brownlie 
v. Campbell, L. R. 5 App. Oas. 925, without 
seeing that in his opinion proof of actual 
fraud or of a willful deception was requisite. 
Having now drawn attention, I believe, to 
all the cases having a material bearing upon 
the question under consideration, I proceed 
to state briefly the conclusions to which I 
have been led. I think the authorities es­
tablish the following propositions: First. I n  
order to sustain a n  action o f  deceit, there 
must be proof of fraud, and nothing short of 
that will suffice. Secondly. Fraud is pro-red 
when it is shown that a false representation 
has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without 
G H fjT'l'J'l . Pn-0 .-.--5 
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belief i n  its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless 
whether it be true or false. Although I bave 
treated the second and third as distinct 
cases, I think the third is but an instance of 
the second ;  for one who makes a statement 
under such circumstances can have no real 
belief in the truth of what he states. To 
prevent a false statement being fraudulent, 
there must, I think, always be an honest be­
lief in its trntb. And this probably covers 
the whole ground, for one who knowingly 
alleges that which is false has obviously no 
such honest belief. Thirdly. If fraud be 
proved, the motive of the person guilty of 
it is immaterial. It matters not that there 
was no intention to cheat or injure the per­
son to whom the statement was made. 
I think these propositions embrace all that 
can be supported by decided cases from the 
time of rasley v. Freeman, 2 Smith, Lea11. 
Cas. 94, down to Bank v. Addie, L. R. 1 H. 
L. Sc. 145, in 1867, when the first suggestion 
is to be founcl that belief in the truth of what 
he has stated will not suffice to absolve the 
defendant if  his belief be based on no rea­
sonable grounds. I have shown that this 
view was at once dissented from by Lord 
Cranwortb, so that there was at the outset 
as much au thority against it as for it. And 
I have met with no further assertion of Lord 
Chelmsford's view until the case of Weir v. 
Bell, 3 Exch. Div. 238, where it seems to bE> 
involved in Lord Justice Cotton's enunciation 
of the law of deceit. But no reason is there 
given in support of the view ; it is treated as 
established Ia w. The dictum of the late mas­
ter of the rolls that a false statement, made 
through carelessness, which the person mak­
ing it  ought to have known to be untrue, 
would sustain an action of deceit, carried 
the matter still further. But that such an 
action could be maintained notwithstanding 
an honest belief that the statement made 
was true, if  there were no rea sonable grounds 
for the belief, was, I think, for the first time 
decided in the case now under appeal. 
In my opinion, making a false statement 
through want of care falls far short of, and 
is a very different thing from, fraud, and the 
same may be said of a false representation 
honestly believed, though on insufficient 
grounds. Inrleed, Cotton, L. J., himself indi­
cated, in the words I ha-re already quotecl, 
that he should not call it fraud. But the 
whole current of authorities, with which I 
have so long detained your lordships, shows 
to my mind conclusively that fraud is es­
sential to found an action of deceit, and that 
it cannot be maintained where the acts pro•­
ed cannot properly be so termed. And the 
case of Taylor v. Ashton, 11 �lees. & W. 
401, appears to me to be in direct conflict 
with the dictum of Sir George Jessel, and in­
consistent with the view taken by the learn­
ed judges in the court below. I observe that 
Sir Frederick Pollock, in his able work on 
Torts (page 2-±3, note), referring, I presume, 
to the dicta of Cotton, L. J., and Sir Geor.;e 
I ::1 r f 
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Jessel, XI. R., says that the actual decision in
Taylor v. Ashton, 11 Mees. & W. 401, is not
consistent with the modern cases, on the du-
ty of directors of companies. I think he is
right. But, for the reasons I have sivon, I
am unable to hold that anything less than
fraud will render directors or any other per-
sons liable to an action of deceit.
At the same time I desire to say distinctly
that, wlien a false statement has been made,
the questions whether there were reasonable
grounds for believing it, aud what were the
means of knowledge in the possession of the
person making it, are most weighty matters,
for consideration. The ground upon which
an alleged belief was founded is a most im-
portant test of its reality. I can conceive
many cases where the fact that an alleged
belief was destitute of all reasonable founda-
tion would sutlice of itself to convince the
court that it was not really entertained, and
that the representation was a fraudulent
one. So, too, although means of knowledge
are. as was pointed out by Lord Blackburn
In Brownlie v. Campbell, L. R. 5 App. Cas.
925, a very different thing from knowledge.
If I thought that a person making a false
statement had shut his eyes to the facts, or
purposely abstained from inquiring into
them. I should hold that honest belief was
absent, and that he was just as fraudulent
as if he had knowingly stated that which
w;is false.
I have arrived with some reluctance at
the conclusion to which I have felt myself
compelled, for I think those who put before
the public a prospectus to induce them to
embark their money in a commercial enter-
prise ought to be vigilant to see that it con-
tains such representations only as are in
strict accordance with fact, and I should be
very imwllllng to give any countenance to
the contrary idea. I think there Is much
to be said for the view that this moral duty
ought to some e.\tent to be converted Into
n li'gal obligation, and that the want of
r<-:iK(iniible care to see that statements maile
miller such clrctiinstunces are true should
bo made an actionable wrong. But this Is
not a matter lit for discussion on the present
occnHlon. If it Is to be done, the legisla-
ture niUHt Intervene, and expressly give a
right of ncllr)n In respect of such a deiHirlure
from duty. It ought not, I think, to be
done by strnlnlng the law, ami holding that
to be frniidident which the tribunal feels
t'auiiiit proprrly l)e ho (lescrlbed. 1 think
nilHclilef Ih likely to result from blurring
the diHllnrtlon between carelessnesH and
frauil. and ei|iiully holding a man fraudti-
lent wlii'thiT hlH acts can or cannot he Just-
ly (to di'Hlgnnted.
It now reinalnii for ine to apply what I be-
lieve to be the law to the facts of the pres-
ent fiiHo. The clinrge agalimt the defeiid-
nnlw Im that tlwy frnudulently repreMcnted
that, by the spi'i-liil iirt of parliiinn'Mt which
the company li:iil ..i.t., in.-.i. ii„.y imil n rlclit
to use steam or other mechanical power in-
stead of horses. The test which I purjwse
employing is to inquire whether the defend-
ants knowingly made a false statement in
this respect, or whether, on the contrary,
they honestly believed what they stated to
be a true aud fair representation of the
facts. Before considering whether the charge
of fraud is proved, I may say that I ap-
proach the case of all the defendants, ex-
cept Wilde, with the inclination to scrutinize
their conduct with severity. They most im-
properly received sums of money from the
promoters, and this unquestionably lays
them open to the suspicion of being ready
to jiut before the public whatever was de-
sired by those who were promoting the un-
dertaking. But I think this must not be
unduly pressed, and when I find that the
statement impeached was concurred in by
one whose conduct in the respect I have
mentioned was free from blame, and who
was imder no similar pressure, the case as-
sumes, 1 think, a different complcKiou. I
nmst further remark that the learned judge
who tried the cause, and who tells us that
he carefully watched the demeanor of the
witnesses and scanned their evidence, came
without hesitation to the conclusion that
they were witnesses of truth, and that their
evidence, whatever may be its effect, might
safely be relied on. An opinion so formed
ought not to be differed from except on very
clear grounds, and, after carefully consid-
ering the evidence, I see no reason to dissent
from Stirling, J.'s. conclusion. I shall there-
fore assume the truth of their testimony.
I agree with the court below that the
statement made did not accurately convey
to the mind of a person reading it what the
rights of the company were, but, to judge
whether it may nevertheless have been put
forward without subjecting the defendants
to the imputation of fraud, your lordsliips
must consider what were the circumstances.
By the general tramways act of 1S70 it is
provided that all carriages used on any
tramway shall be moved by the power pre-
8crlbe<l by the special act, and, where no
such power is prescribed, by animal power
only. 33 & 34 Vict. c. 78, § 34. In order,
therefore, to enable the company to use
steam-power, an act of parliament had to
bo obtained empowering its use. This had
been done, but the power was clogged with
the condition that It was only to be used
will) the consent of llie board of trade. It
was therefore Incorrect to say that the com-
IHiny had the right to use steam. They
would only have that light If they obtained
the consent of the board of trade. But It is
Impossible not to sec that the fact which
would Impress Itself upon the minds of
those connected with the company was that
they had, after submitting the plans to the
boaril of trade, obtained a special act eni-
poweiitig the use of steam. It might well
be tli:il the fiict that the consent of the
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Je el, ll. IL ay that the actual decision i n  
Taylor "I'". Ashton. 1 1  l!ees. & W .  401, i s  not 
con i tent with the modern ca -es. on the du­
ty of directors of companies. I think he is 
right. But, for the rea.ons I haYe c:iYen. I 
am unable to hold that anything less than 
fraud will rende1· director· or any other per-
on. liable to an action o f  deceit. 
.u the ame time I desire to say di ·tinctly 
that. when a false tatement ha been ma!le, 
the que. lion whether there were reasonable 
ground for belie\'ing it. and what were the 
means of know le!lge in the po-·cs ion of t he 
person making it, are most weighty matters, 
for consi!lera tion. The ground upon wllich 
an al leged belief wa founded i a most im­
porta nt test of it rea lity. I ca n conceiYe 
many ca es where the fact t llat an a lleg-ed 
belief was de titute of all rea sonable foun<Ia­
tion would suttke of itself to conYince the 
court that it was not really entertained, and 
that the representation was a fra udulent 
uni.•. ·o, too. although IJleans of knowledge 
are, a - w:i s pointe1l out by Lord lilaeklmrn 
i n  Brownlie 'I'. C:uup!Jell, L. R. 5 App. "as. 
92;), a Yery different thinA" from knowleuge, 
if I thought that a 11erson making a fal e 
"ta tl•ment ha cl :-hut hi eye to the facts. or 
purposely :11.Jsta i ned from inquiriug- into 
the111. l ishould hold that honest uelief was 
aus1•11t. and that he was just as fr:1 11<lulent 
as i f  he bad kuowiugly · t a tl'•l t ha t  wllicll 
w:i ,.  fa he. 
l hn ,.,. a 1Th·c1l with some reluctan<'e at 
t Ill' 1•111wl11si1111 to whicli I have felt myself 
1•1 1m pl'il1•d, for I t h i rll;: thol'e wllo put lJefore 
t it • •  puhl ic a lll"os1 u·1· t us to ind uce thc>rn to 
< ' l l lhn rl;: t hl'i r mom·r in a <·o m mercin l l' n t er· 
iori. c 1111�ht to he v l ;.: l l n n t  to sC'c thul it con-
1 1 1 ! 1 1  s1wh r•�pn·SP11 t a t i om: o n ly ns a rc in 
strl<-t : 1 1·1•n1·d:i nr•p w i t h  J'al'I, a nd l :-hn11hl hi.' 
v e ry 1 1 1 1wll l i 1 1 ;.:  t 1 1  .:In• 11 11 .1 1•0 11ntl'11:1 111·r t o  
t h" 1•011t rn ry lrll':t .  I t h i n !· t h en• l s  1 1 1 1wh 
to he• t111 id fur t lil' 1 I P \\"  t h a t  t hi s  mnm l (]Ut)" 
• JU�ht tn • 11111•• PXIP11t  to lH• co11v .. rtc1l I n to 
u l •'ga l ol t l ig11t l11n, a nd t ha t  t ill' wn n t  of 
t•·ll onnhh.• <"a re to Ill' • '  t hn t  stat .. m ..  11ts 1tH1 t l P  
1 1 1 1' 1  r l fl'h d r  .. 11  ru .  t 1 1 11t·1•s 1 1  n• t rur shnuhl 
l o • 1 1 m r l 1• 1111  11 1 • t lo11a hl<• " runi;. H u t  t h is Is 
11111 II 111 l l l t r nt for di Cll Ion !Ill t ill' pn·�··nt 
r o•'<'lllllon. I r  I t  I to lt1• do111 , t h e lt•;.:1111:1 
l il t•• 11 1 11 t I n t •  n'P111 , u n tl  c•xpn• ly i;l v1• a 
J'li;hl of l l < ' l l o 1 1  l u  n•s 1 1111•t of udr II tl1· 11:1 rt1 1n• 
rrnm 1 1 11 1 ,1 ,  I t  1111i;hl not,  I t h i n ! , 1 1 1  hi' 
1 1 1 1 1 1c  l o\ t rnl rt lu;.: t h •• ln w, a nd hol d i n g t h a t  
t o  h•• fr'n 11 1 1 1 1 l t•11t " h ld1 t h" t rl t .1 1 1 1 1 11  f1·1•ls 
I 1 1 1 1 1 101 J H OJ H'rly ht• 1111 '" 1• rll 11• r l .  1 t h l n l•  
1 1 1 1 I I l l !  r I I l k• l y  t o  l'l' l i lt  I rnm l i l 1 1 rri 1 1 . 
l h  • I I  t l l l l ' l l 1 1 1 1  1 11 t w 1 <'II l'fl l"f •)f'l!Hlll'l!S n n t l  
t rn u d ,  11 11 1 1  •'tt lln l l y  hnh l l ng n 11111 11  fr1 1 1 1 t l u  
I •  n t  \\ h• ! her Ill  1 1 1 ' (  l'll n o r  r•11 11 11nt h1•  J n  t ·  
ly fl •It. '  l s::1 1 1 1  te1I,  
I t  110\1' ri rno 1 11  (nr 1 1 1 1• tu n pply \\ hn t I hi'· 
1 1 1  , ,. tr1 " ' t h •• l11 w 1 1 1  ! 11 1 •  f11 1 • 1 11 or l h rl J i i t f!· 
• •nt  ell •·. 'I h•• <'l1n ri; 11g11 l 1 1 t l he 1 l 1 · r  •11•1· 
nut I t h n t  t h• y f m 1 1 t l 1 1 I  1 1 t l y l'<' I " "  , n l Prl 
1 1111 !, I t.) t h• pl'P J R I  Cl<'t 1 1 (  pa rl lll m l ' n t  wh lr•h 
I h • •011 1 pn 11y hnd • I Jt n l u  <'I,  t lu•y hu t l  n 1 l�l i t  
DI ltiZed by 
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t o  use steam o r  other mechanical power In- bC 
tead of horses. The test wllich I purpose di 
employing is to inquire whetller the defend- 11 
ant knowingly made a false sfatement in wi 
thi respect. or whether, on tlle contrary, iU 
they llonestly belie"l'"ed wllat they stated to tb 
be a true and fair repre entation of the 
facts. Before con idering whether the cllarge I\! 
of fraud is pro"l"ecl, I may say that I ap­
proacll t he case of all the defendants, ex­
cept Wilde, with the inclination to scrutinize 
tlleir conduct with severity. They most im­
properly rccei"red sums of money from the 
promoters, and this unquestionably lays 
them open to the suspicion of being ready 
to put before the public whatever was de­
sired by t hose who were promoting t he un­
derta king. But I t h i n k  this must not be 
unduly pressed, and when I find tllu t the 
statement impeached '"as concurred i n  by 
one whose conduct in the respect I have 
mentioned was free from blame, and who 
was under no similar pres·ure, the case as­
su mes, I think, a different complt>xion. I 
m u s t  further remark that the learned judge 
who tried the cause, and who tells us tllat 
he carefully watched tile demeanor of the 
witne:> e· aud scanned their evidence, came 
without he ila tion to the conclusion tllat 
t lley were "I\ i t ues e· ot' trut ll, and t lla t their 
e' ii lence, whateYcr may be its effect.  migllt 
safelJ be relied on. An opinion so forrued 
ought not to be diITered from excl'JH on Ycry 
C'ica1· grounds, nucl, a fter caref u l l y  t•onsitl­
ering the e"l"idencc>, I see no rea on to dissent 
from 'tirliug, J.'s. conclu ion. I sllnll tllere­
fore assume the truth or tlieir test i mony. 
I a :::-rce w i t h  the court below that the 
::; t a tement made tlicl not a <"l'n r:i t l' iy convey 
to the mind or n person rea d i n g  it what the 
ri:;: h t :-;  of the eo111pa n )  were, but, to j udge 
w het her it ma) ueYertheless have been p n t  
forwa rrl ''" i t hout subject i ng the defemla n t :-.  
t o  t he imp u t a t ion or fraud, your lordio; h i p>< 
m nst co n sl1lcr whn t "\\·Ne the clrcnrnst:l lH'l'S. 
Hy t lw !!<'lll'rnl t raur n  n y s  act or 1 70 It is 
lll"O\'itl1•1l t lrn t all cnrriai.:es used on ::rny 
t ra m w a y  sh a l l  be moYctl by the power pre-
1wrllwc1 by t h e  syil'cia l act, and, where no 
1'111'11 power is JH"Psl·rl hed , by a n i m a l  power 
only.  :i:i & 3 l  \ ict. c. 78, § 31. l n order, 
t ll<' rl'fnre, t.o cnn ble the <'n 111pn 11)· to use 
st .. : 1 1 1 1  power, : 1 1 1  aC'l or pn rlia mcnt had to 
lH' 1 1ht : 1 l nl'tl e 1 1 1powerl1 1;.: i t s  URl' . Tl l l s bad 
hr•p11 tl orw, hn t t he po\n•r w:1 s clo).!"gl'd w i t h  
t h •· 1·nnt l l t l o 1 1  l h n t  I t  w a s  o n l y  t o  he 111-lcd 
\\ l l h  l h 1• ('llllSt ' l l t  of t h t' honrd or t nll ll'.  H 
wn11 t lwrefnn• hwonPct to i;ay tlmt tlle com· 
1 111 1 1 .1 hnd t l u •  1 i i:ht to UHC' steam. 'l'hey 
wn11 lrl  ouls h n '  1• t hn t l " i;.:ht I f  thc>y obtained 
t llf' 1·01F.1• n t. of t ill' hon nl nf t ra clc.  But I t  l!I 
l 1 1 1pm ih ll' not to sc>t' t hnt the fuct which 
\\ Ol l l t l  i ll l ( ll'f'RR l t Mf' l f  l l pOI\ the milld8 Of 
t hnR<' r·nn11r1·t rrl  w i t h t h e compa ny wa11 tllat 
f lw,r h:1 1l,  n ft c• r  "llhm l t t l n l{  tbe plans to th<' 
ho11 rd of t m t 11. ,  o h t a l nerl 11 sp cln l ttct cm-
11 1111 , .rin� t l w 11111•  n r  t-1 ! !'11 1 11 .  I t  mlgbt well 
1 11• t h: 1 t  t i l t '  f:t r t  I h a !  t he COlll:!Clll ot the 
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board of trade was necessary would not
dwell in the same way upon their miuds, if
thoy thought that the consent of the board
would be obtained as a matter of course if
its requirements were complied with, and
that it was therefore a mere question of ex-
penditure and care. The provision might
seem to them analogous to that contained
in the general tramways act, and I believe
in the railways act also, prohibiting the line
lieing opeuod until it had been inspected by
the board of trade, and certified fit for traf-
fic, which no one would regard as a condi-
tion practically limiting the right to use the
line for the purpose of a tramway or rail-
way. I do not say that the two eases are
strictly analogous in point of law, but they
may well have been thought so by business
men.
I turn, now, to the evidence of the defend-
ants. I will take first that of ilr. Wilde,
whose conduct in relation to the promotion
of the company is free from suspicion. He
is a member of the bar, and a director of
one of the London tramway companies. He
states that he was aware that the consent
of the board of trade was necessary, but
tliat he thought that such consent had been
practically given, inasmuch as, pursuant to
the standing orders, the plans had been laid
before the board of trade, with the state-
ment that it was intended to use mechanical
as well as horse power, and no objection
having been raised by the board of trade,
and the bill obtained, he took it for granted
that no objection would be raised after-
wards, provided the works were properly
carried out. He considered, therefore, that,
practically and substantially, they had the
right to use steam, and that the statement
was perfectly true. Mr. Pethick's evidence
is to much the same effect. He thought the
board of trade had no more right to refuse
their consent than they would in the case
of a railway; that they might have required
additions or alterations; but that, on any
reasonable requirements being complied
with, they could not refuse their consent.
It never entered his thoughts that, after
the board had passed their plans, with the
knowledge that it was proposed to use
steam, they would refuse their consent. Mr.
Moore states that he was under the im-
pression that the passage in the prospectus
represented the effect of section 35 of the
act, inasmuch as he understood that the con-
sent was obtained. He so understood from
the statement made at the board by the so-
licitors to the company, to the general effect
tliat evei-y thing was in order for the use
of steam, that the act had been obtained
subject to the usual restrictions, and that
they were starting as a tramway company,
with full power to use steam as other com-
panies were doing. Mr. Wakefield, accord-
ing to his evidence, believed that the state-
iiii'nt in the prospectus was fair; he never
liaJ a doubt about it. It never occurred to
i
him to say anything about the consent of
the board of trade, because, as they had got
the act of parliament for steam, he presum-
ed at once that they would get it. Mr. Ber-
ry's evidence is somewhat confused, but I
think the fair effect of it is that, though he
was aware that under the act the consent
of the board of trade was necessarj-. he
thought that, the company having obtained
their act, the board's consent would follow
as a matter of course, and that the question
of such consent being necessary never cross-
ed his mind at the time the prospectus was
issued. He believed at that time th.nt it
was correct to say they had the right to use
steam.
As I have said, Stirling, J., gave credit to
these witnesses, and I see no reason to dif-
fer from him. What conclusion ought to be
drawn from their evidence? I think they
were mistaken in supposing that the con-
sent of the board of trade would follow as
a matter of course, because they had ob-
tained their act. It was absolutely in the
discretion of the board whether such con-
sent should be given. The prospectus was
therefore inaccurate. But that is not the
question. If they believed that the consent
of the board of trade was practically con-
cluded by the passing of the act, has the
plaintiff made out, which It was for him to
do, that they have been guilty of a fraudu-
lent misrepresentation? I think not. I
cannot hold it proved as to any one of them
that he knowingly made a false statement.
or one which he did not believe to be true,
or was careless whether what he stated was
true or false. In short, I think they honest-
ly believed that what they asserted was
true, and I am of opinion that the charge
of fraud made against them has not been
established. It is not unworthy of note that,
in his report to the board of trade. Gen.
Hutchinson, who was obviously aware of
the provisions of the special act, falls into
the very same inaccuracy of language as
is complained of In the defendants, for he
says: "The act of 1SS2 gives the company
authority to use mechanical power over all
their system." I quite admit that the state-
ments of witnesses as to their belief are by
no means to be accepted blindfold. The
probabilities must be considered. Whenev-
er it is necessary to arrive at a conclusion
as to the state of mind of another person,
and to determine whether his belief under
given circumstances was such as he alleges,
we can only do so by applying the stand-
ard of conduct which our own experience
of the ways of men has enabled us to form,
— by asking ourselves whether a reasonable
man would be likely, under the circumstan-
ces, so to believe. I have applied this test.
With that I have a strong conviction that a
reasonable man, situated as the defendants
were, with their knowledge and means of
knowledge, might well believe what thev
\
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board of trade was necessary would not 
uwell in the same way upon their minds, if 
they thought that the consent of the board 
would be obtained as a matter of course if  
Its requirements were complied with, and 
that it was therefore a mere question of ex­
penditure and care. The provision might 
seem to them analogous to that contained 
in the general tramways act, and I believe 
in the railways act also, prohibiting the line 
lieing opened until it had been inspected l)y 
•the board of trade, and certified fit for traf­
fic, which no one would regard as a con<.li­
tion practically lim iting the right to use the 
line for the purpose of a tramway or rail­
,.,.ay. I do not say that the two cases are 
strictly analogous in point of law, but they 
may well have been thought so by business 
men. 1 I turn, now, to the evidence of the defend­ants. I will take first that of ::lfr. 'iYilde, 
\Y bose conduct in relation to the promotion 
of the company i free from suspicion. He 
is a member of the bar, and a director of 
one of the London tramway companies. Ile 
states that be was aware that the consent 
of the board of trade was necessary. but 
that he thought that suclt consent bad been 
practically given, inasmuch as, pursuant to 
the standing orders, the plans had been laid 
before the board of trade, with the state­
ment that it was intended to use mechanical 
as well as horse power, and no objection 
having been raised by the board of trade, 
and the bill obtained. he took it for granted 
that no objection would be raised n fter­
war<.ls. provided the works were properly 
carried out. He considered, therefore, that, , 
practically and substantially, they had the I right to use steam, a nd that the statement was perfectly true. Mr. Pethick's evidence 
is to much the same effect. He thought the 
board of trade had no more right to refuse 
their consent than they would in the case 
of a railway ; that they might have required 
additions or alterations ;  but that, on any 
reasonable requirements being complied 
with, they could not refuse their consf>nt. 
It never entered his thoughts that, n fter 
the board bad passed their plans, with the 
knowledge that it  was proposed to use 
steam, they would refuse their consent. i\lr. 
::lloore states that he was under the im­
pression that the passage in the prospectus 
represented the effect of section 33 of the 
act. ina much as he understood that the con­
sent was obtained. He so understood from 
t he statement made at the board by the so­
licitors to the company, to the general effect 
that everything was in order for the use 
of team, that the act had been obtained 
subject to the usual restrictions, and that 
they were starting as a tramway company, 
with full power to use steam as other com­
panies were doing. J\fr. Wakefield, accord­
ing to bi evidence, believed that the state­
ment in the prospectus was fai r ;  be never 
ball a d�ubt about it. It never occurred to 
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him to say anything about the consent of 
the board of trade, because, as they bad got 
the act of parliament for steam, be presum­
ed at once that they would get it. Mr. Der­
ry's evidence is somewhat confused, but I 
think the fair effect of it is that, though he 
was aware that under the act the consent 
of the board of trade was necessary. be 
thought that, the company having obtaine<l 
their act, the board's consent would follow 
as a matter of course, and that the question 
of such consent being necessary never cro;;s­
eu his mind at the time the prospectus was 
issued. He believed at that time tb� t it 
wa s correct to say they bad the right to use 
steam. 
A!; I have said, Stirling, J., gave cre<.lit to 
these witnesses. and I see no rea on to d if­
fer from him. \Vbat conclusion ought to hf' 
drawn from their evidence? I think they 
were mistaken in supposing that the con­
sent of the board of trade would follow ns  
a matter of course, because they bad ob­
tained their act. It was absolutely in tbe 
discretion of the board whether such con­
sent should be given. The prospectu wa;; 
therefore inaccurate. But that is not thP 
question. If they believed that the consent 
of the board of trade was practically con­
cl udecl by the passing of the act, has thP 
plaintiff made out, which it was for him to 
do, that they have been guilty of a fraudu­
lent misrnpresenta ti on ? I think not. 1 
cannot hold it proved as to any one of them 
that he knowingly made a false sta tcment. 
or one which be did not believe to be true, 
or was careless whether what he stated was 
true or false. I n  short, I think they honest­
ly believed that what they asserted was 
true, and I am of opinion that the chn rge 
of fraud made against them bas not been 
establishrcl. It is not unworthy of note that, 
in his report to the board of trade, Gen. 
Hutchinson, who 'yas obviously aware of 
the provisions of the special act. falls into 
the very same inaccuracy of language a;; 
is  complained of in the defendants. for h<> 
says: "The act of 1882 gives the comp:rn� 
authority to use mechanical power over all 
their system." I quite admit that the state­
ments of witnes;;cs as to their belief are by 
no means to be accepted blindfold. The 
probabilities must be consi<.lered. \'i-henev­
er it is nece�f:ary to arrive at a conclusion 
as to the state of mind of another person. 
and to determine whether his belief under 
given circumstances was such as be alleges, 
we can only do so by applying the stan<.l­
ard of conduct which our own experience 
of the ways of men has enabled us to form, 
-by asking ourselves whether a reasonable 
man would be likely, under the circumstan­
ces. so to believe. I have applied this test. 
With that I have a strong conviction that a 
reasonable man, situated as the defendants 
were, with their knowledge and means of 
lrnowleclge, might well j:JeJi�ve what tbev 
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state they did believe, and consider that the
presentation made was substantially true.
Adopting the language of Jessel, M. R., in
Smith V. Chadwiek. 20 Ch. Div. 67, I con-
clude by saying that, on the whole, I have
come to the conclusion that the statement,
"though in some respects inaccurate and not
altogether free from imputation of careless-
ness, was a fair, honest, and bona fide state-
ment on the part of the defendants, and by
Qo means exposes them to an action for de-
ceit" I thinli the judgment of the court of
appeal should be reversed.
Order of the court of appeal reversed; or-
der of Stirling, J., restored; the respondent
to pay to the appellants their costs below
and In this house; cause remitted to the
chancery division.
See discussion of the efifect of this case by
Sir Frederick Pollock, 5 Law Quart. Kev. 410;
also, an article by Sir William R. Anson, 6
Law Quart Rev. 72.
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state they did believe, and consider that the 
presentation made was sub tanti:illy true. 
Adopting the language of Jessel, M. R., in 
Smith v. Chadwick, 20 Cb. Div. 67, I con­
clude by saying that, on the whole, I have 
come to the conclusion that the statement, 
"though in some respects inaccurate and not 
altogether free from imputation of careless­
ness, was a fair, honest, and bona fide state­
ment on the part of the defendants, and by 
no means &poses them to an action t.or de-
D i  1t1.led by 
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ceit" I think the judgment of the court of 
appeal should be reversed. 
Order of the court of appeal reversed; or­
der of Stirling, J., restored; the respondent 
to pay to the appellants their costs below 
and in this house ; cause remitted to the 
chancery division. 
See discussion of the effect of this case by 
Sir Frederick Pollock, 5 Law Quart. Rev. 410; 
also, an article by Sir William R. Anson, 6 
Law Quaxt. Rev. 72. 
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HUDNUT V. GARDNER.
(26 N. W. 502, 59 Mich. 341.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. Jan. 27, 1886.
Error to Mecosta; Fuller, Judge.
Palmer & Palmer, for appellant. Gleason &
Bundy, for defendant
CHAMPIJN, J. Plaintiff brought an action
of trespass on the case against the defendant
before a justice of the peace, and recovered
$44.0u damages, which he claimed to have
sustained by reason of certain false repre-
sentations made by defendant to the effect
that ho (defendant) was authorized as agent
of Wetzel Bros, to get certain saw-ruill ma-
chinery repaired at plaintiff's foundry and
works for said Wetzel Bros., and upon their
credit; that, relying upon such representa-
tions, he performed said work, and delivered
it according to defendant's instructions, and
charged the same to Wetzel Bros, on his
books; that in truth defendant was not
the agent of Wetzel Bros., and had no au-
thority whatever from them to contract with
plaintiff, and the representations so made
by him with reference thereto were false and
fraudulent, and were made with intent to de-
ceive, and did deceive, the plaintiff, and de-
prived him of the material used in making the
repairs and the work performed thereon.
The plea was the general issue. On the trial
in the circuit the parties were sworn, and
the plaintiff's testimony proved, if the jury
should give it credence, the representations
set out in his declaration. The conversation,
as he stated it, left no room for doubt or mis-
take. The defendant testified that he was not
the agent of Wetzel Bros, in the transaction,
and that he had no authority to make any
representations to plaintiff such as testified
to by him; and his testimony proved, if the
jury should give it credence, that he made no
such representations as set out in plaintiff's
declaration and testified to by him. The tes-
timony of the plaintiff was corroborated as to
a part of the machinery repaired or made by
the witness Saltsman, a machinist in Hudnut's
employ, who stated that defendant told him
that the work was for Wetzel Bros., and he
so entered it upon his book, and he produced
the book in court. There was no possible way
in which the jury could reconcile the testi-
mony of the plaintiff and the defendant, and
the issue was narrowed down to the question
of credibility. If the jury believed the testi-
mony introduced by the plaintiff, he was en-
titled to a verdict; if they did not, or if they
believed the defendant's, or if the testimony
in the minds of the jury was equally balanced,
the defendant was entitled to a verdict.
The errors assigned relate exclusively to the
charge of the court, and are as follows: The
court erred in instructing the jury as follows:
" '(1^ It is a serious charge, gentlemen, to bring
againstau individual. but there have been men
in the n'orld who have committed just such
offenses,— it is an offense really, It Is an of-
fense morally, although it is not classed in the
eategoi-y of crimes; but a man who can do
that is but one step removed from a criminal.'
'(2) These representations, gentlemen, if they
were made, and made with the intent to de-
ceive the plaintiff,— with the intent to wrong
and defraud him,— it would give him the right
to recover whatever damages he might prove.'
'(3) Said all that he was claimed to have said,
with intent at that time to induce the plaintiff'
to do something which would be to the plain-
tiff's injury,— cheat him, or induce him to do
something which would result to his loss,—
then the plaintiff should recover such dam-
ages as the plaintiff may prove he has suf-
fered.' '(4) The com-t will further instruct
you that, while viewing the testimony in this
case from one standpoint, you might come to
a conclusion that the plaintiff's case is fully
substantiated,— fuUy maintained,— at the same
time, if you are able from the testimony to
find a full explanation of aU the circumstances
by which this defendant would be relieved
from any charge of fraud,— any Intent to de-
ceive,— you have the right to do so.' '(5) If
you should find that this plaintiff, by mistake,
had charged this labor to the wrong party,
unless he was caused to do it by the inten-
tional deceit which was practiced upon him
by the defendant, then the defendant is not
to blame for it.' '(6) I will state to you fur-
ther, on this question of intent: If the party
represented to the plaintiff anything which
was untrue, and it caused the plaintiff, if he
used reasonable care, to act upon such sug-
gestions, the defendant at the time knowing
what he said was untrue, then you would have
the right to presume, and, in fact, you could
find, that there was an intent to defraud the
plaintiff.' "
The remarks of the court upon which the
first assignment of error is based were made
immediately after stating to the jury what
the plaintiff claimed, and, while we see noth-
ing in the case caUing for such remarks, we do
not see that it was calculated to or did preju-
dice the plaintiff's case. Had the vei'dict been
against the defendant, we think he might
well have complained that it tended to preju-
dice the jury against him.
The error in that portion of the instruction
which is alleged in the second assignment
of error arises under the testimony in the
case. The question was, were representations
made? If they were made, they were false
beyond dispute, and the intent to deceive is
conclusively presumed from defendant's knowl-
edge of their falsity. And the jury should
have been instructed that if they found that
the representations were made, the undisputed
evidence being that they were knowingly false
if made, the intent to deceive was proven, and
the plaintiff would be entitled to recover. The
defendant himself testified that he was not
the agent of Wetzel Bros., and had no direc-
tions from them to have the work done for
them, or to have it charged to them, so that
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HUDNUT v. GARDNER. 
(26 N. W. 502, 59 Mich . 341.) 
Supreme Court of Michigan. Jan. 27, 1886. 
Error to l\Iecosta ; Fuller, Judge. 
Palmer & Palmer, for appellant. G leason & 
Bundy, for defendant 
CHA�IPLIN, J. Plaintiff brought an action 
of trespa s on the case against the defendant 
before a j ustice of the peace, a nd recovered 
$-H.00 damages, which he clai med to have 
sustained by reason of certain false repre­
sentations made by defendant to the effect 
that he (defendant) was authorized as agent 
of Wetzel B ros. to get certain saw-mill ma­
chinery repaired at plaintiff's foundry and 
works for said Wetzel Bros., and upon their 
credit; that, relying upon such representa­
tions, he performed said work, and delivered 
it according to defendant's instructions, and 
charged the same to Wetzel Bros. on his 
books ; that in truth defendant was not 
the agent of Wetzel Bros., and had no au­
thority whatever from them to contract with 
plaintiff, antl the representations so made 
by him with reference thereto were false and 
fraudulent, and were made with intent to de­
ceive, and did deceive, the plaintiff, and de­
prived him of the material used in making the 
repairs and the work performed thereon. 
The plea was the general issue. O n  the trial 
in the circuit the parties were sworn, and 
the plaintiff's testimony proved, i f  the j ury 
should give it credence, the representations 
set out in his declaration. 'l'be conversation, 
as he stated it, left no room for doubt or mis­
take. The defendant testified that he was not 
the agent of Wetzel Bros. in the transaction, 
and that he bad no authority to make any 
representations to plaintiff such as testified 
to by him ; and his testimony proved, if the 
jury should give it credence, that be made no 
such representations as set out in plaintiff's 
declaration and testified to by him. The tes­
ti mony of the plaintiff was corroborated as to 
a part of the machinery repaired or made by 
the wi tness Saltsman, a machinist in Hudnut's 
employ, who stated that defendant told him 
that the work was for \'i'etzel Bros., and be 
o entered it uuon his book, and he produced 
the book in court. There was no possible way 
in which the jury could reconcile the testi­
mony of the plaintiff and the defendant, a n d  
the issue was narrowed down to the question 
of credibility. If the j ury believed the testi­
mony introduced by the plaintiff, he was en­
titled to a verdict; if they did not, or if they 
believed the defendant's, or if the test imony 
in the minds of the j ury was equally balanced, 
the defendant was entitled to a verdict. 
The errors assigned relate exclusi>ely to the 
charge of the court, and are as follows : The 
court erred in instructing the jury as follow� : 
" '(1) It is a serious charge, gentlemen, to bring 
ngain�t :rn individua l. but there !lave been men 
in the worltl "-!lo !lave committeu j ust such 
[., I  ::i- 1  Ll.C..1-
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offenscs,-lt is an offense really, It Is an of· 
fense morally, although it is not classed in the 
category of crimes; but a roan who can do 
that is but one step removed from a criminal.' 
'(2) These representations, gentlemen, i f  they 
were made, and made with the intent to de­
ceive the plaintiff,-with the intent to wrong 
and defraud him,-it would give him the right 
to recover whatever damages he might prove.' 
'(3) Said all that he was claimed to have saitl, 
with intent at that time t o  induce the plaintiff 
to do something which would be to the plain­
tiff's inj ury,-cheat him, or induce him to do 
something ·wbicb would result to his loss.­
then the plaintiff should recover such dam­
ages as the plaintiff may prove be bas suf­
fered.' '(4) The coUlt will further instruct 
you that, while viewing the testimony in this 
case from one standpoint, you might come to 
a conclusion that the plaintiff's case is fully 
substantiated,-fully mai ntained,-at the same 
time, if you are able from the testimony to 
find a full explanation of all the circumstances 
by which this defendant would be relieved 
from any charge of fraud,-any intent to de­
ceive.-you have the right to do so.' '(5) If 
you should find that this plaintiff, by mista ke, 
had charged this labor to the wrong party, 
unless be was caused to do it by the inten­
tional deceit which was practiced upon him 
by the defendant, then the defendant is not 
to blame for it.' '(6) I will state to you fur­
ther, on this question of intent: If the party 
represented to the plaintiff anything which 
was untrue, and it caused the plaintiff, if be 
used reasonable care, to act upon such sug­
gestions, the defendant at the time knowing 
what he said was untrue, then you would have 
the right to presume, and, in fact, you could 
fincl, that t here was an intent to defraud the 
plaintiff. ' "  
The remarks of the court upon which the 
fi rst assignment of error is based were m ade 
immediately after stating to the jury what 
the plaintiff claimed, and, while we see noth­
ing in the case calling for such remarks, we do 
not see that it was calculated to or did preju­
dice the plaintiff's case. Had the verdict been 
against the defendant, we think he might 
well have complained that it tended to prej u­
dice the jury against him. 
The error in that portion of the instruction 
which is alleged in th4" second assignment 
of error arises under the testimony in the 
case. The question was, were representations 
made? If they were made, they were false 
beyond dispute, and the intent to deceive is 
conclusively presumed from defendant's knowl­
edge of theiL· falsity. And the jury should 
have been instructed that if they found that 
the representations were made, the undisputed 
evidence being that they were knowingly false 
If macle, the intent to deceive was proven, aml 
the plaintiff would be entitled to recover. The 
defendant himself testified that be was not 
the agent of Wetzel Bros., and had no din�c:­
tions fro m them to have the work done for 
them, or to have it charged to them, so that 
.. . .  
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If he did make the representations claimed
by plaintiff, he not only made them falsely,
but knowing them to be false.
In this connection, we may notice the sixth
assignment of error. The vice of this portion
of the iusti-uction is that the judge required
the jury to find that the plaintiff used reason-
able care in acting upon defendant's rep-
resentations. There was no testimony in the
case to which this portion of the charge could
be applied. It introduced an unnecessarj- and
tincertain element in the case, which the jury
were required to pass upon without directing
them as to what would coustitute reasonable
care or negligence on the part of the plaintiff,
under the evidence. And, further, tlie judge
should have instructed the jury that if the
defendant represented to the plaintiff any-
thing which was untrue, and the plaintiff
acted in reliance thereon, the defendant at
the time knowing what he said was untrue,
they would have the right to presume, and
should find, that there was an intent to de-
fraud the plaintiff.
The fourth and fifth allegations of error
may be considered together. We think the
instructions embraced therein are erroneous.
Under the testimony of the plaintiff there was
no room for a mistake, and it was error for
the comt to advance a theory in conflict with
all the evidence in the case. And the testi-
mony of the defendant did not tend to prove
In any particular that a mistake had been
uiade, or that a misimdcrstanding could have
arisen from what was said at the time.
The judgment must be reversed, and a new
trial ordered.
The other justices concurred.
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if he did make the representations claimed 
by plaintiff, he not only made them fal ely, 
but knowing them to be fal.e. 
In thi, connection, we may notice the -i.xth 
a ignment of error. The Yice of this portion 
of the in�truction is that the jud�e required 
the jury to find that the plaintiff ust>d reason­
al.Jle c-J.re in acting- upon defendant's rep­
rl'. 1.>nta tinns. There \Hts no te,.timouy in the 
case to which thi portion of the ·har!te ·ould 
b!' a11plii:!l. It introuut·ed an unnece-<s.try and 
uucc11ain element in the ·ase, whi<:h the jury 
were require<l to pass upon without directing 
them a. to what would constitute reasonable 
care or negli�enc:e on the part of the plaiutiiI, 
under the evidence. .And, further, the judge 
sboult.1 ha •e instructed the jury that it the 
defendant repre ented to the plaintitr any­
thing which was untrue, and the plaintitl' 
D by 
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acted in reliance thereon, the defendant at 
the time knowing what he said was untrue, 
they would have the right to presume, and 
should find, that there was an intent to de­
fraud the plaintiff. 
The fourth and fifth allegations ot error 
may be considered together. We think the 
inst ructions embraced therein are erroneou . , 
Under the te timony of the plaintiff there wa, 
no room for a mistake, and it wa error for 
the cow-t to advance a theory in conflict with 
all the evidence in the case. And the testi­
mony of the defenda nt did not tend to prove 
in any particular that a mistake had been 
made, or that a misunderstanding could have 
arisen from what was said at the time. 
The juclgruent must be reversed, and a new 
trial ordered. 
The other justices concurred. 
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HULL V. HULL.
(48 Conn. 2r)0.)
Snprome Court of Counecticut. June Term.
1880.
W. K. Townsend and J. H. Whiting, in sup-
port of the motions. II. B. Munson, contra.
LOOM IS, J. The controversy in this case
has reference to the ownership of six colts,
the progeny of two brood mares, which the
plaintiff, some ten years prior to this suit, pur-
chased in Boston of the Rev. William H. H.
Murray. The contract of sale provided that
the plaintiff might take the mares to Mun-ay's
farm, in this state, of which she was and had
been for several years the superintendent, and
there Uoep them as breeding mares; and all
the colts thereafter foaled from them, though
sired by Murray's stallions, were to be the ex-
clusive property of the plaintiff. No attempt
has been made by Murray's creditors or his
trustee to deprive the plaintiff of the mares so
purchased, and they are now in her undisturb-
ed possession; but the colts, while on Murray's
farm, on the 1st of August, 1S79, were at-
tached by one of his creditors, who subse-
quently released the property to the defend-
ant as ti'ustee in insolvency, who had the prop-
erty in his possession at the time the plaintiff
brought her writ of replevin. The sole ground
upon which the defendant claims to hold tbese
colts is that there was such a retention of pos-
session by Murray after the sale as to render
the ti-ansaction constructively fraudulent as
against creditors.
The comt below overruled this claim, and in
so doing we think committed no error. The
doctrine as to retention of possession after a
sale has no application to the facts of this
case. A vendor cannot retain after a sale
what does not then exist, nor that which is
already m the possession of the vendee. This
proposition would seem to be self-sustaining.
If, however, it needs confirmation, the authori-
ties in this state and elsewher-e abundantly
supply it. Lucas v. Birdsey, 41 Conn. 357;
Capron v. Porter, 43 'Conn. 389; Spring v.
Chipman, 6 Vt. 662. In Bellows v. Wells, 36
^'t. 599, it was held that a lessee might con-
vey to his lessor all the crops which might
be grown on the leased land during the teitu,
and no delivery of the crops after they were
harvested was necessary even as against at-
taching creditore, and that the doctrine as to
retention of possession after the sale did not
apply to property which at the time of the
sale was not subject to attacluiieut and had
no real existence as property at all.
The case at bar is within the principle of
the above authorities, for it is very clear that
the title to the property in question when it
first came into existence was in the plaintiff.
In reaching this conclusion it is not necessary
to hold that the mares became the absolute
property of the plaintiff under ^lassachusetts
law without a more substantial and visible
change of possession, or that under our law,
the title to the mares being in the plaintiff
clearly as between the parties, the rule import-
ed from the civil law, i)artus sequitiu' ven-
trem, applies. We waive the consideration of
these questions. It will suffice that, by the
express terms of the contract, the plaintiff was
to have as her own all the colts that might be
born from these mares. That the law will
sanction such a contract is very clear. It is
true, as remarked in Perkins, Conv. tit.
"Grant," § 65, that "it is a common learning
in the law that a man cannot grant or charge
that which he has not"; yet it is equally well
settled that a future possibility arising out of,
or dependent upon, some present right, prop-
erty or interest, may be the subject of a valid
present sale. The distinction is illustrated in
Hobait, 132, as follows: "The grant of all
the tithe wool of a certain year is good in its
creation, though it may happen that there be
no tithe wool in that year; but the grant of
the wool which shall grow upon such sheep
as the grantor may afterwards purchase, is
void." It is well settled that a valid sale may
be made of the wine a vineyard is expected to
produce, the grain that a field is expected to
grow, the milk that a cow may yield, or the
future young born of an animal. 1 Pars. Cont.
(5th Ed.) p. 523, note k, and cases there cited;
Hill. Sales, § 18; Story. Sales, § 186. In Fon-
ville V. Casey, 1 Murph. (N. C.) 389, it was
held that an agreement for a valuable consid-
eration to deliver to the plaintiff the first fe-
male colt which a certain mare owned by the
defendant might produce, vests a property in
the colt in the plaintiff, upon the principle
that there may be a valid sale where the title
is not actually in the grantor, if it is in him
potentially, as being a thing accessory to some-
thing which he actually has. And in ilcCarty
V. Blevins, 5 Yerg. 195, it was held that where
A. agrees with B. that the foal of A.'s mare
shall belong to C, a good title vests in the
latter when parturition from the mother takes
place, though A. immediately after the colt
was born sold and dehvered it to D.
Before resting the discussion as to the plain-
tiff's title, we ought perhaps briefly to allude
to a claim made by the defendant, both in
the comt below and in this court, to the ef-
fect that if the plaintiff's title be conceded
she is estopped from asserting her claim. This
doctrine of estoppel, as all tiiers must have
observed, is often strangely misapplied. And
it is siu^ly so in this instance. The case fails
to show any act or omission on the part of the
plaintiff Inconsistent with the claims she now
makes, or that the creditors of JIurray or the
defendant as representing them were ever mis-
led to their injury by any act or negligence on
her part. On the contrary the estoppel is as-
serted in the face of the explicit finding, that
"as soon as the plaintiff became awaie of the
attachment of her horses she forbade the of-
ficer taking the same, and demanded their im-
mediate return to her." The only fact which
is suggested as furnishing the basis for the
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(.J.8 Conn. 250.) 
Supreme Court of Connecticut. June Term, 
1880. 
W. K. Townsend and J. H. Whiting, in sup­
port of the motions. II. B. Munson, contm. 
LOQ;\I I S, J. The controversy in this case 
bas reference to the ownership of six colts, 
the progeuy of two brood mares. which the 
plaiutiff, some ten years prior to this suit, pur­
chased in Boston of the Rev. William H. H. 
:\Iurray. Tbe contract of sale provided that 
the plaintiff migbt take the mares to Murray's 
farm, in this state, of which she was and bad 
been for several years the superintendent, and 
there keep them as breeding mares; and all 
the colts thereafter foaled from them, though 
sirnd by ;\lurray's stallions, were to be the ex­
clush·e property of the plaintiff. No attempt 
Las been made by l\Iurray's creditors or bis 
trustee to deprive the plaintiff of the mai·es so 
purchased, and they are now in her unclisturb­
ed possession; but the colts, while on :\lurray's 
farm, on the 1st of August, 1879, were at­
tached by one of bis creditors, who subse­
quently released the property to the defend­
ant as trustee in insolvency, who bad the prop­
e1ty in his possession at tbe time the plaintiff 
brought her writ of replevin. The sole ground 
upon which the defendant claims to bold these 
colts is that there was such a retention of pos­
session by Murray after the sale as to render 
the transaction constructively fraudulent as 
against creditors. 
The court below overruled this claim, and in 
so doing we think committed no error. The 
doctrine as to retention of possession after a 
sale has no application to the facts of this 
case. A vendor cannot retain after a sale 
what does not then exist, nor that which is 
already in the possession of tbe vendee. This 
proposition would seem to be self-sustaining. 
If, however, it  needs confirmation, the autho1i­
ties in this state and elsewhere abundantly 
supply it. Lucas v. Birdsey, 41 Conn. 357; 
Capron v. Porter, 43 •Conn. 389 ; Sp1ing v. 
Chipman, 6 Vt. 662. In Bellows v. Wells, 36 
Yt. 3!)!), it was held that a lessee might con­
>ey to his lessor all the crops which might 
be grown on the leased land during the term, 
and no delivery of the crops after they were 
harvested was necessary even as against at­
taching creclitors, and that the doctrine � to 
retention of possession after the sale clid not 
apply to prope1ty which at the time of the 
sale was not subject to attachment and had 
no real existence as property at all. 
The case at bar is within the principle of 
the above authorities, for it is very clear that 
the title to the property in question when it 
first came into existence was in the plaintiff. 
In reaching this conclusion it is not necessary 
to bold that the mares became the absolute 
prope1iy of the plaintiff under l\Iassachusetts 
law without a more substantial and visible 
D I  ILIL. Dy 
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cl.Jange o f  possession, o r  that under our law, 
the title to the mares being in the plaiutiff 
clearly as bet ween the parties, the rule impol't­
ed from the civil law, parlus sequitur veu­
trem, applies. \Ye wai>c the cousitlcration of 
these quest ions. It will suffice that, by the 
express terms of the contract, the plaintiff was 
to have as her own all the c.-olts that might be 
born from t hese mares. That the Jaw will 
sanction such a contra.ct is very clear. It is 
true, as remarked in Perkins, Conv. tit. 
"Grant," § 63, that "it is a common learning 
in the law that a man cannot grant or charge 
that which he bas not" ; yet it is equally well 
settled that a future possibility arising out of, 
or dependent upon, some present right, prop­
erty or interest, may be the subject of a valid 
present sale. The distinction is illustrated in 
Hobart, 13:!. as follows : ''The grant of all 
tile tithe wool of a certain yeai· is good in its 
treation, though it may happen that there be 
no tithe wool in that year; but the grant of 
the wool which shall grow upon such sheep 
as the grantor may afterwarcls purcha:;;e, is 
void." It is well settled that a valid sale may 
be made of the wine a vineyard is expected to 
produce, the grain that a field is expected to 
grow, the milk that a cow may yield, or the 
future young born of an animal. 1 Pa.rs. Cont. 
(3th Ed.) p. 523, note k, and cases there cited ; 
Hill. Sales, § 18; Story. Sales, § 18G. In Fon­
ville v. Casey, 1 ;\lurpb. (N. C.) 38!), it was 
held that an agreement for a valuable consid­
eration to deli\·er to the plaintiff the first fe­
male colt which a certain mare owned by the 
defendant might produce, vests a properiy in 
the colt in tbe plaintiff, upon the principle 
that there may be a valid sale where the title 
is not actually in the grantor, if it is in him 
potentially, as being a thing accessory to some­
thing which be actually bas. And in ;\lcCarty 
v. Blevins, 3 Yerg. 193, it was held that where 
A. agrees with B. that the foal of A.'s ma.re 
shall belong to C., a good title vests in the 
latter when parturition from the mother takes 
place, though A. immediately after the colt 
was born sold and delivered it to D. 
Before resting the discussion as to the plain­
tiff's title, we ought perhaps briefly to allude 
to a claim made by the defendant, both in 
the court below and in this court, to the ef· 
feet that if the plaintiff's title be conceded 
she is estopped from asserting her clalm. This 
doctrine of estoppel, as all hiers must have 
observed, is often strangely misapplied. And 
it is surely so in this instance. The case fails 
to show any act or omission on the pa.rt of the 
plaintiff inconsistent with the claims she now 
makes, or that the creditors of ;\lurray or the 
defendant as representing them were e>er mis­
led to tbeir injury by any act or negligence on 
her part. On the contrary tbe estoppel is as­
serted in tbe face of the explicit finding, that 
"as soon as the plaintiff became aware of the 
attachment of ber horses she forbade the of­
ficer taking the same, and demanded their im­
mediate return to her." The only fact which 
is suggested as furnishing the llasis for tbe 
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alleged estoppel is that from the 1st of Au-
gust, 1S79, to the 12th of Jauuarj- next follow-
ing, "no attempt was made by the plaintiff
to maintain her title by suit, altliough she was
living during the time at Guilford, where said
colts were." But who ever heard of au estop-
pel in an action at law predicated solely on
neglect to bring a suit for the period of live
montlis? To recognize such a thing for any
period short of the statute of limitatious would
practically modify the statute and create a
new limitation. Furthermore, in what respect
liave the defendant and those he represents
been misled to their injury by this fact? The
plaintiff never induced the taking or with-
holding of her property. And can a tort feas-
or or the wrongful possessor of another's prop-
erty object to the delay in suing him for his
wrong, and claim, as in this case, an estoppel
on the ground that his wrongful possession
proved a very expensive one to liim, amount-
ing even to more than the value of the prop-
erty? He might have stopped the expense at
any time by simply giving to the plaintiff
what belonged to her.
The single question of evidence which the
record presents we do not deem it necessary
paitJcularly to discuss. It will sufBce to re-
mai-k that if the defendant's testimony was ad-
missible to show that Murray, after the sale
to the plaintiff (and, so far as appears, in her
absence), claimed to own the mai'es and colts,
it was a complete and satisfactory reply for
the plaintiff in rebuttal to show that Murray's
own entries (presumably a part of the res ges-
taj) in the appropriate books kept by him,
showed the fact to be otherwise, and in ac-
cordance with the plaintiff's claims. At any
rate it is very clear that no injustice was done
by this ruling to furnish any ground for a
new ti-ial. There was no error in the judg-
ment complained of, and a new tiial is not
advised. In this opinion the other judges con-
curred-
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alleged estoppel is that from tbe 1st of Au­
gu t, 1 19, to the 12th of January next follow­
ing, "no attempt wa made by tbe plaintiff 
to maintain ber title by suit, although she was 
living during the time at Guilford, where said 
colts were." But who e>er beard of an cstop­
pel in an action at law predicated solely on 
ne�lect to bring a suit for the period of Jl•e 
m1111tl - ? To recognize uch a thing for any 
periotl bort of the statute of limitation would 
praC'lieally modifr the tatute and create a 
new limitation. Furthermore, in wllat respect 
have tile defendant and tho,;e he repre-cnts 
l•een misled to their injury by tlli fact? The 
pla intiff never induced the taking or witb­
bohlin� or her pwperty. And can a tort fea -­
or or the wrongJul pos>:es or of another· prop­
erty object to the delay in suing him for bi 
wrong, and claim, as in this case. an estoppel 
on the ground that bis wrongful possession 
pro>ed a very e.....:pen ive one to him, amount­
ing even to more than the value of the prop-
D i g 1t1ze by 
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erty ? He might have stopped the expense a t  
any time b y  simply giving to the plaintiff 
what belonged to her. 
The single question of evidence which the 
record presents we do not deem it necessary Jsa 
particularly to discuss. It will suffice to re- ,1!11 
mark that if the defenda nt's testimony was ad- u-.i. 
m issible to show that :Murray, after the sale l.D l 
to the plaintiff (and, so far as appears, in her bL 
ab ence), claimed to own the mares and colts, Hob 
it was a complete and satisfactory reply for in t  
the plaintiff in rebuttal to show that i\Iurray·- 1, 
own enb:ies (pre umably a pait of the res ges­
tre) in the appropriate books kept by him, 
showed the fact to be otherwise, and in ac­
cordance with the plaintiff" claims. At any 
rate it is very clear that no inj ustice was done 
by this ruling to furnish any ground for a 
new tr'..al. There 'ms no error in the j udg­
ment complained of, and a new trial is not 
advised. In this opinion the other judges con­
curred. 
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HOLKOYD V. MARSHAJLL,
(10 H. L. Gas. 191.)
House of Lords. Aug. 4, 18C2.
James Taylor cairied on the business of a
damask manufacturer at Hayes Mill, Oven-
den, near Halifax, in the county of York.
In 185S he became embarrassed, a sale of
his ehects by auction took piace, and the
Holroyds, who had previously employed him
in the way of his business, purchased all
the machinery at the mill. The machinery
was not removed, and it was agreed that Tay-
lur should buy it back for £5,000. And in-
denture, dated the 20th of September, 1858,
was executed, to which A. P. and W. Hol-
royd were parties of the first part, James
Taylor of the second part, and Isaac Brunt
of the third part. This indenture declared
the "machinery, implements, and things spec-
ified in the schedule hereunder written and
fixed in the said mill," to belong to the
Holroyds; that Taylor had agreed to pur-
chase the same for £5,000, but could not then
pay the purchase money, wherefore it was
agreed, &c., that "all the machinery, imple-
ments, and things specified in the schedule
(hereinafter designated 'the said premises')"
were assigned to Brunt, In trust for Taylor,
until a certain demand for payment should
be made upon him, and then, in case he
should pay to the Holroyds a sum of £5,000,
with interest, for him absolutely. If default
in payment was made. Brunt was to have
power to sell, anu hold the moneys in pursu-
ance of the trust for sale, upon trust, to pay
off the Holroyds, and to pay the surplus, if
any, to Taylor. The indenture, in addition
to a clause binding Taylor, during the con-
tinuance of the trust, to insure to the extent
of £5,000, contained the following covenant:
"That all machinery, implements, and things
which, during the continuance of this secu-
rity, shall be fixed or placed in or about the
said mill, buildings, and appurtenances, in
addition to or substitution for the said prem-
ises, or any part thereof, shall, during such
continuance as aforesaid, be subject to the
trusts, powers, provisoes, and declarations
hereinbefore declared and expressed concern-
ing the said premises; ana that the said
James Taylor, his executors, &c., will at all
times, during such continuance as aforesaid,
at the request, i&c., of the said Holroyds, their
executors, &c., do all necessary acts for as-
suring such added or substituted machinery,
implements, and things, so that the same
may become vested accordingly." The deed
was, four days afterwards, duly registered,
as a bill of sale, under 17 & 18 Vict. c. 30.
Taylor, who remained In possession, sold
and exchanged some of the old machinery,
and introduced some new machinery, of
which he rendered an account to the Hol-
royds before April, ISOO; but no conveyance
was made of this new machinery to them,
nor was any act done by them, or on their
behalf, to constitute a formal taking of pos-
session of the added machinery. On the
2d April, 18G0, the Holroyds served Taylor
with a demand for payment of the £5,000
and interest, and no payment being made,
they, on the 30th April, took possession of
the machinei-y, and advertised it for sale by
auction on the 21st May following.
On the 13th April, 18G0, Bmil Preller sued
out a writ of scire facias against Taylor for
the sum of £155. 18s. 4d., damages and costs,
which was executed on the following day
by James Davis, an officer of Mr. Garth
Marshall, then high sheriff of York. On the
10th May, 18G0, a similar writ, for £138. 3s.
3d., was executed by Davis, and on the 25th
May, ISGO, the property was sold by the
sheriff. Notice was given to the sheriff of
the bill of sale executed in favour of the Hol-
royds. The only part of the machinery
claimed by the execution creditors consisted
of those things which had been purchased
by Taylor since the date of the bill of sale.
The sheriff insisted on taking under the
writs these added articles, and the Hol-
royds, on the 30th May, 1860, filed their bill
against the sheriff, and the other necessary
parties, praying for an assessment of dam-
ages and general relief. The cause was
heard before Vice Chancellor Stuart, who
on the 27th July, 1860, made an order, de-
claring that the whole machinery in the mill,
including the added and substituted articles,
at the time of the execution, vested in the
lilaiutiffs by virtue of the bill of sale. On
apijeal, before Lord Chancellor Campbell, on
the 22d December, 1860, the vice chancel-
lor's order was reversed. This present ap-
peal was then brought
Mr. Malins and G. V. Yool, for appellants.
Mr. Amphlett and Mr. Hobhouse, for re-
spondents.
Lord Chancellor WESTBURY. after stat-
ing the facts of the case, said:
My lords, the question is whether as to the
machinery added and substituted since the
date of the mortgage the title of the mort-
gagees, or that of the judgment creditor,
ought to prevail. It is admitted that the
judgment creditor has no title as to the ma-
chinery originally comprised in the bill of
sale; but it is contended that the mortgagees
had no specific estate or interest in the fu-
tui-e machinei-y. It is also admitted that if
the mortgagees had an equitable estate in
the added machinery, the same could not be
taken in execution by the judgment creditor.
The question may be easily decided by the
application of a few elementary principles
long settled in courts of equity. In equity
It is not necessary for the alienation of prop-
erty that there should be a formal deed of
conveyance. A contract for valuable con-
sideration, by which it is agreed to make a
present transfer of property, passes at once
the beneficial interest, provided the contract
is one of which a court of equity will decree
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
7:
37
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/u
c2
.a
rk
:/1
39
60
/t
90
86
js
3p
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
FOHMATlON 0.F T H E  0 .  TRACT-E ' E N TI A LS. 7:3 
HOLROYD v. MARSH ALL. 
(10 H. L. Caa. 191.) 
House of Lor<ls. Aug. 4, 1862. 
James Taylor carried on the business of a 
daillllsk manufacturer at tlayes �111 1, Oven­
den, near llalifax, in the county of York. 
In 1858 he became embarrassed, a sale of 
his efiects by auction took piace, and the 
Holroyds, who had previously employed him 
in the way of his business, purchased all 
the machinery at the mill. The machinery 
was not removed, and it was agreed that Tay­
lor should buy it back for £5,000. And in­
denture, dated the 20th of September, 183 , 
was executed, to which A. P. and W. Ilol­
rnyd were parties of the first part, James 
Taylor of the second part, and Isaac Brunt 
of the third part. This indenture declared 
the "macliinery, implements, and things spec­
ilied in the schedule hereWlder written and 
tixed in the said mill," to belong to the 
llolroyds; that Taylor had agreed to pur­
chase the same for £5,000, but could not then 
vay the purchase money, wherefore it was 
agreed, &c., that "all the machinery, imple­
ments, and things specified in the schedule 
(hereinafter designated 'the said premises')" 
were assigned to Brunt, in trust for Taylor, 
until a certain demand for payment should 
be made upon him, and then, in case he 
should pay to the Holroyds a sum of £5,000, 
with interest, for him absolutely. If default 
in payment was made, Brunt was to have 
power· to sell, an ... hold the moneys in pursu­
ance of the trust for sale, upon trust, to pay 
off the Holroyds, and to pay the surplus, if  
any, to Taylor. The indenture, in addition 
to a clause binding Taylor, during the con­
tinuance of the trust, to insure to the extent 
of £5,000, contained the following covenant: 
"That all machinery, implements, and things 
which, during the continuance of this secu­
rity, shall be fixed or placed in or about the 
:;aid mill, buildings, and appurtenances, in 
addition to or substitution for the said prem­
ises, or any part thereof, shall, during such 
continuance as aforesaid, be subject to the 
trusts, powers, provisoes, and declarations 
hereinbefore declared and expressed concern­
ing the said premises; anu that the said 
James Taylor, his executors, &c., will at all 
times, during such continuance as aforesaid, 
at the request, &c., of the saiLl Holro.nls. tl.ieir 
executors, &c., do all necessary acts for as­
suring such added or substituted machinery, 
implements, and things, so that the same 
wa�· become ve>.ted accordingly." The deed 
was, four days afterwards, duly registered, 
as a bill of sale, under 17 & 18 Viet. c. ::m. 
Taylor, who remained in possession, sold 
and exchanged some of the old machinery, 
and introduced some new machinery, of 
which he rendered an account to the Hol­
royds before April, 1860; but no conveyance 
was made of this new machinery to them, 
nor was any act done by them, or on their 
behalf, te CO.Q . titut a formal taking of pos-
TE A C H  V 
session of the added machinery. On the 
2d April, 1860, the Holroyds served Taylor 
with a demand for payment of the £5,000 
and interest, and no payment being made, 
they, on the 30th April, took possession of 
the machinery, and advertised it for sale by 
auction on the 21st l\fay following. 
On the 13th April, 18GO, Emil Preller suecl 
out a writ of scire facias against Taylor for 
the sum of £155. 18s. 4d., damages and costs, 
which was executed on the following day 
by James Davis, an officer of �Ir. G:ui h 
l\farsha ll, then high sheriff of York. On the 
10th May, 1860, a similar writ, for £138. 3�. 
3d., was executed by Davis, and on the 2::>th 
l\fay, 1860, the property was sold by the 
sheriff. Notice was given to the sheriff of 
the bill of sale executed in favour of the Hol­
royds. The only part of the machinery 
claimed by the execution creditors consisted 
of those things which bad been purchased 
by Taylor since the date of the bill of sale. 
The sheriff insi:;ted on taking under the 
writs the. e added articles. and the Hol­
royds, on the 30th l\fay, 1860, filed their bill 
against the sheriff. and the other necessary 
parties, praying for an assessment of dam­
ages and general relief. The cause was 
beard before Vice Chancellor Stuart, who 
on the 27th July, 1 860, made an order, de­
claring that the whole machi nery in the mill, 
including the added and substituted articles, 
at the time of the execution, vested in the 
plaintiffs by virtue of the bill of s:i le. On 
appeal, before Lord Chancellor Campbell, on 
the 22d December, 1860, the vice chancel­
lor's order was reversed. This present ap­
peal was then brought. 
l\fr. l\falins and G. V. Yool, for appellants. 
l\fr. Amph lett and Mr. Hobhouse, for re­
spondents. 
Lord Chancellor WESTBURY. after stat­
ing the facts of the case, said : 
l\fy lords, the question is whether as to the 
machi nery adcleu and substituted since the 
date of the mortgage the title of the mort­
gagees, or that of the j udgment creditor, 
ought to prevail. I t  is admitted that the 
judgment cre<litor bas no title as to the ma­
chinery orig"inally comprised in the bill of 
sale; b u t  it is contended that the mortgagees 
had no specific estate or interest in the fu­
ture machinery. It is also admitted that if  
the mortgagees bad an equitable estate in 
the added machinery, the same could not be 
taken in execution by the judgment creditor. 
The question may be easily decided by the 
application of a few elementary principles 
long settled in courts of equity. In equity 
it is not neces ary for the alienation of prop­
erty that there should be a formal deed of 
conveyance. A contract for valuable con­
sideration, by which it is agreed to make a 
present transfer of property, pas es at once 
the beneficial interest, provided the contract 
is one of which a court o,f,_ �£U1it;i.: ii! !lecree 
U VERS Uf C L 0 NIA 
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specific peiforuiance. In tlie lan^ua.ire of
Lord Hardwicke, the vendor becomes a trus-
tee for the vendee; subject, of course, to tlie
contract being one to be specitically per-
formed. And this is true, not only of con-
tracts relating to real estate, but also of
contracts relating to personal propertj-, pro-
vided that the latter are such as a court of
equity would direct to be specifically per-
formeil.
A contract for the sjile of goods, as. for
examiile, of five hundred chests of tea, is not
a coutiact which would be spccilically per-
formed, because it does not relate to any
chests of tea in particular; but a contract
to sell five hundred chests of the particular
kind of tea which is now in my warehouse
In Gloucester, is a contract relating to spe-
cific propeny. and which would be specifically
performed. The buyer may maintain a suit
in equity for the delivery of a specific chat-
tel when it is the subject of a contract, and
for an injunction (if necessarj') to restrain
the seller from delivering it to any other
person.
The effect in equity of a mere contract as |
amounting to an alienation, may be illustiat- |
ed by the law relating to the revocation of i
wills. If the owner of an estate devises it
by will, and afterwards contracts to sell it
to a purchaser, but dies before the contract
is performed, the will is revoked as to the
bcneliclal or equitable interests in the estate,
for the contract converted the testator into a
trustee for the purchaser; and. in like man-
ner, it the purchaser dies Intestate before per-
formance of the contract, the eiiuiialilc estate
descends to his heir at law, who may reciuire
the pereonal representative to i)ay the pur-
chase money. But all this depends on the
contract being such as a court of equity would
decree to be specitically perforuuHl.
There can be no doubt, therefore, that If
the mortgngo deed in the present case had
contained nothing but the contract which is
Inviilved In the aforesaid covenant of Taylor,
the mortgagor, such cdiilnict would have
aniiiiuited to a valid assignment In eiiully of
the whole of the machinery and chattels In
question, siippiising hucIi machinery and cf-
fects to have been In existence an<l upon the
mill at the time of the execution of the deed.
Hut It Ih nliegeil that this Is not the effect
iif the ciinlnict, licinuse It relates to ma
I'hiiji-ry not exlHlhig at the lime, but to be
iicqulri'd and llxed and plaicd In the mill
at a ruturo time. It In quite (rue tlint a deed
vvlilrli priifiiweN to convey prcipcMly wliU'li Is
not In exiHtuncc at the time Is as a ccinvcy-
ance volil nt Inw, Kimply bctause there Is
nnllilng to convey. ,Sr> In (HinKy a fimtracl
whii-li I'MuagcH to transfer pruperly, which In
not In exiHti'iiee, cnniml iiperale ns an lin-
niiMllalo nllennllnn merely lieeaiise there Ih
uothlng to IrnnNfer.
Hut If n vi'hdor or inortgnKor ngrecH to hiOI
or niortynKe prop4Tly, real ur perHimfll, <if
which he In not poMsettHed n( the lime, anil he
receives the consideration for the contract,
and afterwards becomes possessed of prop-
erty answering the description in the con-
tract, there is no doubt that a court of equity
would compel him to perform the contract,
and that the contract would, in equity, trans-
fer the beneficial interest to the mortgagee
or pm'chaser immediately on the property be-
ing acquired. This, of course, assumes that
the supposed contract is one of that class of
which a court of equity would decree the
specific performance. If it be so, then im-
mediately on the acquisition of the property
described the vendor or mortgagor would
hold it in trust for the purchaser or mort-
gagee, according to the terms of the contract.
For if a contract be in other respects good
and fit to be performed, and the considera-
tion bus been received, incapacity to perform
it at the time of its execution will be no an-
swer when the means of doing so are after-
wards obtained.
Apply these familiar principles to the pres-
ent case; it follows that immediatelj- on the
new machinery and effects being fixed or
placed in the mill, they became subject to
the operation of the contract, and passed in
equity to the mortgagees, to whom Taylor
was bound to make a legal conveyance, and
for whom he, in the mean time, was a trustee
of the property in question.
Tliere is another criterion to prove tliat the
mortgagee acquiicd an estate or interest in
the added machinery as soon as it was
brought into the mill. If afterwards the
mortgagor had attempted to remove any part
of such machinery, except for the purpose nf
substitution, the mortgagee would have been
entitled to an injunction to restrajn such re-
moval, and that because of his estate in the
specific property. The result is, that the ti-
tle of the appellants is to be preferred to Uiat
of the judgment creditor.
Some use was made at the bar and in the
court below of the language attributed to Mr.
Baron I'arke in the case of Mogg v. Baker,
3 Mees. & W. 108. That learned judge ap-
pears to have given, not his own opinion, but
what he understood would have been the de-
cision of a court of equity upon the ca.se. lie
Is represented as speaking upon the authority
of one of the Judges of the court of chancery.
Any conmiuniealion so made was of course
exira-judlclal, and there Is much danger In
making communications of such a nature the
ground of judicial decision; but I entirely
concur In what appears to have been the
prinelple Inlendeil to be stated; for Mr. Baron
rarke, si)eaklng of the agreement In the case,
Huys. "It woidd cover no s]ieclllc furniture,
and would confer no right in eciuity." I have
alriiidy explained, that a contract relating to
goods, but not to any speelllc goods, would
not be the subject of a decree lor specilic
IK'rrorniance, and that a conlnn^t that could
not be Hpeclllcally performed would not avail
to tiansfer any estate or lMl<"resl.
If, therefore, the contract In Mogg v. Baker
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.pecific performance. In the lan:::ua:::e of I Lord Hardwickc, the Yendor hreomes a trus­
tee for the •endee; subjed. of courst>. to tJic 
contract being one to be ,;pedtkally per­
formed. .And thi is true. not only o f  t•on­
tracts relating to real estate, but also of 
contracts relating to personal property, pro­
'l"idetl that the latter are such as a Ct)urt of 
equity would direct to be specifically per­
forwetl. 
A eontr:ict for the st1le of goods. as. for 
exalllplc>. of fiye lmndred chl'sts of tea. i s not 
a cuutrnct which woulu be s1wd1ita lly per 
formeu, because it does not relate to any 
chests of tea in pa rtkular; but a couttnct 
to • ell fi'l"e hundred chests of the particular 
kind of tea which i- now in ruy warehouse 
in G loucester, is a contract relating to spe­
cific propert�-. alltl which would be s11ecific:ally 
performed. The buyer may maintain a su i t  
i n  ec1uity for t h e  deliYery o f  a spcdfiC' chat­
tel when it is the ·nhject of a contmcl. autl 
for an injunction (if necessary) to restrain 
the seller from dcliYering it to any other 
per:on . 
The <>ffect in equit�· of a mere contract as 
:111111u11ti11:.:- to an alienat ion. may be illust 1 a t ­
e d  liy the law relating to t h e  rern<':ition of 
wJlls. Ir the owner of an <'slate clcYiscs i t  
l>y will, and afterwards contra('ts to sell it 
to a purchaser, but dies l.lefort> t he contract 
Is 111·rfur111etl, thP will is rcYoke1I :ls to t ill' 
hcnf'lidal ur eqnitaiJle interests iu t he estate, 
tor t h\' ('11utract cou\·erted the testator into a 
t rustee for the purchnser ; nnd, lu like man­
ner. if the 11urchasc>r dlcl' i 1 1 t •"·l:1 1 .. lwf111·e 11er­
tor111n11C'c of the t•on trad, t he.> Pqnll a !tlc l'slatc 
tie ·t end.· tu his lll'lr nt Jaw, who may require 
t h,. fJPr.-1111nl rcpn•spnt:t t ln• to pay the pur­
cha,t• lllOllcy. Illlt n i l t h is clC]ll'IHIS Oil t he 
rou t rnc:t helng- such a. n court of t•qul ty would 
1lecn•t> tn he sp •cl tlt•al ly 1•1•rfo1·1111-<1. 
'l'hrrc 1•a 1 1  lit' 110 cl1111h1 , t h1•n•t'11r" th:tt i C  
t he 11101 1 i.,r:1g' tlt•c•tl 111 1 he 1 11 1·s1·11t l':lsl' !mil 
co11t 11 l 11<'tl 11othlw• hut t lw 1 < • 1 1 t r:u·t which Is 
l m·uh·cd In t h " :i forr• n it! <'ll\t'llll l l t  of 'l'n�·lor, 
t h" mortgagor, twh 1'1 111t roe t w1111ld hnv1• 
n1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t 1•d t o n \ H ll<l n 11l::nuw11t 1 1 1  <'q11 J ly  of 
t l ll' \\ ltolc nf t lw 11 11wl i l 1 1 r·ry 11 1 u l  < '1 1 :l l t l 'ls In  
qlll t h m ,  i;11ppo l r ai.: s11r'i1 11 1a da l 1 1 1•ry n nrl  !'f­
r •1 l to hn \ •• 1 11· 1•1 1  ! 1 1  PX("1"1 1 l"I' 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 p11n t I l l '  
1 1 1 1 1 1  n t  t lHI t l m1• of 1 1 11'  • 1•t·111 lo11 of t l 11• d 1 •t•1 l .  
But It I n l l P 'i ' < l  1 hn l t i l l  Is l l • J t  1 1 1 ..  f ' ll<•1•I 
. . r t h<' <.'Ont ru t ,  1 .. ·1111 1• I t  n•ln l •' tn 11 1 ;1· 
• hl11 1 •ry 11ol • I l lni.: nl t he - 1 1 1 1 11�. l o 111  to ht• 
n • 111 J rt r l  n ntl  Ii • ( )  o n tl plm r 1 1  1 1 1  t ho• 1 1 1 1 1 1  
nt n r1 1 t 1 1rti t lmr. 1 1  I t t l l l t t• 1 1 111• t l lll l IL o l 1 •1 •d 
wlald1 11rof tv Oi l \ l'Y 1 1 1·op,.1 1 y  whklt IN  
1101 1 1 1  < '  IHltltr '!' OI  1 h1• t l ll1t' 111 1 1  l l  r 'o l l \ l \'• 
u11r1• \ o ld Ill In \\ . l 1 1 t ply hr 1111 1 t h1 • 1  ,-. ·I 
11ot hl11 • to 'OllH'Y· !in Ill • 1u l ty  11 1•011 t 11  I 
" hli h f 1111' g to lm II ft I' Ill OJl• r t y .  w h h•lt IR 
1111l In l' I h Ill , <'ll llllctt OJl!'rn t •• n u 11 1 1 1 1-
l llt 1 lst li' 11 lll'l111 I lo11 ml'11•ly ht:• 11 u t• l 1 11•1 " Is 
uot hlng to l rnu ft 1 
But t r  n ' t  ndur •1r 111orl J..'fll:or ni.:r P 1 1 1  .. 1 1 
•1r 111uru:n ''' pr•1111·rt , 1 � I 01· 1 11 •r1101111!, t•f 
'' hlcll h '  18 1101 11 0 • ti nt t h •• t h lll'. 11111 1 1 1 1 •  
DI 1trl by 
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recei'l"eS the consideration for the contract, :di 
and afterwards becomes po essed of prop- 1: 1 
erty answering the description i n  the con- (er 
tract. there is no doubt thnt a court of equity 
would compel him to 11erform the contract, 
and that the contract would. in equity, tran<:­
fer the beneficial i nterest to the mortgagee • 
or purcha -er immediately on the property be­
ing acquired. This. of course, assumes that cin 
the , upposed contract is one of that clas or fer 
which a court of equity would decree the rol 
..:pecitlc performance. If i t  be so, then i m- th 
melliately on the acquisition of the property ju 
11cscril.lcd the vendor or mortgagor wouhl 01 
hold i t  i n  trust for the purchaser or mort· 
g-agee, according to tlle terms of the contract. 
For if a contract I.le in other re pects �ood 
and fit to be performed, and tlle considera­
tion h:.s been received, incapacity to perform 
it at the t i me of its execution will be no an­
swer " hen the means of doing so are after­
wards obtai netl. 
Ap11Iy these familiar principles to tlle i11 cs­
eut case; it follows that immediately on the 
ue''" machinery and effects being fi......:ed or 
placed in the mill, they became subject to 
tlw operation of t he contract, and passed i n  
t' quity to the mortgagees. to whom Taylor 
was bou nd to make a legal convc�·ant·e. and 
for 'vhoru he, i n  the mean l i me, was a trustee 
of the property in question. w 
There is another criterion to prove that the rr 
mortga;::ee llCQuired an e tate or iuterl'st i u  
the added machinery a s  soon a s  i t  w:1s 
brought into the mill. IC afterwards the 
mo1·t g-agor had att cmpletl to remoYc :my part 
or ,;nch machinery. except for the purp11sl' of 
suhslilution, t h e  mortg-ngce woulu have llcl'u 
ent i t led to nn injunction to restr:1jn such re­
mcn-al, and t ha t  bcl'ause of bis estate iu the 
speC'iflc property. The result is, that the t i ­
t l e  of the :1ppd lants is to b e  prefcnt'1l to that 
or the judgu1ent crrclitor. 
�ome use was ma<lr at the bar antl in the 
t'Olll"f below Of the lang11nge at t ributed to :\Ir. 
H:irnn Parke lu t he t•nsc of l\Iogg v. 11:\ kl't', 
:1 �l l'CS. & w. ms. That learned jmlge :1 J)-
11rnrs to h:nr ghc>n, not bis own opi n ion, hut 
w ha t lw undl'l'stmirl would have bccu t he de 
1'1s!1 1 1 l  of :l l'OUl't Of Cl}Uit y 1 1 [100 t he C':lS('. 1 1 <' 
ls n•prl'scnt rll as spra ldng upon the n11l h11rity 
of onc of t he jn 1lgcs of t h e court of chanl'cry. 
.\ny rom munlr:i I inn so made• \\':lS of c1rnrse 
•'x t ra -judkl:a l ,  a 11 1 l  ! here Is m 1 1 r h  dnngt>r I n 
11 1 1 1 ldn� 1•1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1mkat lo11s of surh a 1 1a t 11 rt' t br 
;.:ru1 1 1 1d of j ud ki a l dc•l'islon ;  but l t'nt ir<>lv 
1•01w11r i n  wha t : I J l) l<'ars to h llY<' hren t h� 
pl'ittdple lntPnrl t•d lu lw l"l:l l t>d ; for � I r. Harnn 
l 'nrl t', S)l a k l ni; or l l w 111.nl'<'l lH'll!  In the c:lM', 
ti:i) , " J t  wou ld cover no s1 wdllc fnrnltun', 
1 1 1 11 1  would 1•n11 f1•r no rh�ht In equity." I hun• 
n l n•H<ly I'. ph 1 hwd, t hnt n con t r:w t rcl a l l n� t o  
�rnulf!, hnt not lo uny SJ l<'l ' l lk gumls, would 
1 11 1 1  1 11 t lw Rnhj,.�t nr a t l l'lTP•' ror s1wcilil' 
i '"I f·ir1 1 1 1 1 111·<', nml t h a t a c·n1 1t n1 1 · t  l hut 1•011ld 
11111 1 11 •  s1 u·1• l tk: t l ly  1 11·rfnl'1t1Pd would not :t \":l il 
lo t 1 :1 1 1 r .. r : 1 1 1y 1·11t n t P  or l n t 1•n•st . 
r r, t lu ·rr •fon', 1 hi• 1·n 1 1 t r11cl in � l oi.;i.: v. Baker 
O r  :..i · ·  • • • o .  
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related to no specific furniture, it is true ttiat
it would not, at tlie time of its execution, con-
ler any riglit in eciuity; but it is etinally true
that it would atlaeU on furniture answering;
the contrict when acquired, provided the
eoutraet remained in force at the time of
such ae(iuisitioii.
Whetlier a correct construction was put up-
on the agreement in Mogg v. Baker is a dif-
ferent Mueslion, and which it is needless to
consider, as I am only desirous of showing
that the proposition stated by the learned
judse is quite consistent with the principles
on whi('h this case ought to be decided.
I therefore advise your lordships to reverse
the order of Lord Chancellor Canipliell, and
<lirect the petition of rehearing presented to
him to be dismissed, with costs.
Lord WENSLEYDALE. My lords, more
than a year ago, when this case was argued
at your lordships' bar with very great abil-
ity on both sides, on behalf of the appellants
Ijy Mr. Malins and Mr. Yool, and on behalf
of the respondents by Mr. Amphlett and Mr.
Ilobhouse, the late lord chancellor, with that
extraordinary industry which he possessed,
immediately after the argument committed
his opinion to paper, and I was favoured
with a perusal of that opinion, which I read
with great attention. My noble and learned
friend opposite (Lord CHELxMSPORD) also
committed his opinion to paper, and he fa-
voured me with its perusal. Upon considering
those opinions and the argument I had heard
at tlie bar, my opinion then concurred with
that of the late lord chancellor. But now
that the matter has been argued a second
time, and I have heard the opinion of the
lord chancellor upon it, and find that the
opinion of my noble and learned friend op-
posite is the same as it was before. I cannot
say that I feel myself so confident in the ar-
guments that have presented themselves to
my mind as to press your lordships to adopt
them.
1 have heard the very able and vei-y clear
opinion which the lord chancellor has pro-
nounced, and I cannot help saying, that I
thinLc that the views which I adopted upon
the subject after the first argument were
not correct. I feel, therefore, that I must
acquiesce in the judgment proposed.
Lord CHELMSFORD. My lords, this case,
which has become of great importance, has
been twice fully and ably argued, there hav-
ing been a difference of opinion amongst
your lordships upon the first argument, which
made it desirable that a second should take
lilace. Upon the original argument I thought
that the decree of my late noble and learned
friend. Lord Campbell, could not be main-
tained; but I came to this conclusion with
all the deference due to his great legal ex-
lierience, and with the more doubt as to the
soundness of my views, upon finding not
only that he adluM-ed to his opinion on hear-
ing the question argued in this house, but
that he was supported in it by my noble and
learned friend. Lord WEXSLEYDALE, for
whose judgment (it is unnecessary to say) I
entertain the most sincere respect. Aware
that I was opposed to such eminent author-
ities, I listened to the second argument with
the most earnest and anxious attention; but
nothing which I heard in the course of it
tended to shake the opinion which I had
originally formed. I should, therefore,, have
beeu compelled to state this opinion under
such discouraging circumstances, if I had not
happily been fortified by the concurrence of
the noble and learned lord upon the wool
sack, before whom the last argument took
place. His great learning and long experi-
ence in courts of equity justify me now in
expressing myself with some confidence in
a case in which his views coincide with
mine, and which is to be decided upon equi-
table grounds and principles.
In considering the question, I propose to
advert to the various lioints which were
touched upon in the course of both the argu-
ments, although ui3on the last occasion many
were omitted which were raised upon the
first. The question in the case is, whether
the appellants, who have an equitable title
as mortgagees of certain machinery fixed
and placed in a mill, of which the mortgagor,
James Taylor, was tenant, are entitled to the
property which was seized by the sheriff,
under two writs of execution issued against
the mortgagor, in priority to those execu-
tions, or either of them?
The title of the appellants depends upon a
deed dated the 20th September, ISoS. [His
lordship here stated the bill of sale and the
other facts of the case.] The machinery sold
by the sheriff was more than sufficient to
satisfy the first execution, and the appellants
claiming a preference over both executions,
contend that the possession taken by them
on tlie 30th April entitled them, at all events,
to priority over the second execution of the
11th May. The great question, however, is,
whether they are entitled to a preference
over the first execution by the mere effect of
their deed? or whether it was necessai-y that
some act should have been done after the
new machinery was fixed or placed in the
mill, in order to complete the title of the ap-
pellants?
It was admitted that the light of the judg-
ment creditor, who has no specific lieu, but
only a general security over his debtor's prop-
erty, must be subject to all the equities
which attach upon whatever property is tak-
en under his execution. But it was said
(and truly said) that those equities must be
complete, and not inchoate or imperfect, or
in other words, that they must be actual
equitable estates, and not mere executory
rights.
What, then, was the nature of the title
whicli the mortgagees obtained under their
mortgage deed? If the question had to be
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related to no spedfic furniture, it is true that 
it would not, at the time of its execution, con­
fer any right in equity ; but it  is equally true 
that it would attach on fumiture answeriug­
the coutr.ict when acquired, provided the 
eoutrac:t remaim•<l in force at the time of 
suc:b acqnisitiou. 
'V hetller a C'<H l'c:d construction "'as put up­
on tile agreemcut iu l\logg v. Baker is a dif­
ferent questiou, and which it is ueedless to 
consider, as I am only desirous of showing 
tlrn t the proposition stated by the learned 
judge is quite consistent with the principles 
on which tllis case ought to be c1ccit1ell. 
I t herefore adv ise your lordships to reverse 
tile order of Lord Chancellor Campbell. au<l 
direct the petition of rehearing preseuted to 
llim to be dism issed, w i t h  costs. 
Lord WENSLEYDALE. l\Iy loHl�. more 
than a year ago, when this case was nrgtrnLI 
at your lordships' bar with very gr1•a t abil­
ity on both sides, on behalf of the appellants 
by �fr. Ualins and i\lr. Yoo!, and -0n behalf 
of tlle respondents by Mr. Amphlett and i\lr. 
I!obhouse, the late lord ch:i ncellor, witll that 
extraordinary industry which he possessed, 
im mediately after the a- rgument com m itted 
his opinion to paper, and I was favourecl 
with a perusal of that opinion. which I reacl 
with gt·eat attention. My noble and leamecl 
friend opposite (Lord CHEL�ISFORD) also 
committed bis opinion to paper, and he fa­
vom·ed me with its perusal. Upon considering 
tho>:e opinions and the argument I had beard 
at tile bar, my opinion then concurred with 
t hat o f  the late lord chancellor. But now 
that the matter has been argued a second 
time, and I have heard the opinion of the 
lord chancellor upon it, and find that the 
opinion of my noble and leamed friend op­
posite is the same as it was before, I cannot 
say tllat I feel myself so confident i n  the a r­
guments that have presented them selves to 
my m i nd as to press your lordsllips to adopt 
tllem. 
I have beard the very able and very clear 
opinion which the lord chancellor has p ro­
nounced, and I cannot help saying, that I 
think that the views whicll I adopted upon 
the subject after the first argument were 
not correct. I feel, therefore, tllat I must 
acquiesce in the judgment proposed. 
Lord CHIDLl\ISFORD. �Iy lords, this case, 
which bas become o f  great i mportance, llas 
been twice fully and ably argued, there !lav­
ing been a difference of opinion amongst 
your lordships upon the first argument, which 
made it desirable that a second should take 
place. Upon the original argument I thought 
that the decree of my late noble and learned 
friend, Lord Campbell, could not be main­
tained ; but I came to this conclusion with 
all the deference due to his great legal ex­
perience, a n d  with the more doubt as to the 
>:oundness of my v iews, upon finding not 
only tllat h e  •Hlherell to his opinion ou hear-
C 
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ing tile question argued i n  tllis house. lrnt 
that be was upportcd i n  i t  1.Jy my nolJle and 
learned friend, Lord WE?\8J,EYDALE, fur 
whose judgment ( it  is unnecessary to say) I 
entertain the most sincere respect. Aware 
that I was opposed to such eminent autllur­
ities, I l istened to tlle second argument with 
the most earnest and anxious attentio n ;  but 
nothing which I heard i n  the course o f  it 
tended to shake the opinion which I !Ja e! 
ori;.(inally formed. I should, tllerefore, ll<ll'e 
been compelled to state this opinion mHler 
suclJ Lliscouraging circumstauces, if I baLI not 
hn VI>ilY been fortified by the conc:urreuce of 
t h e noble aud learned Joni upon the wool 
sack, before whom tile last argument took 
place. llis great learning and long experi­
euce i n  courts of equity justify me now i n  
expressing myself witll some confidence i n  
a case i n  wllich llis views coincide w i t h  
miue, and which i s  t o  b e  decided upon equi­
table grounds and principles. 
I n  considering the question, I propose to 
advert to the various points which were 
touched upon in the course o f  both the argu­
ments, although upon the last occasion many 
were omitted wllicb were raised upon tile 
fi rst. The question i n  the case is, w hetllcr 
the appellants, who have an equitable title 
a s  mortgagees of certain machinery fixeLI 
and placed in a m ill, of whicll tile mortgagor, 
James Taylor, was tenant, are entitled to tile 
property which was ,.;eized by the sheriff, 
under two writs o f  execution issued against 
the mortgagor, in priority to those execu­
tions, or either of them ? 
The title of the appellants depends upon a 
deed dated the 20th September, lS:iS. [His 
lordship llere stated the bill of sale and the 
other facts of the case.] The machinery sohl 
lJy tile sheriff was more than sufficient to 
satisfy the first execution, and the appellants 
cla iming a preference over both executions. 
cL1Dtend that the possession taken by them 
on the 30th April entitled them, at all events, 
to priority over the sec:oncl execution of the 
1 1th :\Jay. Tile great question, however, is, 
whether they are entitled to a preference 
over the first execution l>y t he mere effect of 
their deed ·1 or w lJet!Jer it "·as necessary tllat 
some act should ha>e been done after the 
new mach inery was flxecl or placed i n  the 
m ill, in order to c:ompletc t he title of the ap­
pellants? 
It was admitted 1 1lat the Light o f  the juck­
ment creditor. wllo has no specific lien. 1.Jut 
only a general secmity o-ver his debtor·s prop­
erty, must be subject to all the equities 
wllich attach upon whatever property is tak­
en under his execution. But it was said 
(and truly said) that those equities must be 
complete, and not inchoate or i m perfect, or 
i n  other words, that they must be actual 
equitable estates, and not mere executor)· 
rights. 
"'hat. then, was the nature of the title 
'"llid1 the mortgagees obtained under their 
mnrt;.::i ge deed ? If the question had to be 
) r f 
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decided at law, there would be no diffioiilty.
At law an assignment of a thing which has
no existence, actual or potential, at the time
of the execution of the deed, is altogether
Toid. Robinson v. Macdonnell, 5 Maule & S.
228. But where future property is assigned,
and after it comes into existence, possession
is either delivered by the assignor, or is al-
lowed by him to be taken by the assignee,
in either case there would be the novus ac-
tus interveniens of the maxim of Lord Ba-
con, upon which Lord Campbell rested his
decree, and the property would pass.
It seemed to be supposed upon the fust ar-
gument that an assignment of this liiud
would not be void in law if the deed contain-
ed a license or power to seize the after-ac-
quired property. But this circumstance
would make no dilTerence in the case. The
mere assignment is itself a sutHcient declara-
tlo propcedens in the words of the maxim;
and although Chief Justice Tinilal. in the
case of Lunn v. Thornton, 1 C. B. 379, said,
"It is not a question whether a deed might
not have been so framed as to give the de-
fendant a power of seizing the future per-
sonal goods," he must have meant, that un-
der such a power the assignee miglit have
taken possession, and so have done the act
which was necessary to perfect liis title at
law. This will clearly appear from the case
of Congreve v. Evetts, 10 Kxch. 2118. In which
there was an assignment of growing crops
and effects as a security for money lent,
with a power for the assignee to seize and
t:ike possession of the crops and elTet^ts bar-
gained and sold, and of all such crops and
effects as might be sulistitutod for them; and
Bari'U Parke said, "If tlie authority given by
the debtor by the bill of sale had not been
executed. It would have been of no avail
against the exc<-ullon. It gave no legal ti-
tle, nor even equltnlde title, to any speclllc
goods; but wlien executed not fully or en-
tirely, but only to the extent of taking pos-
session of the growing crops. It Is the same
In our Jtidgnient as If the debtor himself luid
put the plaintiff in actual possession of those
cpips." And In Hope v. Ilaylcy, .5 El. &
Bl. KV\ tmr, (a rase much relied upon by tho
vice chancellor), wiiere there w.'is an agr(«-
inent to transfer goods, to be nfterwards ac-
qnlrert and KubHtltiiteil, wlili n power to take
posNcKslon of nil original and substituted
goods, Lord Campbell, ("hlef .lustlce, snid,
"Tho Intention of the contracting parties
wnM, that till' present nnil future properly
slioidd imM by the dii'd. That emdd not bo
• •iirrled Into effect by n mere trniisrer: but
the dfvd rontnlneil n liceMse to the gniiitee
to ptiler upon till- |iro|ierty. and that lli'eiise,
%vlion acted «rn>ii, took I'ffect Independently
"f the trnnBfer"
I hnvo thought It right to dwell n little up
on these cnH<>«, both on ncrmint of some t'X-
prrwiloiiK which were ime<l In arguiiieiit ro-
uportlnc Ihein. and nNo becmiHe In iloior-
mlnlnir the preiieni ipu-Htlon It In usi-rnl to
ascertain the precise limits of the doctrine
as to the assignment of future property at
law. The decree appealed against proceeds
upon the gro'ind. not indeed that an assign-
ment of future property, without possession
taken of it, would be void in equity (as tho
cases to which I have referred show that it
would be at law), but that the equitable riglit
is incomplete and imperfect unless there is
subsequent possession, or some act equiva-
lent to it to perfect the title.
In considering the case it will be unneces-
sary to examine the authorities cited in ar-
gument, to show that if there is an agree-
ment to transfer or to charge future acquired
property, the property passes, or becomes
liable to the charge in equity, where the ques-
tion has arisen between tho parties to the
agreement themselves. In order to determine
whether the equity which is created under
agreements of this kind is a personal equity
to be enforced by suit, or to be made avail-
able by some act to be done between the par-
ties, or is in the nature of a trust attaching
upon and binding the property at the instant
of its coming into existence, we must look
to cases where the rights of tlie third persons
Intervene.
Tho respondents, in support of the decree,
relied strongly on what was laid down by
Baron Parke in Mogg v. Baker, 3 Mees. &
W. 10."), 198, as the rule in equity which he
stated he had dei'ived from a very high au-
thority, "that if tho agi'cement was to mort-
gage certain specific fmniture, of whicli tlie
corpus was ascertained, tliat would constitute
an equitable title in the defendant, so as to
prevent it passing to the assignees of the in-
solvent, and tlien the assignment would make
that equitable title a legal one; but if it was
only an agreement to mortgage fm-niture to
be subsequently acquired, or" (the word "or"
Is omitted in the report) "to give a bill of
salo at a future day of the furniture and oth-
er goods of the insolvent, then it would cover
no specific fm-iiitore. and would confer no
right in equity." The meaning of these latter
words must be that tliere would be no com-
plete equitable transfer of tlie property, be-
cause there can be no doubt that the agrce-
nient staleil would create a rigid in ecpiity
upon which the party entitled might lile a
bill for speclllc performance.
Tills point is so clear that It Is almost un-
necessary to refer to the observations of Ixird
Elilon In the case of Tlie \V;irre, S Price, 2i'.!t,
n. In supjiort of It. It must also be observed,
that the iiropositiim In Mogg v. Baker hard-
ly reaches tho i>resent question, because It Is
not staled as a case of an actual liiinsfer of
future property, but jis an agreement to mort-
gage, or to give a bill of sale at a future
day. The only e<pilty which could belong to
a party under such an agreement would be
to have a morlgnge or a bill of sale of the
fntiirn pri)i><>rly executed to lilm. Tt does not
meet a ease like the pi'eseiit. where It Is ex-
piesKly provided that all additional or subsli-
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decided at law. there would be no tlitlkulty. 
At law an as.:ignment of a thin!!; wbi<:b ba 
no exbtence. a1:tual or potential.  at the tnne 
of the execution of the deed. i. altogether 
•oio. Robin.on '\". )facdonnell, 5 )faule ,. 
. . .  " B u t  where future 111·operty i s  a.si ;::-ned, 
'1 nd a fter it come. into exh•tence. riossessinn 
i" l'ither tltlh"· ered by the a. signor. or is al­
lowec1 by him to be taken by the assi:wee. 
i u  either t·ase there would be the novus ac­
rn s  intcrnmien of the maxim of Lord Ba-
1·11n. upon which Lord am pbell rested lli 
1lt>1'ree. and tlle propert�· would pass. 
It ·l'emed to be upposec1 upon tlle first a r­
�llllll'IJt that an a ssi�nment of thi s l;:iud 
woulu nut be -void in law if the deed contn in· 
cd a l ie-en. e or power to seize the aft er-ac­
•1uirec1 property. But this circumslanC'e 
woulcl make no u i ffen'n<'e in the C':lse. Tlle 
mere assignment is itself a utlicient clednra­
tio pr11:c·erJen. in the wonl of t he maxim ; 
:incl al thouzb Chief Ju"tice Tindal. in the 
ca"-'e of Lunn T'. Thornton, 1 C. B. 370. s:t id, 
" I t  is not a question whether a tlt>cd m i;:ht 
not h:1ve been o framed as to ;::h·e the de­
fe11<la nt a 11ower of ,;l'izin ;::- the fu t ure per­
" ual i:oocL," lle must 11ave mea nt . tha t  un­
dt>r "lwb a power t he assignee mi.�ht ha ,.e 
tn l;:t•u prt:-,-<e,;slon, n ud so have tlnuc t he :wt 
whit•h was lle<'es,-nry to perfet·t his title nt 
l n w,  'fbis will ckarly appear from the ca.e 
•lf l 'on:::rcve 'I". Evetts, 10 Exch. '.!!! , In which 
thC're was an as�i ;..:11111 .. nt of i:rn wing- crop 
n ncl t>fl\ 1·t -.:  a n >'l'<'ll ritr for 111011ry kn t. 
w i t h  n )JO\\ ( r tor t ht• :1s,;i"1we to seize n ud 
l ll kt• )lll>'"es-.ion O( t lll' 1 ·r<1 ps n n d  !.'ffl'<' t -<  b:l r­
gn l ttPd n w l  ""111 , nud of al l s1wb erops nnd 
ell'1•et n .  ml :::ht he s11h"t f t n t 1·1l for tlwm : and 
na ron l 'n rl•e s:tld, " I f  t hl' a 11 t h1Jrlt y giYl'll by 
t he •lehtor hy t l u• hi ll of sale hail uot bt>e n 
<' · c·•· U l ••d, I t  woul ll h:t\'t> lirrn of nn nva ll 
n :.:n l nst tl a• •'."t•• •ul lon, It g n vc no lP;;a l ti­
l l <', nor <'\ PU NJH ltn hll' t i l l<', t o  n nr s111·1·!11c• 
i.:oncl ; hut wlw11 exec 1 1 1  .. c l  111Jt fully or en­
t l a•ly, hu <•uly to 1 b e  e x t •  11 1 t\f 1 n l\ 1 11A" pns· 
f' lou of t h" i;:Ttt\\ lllA" l'l't1J1!>, 11 Is t hc' sa m e  
I n  our Jt1 1 lg11 1 1 •nt  n s  I f  t l 11• t1 . .  1 t t 11r hi 1 11s< ' lf h:11I 
]Hit t h<' pl n l 11 t l f1' In n1•t 11nl po i;1• si1111 of t h nsl' 
<'ro11 ." ,\ ucl I l l  1 1 1111(' v. l l :i)'IP)', !i 1: 1 . & 
HI ·10, l'i ru 1•n>1r> m11 1'11 rel lc•tl 1 1 po1 1  I t�· t lw 
' lrt> <'Ian nel'llr 1r1,  wh<'ri' 1 l 1 1•re " n s :i 11 : tJ.: l'l'l'-
111•  1 1 t  t o  1 rn 11 f••r i.:no I , l o ''" 11 f lPr\\ 11 1·it : 1r. 
q u h...- •1 '1 n n d 1 1 l Jl! t l t u t c d ,  w i t h  n fl<l\n•r tn t 1 1 l.1• 
po ' 1011  or n i l  orli.:hinl  n n d  trnh t l t 11 l <'d 
,.:001 1 , l ..urt1 1•11 1 11 phPl l, 1 h l C'f . 1 1 1  1 1<·1., :i ld ,  
"Th•' I n tent ion I r  ""' <'O nt m e t i ng p11rt l 1·� 
" , t hn t  t l i  • 1•r• Pill  n w l  fu t u re pro111 •rly 
•1oul 1 I  J I i  t he tl• ( ] ,  ' I  hn l 1 •ot 1 l d  1 101  l u• 
• urrl• I 1 11 1 0 1 ff, ct l 1y n mere t rn 1 1  f1 •r:  1 > 1 1 1  
t h • 1 1 • '1 ·d • 011 t n h1"•' n l ie• 11 • '  t o  t h• J: l ll l l l 1 •1• 
t o I'll ! •  r 1 1 po11 11 • pro11 rly, 11 1111 t h n l  1 1 1  "II !', 
\ hPn 1wt< t i  11 1 1011, toe I IT t h11J1•11 • 1 1 t l t • 1 1 t  ly 
or t h•• 1n111  r r " 
J I nv t ho111:ht I I  rl ·ht  to •'l \\ •'1 1  n 1 1 1 1 11• u p  
0 1 1  t hr " <'ll • , lwt h 011  " "  0 1 1 1 1 t  " '  11011 1 1  1• -
1• • lnr111 ' hll' h  \\ r .. 11 P<I I n  n rh'1 1 1 1u•11t  r•·· 
JI 1•t l 111: t h <'m, 11111 1 nl o h 1'11 1 1  e In ,,,,, ,  r 
11 1l nh1 1t t h  pr< tilt  • 1 1 1 1  1 1011  It I 1 1111• ru 1 1 1 1  
D i  itiz by 
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• a .cert a i n  t h e  precise limits of the doctrine 
as to the assignment of future p roperty at 
law. The decree a ppealed against proceeds 11f'1 
upon the g1·o·md. not in deed that an assig-n­
rnent of future property, without posse�sion � 
taken of it,  would be 'l"Oid in equi t �·  < a s  tile 
cases to wllich I ba-ve referre11 show Lhat i t lo !  
would be at la w), but that the equ i ta ble rh:ht  f,.n 
i incomplete and imperfect uu le'S t llere i:,; a;. 
ul>seqnent posses ion, or some act equiva- l\'D 
lent to i t  to perfect the t i t le. J&.1 
In consideriug the case it will be u nneces- set 
sary to examine the authorities cited in ar- on 
gument, to show that i f  there is a. n  agree· 
ment to transfer or t o  charge future acquired 
property, the prop 1·ty 11asse . or become 
lial>le to the charge in equity. where the ques· 
t ion bas arisen between the partie to the 
agreen1ent themseh·e . In order to determine 
whether t he equity which i created under 
:l!\'reements of this kind i a per onal equity 
to be enforced by suit, or to be made :wa il· 
able by some act to be done betWt'en the par­
ties, or i in the nature of a tru t a t taeh i n:z 
upon and binding the property a t  the in t:i nt 
or its coming- into existence, we must look 
to cast's where the ri;::-llt of tile third pcrous 
inten·l'ne. 
The rl'spoudents, in support of the decrl'e. 
relit>d stron;.;ly on what wa laid down by 
Ba ron P:ul;:e in Mogg v. Baker, 3 l\Iee . & Of 
W. W:i, 19 , as the rule in equity which be P1 
stntcd ht' llad deri"l'ed trom a very high au­
t hority,  "that i f  the agreement wa s to mort ­
gage ecrta in specific fmn itme, of wh ich the 
corpus wa ascf.'rt aine<l, that would constitute 
!I 
fl 
� 
an equit able t i t le in the defendant, so a to 
lll'C'' C'llt  it  pas. ing to th as ign cs or the in­
solYC•nt. and then the assignment would m n k!.' 
thnt cquital>I!.' title a. legal one ;  l>ut if it wa s 
on!�· :l ll a;.:-re!.'meut to mortgagt> fm·uit uro to 
be :,.;nhsl'quently acquired, or" (the word "or" 
is < m i l  te<l  i L1 t h e re11ort) "to give a b i l l  of 
snl•' : it a future tin y  or t h e furni l urr n m! o t h· 
er goods of t h<' insol v<'nt. th n it wonl tl rover 
n n  s1w<'ifk fnrn i t n r<' , a 1Hl wonlcl l'Oll fl'L' no 
right In <'qn i t y " 'l'he nwan i ng of t ltC'l'lc lntter 
words must Ill' t hn t t lwrc woul<l he no <'Olll· 
J!ll'f<' Pq11 i l a hlC' t r:l n!ift•r of t he prop rty. hl'-
1·:1 n "l' l hl 'l'l' <":In be no doubt t ha t  t h!.' a ;::n•p-
1111·1 1 1  sl:i l t••l wo1tltl  1'l'l': l f ! ' :1 ri;.:hl In rqu i t y  
u pon wh lt'h t h<' p:1 r l ,\'  rn t i t h'<l mtg-ht tllc a 
hlll rnr Sjll'l' l ilC Jll'l'rnr111n 11<'(', 
'l'h ls  poi nt ls so d1•n r t h:it I t  Is a l most 11 1 1-
11 1•1·1· s:i ry to rP fl'I' lo t lw nhsl't'Y:l t I nus of Loni 
J1.l 1 lon In l h l' !':lSI' or 'l'h!.' \\':l lTI', H I'rl <'l', :!ti!l, 
n. In �11ppnrl nf I t .  1 t  must a l so ll(' ohs<'l'\'l' !l ,  
t hn t  th . .  propo::;lt lon 1 11 " ng:! \' .  Hnk!'r hn rr l  
l y  rr·nf'l11•s I h 1 1  lll'PsPn t q 1wst ln11  111'<":1 nst' I t  11-1  
n o l  sin I I'd ns n t':l"I' of n n  :wt 1 1 : 1 1  I r:uH-tl'l'I' of 
rut nrc• prnp1 r l ,\', l t 1 1 1  : l R  :1 1 1  :l "l"<'!'llll' l l (  I n  l l l nrl ­
j.,'ll ltl'. or t n  gh·t• n h i l l  nt' i-t:t h' n l  n r11 t n r1' 
1l:iy. 'l'hc '  n1 1 l y 1·q1 1 l l y  w h l <'11 !'Ol l l t l  lwl nll!.! In 
II p:1 11,\" l l l l t lPr Slll'h 11 1 1  1 1 )! 1'1'<'1111'111 w n 1 1 l 1 I  hi' 
lo 1111 \·I' 11 m111·tg-11g,. or 11 h i l l  of 1-t:tll' of l l w 
fnt 1 1 r11 prnp .. rly 1 • 11. 1·1 · 1 1 l 1•d I n  h i m. I t  dnr•>i nnt 
l l l • '! 'I  1 1  I'll . . I l l  ..  1 1 1 1 •  ) l l'•'>-11'1 1 1 .  W h l'I'(' I t  l >i  l'X 
1 1 1 • I! I,\" pro\ l i l i ·d l h:l l : i l l  11 d d l l lo11 1 1 l or H11hsl i·  
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tutcd macliinery shall be subject to tbe sniuo
trusts as are declared of the existing machiu-
ery.
Under a covenant of this description to bold
that that trust attnclics upon the new ma-
chinery as soon as it is placed in the mill, is
to give an effect to the deed in perfect con-
formity with the intention of the parties, and
as, by the terms of the deed, Taylor was to
remain in possession, the act of placing the
machinery in the mill would appear to be an
act binding his conscience to the agreed trust
on behalf of the appellants, and nothing more
would appear to be requisite, unless by the
established doctrine of a court of equity
some further act was indispensable to com-
plete their equitable title.
The judgment of Lord Campbell, resting,
as he states, upon Lord Bacon's maxim, de-
termines that some subsequent act is nec-
essary to enable "the equitable interest to
prevail against a legal interest made subse-
quently bona fide acquired." It is agreed
that this maxim relates only to the acquisi-
tion of a legal title to future property. It
can be extended to equitable rights and in-
terests (if at all) merely by analogy; but in
thus proposing to enlarge the sphere of the
rvile, it appeai-s to me that sufficient attention
has not been paid to the different effect and
operation of agreements relating to futiu-e
property at law and in equity. At law, prop-
erty, non-existing, but to be acquired at a
future time, is not assignable; in equity it
is so. At law (as we have seen), although
a power is given in the deed of assignment
to take possession of after-acquired property,
no interest is transferred, even as between
the parties themselves, unless possession is
actually taken; in equity it is not disputed
that the moment the property comes into ex-
istence the agreement operates upon it.
No case has been mentioned in which it
has been held that upon an agreement of this
kind the beneficial interest does not pass in
equity to a mortgagee or purchaser immedi-
ately upon the acquisition of the property,
except that of Langton v. Horton, 1 Hare,
549, which was relied upon by the respond-
ents as a conclusive authority in their favour.
I need not say that I examine every judg-
ment of that able and careful judge Vice
Chancellor Wigram with the deference due to
such a highly respected authority. Langton
V. Horton was the case of a ship, her tackle
and appurtenances, and all oil, head matter,
and other cargo which might be caught aud
brought home. The vice chancellor decided,
in the first place, that as against the assignor
there was a valid assignment in equity of the
future cargo. But the question arising be-
tween the mortgagees and a judgment cred-
itor, who had afterwards sued out a writ of
fl. fa., his honour, assuming that the equi-
table title which was good against the assign-
or would not, under the circumstances of the
case, bo available against tlie judgment cred-
itor, proceeded to consider whether enough
had been done to perfect the title of the
mortgagees, and ultimately decided in their
favour upon the acts done by them to obtain
lJo.ssessiou of the cargo.
It was said upon the first argument of this
case by the counsel for the appellants that
the judgment of the vice chancellor was,
upon this occasion, fettered by his deference
to the opinion apparently entertained and
expressed by Lord Cottenham in the case
of Whitworth v. Gaugain, 1 Phil. Ch. 728.
It will be necessary, therefore, to direct at-
tention for a short time to that case, and
especially as it has an immediate bearing
upon the present occasion. The case, as
originally presented before Lord Cottenham,
was an appeal from an order of the vice
chancellor of England appointing a receiv-
er. The bill of the equitable mortgagees
was founded entirely upon alleged fraud
and collusion between the mortgagor and
the tenants by elegit. The defendants bad
denied fraud and collusion, and also notice
of the mortgagee's title at the time of ob-
taining possession under the elegits. The
plaintiffs, in argument, attempted to set up
a case not made by their bill, viz. that in-
dependently of the question of fraud, they
had by law a preferable title to the defend-
ants. The lord chancellor discharged the
order for a receiver solely on the ground
that the plaintil3:s had failed in making out
the case on which they asked for the inter-
ference of the court. Upon discharging the
order. Lord Cottenham is reported to have
said that in the argument a totally different
turn was given, or attempted to be given.
to the plaintiffs' case; viz.. that, independ-
ently of the question of fraud, they had
by law a preferable title to the defendants.'
"If," he added, "the bill had been framed
with that view, and the claim of the plain-
tiffs founded on that supposed equity, I
should have required a great deal more to
satisfy me of the validity of that equity be-
fore I could have interposed by interlocu-
tory order, because I find these defendants
in possession of a legal title, although not
to all intents and purposes an estate, yet a
right and interest in the land which under
the authority of an act of parliament they
had a right to hold, the elegit being the
creature of the act of parliament, and, there-
fore, they have a parliamentary title to hold
the land as against all persons, unless an
equitable case can be made out to induce
this court to interfere," Although Vice
Chancellor Wigram, in Langton v. Horton,
1 Hare, 549, in adverting to this language,
said that he thought Lord Cottenham in-
tended only what his words literally ex-
pressed, that he would not interfere against
the judgment creditor by an interlocutory
order unless he was well satisfied of the
validity of the equity to which he was call-
ed upon to give summary effect, yet it is
impossible to doubt (to use the expression of
his honour) "that the strong leaning of Lord
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tutcd macbinery sball be subject to the same 
trusts as are declared of the existing machin­
;ery. 
Under a covenant of this description to hold 
that that trust attaches upon the new ma-
1chinery as soon as it is placed in the mill, is 
Ito give an effect to the deed in perfect con­
formity with the intention of the parties, and 
as, by the terms of the deed, Taylor was to 
remain in possession, the act of placing the 
machinery in the mill would appear to be an 
met binding his conscience to the agreed trust 
; o n  behalf of the appella nts, and nothing more 
would appear to be requisite, unless by the 
established doctrine of a court of equity 
some further act was indispensable to com­
plete their equitable title. 
The judgment of Lord Campbell, resting, 
as he states, upon Lord Bacon's maxi m, de­
termines that some subsequent act is nec­
essary to enable "the equitable interest to 
prevail against a legal i nterest made subse­
quently bona fide acquired." It is agreed 
that this maxim relates only to the acquisi­
tion of a legal title to future property. It 
can be ex.tended to equitable rights and in­
terests (if at all) merely by analogy ; but i n  
thus proposing to enlarge the sphere o f  the 
rule, it appears to me that sufficient attention 
has not been paid to the different effect and 
operation of agreements relating to future 
property at law and i n  equity. At law, prop­
erty, non-existing, but to be acquired at a 
future time, is not assignable ; in equity it 
is so. At law (as we have seen), although 
a power is given in the deed of assignment 
to take possession of after-acquired property, 
no interest is transferred, even as between 
the parties themselves, unless possession is 
actually taken ; in equity it is not disputed 
that the moment the property comes into ex­
istence the agreement operates upon it. 
No case has been mentioned in which i t  
has been held that upon an agreement o f  this 
kind the beneficial interest does not pass in 
equity to a mortgagee or purchaser immedi­
ately upon the acquisition of the property, 
except that of Langton v. Horton, 1 Hare, 
549, which was relied upon by the respond­
ents as a conclusive authority in their favour. 
I need not say that I examine every judg­
ment of that able and careful judge Vice 
Chancellor Wigram with the deference due to 
such a highly respected authority. Langton 
v. Horton was the case of a ship, her tackle 
and ai:>pw-tenances, and all oil, head matter, 
and other cargo which might be caught and 
brought home. The vice chancellor decided, 
in the first place, that as against the assignor 
there was a valid assignment in equity of the 
future cargo. But the que tion arising be­
tween the mvrtgagees and a judgment cred­
itor. who had afterwards sued out a writ of 
fi. fa., his honour, assuming that the equi­
table title which was good against the assign­
or would not, under the circumstances of the 
ase, be available against l he j uchnncnt cred­
itor, proceeded to consider whet her enough 
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had been done to perfect the title or tlle 
mortgagees, and ultimately decided in thei1· 
favour upon the acts done by them to oblain 
possession of the cargo. 
It was said upon the first argument of tllb 
case by the counsel for the appellants tllat 
the judgment of the vice chancellor was, 
upon this occasion, fettered by his deference 
to the opinion apparently entertained and 
expressed by Lord Cottenham i n  the ca::;e 
of Whi tworth v. Gaugain, 1 Phil. Cb. 72�. 
It will be necessary, therefore, to direct at­
tention for a short time to that case, and 
especially as it has an immediate bearing­
upon the present occasion. The case, as 
originally presented before Lord Cottenham, 
was an appeal from an order of the vice 
chancellor of England appointing a receiv­
er. The bill of the equitable mortgagees 
was founded entirely upon alleged fraud 
and collusion between the mortgagor and 
the tenants by elegit. The defendants had 
denied fraud and coUusion, and also notice 
of the mortgagee's title at the time of ob­
taining possession under the elegits. The 
plaintiffs, i n  argument, attempted to set up 
a case not made by their bill, viz. that in­
dependently of the question of fraud, they 
had by law a preferable title to the defend­
ants. The lord chancellor discharged the 
order for a receiver solely on the groun1l 
that the plaintiffs had failed in making out 
the case on which they asked for the inter­
ference of the court. Upon discharging the 
order, Lord Cottenham is reported to ha>e 
said that in the argument a totally different 
turn was given, or attempted to be given. 
to the plaintiffs' case; viz. that, independ­
ently of the question of fraud, they had 
by law a preferable title to the defendants.' 
"If," he added, "tlle bill had been framell 
with that view, and the claim of the plain­
tiffs founded on that supposed equity, I 
should have required a great deal more to 
satisfy me of the validity of that equity be­
fore I could have interposed by i nterlocu­
tory order, because I find these defendants 
in possession of a legal title, although not 
to all intents and purposes an estate, yet a 
right and interest in the land which under 
the authority of an act of parliament they 
had a right to bold, the elegit being the 
creature of the act o f  parliament, and, there­
fore, they have a parliamentary title to hold 
the land as against all persons, unless an 
equitable case can be made out to induce 
this court to interfere," Although Yire 
Chancellor Wigram, in Langton v. Horton. 
1 Hare, 549, in adverting to this language. 
said that be thought Lord Cottenham in­
tended only what his words literally ex­
pressed. that be would not interfere against 
the j udgment creditor by an interlocutory 
order· unless be was �ell satisfied of the 
validity of the equity to which he was call­
ed upon to give summary effect, yet it i>' 
impossible to doubt (to use the expre �ion of 
his honour) "that the strong leaning of Lonl 
1 f r--
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Cottouhaiu's nnind" was in favour of the
lesal liuht of the judirment creditor over the
equitable title of the luortwisees.
This opinion, though merely expressed in-
cidentally, would be entitled to the greatest
weight upon the present question, if the
law had not been since settled in opposition
to it. For in consequence of the ground
upon which Lord Cottenham discharged the
order for a receiver, the plaintiffs amended
their bill, and inserted a prayer for alterna-
tive relief, independent of fraud and collu-
sion; -and the cause having been brought
on for hearing before A"iee Chancellor Wi-
gram, his honour decided that the mortga-
gees were entitled in equity to enforce their
charge in priority to the judgment creditors
of the mortgagor, although they had no no-
tice of the equitable mortgage, and had ob- !
tained actual possession of the land by writ !
of elegit and attornment of the tenants. j
This decision was afterwards affirmed by i
Lord Lyndhurst. who in the course of his [
judgment mentioned the case of Abbott v. |
Straiten. 3 Jones & L. 003; where Sir Ed-
ward Sugden, then lord chancellor of Ire- I
land, had determined that an equitable mort- '•
gagee was entitled to priority over a subsc- i
quent creditor by judgment, who was in j
possession by a receiver, and who had no I
notice of the mortgage; and refcrrring to |
Whitworth v. Gaugain expressed his agree-
ment with the conclusion to which Vice
Chancellor 'Wigram (3 Hare, 41G) had come
in that case, and stated that "he had repeat-
edly acted on the rule thai an agreement
binding property for valuable consideration,
though equitable only, will take ))rccedonoe
of a subsequent judgment, whatever may
be the consideration for It, and whether it
be obtained In invituni or by confession."
■\Vhatover doubts, therefore, may have
been formerly enlertalned upon the subject,
the right of priority of an eiiullalile mort-
gagee over a judgment creditor, though
without notice, may now be considered to be
llrnily established; and, according to the
opinion of Ijord St. Ix^onards, "any agree-
ment liliidlng property for valuable consld-
oratlon" will confer a similar right.
It docs not nppc.'ir from this review of the
cane of Wlillworth v. Caugalii that It could
have had any liilliience over the qiicRtlou in
Langton v. llorton, as to the Imperfei-tlon
of the morlgngee'H title, unlcsn something
had boon ilone to perfect It. The point docs i
not appear l<i have been at all noticed by I
Lord Cottonham, his observations having I
boon oiiiillnod to the oompetillon botwoon the i
o(|iiltablo tlllo of the mortgagoe and the |
legal title of the Judgment creditors. Lang- i
Ion V. Ilnrlon nnist thorofore be accepted
an nn aiilliorlty Hint tlioro may be cases In '
which nn eipiltalilo niorlgagoe's title may
lie Inniniploto ngHlnst a suliHoquont Judg-
ment croilltor. In Hint <aHo the delivery of
poHMoNslon of the cnrgo <in bonrd the vossol
wna, na ttic vice clianccUur fiald, "Impossl- |
ble. as the vessel was at sea. The parties
could do nothing more in this coimtry with
reference to it than execute an instrument
purporting to assign such interest as Birnie
(the mortgagor) had, send a notice of tlie
assignment to the master of the ship, and
await the arrival of the ship and cargo.
This was the course taken; and on the ar-
rival of the ship at the port of London the
plaintiffs immediately demanded posses-
sion." The cargo was, in point of fact, in
possession of the captain, as the agent for
the owner, the mortgagor. It would have
been rather a strange effect to give to the as-
signment of the future cargo to hold that
when it came into existence a trust attached
upon it for the benefit of tlie mortgagee, that
thereupon the captain became his agent, and
that the mortgagee thereby acquired a per-
fect e(iuitab!e right to the property, which
was valid against all subsequent legal claim-
ants. r,angton v. Horton may have been
rightly decided as to the necessity for the
completion of the mortgagee's title uuder.
the circumstances which there existed, and
yet it will be no authority for saying that
in every case of an equitable mortgage of
future property something beyond the exe-
cution of the deed and the coming into exist-
ence of the property will be necessary.
It certainly appears to be putting too great
a stress upon this case to urge it as an au-
thority that an equitable title would have
beeu defective If certain circumstances had
not existed, when the existence of those cir-
cumstances was established in proof and
made the ground of the decision.
But if it shotdd still be thought that the
decHl, together with the act of bringing the
machinery on the premises, was not sufli-
clent to complete the mortgagee's title, it
may be asked what more could have been
done for this purpose? The trustee could not
take possession of the new machinery, for
that would have been coutrary to the provi-
sions of the deed under whicJi Taylor was to
remain In possession until default in payment
of the mortgage money after a demand in
writing, or until interest should have become
In nrrear for three months; and in either of
these events a power of sale of the machin-
ery might be exercised. And If the intor-
venlent act to perfect the title In trust be
oi\e proceeding from the mortgagor, what
stronger one could be done by him than the
llxing and placing the new machinery in the
mill, by which II became, to his knowledge.
Inimedialoly sidiject to the operation of the
deed '/
I asked Mr. Aniplilclt, upon the second nr
gimicnl, what novus actus he contended Im
be nocossary, and he replied "a new deed."
But this would be Inconsistent with the
terms of the original deinl, whii'h embraces
the sniislltuteil mnchlncrj-, and which certain-
ly was npciatlve upon the futtn-o property ;is
bolwoeu the pailles themselves. And It
H(!eniB to be neither a convenient nor a rca-
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Cottl•ulwlll· miner· was in f:\n111r of the 1 ble, as the >essel was a t  sea. Tbe parties 
le.;.::al right of the j ud:::mcnt ncditor O\ er the could do nothing more i n  this countr:r with 
equit:l ble t itle of t he lllon;.::a;.::ces. reference to it than execute an instrument 
Tlli opiuion, though mere ly expres!'<ed in- purporting to assign such interest as Birnie 
ddentally, would be entitled to the greatest {the mortg-agor) bad, send a notice of the 
wl'i::ht upon the present qut--tion, if the assignment to the master of the ship, arnl 
law hall not been since sett led i n  opposition aTI"ait the arri>al of the ship and cargo. 
to it. For i n  con equeuce of the grounu This wa the course taken ; aucl on the ar­
up11n which Lord Cottenham disehargc l  the rin1l of the ship at the port of Lonclon the 
on.lcr for a recei>er. the plaintill» ameuued plaintiffs immediately demanded posses­
their l1ill. and i nserted a prayer for alterna- sion." The cargo was, i n  poin t  of fact, in 
th-e relief. imlepeuuent of fraud and collu- pos ession of the captain, as the agent for 
.io n :  ·:rnu t h e  cause baYing been brought the owner, t h e  mortgagor. I t  would ha>e 
ou for bearing before \ ke Chancellor Wi- been rather a strange effect to give to the as­
gram. bis honour dedcl•ll that the mortga- signment of the future cargo to bold that 
;.::ees '"ere entitled i n  equity to enforce their when i t  came into existence a trust attached 
d1arge in priority t o  the jull;.::ment creditors u11on it for the benefit of the mortgagee, that 
of the mortgagor, althun;.::h they bad no no- thereupon the captain became bi agent, and 
tice of the equitable lllort;:ag'e, and had ob- that the mortgagee thereby acquired a per­
t;t i n<>tl actual possession of the land b�- ,·n i t  feet equitable right t o  t h e  property, wbiclJ 
.. r elt·�it and attornml•nt of the tenants. was Yalid against all subsequent legal claim-
This deci:ion was afterwards ntfirmed by ants. Langton v. Horton may have been 
Lnril Ly n<l lrnrst. who in the course of bis rig-btly decided as to the neces ity for the 
.. 11 1;..:ment mentioned the ca-e of Abbott v. I eom11letion of the mortgagee·s title under 
s 1" ten. 3 .Jones & L. ClO� ; where it•  Ed- the circumstances which there exi ted, atul 
" .ml .:u�ilcn. then lord chancellor of Ire- yet it \\ ill be no autholity for saying that 
land, had determined that an t'<1uitable mort- in e•ery case of an equitable mortgage of 
;.::;t::l'r was entit lcll t" priority 1wer a ubse- • future property something beyond the exe­
q1w11t Nedit0r by jud;.::ment. who \\" :ts in cution of 1 he deed and t he coming i nto exi t-
1 111ssC"<sinu by a recein�r. an<l who hatl no encc of the 1n·op1,>1iy will be necessary. ol 
notice of the mort�age : and refl'rrring to It c<>rtainly ap)lC'ars to be putting too grea t 11 
\Yllitwortb v. Gau;:a i n  cxpn·sscd h i »  agree- a strt-ss upon t his case to urge it as an au- in 
l l l Pllt with  the condusion to which \'ice thori t y that an cqnitaule title would have T 
1 ' ha l il'l'l lor \Yi�ram (3 Ila re, 41G) had come been defectiYe i f  certain circumsta nces bad � 
1 11 that l'a:;:e. an<l stated tbat "he had repeat- not existed, when the ex istence of tho e cir- b 
f'<liy :l<'te<l on the mil' t h:ll an :t�rerment eumstance:;: was C'stahlished in proof ancl 
l 1l 1 1 < l l 1 1� proprrt�· for valuahlP eonsitler:t t ion. marlt' t he ground of the cleci ion. 
thoug!J e<1ui t ahlc only, wil l  t :1 l.:1• p1·p1·P<ll'J1l·e Hut if it should still  be thought that t bt' 
of a s11hseq 11en t j u1 l;.:1 1 1cnt. whalf•n•r may deed. t ogether with t he act of bringin;: t lw 
l ie•  t l1" eo11slrll'rat i1 1 1 1  for it ,  a 11 <1 " lwt her ii  machinery on the premises, was not sufil­
bP ohtn hll!<l 1 1 1  l n v i t u m  or lty couflossi1111 . "  cient to complete the 11101tgagee·s ti t le, i t  
"'hnte1 ••r < lPnhts. t herrfore, may h:n-e may he asked what more co111U have hcen 
hN•n f•Jl"llll rly l'll l l• r t a i tll'cl upon t he suhjel't, clone for this  purpose? 'l'he trustee could not 
l h<' ri;:lit of priority or nu l'q1 1 l t a hlc u101· t - t ake posst-c;sion or the new lllachi ner�'. for 
;.:a;.:1•1• on•r :1 j n<l;.:nw n t  l'n·1l l t ot', t hnn;.:h t hat  would h:H'e been contrary to the provi 
\\ l t h< 1 1 t 1  ll<1t ke, ma.Y 11ow hc> c·o1 1si i l < 't'l'<I to  Ill' sinns or t he deed under wllic11 TaJ·lor was to 
1 1 1  l l l l)' 1•8l : thli  l 1 1 •1 l ;  :1 11< ! ,  :ll'<'(ll'd i ui; t o  t JH' l'l'l l l :l i U  I l l  JlOSSC'SSiOn UlltiJ cl fault i n  l):lyl11Cllt 
opl1 1 l ( ln "f lJl'• t'll S I .  1 .Pnn: i rds, "nny agn'l'· ol' t he mot•t;.:age mouev aftt-r a demand in  
lll • t i t  l o i 1 1d l 1 1g 11r1 11 1ertr fur \ 1 1 l 1111hlc l'Ollt>l<I· ' wrlt i ug', or u1 1 li l  i n tert-1,;t slloul<l h:l\'e bccouw f•rn t l 1111 " wil l  < oufcr a i; lml lar  right . in nrrrar for t hree mon ths;  and in eit her or 
I t  •lo<'B not 1 1p 1u •n r  fro11 1  t his  I'<'\ ft.w of t hc- t lll'l'C' <'n•n!s  a power of sale of the mnch ln 
r •n l' of \\' h l l \\ <  rt l 1  \._ 1 : a 11gn l1 1  t h nt  II  1·0111 <1  11ry l l l l;.:h! ll' exercised. And i f  the int c>r· 
hn ' r hnd n 11� I 1 1 ll 1 1c1 1  <' nY<'I' t h1• q th· st ! 1 1 1 1  In  YP11h•11t :tC'I to perfl'cl t h e  t i t le In  trust lH' 
Ln 11 ;:: t 1 i 1 1  \". l lorton, n !I  to t l l<' t 1 1 q11•rf1••·l lo1 1  "ll" Jtl'<H'l'l'< l ln;: from t hl' mort;:n;:nr. wli:i l 
of l hP tnorl ;::n g  '< 'll l l t lt', l tn lf'!IB l l l l lPt hlng ll l l"Ol lJ;l'r •111<' <'Ollld Jip rJone by hllll t h:t ll t l l!' 
hn1l hr• II don . l<• JH rr .. d It. 'l'lw pol 1 1 t  "'"'8 fi'l: l ng :uul plad1 1.:.: t hC' IH?\Y 1 1 1nC'l1ine1·y i n  t i l l '  
l l f l t  1 1 1 • 1 1•11 r 10 hn 1 <• l 11·e11 n t  :o il 111 > 1 1 < ·  . .  < 1  l ty mil l ,  hy wh l1•h I t  h<'l':t ll1l', t o  his know!Pr lg<'. 
I .o n !  • "ul t •  nhum, Ill 11h 1 • r 1r1 1 lo11 l l lt \ l u g  ln 1 1 1 1Pd l:t lPly suhJ<'l'l to t he 01w1·n t iun nf t i ll' 
h<•1 ti v 1 1 0 1 1• <1 to t h1 •  <'Ol l lP•'t l l l"ll 1 1 1•1 11 • ' • ·n 1 lw "''"" 'l 
l'f J t l l t nhl• •  t l t h• of l h 1• 1 1mrli;1 1i.: 1  L' 11 1 1 < 1  t l w I a l\<'d ;\ I r. \ m 11hlr t t ,  1 1 1 1011 t h  Rt'<'Ontl nr  
I•• •n l l l t lC '  u f  t h "  j1 1 1 lg1 rw11 1  1·ri>< l l t or11. f ,n ug. g11 1 1 1  .. 1 1 t ,  whn l 110\ us aC'!ni< he coutt-nrle1l h 
ton , .. I I nt ton 1 1 1 1 1  t t h! 'r .. f11r<• ' "' 1 1 ,., .. . , , 1  .. <1  1 11 •  lll'•'<'SSJ1 ry, and he l'Ppl lcd "a new deed." 
11 nn n u t hnt l l y  t lrn t  t l 11 1 1 • 1 1 1 1 1 )' l u• •'111'• '!1 In 1 1 1 1 1  t h is wn11ld ht' lnc•n1 1siH!ent w i t h  l h<' 
\\ hli 'h n u  • 1 1 1 1 t n l il <' 111 •l'IJ:ll �"l''H t l l l l '  1 1 1 1 1y l <•r1 1 1s nt' l hl• nrlii:lual  dr1'<l, whlC'h em ht'llC'l'S 
I • I n• • m pl <>t r• n i.:11 1 1 1  I n Rllh • 1 1 1 1 1 • 1 1 1  J 1 1d1:· f ill' t111h14t l t 1 1 !Pd mnrh htrry, nm! wl.l ich certn ln  
111<'11 t•rp1 J l tor  1 1 1  t l 111 t <'II • •  1 1 1 1 •  d•· l ! l  ,.ry 1 1 f  Ir  wn <1Jwnt t l \'e  upon t he f11 t 1 1re propt-rty nH 
J I< !I I 1011 o r  ! lu• <'l t l'J.111 I Jll J i1111 n l  l h<• \' <'H .. 1 l u1t \\ l 'Pl1 I l l<' 11n11 1C'8 l hemselveH. A nd I t  
\\'118, n t 1 1u  ,.,,,,, d1n 11r P!lor 1 1 1 1 1 ,  "l 1 1 1p11Hlll· 1·1•111a to 11 .. 11c>lt hrr n couve1 1 k•nt nor 11 ren· 
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soiiable view of the rights acquired under
the deed to bold tliat for auy separate article
Iwougbt upon the mill a new deed was neces-
sary, not to transfer it to the mortgagee, but
:to protect it against the legal claims of third
ipersous.
P.ut if something was still requisite to be
done, and that by the mortgagor, I cannot
help thinking that the account delivered by
Taylor to the mortgagees of the old machin-
ery sold, and of the new machinery which
was added and substituted, was a sufficient
uovus actus interveniens, amounting to a dec-
laration that Taylor held the new machinery
upon the trusts of the deed.
Lord ^YE^"S ,EYDALE. My noble and
learned friend will forgive me, but that was
not mentioned in the bill.
Lord CHELMSFORD. My noble and learn-
ed friend is quite correct in that; it must
be taken that that was not mentioned in
tlie bill, and that was the answer given when
I urged, in the course of the argument, that
that account must be taken to be a sufficient
actus. But still I am stating what my views
are of the whole case. I think that the ac-
cuimt delivered by Taylor to the mortgagees
of the whole machinery which was added
and substituted, was a sufficient novus actus
interveniens, amounting to a declaration that
Taylor held the new machinery upon the
trusts of the deed, the only act which could
be done by him in conformity with it; and
it is difficult to understand for what other |
reason such an account should have been ren-
dered. As between themselves, it is quite
clear that a new deed of the added and sub-
stituted machinery was mmecessary. No
possession could be delivered of it, because
it would have been inconsistent with the
agreement of the parties; and anything,
therefore, beyond this recognition of the
mortgagee's right, appears to be excluded by
the nature of the transaction.
I will add a very few words on the subject
of the notice of the claim of the mortgagees
to the judgment creditor. I think that the
equitable title would prevail even if the judg-
ment creditor had no notice of it, according
to the authorities which have been already
observed upon. It is true that Lord Cotten-
ham, in the case of Metcalfe v. Archbishop
of York, 1 Mylne & C. 547, 553, said that if
the plaintiff, in that case, was entitled to the
charge upon the vicarage under the covenant
and charge in the deed of ISll, "then, as the
defendants had notice of that deed before
they obtained their judgment, such charge
must be preferred to that judgment." This
appears to imply that his opinion was that
if the judgment creditor had not had notice,
he would have been entitled to priority.
Much stress, however, ought not to be laid
upon an .ncidental observation of this kind,
where notice had actually been given, and
wliere, therefore, the case was deprived of
any such argument in favour of the judgment
creditor. If Lord Cotti^nhani really meant
to say that notice, by the judgment creditor
of the prior equitable title was necessary in
order to render it available against him, his
opinion is opposed to the decisions which
have established that a judgment creditor,
with or without notice, must take the prop-
erty, subject to eveiy liability under which
the debtor held it.
The present case, however, meets any pos-
sible difficulty upon the subject of notice, be-
cause it appears that the deed was registered
as a bill of sale, imder the provisions of the
17 & IS Vict. c. 36. It was argued that this
act was intended to apply to bills of sale of
actual existing property only, and it probably
may be the case that sales of future proper-
ty were not within the contemplation of the
legislattu-e, but there is no ground for ex-
cluding them from the provisions of the act;
and upon the question of notice, the register
would furnish the same information of the
dealing with future as with existing propeity,
which is all that is required to answer the
objection.
I think that the late lord chancellor was
.right in holding that, if actual possession of
the machinery in question before the sher-
iff's officer entered was necessary, there was
no proof of such possession having been tak-
en on behalf of the mortgagee. But upon a
careful consideration of the whole case, I
am compelled to differ with him upon the
ground on which he ultimately reversed Vice
Chancellor Stuart's decree. I think, there-
fore, that his decree should be reversed, and
that of the vice chancellor affirmed.
Mr. Malins asked the direction of the house
as to costs. The vice chancellor gave the
costs of the sheriff below. Your lordships
have given the respondents the costs of the
petition of appeal to the court below. I un-
derstand your lordships to confirm tlie decree
of the vice chancellor. That would include
the costs of the sheriff as well as the costs
of the respondents.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR. There can
be no costs of this appeal. The petition of
rehearing to the court below is dismissed
with costs; therefore all persons affected by
that petition of reheaiing wUl get their costs
below.
The following order was afterwards enter-
ed on the journals: "That the decree or de-
cretal order of the court of chancery of the
22d of December, 1S60, be reversed; and
that the petition for rehearing, presented by
the said respondent, Emil Preller, to the lord
high chancellor, be dismissed, with costs;
and that the cause be remitted back to the
court of chancery, to do therein as shall be
just, and consistent with this judgment."
Lords' Journals, 4th August, 1S62.
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<onallle view of the riglJts acquired under 
the deed to bold that for auy separate article 
brought upou the mill a new deed was neces­
ary, not to transfer it to the mortgagee, but 
• i:o protect it against the legal claims of third 
per.ons. 
But if something was still requisite to be 
<.lou�. and tl.lat by the mortgagor, I cannot 
help thinking that the account delivered by 
Taylor to the mortgagee of the old machin­
ery sold, and of the new machinery wl.lich 
was added and substituted, was a suffieieut 
. ne>vus aetus interveniens, amounting to a dec­
imation that Taylor held the new macbinery 
upon the trusts of the deed. 
Lord WEXfCEYDALE. My noble and 
learned friencl will forgive me, but that was 
not mentioned in the bill. 
Lord CHEL i\lSFORD. My noble and learn­
ed friend is quite correct in that ; it must 
be taken that that was not mentioned i n  
the bill, and that was the answer given when 
I lll'ged, in the course of the argmnent, that 
that account must be taken to be a sufficient 
actus. But still I am stating what my views 
are of the whole case. I think that the ac­
count delivered by Taylor to the mortgagees 
of the whole machi nery which was added 
antl substituted, was a sufficient novus actus 
interveniens, amounting to a declaration that 
Taylor held the new machinery upon the 
trusts of the deed, the only act which could 
be done by him i n  conformity with it ; and 
it is difficult to understand for what other 
reason such an account should have been ren­
<.Iered. As between themselves, it is quite 
clear that a new deed of the added and sub­
stituted machinery was unnecessary. No 
possession could be delivered of it, because 
it would have been inconsistent with the 
agreement of the parties; and anything, 
therefore, beyond this recognition of the 
mo rtgagee's right, appears to be excluded by 
the natme of the transaction. 
I will add a very few words on the subject 
of the notice of the claim of the mortgagees 
to the judgment creditor. I think that the 
equitable title would prevail even if the judg­
ment creditor had no notice of it, according 
to the authorities which have been already 
observed upon. I t  is true that Lord Cotten­
ham, in the case of Metcalfe v. Archbishop 
of York, 1 l\1ylne & C. 547, 55:3, said that if 
the plaintiff, in that case, was entitled to the 
charge upon the vicarage under the covenant 
and charge in the deed of 1811, "tl.len, as the 
defendants had notice of tbat deed before 
they obtained their judgment, such charge 
must be preferred to that judgment." This 
appears to imply that bis opinion was that 
if the juil:?;ment creditor had not had notice, 
he woul<.l have been entitled to priority. 
:\ 1uch stress, however, ought not to be laid 
upon an . ncidenta.I observation of this kind. 
wbere notice had actually been given, antl 
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where, therefore, tl1e <:ase was d0p1·in�c1 or 
any such argument in favour of t he judgment 
creditor. If Lord Cotten ham really meant 
to say that notice, by the ju<.lgment creditor 
of the prior equitable title was necessary in 
order to render it available against him, his 
opinion is opposed to the decisions which 
have establisbe<.l that a judgment creditor. 
with or without notice, must take the prop 
erty, subject to every liability untler wbicll 
the debtor held it. 
The present case, however, meets any pos­
sible difficulty upon the subject of notice, be­
cause it appears that the deed was registered 
as a bill of sale, under the provisions of the 
17 & 18 Viet. c. 36. It was argued that this 
act was intended to apply to bills or !"ale of 
actual existing property only, and it probably 
may be the case that sales of future proper­
ty were not within tbe contemplation of the 
legislature, but there is no ground for ex­
cluding them from the provisions of the act ; 
and upon the question of notice, tbe register 
would furnish the same information of the 
dealing with future as with existing property, 
which is all · that is required to answer the 
objection. 
I think that the late lord chancellor was 
.right in holding that, if actual possession of 
the machinery in question before the sher­
iff's officer entered was necessary, there was 
no proof of such possession having been tak­
en on behalf of the mortgagee. But upon a 
ca reful consideration of the whole case, I 
am compelled to differ with him upon the 
ground on which he ultimately reversed Vice 
Chancellor Stuart's decree. I think, there­
fore, that his decree should be reversed, and 
that of the vice chancellor affirmed. 
Mr. Malins asked the direction of the house 
as to costs. The vice chancellor ga-ve tbe 
costs of the sheriff below. Your lonlships 
have given the respondents the costs of tbe 
petition of appeal to the court J,lelow. I un­
dersta nd yom lordships to confirm the decree 
of the vice chancellor. That would include 
the costs of the sheriff as well as the costs 
of the respondents. 
THE LORD CHANCELLOR. There can 
be no costs of this appeal. The petition of 
rehearing to the comt below is dismissed 
with costs ; t herefore all persons a ffected by 
that petition of reheming will get their costs 
below. 
The following order was afterwards enter­
ed on the journals : "That the decree or de­
cretal order of the court of cha ncery of the 
22tl of December, 1860, be reversed ; and 
that the petition for rehearing, presented by 
the said respondent, Emil Preller, to the lonl 
high chancellor, be dismissed, with costs; 
and that the cause be remitted back to the 
court of cha ncery, to do therein as shall be 
ju t, a n d  consistent with this judgment. " 
Loras· Journals, 4th August, 1862. 
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McCOXXELL V. HUGHES.
(29 Wis. 537.)
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Jan. Term, 1872.
Appeal from circuit court. Green Lake
county.
Ryan & Kimball, for appellant. A. B.
Hamilton and Butler & Winkler, for re-
spondent
LYON, J. The bill of exoeptions does not
purport to contain all of the evidence.
We cannot, therefore, review the evidence,
but must presume that it sustains the find-
ings of fact by the circuit court. That
court having found that the material alle-
gations of the complaint were proved, it fol-
lows that if the complaint states a valid
cause of action, the plaintiff was entitled to
judgment.
We think that the complaint does state a
valid cause of action. It avers that an ex-
ecutory contract for the sale and purchase of
wheat was made by the parties, and that,
in pursuance thereof, the plaintiff delivered
to the defendants, and the defendants ac-
cepted and received the wheat. It must be
true that by such delivery and aoccplauce
the title to the wheat became vested in the
defendants, and the right to have the price
therefor, when the same should be deter-
mined as provided in the contract, in like
manner became vested in the plaintiff.
But it is urged on behalf of the defendants
that the transaction was Invalid as a sale,
because the contract did not limit the plain-
tiff to the selection of any particular day, or
of a day within a specified lime, on which
the market price of wheat in .Milwaukee
should control the i)rice of the wlieat In
ipiestion, but left him the option to select
any day in the future for the purpose of
fixing the price.
The contract furnishes a criterion for as-
certaining the price of wheat; leaving noth-
ing in relation thereto for further negotia-
tion between the parties. This is all that
the law requires. Story, Sales, § 220. No
case has beeu cited, and we are unable to
find one. which holds that it is essential to
the validity of a sale in such cases that the
criterion agreed upon should, by the terms
of the contract of sale, be applied, and the
price thereby determined, on any specified
day or within a specified time. Judge Story,
in the section of his treatise above cited, ev-
idently does not intend to lay down any
such rule. It may be that, if plaintiff had
delayed unreasonably to make such selec-
tion after being requested to make the
same, he might be compelled to do so. But
we do not decide this point.
It is further argued that, after a valid
sale and Vtefore payment of the price, there
must be a debt owing by the vendee to the
vendor, while in this case, until the price of
the wheat was ascertained, there was no
indebtedness. The latter part of this prop-
osition is erroneous. As soon as the wheat
was delivered, the defendants owed the
plaintiff therefor. There was therefore a
debt, but the amount thereof was not ascer-
tained. ■ It remained unliquidated until the
price of the wheat was determined.
The objections that the assessor could not
list the claim for the price of the wheat for
taxation, and that the same could not be
reached by garnishee process at the suit of
a creditor of the plaintiff, while such price
remained undetermined, present no practical
difficulties. The assessor would fix the
value of the demand according to his best
judgment as in other cases of the valuation
of property and credits; and the creditor in
the garnishee proceeding would probably be
subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff in
respect to determining the contract price
for the wheat
BY THE COURT. The judgment of the
circuit court Is affirmed.
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bO SA LES. 
McCOX�"ELL '· HlJGH ES. 
(29 Wis. 537.) 
Supreme Court of \Yiscon in. Jan. Term, 1872. 
Appeal from circuit court, Green Lake 
county. 
Ryan & Kimball, for appellant. A. B .  
Hamilton and Butler & Winkler, for re­
spondent. 
LYOX. J. The bill of exceptions doe not 
purport to contain all of the evidence. 
'\\'e cannot, therefore. re•iew the e•idence. 
but mu t pre ume that it  ustains the find­
ing of fact by the circuit court. That 
court ha•ing found t hat tile material alle­
gations of the compla int were prov d, i t  fol­
low tbat if the complaint state a Yalid 
·au.e of action, tile pla iutil1 wa entitled to 
judg:ment. 
We tbink that the compln i n t  doc. tate a 
valid cau e of action. It aver th:lt an ex­
ecutory contract for the sale and purchnse of 
wheat wa made by the parties, and that, 
i n  pur uance t hereof, the plaintiff deli"Vc1·cd 
to the defendants. and the defenuants ac­
cepted and receh-ed the wheat. It must be 
true that by uch del iYerr and at·t·Ppt :rnce 
tile title to the wheat became vc tcd in the 
defendants, and tile ri�llt to ha•e t hC' price 
therefor, when tile :uue bould he deter­
mined as provided in the contract. in like 
maun 1· be<'ame vestC'd in tile plainti ff. 
But it i urged on bcllalC or tile defendants 
that the tran.action wa ln;alid :l!'; a sale, 
beeau, e the contract did not limit the plain­
tiff to t he seleeotion of any particular da�·, or 
of a day within a specified t i me. on which 
tile market price or wheat in \ l i l waukee 
shoulcl control t h e priee of the wheat In 
q11<•stlon, but left him tile option t o  select 
:111� day In the fu ture for the purpose of 
11.- l u �  the price. 
Tile contract furnishes n criterion tor as­
certaining the price of wheat; leaving notb-
D : J 1t1.l. by 
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ing i n  relation thereto for further negotin­
tioo between the parties. This is all  that 
L' 
the law requires. Story, Sales, § 220. No 
case bas been cited, and we are unable to s . 
find one. which bold t ha t  i t  is essential to 
tile "Validity of a sale in uch cases that tile 
criterion agreed upon should, by the terms 
of the contract of sale, be applied, and the 
price therehy determined. on any specified 
day or within a specified time. Judge Story, 
i n  the section of bis treatise above cited, e•­
idently does not intentl to lay down an�­
surh �-ule. It may be tllat, i f  plaintiff hacl 
delayed unreu onably to make such selec­
tion after heing requested to make the 
same. he mig-ht be compelled to do so. But 
we do not decide this point. 
It i further argued that, after a valid 
,ale and before payment of t he price, there 
nm t be a dcht o'l>ing by the vendee to tile 
"l"cndor, while io thi' ca e, until the price of 
the wheat was ascertained. there wns n o  
i n deutedne s.  T h e  latter part o f  t h i s  prop­
osition is enoneous. A oon as the wheat 
wa delivcrC'cl, the defendnnts owed the 
plaintiIT therefor. There wa therefore a 
debt. but the a mount thereof was not ascN­
tained. It remained unl iqu idated until the 
prke of the wheat w:1 s determined. 
The objections that the asse sor could not 
Ii t tile claim for the price of the wheat for 
t a xation, and tha-t t he sa m e  could not be 
reached by garnishee process at the suit of 
a cred ilCll" or the plaintif , while such price 
rC'mainC'd undetermined, present n o  practical 
difficulties. The assessor would fix the 
Yalue of the demand according to hi be t 
jnd1'ment as in other ca es of the valua t ion 
of pro11erl�' and rrC'dil ; and the creditor in 
the garni llee proceed ing would probably be 
subro1'n ted to the rights of tile pla i ntitr io 
respect to determining the contract price 
for the wlleat. 
BY THE COURT. The judgment of the 
circuit court ls affirmed. 
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LYON et al. v. CULBERTSON et al.
(S3 Ul. 33.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. Sept. Term, 1876.
Appeal from superior court, Cook county.
Leonard Sweet and John J. Herrick, for
appellants. Dent & Black, for appellees.
WALKER, J. We learn from tbis record
:bat appellees, as partners in the firm of
Oulbertson, Blair & Co., brought suit
against appellants, also partners, doing
business under the name of J. B. Lyon &
Co., to recover damages for au alleged fail-
ure to perform contracts for the purchase
of a quantity of wheat. There were several
contracts, alike iu their terms, except as
rto amounts and dates, and they were sigu-
3d by different persons. This is a copy of
Bne of them:
"Chicago, August 14, 1872. We have this
day bought of Culbertson, Blair & Co. 10,-
000 bushels of No. 2 spring wheat, in store,
at $1.57% per bushel, to be delivered, at
sellers' option, during August, 1872. This
contract is subject, in all respects, to the
irules and regulations of the board of trade
of the city of Chicago. J. B. Lyon & Co.
tC."
The rules and regulations referred to are
embraced in —
"Rule IX. Margins on Time Contracts.
"Section 1. On all time contracts, made
between members of the association, de-
iposits for security and margin may be de-
manded by either or both parties; said
imargln not to exceed ten (10) per cent, on
the value of the property bought or sold
on the day it is demanded. All such de-
iposits to be made with the treasurer of the
association, unless otherwise agi'eed upon
iby the parties. Said deposits and margins
may be demanded on and after the date
of contract, and from time to time, as may
he necessary to fully protect the party call-
ing for the same. When margins are de-
manded, the party called upon shall be
entitled to deduct from the margin called
any difference there may be in his favor
between the market price and the con-
1 tract price of the property bought or sold.
Any deposit made to equalize the contract
price with the market price shall be con-
sidered as a deposit for security, and not
margin.
"Sec. 2. Should the party called upon, as
herein provided for, fail to respond within
the next banking hour, it shall thereafter
be optional with the party making such
call, by giving notice to the delinquent, to
consider the contract filled at the market
value of the article at the time of giv-
ing such notice; and all differences be-
tween said market value and the contract
price shall be settled the same as though
the time of said contract had fully expired:
GUIF.PERS.PROP. — 6
provided, however, that, when the call is
made during the general meeting of the
board between 11 a. m. and 1 p. m., the
deposit shall be made before 2 o'clock of
the same day."
Under these contracts, deposits and mar-
gins were put up by the parties in con-
formity to the rules, from time to time.
On the 19th day of August, 1872, the mar-
ket for No. 2 spring wheat opened at from
$1.55 to $1.57, and declined during the day,
closing, after exchange hours, at from $1.44
to as low as $1.38. On the 20th the mar-
ket opened at from $1.27 to $1.31, and fell
rapidly during business hours. Between 11
and 1 o'clock, it was as low as $1.10 to
$1.11 per bushel. It is claimed that on the
morning of the 20th appellees became en-
titled to further deposits, and thereupon,
by written notice sent to the office of the
buyers, demand was made of Lyon & Co.
for further margins, but, failing to respond
to the demand within the next banking
hour, Culbertson, Blair & Co. elected, un-
der the rules, to consider the contracts fill-
ed, and charged to account of Lyon & Co.
the difference between the purchase price
and $1.11%, and notified appellants there-
of. This difference is the matter in dis-
pute between the parties. On a trial in the
court below, the jury found for plaintiffs
the difference as claimed. A motion for a
new trial was overruled, and judgment ren-
dered on the finding, and this appeal Is
brought by defendants.
The contract signed by Anderson has been
adjusted, and hence it is not necessary to
be considered; but the contracts signed by
Templeton, as the purchaser, were admitted
in evidence, against the objections of ap-
pellants. The court excluded evidence of-
fered by appellees to show a usage among
the members of the boai;d of trade to de-
mand of the broker the name of his prin-
cipal at the time of the purchase, and,
failing to do so, it was regarded as an
election by the seller to look alone to the
agent for a fulfillment of the contract.
The proper foundation for the introduction
of this evidence was laid. Inasmuch as the
great mass of commercial business is trans-
acted by men pressed by their affairs, and
who are not in the habit, even if time wouM
permit, of reducing their agreements to
writing beyond a mere memorandum, the
courts are compelled to look to the usages
of trade or business to learn the real In-
tention of the parties. If proof of such
usages was not allowed, it is believed that
in a large number, if not the greater por-
tion, of commercial transactions, the in-
tention of the parties would be defeated,
instead of being enforced, when differences
should occur between them. Where there
is a well-known usage which obtains in
trade, it must be presumed that all who
are engaged in that business, where it iire-
vails, contract with a view to it, unless
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FORMA TION OF TIIE CONTlL\.CT-E::;. ' E N" T I A LS. 8 1  
LYON e t  al. v. CULBERTSON et al. 
(83 Ill. 33.) 
' 3upreme Court of Ulinois. Sept. Term, 1876. 
hl 
Appeal from superior court, Cook county. 
Leonard Sweet and John J. Herrick, for 
appellants. Dent & Black, for appellees. 
r. WALKER, J. We learn from this record 
r. :bat appellees, as partners in the firm of 
1,1 .Julbertson, Blair & Co., brought suit 
igaiust appellants, also partners, doing 
t>usiness under the name of J. B. Lyon & 
Co., to recover damages for an alleged fail­
ure to perform contracts for the purchase 
f a quantity of wheat. There were several 
� _on tracts, alike in their terms, except as 
to amounts and dates, and they were sign­
d by different persons. This is a copy of 
nne of them : 
"Chicago, August 14, 1872. We have this 
.day bought of Culbertson, Blair & Co. 10,-
00 bushels of No. 2 spring wheat, in store, 
t $1.5/lh per bushel, to be delivered, at 
'Sellers' option, during August, 1872. This 
contract is subject, in all respects, to the 
ules and regulations of the board of trade 
of the city of Chicago. J. B. Lyon & Co. 
and regulations referred to are 
, embraced in-
"Rule IX. Margins on Time Contracts. 
"Section 1. On all time contracts, made 
!between members of the association. de-
1posits for security and margin may be de­
manded by either or both parties ; said 
1margin not to exceed ten (10) per cent. on 
lthe value of the property bought or sold 
·on the day it is demanded. All such de-
1posits to be made with the treasurer of the 
association, unless otherwise agreed upon 
lby the parties. Said deposits and margins 
1may be demanded on and after the date 
of contract, and from time to time, as may 
be necessary to fully protect the party call­
ing for the same. When margins are de­
manded, the party called upon shall be 
entitled to deduct from the margin called 
any difference there may be in his favor 
between the market price and the con­
tract price of the property bought or sold. 
Any deposit made to equalize the contract 
1Price with the market price shall be con­
sidered as a deposit for security, and not 
1margin. 
"Sec. 2. Should the party called upon, as 
ilerein provided for, fail to respond within 
1 the next banking hour, it shall thereafter 
be optional with the party making such 
call, by giving notice to the delinquent, to 
consider the contract filled at the market 
value of the article at the time of giv­
ing such notice; and all differences be­
tween said market value and the contract 
price shall be settled the same as though 
the time of said contract had fully expired : 
GRE>��aor- 6 
t: \J t  A K L rl  E 
provi1l<'cl, however, that, when the call is 
ma<le <lurin� the general meeting of the 
board between 1 1  a. m. and 1 p. m., the 
deposit shall be made before 2 o'clock of 
the same day." 
Under these contracts, deposits and mar­
gins were put up by the parties in con­
formity to the rules, from time to ti me. 
On the lDth day of August, 1872, the mar­
ket fot· No. 2 spring wheat opened at from 
$1.55 to $1.57, and declined during the llay,  
closing, after exchange hours, at from !jil.44 
to as low as $1.38. On the 20th the mar­
ket opened at from $1.27 to $1.34, and fell 
rapidly during business hours. Between 1 1  
and 1 o'clock, it was a s  low a s  $1.10 to 
$1.11 per bus!Jel. It i s  claimed that on the 
morning of the 20th appellees became en­
titled to further deposits, and thereupon, 
by written notice sent to the office of the 
buyers, demand was made of Lyon & Co. 
for further margins, but, failing to respond 
to the demand within the next banking 
hour, Culbertson, Blair & Co. elected, un­
der the rules, to cousider the contracts fill­
ed, and charged to account of Lyon & Co. 
the differenre between the purchase price 
and $1.111h, and notified appellants there­
of. This difference is the matter in dis­
pute between the parties. On a trial in the 
court below, the jury found for plaintiffs 
the difference as claimed. A moti.on for a 
new trial was overruled, and judgment ren­
dered on the finding, and this appeal is 
brought by defendants. 
The contract signed by Anderson has been 
adjusted, and hence it is not necessary to 
be considered ; but the contracts signerl by 
Templeton, as the purchaser, were aurni lteu 
in evidence, against the objections of ap­
pellants. The court excluded evidence of­
fered by appellees to show a usage among 
the members of the boai;d of trade to de­
mand of the broker the name of his prin­
cipal at the time of the purchase, au<l, 
failing to do so, it was re.garded as r.n 
election by the seller to look alone to the 
a ,gent for a fulfillment of the contract. 
The proper foundation for the introduction 
of this evidence was laid. Inasmuch as the 
great mass of commercial business is trans­
acted by men pressed by their affairs, and 
who are not in the habit, even if  time woul•l 
permit, of reducing their agreements to 
writing beyond a mere memorandum, the 
courts are compelled to look to the usages 
of trade or business to learn the real In­
tention of the parties. If proof of such 
usages was not allowed, it is believed that 
in a large number, if not the greater por­
tion. of commercial transactions, the in­
tention of the parties would be defeated, 
instead of being enforced, when differences 
should occur between them. \\here there 
is a well-known usage which obtains in 
trade, it must be presumed that all who 
are engaged in that business, where it prP­
vails, contract with a view to it, unless 
- · ·::i· r  . f. -· . 
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they exclude the presumption by their con-
tract Hence it has been repeatedly held
by this court that a usage may be proved
to interpret the otherwise indeterminate in-
tention of the parties, and to ascertain the
nature and extent of their contracts, not
from their express stipulations, but from
mere implication and presumptions, and
acts of doubtful or equivocal character; but,
to have commercial usage take the place
of general law, it must be so uuiforinly
acquiesced in for such a length of tiuie ;
that the jury will feel themselves constrain- ;
eU to find that it entered into the minds :
of the parties, and formed a part of the !
contract. Dixon v. Dunham, 14 HI. 324; -
Crawford v. Clark, 15 111. 5G1; SIuuu v. '
Burch, 25 111. 35; Fay v. Strawn, 32 111. j
295; Deshler v. Beers, Id. 368; Insurance
Co. V. Favorite, 4U 111. 203; Turner v. Daw-
son, 50 111. S5. Other cases might be cited
in illustration of the rule, were not those !
referred to amply sulhcient for the purpose.
Were it not for the terms and conditions
of the contracts as expressed in the rules
of the board of trade, the case would be
exceedingly simple, and free from all diffi-
cultj'. We presume all persons in the pro-
fession know that when, on the face of
these agreements, the delivery of the wue.it
and the payment of the money were con-
current acts, to be performed by the par-
ties at one and the same time, neither par-
ty could put tlie other in default without
performing his part of the agreement, or
offering to perform it. Had the time elaps-
ed for performance, all know that appellees
would have been compelled to tender the
wheat, and appellants to have refused to
receive and pa.v for it, before the former
could have sued and recovered. 2 Pars.
Cont. p. 189; 1 Chit. I'l. 351. This is lllus-
trnted by every well-prepared preced.>nl of
a declaration on such contracts, whatever may
be the form of action.
But, the parties having iucoriKiratoit the
rules of the board of trade into their agree-
ment, the (juestion arises as to its olTect on
the contract. It in terms provides that, when
either i)arty shall be In default in pulling up
margins, after notice, and within the next
banking hour, the parly caliiiig for them shall
tliereu|Kin liave the right to consider tlie con-
tract lilled at the market value nt the time
of giving such notice, and all dlfri-rcnces be-
tween such market value and the contract
prlci' shall be settled the same as tho\igh the
time for rultliling the contract had fully ex-
plreil. This, In terms, does not recpiire an
olTcr, or nn ability or willingness, to perform
on elllier [inrt. It only. In terniH, roquiros a
mental operation, uiiaccom|ianieil with any
physical act. Until the expirnllcm of the hoiu',
anil for a juTiod nt time aftiTW.'irds, the parly
claiming a defanll hns, by the lerins nf the
rule, the option to conHlder the contnict Illled
or not, as he niiiy choose. Ilnd the agreement
required llie piiily, before he exerclseil llie
option, to have an offer, or at least have
shown that he had the abiUty, to fulfill his
part of the agreement, and was willing to
do so, then the contract would have conform-
ed to legal principles; but, under the tei-ms
of this contract, appellees were not required
to have a bushel of grain they could have de-
livered at the place of performance. It is
true, the contract speaks of wheat "in store,"
but neither wheat nor warehouse receipts were
offered, nor was it shown that appellees had
; any wheat in Chicago, and it could not have
; been in the contemplation of the iJarties to
: deliver or receive it elsewhere, or it would
! have been so stated in the contract. The use
; of the words "in store" we understand to
mean that it was, at the time of delivery, to
j be in store in Chicago. The fact that no
wheat was offered or demanded, shows, we
think, that neither party expected the deliv-
ery of any wheat, but, in case of default in
keeping margins good, or even at the time for
dehvery, they only expected to settle the con-
tract on the basis of differences, without ei-
ther performing or offering to perform his part
of the agreement; and, if this was the agree-
ment, it was only gaming on the price of
wheat, and, if such gambling transjtctions
shall be permitted, it must eventually lead \o
Avhat are called "corners," wliich engulf iuin-
dreds in utter ruin, derange and unsettle
prices, and operate injuriously on the fair and
legitimate trader in grain, as well as the
producer, and are pernicious, and highly de-
moralizing to the trade. A contract to he
thus settled is no more than a bet on the
l)rice of grain during or iit the end of a limited
period. If the one parly is not to deliver or
the other to receive the grain, it is, in all but
name, a gambling on the price of the com-
modity; and the change of names never chan-
ges the quality or nature of things. It has
never been the policy of tlie law to encom'age.
or even sanction, gaming transactions, or sucli
as are injurious to trade, or are immoral in
their tendency; and the old maxim that courts
will always suiipress new and sulilile inven-
tions in derogation of the common law
(Branch's I'rincipia, 71) would be applicable
to sucli contracts. This seems to l)e a sublile
Invention to abrogate well-established, fair,
and just principles of the law of contracts,
and not only .so, but to the great injury of fair
and legitimate trade. Here there was suiren-
dered to appellees the deposit of .f2,:>(U>, and
tlie j\n\v have found a verdict of ;f5,7t)0, mak-
ing in all .fS,0(X) for coinpensalion for damages
Kuslaiiied, when, so far as the evidence shows,
ai>pellccs had no wheat they could have deUv-
ered in fulllllinent of the contract, nor does It
appear Ihat Ihey ever expected to deliver a
bushel uiiilei- this con tract. They do not show
that lliey have lost a dime, or tliat they are
lialile to lose anything, under this contract.
Why, then, say appi'llecs shnuld recover this
large sum? All know that It 1b a fundamental
rule that a parly canimt recover more than
a compensation ciimmI Id his loss by any In-
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SALES. 
they exclude the presumption by their con­
tract. Hence it has been repeatedly held 
by this court that a usage may be proved 
to interpret the otherwise indeterminate in­
tention of the parties, and to ascertain the 
nature and extent of their contracts. not 
from their expre s stipulation , but from 
mere implication and presumption . and 
acts of doubtful or equi>ocal character; but, 
to ha>e commercial usage take the place 
of general law, it must be so uniformly 
acquiesced in for such a length of t iu1e 
that the jury will feel themsel>es constrain­
ed to find that it entered into the mi•lll 
of the parties, and formed a part of the 
contract. Dixou v.  Dunham. 14 Ill. 324 ; 
Ora wford v. Clark, 15 Ill. 5Gl; Munn v. 
Burch, 25 Ill. 35 ; Fay v. Stra w n , 3:2 Ill. 
295; Deshler v. Beers, Id. 36 ; Insurauce 
Co. v. Favorite, 41.: Ill. 2G3; Turner Y. Daw-
on, ;;o Ill. 85. Other ca es might be cited 
in illustration of the rule. were not those 
referred to amply sutfic:ient for tbe purpo e. 
'Yere it not for tbe terms and conditions 
of the contracts as expressed in the rules 
of the board of trade. the case would be 
exceedingly simple, and free from all diffi­
culty. -n·e pre ume all pcn;on in th> pro­
fe- ion know ti.lat  when, on tllc face of 
these agreements, the deli\  cry of tlw "ne.H. 
and tbe payment of the money were con­
t·111Tt'nt nets, to be l)Crfo rn1cll by the par­
t i1·s at one and the :;awe time , neither par-
1 y  could put t he other in default without 
r•erfunuiug his part of the agreement, or 
ufferiug to perform it. Had the time elaps­
e r l for performance, all kuow that appell •es 
woulcl ba ,·e been com1wlled to tcuder the 
w heat. and appcl l an ts to have refused t o  
rccei Y e  an1l pay for it, before t he former 
c·oultl h:ne sued aud recovered. � l'ars. 
C'ont. p. isn; 1 Chit l ' l.  :�;;l. 'l'bis is illus­
t r:ttP1l hy ' n'rs wt'll prcpn recl prececl .-n t vf 
a tlc•da rnllou ou s1 1c·b contnH'ts, " bnteYer mny 
lie t he fon11 of :wt ion. 
But. 1 !11• pa rt in; ha y i ng" lucor110rn l etl t he 
rul1>s of tl11> hoarrl of trade into their :lA"ree· 
1 1 11'11t,  1 he < ) 111.'StiOll 11 ri�l'S as to Its c(fcet Oil 
the •·o u t ra<" t .  I L  in t c rn1s prm !fles th n t ,  when 
Plthr-r party sbull he In defu ult in put t l u� up 
1 1 1a rgi 1 1s, a fter notice, and \Vithln tbe m·:1.t 
hn 11 J{ l 1 1 �  holll', t hl' p:t rly c·:t l l lng for them 11ba l l 
tlwrf'll J ><•n h:I \ "  t lw di;hl lo .. uuslder t he <·1111 
1 ra<·t l l lh •tl nt t he ma rl;et \ :t luc n t  l hP time 
nr J!I \ I n g surh 1111tkt'. a nd nil c l l ffPl'!'lll'Cs he 
t wr·1·11 .s1wh 1 1 111 rkd ,·n tuc 11 ud the c-nu t rn<'l 
prk• • i;l11 1 1l  ' "' Hl ' t l ll'd t lw snme IHI thouJ!h thr 
tlm" l 1 1r  l 1 1 l ll l l l ng l lw <'Olll rnct hnd fully cx­
plrPrl. 'l 'h l  , 1 1 1  t l'rms, 1lc11•s 1 1ol n•q 1 1 l n• an 
nlTf'I', 1 1 r  : 1 1 1  a hl l l t y or \\' i l l l 1 1J!n<�s. In 1wrfor1 1 1 
1 1 1 1  , . f t hr•r 1111 rt . I t  1 1 1 1 ly, 1 1 1  t P rn 1H, rrq 11h·c"l n 
1 1 1 1 • n l u l  0111 •rn t lr 1 1 1 ,  1 1 1 11 1 rP111 1 1pu1 1 l1•cl with u ny 
phyHkul 111 •1. U n t i l  l hl' r• pl11 1 l lnn o( tlw ho1 1 r, 
n nr l  for a J I •rloc l 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 11• a f t P r\\ a rrl>l, t l w pn rty 
d:i l 1 1 1l  1 1 �  11 r f pf;i 1 1 1 1  hn , hy t l w t 1 ·r1 1 1!'.! of t hi' 
nrlr', I i i<• 1 1pt 11 1 1 1  to 1�111 lrll'r t lll' 1·0 1 1 !  111<'[ l l l l<'cl 
nr 1 10 1 ,  ll H hr• 1 1 11 1 )' d1n11 r •  l l nd t hl' H�l'l't ' l l l t ' l l f  
r0r g\titeti1'b� 1: 1 1 t .\" , hl 'fo lf • I I< ' < 'Xt'l'l'li;1•r f I l l!'  
I NTE RNET A R C H  V E  
option, to have a n  offer, o r  a t  lea t have 
hown that he had the ability, to fulfill his 
part of the agreement, and was willing to 
do so, then the contract would have conform­
ed to legal principles; but, under the terms 
of this contract, appellees were not required 
to have a bushel of grain they could have de­
livered at the place of performance. It is 
true, the contract speaks of wheat "in store," 
but neither wheat nor warehouse receipts were 
offered. nor "-as it shown that appellees had 
an) "·beat in Chicago, and it could not have 
been in the contcmplatiou of the parties to 
deli>er or receive i t  elsewhere, or it would 
have been so stated in the contract. The use 
of the words "in store" we understand to 
mean that it was, at tile time of delivery, to 
be in store in Chicago. The fact that no 
wlleat was offered or demanded, shows, we 
ti.link, that neither party expected tlle deliY­
ery of any wheat,  but, in case of default in 
keeping margins goocl. or eYen at the time for 
delivery, they only expected to settle the con­
tr<lct on the basis of ditference , w ithout ei­
ther performing or offering to perform llis part 
of the agreement; and, if thi '\\a the agree­
ment, it was onl;y gaming on the price of 
wheat, and, if such gambling tran�wtions 
ball be llerlll ilted, it JllUSt l'Yent ually ll':ld to 
what are called "corne1·s, · ·  \Yhil:h cugnlt' bun 
dr ds in utter ruin, deran�e a nd nnsettle 
prices. and operate injuriou ly on the fa i r  and 
legit imate t rader in grain, a wel l a t he 
prodm·e r. and are pcrnieiou , and hi�hly de­
moralizing to the t rade. A cou tract to be 
thus settled is no more tl.lan a bet on tlle 
]lrice of gra in during or at the end of a li mited 
11eriod. I f  the one pal'ls is not to deliYer or 
the other to rt>eeive the �rn in,  it is, in all but 
uame, a gambling on t he 11rke of t he com­
modity ; and t he chan�c of names neYcr chan­
ges the quality or unturc of thing'. It has 
ueYer he en t he policy of t he law to encourage. 
or even sand Ion, g:uni ng- transaction , or stwh 
as are inj urious to tr:Hlc, or :trl.' i mmoml i 1 1  
t heir tendency ; and the old maxim that court 
will al ways su]lprcss new a n<l sullt i l e  inve11-
t ions in cl crnga l lou ut t he common law 
(Ilrn 111·h's l ' rindpla, 7L) woulcl I.Jc applkahlC' 
to Ml< h cc1 1 1 t  r:wts. Tllis seems to be a subt ik 
lnYen t ion to alll'r1ga tc well·ci-;tahllshed, fair, 
am! Ju�t pri rwipll's of the law nf cont racts. 
:Incl not onl� so, hut l o  t he A'l"l':t l i njnr�· of fair 
and Jpglf lmntc t rade. l T C'rc t here wus Nlll"l"en-
1h•n•1I  to :t PPl' f lPes t he 1lcpP .. -;l t  o f  *:.!,:loo, nod 
t ht> J u ry have round n vcnll<'l or :j;r1,700, mak­
l t 1J! 1 1 1  :t l l  :j: ,000 for t•nmpC'ns:l l lou for dumag 11 
1rnsl :t i n  ... 1 ,  whPrt, sn f:t r as t he e\·h!Pnl'c ::;hows, 
: t f lf l"l ll't'S h:td no " hea l l lwy roul<I have dellv­
l'l"l'd 1 1 1  f11 1 1 J l l 1 1 w 1 1 t  of t h  contract, nor doca It  
: 1 p 1 wn r t hn l  t he.} c>n•r l''\ J l l '<'l ecl  to  dcllver u 
h11sl a•I 1 1 1 1cler l h lH c•nn t rnc t. '!'he} do not sbo.w 
l hn t  lhpy ha ye lm;t u di me, or l hn t  they are 
l l .1h!P t o  Jm;p 11 1 1 y t h i l 11!'., un r lC'r l h l11 c•on trnct. 
\\ h.\ ,  t hen, i;ny 11 ppl'll P1•s i<hnuld recover thiH 
l :m.?C• Hu m '/ Al l  know t hat I t  I.a a fundnmenln l 
rnll' t h11 t a pn rt s l'll nnot l'l'COH?r more than 
u c·n11 1 1 11 • n  al 1 1 1 1 1  r1.11 1 u l  t o  hi loss h y  n uy I n-
UNIV E R S ITY O F  CALI FOR N  ti 
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jury he may have sustained, except where
Iiunitive damages are given. There is no
evidence tliat appellees had contracted for the
wheat necessary to fill this contract, or had
incurred the least expense towards its per-
formance. Then why allow them to recover
(Ills large sum of money V We know of no
principle of justice that requires it more than
that of any debt incurred without considera-
tion to support it. It is ti'ue that appellees
had put up their margins, and if, at the end
of the time stipulated, the market had been
against them, or if that had been the case be-
fore that time, and they had been in default,
they would have lost it. The statute has pro-
hibited, under heavy penalties, the sale of
wheat on called options to buy or sell grain,
because of its pernicious tendency; but it
seems to us that these contracts for the sale
of grain, where neither pa.ity intends to per-
form them, but simply to cancel them before
or at their maturity, and pay differences, are
as injurious to trade and fully as immoral as
are the sales of options. Neither belongs to
fair and legitimate trade.
It is claimed this wheat was again sold to
ascertain the differences that should be paid.
What wheat? it may be asked. There is no
evidence that appellees had any wheat that
could be delivered at the place of this contract.
So far as we can see, the wheat only exist-
ed in imagination; and even this imaginary
wheat may have already been sold a number
of times before the imaginary fulfillment of
the contract, which it is claimed put appel-
lants in default. If the contract was for an
actual sale,— a delivery of the grain by ware-
house receipts or otherwise, — it would have
been necessary to offer to perform, or at least
shown a readiness to perform, to have placed
appellants in default; and then the difference
between the selling price and the contract
price would have been the fair measure of
(la mages.
Whilst the law has studiously fostered fair
and legitimate trade, it has not sanctioned
pernicious practices that are Injurious to its
votaries, and are demoralizing in their tend-
encies. Nor can it change the rule that the
contract may have been made in good faith,
with an honest expectation that the w-heat
would be delivered, and the money paid there-
for, as the law is equally imperative that an
offer, or at least a readiness, to perform must
lie shown by the party seeking to put the
other in default. But when they, by the
agreement, dispense with a performance, or
at least an offer or readiness to i^erform, then
they render the contract obnoxious to the law
of contracts. Pickering v. Cease, 79 111. 328.
It is this effort which stamps it as being in
Uip nature of a gaming contract. It is tliis
effort which characterizes the transaction, and
renders it illegal.
We are aware that there are cases which
hold that a party may be excused, by the
default of the other in the performance of
a precedent act, from proving an offer or a
readiness to perform on his part, before de-
claring the contract at an end. Nor is it
claime<l that, when appellants failed to put
up further mai'gins, appellees might not have
rescinded the contract by notifying appel-
lants that it was at an end. The contract,
on its face, was for the sale and delivery of
wheat at a specified price, within a given
time; and there was a further agreement
contained in the rules of the board of trade
that the parties would put up margins, each
to secure the other in the performance of
the contract. Then, when this hitter agree-
ment was not performed by appellants, what
resulted as a legal consequence? Why, man-
ifestly, the damage only resulting from a
failure to comply with its requirement. It
was not for a failure to receive the grain on
an offer or a readiness to deliver. And in
such a case, what may be recovered? Sure-
ly nothing more than the damages sustained
by appellees. And what were the damages
sustained? The proof shows they were
nothing, as appellees had no wheat that
could be delivered in fulfillment of the con-
tract. An agreement to perform several acts
at different times does not authorise a party
to recover for a breach of all because the
other party has refused to perform the first
in the series. Suppose an owner of a lot of
ground were to contract with a builder to
furnish all the materials and labor, and con-
struct for him a house on the lot; and sup-
pose the agreement provided that the build-
er should commence the work at once, and
complete the stracture within 12 months,
and the owner was bound to pay therefor
$20,000, in equal monthly installments: and
the builder should enter upon the perform-
ance of the contract, and expend .?l.t)tX) in
materials and labor; and the owner should
make default in the payment of the first in-
stallment. Does any one suppose that the
builder could, even if the agreement so pro-
vided, treat the contract as filled by him, and
sue for and recover the $20,(X)0? We appre-
hend that no one would contend that he
could. Again, suppose there should be add-
ed to such an agreement a provision that, if
the builder should make default, the owner
might treat the contract as fully performed
by him, does any one imagine, on the default
of the builder, that the owner could sue for
and recover of the builder as though he had
paid him in advance the ?20,000, although
he had not paid a dollar on the contract?
We presume no one could say it would be
legal or just to permit such a recovery. Or
suppose in such a contract it should be
agreed that the builder should furnish the
materials, for which the owner should pay
him, and, if the owner should make default,
that he should pay for all increase in their
value, and suppose that from some sudden
and unexpected emergency, building mate-
rials should advance 50 per cent., would any
one suppose that he could, on the default of
the owner, sue him, ana recover the rise In
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FOIUIAT lON OF THE CONTB.ACT-E-;SEN"TIA LS. 
jury be may have sustained, except where 
punitive damages are given. There is no 
evidence that appellees bad contractecl for the 
wheat necessary to fill this contract, or bad 
incurred the least expense towa rds its per­
formance. Then why allow them to recover 
this large sum of money ? We know of no 
11 rinciple of justice that requires it more than 
that of any debt incurred without considera­
tion to support it. It is true that appellees 
bad put up their margins, and if, at the end 
of the time stipulated, the market had been 
against them, or if that bad been the case be­
fore that time, and they had been in default, 
they would have lost it. '.l'he statute bas pro­
hibited, under heaYy penalties, the sale of 
wheat on called options to buy or sell grain, 
beca use of its pernicious tendency; but it 
seems to us that these contracts for the sale 
of grain, where neither paJty intends to per­
form them, but simply to cancel them before 
or at their maturity, and pay differences, are 
as inj urious to trade and fully as immoral as 
a re the sales of options. Neither belongs to 
fair and legitimate trnde. 
It is claimed this wheat was again sold to 
ascertain the differences that should be paid. 
What wheat ? it may be asked. There is no 
evidence that appellees bad any wheat that 
could be delivered at the place of this contract. 
So far as we can see, the wheat only exist­
ed in imagination; and even this imaginary 
"·lleat may have already been sold a number 
of times before the imaginary fulfillment of 
the contract, which it is claimed put appel­
lants in default. If the contract was for a n  
1ctual sale,-a delivery o f  the grajn by ware­
house receipts or otherwise,-it would have 
been necessary to offer to perform, or at least 
shown a readiness to perform, to have placed 
appellants in default; and then the difference 
between the selling price and the contract 
price would have been the fair measure of 
clama:;es. 
Whilst the law has studiously fostered fair 
and legitimate trade, it bas not sanctioned 
pernicious practices that are injurious to its 
votaries, and are demoralizing i n  their tend­
encies. Nor can it change the rule that the 
contract may have been made in good faith, 
with an honest expectation that the wheat 
would be delivered, and the money pajd there­
for, as the law is equally imperative that a n  
offer, o r  a t  least a readiness, t o  perform must 
he shown by the party seeking to put the 
other in default. But when they, by the 
agreement, dispense with a performance. or 
at least an offer or readiness to perform, then 
they render the contract obnoxious to the law 
of contracts. Pickering v. Cease, 79 ru. 328. 
It is this effort which stamps it as being in 
1 be nature of a gaming contract. It is this 
effort which characterizes the transaction, and 
renders it illegal. 
"·e are aware that there are cases wbicb 
hold that a party may be excused, by the 
t10fault of the other in the performance of 
a pr ecoient act, from proving an offer or a 
1TE RNEl A R C H  V E  
readiness to perform on bis part, berore de­
claring the contmct at an end. Nor is l t  
claimed that, when appellants failed to put 
u p  further lllfil'gins, appellees might uot have 
rescinded the contract by notifyin;.{ appel­
lants that it was at an end. Tl.Je contract, 
on its face, was for the sale and delivery of 
wheat at a specifiecl price, within a given 
time ; and there was a further agreement 
contained in the rules of the board of tracle 
that the parties would put up margius, each 
to secure the other in the performance of 
the contract. Then, when this latter agree­
ment was not pP.rformed by appellants, what 
resulted as a legal consequence? 'Vlly, man­
ifestly, the damage only resulting from a 
failure to comply with its requirement. It 
was not for a failure to receive the grain on 
an offer or a readiness to deliver. And in 
such a case, what may be recovered ? Hure­
ly nothing- more than the damages sustained 
by appellees. And what were the damages 
sustained ? The proof shows they were 
nothing, as appellees had no wheat that 
con!<! be delivered in fulfillment of the con­
tract. An a�reeruent to perform several acts 
at different times does not authorize a party 
to recover for a breach of all because the 
othrr patty has refused to perform the first 
in the series. Suppose an owner of a lot of 
ground were to contract with a builder to 
furnish all the materials and labor, and con­
struct for him a house on the lot ; and sup­
pose the agreement p rovided that the build­
er sbonlll commence the work at once. and 
complete the structure within 12 n10ntbs, 
a nd the owner was bound to pay t11erefor 
$20,000, in equal monthly installments ; and 
the builder should enter upon the perform­
ance of the contract, and expend $ 1 .000 in 
materia ls and labor; and the owner :<bould 
make dcfa ult in the payment of the first in­
stallment. Does any one suppo::;e that the 
builder could, even if the agreement so pro­
vided. treat the contract as filled by him, anti 
sue for and recover the $20,000 ? \\'e a ppre­
hend that no one would contend that be 
could. Again, suppose there should be add­
ed to such an agreement a provision t bat, if 
the builder should make default, the owner 
might treat the contract as fully performed 
by him, does any one imagine, on the default 
of the builder, that the owner could sue for 
and recon�r of the builder as though he had 
paid him in advance the $20,000, although 
be had not paid a dollar on the contract ? 
'Ve presume uo one could say it would be 
lega l or just to permit such a recovery. Or 
suppose in such a contract it should be 
agreed that the builder should furnish the 
materials, for which the owner should pay 
bim, and, if the owner should make default, 
that he should pay for all increase in their 
value, a nd suppose that from some sudden 
and unexpected emergency, building mate­
rials should advance 50 per cent .. would any 
one suppose that be could, on the default of 
tile owner, sue him, ana recover the rise in 
I (  r . f 
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their value,— we will suppose $5,000 or $6,000,
— when he did uot have on hand any such
material, and had contracted for none, nor
expended anything therefor? We apprehend
that all fair-minded men would say it would
be unjust and oppressive in the extreme.
In the cases supposed, such has never been
held to be the measure of recovery, and it
seems to be obvious that the parties could
not contract for such a measure of damages.
It would shock the sense of justice of all
right-thinking persons, and such a rule
would be monstrous. All must concede, in
the cases supposed, that a recovery for the
labor already performed and money expend-
ed, together with such proximate damages
as the party not in default had actually sus-
tained, would be the limit of the recovery,
because that would be the injury sustained.
Then the recoveiy would not be the sum due
on the fulfillment of the contract by either
party, but the amount of damages sustained
by the breach of the precedent clause of the
agreement. In the cases supposed, an ac-
tion could not be maintained on an averment
that the party not in default had fulfilled his
part of the contract, although it might have
stipulated he might treat it as fulfilled; but,
to recover, the action would be on the bre.Tch
of the precedent clause of the agreement.
And this is the extent of the cases which
hold that on the breach of a precedent clause
of the agreement by one of the parties the
other may terminate the contract, and sue
for and recover damages, without waiting
for the expiration of the time for the ful-
fillment of the agreement, or offering or
showing a readiness to perform his part of
the contract. And in such case the party
not in default may recover all damages
growing out of the breach of the precedent
part of the agreement, and not to the .sime
extent that he could had he perfornieil in
full his part of the agreement, and the otiier
had not performed his part.
We fail to perceive any difference in iirin-
ciple between the supposed cases and llie
one at bar. It may be tliat, had the dec-
laration counted alone for a breach of the
agreement to put up margins, and appel-
lees had proved that they had sustained
damage by having wheat on hand to deliver,
or wheat actually piircliased to be delivered
on the contract, and on whicli tliey had sus-
tained loss, the amount of such loss might
have b('en recovere<l: but no such loss Is
shown.
Tliore Is another cli,ss of cases whldi hold
that the conlrnclliig parties may fix a
measure of dainagi's wlilcli either shall pay
who shall make default. But, to bo li-gal.
the sutii lliiiH ;igrci'd to be paid as llqulil.aled
damages must be roasoii.'ilile, and not op-
pressive. If the sum thus fixed la highly
penal, and unjustly oppressive, courts of
Justice should never enforce the payment of
Buch exorbitant hiiius. fViurts must treat
BUch unjust and oppri'sslve agrecTiients aH
penalties, and refuse to enforce them. In
all penal bonds there is a positive agreement
to pay the sum named if the obligor shall
fail to perform the annexed condition; and
yet all know the penalty cannot be collected,
but only the actual damages sustained by
the breach of the condition. If the damages
proved equal the sum named in the bond, the
recovery may be to that extent; but the re-
covery is for the damages, and uot the pen-
alty. In this case the conditions contained
in the rules of the board of trade, if to be
enforced as claimed, are highly penal, as Is
illustrated by the recovery below; so much
so as not to be enforced.
Another view may be taken of this con-
tract. We have seen that, in case of a fail-
ure to i)ut up margins as required, the party
demanding them may elect to consider the
contract as filled, and the settlement shall
then be based on the ditference between the
contract price and the market price when
the default is made. It would by no means
be a forced construction to say this contract
means that, when the party elects to regard
the contract as filled, if he desires to do more
than to simply declare the contract at an
end— if he desires to hold the other party
li.able for damages— he must do all things
that would have been required of him in
case the time for the delivery had elapsed.
Had the time for delivery by one party and
payment by the otlier arrived, by the lerms
of the contract appellees would, it may be
held, have been compelled to have tendered
the wheat or warehou.se receipts before they
could have put appellants in default, so as
to recover damages for a breach of contract.
And tlie agreement gave the sellers the op-
tion to t\s. the day of delivery, and the right
thereupon to demand payment, so it should
be within the period limited by the contract.
If such was the effect of the terms of this
contract, then appellees had the right to, and
were reqiiired to, olTer the grain, whenever
they electotl to tieat the time as having ar-
rived for the fullillment of the agreement.
If they elected, on the 20th of August, to
treat the time as having arrived, when they
Would fill the contract, they should have done
so i)recisely as tliougli the last day had ar-
rived within which they could make a de-
livery and demand payment. WItli this con-
struction, appelliM's were bound to offer the
wheat or w.'irehouse receipts therefor; and
hence, they having failed to make such an
olTer. they have failed to show themselves
entitled to recover.
We have exandned willi great care the
able and exhaustive argument of appi>lleos'
counsel, filed on a petition for a rehearing,
but are constrained to adhere to the conchi-
slon heretofore !innoimced. but have modi-
fied In some respiK'ts the views heretofoie
expressed. For the reasons li<>reln expressed,
the Judgment of the court below must be re-
verseil, and the cause remanded. Judgment
reversed.
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84 S A LE . 
their value,-we will  suppose $5,000 or $6,000, 
-when he did not have on hand any such 
material, and had contracted for none, nor 
expended anything therefor? We apprehend 
that all fair-minded men would say it would 
be unjust and oppressive in the extreme. 
In the cases supposed, such has never been 
held to be the measure of recovery, and it 
seems to be obvious that the parties could 
not contract for such a measure of damages. 
It would shock the sense of justice of all  
right-th inking persons, and such a rule 
would be monstrous. All must concede, i n  
the cases suppo e>d, that a recovery for the 
labor already performed and money expend­
ed, together with such proximate damages 
as the party not in default bad actually sus­
tained, would be the limit of the reco•ery, 
because that would be •he injury sustained. 
Then the recovery would not be the sum due 
on the fulfillment of tlie contract by either 
party, but the amount of damages su tained 
by the breach of the precedent clause of the 
agreement. In the cases supposed, an ac­
tion could not be maintained on an a•erment 
that ihe pa1·ty not in default bad fulfilled his 
pa.rt of the contract, although it mig-ht have 
stipula ted he might treat it as fulfilled; but. 
to recover, the action would be on the brea ch 
of the precedent clause of the agreement. 
And this is the extent of the case which 
hold that on the breach of a precedent clause 
0£ the agreement by one or the partie the 
other may terminate the contract, and sue 
for and recover damages, without waiting 
for the expira t ion of the time for the ful­
fil11oent of th agreement, or offerin!! or 
!'howing a readin ss to perform bis part of 
t he eon t m ct. And in such case the party 
uot in default rnn y recover all da rnages 
gm wing out of t he 1Jread1 or the pre<'edent 
part or t h e  agrm 1uent. and not to the snme 
extent that he r·oulcl hacl he performe1l in 
full his part of t he agreement, and the other 
had not pcrforme1l his part. 
\\'e fail to perc·c>iYe any c l i tTC'rc>nce in prin­
c·iple hctwe'll t he SU JJpos<'cl <'Ul'les n n c l  t he 
one at bar. It may he t ha t .  had t h C' 1ler­
la ratlon coun terl alone for a hrcnd1 o f  t he 
agrec>11 1c>n t to put up mari;:lns, n nd a ppel­
Jec>H ha d pro,·rc l t hn t llJC•y hnd s11stn i ne cl 
d11 111n i:<' hr ha Y ln :r wheat ou ha nd to r lrl h ·e1·. 
or w l w a t  art 1 1: 1 1 l y  1 m n ·lrn sed t o  be <lr l i Yerr1l 
on t h " C"on t ra <' I ,  :i nd nn " h lc·h t h ey hail  s11R­
t11 l n ccl lm�!'I, t he amount of sllC'h loss m l �ht 
hn ve lu•pn r covPrefl : hut no such Joss I s  
8hflWll. 
TIH't'I' Is : 1 no t h rr rl!,8H or !"ll"l'!'I w h kh hnlc l  
t h:i t t he <'nn t rn r · t l ; i g  pn rlteH 1 1 1 1 1J fh . 11 
1 1 1P!1H11 r" o r dn rn a i.:-•� w h t c·h l ' l t lwr shall  pny 
whn i'h n l l  m11 l " cl1 ra 1 1 l t. H1 1 t ,  to he l • •i::a l ,  
t he Rl l l l l  t h llR : 11.: rc •Pr l  t o  hC' pn td n s  J t q 1 1 t c l : 1 t <'1I 
c ln ma�eR 11 1111'( hi' rt•a Honn hl e, nnc l nnt  np 
rirrsHIVf'. I f  t l t P  Hl t l l l  t l 1 1 1 H  fh:Prl  Is hl�hly 
p<'nflJ, fill(} l l lljl l.  t l y OJl) ll'f'H. hi', r'Olll' t �  o r  
j nH l kP Hho11lr l nr.n·r Pr. forC'P t h P Jlll)' l ll P l l t  o f  
1 w b  " nrhltnnl H l l ll l  . ( '<11 1 rt H  rn n • t  t rra t 
such 1 1 11J ual a n rl oppr1•sslvr. llJ.:rc•rmP n t s  llH 
c t 
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penalties, and refuse to enforce them. I n  
all penal bonds there i s  a positive agreem,..nt 
to pay the s u m  named if the obliger shall 
fail to perform the annexed condition ; and 
yet all know the penalty cannot be collected, 
but only the actual damages sustained b y  
the breach o f  the condition. If the dama�es 
proved equal the sum na med in the bond, the 
recovery may be to that extent ;  but the re­
covery is for the damages, and not the pen­
alty. In this case the conditions contained 
i n  the rules of the board of trade, if to be 
enforced as claimed. are highly penal, as ls 
illustra ted by the recovery below; so much 
so as not to be enforced. 
Another view may be taken of this con­
tract. �Ye have seen that, in case of a fail­
ure to put up margins as required. the party 
demanding them may elect to consider the 
contract as fil led, and the settlement shall 
then be based on the difference between the 
contract price aml t h e  market price when 
the defa ult is matle. It would by no means 
be a forced construction to say thi contract 
means that. when t he party eleC'ls to rc,;ard 
the contract as filled. if be desires to do more 
than to simpl�· de !are the contract at an 
end-if he desi res t o  hold the other party 
Jiahle for damage -he must do all thin�s 
lbat would have been required of him in 
case the time for thl' delivery had el:1 11i-e1l. 
!Incl the time for delh ·ery by one party and 
pa) meut by the oth0r a rriYe<l. hy thl' t«1·ms 
or the contract a11pellecs would, it may be 
held. ha Ye been compelled to have ten<lcre1l 
the w hea t or warehouse receipts before tbey 
could baYe put a ppellants in default. so as 
to recoY r 1la mages for a breach of contract. 
And the agreement gave the ellers the op­
tion t o  fix the day or delivery, and the right 
thereupon to demand payment, o it bould 
be within thr period li mited by t he contract. 
I f  such was tlJe effect of the terms of this 
contract, t hen appclle • had the right to, and 
were r c111 ired to,  offer t he grain, whrn eYer 
1 l 1<'y ckd c>d to treat the time as haYin� a1·­
rivc•d for t he ful!illm ent of tlle agreement. 
If t hey •lecte<l, on the 20th of August. to 
trc>n t t h<' l l mr as h:n i n� n. rriYerl, when t hry 
w o u l d  fil l  th contra c t ,  they should llaY<' done 
so pre('isd�· as t l lnu.�h the laRt d:ly llncl  ar­
rh d wit h i n '" hid1  t hey conlcl mak!' a de­
llv ry a nr l  clr1 11 a n 1l Jl:lymenl. "' llh thii'i con· 
st nwt iou , n 1111l'llc>es were bnnnd to off1•r th<' 
w l wn t or w a rchou� reC'clrits t herefo r ;  a nd 
h<'nt·e. t h ey haYlni:: fa i led to m n ke such n n 
offer. t he�· lune> f:1 i l ,'rl to show t hemsch· rs 
en t i t lrd to l'PC'O YC'I' 
"' hnv e. n 1 1 1 l l wd w i t h gT<':tt ra r.- t h P 
n hlr an c l  C''\ hn u:-1t t ve a 1·;;11 m n t or a f l J JC'l lc>r><' 
ro 11 11Hrl,  f l lrd 011 n prt It Inn for 11 r<o'hea rl n�. 
h u t  n rr ron Hl ra l t 1Prl to n 1 l h<'re to the cou d 1 .  
Hlon lwrr t n forr 1 1 1 1 1 1011  nPer l , h u t  ha Y e  moil i 
fl!'rl I n  Ho111P l'l'Hf lN' t H  t h e v lrws h l'rc>t o fo1·1• 
1 ':\ J ll'<'RR<'ll l•'ol' t l l<' l'r: t HOllA ) ) ( 'l'C'l n e'\presfle d .  
t hr J n c l�ment o f  t he> <"n1 1 rt heln w muRt he r<' 
Y<'l'SPc l ,  n n d  the ra uHc r 111: 1 1 1 c l cd. J u d�mcut 
l'CV rH<'d. 
u r1 !'a l tram 
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FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT— STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
85
LEE V. GRIFFIN.
(1 Best & S. 272.)
Queen's Bouch. May 9, 1861.
Declaration against tlie defendant, as the
executor of one Frances P., for goods bar-
gained and sold, goods sold and delivered, and
for work and labor done and materials pro-
vided by the plaintiff as a surgeon-dentist for
the said Frances P.
Plea, that the said Prances P. never was
indebted as alleged.
The action was brought to recover the sum
of £21 for two sets of artificial teeth ordered
by the deceased.
At the trial, before Crompton, J., at the sit-
tings for Middlesex after Michaelmas temi,
1860, it was proved by the plaintiff that he
had, in pursuance of an order from the de-
ceased, prepared a model of her mouth, and
made two sets of artificial teeth; as soon as
they were ready he wrote a letter to the de-
ceased, requesting her to appoint a day when
he could see her for the purpose of fitting
them. To this communication the deceased re-
plied as follows:—
"My Dear Sir,— I regret, after your kind ef-
fort to oblige me, my health will prevent my
taking advantage of the early day. I fear I
may not be able for some Cays. Yours, &c.,
Frances P."
Shortly after writing the above letter Fran-
ces P. died. On these facts the defendant's
counsel contended that the plaintiff ought to be
nonsuited, on the ground that there was no
evidence of a delivery and acceptance of the
goods by the deceased, nor any memorandum
in writLug of a contract within the meaning of
the seventeenth section of the statute of
frauds (29 Car. II. c. 3), and the learned judge
was of that opinion. The plaintiff's counsel
then contended that, on the authority of Clay
V. Yates, 1 Hurl. & N. 73, the plaintiff could
recover in tlie action on the coimt for work
and labor done, and materials provided. The
learned judge declined to nonsuit, and direct-
ed a verdict for the amount claimed to be en-
tered for the plaintiff, with leave to the de-
fendant to move to enter a nonsuit or verdict.
In Hilary term following, a rule nisi having
been obtained accordingly,
Palchett now shewed cause. Griftlts, in sup-
port of the rule, was not called upon to argue.
CROMPTON, J. I think that this rule ought
to be made absolute. On the second point I
am of the same opinion as I was at the trial.
Tliere is not any sufiicient memorandum in
writing of a contract to satisfy the statute of
frauds. The case decided in the house of
lords, to which i-eference has been made dur-
ing the argument, is clearly distinguishable.
That case only decided that if a document,
which is silent as to the particulars of a con-
tract, refers to auotlier document which con-
tains sucli particulars, parol evidence is ad-
missible for the pun)oso of shewing what doc-
ument is referred to. Assuming, in this case,
that the two documents wore sufficiently con-
nected, still there would not be any sufficient
evidence of the contract. The contract in ques-
tion was to deliver some particular teeth to be
made In a particular way, but these letters do
not refer to any particular bai'gain, nor in
any manner disclose its terms.
The main question which arose at the trial
was, whether the contract in the second count
could be ti'eated as one for work and labor.
or whether it was a contract for goods sold
and delivered. The distinction between these
two causes of action is sometimes very fine;
but where the contract is for a chattel to be
made and delivered it clearly is a contract for
the sale of goods. There ai'e some cases in
which the supply of the materials is ancillai-y
to the contract, as in the case of a printer sup-
plying the paper on which a book Is printed.
In such a case an action might perhaps be
brought for work and labor done and mate-
rials provided, as it could hardly be said that
the subject-matter of the contract was the sale
of a chattel: perhaps it is more in the nature
of a contract merely to exercise skill and labor.
Clay V. Yates, 1 Hurl. & N. 73, turned on its
own peculiar circumstances. I entertain some
doubt as to the coiTectness of that decision;
but I certainly do not agree to the proposition
that the value of the skill and labor, as com-
pared to that of the material supplied, is a
criterion by which to decide whether the con-
tract be for work and labor, or for the sale of
a chattel. Here, however, the subject-matter
of the contract was the supply of goods. The
case bears a strong resemblance to that of a
tailor supplying a coat, the measurement of
the mouth and fitting of the teeth being analo-
gous to the measurement and fitting of the gar-
ment.
HILL, J. I am of the same opinion. I think
that the decision in Clay v. Yates, 1 Hm'l. &
N. 73, is perfectly right. That was not a case
in which a party ordered a chattel of another
which was afterwards to be made and deliv-
ered, but a case in which the subject-matter
of the contract was the exercise of skill and
labor. Wherever a contract is entered into for
the manufacture of a chattel, there the sub-
ject-matter of the contract is the sale and de-
livery of the chattel, and the party supplying
It cannot recover for work and labor. Atkin-
son V. Bell, 8 Barn. & C. 277, is, in my opinion,
good law, with the exception of the dictum of
Bayley, .1., which is repudiated by Maule, J.,
in Grafton v. Armitage, 2 C. B. 339, where he
says: "In order to sustain a count for work
and labor, it is not necessary that the work
and labor should be performed upon materials
that are the property of the plaintiff." And
Tindal, C. J., in his judgment in the same
rase, page 340, points out that in the applica-
tion of the observations of Bayley, J., regard
must be had to the particular facts of the
case. In every other respect, therefore, the
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LEE v. GRIFFIN. 
(1 Best & S. 272.) 
Queen's Bcuch. May 9, 1861. 
Declaration against the defendant, as the 
€xecutor of one Frances P., for goods bar­
gained and sold, goods sold and delivered, and 
for work and labor done and materials pro­
vided by the plaintiff as a surgeon-dentist for 
the said Frances P. 
Plea, that tbe said Frances P. never was 
indebted ai; allegeu. 
The action was brought to recover the sum 
of £'.!l for two sets of artificial teeth ordered 
by the deceased. 
At the trial, before Crompton, J., at the sit­
tings for Middlesex after Michaelmas term, 
1860, it was proved by the plaintiff that he 
bad, in pursuance of an order from the de­
ceased, prepared a model of her mouth, and 
made two sets of artificial teeth;  as soon as 
they were ready he wrote a letter to the de­
ceased, requesting her to appoint a day when 
he could see her for the purpose of fitting 
them. To this communication the deceased re­
plied as follows:·-
• ·)Iy Dear Sir,-I reg1·et, after your kind ef­
fort to oblige me, my health will prevent my 
taking advantage of the early day. I fear I 
may not be able for some days. Yours, &c., 
Frances P." 
Shortly after writing the above letter Fran­
ces P. died. On these facts the defenuant's 
counsel contended that the plaintiff ought to be 
nonsuited, on the ground tha.t there was no 
evidence of a deliYery and acceptance of the 
goods by the decea ·ea, nor any memorandum 
in writing of a contract within the meaning of 
the seventeenth section of the statute of 
frauds (29 Car. II. c. 3), and the learned judge 
was of that opinion. The plaintiff's counsel 
then contended that, on the authority of Clay 
'· Yates, 1 Hurl. & N. 73, the plaintiff could 
recover in the action on the count for work 
and la!Jor done, and materials provided. The 
learned judge declined to non uit, and direct­
ed a verdict for the amount claimed to be en­
tered for the plaintiff, with leave to the de­
fendant to move to enter a nonsuit or verdict. 
I n  Hilary term following, a rule nisi having 
been obtained accordingly, 
Patchett now shewed cause. Griffits. in sup­
port of the rule, was not called upon to argue. 
CROi\IPTON, J. I think that this rule ought 
to be made absolute. On the Recond point I 
am of the same opinion as I was at tbe trial. 
There is not any sufficient memorandum in 
writing of a contract to satisfy the statute of 
frauds. Thi:! case decided in the house of 
lords, to which reference bas been made dur­
ing the argument, is clearly distiuguisbable. 
Tbat case only de<.:icled that if a document, 
which is silent as to the parti<·ulars of a con­
tract. refrrs to aunther ducumcut which con-
1,1ins such varticulars, parol evidence is ad-
D 1 g 1tiz by 
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missible for the pm11ose of shewin� what doc­
umeut is referred to. Assuming-, in this case, 
that tbe two documeuts were sullicieutly con­
nected, still there would not be any sufficient 
evidence of tbe contract. The contract in ques­
tion was to deliver some particular teeth to be 
made in a particular way, but these letters do 
not refer to any particular bru·gain, nor in 
any manner disclose its terms. 
The main question which arose at tbe trial 
was, wbether the contract in tbe second count 
could be treated as one for work and labor. 
or whether it was a contract for goods soltl 
and delivered. The distinction between these 
two causes of action is sometimes very fine; 
but where the contract is for a chattel to be 
made and delivered it clearly is a contract for 
the sale of goocls. Tbere ru·e some cases in 
wllich the supply of the materials is ancillary 
to the contract, as in the case of a printer sup­
plying the paper on which a book is printed. 
I n  such a case an action might perhaps be 
brought for work and labor done and mate­
rials provided, as it could hardly be said that 
the subject-matter of the contract was the sale 
of a chattel : perhaps it is more in the nature 
of a contract merely to exercise skill and labor. 
Clay v. Yates, 1 Hurl. & �- 73, turned on its 
own peculiar circumstances. I entertain some 
doubt as to the correctness of that decision ; 
but I certainly do not agree to the proposition 
that the value of the skill aud labor, as com­
pared to tbat of the material supplied, is a 
criterion by which to decide whetber the con­
tract be for work and labor, or for the sale of 
a chattel. Here, however. the subject-matter 
of the contract was the supply of goods. The 
case bears a strong resemblance to that of a 
tailor supplying a coat, the measuremeut of 
1.he mouth and fitting of the teeth being analo­
gous to the measurement and fitting of the gar­
ment. 
HILL, J. I am of the same opinion. I think 
that tbe decision in Clay v. Yates, 1 Hurl. & 
N. 73, is perfectly right. That was not a case 
in which a party ordered a chattel of another 
which was afterwards to be made and delh·­
ered, but a tase in which the subject-matter 
of the contract was the exercise of skill and 
labor. ·wherever a contract is entered into for 
t.be manufacture of a chattel, there the sub­
ject-matter of the contract is the sale and dc­
li\·ery of the chattel, and the party supplying 
it cannot recoYer for work and labor. .Atkin­
son v. Bell. 8 Earn. & C. 277. is, in my opinion, 
goorl law, with the exception of the dictum of 
BayiL•y, .T ., wbich is repudiated by :\Iaule. J., 
in Grafton v . .Armitage, 2 C. B. 330, where he 
says: "In order to sustain a count for work 
and labor, it is not necessary that the work 
and labor should be performed upon m aterials 
that are tbe property of tbe plaintiff." And 
Tinda.l, C. J., in his judgment in tbe same 
ra.se, pag-e a.J.O, poiuts out tbat in the applica­
tion of the observations of Bayley, J., regarll 
must be had to the particular fact.s of the 
ca:se. In every other respect, therefore, the 
01 1 y 1 1 .:1 from 
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case of Atkinson v. Bell, S Barn. & C. 277, is
law. I tliinli tliat these authorities are a com-
plete answer to the point taken at the trial on
behalf of the plamtifif.
When, however, the facts of this case are
looked at, I cannot see how, wholly irrespec-
tive of the question arising under the statute
of fi-aiuls, this action can be uiaiulaiued. The
contract entered into by the plaiutitE with the
deceased was to supply two sets of teeth,
which were to be made for her and titted to
her mouth, and then to be paid for. Through
no default on her part, she having died, they
never were titted; no action can therefore be
brought by the plaintiflf.
BLACKBURX, J. On the second point, I
am of opinion that the letter is not a sufficient
memorandum in writing to take the case out of
the statute of frauds.
On the other point, the question is whether
the contract was one for the sale of .moods or
for work and labor. I think tliat in all cases,
in order to ascertain whctlier the action ought
to be brouglit for goods sold and delivered, or
for worlc and lalKir done and materials pro-
vided, we must look at the iwrticular contract
entered into between the parties. If the con-
tract be such that, when carried out, it would
result in the sale of a chattel, the party can-
not sue for work and labor; but if the result
of the contract is that the party has done work
and labor which ends in notliing that can be-
come the subject of a «ilo, the party cannot
sue for goods sold and delivered. The case of
afc attorney employed to prepare a deed is an
Illustration of this latter proposition. It can-
not be said that the paper and ink he uses
in the preparation of the deed are goods sold
and delivered. The case of a printer printing
a book woiild most probably fall within the
same category. In Atkinson v. Bell, 8 Barn.
& C. 277, the contract, if carried out, would
have resulted in the sale of a chattel. In Graf-
ton V. Armitage, 2 C. B. 340, Tindal, C. J.,
lays down this vei'.v principle. He draws a
distinction Ijetween the case of Atkinson v.
Bell, S Barn. & C. 277, and that before him.
The reason he gives is that, in the former
case "the substance of the contract was goods
to be sold and delivered by the one party to
the other;" in the latter, "there never was any
intention to make any thing that could properly
become the subject of an action for goods sold
and delivered." I think that distinction recon-
ciles those two cases, and the decision of Clay
V. Yates. 1 Hurl. & N. 73, is not inconsistent
with them. In the present case the contract
was to deliver a thing which, when completed,
would have resulted in the sale of a chattel;
in other words, the substance of the contract
was for goods sold and delivered. I do not
think that the test to apply to these cases is
whether the value of the work exceeds that
of the materials used in its execution; for, if a
sculptor were employed to execute a work of
art. greatly as his skill and labor, supposing it
to be of the highest description, might exceed
the value of the marble on wliich he worked,
the contract would, in my opinion, neverthe-
less be a contract for the sale of a chattel.
Rule absolute.
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case of A.tkiaron "'· Bell, 8 Barn. & C. 277, is 
law. I think that these authorities are a com­
plete answer to the point taken at the trial on 
behalf of the plaintiff. 
When, howe'\"e1·, the facts of this case are 
looked at, I cannot see how, wholly irrespec­
ti'\"e of the question arising under the statute 
of frauds, this action can be maintained. The 
contrad enteretl into by the plaintiff with the 
de.ceasetl was to su1,ply two sets of teeth, 
which were to be made for her and fitte<l to 
her mouth. and then to be paiu for. Through 
no default on her part, she ha'l"ing <lied, they 
neYer were fittetl ; no action can therefore be 
brought by the plaintiff. 
BLACKBCR);, J. On the second point, I 
am of OJiinion that the letter is not a sufficient 
memoranuum in writing to take the ca e out of 
the statute of frauds. 
On the other point, the question i. " hethcr 
the contract was one for the sale of goods or 
for work and labor. I think that in all ca es, 
in order to a certain whether the action ought 
to be brou�ht for goods old and delivered, or 
for work aud lallOr dorw auil material pro­
Yided. we must loo!;: a t  the p:uticul:tr contract 
euterctl intll between the parties. I f  the l'Oll­
tract 1.Je such that, wlwn <'al'l'i<'il out. it would 
re-ult in the sale of a chattel. the party can­
not sue for worlt and labor; but if the result 
of thL' t·ontr:ict is that the party has done work 
and lal.Jor which e11<!1> in nothing that can be­
come the subject of a i:i:tle. the party cannot 
sue for goods sold and delinreu. The case of 
a11. llttorney employed to prepare a deed is an 
D i g  tize by 
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illustration o f  this latter proposition_ It can­
not be said that the paper and ink he uses 
in the preparation of the deed are goods old 
and delivered. The case of a printer printing 
a book would most probably fall within the 
same category. In Atkinson v. Bell, 8 Bam. 
& C. 277, the contract, if cn1Tied out, would 
have resulted in the sale of a chattel. In Graf­
ton '\". Armitage, 2 C. B. 340, Tindal, C. J., 
1 lays do'IYn this V'er.v principle. Ile draw a 
1 di�tinctiun between the case of Atkinson v. 
Bell, Barn. & C. 217, and that before hiw. 
The reason be gi'\"eS is that, in the fon er 
case "the substance or t he contract was goods 
to IJe sold and deli\·ered by the one party to 
the other;" in the latter, "there never was any 
intention to make any thing that could properly 
become the subject of an action for goods sold 
and ueli'l"ered." I think that distinction recon­
ciles thoi;;e two case , and the decision of Clay 
v. Yates. 1 Hurl. & N. 73, is not inconsistent 
with them. In the present ca e the contract 
was to deliver a thing which. when completed. 
would ha,·e resulted in tbe sale of a chatt l ;  
i n  other words. the substance o l'  the conh·act 
was for good sold and delivered. I do not 
think that the te t to apply to tb�e cases i 
whether the '\"alu(' of the work exceeds that 
of the materials u.ed in its execution; for, if a 
sculptor were employed to execute a work of 
art. gren tly as llis skill and labor. supposin;r it 
to be of the highest description, might exceed 
the n1lue of the marble on which be worked, 
the contract would, in my opinion, neverthe­
less be a contmct for the sale of a chattel. 
Huie absolute. 
O ri i r- I fror 1 
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COOKE et al. v. MILLARD et al.
(65 N. 1. 352.)
Commission of Aiuioals of New Yorlt. 1875.
Action to recover the price of certaiu lum-
ber sold and delivered. The referee found
that plaintiffs were copartners and whole-
sale lumber merchants, and proprietors of
a planing mill, at Whitehall, N. i'., and de-
fendants were partners and lumber mer-
chants, at New Hamburgh, on the Hudson.
The course of business is, that the lumber
is shipped from Whitehall by canal to Troy,
and thence to New Hamburgh by the Hud-
son river. On the 5th day of Sept., 18G5,
the defendants desiring to purchase certain
kinds of lumber, were shown by the plain-
tiffs the lumber then in their yard at White-
hall. This was of the desired quality, but
needed to be dressed and cut into the dif-
ferent sizes which they wished. There was
much more lumber in the yard shown to the
defendants than was requisite for their pur-
poses. The defendants thereupon orally
gave to the plaintiffs an order for certain
quantities and sizes of lumber, at specified
prices, amounting in the whole to $918.22.
A memorandum of the order so agreed to
was made by the plaintiffs, but was not sub-
scribed by any one. No particular lumber
was selected or set apart to till the order,
nor was any part of it then in condition to be
accepted or delivered. The defendants told
the plaintiffs that Percival, a forwarder at
Whitehall, would send a boat to take the
lumber, when notified that it was ready to
be delivered. Percival, during the same sea-
son, and prior to Sept. 5, had taken up a
boat for the defendants, and shipped a part
of a load of lumber from the plaintiffs' dock,
making up the residue from his own yard.
He had frequently shipped lumber for the
defendants. By the course of trade, a boat
could not be obtained to carry a part of a
load of lumber from Whitehall to New Ham-
burgh, except for the price of a full load.
To avoid paying such full price, arrange-
ments had to be made to fill out the load.
The defendants knew of this when they
made the order of Sept. 5. The order only
amounted to one-half a boat-load. Percival
then had a pile of lumber (seventeen thou-
sand six hundred and seventy-one feet of
culls) to ship to the defendants, which was
no part of the lumber to be dressed by
plaintiffs. The lumber ordered on Sept. 5
was to be taken from the lots examined by
the defendants, and the lumber dressed and
piled on the plaintiffs' dock, was all taken
from the lumber shown. After the oral or-
der defendants went into the lumber yard
with the plaintiffs' foreman, Martin, and
pointed out to him some of the piles from
which they desired the lumber to be manu-
factured, and directed plaintiffs to put the
lumber, when ready, on plaintiffs' dock and
to notify Percival; and told plaintiffs that
when this was done, Percival, who was also
a lumber dealer, would take up a boat and
sliip the lumber, and make out the load from
his yard. Subsequently, the 15th of Sept.,
the lumber haviug been prepared and dress-
ed, according to the oral agreement, it was
piled upon the dock of the plaintiffs at
Whitehall, along the front of the planing-
mill, and was. on the IGth of that month,
measured by plaintiffs, and was In all re-
spects ready for delivery by them, accord-
ing to the oral agreement.
The plaintiffs, on the same day, gave no-
tice to Percival that the lumber was ready
for delivery, and requested him to send a
boat and take it away. Percival had not
been notified that he was to ship the lum-
ber, and paid no attention to the notice giv-
en him by plaintiffs. On the other hand,
the plaintiffs did not ascertain that Percival
did not know of the arrangement, which the
defendants had told them they would make
with Percival as to shipping the lumber, un-
til after the fire hereinafter mentioned. On
the next day, Sunday, the lumber being still
on the dock, as it was at the time Percival
was notified, was consumed by an accidental
fire, with the planing-mill and much other
property. Judgment for defendants.
Jlartiu W. Cooke, for appellants. Thomp-
son & Weeks, for respondents.
DWIGHT, C. No exceptions were taken
in this cause, except to the conclusions of
law derived by the referee from the facts as
found in the report. There are but two
questions to be considered: One is, whether
the contract is within the statute of frauds;
the other is, if it be held that it is within the
statute, were the acts, done by the parties,
sufficient to comply with its terms, so as to
make the contract enforceable in a court of
justice?
In order to determine whether the con-
tract is within the statute, it is important
briefly to state the exact acts which the
plaintiffs were to perform.
The contract was plainly executory in its
nature. There were no specific articles up-
on which the minds of the buyer and seller
met, so that it could be aflirmed that a
title passed at the time of the contract. The
seller was to select from the mass of lumber
in his yard, certain portions that would com-
ply with the buyer's order. The purposes
of the parties could not even be accomplish-
ed by the process of selection. The lumber
must 1)0 put in a condition to answer the or-
der. It must be dressed and cut into requir-
ed sizes. The contract called for distinct
parcels of surface pine boards, clapboards
and matched ceiling. Part of the lumber
was surfaced, and a portion of it still in the
I'ough. The clapboards were manufactured
from stuff one and a quarter-inch thick. It
had to be split, surfaced and rabbeted. The
order for the various items was a single one.
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COOKE et al.  v .  ?II ILLARD et al. 
(G5 N . . L  a:>2.) 
Commission of A11veals of New York. 1875. 
Action to recover the price of certain lum­
ber sol cl and deli vered. The referee found 
that plaintiffs were copa1tners and w hole­
sale lumber merchants, and proprietors of 
a planing mill, at \Vhitehull, N. Y., a nd de­
fendants were partners and luwbcr IUer­
chants, at New liamburglJ, on the IIuclson.. 
The course of business is, that the lumber 
is shipped from "T hitehall by canal to Troy, 
and thence to New llarnburgh by the Ilud­
son river. On the ::ith day of Sept., lSU:i, 
the defendants desiring to purchase certain 
ki ucls of lumber, were shown by tlw vla in­
tiffs the lumber then in their yard at White­
hall. Tllis was of the desired quality, but 
needed to be d ressed and cut into the dif­
ferent sizes which tlley wished. There was 
much more lumber in the yard shown to the 
defendants than was requisite for their pur­
poses. The defendants thereupon orally 
gave to the plaintiffs an order for certain 
quantities and sizes of luIUber, at specified 
prices, amounting i n  the whole to $918.2�. 
A memorandum of tile order so agreed to 
was made by the plaintiffs, but was not sub­
scribed by any one. No particular lumber 
was selected or set apart to fill the order, 
nor was any part of it then in condition to be 
accepted or delivered. The defendants told 
the plaintiffs that Percival, a forwarder at 
Whitehall,  would send a boat to take the 
lumber, when notified that it was ready to 
be delivered. Percival, during the same sea­
son, and prior to Sept. 5, hacl taken up a 
boat for the defendants, and shipped a part 
of a load of lumber from the plaintiff,;' dock, 
making up the residue from bis own yard. 
He bad frequently shipped lumber for the 
defendants. By the course of trade, a boat 
could not be obtainecl to carry a part of a 
load of lumber from Whitehall to New Ham­
burgh, except for the price of a full load. 
To a void paying such full price, arrange­
ments had to be made to fill out the load. 
The defendants knew of this when they 
made the order of Sept. 5_ The order only 
amounted to one-half a boat-load. Percival 
then had a pile of lumber (seventeen thou­
sand six hundred and seventy-one feet of 
culls) to sbip to the defendants, whicb was 
no part of the lumber to be dressed by 
plaintiffs. The lumber ordered on Sept. 5 
was to be taken from the Jots examined by 
the defendants, and the lumber dressed and 
piled on the plai ntiffs' dock. was a l l  taken 
from the lumber shown. After the oral or­
der defendants went into the lumber yard 
with the plaintiffs' foreman, Martin, and 
pointed out to him some of the piles from 
which they desired the lumber to be manu­
factured, and di rected plaintiffs to put the 
lumber. when ready, on plaintiffs' clock n ncl 
to notify Perciva l ;  ancl told plaintiffs that 
D i gitized by 
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when t!Jis was doue, Perc:i\·al, \Y ho was also 
a lumber dealer, would take u11 a boat aurl 
ship the lumller, and make out t ile load frolll 
his yard. Subsequently, the lGtb of Sept .. 
the lumber having been prepared and dress. 
eel, according to the oral agreement, it was 
piled upon tile dock of the plaintiffs at 
Whitehall, along the front of the planiu;:­
mill, and was, on tlw Hith of that montll. 
mc:isurecl by plaintiffs, and was i n  all re­
spects ready for delivery by them, accord­
ing to the oral agrceIUent. 
The plaint iffs. on the same day, gave no­
tice to Percival that the lumber was ready 
for delivery, and requested him to send a 
boat and take it away. Percival hau not 
beeu notified that he was to ship the lum 
ber, and paid no attention to the notice giY­
en him by plaintiffs. On the other band. 
the plaintiffs d itl not ascertain that Percival 
did not know of the arrangement, which till' 
defendants had told them they would make 
" ith Perch·al as to shipping the lumber, un­
til after the fire hereinafter mentioned. On 
the next day, Sunday, the lumber being still 
on the dock. as it was at the time PerciYal 
was notified, was consurnc>d by an accidental 
fire. with the planing-mill a n rl  much other 
property. Judgment for defendants. 
?lfartin \\'. Cooke. for appellants. Thomp 
son & \Yeeks, for respondents. 
D\\' IGIIT, C. No exceptions were taken 
in this cause, except to the conclusions of 
law derived by the referee from the facts a.; 
found in the report. There are but t \"\·o 
questions to be consitlered : One is, whether 
the contract is within the statute of fraud» ;  
the other is, i f  it be held that i t  i s  within the 
statute, were the acts, done by the parties, 
sutticient to comply with its terms, so as to 
wake the contract enforceable in a court of 
justice? 
In order to determine whether the con­
tract is within the statute. it is important 
briefly to state the exact acts which the 
plai ntiffs were to perform. 
The contract was plainly executory in its 
nature. There were no ,;pecific articles uv­
on which the mi mls of the buyer and seller 
met, so that it could be affirmed that a 
title passed at the time of the contract. The 
seller was to select from the mass of lumlwr 
in bis yard, certain portions that would com­
ply with the buyer's order. The purposes 
of the parties could not even be a<'compli,;b­
ed by the process of selection. The lumber 
must be put in a condition to answer the or­
der. It must be drc;;sed and cut into reqnir­
ecl sizes. The contract called for distinct 
parcels of surface pine boards, clapboards 
and matched ceiling. Part of the lumber 
was surfaced. and a portion of it still i n  the 
rough. The clapboards were manufactured 
from stuff one and a quarter-inch thick. It 
harl to be ;;plit. ;;urfaced and rabbete<l. The 
, nnh• r fpr the ,·ariouR i u  1 1 1 ;;  w a s  a single one, 
O rig i 11a l  from 
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there being fifteen thousand four hundred
and forty-one feet of the surface piue, ten
thousand one hundred and forty-four feet
of clapboards, and eight thousand feet of
matched ceiling. The surface boards and
the ceiling were in existence, and only need-
ed dressing to comply with the order.
Whether the clapboards can be deemed to
have been in existence may be more doubt-
ful If a part of the order is withiu the
statute of frauds, and a portion of it without
it, the whole transaction must be deemed to
be within it, as an entire contract cannot, In
this case, be divided or apportioned. Cooke
V. Tombs, 2 Anst. 420; Chater v. Beckett, 7
T. R. 201; Mechelen v. Wallace, 7 A. & E.
49; Thomas v. Williams, 10 B. & C. 664;
Loomis v. Newhall, 15 Tick. 159. I think it
clear that the contract was in its nature en-
tire. It was in evidence that the intention
was to buy enough, in connection with what
Percival had on hand, to make up a boat-
load. This could only be accomplished by
using the entire amount of the order. Ac-
cordingly even if the contract for the clap-
boards was not a sale, it cannot be separated
from the rest of the order, and the cases
above cited are applicable.
The question is thus reduced to the follow-
ing proposition: Is a contract wliich is, in
form, one of sale of lumber then in exist-
ence for a fixed price, where the seller agrees
to put it into a state of fitness to fill the or-
der of the purchaser, his work being includ-
ed in the price, in fact a contract for work
and labor and not one of sale, and accord-
ingly not within the statute of frauds?
The New York statute is made applicable
to the "sale of any goods, chattels or things
In action." for the price of ^.jO or more. The
words '-goods and chattels" are, literally
taken, probably more comprehensive than
the e.\pressions In the ICuglisli statute
"goods, wares and merchandise." It will
be assumed however in this discussion, that
they are equivalent.
There are at least three distinct views ns
tr) the moaning of the words in the statute.
These may be called, for the sake of conven-
ience, the English, the Massachusetts and
tlie Now York rules, aa representing the de-
cisions In the respective courts.
The Knglisli rule lays especial stress upon
the point, wliether the articles bargained for
(•an be regarded as goods capable of sale by
the professed seller at the lime of delivery,
without any reference fo the Inquiry wheth-
er they were In existence at tlie time of the
contract or not. If n ninnnfaeturer la to
produce an article which at the time of the
di'llvery could be the subject of sale by him,
tlip CISC la within tli.> statute of frauda. The
rule excludes nil c:im"M wIhto work la done
upon the goods of niiolher, or even mate-
rlnla supplied or added to the gooda of an-
other. TliiiH If a cjirrlnge-m.'iker should re-
pair my ''.".rrlnge, l>oth furnlKhlng labor nnil
Hupplyliu: ninterlala. It would be a cniitnii-t
for work and labor, as the whole result of
his efforts would not produce a chattel which
could be the subject of sale by him. If on
the other hand, by the contract he lays out
work or materials, or both, so as to produce
a chattel which he could sell to me, the con-
tract is within the statute. This conclusiou
has been reached only after great discussion
and much fluctuation of opinion, but must
now be regarded as settled. The leading
case upon this point is Lee v. Griffin, 1 Best
& S. 272; Beuj. Sales, 77. The action was
there brought by a dentist to recover £21
sterling for two sets of artificial teeth, made
for a deceased lady of whose estate the de-
fendant was executor. The court held this
to be the sale of a chattel within the stat-
ute of frauds. Blackburn, J., stated the
principle of the decision in a clear manner:
"If the contract be such that it will result in
the sale of a chattel, then it constitutes a
sale, but if the work and labor be bestowed
in such a manner as that the result woidd
not be any thing which could properly be said
to be the subject of sale, tlie action is for
work and labor."
The Massachusetts rule, as applicable to
goods manufactured or modified after the
bargain for them is made, mainly regards
the point whether the products can, at the
time stipulated for delivery, be regarded as
"good.s. wares and merchandise," in the
sense of being generally marketable com-
modities made by the niauufacturer. In that
respect it agrees with the English rule. The
test is not the non-existence of the commod-
ity at the time of the bargain. It is rather
whether the manufacturer produces the arti-
cle in the general course of his business or as
the result of a special order. Goddard v.
Biuney, 115 Mass. 4.')0, 15 Am. Rep. 112. In
this very recent case, the result of their de-
cisions is stated in the following terms: "A
contract for the sale of articles then exist-
ing, or such as the vendor In the ordinary
cour.se of his business mauufacturoa or pro
cures for the general market, whether on
hand at the time or not. is a contract for
the sale of goods to which the statute ap-
plies. But on tlie other hand, if the goods
arc to be manufactured especially for th<-
purchaser and upon his special order, aii(i
not for the general market, the case Is not
wltliin the statute." Under this rule it was
held In Gardner v. Joy, !) iMelc. 177, that a
colli rnct to buy a certain nniiiber of boxes of
<,'andlcs at a fixed price per pnniid, which the
vendor said he would manufa<lure and dc
liver In about throe months, was held to be
a contract of sale. On tlie other hand In
<!(Mlilard V. Blniicy, supra, the rontract with
a carriage maiiur:i<'lurer was tliat he should
make a buggy for tlie person ordering it.
tli.'it the color of the lining should be drab,
and the outside seat of cane, and have on II
the moiiogrum and Initials of llie part.v for
whom It was niaile. This was held not to
I be a contract of sale within the statute.
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there being fifteen thousand four hundred for work and labor, as the ?:bole result  or 
and forty-one feet of the surface pine, ten bis efforts would not produce a chattel which 
thousand one hundred and forty-four feet could be the subject of sale by him. I f  on 
of clapboards, and eight thousand feet of the other band, by the contract be lays out 
matched ceiling. The surface board and work or materials, or both, so as to produce 
the ceiling were in existence, and only need- a cha ttel which he could sell to me, the con­
ed dre ·ing to comply with the onler. tract is within the statute. This conclusion 
"·betber the clapboards can be deemed to bas been reached only after great discussion 
haYe been in existence may be more doubt- and much fluctuation of opinion, but must 
fuL If a part of the order is within the now be regarded as settled. The lea d i ng 
statute of frauds, and a portion of it w i thout case upon this point is Lee v. Griffin, 1 Best 
it, the whole tran action must be dce!lled to & S. 272; Benj. Sales, 77. The action was 
be witllin it, as an entire contract caunot, i n  there brought b y  a dentist t o  recoYer £21 
this case, be di'l"ided or apportioned. Cooke sterling for two sets of artificial teeth. made 
'· Tombs, 2 Aust. -!20; Chater v .  Beckelt, 7 for a tlcceasetl latly of w hose estate the de­
T. R. 201 ; Mecbelen v. Wallace, 7 A. & E. fenclant was executor. The court held t h i s 
49 ; Thomas '· "'i l l iams. 10 B. ,- C. 6G4 ; to be the sale of a chattel within tbe st at­
Loomis v. Kewhall. 1;; Pick. l;:;i9. I think it ute of frautls. Blackburn, J., stated the 
dear that the contract was in i t  nature en- principle of the decision in a clPar mauner: 
tire. It was i n  e•idence that the intention "If the contract be such t ha t  it will rc:.ult i n  
was t o  buy enough, i n  connection with what the sale of a chattel, then it con titutes a 
l'el'cin1l bad on band, to make up a boat- sale, but if the work and labor be bestowed 
load. This could only be accomplished by in such a manner as that the re ult would 
usin� the entire amount of the order. Ac- not be any thing which could properly l>e sai<l. 
t·onlin::ly eyen if the contract for the clap- to be the subject of sale, the action is for 
bnar1b wa · not a sale, it cannot be sc>parnted worl;;: and labor." 
from the rest of the order, am! tllc ca es The Mas achusetts rule, as applicable to 
aho'l'e cited are applicable. goods manufactured or modified after th<' 
The que tion is thus reduced to the follow- bargain for them is made, mai nly rei::-a rds 
ing' propo ition : Is a co n t ract which is,  in the po i n t  whether t he 1iroclnl'ts cun, at the' 
form. one of sale of lumber then in t'x ist- time stipulated for deliYery, be regankd :is; 
en cc for a fixed price, wht•re the Sl'ller ug-rees • ·g-ootls, wa res and merch:1 1Hlise," in t h e  
t o  put it into a state o f  fitness to till tlle or- sense of being generally m:nketable com­
•lPr of the fHll'<'baser, his work bl'i n;.. includ- mo<lities made by the man ufa<'lurer. In that 
cd in the price, in fact a coutraC't for work respect it agrees with the English rule. Till' 
a rul labor and not one of sale, an1l ac1·ord- test is not the non-ex istence of t he t•ommod­
iu::ly not w i t h i n  the stat ute of fr:rn 1 l s ?  ity at the t i me of the bargain. I t  is  ra t hN 
Th1' X<·w York statutP is marlP n11pli1·a blc whether the manufacturer produt·es the arti­
to the ·•sale of any :.:0011. -. l'!1a ttPls or t hing- cle i n  the gent!ral course o f  bis businl'ss 01· :ls 
lu act ion , "  for till' pricl' of �·:tn or mor••. The t he re ult llf a spedal 01·(lcr. noLl<la nl ,. , 
words "g-oods :1 11 11  chattels" are, l ill'rnlly Binney, 115 �I:lss. J:>O, 15 A m . nc11. 1 1 :2. I n  
taken, prollallly more eu 11 1 11rc>hcusin• t h a n  ' t his yery rceC' nt l':t se, the result of t h eir de­
thl' l'X i 'l'l ·siorn; 111 t h " gugl i sh 1->t.11 11tc dsions is . t a tC'd in the fol lowiu.� krms: "A 
"good . wares u n ll mcrd1 a11 1 li sl'." I t  will contract far the sale or  :nt idcs t bcu l'X ist­
hC' nssu1111:u ho\\ l'\l'l' iu t h l  di 1•ussio11, t h a t ing, or st!C'h as t hl' ven<lor i n  the ordinary 
they arc l'<JU i \':t lcnt. cou rse of bis bu:.i nl'ss m:rnu f:wt m·es 01· pro· 
'l'ht'I'" nrP at h·a"t t hr('(• d istinct \' IPws a s  c•ures for t he g't'tll'r:t l  m:nkt• t, w lw t h l'I' o n  
t o  t he 111Pa ni11� of 1 111• words I n  the statute. hnnd at the time or not , ls :t c•ontr:11't for 
Tltl'Sc ma y Ill' <':t llrtl, for thl' fl:lkP of t•1 1 1 11  l' ll- t I ll' :.ale o f  gnnds to w h it'l 1 t he s t :1 t 11 l l' :t(l· 
i 1 •11e<'. t ilt' E 1 1gli>1h , t lw ;\ l a ssaf'ln1M• t t s  : 1 1 1 1 !  )lli<':->. H u t  on t hl' ot lw r  hn n tl ,  If till' gn111l :-;  
t h •  • , . ,,. Yori• r11l•  :-;,  a s  n·prP 1• 1 1 1i 1 1 g- t he de- :ire t n  hl' rn:umfa r t n r!'tl c"> JH'<'l n l l y  for t l u •  
dsl1111s I n  1 h l' r1•:1H'l' l l l'1• <'1 1 1 1 1'1 . p11rl'l1:1 "'"l' n JH I  npon h i s  �J H'l'ill l nr1kr, :1 1 1 <1 
Thr• 1J 11gl l h rule lays l 'SJIP• ' lal  s1 n i:;s n pnn nnt for t l H' "'•'11 1"11 m n rk<'t, t 1 1t• c·:i�I' Is 11ol 
lhP 7111 l 1 1 t, wh Nh••r tlw a rl l1•IPS ha rg:li rH•d for w l t h l 1 1  thl' s t n l l 1 t c• . "  l J 1 1 1IPr l h i s  rnll' i t  \I'll " 
< 'an hi' rl·�n rd•'rl as go<•ilA ••n pa hlr of 1mlc by lwld 111  C 11rtl1 1c ·r \", ,J oy, :l ,\l 1 •t 1 •. !'ii,  t ha t  :i 
l h<' 11rof1•s 1•d IH •ll('I' at t h<' t l nw of d 1• l l n •ry, 1 •0 1 1 t r: et to huy :l '"'!' l a i n 1 1 1 1 1 • 1 hL • r  o f  h n X P S  o f  
w i t hout nny r<'ff'r('Jlf'<' t o  t h e l 1 1 1p 1l ry w h1•t h· l ':1 111 1 ! 1 •, :ti n lix,.tJ prl•·P JH'l' 111 > 1 1 1 111 ,  w hl t• l t  t he 
• r t lwy Wf!rc 1 1 1  l' 1 , t l'llC'P at 1 1 11• t i ln" of t he I \ 1• 1 1 < lor tm l i l  he would 1n:1 1 1 1 1 1'11et 1 l l'I' a 1 1d <II'· 
<'o n t rul'l o r  not. If n m11 1 1 1 1 f:wt 11 n•r IH tn � l h<'r In : ihont  t h t'l'l' 1 1 1 11 1 1 t hs, w1 s h1 • ld 1 1 1  ht• 
pror l i1t1• 11n n rl l dc W h ich ut t ill '  I hm• ot l hP n 1·0 11 t rn<'l or Hll lt'. On 1J1p 1 1 l )11•r h:1 1 11 I  I n  
<lPl l \« ry coul t l  h i'  1 111• 11 1 1 l >J •  d o f  111111' hy h i m, ' U rnl< l:t n l v. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 <\\", Htq1r:t . t l u· · ·1 1 1 1 l r:wt w i t h  
t hC' ('0 (' Is w i thin t h,> 11 t n t u t 1• o r  fl'11 111I B. 'l'hl' I II r·:1 rrl:1gl' 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 f: 1 1 • t 1 1 rP r  l\':tR t hat hi' Hhnu l t l  
r u l "  " "1 11<1 n i l  1·:1<1••R w h"r" worl Is rl1111 < •  mnh' n hui:i::r fnr t h<' Jl"r,;1111 ordPrlng i t ,  
1 1 po11 t b "  J.i"ndR n f  n not lwr, o r  "''"II 1 1 1 11 t ,.. t lt:t t t i l t ' r11l11r n f  t h1 •  l l n l n i:  shn11 l t l  Jw d rn h, 
rlnlK t tppl l••rl rir 11 1 ld1•d lo l h r•  i:;nml!l of ll ll• 1 1 1 1 1 1  t hl '  1111t l d 1• ·1·11 1 of C':t ll<'. :1 1111  h:t\'I' on It 
ot her. '1'1111  If n 1 n rrh1 1-:••·111n l ••r l1n11ld n.. 1 1 1 1 •  111011 11i:;1·11 1 1 1  11 1 1d l 1 1 l i l 1 t l'I nf t h ,. p:t rt y for 
pn l r  Ill� t ,  1 1 1 '1 .,. I Jnl h f 1 1 11i l  li ln g l n hrir 11 1 1 1 1  w h o m  I I  \\' ' l '-1  1 1 111 11 1>, ' I  h i  \\'UH lwl<l not t o  
l lpJ1l� l r 11 1 1 1 1 t  •1 h l , I t  w111 1 ld "" n r 1 1 1 1 l r1 1 c·t h<' n r·o 11 t r:1 t•I 1 1 1' H:t lt• w l t l t l 1 1  t h" i; t a t 1 1 t e. 
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See, also, Mixer v. How.arth, 21 Pick. 205, 32
Am. Dec. 256; Lamb v. Crafts, 12 Mete. 353;
Spencer v. Cone, 1 Mete. 283.
The New York rule is still different. It
is held here by a long course of decisions
that an agreement for the sale of any com-
modity not in existence at the time, but
which the vendor is to manufacture or put
in a condition to be delivered, such as flour
from wheat not yet ground, or nails to be
made from iron belonging to the manufac-
turer, is not a contract of sale. The New
York rule lays stress on the word "sale."
There must be a sale at the time the con-
tract is made. The latest and most authori-
tative expression of the rule is found in a
recent case in this court. Parsons v. Loucks,
48 N. Y. 17, 19, 8 Am. Rep. 517. The contrast
between Parsons v. Loucks, in this state, on
the one hand, and Lee v. Griffin, supra, in
England, on the other, is that in the former
case the word sale refers to the time of en-
tering into the contract, while in the latter,
reference is had to the time of delivery, as
contemplated by the parties. If at that time
it is a chattel it is enough, according to the
English rule. Other cases in this state
agreeing with Parsons v. Loucks are Crook-
shank V. Burrell, 18 Johns. 58; Sewall v.
Fitch, 8 Cow. 215; Robertson v. Vaughn, 5
Sandf. 1; Parker v. Schenck, 28 Barb. 38.
These cases are based on certain old deci-
sions in England, such as Towers v. Os-
borne, 1 Strange, 506, and Clayton v. An-
drews, 4 Burrows, 2101, which have been
wholly discarded in that country.
The case at bar does not fall within the
rule In Parsons v. Loucks. The facts of
that case were that a manufacturer agreed
to make for the other party to the contract,
two tons of book paper. The paper was not
in existence, and so far as appeai-s, not even
the rags, "except so far as such existence
may be argued from the fact that matter is
indestructible." So in Sewall v. Fitch, su-
pra, the nails which were the subject of the
contract were not then wrought out, but
were to be made and delivered at a future
day.
Nothing of this kind is found in the pres-
ent ease. The lumber, with the possible ex-
ception of the clapboards, was all In exist-
ence when the contract was made. It only
needed to be prepared for the purchaser —
dressed and put in a condition to fill his or-
der. The court accordingly is not hampered
in the disposition of this cause by authority,
but may proceed upon principle.
Were this subject now open to full discus-
sion upon principle, no more convenient and
easily understood rule could be adopted than
that enunciated in Lee v. Griffin. It is at
once so philosophical and so readily compre-
hensible, that it is a matter of surprise that
it should have been first announced at so
late a stage in the discussion of the stat-
iite. It is too late to adopt it in full in this
state. So far as authoritative decisions have
gone, they must be respected, even at the
expense of sound principle. The court how-
ever in view of the present state of the law,
should plant Itself, so far as It is not pre-
cluded from doing so by authority, upon
some clearly intelligible ground, and intro-
duce no more nice and perplexing distinc-
tions. I think that the true rule to be ap-
plied in this state, is that when tlie chattel
is in existence, so as not to be governed by
Parsons v. Loucks, supra, the contract
should be deemed to be one of sale, even
though it may have been ordered from a
seller who is to do some work upon it to
adapt it to the uses of the purchaser. Such
a rule makes but a single distinction, and
that is between existing and non-existing
chattels. There will still be border eases
where it will be difficult to draw the line,
and to discover whether the chattels are in
existence or not. The mass of the cases
will however readily be classified. If, on
further discussion, the rule in Lee v. Griffin
should be found most desirable as applicable
to both kinds of transactions, a proper case
will be presented for the consideration of
the legislature.
The view that this case is one of sale is
sustained by Smith v. Central B. Co., *43 N.
Y. ISO, and by Downs v. Ross, 23 Wend. 270.
In the first of these cases there was a con-
tract for the sale and delivery of a tiuautity
of wood, to be cut from trees standing on
the plaintiff's land. The court held that it
could not be treated as an agreement for
work and labor in manufacturing fire-wood
out of standing trees. The cases already
cited were distinguished in the fact that no
change in the thing sold and to be delivered
was contemplated, and that the transaction
could be regarded as a sale in perfect con-
sistency with the cases which hold that
where the substance of the contract consists
in the act of converting materials into a new
and wholly different article, it is an agree-
ment for work and labor. It was further
considered that the case of Towers v. Os-
borne, 1 Strange, 506, where an agreement
for the manufacture of a chariot was a con-
tract for work and labor, was extreme in its
nature, and was not to be carried any fur-
ther. Page 200. The cases of Garbutt v.
Watson, 5 B. & Aid. 613. and Smith v. Snr-
man, 9 B. & C. 561, were cited with ap-
proval. In Garbutt v. Watson a sale of
flour by a miller was held within the statute,
although not ground when the bargain was
made.
In Downs v. Ross there was a contract
for the sale of seven hundred and fifty bush-
els of wheat, two hundred and fifty of the
quantity being in a granary, and the residue
unthreshed, but which the vendor agreed to
get ready and deliver. The court held the
contract to be within the statute of frauds,
notwithstanding that the act of threshing
was to be done by the vendor. The rule
that governed the court was that if the
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See, also, Mixer v. Howarth, 21 Pick. 20:3, 32 
Am. Dec. 256; Lamb v. Crafts, 12 Mete. 353; 
Spencer v. Cone, 1 Mete. 283. 
The New York rule is still different. It 
is held here by a long course of decisions 
that an agreement for the sale of any com­
modity not in existence at the time, but 
which the vendor is to manufacture or put 
in a condition to be delivered, such as flour 
from wheat not yet ground, or nails to be 
made from iron belonging to the manufac­
turer, is not a contract of sale. The New 
York rule lays stress on the word "sale." 
There must be a sale at the time the con­
tract is made. The latest and most authori­
tative expression of the rule is found in a 
recent case i n  this court. Parsons v. Loucks, 
48 N. Y. 17, 19, 8 Am. Rep. 517. The contrast 
between Parsons v. Loucks, in this state, on 
the one hand, and Lee v. Griffin, supra, in 
England, on the other, is that in the former 
case the word sale refers to the time of en­
tering into the contract, while in the latter, 
reference is bad to the time of delivery, as 
contemplated by the parties. If at that time 
it is a chattel it is enough, accordiug to the 
English rule. Other cases in this state 
agreeing with Parsons v. Loucks are Crook­
shank v. Burrell, 18 Johns. 58 ; Sewall v. 
Fitch, 8 Cow. 215 ; Robertson v. Vaughn, 5 
Sandf. 1 ;  Parker v. Schenck, 28 Barb. 38. 
These cases are based on certain old deci­
sions in England, such as Towers v. Os­
borne, 1 Strange, 506, and Clayton v. An­
drews, 4 Burrows, 2101, which have been 
wholly discarded in that country. 
The case at bar does not fall within the 
rule in Parsons v. Loucks. The facts of 
that case were that a manufacturer agreed 
to make for the other party to the contract, 
two tons of book paper. The paper was not 
in existence, and so far as appears, not even 
the rags, "except so far as such existence 
may be argued from the fact that matter is 
indestructible." So in Sewall v. Fitch, su­
pra, the nails which were the subject of the 
contract were not then wrought out, but 
were to be made and delivered at a future 
day. 
Xothing of this kind is found in the pres­
ent case. The lumber, witb the pol'<sible ex­
ception of the clapboards, was all in exist­
ence when tile contract was made. It only 
needed to be prepared for tlie purcbaser­
dressed and put in a condition to fill his or­
der. The court accordingly is not hampered 
in the disposition of this cause by authority, 
but may proceed upon principle. 
Were this subject now open to full discus­
sion upon principle, no more convenient and 
easily understood rule could be adopted than 
that enunciated in Lee v. Griffin. It is at 
once so philosophical and so readily compre­
hensible, that it is a matter of surprise that 
it should have been first announced at so 
late a stage in the discussion of the stat­
ute It is too late to adopt it in full in this I �tate. So far as autborit:Lth·e decisions have 
C. .::r · �·--
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gone, they must be respected, even a t  the 
expense of sound principle. The court how­
ever in view of t.he present state of the law, 
should plant itself, so far as it is not pre­
cluded from doing so by authority, upon 
some clearly intelligible ground, and intro­
duce no more nice and perplexing distinc­
tions. I think that the true rule to be ap­
plied in this state, is that when the chattel 
is in existence, so as not to be governed by 
Parsons v. Loucks, supra, the contract 
should be deemed to be one of sale, even 
tbougb it may have been ordered from a 
seller who is to do some work upon it to 
adapt it to the uses of the purchaser. Such 
a rule makes but a single distinction, and 
that is between existing and non-existin;; 
chattels. There will still be border cases 
where it will be difficult to draw the line, 
and to discover whether the chattels are in 
existence or not. The mass of the cases 
will however readily be classified. If, on 
further discussion, the rule in Lee v. Griffin 
should be found most desirable as applicable 
to both kinds of transactions, a proper case 
will be presented for the consideration of 
the legislature. 
The view that this case is one of sale is 
sustained by Smith v. Central R. Co., *43 N. 
Y. 180, and by Downs v. Ross, 23 Wend. 270. 
In lhe first of these cases there was a con­
tract for the sale and delivery of n c1uantity 
of wood, to be cut from trees standing on 
the plaintiff's land. The court held that it 
could not be treated as an agreement for 
work and labor in manufacturing fire-wood 
out of standing trees. The cases already 
cited were distinguished i n  the fact that no 
change in the thing sold and to be <lelivered 
was contemplated, and that the transaction 
could be regarded as a sale in perfect con­
sistency with the cases which bold that 
where the substance of the contract consists 
in the act of converting materials into a new 
and wholly different article, it is an agree­
ment for work and labor. It was further 
considered that the case of Towers v. Os­
borne, 1 Strange, 506, where an agreement 
for the manufacture of a chariot was :;. con­
tract for work and labor, was extreme in its 
nature, and was not to be carried any fur­
ther. Page 200. The cases of Garbutt v. 
Watson, G B. & Aid. 613. and Smith v. Sur­
man, 9 B. & C. 561, were cited with ap­
proval. In Garbutt v. Watson a sale of 
flour by a miller was held within the statute. 
although not ground when the bargain was 
made. 
In Downs v. Ross there was a contract 
for the sale of seven hundred and fifty bush­
els of wheat, two hundred and fifty of the 
quantity being in a granary, and the residue 
unthreshed, but which the vendor :igreed to 
get ready and deliver. The court held the 
contract to be within the st.'ltute of frauds, 
notwithl'<tanding that the act of threshing 
was to be done by the venrlor. The rule 
that governed ibe court was tliat if the 
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thing sold exist at the time in solicio, the
mere fact that sonietliing remains to be done
to put it in a marlcetable condition will not
take the contract out of the opei-ation of the
statute. Page 272. This proposition is in
marked contrast to the view expressed by
Cowen, J., in a dissenting opinion. His the-
oi-y was that where the article which forms
the subject of sale is understood by the par-
ties to be defective in any particular which
demands the finishing labor of the vendor in
order to satisfy the bargain, it is a contract
for work and labor and not of sale. The
two theories (where the goods exist at the
time of sale) have nowhere been more terse-
ly and distinctly stated than in the conflict-
ing opinions of Bronson and Cowen. J J., in
this case. See also Courtright v. Stewart,
19 Barb. 4m.
The fallacy in the proposition of Cowen,
J., is in assuming that there is any "work
and labor" done for the vendee. All the
work and labor is done on the vendor's prop-
erty to put it in a condition to enable him
to sell it. His compensation for it is found
in the price of the goods sold. It is a juggle
of words to call this "a mixed contract of
sale and work and labor." When the goods
leave the vendor's hands and pass over to
the vendee they pass as chattels under an
executed contract of sale. While any thing
remained to be done the contract was exec-
utory. There is abundance of autliority for
maintaining that a contract in its origin ex-
ecutory may, by the performance of acts un-
der its terms, by one of the parties, become
In the end executed. Rohde v. Thwaites, G
B. & C. 3S8; Benj. Sales, chap. 5, and uases
cited.
The case of Donovan v. Wlllson. 20 Barb.
138, and Parker v. Schenck, 28 Barb. 38, are
to be upheld as falling within the principle
of Parsons v. Loucks. supra. Both of these
cases concerned articles not in existence,
but to be produced by the manufacturer; in
the one case beer was to be nianufacturcd.
and in the other a bniss pump. So In Pas-
saic Manuf. Co. v. HoiTman, H Daly. -I'.iri. the
contract was for the manufacture and deliv-
ery of lifly warps. None of these were in
existence when the order was received.
Wliile tlio case appears to fall witliln the
rule of Parsons v. Ijoucks, the eminent
judge who wrote an elaborate opinion ex-
pressing the views of the court would Hci'in
to rely upon the Mnssadnisetts rule rather
than otir own. Wlinfever view might be en-
tertained of the soundness of that distinc-
tion It Is now too late to adopt It here, and
the case cannot be sustained on that gro\ind.
The only cn.Mc In our reiiorts appearing to
stand In tlio way of the conclusion arrived
nt in this cause Is Mearl v. Case, X\ Barb.
2ft'2. The court In tlint case recognized the
distinction lierein upheld. The only do\ibt
about the case Is wlietlier the coin-t cotTccl-
ly npplI'Ml tlie rule to the facts. These were
that several pieces of niarhle put together In
the form of a monument were standing in
the yard of a marble-cutter. That person
agreed with a buyer to polish, letter and fin-
ish the article as a monument, and to d'li'-
pose of it for an entire price— $200. The
court held that there was no monument in
existence at the time of the bargain. There
were pieces of stone in the similitude of a
monument, and that was all.
It is unnecessary to quarrel with this case.
If unsound, it is only a case of a misapplica-
tion of an established rule. If sound, it is a
so-called "border case," showing the rcfint-
ments which are likely to arise In applying
to various transactions tlie rule adopted in
Sewall V. Fitch, and kindred cases. It is
proper however to say that the notion that
such an arrangement of marble placed in a
cemetery over a grave cannot be regarded
as a monument, in the absence of an inscrip-
tion, seems highly strained. Then theio
could not be a memorial church without an
inscription. Then it could not have been
said of Sir Christopher Wren, in bis relation
to one of his great architectural productions.
"Si quiuris monumentum, circumspice," It
would seem to be enough if the monument
reminds the passer-by of him whom it is in-
tended to commemorate, and this might be
by tradition, inscriptions on adjoining or
neighboring objects, or otherwise.
In the view of these principles, the defend-
ants had the right to set up the statute of
frauds. I think that this was so even as
to the clapboards. Although not strictly in
existence as clapboards, they fall within tlie
rule in Smith v. Central R. Co. They were
no more new products than was the wood in
that case. There was simply to be gone
through with a process of dividing anil
adapting existing materials to the plaintiffs'
use. It would be ditlicult to distinguish be-
tween splitting planks into clapboards, and
trees into wood. No especial skill is r<-
quired, as all the work is done by machincr\
in general use, and readily managed by any
producers of ordinary intelligence. The case
bears no resemblance to that of Parsons v.
I>oticks, where tlie product was to be create I
from materials in no respect existing in the
form of paper. The cases would have been
more analogous had the contract in that
case been to divide large sheets of paper in-
to small ones, or to make packages of en-
velojies from existing paper. In Oilman v.
mil. :'.i; N. H. .•?n. it was held that a con-
tract for sheep pelts to be taken from sheep
was ,a contract for things In existence, and
a sale.
The next Incpilry is, wliellier there have
been sulflclent acts done on the part of the
buyers to comply with the statute. In order
to properly solve this question. It Is neces-
sary to look more do.sely Into the natiu'e of
the contract. As lias been already suggest-
ed, the contract was In Its origin executory.
It called for selection on the part of the Sell-
ers from a mass of materials. At the time
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of the bargain there was no sale. There
was at most only an agreoiiiput to sell. The
plaintiffs however lay much stress on the
fact that after the oral bargain and after
the defendants had inspected the lumber,
they gave directions, also oral, to the plain-
tiffs t« place the lumber after it had been
made ready for delivery upon the dock and
to give notice to Percival. They urge that
the subsequent compliance with these direc-
tions by the plaintiffs satisfy the terms of
the statute.
It will be observed that all of these direc-
tions were given while the contract was still
wholly executory, and before any act of se-
lection had been performed by the i)laintiffs.
It will thus be necessary to consider wheth-
er these directions are sufficient to turn the
executory contract of sale into an executed
one, independent of the statute of frauds,
and afterward to inquire whether there was
any sufficient evidence of "acceptance and
receipt" of the goods to take the case out of
the statute. The.se questions are quite dis-
tinct in their nature and governed by differ-
ent considerations: (1) If the contract had
been for goods less than $oO In value, or for
more than that amount, and ordered by the
defendants in writing, it would still have
been executory in its nature, and would have
passed no specific goods. It would have
been an agreement to sell and not a sale.
The ease would not have fallen within such
authorities as Crofoot v. Bennett, 2 N. Y.
25S, and Kimberly v. Patchin, 19 N. Y. 330.
Since the goods could not have been identi-
fied at all, except by the act of the seller in
selecting such as would comply with the or-
der, nor could the purposes of the contract
have been performed except by the labor
of the plaintiffs in adapting the goods to the
defendants' use, the case falls within a rule
laid down by Mr. Blackburn in his work on
Sales (pages 151, 152): "Where, by the agree-
ment, the vendor is to do any thing to the
goods for the purpose of putting them into
that state in which the purchaser is to be
bound to accept them, or as it is some times
worded, into a deliverable state, the per-
formance of these things shall, in the ab-
sence of circumstances indicating a contrary
intention, be taken to be a condition preced-
dent to the vesting of the propeity." Acra-
man v. Morrice, 8 0. B. 44!); Gillett v. Hill,
2 C. & M. 530; Campbell v. Mersey Docks,
14 C. B. (N. S.) 412.
Proceeding on the view that tliis was an
executory contract, it might still pass into
the class of executed sales by acts "of sub-
sequent appropriation." In other words, if
the subsequent acts of the seller, combined
with evidence of intention on the part of the
buyer, show that specific articles have been
set apart in performance of the contract,
there may be an executed sale and the prop-
erty in the goods may pass to the purchaser.
Blackburn, Sales, 12S; Benj. Sales, c. 5;
Fragano v. Long, 4 B. & C. 219; Itohde v.
Thwitites, 6 B. & C. 3SS; Aldridge v. .John-
son, 7 E. & B. 8S5; Calcutta, etc., Company
V. De Mattos, 33 L. .1. (Q. B.) 214, in Exch.
Cham. This doctrine requires the as.seut
of both parties, tliough it is held that it is
not necessary that such assent should be
given by the buyer subsequently to the ap-
propriation by the vendor. It is enough
that the minds of both parties acted upon
the subject and assented to the selection.
The vendor may be vested with an implied
authority by tlie vendee to make the selec-
tion and thus to vest the title in him. Browne
V. Hare, 3 H. & N. 484; s. c., 4 H. & N. 822.
This doctrine would be applicable to existing
chattels where a mere selection from a mass
of the same kind was requisite. On the other
hand, if the goods are to be manufactured
according to an order, it would seem that
the mind of the purchaser after the manu-
facture was complete, should act upon the
question whether the goods had complied
with the contract. See Mucklow v. Mangles,
1 Taunt. 318; Bishop v. Crawshay, 3 B. &
C. 415; Atkinson v. Bell, 8 B. & C. 277. This
point may be illustrated by the case of a sale
by sample, where the seller agrees to select
from a mass of products certain items cor-
responding with the sample, and forward
them to a purchaser. The act of selection by
the vendor will not jjass the title, for the
plain and satisfactory reason, that the pur-
chaser has still remaining a right to deter-
mine whether the selected goods correspond
with the sample. Jenner v. Smith, L. R. 4
C. P. 270. In this case the plaintiff at a fair
orally contracted to sell to the defendant two
pockets of hops, and also two other pockets
to corre.si^ond with a sample, which were
lying in a warehouse in London, and which
he was to forward. On his return to Lon-
don, he selected two out of three pockets
which he had there, and directed them to be
marked to "wait the buyer's order." The
buyer did no act to show his acceptance of
the goods. The court held that the appro-
priation was neither originally authorized
nor subsequently assented to by the buyer,
and that the property did not pass by the
contract. Brett, J., put in a strong form the
objection to the view that the buyer could
have impliedly assented to the appropriation
by the seller. It was urged, he said, "that
there was evidence that by agreement be-
tween the parties, the purchaser gave author-
ity to the seller to select two pockets for him.
If he did so. he gave up his power to object
to the weighing and to the goods not cor-
responding with the sample; for he could
not give such authority and reserve his right
to object, and indeed it has not been contend-
ed that he gave up those rights. That seems
to me to be conclusive to show that the de-
fendant never gave the plaintiff authority to
make the selection so as to bind him. Un-
der the circumstances therefore it is impos-
sible to say that the property passed." Page
278. The same general principle was main-
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of the barga in there was no sa l e. There 
was at most only an a�rccm<>nt to sell. '.rhe 
plaintiffs however lay much stress on the 
fact that after t he oral bargain and a fter 
t h e  defendants had inspected the lumher, 
t hey gave directions, also oral, to the plain­
tiffs to place the lumber after it had been 
made reacly for delivery upon the docl� and 
to give no1 ice to Percival. They urge that 
the subset1uent compliance with these direc­
tions by the plaintiffs satisfy the terms of 
the sta tute. 
It will be observed that all of these direc­
tions were given while the contract was still 
wholly executory. and before any act of se­
lection had been performed by the plaintiffs. 
I t  will thus be necessary t o  consi•lcr wheth­
er these directions are sufficient to turn the 
executory contract of sale into an exl'entecl 
one. independent of t h e  statute of frauds, 
and afterward to inquire whether there was 
any sufficient evidence of "acceptance and 
receipt"' of the goods to take the case out of 
the statute. These questions are quite dis­
tinct i n  their nature and governed by differ­
ent considerations: (1) If the contract bad 
been for goods less than $30 in value, or for 
more than that amount, and ordered by the 
defendants in writing, it would sti l l  have 
bean executory in its nature, and would have 
passed no specific goods. It would have 
been an agreement to sell and not a sale. 
The case would not have fallen within such 
authorities as Crofoot v. Bennett, 2 N. Y. 
258, and K i mberly v. Patchin, 19 N. Y. 330. 
Since the goods could not have been identi­
fied at all, except by the act of the seller in 
selecting such as would comply with. the or­
der, nor could the purposes of the cont ract 
have been performed except by t h e  labor 
of t he plaintiffs i n  adapting the goods to the 
defendants' use, the case falls within a rule 
laid down b y  Mr. Blackburn i n  his work on 
Sales (pages 151, 152) : "Where, by the agree­
ment. the vendor is to do any thing t o  the 
goods for the purpose of putting them into 
that state i n  which th.e purchaser is to be 
bound to accept them, or as i t  is some times 
worded, into a d�liverable state, the per­
formance of these tbing-s shall. in the ab­
sence of circumstances indicating a contrary 
intention. be taken to be a condition preced­
dent to the vesting of the property." Acra­
man v. l\Iorrice, 8 C. B. 440; Gillett v. Hill, 
2 C. & :\I. 530 ; Campbell v. l\Iersey Docks, 
14 C. B. (N. S.) 412. 
Proceeding on th.e view that this was a n  
executory contract. i t  might still pass into 
t he class or executed sales by acts "of sub­
sequent appropriation." In other words, if 
the subsequent acts of the seller, combined 
with evidence of intention on the part of the 
buyer. show that specific articles have been 
et apart in performance of th.e cont ract, 
there may be an executed sale and the prop­
erty in t h e  goods may pass to the purchaser. 
Blackburn, Sales, 1'.:! ; Benj. Sales. c. 5 ;  
Fragano v .  Long, 4 Il. & C .  219; l tohde v. 
D 1g 1t1z by 
I NTE RNET A R C H  V E  
Thwaites, G B. & C .  :: s ;  Al<lricl;;e v. John­
son, 7 E. & B. 88;J; Cnkutta, et<"., C'ompau,r 
v. De ::\latto;;, :i:i L . .r. (<J. ll.) :.! l  �. iu Exd • .  
Cbn m. '!'h is doctrine requires till' as:-;ent 
or both pa rties, Uwugh it is held that it is 
not necessary that sutll assent sllould IJe 
given by the bu�-er suhsequently to tlie ap­
propriation by t he venclor. It is enou;;h 
that the minds of both parties acted upon 
the subject and assented to the selc>ction. 
'l'he vendor may be vested with. a n  impl iecl 
authority by the venclee to make the selec: 
tion and th.us t o  vest the title in him. Browne 
v. Ha re, 3 II. & N. 484 ; s. c., 4 ll. & N. 8:.!'.!. 
This doctrine would be applicable to existing 
chattels where a mere selection from a mass 
of tile same kind was requisite. On the other 
band. if the goods are to be manufactured 
according to an order, it ''ould seem th.at 
the mind of the pmchaser after the manu­
facture was complete, sh.ould act upon the 
c1nestion whether the goo<.ls bad complied 
with the contract. See ::\lucklow v. :\!angles, 
1 Taunt. 318; Bishop v. Crawshay, 3 B. & 
C. 415 ; Atkinson v. Bell, 8 B. & C. 277. This 
point may be illustrated by the case of a sale 
lly sample, where the seller agrees to seled. 
from a mass of products certain items cor­
respond ing with the sample, and forwanl 
them to a purchaser. The act of selection by 
tbe vendor will not pass the title, for the 
plain and satisfactory reason, that th.e pur­
chaser has still rema i ning a right to deter­
mine whether the selected goods correspond 
with. the sample. Jenner v. Smith, L. R. 4 
C. P. 270. In this case the plaintiff at a fair 
orally contracted to sell to th.e defendant t"·o 
pockets of hops, a.nu also two other pockets 
to correspond with a sample, wllith. were 
lying in a warehouse in London, and which 
he was to forward. On his return to Lon­
don. be selected two out of three pockets 
which be llad there, and directed them to be 
marked to "wait the buyer's order." The 
IJuyer did no act to show bis acceptance of 
the goods. The court held that the appro­
priation was neith.er originally authorized 
nor subsequently assented to by the buyer, 
and tha t the property did not pass by the 
contract. Brett. J . ,  put in a stl'ong form the 
objection to the view tll'lt tile buyer could 
ha\e impliedly assented to th.e appropriation 
by the ::;eller. It ''a� u rged. h.e said. "tbat 
there was ev irlenc!' tha t by agreement be­
tween the partie>:. the p urchaser ga\e author­
ity to the seller to select two pockets for him. 
I f  he did so.  he gave up lli:,< power to object 
to th.e weighing and to tbe goods not cor­
responding with the sample; for he could 
not give such authority aml resene his right 
to object, and imlecd it bas not been contend­
ed tbat be gave up those right . 'Th.at seems 
to me to be conclusi'e to show ti.lat the de­
fendant never gave the vlaintiff :rnthority to 
make the selection so as to bind him. 1.;n­
der tbe t ircumstances therefore it is impo;::­
sible to sa y that th.c property passed." Pa:::e 
27 '. Th.e same general principle was main-
Or ig ir-a l  from 
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tained in Kein v. Tupper, 52 N. Y. 550, where
it was bold that the act of the vendor put-
ting the goods in a state to be delivered did
not pass the title, so long as the acceptance
of the vendee, provided for under tJie terms
of the contract, had not been obtained.
The result is, that if this sale, executory as
it was in its nature, had not fallen within
the statute of frauds, there would have been
no sufficient appropriation by the vendor to
pass the title. The transaction, so far as
it went, was even at comujon law an agi'ee-
ment to sell and not an actual sale.
(2) But even if it be assumed that this
would have been an executed coutmct of
sale in its own nature, without reference to
the statute of frauds, was there "an accept-
ance and a receipt" of the goods, or a part of
them, by the buyer, so as to satisfy the stat-
ute?
The acceptance and receipt are both neces-
sary. The contract is not valid uuless the
buyer does both. These are two distinct
things. There may be an actual receipt
without an acceptance, and an acceptance
without a receipt. The receipt of tlie goods
is the act of taking p<issession of them.
When the seller gives to tlie buyer the actual
control of the goods, and the buyer accepts
such control, he has actually received them.
Such a receipt Is often an evidence of an ac-
ceptance, but it is not the same thing. In-
deed the receipt by the buyer may be, and
often is, for the express purpose of seeing
wliother he will accept or not. Blackb. Sales,
lOG; see Brand v. Foclit, 3 Keyes, 409; Stone
v. Browning, 51 N. Y. 211.
There are some dicta, of various judges,
cited by the plaiutiCfs to the effect that ae-
coptance and receipt are equivalent Per
Crompton, J., and Cockburn, Ch. B., in Cas-
tle v. Swordor, C. II. & N. 8:!2; per Erie, C.
.T., In Marvin v. Wallis. (i K. & B. 72(i. These
remarks cannot be regarded as of any weight,
being contrary to the decided current of au-
thority. Indeed a late and approved writer
.s;iys: "It may be conlidently assumed how-
ever that the construction which attributes
distinct meanings to the two expressions, "ac-
ceptanee' and 'actual receipt,' is now too
llrnily settled to be treated na an open ques-
tlun, and tills Is plainly to be Inferred from
the opinions delivered In SmIlh v. Iludsou."
6 B. & S. 43f!; BenJ. Sales.
It cannot be conei'ded that there was any
neeeptnnee In the present ease by reason of
llie acta and words occurring bctwtvn the
parlies after ilio parol contract and before
the gm«ls were prepnr«'d for delivery. There
coulil be no accepianee without the assent
of the liiiyerH to ilie artleles In tlieir changed
conilltiiin. rind tin iidapted to their use. If
the case had been one of specllle goods to be
aelected from a mnss without any jirepiiratlon
to be niiide, and nnthlng to be done by the
vendor but merely to select, the mailer would
have presented n very dl(Ti'i-oiit aspect . This
distinction itt well pointed mil by WllleH, .1.,
in Bog Lead Min. Co. v. Montague, 10 C. B.
(N. S.) 4S1. In this case the question ttu-ued
upon the meaning of the word "acceptance,"
in another statute, but the court proceeded
on the analogies supposed to be derived from
the construction of the same word in the
statute of frauds. The question was as to
what was necessary to constitute an "ac-
ceptance" of shares in a mining company, un-
der 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47. The court having
likened the case to that of a sale of chattels,
said: "It may be that in the case of a eon-
tract for the purchase of unascertained prop-
erty to answer a particular deseriiition, no
acceiitanco can be properly said to take place
before the purchaser has had an opportunity
of rejection. In such a case, the offer to
l)urchase is subject not only to the assent or
dissent of the seller, but also to the condition
that the property to be delivered by him shall
answer the stipulated description. A right
of inspection to ascertain whether such con-
dition has been complied with is in the con-
templation of both parties to such a contract:
and no complete and flnal acceptance, so as
irrevocablj' to vest the property in the buy-
er, can take place before he has exercised or
waived that right. In order to constitute
such a final and complete acceptance, tlie
assent of the buyer should follow, not pre-
cede, that of the seller. But where the con-
tract is for a specific, asceitained chattel,
the reasoning is altogether different. Equal-
ly, where the offer to sell and deliver has been
first m.ade bj' the seller and afterwards as-
sented to by tlie buyer, and where the oiler
to buy and accept has been first made by
the buyer and afterwards assented to hy
the seller, the contract Is complete by thi'
assent of both parties, and It Is a contract
the expression of which tcstilles tliat the sell-
er has agreed to sell and deliver, and the
buyer to buy and accept the chattel." Pages
4S!), 400.
This view is confirmed by Maberley v. Shep-
pard, 10 Biiig. !)'.1. That was an action for
goods sold and delivered, and It was proven
that the defendant ordered a wagon to be
made for him by the plalntilT. and, during
the progress of the work, furnished the Iron
work and sent it to the plain! ilT, and sent a
man to help the plaintiff in lilling the iron
to the wagon, and bought a tilt and sent It
to the jilaintiff to be put on the wagon. It
was Insisted, on these facts, that Ihe del'entl-
ant had exercised such a dominion over the
goods sold as amoiintwl to an aceeplancc.
The court, per 'I'indal. C. .L, held that the
plaintiff had be<'n rightly nonsnite<l. because
the acts of the defendant had not been done
after the wagon was finished an<l cajiablo of
delivery, but iiKM'ely while It was In iirogrms,
so that It still remained In the iilaintllT's yard
for fiirdier work until It was llnished. The
court adde<l: "If Ihe wagon had been com-
)ilete<l and ready for delivery and the de-
fendant had then sent a wi>rkman of his own
to perform any addillon.al work upon It, such
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92 . ALE-;. 
tained in Kein ""· Tupper, 52 X.  Y. 5:i0, w here 
it wa held th:it the act of the ven<lor put­
tii.:: the !!ood · in a tate to be deli;ered di<l 
nut pa:s the ti tie. so long as tbe accepta nce 
of the Yendee, pro;ided for under U1e te11ll s 
Qf the contract. had not been obtaine<l. 
The re ult is, that if this sale, executory as 
it wa in its nature, h:id not fallen within 
the tatute of frautls, there would ha;e been 
no sufficient appropria tion by the Yentl )r to 
pa,:; the t i tle. The transaction, so far as 
it went, was e'l'en at common law an agree­
ment to sell and not an actual sa1e. 
(:?) But e'l'en if it be as. ume<l that this 
woul<l have been an executed contract of 
sale in its own nature, without reference to 
the statute of frautls, was there "an accept­
:r nce and a receipt" of the goods, or a part of 
them, by the buyer, o as to at isf.r the stat­
ute? 
The acceptance and receipt are both neces­
sary. The contract is not 'l'alid unless the 
buyer does both. These are two distinct 
things. There may be an actual receipt 
'''' t h· •Ut an accepta nce, and an acceptance 
without a receipt. The receipt of U1e good· 
i,:; the act of taking pQ ·ses ion of them. 
When the seller gi'l'es to the buyer the actual 
1·outrol of the goods. and the buyer accept 
s11eh control, be ha actually rece i'l'ed them. 
�u. ·h a reC'eipt Is often a n  evidence of an ac­
l'eptanee. I.Jut it is not the same thing. In­
tleetl the receipt by the lmyer may be. antl 
often is, for the express purpooe of seeing 
wlwther he \\' ill  ac1·cpt or not. Ill:tckb. S:tles, 
lt1G ; i::ee Brand 'I'. Fucht, :� Keyes, 40�; 'tone 
,._ Browuln i::. 51 • '. Y. :!11. 
There are some dicta, or various judges, 
<'ited by tbe pl:iintilTs to tbe effect that ac­
<'('pt:1 nc·e antl reec>ipt arc l'l}lli Yalent. Per 
l'rompton, .T .. and C'ockburn. Ch. ll., i n  ns­
t le '" Swc1rtl •r. c; II.  & '\. , '1::! ; per Eric, 
.r .. lo )l:n'\·ln 'I'. \Y:tlli." Ii 1'J & R 7:..!li. 'l'hese 
l'l 'm nrl.:s r·a nnot he re;;:t r(h'tl as of any Wl'l;! h t, 
hein� 1·011t r:t ry to t lw dcdd1·1l eurrent of au­
tlwrlty. l n 1leed a Ja tr> a111l a p11r11n•1l wril<'r 
1>o1j"': "It may he co 1 1 fid1•11tly :tss1111wil how­
<.•\'l'r that t hr� cons t rnet i on whkh u ltrllmtcs 
111  tl n<"t meaul ui:: to t he t wo ex 1n·ci;i;lo11!1, ·nc-
c>p t n. 111·c' n ud 'Ul'l11nl rel'Pl pt., ' is uow too 
t1rmly s"ltk><I to he i r<'nted t1A nn 01w n q1H's­
t l11u,  lt nd ! h i s Is p la i nly to hf' l1tfl'IT1'd from 
tlir• opl n l1111s rl!' l f \·pn·d 1 1 1  811111  It v. I I  u<lson." 
H Tl. l'" • .'. •t:� ;: I�t\nJ. �:tll'�. 
l t • 'nl tnot L u• 1·11111·,.1 lc• < I  t lut  t. th1•re wns a nJ' 
rt('l f'!llll lll'l' I ll f f t1• Jll'l°l'll'll(  f':l 'f' h_r l'l'll�Oll or 
I h" lll't8 n nil wonls O<'<'l l t'J' lni; hrt \\'<'I'll t he• 
pn rtl1 u f t "r 1 h f'  1m rol 1·011t r:tl'I :t 1 1 1 1  11 .. 1 nre 
t l w  goml wc•rl! J i rl'p:tr(• I for !IPl l l'l·ry. 'I h<'l'l' 
C!>Ul l !Jc• un 111•1 •1•pt, Ill'(' w l l hot t l the• :n;s1•11t 
of t i t•• l oll) l't'fl lo I lit• II rllrl1•g I 11 I 111'1 r <'it :t I I  'I'd 
·�nd lt lnu, n u•I 11 ndn pl1•1l l o  t hl' l r 11 L'. 1 1·  
1 111• I'll ,-. h:HI l wen Oil<' or ()<'<'I lle J,:1111 I to h1 • 
f!C•l1·r ·t1•1 I  from n mn w l l hout 11 1 1y pl'PJl:I rn 1 11 111 
l r t  hr• 111 n d r',  n 11d II' t h i n �  lo 111• < 1 1 1 111• hy t h1 •  
\' ••ml• r httt  11wr1•l y to r •IN.' I ,  t h•• m n l l  • r  w1 11 1 ld 
t ,n \'<• pr e n t 1  I n "<'rY 1 l l t'rt0t"\.'11t  :i 11 'l'I . ' I  h i  
d i  t l t wt lon Isl we I I  ) to l n l »il 0 1 1 1  hy \\' 1 1 1 1•11, . J . ,  
D i g 1t1zect by 
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i n  Bog Lead )!in.  Co. v. )Iontague, 1 0  C. B. 
(X. S.) 431. In tbi case the question turnetl 
upon the mean ing of the word "acceptance," 
in another tatute, but the court proceeded 
on the analogies supposed to be deri'l'ed from 
the con tructioo of the same word in t h l'  
tatute o f  frautls. The question w a s  as t1 1 
what was necessary to constitute a.u "•le· 
ceptance" of shares in a mining company, u u­
der 19 & :!O Viet. c. 47. The court ba'l'ing 
likened the case to that of a sale of chattels, 
said : "It may be that in the case of a con­
tract for the purchase of uuascertai oe<l prop­
erty to answer a pa rticular description, n o  
acceptance ca n b e  properly aid to t a k e  place 
before the purchaser has had a n  opportunity 
of rejection. In such a case, the offer to 
imrchase is subject not onl3· to the a sent or 
dissent of the seller, but also to the eondition 
tL!at tbe property to be del i vered by him shall 
a nswer tbe stipulated description. A right 
of inspection to a certain wl.Jether such con­
dition has been complied ,..,.ith L in the con­
ternpla ti on of botb parties to such a contract ; 
and no complete and final acceptance, so :i s  
i lTe'l'ocably to vest the property i n  the buy­
er, ca n tal;:e place l.JeCore he bas exercise<l or 
wai'l'ed that right. In order to con titutc 
such a fina l  and complete acceptance, t lw 
a sent or Ute buyer hould follow, not pre­
cede. that of tbe seller. But where the con­
tract is for a specific, a certained chattC'l, 
the rea soning is a ltogether dif erent. Equa l­
ly, whe re the offer to ell and deliver ha bee n 
!ir t made by the seller and afterwa rds n s­
sented to by the buyer, auu wbere tbe offrr 
to tiu;1• and ac>cept has been first made hy 
tbe bu,,·er and a fterwa rd assented to by 
tl.Je seller, the contract Is complete by l lH' 
assent or both parties, and It l s  n. cont rn et 
t he expression of wbicb te ti l'le that the sl'll­
e r  has :1gl'ced to se ll nnd deliYer, and t lH' 
huyl't' to buy nnd accept tbe chnttel." PagC's 
-l.S!), .lfl(). 
This Yi<'w is confirme<l by ;\fa berlcy 'I'. �lwp­
p:ird, 10 Bing. !l!). Thnt wn a u aetion for 
gootls sold n nd dd iverc>cl , :\ nll 1 t was pron•u 
t hat the clcfrncl:rnt onk rt•cl n wng"on to hl' 
m:Hll' rm· hi m l>.1• the J)J:t i n t i ff. n nd, d u ring­
t he 11rogrl'ss of t he work, furni shed t he lrnn 
wnrk : tml sl'llt it t o l ll<' pla i n t i f .  a nd sent a 
ma n to !IC'l p  ! h t' pl a i n ! i fl' In li t t l n� t br irnu 
lo t h«' w:igon, :1111l ho11;."hl n t i l t  a nti s!'nt I t  
t o  t lw p l:t i nt iff t o  he pu t on the W!l;!Oll I t  
\\':IS l nsbl!•(l .  on t lwsc fads, t ltn l t lw dt•fpml­
nnt h:td e..X<' rdsl'< l snc-h a do11 1 J 1 1 ln1 1  O'l'«'l' t ht• 
c;fl11<ls ::<olcl as :1 1 1 101 1n ! c'< I  to a n  n1·1·l'pU1 nc •t• 
'l'lto c·nnrt. 1wr 'l'l 1 1 1 l n l ,  C . . T . ,  lwl1l  t ha t Ow 
pla I nt l ll' hr11l  h1't'll rl:.rhtly 11011-.u l t  < 'I I ,  h1'<'lH1St' 
t ill' :tl ' I S  or 1 111' d1·fl'lld:t 1 1 t  h:td 1111t  hPt'll l l nllC' 
aft Pl' t h 1• wn�on w:ts lln lsht•d n m l  enpnhl!' of 
rlPlh«· r-.1-, hut 111<'1'1'1,\· wh l l!' I t  \\ :ls In prngn�s. 
Hn t h n t  II st ill l'Pl l l : t l twd In t h P pl:t l nt l lf's l ll l 'd 
for f11 rl h1•r  wort\ 1111 t f l  I t  W!ll't l 1 1 1 li·ll 1P<l .  'l'lw 
< 'ottrl  n d d t'll : " I f  t h l' \\ : tJ.:<1 1 1  h:Hl l l!'<'tl <.'Olll 
pll'l <'<I 11 11<1 r<•:11Jy for d1•lh <'l'Y nnd I hi' 11 ... 
r<'nd n n t  h a d  t 1 11 • 1 1  s<"nt n work ma n of h is own 
In 111•rfon11  :1 11r : t rld i l tn11:1 I wo rl\ upon l l,  s11d1 
Oru l'a l  from 
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conduct on the part of the defendant might
have amounted to an acceptance." See also
Benj. Sales, e. 4, and cases cited.
The plaintiffs, in the case at bar, rely much
upon the decision in Jlorton v. Tibbett, 15
Ad. & El. (N. S.) 428. They maintain that
this case clearly establishes that there may
be an acceptance and receipt of goods by a
purchaser, within the statute of frauds, al-
though he has had no opiMrtunity of exam-
ining them, and although he has done noth-
ing to preclude himself from objecting tliat
they do not correspond with the contract.
The expressions in Morton v. Tibbett are
not to be pressed any further than the facts
of the case require. The buyer of wheat by
sample had sent a carrier to a place named
in a verbal contract between him and the
seller on August 25. The wheat was received
on board of one of the carrier's lighters for
conveyance by canal to Wisbeach, where It
arrived on the 28th. In the mean time it
had been resold by the buyer, by the same
sample, and was returned by the second pur-
chaser because found to be of short weight.
The defendant then wrote to the plaintiff on
the 30th, also rejecting it for short weight.
An action was brought for goods bargained
and sold. There was a verdict for plaintiff,
with leave to move for a nonsuit. The ques-
tion for the appellate court was, whether
there was any evidence that the defendant
had accepted and received the goods so as to
render him liable as buyer. The court held
that the acceptance under the statute was
not an act subsequent to the receipt of the
goods, but must precede, or at least be con-
temporaneous with it; and that there might
be an acceptance to satisfy the statute,
though the purchaser might on other grounds
disaffirm the contract.
Morton v. Tibbett decides no more than
this, viz., that there may be a conditional
acceptance. It is as if the purchaser had
said: "I take these goods on the supposi-
tion that they comply with the contract. I
am not bound to decide that point at this
moment. If, on examination, they do not
correspond with the sample, I shall still
return them under my common-law right,
growing out of the very nature of the con-
tract, to declare it void, because our minds
never met on its subject-matter — non in haec
foedera veni." It is not necessary to decide
whether this distinction is sound. It is
enough to say that It is Intelligible. The
case, in no respect, decides that there can be
an acceptance under the statute of frauds
without a clear and distinct intent, or that
unfinished articles can be presumed to be
accepted before they are finished. The act
of acceptance was clear and unequivocal.
There was a distinct case of Intermeddling
with the goods in the exercise of an act of
ownership — a fact entirely wanting in the
case at bar. The proof of acceptance was the
act of resale before examination. The point
of the decision is, that this was such an ex-
ercise of dominion over the goods as is in-
consistent with a continuance of the rights
of property in the vendor, and therefore evi-
dence to justify a jui-y in finding acceptance
as well as actual receipt by the buyer.
Hunt V. Hecht, 8 Exch. 814.
Even when interpreted in this way, Mor-
ton V. Tibbett cannot be reg.arded as abso-
lutely settled law in England. See Coombs
V. Bristol & Exeter Ry. Co., 3 H. & N. 510;
Castle V. Sworder, 6 H. & N. 828. The
court of queen's bench recognizes it, while
the court of exchequer has not received it
with favor. Later cases distinctly hold that
the acceptance must take place after an op-
portunity by the vendee to exercise an op-
tion, or after the doing of some act waiving
it. Bramwell, B., said in Coombs v. Bristol
& Exeter Ry. Co.: "The cases establish
that there can be no acceptance where there
can be no opportunity for rejecting." All
the cases were reviewed in Smith v. Hud-
son, 6 Best & Smith, 431 (A. D. 18G5), where
Hunt V. Hecht was approved. The two
last cited cases disclose a principle applica-
ble to the case at bar.
In Hunt V. Hecht the defendant went to
the plaintiff's warehouse and there inspect-
ed a heap of ox bones, mixed with others
inferior in quality. The defendant verbally
agreed to pvirchase those of the better quali-
ty, which were to be separated from the
rest, and ordered them to be sent to his
wharfinger. The bags were received on the
9th, and examined next day by the defend-
ant, and he at once refused to accept them.
There was held to be no acceptance. The
case was put upon the ground that no ac-
ceptance was possible till after separation,
and there was no pretense of an acceptance
after that time. Martin, B., said that an ac-
ceptance, to satisfy the statute, must be
something more than a mere receipt. It
means some act done after the vendee has
exercised or had the means of exercising
his right of rejection.
In Smith v. Hudson, supra, barley was
sold on November 3, 1SG3, by sample, by
an oral contract. On the 7th it was taken
by the seller to a railway station, where he
had delivered grain to the purchaser on
several prior dealings, and where it was
his custom to receive it from other sellers.
The barley was left at the freight-house of
the railway, consigned to the order of the
purchaser. It was the custom of the trade
for the buyer to compare the sample with
the bulk as delivered, and if the examination
was not satisfactory, to reject it. This right
continued in the present case, notwithstand-
ing the delivery of the grain to the railway
company. On the 9th the purchaser became
bankrupt, and on the 11th the seller notified
the station-master not to deliver the barley
to the purchaser or his assignees. The court
held that there was no acceptance sufficient
to satisfy the statute. The most that could
be said was, that the delivery to the com-
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conduct on the p:ut oC t he defendant might 
have amounted to an acceptance." See also 
Benj. Sales, c. 4, and cases cited. 
The plaintiffs, in the case at bar, rely much 
upon the decision in Morton v. Tibbett, 15 
Ad. & El. (N. S.) 428. They maintain that 
this case clearly establishes that there may 
be an acceptance and receipt of goods by a 
purchaser, within the statute of frauds, al­
though he has had no opportunity of exam­
ining them, and although he bas done noth­
ing to preclude himself from objecting that 
they do not correspond with the contract. 
The expressions in l\lorton v. Tibbett are 
not to be pressed any further than the facts 
of the case require. The buyer of wheat by 
sample had sent a carrier to a place named 
in a verbal contract between him and the 
seller on August 23. The wheat was received 
on board of one of the carrier's lighters for 
conveyance by canal to Wisbeach, where it 
arrived on the 28th. In the mean time it  
had been resold by the buyer, by the same 
sample, and was returned by the second pur­
chaser because found to be of short weight. 
The defendant then wrote to the plaintiff on 
the 30th, also rejecting it for short weight. 
An action was brought for goods bargained 
and sold. There was a verdict for plaintiff, 
with leave to move for a nonsuit. The ques­
tion for the appellate court was, whether 
there was any evidence that the defendant 
had accepted and received the goods so as to 
render him liable as buyer. The court held 
that the acceptance under the statute was 
not an act subsequent to the receipt of the 
goods, but must precede, or at least be con­
temporaneous with it; and that there might 
be an acceptance to satisfy the statute, 
though the purchaser might on other grounds 
disaffirm the contract. 
Morton v. Tibbett decides no more than 
this, viz.,· that there may be a conditional 
acceptance. It is as if the purchaser had 
said: "I take these goods on the supposi­
tion that they comply with the contract. I 
am not bound to decide that point at this 
moment. If, on examination, they ao not 
correspond with the sample, I shall still 
return them under my common-law right, 
growing out of the very nature of the con­
tract, to declare it void, because our m inds 
never met on its subject-matter-non in baec 
foedera veni." It is not necessary to decide 
whether this distinction is sound. It is 
enough to say that it is intelligible. The 
case, in no respect, decides that there can be 
an acceptance under the statute of frauds 
without a clear and di tinct intent, or that 
unfinished articles can be presumed to be 
accepted before t hey are finished. The act 
of acceptance was clear and unequivocal. 
There was a distinct case of intermeddling 
with the goods in the exercise of an act of 
ownershi)}-a fact entirely wanting in the 
case at bar. The proof of acceptance vrns the 
act of resale before examination. The point 
of the decision is, that this was such au ex-
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crcise o f  domin ion over the goods as i s  in­
consistent with a continuance of the rigllts 
of property in the vendor, and therefore evi­
dence to justify a j ury i n  finding acceptance 
as well as actual receipt by the buyer. 
IIunt v. Hecht, 8 Exch. 814. 
Even when interpreted in this way, Mor­
ton v. Tibbctt cannot be regarded as ahf'o­
lutely settled law in England. See Coombs 
v. Bristol & Exeter Ry. Co., 3 H. & N. GlO; 
Castle v. Sworder, 6 H. & 'N. 828. Th<' 
court of queen's bench recognizes it, while 
the court of exchequer has not received it 
with favor. Later cases distinctly bold that 
the acceptance must take place after an op­
portunity by the vendee to exercise an op­
tion, or after the doing of some act waiving 
it. Bramwell, B., said in Coombs v. Bri::;tol 
& Exeter Ry. Co. : "The cases establish 
tllat there can be no acceptance where there 
can be no opportunity for rejecting." All 
the cases were reviewed in Smith v. Hud­
son, 6 Best & Smith, 431 (A. D. 18G5), where 
Hunt v. Hecht was approved. The two 
last cited cases disclose a principle applica­
ble to the case at bar. 
In Hunt v. Hecht the defendant went to 
the plaintiff's warehouse and there inspect­
ed a heap of ox bones, mixed with others 
inferior in quality. The defendant verbally 
agreed to purchase those of the better quali­
ty, wllich were to be separated from the 
rest, and ordered them to be sent to his 
wllarfinger. The bags were received on the 
9th, and examined next day by the defend­
ant, and be at once refused to accept them. 
There was held to be no acceptance. The 
case was put upon the ground that no a.c­
.ceptance was possible till after separation, 
and there was no pretense of an acceptance 
after that time. l\Iartin, B., said that an ac­
ceptance, to satisfy the statute, must be 
something more than a mere receipt. It 
means some act done after the vendee has 
exercised or had the means of exercising 
his right of rejection. 
In Smith v. Hudson, supra, barley was 
sold on November 3, 18G3, by sample, by 
an oral contra.ct. On the 7th it was tal;:eu 
by the seller to a rail way station, where he 
had delivered grain to the purchaser on 
several prior dealings, and where it was 
bis custom to receive it from other sellers. 
The barley was left at the freight-house of 
the railway, consigned to the order of the 
purchaser. It was the custom of the trade 
for the buyer to compare the sample with 
the bulk as delivered, and if the examination 
was not satisfactory, to reject it. This rigllr 
continued in the present case, notwitbstaml­
ing the delivery of the gra in to the railway 
company. On the 9th the purchaser beca me 
bankrupt, and on the 11th the seller notifie11 
the station-master not to deliver the barle�· 
to the purchaser or bis ai;;signees. The court 
held that there was no acceptance sufficient 
to satisfy the statute. The most that couhl 
be said was, that the deli\  ery to the L'tllll-
J ,  o � J 11'CJ1 f, '" I 
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pany, considered as an agent of the buyer,
was a receipt. It could not be claimed that
it was an acceptance, the carrier having no
implied authority to accept. The buyer had
a right to see whether the built was accord-
ing to the sample, and until he had exercis-
ed that right there was no acceptance. Opin-
ion of Cocliburn. Ch. J., 446; see, also. Caul-
kins V. Hellman, 47 N. Y. 449; Ualterliue v.
Kice, 02 Barb. 593; Edwards v. Grand Trunk
Ry. Co., 48 ile. 379, 54 ile. 111.
The case at bar only differs from these
cases in the immaterial fact that the defend-
ants, after the verbal contract was made,
gave verbal directions as to the disposition
which should be made of the goods after
they were put into a condition ready for
delivery. All that subsequently passed be-
tween them was mere words, and had not
ihe slightest tendency to show a waiver of
the right to examine the goods to see if they
corresponded with the contract. Whatever
effect these words might have had iu indicat-
ing an acceptance, if the goods had been spe-
cific and ascertained at the time of the di-
rections (see Cusack v. Robinson, 1 Best &
S. 299), they were without significance under
the circumstances, as the meeting of the
minds of the parties upon the subject to be
settled was necessary. Shepherd v. I'ressey,
32 N. H. 57. In this case the effect of subse-
quent engagements by the buyer was passed
upon as to their tendency to show a receipt
of the goods by him. The court said: "As
mere words constituting a part of the origi-
nal contract do not constitute an acceptance,
so we are of opinion that mere words after
words used, looking to the future, to acts
afterward done by the buyer toward carry-
ing out the contract, do not constitute an
acceptance or prove the actual receipt re-
quired by the statute." The case was sti-on-
ger than that under discussion, as the goods
were specific and fully set apart for the pur-
chaser at the time of the subsequent con-
versations. No distinction is perceived be-
tween future acts to be done by the buyer
and by the seller, as both equally derive
their force from the buyer's assent.
I see no reason in the case at bar to hold
that the defendants received the goods, in-
dependent of the matter of acceptance.
There was no evidence that Percival became
their agent for this purpose. The most that
can be said is that they promised the plain-
tiffs that they would make Percival their
agent. This promise being oral and connect-
ed with the sale, is not binding. They did
not in fact communicate with him, nor did
he assume any dominion or control over the
property. The promissory representations of
the ijlaiutiffs are clearly within the rule in
Shepherd v. Pressey, supra.
The whole case falls within the doctrine
in Shindler v. Houston, 1 N. Y. 2(51, there
being no sufficient act of the parties amount-
ing to transfer of the possession of the lum-
ber to the buyer and acceptance by him.
The judgment of the court below should be
affirmed.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.
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pany, considered as an a�cnt of the bu�·er. 
'\\as a receipt. It coul1l  not l>e daimed that 
i t  '\\as a n  ac;;eptance. the 1·arrier baYi D "  no 
implied authority to accept. The buyer b:1.1l 
a rigbt to see whether tbe bulk was an:onl­
in!! to the ample, and until be bad exercis­
ell that right there was no acceptance. Upin­
i' n of Cockburn. Cb. J., -Hu; ee. al o, Caul­
kin '\". Hellman, 47 X. Y. 449; lla lterline 'I". 
!:ice. u'.! Darb. 593 ; Edward 'I". Grand Trunk 
Tiy. Co . 4 :\Ie. 379, 54 :\le. 111. 
The ea,e at bar only differs from these 
case · in tl.Je iwwalerial fact that the defend­
ants. after the Yerbal contract wa matle, 
gaye Yerlwl directions as to the disposition 
which bould be made of the goods after 
they were put into a condition ready for 
dcli>ery. All that ubsequently pas ·etl be· 
tween them '\\as mere word , and bad not 
the slig-htest tendency to show a wah·er of 
the right to examine the goods to see if they 
corresponded 'llitb the contract. 'YbateYer 
effect tbe·e words might ba,-e bad in indicat­
ing an accepta nce, if the goods bad been spc­
dtk and ascertained. at the time of the di­
rections (see Cusack v. Robinson, 1 Best & 
' . 209). they were without ignificauce under 
the eil·cum tances, as the meeting of the 
111in1ls or the parties upon the subject to be 
settled wa necessary. "hep berd v. Pres cy, 
:J� X. H. 37. In this ca ·e the effect or su ll::,t:­
quent engagement by the buyer was passed 
upon a to their tendency to show a receipt 
of the goods by him. The court sa id : ".\.s 
were words constituting a part of the origi­
nal contract do not constitute an acceptance, 
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o we are o f  opinion that mere word after 
word used, looking to the future. to acts 
afterward done by the buyer toward carry­
ing out the contract, do not con ·titutc an 
acceptance or prove the actual receipt re­
quired by the statute." The case was stron· 
ger than that under discu sion, a the goods 
were pecific and fully set apart for the pur­
cha er at the time o f  the subsequent con­
Yer ·ation . ?\'o di t i nction is perceived be­
tween future acts to be done by the buyer 
and by the seller, as both equally derive 
their force from the buyer's assent. 
I see no rea on in the ca e at bar to hold 
that the defendants recei>ed the goods, in­
dependent of the matter of acceptance. 
There was no evidence that Perci>al became 
their agent for this pu rpose. Tbe most that 
can be said is that they promi ed the plain­
tiffs that they would make rerciYal their 
agent. This promise being oral and connect­
ed with the sale, is not binding. They did 
not in fact communicate with him, nor did 
be a ·ume any dominion or control over the 
property. The promissory representations of 
the plaintiffs are clea r!�· within tlie rule in 
Shepherd v. Pressey, supra. 
The whole ca e fall within the doctrine 
in Shindler v. Hou ton, 1 N. Y. 261, there 
being no sufficient act of the parties amount­
ing to transfer of the possession of the lum­
ber to the buyer and acceptance by him. 
'l'he j udgment of the court below should be 
affirmed. 
All concur. 
Judgment affirmed. 
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GODDARD V. BINNEY.
(115 Mass. 450.)
Supreme .Tudicial Court of Massachusetts. Suf-
folk. Sept. 4, 1874.
Contract to recover tbe price of a buggy
built by plaiutifC for defendant. Plaintiff
agreed to build a buggy for defendant, and
to deliver it at a certain time. Defendant
gave special dire<_'tions as to style and finish.
The buggy was built according to directions.
Before it was finished, defendant called to
see it, and in answer to plaintiff, who asked
him if he would sell it. said no; that he
would keep it. When the buggy was fin-
isliod, plaintiff sent a bill for it, which de-
fendant retained, promising to see plaintiff
in regard to it. The buggy was afterwards
burned in plaintiff's possession. The case
was reported to the supreme judicial court.
C. A. Welch, for plaintiff. G. Putnam,
.Tr., for defendant.
AMES, J. Whether an agreement like that
described in this report should be considered
as a contract for the sale of goods, within
the meaning of the statute of frauds, or a
contract for labor, services and materials,
and therefore not within that .statute, is a
(piestion upon which there is a conflict of au-
thority. According to a long course of de-
cisions in New York, and in some other states
of the Union, an agreement for the sale of
any commodity not in existence at the time,
but which the vendor is to manufacture or
put in a condition to be delivered (such as
Hour from wheat not yet ground, or nails to
be made from iron in the vendor's hands),
is not a contract of sale within the meaning
of the statute. Crookshank v. Burrell, IS
Johns. 58; Sewall v. Fitch, 8 Cow. 215; Rob-
ertson V. Vaughn, 5 Sandf. 1; Downs v. Ross,
•-'3 Wend. 270; Eichelberger v. M'Cauley, 5
Har. & J. 21.3. In England, on the other
hand, the tendency of the recent decisions
is to treat all contracts of such a kind in-
tended to result in a sale, as substantially
ciintracts for the sale of chattels; and the
decision in Lee v. Griffin, 1 B. & S. 272, goes
so far as to hold that a contract to make
and fit a set of artificial teeth for a patient
is essentially a contract for the sale of goods,
and therefore is subject to the provisions of
the statute. See Maberley v. Sheppard. 10
Bing. 99; Howe v. Palmer, 3 B. & Aid. 321;
Baldoy V. Parker. 2 B. & C. 37; Atkinson v.
Bell, 8 B. & C. 277.
In this commonwealth, a rule avoiding
both of these extremes was established in
Mixer v. Howarth, 21 Pick. 205, and has been
recognized and affirmed in repeated decisions
of more recent date. The effect of these
decisions we undex-stand to be this, namely,
that a contract for the sale of articles then
existing or such as the vendor in the ordinary
course of his business manufactures or pro-
cures for the general market, whether on
hand at the time or not, is a contract for the
sale of goods, to which the st;itute applies.
But on the other hand, if the goods are to be
manufactured especially for the purchaser,
and upon his special order, and not for the
general market, the case is not within the
statute. Spencer v. Cone, 1 Met. 283. "The
distinction," says Chief Justice Shaw, in
Lamb v. Crafts, 12 Met. 353, "we believe is
now well understood. When a person stip
ulates for the future sale of articles, which
he is habitually making, and which, at the
time, are not made or finished, it is essential-
ly a contract of sale, and not a contract for
labor; otherwise, when the article is made
pursuant to the agreement." In Gardner v.
Joy, 9 Met. 177, a contract to buy a certain
number of boxes of candles at a fixed rate
per pound, which the vendor said he would
manufacture and deliver In about three
months, was held to be a contract of sale
and within the statute. To the same general
effect are Waterman v. Meigs, 4 Cush. 497,
and Clark v. Nichols, 107 Mass. 547. It is
true that in "the infinitely various shades of
different conti'acts," there is some practical
difficulty in disposing of the questions that
arise under that section of the statute. Gen.
St. c. 105, § 5. But we see no gi-ound for
holding that there is any uncertainty in the
rule itself. On the contrary, its coirectness
and justice are clearly implied or expressly
affirmed in all of our decisions upon the sub-
ject matter. It is proper to say also that
the present case is a much stronger one than
Mixer v. Howarth. In this case, the car-
riage was not only built for the defendant,
but in conformity in some respects with his
directions, and at his request was marked
with his initials. It was neither Intended
nor adapted for the general market. As we
are by no means prepared to overrule the
decision in that case, we must therefore hold
that the statute of frauds does not apply to
the contract which the plaintiff is seeking
to enforce in this action.
Independently of that statute, and in cases
to which it does not apply, it is well settled
that as between the immediate parties, prop-
ei'ty in personal chattels may pass by bargain
and sale without actual delivery. If the par-
ties have agreed upon the specific thing that
is sold and the price that the buyer is to pay
for it, and nothing remains to be done but
that the buyer should pay the price and take
the same thing, the property passes to the
buyer, and with it the risk of loss by fire or
any other accident. The appropriation of the
chattel to the buyer is equivalent, for that
purpose, to delivery by the seller. The as-
sent of the buyer to take the specific chattel
is equivalent for the same pui-pose to his
acceptance of possession. Dixon v. Yates,
5 B. & Ad. 313, 340. The property may well
be in the bujer. though the right of pos-
session, or lien for the price, is in the seller.
There could in fact be no such lien without
a change of ownership. No man can be
said to liave a lien, in the proper sense of the
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GODDARD v. B CN;\'EY. 
(115 Mass . 450.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of M as�::icbusetts. Suf­
folk. Sept. 4, 1874. 
Contract to recover tbe price of a buggy 
built by plaintiff for defendant. Plaintiff 
agreed to build a buggy for defendant, and 
to deliver it at a certnin time. Defendant 
gave special dirn<!tions as to style and finish. 
The buggy was built according to directions. 
Before it was fin isbed, defendnnt called to 
see it, and in answer to plaintiff, who asked 
bim if be would sell it. said no ; that be 
would keep it .  When the buggy was fin­
ished, plaintiff sent a bill for it, which de­
fendant retained, promising to see plaintiff 
in regard to it. The buggy was afterwards 
burned in plaintiff's possession. The case 
"·as reported to the supreme judicial court. 
C. A. Welch, for plaintiff. G. Putnam, 
Jr., for defendant. 
AMES, J.  Whether an agreement l ike that 
described in this report should be considered 
a::> a contract for the sale of goods, within 
the meaning of the statute of frauds, or a 
contract for labor, services and materials, 
and therefore not within that statute, is a 
question upon which there is a conflict of au­
thority. According to a long course of de· 
cisions in New York, and in some other states 
of the Union, an a greement for the sale of 
any commodity not in existence at the time, 
but which the vendor is to manufacture or 
put in a condition to be delivered (such as 
flour from wheat not yet ground, or nails to 
be made from iron in the vendor's bands). 
is not a contract of sale within the meaning 
of the statute. Crookshank v. Burrell ,  18 
.Johns. 58; Sewall v. Fitch, 8 Cow. 215; Rob· 
ert on v.  Vaughn, 5 Sandf. 1; Downs v. Ross, 
:.?3 Wend. 270; Eichelberger v. :r.I'Cauley, 5 
Har. & J. 213. In England, on the other 
band, the tendency of the recent decisions 
is to treat all contracts of such a kind in­
tended to result in a sale, as substantially 
contracts for the sale of chattel s ;  and the 
decision in Lee v. Griffin, 1 B. & S. 272, goes 
so far as to hold that a contract to make 
and fit a set of artificial teeth for a patient 
is essentially a contract for the sale of goods. 
and therefore is subject to the provbions of 
the statute. See i.\laberley v. Sheppard. 10 
Bing. 99 ; Howe v. Palmer, 3 B.  & Ald. 321 ; 
Baldey v. Parker, 2 B. & C. 37 ; Atkinson v. 
Bell, 8 B. & C. 277. 
In this commonwealth, a rule a•oiding 
both of these extremes was established in 
i.\li.xer v. Howarth, 21 Pick. 205, and bas been 
recognized and affirmed in repeated decisions 
of more recent date. The effect of these 
decisions we understand to be this, namely, 
that a contract for the sale of articles then 
existing or such as the vendor in the ordinary 
cour-e of bis bu iuess manufactures or pro­
cures for the general market, TI·hetber on 
band at the time or not, is a contract for the 
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sale of g-oods, to which the 8laln1e appli<'s. 
But on the other hand, if the goous are to b� 
manufactured espe<:ially for the purcha�u. 
and upon his special orcler, and not for the 
general marlrnt, the case is not within the 
statute. Spencer v. Cone, 1 Met. 283. "The 
disUnction," says Chief .JustiC'e Shaw, in 
Lamb v. Crafts, 12 Met. 353, "we believe is 
now well understood. ·when a person :stip 
ulates for the future sale of articles, which 
he is habitually making, and which, at the 
ti me, are not made or fin ished, it is ess<>n tial­
ly a contract of sale, and not a cont ntc·t for 
labor; otherwise, when the article is maue 
pursuant to the agreement." In Garoner v. 
Joy, 9 Met. 177, a contract to buy a certain 
number of boxes of candles at a fixed rate 
per pound, which the vendor said be would 
manufacture and deliver in about three 
months, was held to be a contract of sale 
and within the statute. To the same general 
effect are Waterman v. i.\leigs, 4 Cush. 497, 
and Clark v. Nichols, 107 i.\lass. G47. It is 
true that in "the infinitely various shacles of 
different contracts," there is some practical 
difficulty in disposing of the questions that 
arise under that section of the statute. Gen. 
St. c. 105, § 5. But we see no ground for 
holding that there is any uncertainty in the 
rule itself. On the contrary, its correctness 
and justice are clearly implied or expressly 
affirmed in all of our decisions upon the sub­
ject matter. It is proper to say also that 
the present case is  a much stronger one than 
i.\lixer v. Howarth. In this case, the car­
riage was not only built for the defendant, 
but in conformity in some respects with his 
directions, and at bis request was marked 
with bis initials. It was neither intenclecl 
nor adapted for the general market. As we 
are by no means prepared to overrule the 
decision in that case, we roust therefore holu 
that the statute of frauds does not apply to 
the contract which the plaintiff is seeking 
to enforce in this action. 
Independently of that statute, and in cases 
to '"hich it does not apply, it is well settled 
that as !Jetween the immediate parties, prop­
erty in personal chattels may pass by bargain 
and sale without actual delivery. If the par­
ties have agreed upon the specific thing that 
is sold and the price that the buyer is to pay 
for it, and nothing remains to be done but 
that the buyer should pay the price and take 
the same thing, the property passes to the 
buyer, and with it the risk of loss by fire or 
any other accident. The appropriation of the 
chattel to the buyer is equivalent, for that 
purpose, to delivery by the seller. The as­
sent of the buyer to take the specific chattel 
is equivalent for the same purpose to bi 
acceptance of possession. Dixon v. Yates. 
5 B. & Ad. 313, 340. The property may well 
be in the buyer, though the right of pos· 
session, or lien for the price, is in the seller. 
There could in fact be no such lien without 
a change of ownei"'hip. Xo man can be 
said to ha •e a l ien, in the proper sense of the 
J r  ::i r f r· 
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term, upon his o-wn property, and the seller's
lien can only be upon tlae buyer's property.
It has often been decided that assumpsit for
the price of goods bargained and sold can be
maintained where the goods have been se-
lected by the buyer, and set apart for him by
the seller, though not actually delivered to
him, and where nothing remains to be done
except that the buyer should pay the agreed
price. In such a state of things the property
vests in him, and with it tbe risk of any ac-
cident that may happen to the goods in the
meantime. Noy's Maxims, S9; 2 Kent, Com.
(12th Ed.) 492; Bloxam v. Sanders, 4 B. &
C. 941; Tarling v. Baxter, 6 B. & C. 3G0;
Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East, 571; Macom-
ber V. Parker, 13 Pick. 175, 1S3; Morse v.
Sherman, IOC Mass. 430.
In the present case, nothing remained to
be done on the part of the plaintiff. The
price had been agreed upon; the specific
chattel had been finished according to order,
set apart and appropriated for the defend-
ant, and marked with his initials. The plain-
tiff had not undertaken to deliver it else-
where than on his own premises. He gave
notice that it was finished, and presented
his bill to the defendant, who promised to
pay it soon. He had previously requested
that the carriage should not be sold, a re-
quest which substantially is equivalent to
asking the plaintiff to keep it for him when
finished. Without contending that these cir-
cumstances amount to a delivery and accept-
ance within the statute of frauds, the plain-
tiff may well cl.ijm that enough has been
done, in a case not within that statute, to
vest the general ownership in the defend-
ant, and to cast upon him the risk of loss
by fire, while the chattel remained in the
plaintiff's possession.
According to the terms of the reservation,
the verdict must be set aside, and judgment
entered for the plaintiff.
COLT and ENDICOTT, JJ., absent
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term, upon his own property, and the seller's 
lien can only be upon the buyer's property. 
It bas often been decided that assumpsit for 
the price of goods bargained and sold can be 
maintained where the goods have been se­
lected by the buyer, and set apart for him by 
the seller, though not actually delivered to 
him, and where nothing remains to be done 
except that the buyer should pay the agreed 
price. In such a state of things the property 
vests in him, and with it the risk of any ac­
cident that may happen to the goods in the 
meantime. Noy's Maxims. S9; 2 Kent, Com. 
(12th Ed.) 492; Bloxam v. Sanders, 4 B. & 
C. 941 ;  Tarling v. Baxter, 6 B. & C. 360; 
Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East, 571 ; Macom­
ber v. Parker, 13 Pick. 175, 183 ; l\Iorse v. 
Sherman, 106 l\Iass. 430. 
In the pre ent case, nothing remained to 
be done on the part of the plaintiff. The 
price bad been agreed upon; the specific 
chattel bad been finished according to order, 
set apart and appropriated for the defend-
D i g 1t1zect by 
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ant, and marked with bis Initials. The plain­
tiff bad not undertaken to deliver it else­
where than on his own premises. He gave 
notice that it was finished, and presented 
bis bill to the defendant, who promi ed to 
pay it soon. He bad previously requested 
that the carriage should not be sold, a re­
quest which sub tantially i s  equivalent to 
asking the plaintiff' to keep i t  for him when 
finished. ·without contending that these cil"­
cumstances amount to a delivery and accept­
ance within the statute of frauds, the plain­
tiff may well claim that enough bas been 
done, in a case not within that statutE', to 
ve t the general ownership in the defend­
ant, and to cast upon him the risk of los· 
by tire, while the chattel remained in the 
plaintiff's possession. 
According to the terms of the re ervation, 
the verdict must be set aside, and judgment 
entered for the plaintiff. 
COLT and ENDICO'.IT, JJ., absent. 
Or1 g 1 �al  fro m  
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HUMBLE V. MITCHELL.
(11 Adol. & B. 205.)
Queen's Bench, Mi<'h,aclma8 Vacation. Nov.
27, 183U.
Assumpsit by the purcliaser of shares in a
joint-stock company, called the Northern and
Central Bank of England, against the vendor
for refusing to sign a notice of transfer ten-
dered to him for signature, and to deliver
the certificates of the shares, without which
the shares could not be transferred.
Pleas. 1. That the contract mentioned in
the declaration was an entire contract for
the sale of goods, wares, and merchandises,
for a price exceeding £10, and th,at plaintiff
liad not accepted or received the said goods,
&c., or any part thereof, and did not give any
thing in earnest to bind the bargain or in
part payment, and that no note or memoran-
dum in writing of the bargain was made and
signed by defendant or his agent thereunto
lawfully authorized. Verification.
2. That the contract was a contract for the
sale of, and relating to an interest in and
concerning lands, tenements, and heredita-
ments of and belonging to the said company,
and that there was not in respect of, or re-
lating to, the said contract, an agreement or
any memorandum or note thereof In writing
signed by defendant, or by any other person
thereunto by him lawfully authorized accord-
ing to the form of the statute etc. Verifica-
tion.
Replication: to the first plea, denying that
the contract was for the sale of goods, wares,
etc.: to the second, denying that it was for
the sale of an interest in lands etc. Issues
thereon.
At the trial of the cause before Coleridge,
J., at the Liverpool spring assizes, 1838, it
was proved that the company was in posses-
sion of real estate; but no title deeds to the
estate were produced; nor was it shewn what
GRIF. PERS. PROP. — 7
was the nature of the property belonging to
the company, or the extent of their Interest
therein. The Juiy found a verdict for the
plaintiff on both issues, subject to a motion
to enter a verdict for the defendant. In th«
following Easter term Alexander obtained a
rule nisi according to the leave reserved, cit-
ing, on the first plea. Ex parte Vallance, 2
Deac. 354, and, on the second plea, Ex parte
The Vauxhall Bridge Company, 1 Glyn. & J.
101, and Ex parte Home, 7 Bam. & C. 632.
Cresswell and Crompton now shewed cause.
Mr. Alexander, contra.
Lord DENMAN, C. J. With respect to the
question arising on the second plea, we have
already disposed of it. The other point is
whether the shares in this company are
goods, wares, or merchandises, within the
meaning of § 17 of the statute of frauds. It
appears that no case has been found directly
in point; but it is contended that the de-
cisions uijon reputed ownership are applica-
ble, and that there is no material distinction
between the words used in the statute of
frauds, and in the bankrupt act. I think
that both the language and the intention of
the two acts are distinguishable, and that
the decisions upon the latter act cannot be
reasonably extended to the statute of frauds.
Shares in a joint-stock company like this are
mere choses in action, incapable of deliveiy,
and not within the scope of the 17th section.
A contract in writing was therefore unneces-
sary.
PATTESON, WILLIAMS, and COLE-
RIDGE, JJ., concurred.
Rule discharged.
A question also arose as to the proper mode
of estimating the damages in this action; but
on this point the parties eventually agreed.
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HUl\IBLE v. M ITCHELL. 
(11 Ado!. & ID. 20:3.) 
Queen's Bench, l\lic·hnclmas Vacation. Nov. 
27, 1839. 
Assumpsit by the purchaser of shares in a 
joint-stock company, called the Northern and 
Central Bank of England, against the vendor 
for refusing to sign a notice of transfer ten­
dered to him for signature, and to deliver 
the certificates of the shares, without which 
the shares could not be transferret1. 
Pleas. 1. That the contract mentioned in 
the declaration was an entire contract for 
the sale of goods, wares. and merchandises, 
for a price exceeding £10, and that plaintiff 
bad not accepted or received tbe said goods, 
&c., or any part thereof, and did not give any 
thing in earnest to bind the bargain or in 
part payment, and that no note or ruemoran­
tfum in writing of the bargain was made and 
signed by defendant or bis agent thereunto 
lawfully authorized. Verifieation. 
2. That the contract was a contract for the 
sale of, and relating to an interest in and 
concerning lands, tenements, and beredita­
ments of and belonging to the said company, 
and that there was not in respect of, or re­
lating to, the said contract, an agreement or 
any memorandum or note thereof in writing 
signed by defendant, or by any other person 
thereunto by him lawfully authorized accord· 
ing to the form of the statute etc. Verifica­
tion. 
Replication: to the first plea, denying that 
the contract was for the sale of goods, wares, 
etc. : to the second, denying that it was for 
tbe sale of an interest in lands etc. Issues 
thereon. 
At the trial of the cause before Coleridge, 
J., at the Liverpool spring assizes, 1838, it 
was proved that the company was in posses­
sion of real estate; but no title deeds to the 
estate were produced ; nor was it shewn what 
GRIF. PERS. PROP. -7 
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was the na ture or the proverty bclunging to 
the company, or the extent of their interest 
therein. The jury found a verdict for tlw 
plaintiff on both issues, subject to a motiuu 
to enter a verdict for the defemlant. In U1t 
following Easter term Alexander obtained a 
rule nisi aceonling to the leave rci::erved, cit­
ing, on the first plea, Ex parte Vallan<"P, 2 
Deac. 354, and, on the second plea, Ex varte 
The Yauxllall B ridge Company, 1 Glyn. & ,J. 
101, and Ex parte Horne, 7 Barn. & C. G:J:!. 
Cresswell and Crompton now shewed cause. 
l\Ir. Alexander, contra. 
Lord DENMAN, C. J. With respect to the 
question :i rising on the second plea, we ha.ve 
a.lrea.dy dispo�cd of it. The other point is 
whether the shares in this company are 
goods, wares, or merchandises, wilhin the 
meaning of § 17 of the statute of frauds. It 
a.ppe:i rs that no case has been found directly 
in point; but it is contended tba.t the de­
cisions upon reputed ownership are applica­
ble, and that there is no material distiud1on 
between the words used in the statute of 
frauds, and in the bankrupt act. I think 
that both the language and the intention of 
the two acts are distinguishable, and that 
the decisions upon the latter act cannot !Je 
reasonably extended to the statute of frauds. 
8hares in a joi nt-stock company like this are 
mere choses in action, incapable of uelivery, 
and not within the scope of the 17tb seetion. 
A contract in writing was therefore unneces­
sary. 
PATTESON, WILLIAMS, and COLE­
RIDGE, JJ., concurred. 
Rule discharged. 
A question also arose as to the proper mode 
of est imating the damages in this action: but 
on this point the parties eventually agreed. 
O ri g i r3 1  from 
UNIV E R S ITY OF CALI FORNIA 
98
SALES.
TISDALE V. HARRIS.
(20 Pick. 9.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
March Term, 1838.
Assumpsit by the plaintiff, an inhabitant
of New York, against the defendant, a mer-
chant of Boston, on a contract alleged to
have been made in October. 1S35, by which
the defendant agreed to sell to the plaintiff
two hundred shares, with all the earnings
thereon, in the capital stock of the Collins
Manufacturing Company, a corporation es-
tablished in Connecticut, at §10.80 per share,
the par value being .$10 per share. The ob-
ject of the suit was to recover ?300, being
the amount of a dividend of 15 per cent on
the two hundred shares, declared on the 7th
of October. lS3o. and payable on the 15th.
At the trial, belore Shaw, C. J., Nathaniel
Curtis, junior, of the firm of Curtis & Leav-
ins, being called as a witness by the plain-
tiff to prove the contract and the breach,
the defendant objected to any parol evi-
dence of the contract, because the contract
was reduced to writing, and he produced a
memorandum as follows, dated Boston. Oct.
14, 1835, directed to the defendant and sign-
ed by Curtis & Leavins:— "Sir, When you
will furnish the certificate of 200 shares in
the Collins Manufacturing Company to Mr.
Ssmiuel T. Tisdale. of New York, we hereby
dgree to pay you for the same at lOS cents
Mer dollar or S per cent advance on the par
amount of ten dollars each." But it was
ruled, that this paper was not to be con-
sidered as the contract of the defendant to
sell, but of the plaintiff by his agents to pay;
that if the contract of the defendant to sell
was not reduced to writing, the objection to
the parol evidence could not prevail.
The witness toslificd. that at the request
of the plaintiff ho applied to the defendant
about the 10th of October, 1835, in order to
ascertain whether he would sell his shares;
that the defendant said he was disposed to
sell them at a fair price; but subsequently
the witness offered him the par value; that
the dofciidant said he would not sell at that
rate, and that he had been recently inform-
ed that there would probably be a dividend
of 10 per cent In December; that the wit-
ness took the refusal of them at $10.80- per
share, until he could hear from New York;
that having rcidved a letter from the plaln-
tirr. dated October llilli. he called on the de-
fendant and asked him whether In offering
the sharcH he Intended to Include all the
earnings, and the defendant said yes, all
that belongs io Iheni, all that they have
earned; that Hie witness road to the defend-
ant the letter of October 13th, In which the
plnlnllff says ho will take the fitock nt $10.-
80 rash, all earnings or dividends of the
company "P to the tlriK- of sale to be In-
cluded; that the defendant wrote a letter
to his iigi'Tit at Hartford, Instructing lilin to
transfer the sluircs Into the iiaine of the
plaintiff, and send the certificate to the de-
fendant, and the defendant handed the let-
ter to the witness to forward, which he did:
that the defendant said he did not know the
plaintiff, and he thought, as the shares
would be transferred, he ought to have
something to secure him, to which the wit-
ness assented, and the defendant wrote the
memorandum which the witness signed,
agreeing to pay him the money; that after
sufficient time had elapsed for an answer,
the witness called on the defendant, and at
that time both the witness and the defend-
ant had received information that a divi-
dend of 15 per cent had been declared up-
on the shares; that at subsequent inter-
views the witness demanded the certificate
of stock with an authority to receive the
dividend, and was ready thereupon to pay
the money, but the defendant declined giv-
ing the authority to receive the dividend;
that some weeks afterwards, and after this
action had been commenced, the defendant
called on the witness for the money and
threatened to sue him upon the contract
which he had given for the plaintiff, if he
did not pay it, whereupon the witness took
the certificate and paid the money, but un-
der an express declaration that it was not
to prejudice the claim of the plaintiff for the
dividend.
The question of fact was left to the jury,
whether the bargain made by the defendant
for the sale of the shares included all divi-
dends then due or growing due, with direc-
tions, if it did, to find a verdict for the plain-
tiff; otherwise to find a verdict for the de-
fendant.
A verdict vpas returned for the plaiutiiT;
which the defendant moved to set aside: 1.
Because parol evidence was admitted to add
to and vary a written contract made subse-
quently to the conversation and letters re-
ferred to; 2. Because the contract sot up
was within the statute of frauds, being a
contract for the sale of goods, wares, or
merchandi.se for the price of fifty dollars
or more, under which, at the time of action
brought, there had been no acceptance of
the same or any part thereof by the pur-
chaser, nor any earnest or part payment
made, and so was incapable of proof other-
wise than by memorandum, in writing, sign-
ed by the defendant or his agent.
SIIAW, 0. J., delivered the opinion of the
court.
S(>veral points reserved tit the trial of this
cause are now waived, and the motion made
by the defendant for a new trial Is placed
on two grounils.
First, that under the circumstances, parol
evidence was not admissible, because the con-
tract of the ])artli-s was redticed to writing,
and that such writing was the best evi-
dence. But the couit are of opinion, that the
objec-tlon Is not sustained by the fact. No
loiilract In writing was niado by the defend-
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TISDALE v .  HARRIS. 
('.?0 Pick. 9.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of :\Iassachusetts. 
Murch Term, 1838. 
Assumpsit by the plaintiff, an i nhabitant 
of Xew York, a�ainst the defendant, a mer­
chant of Boston, on a contract alleged to 
have been made in October. 1835, by which 
�be defendant agreed to sell to the plaintiff 
two hundred shares, with all the earnin�i;; 
thereon. in the capital stock of the Collins 
:\I:mufacturing Company, a corporation es­
tablished in Connecticut, at $10. 0 pe r share, 
the par value being :;;10 1rnr share. '.rhe ob­
ject of the suit was to recover .'300, being 
the am• unt of a d i v idend of 15 per cent on 
tbe two bunch-C'd shares. llecla red on the 7th 
of October. 1 S:l:'i. and payable on the l:'ith. 
At the trial, before Sba w, C. J., Nathaniel 
C'urti . junior, of the firm of Curtis & Leav­
in • .  being called as a witne s by the plain­
tifr to pron• t he contra<'t and the breach, 
t he clefen1lant objecteil to any parol e•i­
ilence of the coutrac:t. because tlle l'Olltrac:t 
was reduced to writin;.:. and he prOll uced a 
11 'morandum as follows. elated Boston. Oct. 
H. l ''G, cl i rectcc l  to the llefentlant a nd sign­
ed hy Curtis & LeaYins :-":ir, "-hen you 
will fu rnish the cPrtificate of :!OO shares in 
tbe Collins :\I:rnufacturin� Company to :\Ir. 
�:imnel T. Tisdale. of Xew York, we hereby 
· �rcr to pay you for t be same at 10 cents 
• 1er dollar 01· 8 per cent advance on the par 
an1011nt of tc>n clollars cacll." But it was 
ruled, that tbis paper was not to he con­
siilrrell as the c·nntral't of the defendant to 
s<'l l. hnt of tlle pla int i ff hy his a:;:l'nt� to pny ; 
t hat if the ('11 n t rad or thl' ckfl'mlant lo sell 
wn� 1111t l'C<hwecl to w r i t i n�. t hl' ohjection to 
t hr paro l e' icl<'nc·e c·onhl 1101 preva i l .  
Thr wit ness t l'�t i fiP <l . t h at :l t  t hC' l'l'<]UC!lt 
ot t hP pl a i n t ifC lw :1 pp li1•i l t o  the ch•fl•rnlant 
a l.rrnt t he 1 0th of Ocl<1hl'I'. 1 s:3;;, in order to 
:1 "<'<•rt n l n w lwt lwr he wou l i l �ell hi!! shares; 
t h:1 t t he dPfl'1 1 <l n 1 1 t  snlcl he was d lsposl'Cl tn 
srl l t ht>m at a fa i r prii'r; lmt suhsN)\ll'll t l y  
t lw w i t nr!'l" oft't• rr<l h i m t he par valne; thnt 
t he r1P f<'111!: 1 11t snlcl  he wo11l1l not l'C'll  n t  t h a t  
r: 1 t <', n 1 1<1 t l1 : 1t h e  h a i l  hrrn r<'<'Pn t l y  i n fnrm-
1'11 t h n t  l h pn• wo11lcl pr11h:1hly he a c l l vic lc•ncl 
1 1f  10 ) ll�r 1·r 1 1 t  111 D<'<'<' l llhPr; t hnt t hl' w i t ·  
111'!1!1 t uo!, t h <• I • fll !':a ! Of t hc•m at $ 1 0,SO J l<'I' 
flh11 rc•. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  lw <'11 1 1 !<1 h<'nr from PW )nrk ; 
t ha t  ha\' l l l J..: r"''"ln·d H l < ' l t l'l' frnm t lw pl:1 l 11 ·  
t i ff. 1l n t 1•d c 11•toh1•r 1 :1t h,  l w  r·al1N1 on t hr cl ·· 
fl'1 1 i l :1 1 1 t  n u <! n li1•1l h im whPt lwr I n  nffPrln g 
1 l ir• i;hn n·H 1 1 1• l 1 1 t r>11 1 l <'cl t 11 h l <'l11tlc a l l  t lw 
rnrn l ngs, : 1 1 1 < 1  t h •• flpfp11 < l : 1 1 1 t  snit! ) <'�. n l l  
t h u t  1 11>!0111; l o  t 1 1 1 • 1 1 1 ,  n i l  t h : r t  t he.r h:nc• 
w1 r11<'d ; t h a t  t h<> w l t 111• s n•:1< I  tu t he clPfl'JHI· 
n 1 1 t  l l ll' l • • l l<•r nC l h' t oh1• r l :l t h ,  1 11 w l 1kh 1 lw 
pl a i n t i ff  1<:rys Irr• w l l l  t n k<' t hr. Ht of'!c u t  � I ll.· 
SO r•u h, all Pll rn l ni;s nr clh l < IP111 IR ol t h <' 
<'fllll J l l l l lY l l fl t n  t hr t l 111<' o r  11n l l' t n  I H! 1 1 1· 
d11rl1•il ; t h:i t  l lw <1rr1• 1 1 c l :r n t  w n•t <' 11 !Pt t P r  
to ! t i e  n J.: ••n t 11 t l l :r rl rn n l ,  1 1 1 t nll 't l u i.:  h i m  t 1 1  
t rn n r . . .. t h e •  Hhll l'f'S In t o 11 1 1 ·  1 1n1 111• nf t h 1 •  
Di itiz ct by 
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plaint iIT, and send the certificate to the de­
fendant. and the defe>rnlant handed the let­
ter to tile witness to forwanl. which be tlhl : 
that t he defendant said he t'l itl not know t lle 
plaintiff. and he thought, as the shares 
would be transfel'l'etl, lie on!!;ht to llaYe 
somethin::: to secure him, to "IYllich the wit­
ness assented, and the defendant "Tote tile 
memorandum which tile w itness sig-ned, 
ag-reeing to pay ll im tile money ; tllat after 
sufficient time hatl elapsed for an answer, 
the witnes called on tile defendant, and at 
that time both the witness and the defend­
ant had received information that a divi­
dend of 15 per cent had been declared up­
on the sllares; tllat at subsequent inter­
•iews the witness demanded the cel'tificate 
of stock with an :rntbority to rec:eive the 
di•idend. and was ready t hereuJ)On to pay 
t he money, but tile defcrnlnnt dec l ined giv­
ing- the authority to rcceiYe t he tl i \  iClend ; 
t hat some weeks afterwards, and after t h i s  
ac:tion had been commenced. the defeudant 
called on tlle wit ness for the money aDll 
t hrea t cncd to sue him upon the contract 
" h icll he bad given for the plaintiff. if be 
<lid not pay it, whereupon t he w i t ncsi;: took 
t he cert ificate and paid the money, but nu­
der an express dedaratiou that it wa not 
to prej udice the claim of tlle plaintiff for tile 
dh idend. 
'I'he que tion of fact was Jert to the jury, 
wllether the barg-a in made by tile clefendaut 
for the sale of the shares inclndetl a ll di\· i ­
dends then d u e  o r  !!t·owin!! elm'. w i t h  direc­
tions. i C  it  did, to find a verdict for tlle plnin­
tiff;  ot herwise to find a Yerdict for t i le de­
fendnnt. 
.\. venlict wns rel urned for t he plain t i ff: 
which the defendan t  moved to set aside: 1. 
necause parol evillenc•e was admi tted to add 
to ancl Y:t rJ· a wri t ten contract made sulise­
quentl r to the conYersa tion and letters re­
fl>rre<l tn : :!. Hera nse the contract set u p  
was w i t h i n  t he statute of frnnds, bei ng- a 
ront 1·act for t he :::nle of i.:oods. wa res. or 
merl'ha ndise for th e price' of fifty dollars 
nr morr. mHlcr which, at the t i m e  or action 
hrmu:ht .  t here bad hPen no acceptance of 
t I JP  i;n me 01· any 1iar1 t hereof by tllc 1mr­
rhnsPt', nor nny l':lrrt('St or part pa) mC'nt 
1 1 1 : 1 11 <-. :incl �o w:i �  irwnpnhle or proor other­
wisl' t h n n  hy nremcir:mcl n m .  I n w ri t i ng, slgn­
e<l by t he 11\'f(•ncl a u t  or his ni.:cuL 
:" I L\ W, . . l . ,  cl<'llYC'recl t he opinion ot tbo 
f'ol lrl . 
:-;('\ 1 ' 1':11 pnln l ::: l'f'lll'J"Y l'fl a t  t h e trlol or thl!l 
rans<' : 1 1·p now w:r l Yed, : 1 1 1 < !  t i ll' mot ion mnclc 
hr t h <• rfpf(• 11 1 ! : 1  nt for a 1 11•w t ria l Is pln cecl 
nn I w11 g-ro1 1 ncl� 
!' I r. I ,  t hn t  uncl<'r t he C'l rru ntHtanc<'H, pnrol 
<'Vld1•1 11·<' wns not : r c lm lssih!P, hPrllUHC tho con-
1 rart nf t l w pn rl l<•s wns n•rlnrPcl to w r i t ing, 
1 1 11 < 1  t h: 1 l  rmf'h 11rl t l 1 1i.: wnH t h l' br1:1t evl­
d1•11"" Hnl t lw pourt a ro o r  opi nion, t ha t  t he 
nhJP1° l lnn IH nnt Hll!-ltlll rl<'rl h.\ t h r  ro rt. No 
1 •n11t rn d  I n w r l l l ni.: waH mudo hy the dcfrnd-
Ori g i r - 1  
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ant with the plaintiff, to sell those shares.
After the negotiation had resulted in an
agreement, the agent of the plaintiff, in the
name of hi.s firm, gave the defendant a mem-
orandum in writing, undertaking to pay the
money, on the performance of the defend-
ant's agreement to transfer the shares. But
it was not signed by the defendant, nor by
any person for him, nor did it purport to
e.xpress his agreement. The cotu't are there-
fore of opinion, that the defendant's agree-
ment not being reduced to writing, the parol
evidence was i-ightly admitted.
But by far the most important question in
the case arises on the objection, that the case
is within the statute of frauds. This statute,
which is copied precisely from the English
statute, is as follows. "No contract for the
sale of goods, wares, or merchandise for the
price of ten pounds ($33.33) or more, shall be
allowed to be good, except the pm-chaser shall
accept part of the goods so sold, and actually'
receive the same, or give something in ear-
nest to bind the bargain, or in part payment,
or that some note or memorandum in writing
of the said bargain be made and signed by
the parties to be charged by such contract, or
their agent thereunto lawfully authorized."
This being a contract for the sale of shares
in an incorporated company in a neighboring
state, for the price of more than ten pounds,
and no part having been delivered, and no
pm-chase-money or earnest paid, the question
is, whether it can be allowed to be good,
without a note or memorandum in writing,
signed by the party to be charged with it.
This depends upon the question, whether
such shares are goods, wares, or merchan-
dise within the true meaning of the statute.
It is somewhat remarkable that this ques-
tion, arising on the St. 29 Car. II., in the
same terms, which ours has copied, has not
been definitively settled in England. In the
case of Pickering v. Appleby, Com. Rep. 354,
the case was directly and fully argued, be-
fore the twelve judges, who were equally
divided upon it. But in several other cases
afterwards determined in chancery, the bet-
ter opinion seemed to be, that shares in in-
corporated companies were within the stat-
ute, as goods or merchandise. Mussell v.
Cooke, Finch. Prec. 533; Crull v. Dodson,
Sel. Cas. Ch. 41.
We are inclined to the opinion, that the
weight of authorities, in modern times, is,
that contracts for the sale of stocks and
shares in incorporated companies, for more
than ten pounds, are not valid, unless there
has been a note or memorandum in writing,
or earnest or part payment. 4 Wheat. 89,
note; 3 .Starkie, Ev. (4th Am. Ed.) 608.
Supposing this a new question now for the
first time calling for a construction of the
statute, the court are of opinion, that as well
by its terms as its general policy, stocks are
fairly within its operation. The words
"goods" and "merchandise," are both of very
large signification. "Bona," as used in the
civil law, Is almost as extensive as personal
property Itself, and in many respects it has
nearly as large a signification in the common
law. The word "merchandise" also, includ-
ing in general objects of traffic and com.
merce, is broad enough to include stocks or
shares in incorporated companies.
There are many cases indeed in which It
has been held in England that buying and
selling stocks did not subject a person to the
operation of the bankrupt laws, and thence
it has been argued that they cannot bo con-
sidered as merchandise, because banlu'uptcy
extends to persons using the trade of mer-
chandise. But it must be recollected that the
bankrupt acts were deemed to be highly
penal and coercive, and tended to deprive a
man in trade of all his property. But most
joint stock companies were founded on the
hypothesis at least, that most of the share-
holders took shares as an investment and
not as an object of traffic; and the construc-
tion in question only decided, that by taking
and holding such shares merely as an invest-
ment, a man should not be deemed a mer-
chant so as to subject himself to the highly
coercive process of the bankinipt laws. These
cases, therefore, do not bear much on the
general question.
The main argument relied upon, by those
who contend that shares are not within the
statute, is this: that the statute provides that
such contract shall not be good, etc., among
other things, except the purchaser shall ac-
cept part of the goods. From this it is ar-
gued, that by necessary implication the stat-
ute applies only to goods of which part may
be delivered. This seems, however, to be
rather a nan-ow and forced construction. The
provision is general, that no contract for the
sale of goods, etc. shall be allowed to be
good. The exception is, when part are de-
livered; but if part cannot be delivered, then
the exception cannot exist to take the case
out of the general prohibition. The provision
extended to a gi-eat variety of objects, and the
exception may well be construed to apply
only to such of those objects to which it is ap-
plicable, without affecting others, to which
from their nature it cannot apply.
There is nothing in the nature of stocks, or
shares in companies, which in reason or
sound policy should exempt contracts in re-
spect to them from those reasonable restric-
tions, designed by the statute to prevent
frauds in the sale of other commodities. On
the contrary, these companies have become .
so numerous, so large an amount of the prop-
erty of the community is now Invested in
them, and as the ordinary indicia of prop-
erty, arising from delivery and possession,
cannot take place, there seems to be peculiar
reason for extending the provisions of this
statute to them. As they may properly be in-
cluded uuder the term "goods," as they are
within the reason and policy of the act, the
court are of opinion, that a contract for the
sale of shares, in the absence of the other
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ant with the plaintiff, to sell those shares. 
After the negot iation had resulted in an 
agreeu1ent. the agent of the plaintiff, in the 
liame of his firm, gave the defendant a mem­
orandum in writing, undertaking to pay the 
money, on the performance of the defend­
ant's agreement to transfer the shru·es. But 
it was not signed by the defendant, nor by 
any person for him, nor did i t  purport to 
express his agreement. The court are there­
fore of opinion, that the defendant's agree­
ment not being reduced to writing, the parol 
evidence was rightly admitted. 
But by fru· the most important question in 
the case arises on the objection, that the case 
is within the statute of frauds. This statute, 
which is copied precisely from the English 
statute, is as follows. "No contract for the 
i;;ale of goods. wares, or merchandise for the 
price of ten pounds ($33.33) or more, shall be 
allowed to be good, except the purchaser shall 
accept part of the goods so sold, and actually' 
receive the same, or give something in ear­
nest to bind the bargain. or in part payment, 
or that some note or memorandum in w1iting 
of the said b1rgain be made and signed by 
the parties to be charged by such contract, or 
their agent thereunto lawfully authorized." 
This being a contract for the sale of Rhares 
in an incorporated company in a neighboring 
state, for the price of more than ten pounds, 
and no part having been delivered, and no 
purchase-money or earnest paid, the question 
is, whether it can be allowed to be good, 
without a note or memorandum in writing, 
Ria-ned by the party to be charged with it. 
This depends upon the question, whether 
such shares are goods, wares, or merchan­
dise within the true meaning of the statute. 
It is somewhat remarkable that this ques­
tion, ru·ising on the St. 29 Car. II., in the 
same terms, which ours has copied, bas not 
been definitively settled in England. In the 
case o f  Pickering v. Appleby, Com. Rep. 35-1. 
the case was directly and fully argued, be­
fore the twelve judges, who were equally 
divided upon it. But in several other cases 
afterwards determined in chancery, the bet­
ter opinion seemed to be, that shares in in­
corporated companies were within the stat­
ute, as goods or merchandise. Mussell v. 
Cooke, Finch, Pree. 533; Crull v. Dodson, 
Se!. Oas. Ch. 41. 
We are inclined to the opinion, that the 
weight of authorities, in modern times. is, 
that contracts for the sale of stocks and 
shares in incorporated companies, for more 
than ten pounds, are not valid, unless there 
has been a note or memorandum in writing, 
or earnest or part payment. 4 Wheat. 8!), 
note; 3 Starkie, Ev. (4th Am. Ed.) 608. 
Supposing this a new question now for the 
first time calling for a construction of the 
statute, the court are of opinion, that as well 
by its terms as its general policy, stocks arc 
fairly within its operation. The words 
"good " and "merchandise," are both of very 
la1·ge signification. '·Bona," as used in the 
D t 
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civil law, i s  almost as extensive as personal 
property itself, and in many respects it bas 
nearly as large a signification in the common 
law. The word "merchandise" also. inclu<l­
iug in general objects of traffic and corn 
mcrce, is broad enough to include stocks or 
shares in incorporated companies. 
There are many cases indeed in which it 
has been held m England that buying and 
selling stocks did not subject a person to the 
operation of the bankrupt laws, and thence 
it has been argued that they cannot be cou. 
sitlered as merchandise, because banlu-uptcy 
extends to persons using ti.le trade of wer. 
chandise. But it must be recollected that the 
bankmpt acts were deeme<.l to be highly 
penal and coercive, and tended to deprive a 
man in trade of all bis property. But most 
joint stock companies were founded on the 
hypothesis at least, that most of the share­
holders took shares as an investment and 
not as an object of traffic; and the construe. 
tion in question only decided, that by taking 
and holding such shares merely as an invest­
ment, a man should not be deemed a mer­
chant so as to subject himself to the highly 
coercive process of the bankn1pt laws. These 
cases, therefore, do oot bear much on the 
general question. 
'l'be main argument relied upon, by those 
who contend that shares are not within tlH' 
statute, is this: that the statute provides that 
such contract shall not be good, etc., among 
other things, except the purchaser shall ac­
cept part of the goods. From this it is ar· 
gued, that by necessary implication the stat· 
ute applies only to goods of which part may 
be delivered. This seems. however, to be 
rather a narrow and forced construction. The 
provision is general. that no contract for the 
sale of goods, etc. shall be allowed to oo 
good. The exception is, when part are de­
livered ; but if part cannot be deli>ered, then 
the exception cannot exist to take the case 
out of the general prohibition. The provisi in 
extended to a great variety of objects, and the 
exception may well be construed to apply 
only to such of those objects to which it is ap. 
plicable. without affecting others, to which 
from their nature it cannot apply. 
There is nothing in the nature of stocks, or 
shares in companies. which in reason Ol 
sound policy should exempt contracts in re. 
spect to them from those reasonable restric­
tions, designed by the statute to pre>ent 
frauds in the sale of other commodities. On 
the contrary, these companies have become 
so numerous, so large an amount of the prop­
erty of the community is now i nvested in 
them, and as the ordinary indicia of prop­
erty, arising from delivery and possession, 
cannot take place, there seems to be peculiar 
reason for extending the provisions of this 
statute to them. As they may properly be in­
cluded under the term "goods," as they aro 
within the reason and policy of the act, the 
court arc of opinion, that a contract for the 
sale of shares, in the absence of the other 
l f 
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SALES.
requisites, must be proved by some note or
memorandum in writing; and as there was
no such memorandum in writing, in the pres-
ent case, the plaintiff is not entitled to main-
tain this action. As to the argument, that
here was a part performance, by a payment
of the money on one side, and the delivery
of the certificate on the other, these acts took
place after this action was brought, and can-
not therefore be relied upon to show a cause
of action when the action was commenced.
Verdict set aside, and plaintiff nonsuit
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100 SALE ... 
requisites, must be proved by some note or 
memorandum in writing; and as there was 
no such memorandum in writing, in the pres­
ent case, the plaintifl' is not entitled to main­
tain this action. As to the argument, that 
here was a part performance, by a payment 
D 1:J 1t1z_ by 
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of the money on one side, and the delivery 
of the certificate on the other, these acts took 
place after this action was brought, and can­
not therefore be relied upon to show a cause 
of action when the action was commenced. 
Verdict set aside, and plaintifl' nonsuit. 
O ri i r ::i l  frc 1 
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BALDWIN y. WILLIAMS.
(3 Mctc. 365.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Nov. Term, ISil.
This case was tried before Wilde, J., who
made the following report of it:—
This was an action of assumpsit, and the
declaration set forth an agreement of the
plnintiff that he would bargain, sell, assign,
transfer, and set over to the defendant, and
indorse without recourse to him, the plain-
tiff, in any event, tv/o notes of hand by him
held, signed by S. J. Gardner; one dated
April 24th, 1835, for the payment of 31,.500;
the other dated May 5th, 1830, for the pay-
ment of $500; and both payable to the plain-
tiff or order on the 3d of April, 1839, with
interest from their dates. The declaration
set forth an agreement by the defendant, in
consideration of the plaintiff's agreement
aforesaid, and In payment for said Gard-
ner's said notes, to pay the plaintiff $1,000
in cash, and to give the plaintiff a post note,
made by the Lafayette Bank, for $1,000, and
also a note signed by J. B. Russell & Co. and
indorsed by D. W. Williams for $1,000.
The plaintiff at the trial proved an oral
agreement with the defendant as set forth
in the declaration, and an offer by the plain-
tiff to comply with his part of said agree-
ment, and a tender of said Gardner's said
notes, indorsed by the plaintiff without re-
course to him in any event, and a demand
upon the defendant to fulfil his part of said
agreement, and the refusal of the defendant
to do so. But the plaintiff Introduced no
evidence tending to show that any thing
passed between the parties at the time of
making the said agreement, or was given in
earnest to bind the bargain.
The judge advised a nonsuit upon this ev-
idence, because the contract was not in
writing nor proved by any note or memo-
randum in writing signed by the defend-
ant or his agent, and nothing was received
by the purchaser, nor given in earnest to
bind the bargain. A nonsuit was accord-
ingly entered, which is to stand if in the
opinion of the whole court the agreement
set forth in the declaration falls within the
statute of frauds (Rev. St. c. 74, § 4); oth-
erwise, the nonsuit to be taken off, and a
new trial granted.
Mr. Clarke, for plaintiff. S. D. Parker, for
defendant.
WILDE, J. This action is founded on an
oral contract, and the question is, whether
it is a contr.act of sale within the statute
of frauds.
The plaintiff's counsel contends in the first
place that the contract is not a contract
for the sale of the notes mentioned in the
declaration, but a mere agreement for the
exchange of them; and in the second place
that If the agreement is to be considered as
a contract of sale, yet it is not a contract
within that statute.
As to the first point, the defendant's coun-
sel contends that an agreement to exchange
notes is a mutual contract of sale. But it
is not necessary to decide this question, for
the agreement of the defendant, as alleged
in the declaration, was to pay for the plain-
tiff''s two notes $2,000 in cash, in addition
to -two other notes; and that this was a
contract of sale is, we think, very clear.
The other question is more doubtful. But
the better opinion seems to us to be, that
this Is a contract within the true meaning
of the statute of frauds. It is certainly
within the mischief thereby intended to be
prevented; and the words of the statute,
"goods" and "merchandise," are sufficiently
comprehensive to include promissory notes
of hand. The word "goods" is a word of
large signification; and so is the word
"merchandise." "Merx est quicquid vendi
potest."
In Tisdale v. Harris, 20 Pick. 9, it was de-
cided that a contract for the sale of shares
In a manufacturing corporation is a contract
for the sale of goods or merchandise with-
in the statute; and the reasons on which
that decision was founded seem fully to au-
thorize 'a similar decision as to promissory
notes of hand. A different decision has re-
cently been made in England in Humble v.
Mitchell, 3 Perry & D. 141, 11 Adol. & E.
207. In that case It was decided that a
contract for the sale of shares in a joint-
stock banking company was not within the
statute of frauds. But it seems to us that
the reasoning in the case of Tisdale v. Har-
ris is very cogent and satisfactory; and it
is supported by several other cases. In
Mills V. Gore, 20 Pick. 28, it was decided
that a bill in equity might be maintained to
compel the redelivery of a deed and a prom-
issory note of hand, on the provision in the
Rev. St. c. 81, § 8, which gives the court
jurisdiction in all suits to compel the rede-
livery of any goods or chattels whatsoever,
taken and detained from the owner thereof,
and secreted or withheld, so that the same
cannot be replevied. And the same point
was decided in Clapp v. Shephard, 23 Pick.
228. In a former statute (St. 1823, c. 140),
there was a similar provision which extend-
ed expressly to "any goods or chattels, deed,
bond, note, bill, specialty, writing, or other
personal property." And the learned com-
missioners, in a note on the Rev. St c. 81,
§ 8, say that the words " 'goods or chattels'
are supposed to comprehend the several par-
ticulars immediately following them in St.
1823, c. 140, as well as many others that
are not mentioned."
The word "chattels" is not contained in
the provision of the statute of frauds; but
personal chattels are movable goods, and so
far as these words may relate to the ques-
tion under consideration they seem to have
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BALDWIN v. WILLIAUS. 
(3 Mete. 365.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 
Nov. Term, 1841. 
This case was tried before Wilde, J., who 
made the following report of it:-
This was an action of assumpsit, and the 
declaration set forth an agreement of the 
pla intiff tha t he would bargain, sell, assign, 
transfer, and set over to the defendant, and 
indorse without recourse to him, the plain­
tiff, in any event, two notes of band by h i m  
held, signed by S.  J. Gardner; o n e  dated 
April 24th, 1835, for the payment of $1,500; 
the other dated May 5th, 1836, for the pay­
ment of $500 ; and both payable to the plain­
tiff or order on the 3d of April, 1839, with 
i nterest from their dates. The declaration 
set forth an agreement by the defendant, i n  
consideration o f  the plaintiff's agreement 
aforesaid, and In payment for said Gard­
ner's said notes, to pay the plaintif  $1,000 
in cash, and to give the plaintiff a post note, 
made by the Lafayette Bank, for $1,000, and 
also a note signed by J. B. Russell & Co. and 
indorsed by D. W. Williams for $1,000. 
The plaintiff at the trial proved an oral 
agreement with the defendant as set fo1th 
in the declaration, and an offer by the plain­
tiff to comply with his part of said agree­
ment, and a tender of said Gardner's said 
notes, indorsed by the plaintiff without re­
course to him in any event, and a demand 
upon the defendant to fulfil his part of said 
agreement, and the refusal of the defendant 
to do so. But the plaintiff introduced no 
evidence tending to show that any thing 
passed between the parties at the time of 
making the said agreement, or was given in 
earnest to bind the bargain. 
The judge advised a nonsuit upon this ev­
idence, because the contract was not i n  
writing nor proved b y  any note or memo­
randum in writing signed by the defend­
ant or his agent, and nothing was received 
by the purchaser, nor given in earnest to 
bind the bargain. A nonsuit was accord­
ingly entered, which is to stand if in the 
opinion of the whole court the agreement 
set forth in the declaration falls within the 
statute of frauds (Rev. St. c. 74, § 4) ; oth­
erwise, the nonsuit to be taken off, and a 
new trial granted. 
:\1r. Clarke, for plaintifl'. S. D. Parker, for 
defendant. 
WILDE, J. This action ls founded on an 
oral contract, and the question is, whether 
it is a contract of sale within the statute 
of frauds. 
The plaintiff's counsel contends in the first 
place that the contract is not a contract 
for the sale of the notes mentioned in the 
declaration, but a mere agreement for the 
exchange of them ; and in the second place 
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that I f  the agreement i s  to he considered as 
a contract of sale, yet it  is not a eontr!1ct 
within that statute. 
As to the first point, the defendant's C'Oun­
sel contends that an agreement to exchange 
notes is a mutual contract of sale. But it 
is not necessary to decide this question, for 
the agreement of the defendant, as alleged 
in the declaration, was to pay for the plain­
tiIT's two notes $2,000 in cash, in addition 
to . two other notes; and that this was a 
contract of sale is, we think, very clear. 
The other question is  more doubtful. But 
the better opinion seems to us to be, that 
this is a contract within the true meaning 
of the statute of frauds. It is  certainly 
within the mischief thereby intended to be 
prevented ; and the words of the statute, 
"goods" and "merchandise," are sufficiently 
comprehensive to include promissory notes 
of hand. The word "goods" is a word of 
large signification ; and so is the word 
"merchandise." "Merx est quicquid vendi 
potest." 
In Tisdale v. Harris, 20 Pick. 9, it was de­
cided that a contract for the sale of shares 
In a manufacturing corporation is a contract 
for the sale of goods or mercha ndise with­
in the statute; and the reasons on which 
that decision was founded seem fully to au­
thorize 'a similar decision as to promissory 
notes of hand. A different decision has re­
cently been made in England in Humble v. 
Mitchell, 3 Perry & D. 141, 1 1  Adol. & E. 
207. In that case it was decided that a 
contract for the sale of shares in a joint­
stock banking company was not within the 
statute of frauds. But it seems to us that 
the reasoning in the case of Tisdale v. Har­
ris is very cogent and satisfactory ; and it  
i s  supported by several other cases. In 
'Mills v.  Gore, 20 Pick. 28, it was decided 
that a bill in equity might be maintained to 
compel the redelivery of a deed and a prom­
issory note of hand, on the provision in the 
Rev. St. c. 81, § 8, which gives the court 
jurisdiction in all suits to compel the rede­
livery of any goods or chattels whatsoever, 
taken and detained from the owner thereof, 
and secreted or withheld, so that the same 
cannot be replevied. And the same point 
was decided in Clapp v. Shephard, 23 Pick. 
228. In a former statute (St. 1823, c. 140), 
there was a similar provision which extend­
ed expressly to "any goods or chattels, deed, 
bond, note, bill, specialty, writing. or other 
personal property." And the learned com­
missioners. in a note on the Rev. St c. 1, 
§ 8, say that the words " 'goods or chattel ' 
are supposed to comprehend the several par­
ticulars immediately following them In St. 
1823, c. 140, as well as many others that 
are not mentioned." 
The word "chattels" is  not contained in 
the provision of the statute of fraud ; but 
personal chattels are movable goods, and so 
far as these words may relate to the ques­
tion under consideration they seem to have 
) f . . . 
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the same meaning. But however this may
be, we think the present case cannot be
distinguished In principle from Tisdale v.
Harris; and upon the authority of that case,
taking into consideration again the reasons
and principles on which It was decided, we
are of opinion that the contract in question
is within the statute of frauds, and conse-
quently that the motion to set aside the
nonsuit must be overruled.
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the same meaning. But however this may 
be, we think the present case cannot be 
distinguished in principle from Tisdale v. 
Harris; and upon the authority of that case, 
taking into consideration again the reasons 
D ::J 1ti.l by 
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and principles on which It was decided, we 
are of opinion that the contract in question 
is within the statute of frauds, and conse­
quently that the motion to set aside the 
nonsuit must be overruled. 
O ri i r  I frcr1 
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ALLARD V. GRl!-ASERT.
(61 N. Y. 1.)
Commission of Appeals of New York. Sept.
Term, 1874.
Action for goods sold and delivered. De-
fendant firm orally agreed with an agent of
plaintiffs to buy by sample the following bill
of bats and caps:
Of case No. 361, % doz. child's
Leghorn sylvans, at $11 per
doz. $ 5 50
Of case No. 312, one doz. harvest
hats, at 4 50
Of case No. 371, half doz. Pana-
ma hats, at 28 50 a doz.
Of case No. 372, half doz. Pana-
ma hats, at 36 00 a doz.
Of case No. 326, one doz. palm
leaf hats, at 2 50 a doz.
Of case No. 324, one doz. palm
leaf hats, at 3 00 a doz.
Of case No. 329, one doz. white
Gleuwood, at 15 00 a doz.
Of case No. 159, one doz. black
Alpine, at 24 00 a doz.
Of case No. 300, one doz. Leg.
harvest, at 3 25 a doz.
The samples were shown by the agent, and
the prices of the different styles named, and a
memorandum made by the agent of the num-
ber of each kind purcha.sed. No memorandum
was made in writing, and signed by either
party. When the goods were sent, by ex-
press, as ordered, defendants refused to re-
ceive them because the one dozen ha,rvest
were in some slight particular different from
the samples shown. Defendants moved for a
nonsuit because (1) "that the agreement under
which the plaintiffs seek to recover is within
the statute of frauds, and void; (2) that the
order for the goods constitutes one entire eon-
tract, and the plaintift's have failed to fulfill,
on their part, to deliver the harvest hats of
the description ordered; that, by reason of
said failure, the defendants had a right to
refuse to receive any of the goods sent." The
court nonsuited plaintiffs on the last ground.
Daniel Wood, for appellants. Bowen & Pitbs,
for respondents.
EARL, O. The judge at the circuit regard-
ed this as an entire contract of sale, and not
severable; and if he was right in this, he
properly nonsuited the plaintiffs upon that
ground. If it was an entire contract, within
the meaniug of the law, the plaintiffs could re-
cover only by showing entire performance, by
a fuU delivery of all the articles purchased.
But it is not necessary, in this case, to deter-
mine whether this was an entire or a severa-
ble contract, because the defendants also mov-
ed for a nonsuit upon the ground that the
contract of sale was void under the statute of
frauds. Although tlie judge did not place the
nonsuit upon this ground, it may be consider-
ed here. He nonsuited the plaintiffs, and even
if he gave a wrong reason for it, and placed
it upon the wrong ground, the nonstiit may be
upheld upon any ground appearing in the
case. Curtis v. Hubbard, 1 Hill, 336; Siinar
V. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298; Deland v. Richard-
son, 4 Denio, 05.
Even if this were a severable contract so far
as relates to the performance of the same,
within the meaning of the statute of frauds
it is an entire contract. The reasons for hold-
ing it to be such are clearly set forth in Baldey
V. Parker, 2 B. & C. 41, and Story, Sales,
§ 241. This, within the meaning of the stat-
ute of frauds, is a contract for the sale of
goods for the price of $50 or more, and as
there was no note or memorandum or pay-
ment, the question to be determined is, wheth-
er the goods were accepted and received by
the buyers so as to satisfy the statute. By
the terms of the contract, the goods were to
be delivered to the Merchants' Union Ex-
press, to be carried to the defendants, and
they were so delivered. It is well settled that
when there is a valid contract of sale, a de-
livery to a carrier, according to the terms of
the contract, vests the title to the property in
the buyer. It was decided in Rodgers v.
Phillips, 40 N. Y. 519, that a delivery, accord-
ing to the contract, to a general carrier, not
designated or selected by the buyer, does not
constitute such a delivery and acceptance a.s
to answer the statute of frauds. But it has
been held that when the goods ha\e been ac-
cepted by the buyer, so as to answer that
portion of the statute which requires accept-
ance, a delivery to a carrier selected by the
buyer will answer that portion of the statute
which requires the buyer to receive. Cross v.
O'Donnell, 44 N. X. 001. So far as I can dis-
cover, it has never yet been decided in any
case that is entitled to respect as authority,
that a mere carrier designated by the buyer
can both accept and receive the goods so as
to answer the statute. Benj. Sales, 124. The
cases upon this subject are cited and com-
mented upon, and the principles applicable to
the question are so fully set forth in the Uvo
recent cases above referred to that no fur-
ther citation of authorities or extended discus-
sions at this time is important. It will be
found by an examination of the authorities,
that in most of the cases where a delivery to
a carrier has been held to satisfy the stat-
ute of frauds, there had been a prior ac-
ceptance of the goods by the buyer or his
agent. A buyer may accept and receive
through an agent expressly or impliedly ap-
pointed for that pmpose. There is every rea-
son for holding that a designated carrier may
receive for the buyer, because he is expressly
authorized to receive, and the act of receiv-
ing is a mere formal act requiring the exer-
cise of no discretion. But there is no reason
for holding that the buyer in such case intend-
ed to clothe the carrier, of whose agents he
may know nothing, with authority to accept
the goods, so as to conclude him as to their
quality, and bind him to take them as a com-
pliance with a contract of which such agents
can know nothing. This case furnishes as
good an illustration as any. The goods were
boxed; the carrier could know nothing about
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ALLARD v. GlLbA.:SJ.JlRT. 
(61 N. Y. 1.) 
Commission of Appeals of New York. Sept. 
'.rerm, 1874. 
Action for goods sold and delivered. De­
fendant firm orally agreed with an agent of 
plaintiffs to buy by sample the following bill 
of bats and caps: 
Of case No. 361, � doz. child's 
Leghorn sylvans, � at $11 per 
doz. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $ 5 50 
Of case No. 312, one doz. harvest 
hats, at.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 50 
Of case No. 371, haH doz . .Pana-
ma hats, at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28 50 a doz. 
Of case No. 372, half doz . .Pana-
ma hats, at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36 00 a doz. 
Of case No. 326, one doz. palm 
leaf hats, at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 50 a doz. 
Of case No. 324, one doz. palm 
leaf hats, at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 00 a doz. 
Of case No. 320, one doz. white 
Ulenwood, at. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 00 a doz. 
Of case No. 159, one doz. black 
Alpine, at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 00 a doz. 
Of case No. 300, one doz. Leg. 
harvest, at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 25 a doz. 
The samples were shown by the agent, aud 
the prices of the different styles named, and a 
memorandwn made by the agent of the num­
ber of each kind purchased. No memorandum 
was made in writing, and signed by either 
party. When the goods were sent, by ex­
press, as ordered, defendants refused to re­
ceive . them because the one dozen ba,rvest were m some slight particular different from 
the samples shown. Defendants moved for a 
nonsuit because (1) "that the agreement under 
which the plaintiffs seek to recover is within 
the statute of frauds, and void; (2) that the 
order for the goods constitutes one entire con­
tract, and the plaintiffs have failed to fulfill 
on their part, to deliver the harvest hats of 
the description ordered ; that, by real'on of 
said failure, the defendants bad a right to 
refuse to receive any of the goods sent." The 
court nonsuited plaintiffs on the last ground. 
Daniel Wood, for appellants. Bowen & Pitts, 
for respondents. 
EARL, C. The judge at the circuit regard­
ed this as an entire contract of sale, and not 
severable ; and if b e  was right in this, he 
properly nonsuited the plaintiffs upon that 
ground. If it was an entire contract, within 
the meaning of the law, the plaintiffs could re­
cover only by showing entire performance, by 
a full delivery of all the articles purchased. 
But it is not necessary, in this case, to deter­
m i ne whether this was an entire or a severa­
ble contract, because the defendants also mov­
ed for a nonsuit upon the ground that the 
contract of sale was void under the statute of 
frauds. Although the judge did not place the 
nonsuit upon this ground, it may be consider­
ed here. He nonsuited the plainti1'!'s, and even 
if be gave a wrong reason for it, and placed 
it upon the wrong ground, the nonsuit may be 
upheld upon any ground appearing in tbe 
case. Curtis v. H ubbard, 1 Ilill, 33ll; :Sin1ar 
D t 
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v .  Caua1lny ,  ::;:; N. Y .  WS; Dela111l v. Itlchar'1· 
son, 4. Denio, 03. 
Even if this were a seYerable contrac·t so far 
as relates to the performance of the same, 
within the meaning of the statute or fraud:> 
it is an entire contract. The reasous for hold­
ing it to be such are clearly set forth i n  Bal<l<'Y 
v. Pa rker, 2 B. & C. 41,  and Story, Sal1•s, 
§ 241. This, within the nwaning of the stat 
ute of frauds, is a contract for the sale of 
goods for the price of $30 or more, "and as 
there was no note or memorandum or va�·­
ment, the question to be determined is, "·heth­
er the goods were accepted and receinxl by 
the buyers so as to satisfy the statute. By 
the terms of the contract, the goods were to 
be delivered to the :.\Iercbants' Union Ex­
press, to be carried to the defendants, and 
tliey were so deli1ered. It  is  well settled that 
1Tben there is a Yalid contract of sale, a de­
livery to a carrier, according to the terms of 
the contract, Yests the title to the property i n  
tile buyer. l t  was decided in Rodgers v. 
Phillips, 40 N. Y. 51D, that a delivery, accord­
ing to the contract, to a general canier, not 
designated or selected by the buyer, docs not 
constitute such a delivery and acceptance a,; 
to answer the sta.tute of frauds. nut it has 
been held that when the goods haYe l.Jeen ac­
cepted by the buyer, so as to answer that 
portion of the statute which requires accrpt­
ance, a delivery to a carrier selected by the 
buyer will answer that portion of tile statute 
whicll reL1uires the buyer to recei1e. Cross 1·. 
O'Donnell, 4± N. Y. 6Gl. So far as I can dis­
cover, it has never yet been decided in any 
case that is entitled to respect as autboritJ", 
that a mere carrier designated by the buyer 
can both accept and receive the goods so as 
to answer the statute. Benj. Sales, 1:.!.J.. Tile 
cases upon this subject are cited and com­
mented upon, and the principles applicable to 
the question are so fully set forth in the t"·o 
recent cases above referred to that no fur­
ther citation of authorities or extended discus­
sions at tllis time is important. It will be 
found by an examination of the authorities, 
that i n  most of the cases where a deliyery to 
a carrier has been held to satisfy the stat­
ute of frauds, there had been a prior ac­
ceptance of the goods by the buyer or bis 
agent. A buyer rua'y accept and rec:ei"l'e 
through an agent expressly or impliedly ap­
pointed for that pw·pose. There is e1ery rea­
son for holding that a designated carrier may 
recei1e for the buyer, because he is ex pre ·sly 
authorized to receiYe, a nd the act of recei1·­
ing is a mere formal act requiring the exer­
cise of no discretion. But there is no reason 
for holding that the buyer i n  such case intend­
ed to clothe the carrier, of whose agents he 
may know nothing, with authority to accept 
the goods, so as to conclude him as to their 
quality, and bind bim to take them as a com­
pliance with a contract of which such agent· 
can know nothing. This case furnil'<lles a s  
goocl an illustmtion as any. '.rile good� were 
boxetl; tile carrier could knO\T notlling about 
0 .  ·::i• r;  , f, om 
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tbem; and its agents had no right to unpack
and handle them. Its sole duty and author-
'.ty was to receive and transport them. In
such a case, it would be quite absurd to hold
that the carrier had an implied authority from
the buyer to accept the goods for him. If the
buyer does not accept in person, he must do
it through an authorized agent. Here it is
not claimed that there was express authority
conferred upon the carrier to accept, and the
circumstances are not such that such author-
ity can be implied.
Upon this last ground therefore the non-
suit was proper, and the judgment must be
affirmed, with costs.
All concur.
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them ; and its agents bad no right to unpack 
and handle them. Its sole duty and autllor­
:ty was to receive and transport them. In 
such a case, it would be quite absurd to hold 
that the carrier had an implied authority from 
the buyer to accept the goods for him. If the 
buyer does not accept in person, be must do 
it through an authorized agent. Here it is 
D i g 1t1zed by 
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not claimed that there was express authorit)· 
conferred upon the earlier to accept, and the 
circum tances are not such that such author­
ity can be implied. 
Upon this last ground therefore the non­
sult was proper, and the judgment must be 
affirmed, with costs. 
All concur. 
Oru P.a l  frorr 
UNI  E R S I  O F  CALI FO 
rORMATIOJS OF THE CON Til ACT— STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
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SAFFOIID et al. v. McDONOUGH.
(120 Mas3. 290.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suf-
foll£. May 6, 1876.
T. H. Sweetser and B. P. Hayes, for plain-
tiffs. S. A. B. Abbott, for defeudant.
MORTON, J. This is an action of contract
to recover the price of a quantity of leath-
er, exceeding fifty dollars in value, alleged
to have been sold by the plaintiffs to the de-
fendant. There was no memorandum in
writing of the conti-act. and the purchaser
did not give anything in earnest to bind the
bargain or in pait payment.
It appeared on the trial that the defend-
ant on May 17, 1872, went to the plaintiffs'
store and agreed to purchase the leather at
the price named, to be paid for by a satis-
factoi7 note.
On the thirty-first day of the same month,
he again went to the plaintiffs' store, ex-
amined the leather, had it weighed, marked
with the initials of his name, and piled up
by itself, to be taken away by him upon giv-
ing a satisfactory note for the price, or the
payment of the price in money, but not
otherwise. He never complied with the
terms of the agreement. The plaintiffs re-
fused to allow him to take the leather from
their store without such compliance, claim-
ing a lien upon it for the price due. It re-
mained in then- store till November 9, 1872,
when it was bm-nt with the store. Upon
this evidence the presiding justice of the su-
perior court ruled that the leather had not
been so accepted and received by the defend-
ant as to take the contract out of the stat-
ute of frauds, and the plaintiff excepted to
such ruling.
It should be kept In mind that the ques-
tion is not whether, if a vaUd contract of
sale upon the terms above named had been
proved, the title in the property would have
passed to the defendant, so that it would be
at his risk. In such a case, the title would
pass to the purchaser unless there was some
agreement to the contrary, but the vendor
would have a lien for the price, and could re-
tain possession until its payment. Haskins
V. Warren, 115 Mass. 514; Morse v. Sher-
man, 106 Mass. 430; Townsend v. Har-
graves, 118 Mass. 325. But the question is
whether the defendant had accepted and re-
ceived the goods, so as to take the case out
of the statute of frauds, and thus complete
and make valid the oral contract relied on.
Unless there was such acceptance and receipt,
there was no valid contract by virtue of
which the title to the goods would pass to
the defendant To constitute this, there
must be a delivei-y by the seller, and some
unequivocal acts of ownership or control of
the goods on the part of the purchaser.
Knight V. Maun, 118 Mass. 143, and cases
cited.
In the case at bar, there was no actual
acceptance and receipt of the goods by the
defendant. They were never in his posses-
sion or control, but remained in the posses-
sion and control of the plaintiffs, who refused
to allow him to take them, claiming a lien
for the price. If they had and asserted a
lien as vendors, this is inconsistent with the
delivery of possession and control, necessary
to constitute an acceptance and receipt by
the vendee. In Baldey v. Parker, 2 B. & 0.
37, 44, Holroyd, J., says: "Upon a sale of spe-
cific goods for a specific price, by parting
with the possession the seller parts with his
lien. The statute contemplates such a part-
ing with the possession, and therefore, as
long as the seller preserves his control over
the goods, so as to retain his lien, he pre-
vents the vendee from accepting and receiv-
ing them as his own within the meaning of
the statute." Benjamin on Sales, (.4ni. Ed.)
151, and cases cited; Browne, St. Fraud, § 317.
It is ti-ue there may be cases in which the
goods remain in the possession of the vendor,
and yet may have been accepted and receiv-
ed by the vendee. But in such cases the
vendor holds possession of the goods, not by
virtue of his lien as vendor, but under somt
new contract by which the relations of the
parties are changed. Cusack v. Robinson,
1 B. & S. 299, 30S; Castle v. Sworder, H.
& N. 828; Dodsley v. Varley, 12 A. & E. 032.
In the case at bar, the vendors refused to
permit the vendee to take possession or con-
trol of the goods, but claimed and asserted
thoir lien as vendors for the ijrice. We are
therefore of opinion that the ruling of the
superior court was correct.
Exceptions overniled.
ENDICOTT and LORD, JJ., absent
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SAFFORD et al. v. l\lcDONOUGH. 
(120 Mass. 290.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suf­
folk. May G, 1876. 
T. H. Sweetser and B. F. Hayes, for plain­
tiffs. S. A. B. Abl.Jott, for defendant. 
MORTO�. J. This is an action of contract 
to recover the price of a quantity of leath­
er, exceeding fifty dollars in value, alleged 
to have been sold by the plaintiffs to tl:\.e de­
fendant. There was no memorandum in 
writing of the contract, and the purchaser 
did not give anything in earnest to bind the 
barga in or in part payment. 
It appeared on the trial that the defend­
ant on l\Iay 17, 1872, went to the plaintiffs' 
store and agreed to purcl.Jase the leather at 
the price named, to be paid for by a satis­
factory note. 
On the thirty-first day of the same month, 
he again went to the plaintiffs' store, ex­
amined the leather, had it 'veighed, marked 
with the initials of his name, and piled up 
by itself, to be taken away by him upon giv­
ing a satisfactory note for the price, or the 
payment of the price in money, but not 
otherwise. He never complied with the 
terms of the agreement. The plaintiffs re­
fused to allow him to take the leather from 
their store without such compliance, claim­
ing a lien upon it for the price due. It re­
mained in their store till November 9, 1872, 
when it was bmnt with the store. Upon 
this evidence the presiding jm;tice of the su­
perior court ruled that the leather bad not 
been so accepted and receivl.!d by the defend­
ant as to take the contract out of the stat­
ute of frauds, and the plaintiff excepted to 
such ruling. 
It should be kept In mind that the ques­
tion is not whether, if a valid contract of 
sale upon. the terms above named bad been 
proved, the title in the property would baYe 
passed to the defendant, so that it would be 
at his risk. In such a case, the ti tle would 
pass to the purchaser unless there was some 
agreement to the contrary, but the vendor 
would have a lien for the price, and could re­
tain possession until its payment. Haskins 
v. Warren, 115 Mass. 514; Morse v. Sher­
man, 106 Mass. 430; Townsend v. Har­
graves, 118 Mass. 325. But the question is 
D i gitize by 
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whether the defendant hau accepted awl re­
ceived the goods, so as to take the case out 
of the statute of frauds, and thlll:I complete 
and make valid the oral contract relied on. 
Unless there was such acceptance and i·ecelpt, 
there was no valid contract by virtue of 
which tbe tille to the goods would vasi; to 
the <lefeadant To constitute this, there 
must be a delivery by the seller, antl sorne 
unequivocal acts of ownership or control of 
the goods on the part of the purc:haser. 
Knight v. l\Iann, 118 :\lass. 143, and cases 
cited. 
In the ca. e at bar, there was no actual 
acceptance an<l receipt of the goods by the 
defendant. They were never in his posses­
sion or control, but remained in the posses­
sion and control of the plaintiffs, who refused 
to allow hiw to take thew, claiming a lien 
for the price. If they had and asserte<l a 
lien as vendors, this is i nconsistent with the 
delivery of possession and control, necessary 
to constitute an acceptance and receipt by 
the vendee. In Baldey v. Parker, 2 B. & C. 
37, 44, llolroyd, J., says : "Upon a sale of spe­
cific goo<ls for a specific price, by parting 
with the po session the seller parts with bis 
lien. The statute contemplates such a part­
ing with the possession, and therefore, as 
long as the seller preserves his control OYer 
the goods, so as to retain his lien, be pre­
vents the vendee from accepting and receiv­
ing them as bis own within the meaning of 
the statute." Benjamin on Sales, (Am. g1J.) 
151, and cases cited; Browne, St. Fraud, § 317. 
It is true there may be cases in " hicb the 
goods remain in the possession of the Yen<lor, 
and yet may have been acceptct.l and receiv­
ed by the vendee. But in such cases the 
vendor bolds possession of the goods, not by 
virtue of his lien as vendor, but un<ler soIDc. 
new contract by which the relations of the, 
parties are changed. Cusack v. Robinson, 
1 B. & S. 290, 308 ; Castle v. Swonler, U II. 
& N. 828; Dodsley v. Varley, 12 A. & E. !h32. 
In the case at bar, the vemlors refused to 
permit the vendee to take possesl:-ion or con­
trol of the goods, but claimed aml assertet.l 
their lien as vendors for the 11rice. We are 
therefore of opinion that the ruling of the 
superior court was co1 rect. 
Exceptions overruled. 
ENDICOTT and LORD, JJ., absent. 
O rigi ra l  from 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
lOG
SALES.
CAULKIXS V. HELLMAN.
(47 N. 1'. 449.)
Court of Appeals of New York. 1872.
Action to recover for wines and casks
sold.
Steplien K. Williams, for appellant. E. G.
Latham, for respondents.
RAPALLO, J. The instructions to tiie
jury as to tlie legal effect of tlie delivery
of the wine at Blood's Station in couform-
•tj- with tlie terms of the verbal contract
of sale were clearly erroneous. No act of
the vendor alone, in ijerformance of a con-
tract of sale void by the statute of frauds,
can give validity to such a contract.
Where a valid contract of sale is made
in writing a delivery pursuant to such con-
tract at the place agreed upon for deliv-
ery, or a shipment of the goods in con-
formity with the terms of the contract, will
pass the title to the vendee without any
receipt or acceptance of the goods by him.
But if the contract is oral, and no part
of the price is i)aid by the vendee, there
must be not only a delivery of the goods
by the vendor, but a receipt and accept-
ance of them by the vendee to pass the
title or malie the vendee liable for the
price; and this acceptance must be volim-
lary and unconditional. Even the receipt
of the goods, without an acceptance, is not
suflicient. Some act or conduct on the part
of the vendee, or his authorized agent, man-
ifesting an intention to accept the goods
as a performance of the contract, and to
appropriate them, is required to supply the
place of a written contract. This distinc-
tion seems to have been overlooked in tne
charge. The learned judge instructed the
jury, as a matter of law, that if they were
satislifd that the wine or any portion of it
was actually delivered in pur.suauce of the
verbal contract, that circumstance was suf-
ficient to take the contract out of the
Hialuto of frauds, and the contract was a
valiil one, and might be enforced notwitli-
standiug It was not In writing. The at-
tention of the jury was directed to the In-
<pili-y whcllior the plalntilV.s had faithfully
perfnrnicd their part of tlie contract rallicr
than to the action of tlio dcfcndiuil. and llio
Judge proceeded to state tliat If the wine
was delivered to the express company at
lllood'H Station In good order, In merclianl-
ablo condition, and corrcspondi'd In tjnal-
lly anil all subslaiilial and material rcspcrts
with the samples, then ho Inslructeil the
jury as a matter of law, that If they found
llic contract as Ciordon trstlUcd with re-
spcct to the place of delivery, that was n
c'ompletc delivery under the contract, and
liaHNcd the title from the plaliitin's to the
defendant, and the plalntHTs were entitled
to recover the contract price of tlie wines.
The plalnlllT'M roiiiiHcl HUggesIs in the
gtntement of facts npiiciided to his ixtliitu,
that Gordon was the agent of the dcl'oini-
ant, to accept the goods at Blood's Station.
But this statement is not borne out by
the evidence; Gordon was the agent of the
plaintill's for the sale of the goods; it was
incumbent upon them to make the ship-
ment. All that Gordon testiiies to is that
the defendant requested him to make the
best bargain he could for the freight. He
does not claim that he had any authority
to accept the goods for the defendant.
According to the defendant's testimony
Gordon clearly had no such authority, nor
did the defendant designate any convey-
ance, and tlie judge submitted no question
to the jury as to the authority either of
Gord6n or the express company to accept
the goods. On the contrary, he repeated
thai if when the wine was delivered at
Blood's Station it was in good order and
corresponded with the samples, the plain-
tiffs would be entitled to a verdict for the
contract price, upon the ground tliat the
parties by the contract (assuming it to be
as claimed by the plaintiffs), fixed upon
that station as the place of delivery; "that
it was true that the defendant was not
there to receive it, and had no agent at
Blood's Station to receive it, and had no
opportunity to inspect it there; but that
that was a contingency ho had not seen,
and which he might have guarded against
in the contract."
It is evident that the learned judge ap-
plied to this case the rule as to delivery,
which would be applicable to a valid, writ-
ten contract of sale, but which is inappli-
cable when the contract is void by the
statute of frauds.
The effect of the delivery of goods at a
railway station, to be forwarded to the
vendee in pursuance of the terms of a
verbal contract of sale, was very fully dis-
cussed in the case of Norman v. i'hilliiis.
II :\Iees. & W. •J77. and a verdict for the
plaintiff founded upon such a delivery, and
upon the additional fact that the vendor
sent an invoice to the vendee, which lie
retained for several weeks, was set aside.
Tlie English authorities on the subject are
reviewed In that case, and the American
and Ijiigllsh authorities bearing upon the
sjime question are also referred to In the
bile cases of Hodgers v. rhilllps, -10 N. Y.
r.l'J, and Cross v. O'Doniiell, 44 N. Y. 001.
The latter case is cited by the counsiU for
the pl;iliiliffs as an authority for the prop-
osition that a <lellvery to a designated car-
rier Is sulllcli'iit to take the ca.se out of
the statute; but It does not so decide. It
liolds only tliat the receipt and acceptance
need not be simultaneous, but that they
may take |)lace at different times, and
lli.'it after the purchaser had himself In-
HlHM'ted and accepted the goods purcha.sed,
the dellverj' of them by his direction to a
designated carrier was a good delivery, and
the carrier was the agent of the purchaser
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CAULKIX::; ' · IIELL�lA�. 
l-11 X.  L -HU.) 
Court of .Appeals of .:\ew York. 1872. 
Action to reco>er for wines :rnd casks 
sold. 
Stephen K. \Yi llia ms, for appellant. E. G. 
Latham, for respondents. 
I that Gordon was the agent of the d<!fC:.Hl­ant. to accept the goods at Bloou's :Station. But thi' statement is not boru<' out h!· 
t he eyitlence; Gordon was the ageut of the 
IlAPALLO, J. The instructions to t he 
ju ry as to the legal effect of the deli >ery 
of the wine at Blood·s Station in <:ouforw- 1 
pla iut i!I · for the sale of the goods ; it was 
int:uml>ent upon them to make the ship­
ment. All that Gordon testifies to is that 
the defeudaut requestel l  him to make t he 
l>est lm ri;a i n he coultl fo1· the freight . He 
does not claim that he had aur authoritr 
to aceept the goods for the defeudaut. 
Act:ortl ing to the defendant 's testirnonr 
i•y with the terms of the >erbal contract 
o f  sale were clea rly erroneous. Xo act of 
the 1·eudor alone, iu lJerformauce of a con­
tract of sale >oid by tbe statute of frauds, 
can giYe Yalidity to such a contract. 
\Yhe re a >alill contract of sale is made 
in writing a deliYe1·y pursuant to sud1 con­
trnct at the place agreed upon for deliv­
ery, o r  a shipment oC tbe goods i n  cou­
formity witb the terms of lbc con t ract, will 
pass tbe title to the Yeutlee without any 
receipt or acceptance of tbe goods by hi m . 
But if the contract is oral. and no part 
of the price is paid by t he Yellllee. tllere 
must be not onl) a deliYery of the gootls 
by the ,·endor. but a receipt autl accept­
auce of them by the veudee to pass t he 
title or make the Yendee lia\1le for the 
price; and t h is acceptance must be volun­
tary and unconditional. EYcn the receipt 
or t he goods, without au acceptance, is not 
sutli<'ient . Some act or couduct on the part 
of the vendee, or his a uthorized a�ent, man­
ifesting an i ntculion to accept the goods 
as a performance of the cuntmct, and to 
appropriate them, is rc11u ln:tl to supply the 
place of a w ritten contract. Thi- t!isti m.:· 
1 ion seems to have been overlooked In t nc 
1'!1:1 rge . The lc>arned j u1\gc instrnctetl the 
j ury, as a mntte1· ol' law, t h at if  tlle:r wt>rc 
s:1 1 isli1 •1\ tllat the w i ne or :t ny portion of it 
was actually 1\elh ercd iu 11 u rsu:mt·e of t he 
n rhal ('O JJt r:ict, Uia.t c i n•11 1 1 1sta11cc was suf­
lki1·1 1 l  to tnke t h e co11l ract out or t i le 
s l a l n l c>  of frauds, and t he t•nntr:td w:\ s a 
Yn ll<I one, :w 1\ might lle e11 fnr1·Pd no t w i t h  
z.>tn 1 1 1 1 l 11g I t  was uot I n  w r i t i ng. T h e  at­
t Pn t ion of t hP j u ry wn� tll ret• t e1l to t hP l n­
• 1 1 1 l ry wh!'t h .. r t ht• 11I11 l 1 1 t lffs hail f11 i 1 1 t 1 1 1 1ly 
1 11 rf.,r111rd t l 1 1 • lr 11arl of t lw 1•0 11 t ra1•! rn l l11'r 
1 1 111 1 1  ! 1 1  t 1 1 1 •  aeti .. u nl' t h e i1Pf1•111l a 1 1 t .  1 1nd t h • 
j 11dgt• 1 1 ri1c1 •d1·d to s t :1 tc• t ha t  If t h e  w i n e  
\ \  ll  r !Plh "r•'d l o  I ht• l'X J l l'l'ilS 1·0 1 1 1pa11y : t  t 
1 : 1 . .. urs :-; 1 11 1 ion in g1101l nnlc>r, I n  1 1 1 1 •n·h n 1 1 t-
11 hl" 1•0111l l t lon, 11 1111 1·nrr1•sp11 1 1 t l l'rl I n  l 1 1 1a l ·  
l t y  :1 1 1 r l  n i l  1 1hst:1 1 1 l l a l  : tnrl  1 1 1 a l l'l'l: 1 l  l'•'NJ l<'t ' l!I 
\\ I t h  t l 11•  :1 1 1 1 pl1•i;, 1 1 1 1 ' 1 1  1 1 1• In l r n1• tpd t h t• 
j 1 1 r� as 11 1 1 1u t t <'r of 1 1 1w, t hn t  I I' t l l f'y fo und 
1 1 1 1 '  c1 1 1 1 l rn•• I  I I  1 , onln11  l < 'Sll li<-cl \\ I t h  rl'· 
Iii " • · l  I n  t IH' plat•p of t l 1 • l h' l ' l'Y, t ha I \\'1111 11 
t'Olll j t l t ' l t• r l d l l  "l'Y 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 '1" l he <'Ol l l l':t < ' t ,  1 1 1111 
JHll! , . c 1  I l ic  1 1 1 1  .. from t h" pl11 l 1 1 t l ll'8 tn t he 
tlf'(1 • 1 1d11 1 1 t ,  1 1 1 1 t l  l h t• pl11 l 1 1 t ln11 \\ l'l'I' l' l l l l lll'll 
to l'l'Ct1\' 1 •r  I hr• 1·111 11  r1 1 1 • t )lrh'I' or 1 1 1 1 •  \\' h l l·�· 
'I I l l '  pl:i l 1 1 t l fT '11 1•1 1 1 1 1 1  Pl fll l!-:J:t 'l l R  I l l  I 1 1 1• 
shi t · 1 1 11° 1 1 1  o f  fu•·f8 :i p1 1 1 • 1 1 t l 1 •t l  1 11 hl11 p1 1 l 1 1 t s, 
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Gordon clearly had no such authority, nor 
did the uefeudant designate any com·ey­
auce. au d the j udge submitted no question 
to the j u ry as to the authority either of 
Gonlbu or the express company to accept 
t h <' gooils. On the coutrary, lle repea led 
l 11:1 1 if when the wine was delh crlld at 
Hloutl·s Stat ion it was i n  ,!{OOtl onler a u d 
co rrespumled with the samples, the plain­
tilis would be entitletl to a verd ict for the 
co n t ract price, uvon the ground that the 
parties b.r the contract (assuming it to be 
a s  claimed by the plaint iffs) , tixed upon 
that station as the place of deli \"'ery ; "that 
i t  was true that the defepcla nt was not 
t here to rccci•e it, and bad no agN1t at 
Blood's Station to recei Ye it, antl lt:1 1\ uo 
opportuuily to inspect it  there ; I.Jul that 
that was a contiugency Ile had not set:n, 
a111l w hich be might !Jaye guardeu against I in the contract." It is e\"'idcnt that the learned jud;..:c a p­pliP1\ to this case tile rule as to deli Yery, 
w hidt would be applicable to a valid, writ-
t l'n cont r�lct of sale. but wh ic:h is inappli­
t·a blc when the contract is \ oitl by the 
s t atute or frauds. 
The e!Iect of the tlcli•ery or �oods at a 
r:i.i lwa:r station, to be forwa nlct! to th l' 
y c111h•c in pursuance of t \Jc t e r m s  or :l 
Ycrhal conlmct of sale, was very fully 1lis­
c:11sspd In the case of Norman Y. l ' h i l l ips. 
l 1 :l [ PCS. & "\\T. :277. and a Yenlict for t lH '  
1 11:1 in t i ff foun1k1! upon such n t!rllH•ry, nud 
upon t he add i l ioual fact that t he Yl'llt\•11· 
Sl' l ll  nn im oice to t he ye1ulrr. whkll he 
n'l:1 il •t'cl for seYern I \\ t>eks, was i:;et :tsi1lt'. 
'l'hl' E n gllsh nut !tori ties on t he sultJt'd : 1  re 
n• vil'W•·tl In t hat rase, and t h e A11wri .. :1 n 
a m l  En;;;l l s h  a u t horit ies bt•n rlug upon t he 
s:1 111t> qtwstinu :uc al so referred to In the 
late l'llSl'S of ltndi.rcrs V. l ' l t l l l i 11s. 10 N. Y. 
:-i i !!, a nd ('ross v. U'Dot1 1ll' l l ,  ·I l :'\ Y ( it i l  
'!'ht• l a t  t.•r l'asc I s  rltrtl hy t hr ro11 1 1s1•\ l'nr 
t h" pl : t l 1 1 t lffs as nn a u t ho r i t y  fnr t l t1 ·  pr1 1p· 
nsl l lt t l l  1 1 111 1 :t c l l'll Ycry l o  a clcsl '.:n:tt l'd 1•:1 1·· 
rll'r Is s11 1ll1•l1•11t to l : t kl' t h <' 1•as1: out of 
t h P s t n l 1 1 t e ;  hut I t  dot's n o t  Ho dl'clih» I t  
hnlcls 0 1 1 1 )  t h a t  t hr rc>rt>lpt a 1 1 1 l  H l't'L' J l l :t nr•e 
111·1 d nnt he sl 1 1 1nl l a 1wo11s, h11l  that t11cy 
1 1 1 : 1 r  t n k <'  plac·" nt < l l llPrP11t  t lnws, 111ul 
t h a t  : 1 ft l• r  t h · 1 1 1 1rrhnsPr hnd hl 1 1 1fH'l f  i 1 1 -
HJil'1'f < '< I und O<'l'l'pkd the gooclR )llJl'l'hl\SL�l .  
t l 11• dl'lh 'Pry of t lw m  I i� hlH d h·1•1 · l ln11  tn a 
d1•11li.;11 1 1 t 1 ·r l  <'l l rrlcr was u good r l 1 •l l n•r_y, :1 1 1 1 1  
t h 1• <':l l'l'll'r w a t1  t h •� ngr•ut o r  t h e p11rcha 'Pr 
0 11 ir I fror 1 
UN V E R S ITY 0 - CALIFOR N  A 
POllMATION OF Tin: CONTRACT— STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
1U7
to receive them. No question however aris-
es in the present case as to a deUver.v to a
designated carrier, as the evidence in re-
.'ipect to the agreed mode of delivery is con-
Uicting, and no ijuestiou of acceptance by
the carrier as agent for the defendant was
submitted to the jury.
The judge submitted to the jury two
<luestions, to which he required specific an-
swers.
1st. Was the wine delivered at the rail-
road station at the time agreed upon by
tile parties, and was it then in all respects
in good order, and like the samples exhib-
ited by the plaintiff to the defendant V and,
2d. Was the wine accepted by the de-
fendant after it reached his place of busi-
ness in New York?
The jury answered both of these ques-
tions in the affirmative, and it is now claim-
ed that the answer to the second question
renders immaterial any error the judge
niay have committed in respect to the ef-
fect of the delivery at the station.
It is difficult to find any evidence justify-
ing the submission to the jury of the see
ond question; but no exception was taken
to such submission. The motion for a non-
suit would have raised that point, were it
not for the fact that there was evidence to
go to the jury on the claim of $52 for bar-
rels, and this precluded a nonsuit. We
think however that the error in the charge
may have misled the jury in passing upon
the second question; at all events, it is not
impossible that it should have done so.
Having been instructed that upon the fact
as they found it in respect to the agree-
ment for a delivery at Blood's Station, the
title to the goods had passed to the de-
fendant before the receipt of them at New
York, and that their verdict must be for
the plaintilfs, they may have examined the
question of his acceptance of them at New
York with less scrutiny than they would
have exercised had they been informed tliat
the result of the case deiiended upon their
finding on that question. And the construc-
tion of the defendant's acts and language
may, in some degree, have been influenced
by the consideration that when the wine
arrived in New York the title had, accord-
ing to the theory on which the case was
submitted to them, passed to the defend-
ant, and he had no right to reject the wines.
Furthermore, we think the judge erred in
excluding the evidence of the contents of
the telegram which the defendant attempt-
ed to send to the plaintiffs immediately up-
on the receipt of the wine. If, as was of-
fered to be shown, it stated that he de-
clined to accept the wine, it was material
as part of the res gestse. A bona fide at-
tempt, immediately on the receipt and ex-
amination of the wine, to communicate
such a message, was an act on his part
explaining and qualifying his conduct in
receiving the wine into his store and al-
lowing it to remain there. And even though
the message never reached the plaintiffs, it
bore upon the question of acceptance by
the defendant. The objection to the evi-
dence of the contents of the telegram was
not placed on the ground of omission to
produce the original, and the judge in his
charge instructed the jury that the at-
i tempt to send this telegram did not affect
I the plaiutiffs' rights, for the reason that it
j was not shown to have been received by
[ them, and this was excepted to. In Norman
j V. Phillii)s, 14 Mees. & W. 277, the de-
j fendant was allowed to prove that on being
I informed by the railway clerk that the
goods were lying for him at the station, he
said he would not take them, and stress
' was laid upon the fact. Yet this statement
to the clerk was not communicated to the
plaintiffs. Evidence of an attempt to send
a message to them to the same effect,
though unsuccessful, would have been no
more objectionable than the declaration to
the clerk. The acts of the defendant at
! the time of the receipt of the goods, and
his bona fide attempt to communicate to
the plaintiffs his rejection of them were I
think material and competent to rebut any
presumption of an acceptance arising from
their retention by him.
The judge was requested to instruct the
jury that the true meaning of the defend-
ant's letter of March 31 was a refusal to
accept the wine under the contract. A care-
ful examination of that letter satisfies us
that the defendant was entitled to have the
jury thus instructed. The letter clearly
shows that the defendant did not accept
or appropriate the wines. After complain-
ing in strong language of their quality and
I condition, and of the time and manner of
j their shipment, he says to the plaintiffs,
"What can be done now with the wine after
it sult'ered so much, and shows itself of
such a poor quality? I don't know myself
and am awaiting your advice and opinion."
He concludes by expressing his regret that
their first direct transaction should have
turned out so unsatisfactory, and by stat-
ing that he cannot be the sufferer by it,
and he awaits their disposition.
This language clearly indicates an inten-
tion to throw upon the plaintiffs the re-
STiousibility of directing what should be
done with the wine, and is inconsistent
with any acceptance or appropriation of
it by the writer.
For these reasons the judgment should
be reversed, and a new trial granted, with
costs to abide the event.
All concur.
Judgment reversed.
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to receive them. No question however aris­
es in the preseul case as to a delivery to a 
llesignated carrier. as the evidence in rl;l­
spect to the agreed mode of delivery is con­
flicting, and no question of acceptance by 
the carrier as agent for the defenllant was 
submitted to the jury. 
The judge submitted to the j ury two 
questions, to which he required specific an­
swers. 
1st. Was the wine deli vered at the rail­
roacl sta tion at the time a�reed upon by 
the JJ:l l'tics, and was it then in all rcspC'Ctf' 
in good order, ancl like the samples exhib­
ited by the plaintiff to the defenllaut'! and, 
2d. Was the wine accepted b) the de­
fendant after it reached bis place of busi­
ness in New York? 
The jury answered both o f  these ques­
tions in the affirmative, and it is now daim­
ed tba t the answer to the sccoull ljuestion 
renders immaterial any enur tlJe j udge 
p1ay have committed in respect to the ef­
fect of the delivery at the station. 
It is difficult to find any evidence justify­
ing the submission to the jury of the sec 
ond questio n ;  but no exception was taken 
to such submission. The motion for a non­
suit would Lave raised that point, were it 
not for the fact that there was evidence to 
go to the j u ry on the claim of $32 for bar­
rels, and this precluded a nonsuit. ·we 
think however that the error in the charge 
may have misled the jury in passing upon 
the second question;  at all events, it is not 
impossible that it should have done so. 
Having been i nstructed that upon the fact 
as they found it in respect to the agree­
ment for a deli•ery at Blood's 8tatiou. tl:e 
title to the goods bad passed to the de­
fendant before the receipt of them at New 
York, and that their •erdict mnst be for 
the plaintiffs, they may have examined the 
question of his acceptance of them at Xew 
York with less scrutiny than they would 
ha•e exercised bad they been informed that 
the result of the case depended upon their 
finding on that question. And the construc­
tion of the defendant's acts a nd language 
may, in some degree, have been influenced 
by the consideration that when the wine 
a rrived in New York the title bad, accord­
ing to the theory on whicb the cnse was 
sul1rnitted to tbem, passed to the defend­
ant, and be bad no right to reject the wines. 
Furtbet·more, we think the judge erred in 
excluding the evidence of tbe contents of 
the telegram which the defendant attempt­
ed to send to the plaintiffs i mmediately up­
on the receipt of tbe w ine. If, as was of­
fered to be shown, it stated that be de­
clined to accept the wine, it was material 
as part of the res gestre. A bona fide at­
tempt, i mmediately on the receipt and ex­
amination of the wine, to communicate 
D i g itized by 
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I such a message, was an act on his vart explaining and qualifying bis co1HIU<;t iu receiving the wine into bis store aucl al­lowing i l to remain there. And even t!Jough 
the message never rcacltcd tlie plamtiITs, i t  
bore upou t h e  quest ion o f  acceptance lJy 
the defendant. The objection to the e>i­
dence of the contents or the telegram was 
not placed on the ground of Olllissiou to 
prnduce tbe origiual, ancl the judge iu llis 
charge instrnctecl tile ju ry that the a t ­
tempt t o  S<'lld this tckgralll did uot affcet 
lbc plainl iffs' rights, for the reason tll,tt it 
was not shown to have been receiYed l1y 
thew, and this was excepted to. I n  Xorman 
v. Pbillivs. 14 i\Iees. & W. 277, the de­
fendant \YU.S allowed to prove tllat on lJeiug 
informed by the rail wa v clerk that the 
goucls were lyiug for him at the station, he 
said be would not take tbelll, a.nu strcsi:; 
was laid upon the fact. Yet this statement 
to the clerk was not communi<·ated to tile 
plaintiffs. Ev idence of an attempt to scml 
a mess:1ge tu tllem to the same effect, 
though unsuccessful, would have been no 
more objectionable than the declaratiou tu 
the clerk. The acts o f  the defe111l:lllt at 
the time of the receipt o f  the guous. and 
his bona fide attempt to communi<:ate to 
the plaintiffs bis rejection of them were I 
think material and co111vetent to rebut any 
presumption of an acceptance arisiug froru 
their retention by him. 
Tue judge was requested to instruct the 
jury that the true meaning of tile defend­
ant's letter of l\Iarch 31 was a refusal to 
accept the wine under the contract. A care­
ful examination of that letter satisfies us 
that the defendant was entitled to ha ·rn the 
j u ry thus instructed. The letter clearly 
shows that the defendant did not accept 
or appropriate the wines. After complain­
iug in strong language of their quality aud 
condition, and of the time and manner of 
their shipment, be says to the plaintiff;;, 
"\Yhat can be done now with the wine after 
it suffered so wnc:h, and shows itself of 
such a poor quality ? I don't know myselr 
and am a ""a iling yuur :l<l>ice and opinion." 
He concludes by expressing- his reg-ret that 
their tirst uirect ti�rnsactiou should have 
turned out so un�a tisfaf'tory, a nd by stat­
ing that be cannot be the sufferer by it, 
and he awaits their tlisposition. 
This language clt>arly inrlicates an inten­
tion to throw upon the plaintiffs the> re­
sponsibility of directing what should he 
done with the wine, and is inconsistent 
with any acceptance or appropriation of 
it  by the writer. 
For these reasons the judgment should 
be re•ersed, and a new trial granted, with 
costs to abide the event. 
All concur. 
Judgment reversed. 
Orig i n-a l  from 
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HOWE V. HAYWARD.
(lOS Mass. 54.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Worcester. Oct. Term, 1871.
T. G. Kent, for plaintiff. P. E. Aldrich, for
defendant
CHAPMAN, C. J. It appears by the report,
that the parties made an oral contract for
the sale of property by the plaintiff to the
defendant, and that each of Ihein deposited
the sum of §200 in the hands of one Tatt.
The plaintiff contended that the money de-
posited by the defendant was given in earn
est to bind the bargain, or in part payment
The defendant contended that it was under
an agreement that the sum should be for-
feited in case he refused without just cause
to perform the contract. The jury found
that it was not deposited in earnest or In
part payment, but was deposited "as a for-
feiture, to be paid over to the party who was
ready to perform the contract, if the other
party neglected to do so;" and under the in-
struction of the court found for the defend-
ant. The plaintiff contends that the find-
ing should have been for the plaintiff, be-
cause. If the money was deposited as a for-
feiture, as stated, it amounted to "earnest"
within the meaning of the statute of frauds.
This depends upon the proper definition of
that term as used in the statute.
The idea of "earnest," in connection with
contracts, was taken from the civil law.
Guterbock on Bracton (Am. tran.sl.) 145. It
is not necessary to consider its precise ef-
fect under that law. As used in the statute
of frauds, "earnest" is regarded as a part
payment of the price. 2 Bl. Comm. 447;
Pordage v. Cole, 1 Saund. olOi; I^ingfort v.
Tiler, 1 Salk. 113; Morton v. Tibbett, 15 Q.
B. 42S; Walker v. Nussey. 16 M. & W. :!02;
1 Dane, Ab. 235. The case of Blenkinsop v.
Clayton, 7 Taunt. 597, cited by the plaintiff',
turned on the question of delivery.
The deposit with Taft was not therefore
equivalent to an earnest to bind the bar-
gain, or part payment, and there was not a
valid sale within the statute of frauds. The
ruling was correct.
Judgment an the verdict.
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108 SALE '. 
HOWE v. HAYWARD. 
(10 Mass. 54.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of Mas achusetts. 
Worcester. Oct. Tenn, 1 71. 
T. G. Kent. for plaintiff. P. E. Aldrich, for 
defendant 
CHAP:.\IA...'\I, C. J. It appears by the report, 
that the parties made an oral contract for 
the sale of property by the plaintiff to the 
1lefe11c1ant. and that each of them deposited 
the sum of $'.WO in the hands of one Taft. 
The plaintiff contended that the money cle­
po ited by the defendant was gi 'l·en in earn 
est to bind the bargain, or in part payment 
The defendant contended that it was under 
an agreement that the sum should be for­
feited i n  case he refused without just cause 
to perform the contract. The jury found 
that it was not depo ited in earnest or in 
part payment, but was depo ited "as a for­
feiture, to be paid over to the party who was 
ready to perform the contract, if the other 
party neglected to do so;" and under the in­
struction of the court found for the defend-
D i g 1t1zect by 
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ant. The plaintiff contends that the find­
ing should have been for the plaintiff, be­
cause, if the money was deposited as a for­
feiture, as stated, it amounted to "earnest.'' 
within the meaning of the statute of frauds. 
This depends upon the proper definition of 
that term as used in the statute. 
The idea of ·•earnest, " in connection 'IYit h  
contracts, was taken from the civil law. 
Guterbock on Bracton (Am. transl . )  143. It 
is not necessary to consider its precise ef­
fect under that law. As used in the statute 
of frauds, "earnest" is regarded as a part 
payment of the price. 2 Bl. Com m. 4-17; 
Pordage v. Cole, 1 Saund. 319i ; Langfort v. 
Tiler, 1 Salk. 113; Morton v. TilJbett, 15 Q. 
B. 428; Walker v. Kussey, 16 ?II. & W. :10�; 
1 Dane, Ab. 235. The case of Blenkinsop v. 
Clayton, 7 Taunt. 597, cited by tlle plaintiff, 
turned on the question of deli very. 
The deposit with Taft was not therefore 
equivalent to an earnest to bind the bar­
gain, or part payment. and there was not a 
valid sale within the statute of frauds. The 
ruling was conect. 
Judgment <Jn the verd ict. 
O ru l'a l  fro 
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BUTLER V. THOMSON et aL
(92 V. S. 412.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Oct.
Term, 1875.
Error to the circuit court of the United
States for tlie Southern district of New
Yorl£.
Mr. William M. Evarts for the plaintiff
in error. Mr. E. H. Owen, contra.
Mr. .Justice HUNT delivered the opinion of
the court.
The plaintiff alleged that on the eleventh
day of July, 1867, he bargained and sold to
the defendants a quantity of iron thereafter
to arrive, at prices named, and that the de-
fendants agreed to accept the same, and pay
the purchase-money therefor; that the iron
arrived in due time, and was tendered to
the defendants, who refused to receive and
pay for the same; and that the plaintiff aft-
erwards sold the same at a loss of $6,581,
which sum he requires the defendants to
make good to him. The defendants inter-
posed a general denial.
Upon the trial, the case came down to this:
The plaintiff employed certain brokers of the
city of New York to make sale for him of
the expected iron. The brokers made sale
of the same to the defendants at 12% cents
per pound in gold, cash.
The following memorandum of sale was
made by the brokers; viz.: —
"New York, July 10, 1867. Sold for Messrs.
Butler & Co., Boston, to Messrs. A. A. Thom-
son & Co., New York, seven hundred and
five (705) packs first-quality Russia sheet-
iron, to an-ive at New York, at twelve and
three-quarters (12%) cents per pound, gold,
cash, actual tare. Iron due about Sept. 1,
'67. White & Hazzard, Brokers."
The defendants contend, that, under the
statute of frauds of the state of New York,,
this contract is not obligatory upon them.
The judge before whom the cause was tried
at the circuit concurred in this view, and
ordered judgment for the defendants. It is
from this judgment that the present review
is taken.
The provision of the statute of New York
upon which the question arises (2 R. S.
p. 136, § 3) is in these words:—
"Every contract for the sale of any good.s,
chattels, or things in action, for the price of
fifty dollars or more, shall be void, unless (1)
a note or memorandum of such contract be
made in writing, and be subscribed by the
parties to be charged thereby; or (2) unless
the buyer shall accept and receive part of
such goods, or the evidences, or some of
them, of such things in action; or (3) unless
the buyer shall at the time pay some part
of the purchase-money."
The eighth section of the same title pro-
vides that "every instrument required by
any of the provisions of this title to be sub-
scribed by any party may be subscribed by
the lawful agent of such party."
Tliere is no pretense that any of the goods
wore accepted and received, or that any part
of the purchase-money was paid. The ques-
tion arises upon the first branch of the stat-
ute, that a memorandum of the contract shall
be made in writing, and be subscribed by the
parties to be charged thereby.
The defendants do not contend that there
is not a sufficient subscription to the con-
tract. White & Hazzard, who signed tlie in-
strument, are proved to have been the au-
thorized agents of the plaintiff to sell, and
of the defendants to buy; and their signa-
ture, it is conceded. Is the signature both of
the defendants and of the plaintiff.
The objection is to the sufficiency of the
contract itself. The written memorandum
recites that Butler & Co. had sold' the iron
to the defendants at a price named; but it
is said there 'S no recital that the defendants
had bought the iron. There is a contract of
sale, it is argued, but not a contract of pur-
chase.
As we understand the argument, it is an
attack upon tlie contract, not only that it is
not in compliance with the statute of frauds.
but that it is void upon common-law princi-
ples. The evidence required by the statute
to avoid frauds find perjuries— to wit, a writ-
ten agreement — is present. Such as it is, the
contract is sufficiently established, and pos-
sesses the evidence of its existence required
by the statute of frauds.
The contention would be the same if the
articles sold had not been of the price named
in the statute; to wit, the sum of fifty dol-
lars.
Let us examine the argument. Blackstone"s
definition of a sale is "a transmutation of
property from one man to another in con-
sideration of some price." 2 Bl. 446. Kent's
is, "a contract for the transfer of property
from one person to anotlier." 2 Kent, 615.
Bigelow, C. J., defines it in these words:
"Competent parties to enter into a contract,
an agreement to sell, the mutual assent of
the parties to the subject-matter of the sale,
and the price to be paid therefor." Gard-
ner V. Lane, 12 Allen, 39, 43. A learned au-
thor says, "If any one of the ingredients
be wanting, tliere is no sale." Atkinson,
Sales, 5. Benj. Sales, p. 1, note, and p. 2.
says, "To constitute a valid sale, there must
be (1) parties competent to contract; (21
mutual assent; (3) a thing, the absolute or
general property in which is transferred
from the seller to the buyer; (4) a price in
money, paid or promised."
How, then, can there be a sale of seven
hundred and five packs of iron, unless there
be a purchase of It? How can there be a
seller, unless there be likewise a purchaser.
These authorities require the existence of
both. Tlie essential idea of a sale is that of
an agreement or meeting of minds by which
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BUTLER v. TIIOMSON et al. 
(92 u. s. 412.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. Oct. 
Term, 1875. 
Error to the circuit court of the United 
States for the Southern district of New 
York. 
Mr. William M. Evarts for the plaintiff 
in error. Mr. E. H. Owen, contra. 
Mi·. Justice HUNT delivered the opinion of 
the court. 
The plaintiff alleged that on the eleventh 
day of July, 1867, he bargained and sold to 
the defendants a quantity of iron thereafter 
to arrive, at prices named, and that the de­
fendants agreed to accept the same, and pay 
the purchase-money therefor; that the iron 
arrived in due time, and was tendered to 
the defendants, who refused to receive and 
pay for the same; and that the plaintiff aft­
erwards sold the same at a loss of $6,581, 
which sum he requires the defendants to 
make good to him. The defendants inter­
posed a general denial. 
Upon the trial, the case came down to this: 
The plaintiff employed certain brokers of the 
city of New York to make sale for him of 
the expected iron. The brokers made sale 
of the same to the defendants at 12%, cents 
per pound in gold, cash. 
The following memorandum of sale was 
made by the brokers ; viz. :-
"New York, July 10, 1867. Sold for Messrs. 
Butler & Co., Boston, to Messrs. A. A. Thom­
son & Co., New York, seven hundred and 
five (705) packs first-quality Russia sheet; 
iron, to arrive at New York, at twelve and 
three-quarters (12*') cents per pound, gold, 
cash, actual tare. Iron due about Sept. 1,  
'67. White & Hazzard, Brokers." 
The defendants contend, that, under the 
statute of frauds of the state of New York,. 
this contract is not obligatory upon them. 
The judge before whom the cause was tried 
at the circuit concurred in this view, and 
ordered judgment for the defendants. It is 
from this judgment that the present review 
is taken. 
The provision of the statute of New York 
upon which the question arises (2 R. S. 
p. 136, § 3) is in these words:-
"Every contract for the sale of any goods, 
chattels, or things in action, for the price of 
fifty dollars or more, shall be void, unless (1) 
a note or memorandum of such contract be 
made in writing, and be subscribed by the 
parties to be charged thereby ; or (2) unless 
the buyer Rhall accept and receive part of 
such goods, or the evidences, or some of 
them, of such things in action ; or (3) unless 
the buyer shall at the time pay some part 
of the purchase-money." 
The eighth section of the same title pro­
vides that "every instrument requireu by 
D t 
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any of the proYisions o f  this tille t o  b e  i:;ub­
scribed by any party ruay be subscribed l>y 
the law.Cul agent of such party." 
There is no pretense that any of the goods 
were accepted and receive(], or that any part 
of the purcbaRe-ruoney was paid. The ques­
tion a1·ises upon the .G1·st branch of the stat­
ute, that a memoran11 um of the contract shall 
be made in writing-, an<l be sulJscribed by tbl' 
parties to be charged thereby. 
The defendants do not contend that thcr" 
is not a sufficient suhseription to tile eon­
tract. White & Ilazznrd, who signed the in­
strument, are proved to have bCC'll the au­
thorizecl agents of the plaintiIT to sell, aJHl 
of the defendants t o  buy ; and their signa 
ture, it is conceded, is the signature both of 
the defendants and of the plaintiff. 
The objection is to the sufficiency of the 
contract itself. The written memoranr1um 
recites that Butler & Co. had sold· the iron 
to the defendants at a price named ; but it 
is said there ;s no recital that the defendant:-; 
had bought the iron. There is a contract of 
sale, it is argued, but not a contract of pur­
chase. 
As we understand the argument, it is an 
attack upon the contract, not only that it i,; 
not in compliance with the statute of frauds. 
but that it is void upon common-law prind­
ples. The eYidence required by the sta t u tP 
to avoid frauds ;rnd perjuries-to wit, a writ­
ten agreement-is present. Such as it is, the 
contract is sufficiently established, and po><­
sesses the evidence of its existence require11 
by the statute of frauds. 
The content10n would be the same if the 
articles sold ball not been of the price name11 
in the statute; to wit, the sum of fifty dol­
lars. 
Let us examine the argument Blackstone's 
definition of a sale is "a transmutation of 
property from one man to another in con­
sideration of some price." 2 Bl. 44.G. Kent's 
is, "a contract for the transfer of p roperty 
from one perRon to another." 2 Kent, Gl:). 
Bigelow, C. J., defines it in these word <; :  
"Competent parties t o  enter into a contract. 
an agreement to sell, the mutual assent 01' 
the parties to the subject-matter of the sale, 
and the price to be paid therefor." Gard­
ner v. Lane, 12 Allen, 39, 43. A learned au­
thor says, "If any one of the ingredients 
be wanting. there is no sale." Atkinson, 
Sales, 5. Benj. Sales, p. 1, note, and p. 2. 
says, "To constitute a valid sale, there must 
be (1) parties competent to contract; (21 
mutual assent;  (3) a thing, the absolute or 
general property in which is transfcrrc1l 
from the s<:>llcr to the buyer; (-!) a price in 
money, paid or promised." 
How, then, can there be a sale of se'l'"en 
hundred and five packs of iron, unless there 
be a purchase of i t ?  IIow can there be a 
seller, unless there be likewise a purcha er. 
These authorities require the existence of 
both. The essential idea of a sale i" that o f  
an agreement o r  meeting of mind� by wllk!.J 
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:i title passes from one. and vests in another.
A man cannot sell his chattel by a perfected
sale, and still remain its owner. There may
be an offer to sell, subject to acceptance,
which would bind the party offering, and
not the other party uniil acceptance. The
same may be said of an optional purchase
upon a sufficient consideration. There is
also a class of cases under the statute of
frauds where it is held that the party who
has signed the contract may be held charge-
able upon it, and the other party, who has
not furnished that evidence against himself,
will not be thus chargeable. Unilateral con-
tracts have been the subject of much discus-
sion, which we do not propose here to reiieat.
In Thornton v. Kempster, 5 Taunt. 7SS. it is
said,—
"Contracts may exist, which, by reason of
the statute of frauds, could be enforced by
one party, although they could not be en-
forced by the other party. The statute of
frauds in that respect throws a difficulty in
the way of the evidence. The objection does
not interfere with the substance of the eon-
tract, and it is the negligence of the other
party that he did not take care to obtain
and preserve admissible evidence to enable
himself also to enforce it."
The statute of 29 Car. II., c. 3, on which
this decision is based, that "no contract for
the sale of goods, wares, and merchandise,
for the price of £10 sterling or upwards, shall
lie allowed to be good except the buyer," &c.,
is in legal effect the same as that of the
statute of Xew York already cited. See .Jus-
tice v. I,ang, 42 N. Y. 4'J3, that such Is the
effect of the statute of New Y'ork.
The case before us does not fall within this
class. There the contract is signed by one
party only; here both have signed the paper;
and, if a contract Is crcaled, it is a mutual
one. Both are lialile, or neither.
I.'ndor these authorities, it seems dear
that there can be no sale unless there is a
pui-chase, as theie can be no jnircliase un-
less there be a sale. When. Iherefore, the
parties mutually certify and declare In writ-
ing that Butler & Co. have sold a certain
amount of Iron to Thomson & Co. at n price
named, there Is included (herein a certldcate
and di'djiratlon that 'ninnisun & Co. have
bought the Iron at that price.
In Newell v. Kadfi.rd. I.. U. .T C. P. 52. the
nieiiiDrandiini w.ms In thi-se words: "Mr. II.,
"." .>ia<'U« culasscs nt .''.'.is.. "MO lbs., to wait or-
ders;" signed, ".lohn Wllllnins." It was ob-
Jci'tfd that If was Imiiosslble to tell from
this meiiioraiidiini which party was the buy-
er, and which wmh the wcller. I';irol proof
of llio Hituiitlon of the parties was roci'lvod,
and that A\'llllaiiiH was the defendant's
agent, and made theonlry In the plnlntirT's
1kk)I(h. In nnnwer to the objection the court
pay, "The plnlntllT was a linker, who would
reipilre the flour, and the defi-ndant u per-
Kon who was In llie habit of selilrig If;" and
the plalntllT recovered. It may be notli-ed.
also, that the memorandum in that case
was so formal as to contain no words either
of purchase or sale ("Mr. H., 32 sacks culas-
ses at 30s., 2S0 lbs., to wait orders"); but it
was held to create a good contract upon the
parol evidence mentioned.
The subject of bought aud sold notes was
elaborately discussed in the case of Sivew-
right V. Archibald, 6 Eng. L. & Eq. 2S6; s. c.
17 Q. B. 103; Benj. on Sales, p. 224, sect. 290.
There was a discrepancy in that case be-
tween the bought and sold notes. The sold
note was for a sale to the defendant of "500
tons Messrs. Dunlop, Wilson, & Co.'s pig-
iron." The bought note was for "500 tons of
.Scotch pig-iron." The diversity between the
bought and sold notes was held to avoid the
contract. It was held that the subject of
the contract was not agreed upon between
the parties. It appeared there, and the cir-
cumstance is commented on by Mr. Justice
Patteson, that the practice is to deliver the
bought note to the buyer, and the sold note
to the seller. He says, "Each of them, in
the language used, purports to be a repre-
sentation by the broker to the person to
whom it is delivered, of what he, the broker,
has done as agent for that person. Surely
the bought note delivered to the buyer can-
not be said to be the memorandum of the
contract signed by the buyer's agent, in or-
der that he might be bound thereby; for
then it would have been delivered to the
seller, not to the buyer, and vice versa as to
the sold note."
The argument on which the decision be-
low, of the ca.se we are considering, was
based, is that the contract of sale is dis-
tinct from the contract of purchase; that to
charge the purchaser, the suit should be
brought upon the bought not(>; and that the
purchaser can only be nold where his agent
has signed and delivered to the other party
a bought note,— that is, an Instrument ex-
pressing that he has bought and will pay
for the articles specified. Mr. .luslice Pat-
teson answers this by the statement that the
bought note Is always delivered to the buyer,
and the sold note to the seller. The plain
tiff here has the signature of both parties,
and the counterpart delivered to him. and
on which he brings his suit, is, according to
Mr. .Justice Patteson, the proper one for that
pin-pose,- that is, the sold note.
We do not dh-cover In .Justice v. I.ang, re-
ported In 42 N. Y. 4!>:i. and again In .-)2 N. Y.
.'(23, any thing that conlllcts with the views
we have f\]>vi ssed, or that gives material
aid In deciding the points we have discussed.
The memoi-aiidum In question, expressing
IliJlt the Iron had been sold, Imported nec-
essarily that It lia<l boon bought. The con-
tract was signed by the agent of both par-
tloH, (he buyer and the seller, and In our
o|ilidon was a jierfect contract, obligatory
u|)iin both the parties thereto.
.Indginent reversed, and cause remanded
for a new triaL
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a title pa,:;ses f!'orn one. and Yest in another. 
A ma11 ca11not sell h is chattel by a perfected 
ale. a n d  still remain its owner. There mar 
lte a n  offer to sell, subject to acceptance. 
which would bind the party offering, and 
1wt tbe othe1· party umil acceptance. The 
-:t me may be said of an optional purchase 
upon a sufficient consideration. There i s  
a lso a dass of cases under t h e  statute o f  
fr:1111ls where it i s  held that the party who 
has "i;.:necl the contract may be held charge­
able upon it, and the other varty, who has 
uot furnished that e;ideot'e a::ainst himself, 
will not be thus chargeable. {;11i lateral con­
tracts b:n·e been the subject of much d iscus­
sion. which we clo not propo e here to repeat. 
In Thornton "I". Kemp ter, 5 Taunt. 7 ·s. it i s  
a id,-
"Contracts may exist. which, br re:-u;on of 
t ht• statute of ftancl>:. could be enforced by 
one party, althon:.:h th('y conld not be en­
fon·cd hy the other party. The t a t u te of 
framls i n  that res!'l'Ct throws a d illicul ty in 
the way of the e\'i1lencc. The objection does 
not i nterfere with the snhstaoce of the con­
trad. and it is the ue�li�ence of tbe other 
Jlarty that he did not take t'are to oht<lin 
an1l pres1•rYe a11 m issible eYiclence to enable 
L i msl'lf also to enforce i t." 
'fhP statute of :..!!> 'ar. I I., c. 3, on whkh 
this 1kl"ision is based, that "no contract for 
the sale of goods, wares. and merchnndi s<'. 
f• r tlw price of £10 sterling: or upwards, shall 
l u · :illo w1•<1 to ul' ;.!•><>tl eXt"<'llt the buyer." &r., 
Is i n lega l Pff1•1·t t he ::;ame as t h n t  of the 
st:1 t 11lr• of Xew York a lrC':Hly ci1N1. Rt>P .Tus­
t i  ·e '" Lan::, 42 • '. Y . . rn:1, that suc:h is the 
l'ITl'c ·t of the st atute of . ·cw York. 
'!'he l':t<:r ht>forc us docs n•H fa l l w i t h i n  t h i s  
<'la ·s. 'I hi' re t h e  1•on t r:H'I is , i;.:1w<l hy OtH' 
p:1 r t r  only ; hL·n· hn t h  h a \'C' sig11l'1l the ]>a per; 
a n1l , if a ('ont ral'f Is c·rt'a t .. 11. I t  is a 11 1 u 1 u: 1 l 
Ol!P. B•>lh are l iah!P, or 1 1 1• it lwr. 
[ ' 11 11 ..  r th r:-c n u t l t ol'i t i Ps, It sC'C'lllS 1·ka r 
t h a t  t h<'re <':t n 1 11• 1 10  :<a IP unless l hl'l'C is a 
1 ' l lr1•! 1:1s1•, :t s t h••I L' 1•:1 1 1  l ip no pur<'h:1 se U n· 
It• · tht•rt' ho 11 811 1<' "'hen, t h1•rpfore, t ht• 
pa rt l 1•� m u t ually c ·1• rt l fy n 11 c l  1h•t•la rL• In w rl t-
1 1 1:.: lhl l l  l int ie r S.: l 'o, IHI \'<' sold a <'P rta l n 
:i mnn n t  o f  I ron tn 'I ho 1 1 1 su11  ,\: Cn. a t  n prlr-c 
Ufl l l l l 'rl,  t lwn• Is i t lf'l llflCd t h l't'P ln n c·1•rl l fk:t t l ' 
a w l  r l f 'l • l:i rn t lt > 1 1  t h n t  Th1 1 1 11s1111 & 'o. h:t \ !' 
1 11 1 1 1;.:ht I hr• 1 1•1111 n t t l 1:1 t pr lr·p 
I n . 'l'WPll \·. l !a tl fo n l ,  J,, It. 3 r:. I'. fi:.!. t he 
mt•1 1 1or11 111l 1 1 m  wn ht t h l '!'I' wnnls: ";lt r. I I . , 
: ::.: ni·I� t -nln� t a I :t:• ..... . :..: f l  lh� , tn \\':I ft or_.. 
d('r ; " IJ: 111•d , ",11'111 1  \\' l l l l 11 111s," I f  w n l:!  nh· 
J 1 •r t <1I t i n t I t  Wit i 1 1 1pofl!;lhlP to t .. 11 from 
t h l ( l l l ' l l l01 11 1 1 < 1 1 1 m  \\ h l rh ) lf l l ' tJ \\ll S t h (' h11y-
1 •r, 11 1 1 1 1  \\ h i d 1  Wit t h e 1 • ! 1 1 •1-. l ': 1 ro l prnnf 
nf t ! H• i l 1 1 : 1 t ln11  of t h P )l:t l"t l 1 •  \\' ilS n•1•"1 1" f'fl , 
:1 1 1d  t ha t  \\' l l l 1:1 rn WllN t l w r l 1 • f1• 1 1 r l :1 1 1 t 'i-1 
:i i:•• 11 t ,  11 1 1 1 1  m nr l i• t h l' f' ll l ry In 1 l 1r ) ll 11 l 1 1 t l lf 'N 
hrio)·I:!, I 11  11 11 s\1·1•r t n t l w nhj1•1'1 Ion t Ill' 1·01 1 1·t 
l!ay, "'1'1 11• p l n h1 I HI'  wnR 11 h:il;1•r, w hn wo 1 1 l r l  
r1•q 1 1 l r,. t l 1 1 •  flnnr, a 11d t h 1• dl' f1 •11 1 l :1 n l  n 1 11• 1·-
1111 whr. \I ll 11 1  1 1 11 l 111 hlt  of r i l i n g  I t ;" 11 1 1 < 1  
t h •• pl:i l n t l lT  n ·1•01·1 · n·r l , I t  1 1 1 1 1 y  111' 11nt l1•f 'd, 
D i g 1t1zect by 
I JTE RNET A R C H  V E  
also, that the memorandum i n  that case 
was so formal as to contain no words either 
of purchase or sale ("�Ir. H., 32 sacks culas-
e at 39s., 2 O lbs., to wait orders"') ; but it 
was held to create a good contract upon the 
parol e;idence mentioned. 
The subject of bought a nd sold note was 
elaborately discussed in the case of ivew­
right v. Archibald, G Eng. L. & Eq. 286; . c. 
17 Q. B. 103; Benj. on Sales, p. 224, sect. :!DO. 
There was a discrepanc�y in that ca e be­
tween the bought and sold notes. The sold 
note was for a sale to the defendant of "500 
tons �lessrs. Dun lop, '"\\" i lson, & Co. 's pig­
iron." The bought note was for "500 tons of 
Scotch pi�-iron." The diversity between the 
bought a ud sold notes was held to aYoid the 
contract. It was held that t he subject of 
t he contract was not agreed upon betwC'en 
the parties. It appeared t here. and the cir­
cumstance is commented on by �Ir. Justice 
Patteson, that the practice is to delh·er the 
bought note to the buyer, and the old note 
to the seller. Ile says, "Each of them, i n  
the language used, purports t o  be a. repre­
sentation by the broker to the per on to 
whom it is deli 'l"ered, of what he. the broker. 
has clone as agent for that person. urely 
the bought note deli n:red to the buyer can­
not be said to be the memorandum of the 
contract signed by the buye>r's agent. i n  or-
1ler that he m h:d1t bt. honud thereby ; for 
then it  woul�1 ha' e been dcl i \·erNl to tht> 
seller, not to the buyer, ancl v ice Yer a as to 
the old note." 
The :n; .. rn mt>nt on which the decision be­
low, of th(' case we are cou idering, was 
ha::;ed, is t hat the <'ontract oi' . ale is dis­
tinct from the contract of p u rchn.l'; th:lt to 
eha1·::t• the purchaser. t h e  suit  ::;hnnltl be 
hrou.!!ht tt l)Oll t he bou�ht nnt P ;  anti that t h c  
Jllll'l'h:ist>r c· a n  onl)· b e  nchl where h i s  ag-ent 
has signed :md ck l h  cred to t he othcr party 
a hou�h l uo te,-t ha t  is, an l n :=;t rnmcnt ex­
press i11g that he has bou!!ht ancl will pay 
fol' the artiC'lCS SJlCt'ifictl. ' f r  . .  h1>:t ke Pat­
t1•son answl•t·s t h is by th<' st:tf C'lllC'lll t h a t  tht' 
hnn;.:ht note Is n l wn y s  de l i \'Cl'C'cl to t lw buyer, 
n nrl  th(' snl1l note to t h<' scllC'r The pla i n  
t l ft' h"rt> h n s  t lw signa t u rc of l1o th 11:u·tics, 
a n o l  t hr 1·1 1 1 1 1 1 t Prp:11t rlel i\"C' rC'Cl to hi m , :m il  
on wh l1' 11 I l l' hrln .::s hi!'! snit,  is, n C'c'ol'!l i n !!  t n  
\I r . . 1 nsl1<·1•  ! 'at  t Psnn,  t hC' prnpC'r one for t b:l t 
J l l l l'lHlSI',- t ll:l t is,  t hC' sold l lOtP 
""r. rln not d i  ·1·11' 1•r I n  .T nstil'C' \'. Lan:?, re­
p11r t C'1I I n  I '.' '\ \ 1n:1. 11 11 1 \  : 1,rnln In �1:..! N. Y .  
:::!;I, : 1 n y  t h l 1w l h :t l 1•nn l l it t s  \\ I t h  t l l l '  Y i Pws 
""" h:l \·,. 1 • \ p n ss!'tl, or t h: 1 t  :.:h ·rs 1 1 1:1 f p rl: 1 l 
:t ic! I n  d1•d d i 1 1 �  f hP pnl n t s  "'" h:t \"l' cl li'l< " llSSP1I. 
'l'hl' 1 1w11 1 1 1rn nd 1 1 1 1 1  In fi l l  PSI inn, ,.. , 1 11· . . ssl 1 1 .�  
t h a t  1 1 11'  l rr m  l a n d  hrr'n sn l d ,  l m pnrt pd 1w1·­
,.R. : i r l l y  t h :t t I t h:td hPrn l 10 11 i.:h! . 'J'hc con­
t r:il ' f  wn sk11 1 '< I  hy t l w H ':<• 1 1 t  or hot h par­
t l 1•i<, t h i> huyrr n n rl t h P sPl l P I' ,  nnc l  In ou r 
opln lnn w n 11  a JlC'rrrct l'nl l t  ract, ohll�alory 
1 1 11011 hot h t hi' pn rt 11·� l 1 1Prcto. 
.l  1 1r1 1'11w11 t rr\ Pr11t•d, nod cu use remanded 
rnr n new I rial. 
O ru P.a l fro m  
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rOHMATION OF THE CONTRACT— STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Ill
SANBOKN et al. v. FLAGLEIt.
(9 Allen, 474.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Nov., 1SI>4.
Contract broujjlit by plaintiffs, who were part-
ners under the firm name of Sanborn, Richard-
son & Co., against .lulm H. Flakier and
Holdane, as partners under the firm name of
Holdane & Co. The writ was served only upon
Flagler. The plaintiffs alleged that the de-
fendants had refused to deliver to them fifty
tons of best refined iron, in accordance with a
written agreement entered into between them.
The defendant set up among other defenses the
statute of frauds. One of the plaintiffs was
ralK'd to the stand, and produced to be offered
in evidence a paper, of which the following is
a copy as near as can be made:
"Will deliver S. R. & Co. best refined iron
50 tons within 00 days— at T^ ct p lb 4 of cash.
Plates to be 10 to Ki inches wide and 9 ft to
11 long. This offer good till 2 o'clock Sept. 11,
1802. J. H. P. J. B. R."
The defendant objected that the paper was
not a sufficient memorandum in writing of the
alleged bargain signed by the party to be char-
ged, and that parol evidence was not admissi-
ble so as to make it such a memorandum as
could be admitted. The judge ruled that the
paper was a sufficient memorandum, and would
bind the defendant if he was a member of the
firm of Holdane & Co. The witness then tes-
tified that the agreement was written by him,
and that he and the defendant signed their ini-
tials, the defendant writing the initials "J. H.
F.," and he the initials "J. B. R.;" and that
before the defendant left the plaintiffs' oiflce,
and before 2 o'clock, he accepted the proposi-
tion, and so stated to the defendant verbally.
The witness testified that he signed his initials
on behalf of the plaintiffs, and that he under-
stood the defendant to sign for the firm of
Holdane & Co. This evidence was not de-
nied by the defendant. The judge ruled that
said paper, with the explanation given, if
Richardson was believed, was a sufficient note
or memorandum, and was binding on the de-
fendant if the juiT found him to be a partner
as alleged. The jury found a verdict for the
plaintiffs, and the defendant alleged excep-
tions.
A. A. Ranney, for plaintiffs. C. T. Russell,
for defendant.
BIGELOW, C. J. The note or memoran-
dum on which the plaintiffs rely to maintain
their action contains all the requisites essential
to constitute a binding contract within the
statute of frauds. It is not denied by the de-
fendant that a verbal acceptance of a written
offer to sell merchandise is sufficient to consti-
tute a complete and obligatory agreement, on
which to charge the person by whom it is sign-
ed. In such case, if the memorandum is oth-
erwise sufficient when it is assented to by him
to whom the proposal has been made, the con-
tract is consummated by the meeting of the
minds of the two parties, and the evidence
necessary to render it valid and capable of en-
forcement is supplictl by the signature of the
party sought to be charged to the offer to sell.
Indeed, the rule being well settled that the
signature of the defendant only is necessary to
make a binding contract within the provisions
of the statute relating to sales of merchandise,
it necessarily follows that an offer to sell and
an express agreement to sell stand on the same
footing, inasmuch as the latter, until it is ac-
cepted by the other party, is in effect nothing
more th;m a proposition to sell on the terms
indicated. The acceptance of the contract by
the party seeking to enforce it may always be
proved by evidence aliunde.
The objections on which the defendants rely
are twofold. The first is that the note or
memorandum does not set forth upon its face,
in such manner as to be understood by the
court, the essential elements of a contract.
But this position is not tenable. The nature
and description of the merchandise, the quan-
tity sold, the price to be paid therefor, the
terms of payment, and the time within which
the article was to be delivered, are all clearly
set forth. But it is urged that the paper does
not disclose which of the parties is the pur-
chaser and which the seller, and that no pur-
chaser is in fact named in the paper. This
^^■ould be a fatal objection if well founded.
There can be no contract or valid memoran-
dum of a contract which does not shew who
are the contracting parties. But there is no
such defect in the note or memorandum held
by the plaintiffs. The stipulation is explicit to
deliver merchandise to S. R. & Co. It cer-
tainly needs no argument to demonstrate that
an agreement to deliver goods at a fixed price
and on specified terms of payment is an agree-
ment to sell. Delivery of- goods at a stipu-
lated price constitutes a sale; an agreement
for such delivery is a contract of sale. Nor
can there be any doubt raised as to the in-
trinsic import of the memorandum concerning
the character or capacity in which the parties
are intended to be named. A stipulation to
deliver merchandise to a person clearly indi-
cates that he is the purchaser, because in every
valid sale of goods delivery must be made by
the vendor to the vendee. We can therefore
see no ambiguity in the insertion of the name
of the purchaser or seller. The case is much
stronger in favor of the validity of the memo-
randum in this respect than that of Salmon
Falls Manuf. Co. v. Goddard. 14 How. 440.
There only the names of the parties were in-
serted, without any word to indicate which
was the buyer and which was the seller. It
was this uncertainty in the memorandum
which formed the main ground of the very
able dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Curtis
in that case. So in the leading case of Bailey
V. Ogden, 3 Johns. 399, there was nothing in
the memorandum to shew which of the two
parties named agreed to sell the merchandise.
But in the case at bar, giving to the paper a
rea.sonable intenuetation, as a brief document
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SA::\Bl)lt::-;' et al. v. I•'LAG LE H.. 
(9 Allen, 474.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of i\Inssachnsetts. 
Nov., 1804. 
Contract brought by pla intiff>;, wbo were part­
m•rs umler the firm name of Sanborn, Ricbard­
s1 1 1 1  & Co. , a.!!:ainst .John II. I•'lngler a u d  
Holtla ne, a s  partners un cler the firm name of 
IIolclane & Co. 'file writ was served only upon 
Flagler. The plaintiffs a lleged tbat tbe de­
fendants bad refused to deliver to them fifty 
tons of best refined iron, in acconl:mce with a 
written agreement entered into between them. 
The defendant set up among other defenses the 
statute of frauds. One of the plaintiffs was 
«<lll1•1l to the stand. and prorltwed to be offered 
in C'\ idence a paper, of whid1 the follow ing is 
a c•qpy as near as can be made: 
"Will deliver R. TI.  & Co. best refined iron 
;-,o tons within 00 days-at :; ct p lb 4 of cash. 
Plates to be 10 to rn i nr·bes wide and D ft to 
11 long. This offer good till 2 o'clock Sept. 11,  
1Sfi2. J. H .  F. J.  B .  R." 
'l'he defendant objected that the paper was 
not a sufficient memorandum in writing of the 
:illegeu barga in signed by the party to be <'bar­
geil, and that parol evidence was not admissi­
ble so as to make It such a memorandum as 
could be admitted. The j udge ruled that the 
vnper was a sufficient memorandum, ancl would 
bind the defendant if he was a membe1· of the 
firm of Haldane & Co. The witness then tes­
tified that the agreement was written by him. 
and that be and the clefendant signed their ini­
tials, the defendant writing the initials ".J. II. 
F.," and he the initials "J. B. R. ;" anrl 1 bat 
before the defendant left the plaintiffs' otlice, 
and before 2 o'cloC'k. he acC'epted the proposi­
tion, and so stated to the defendant verbally. 
The w itness testified that he signed his initials 
on behalf of the plainti!Is, and that he uncler­
stood the defendant to sign for the firm of 
Holrtane & Co. This e,-iclence was not de­
nied by the defendant. The judge ruled that 
said paper, with the explanation given, if 
Hichardson was believed. was a sufficient note 
or memorandum, and was binding on tbe de­
femlant if the jury found him to be a partner 
as alleged. The jury found a verdict for the 
plaintiffs, and tbe defendant alleged excep­
tions. 
A. A. Ranney, for plaintiffs. C. T. Ru>;scll, 
for defendant. 
TIIGELO\\', C. J. The note or memoran­
dum on which the plaintiffs rely to maintain 
their action contains all the requi>;ites es::;ential 
to constitute a binding contract within the 
statute of frauds. It is not denied by the cle­
fendant that a verbal acceptance of a written 
offer to sell merchandise is sufficient to consti­
tute a complete and obligatory agreement, on 
which to charge the person by whom it is sign­
ecl. In such case, if the memorandum is oth­
envise sufficient when it is a sented to by him 
to whom the proposal bas been made. the con­
tract is consummated by the meeting of tbe 
[ t 
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rui1Hls of the two rmrlic•s, :11111 th<' ,.,·i•I• 11"" 
nef'essary to rentler it Yalicl am! c:ipaLle of "ll 
fon·ement is suv11l ie• I 1.Jy the signature of ti • 
varty sought to I.Jc eha rgl•1l tu th<' offer to !'t:ll 
Indecu, the 111le being well fwltlell that thC' 
signature of tbe clcfcntlant only is necc�!'ary to 
make a binding eon t ract within tbe pr0Yisio11'5 
of the statute relating to sales of mcreh:rn1li�t·. 
it neC'essal'ily follows that an offer to sell anu 
an ex11res5' agreement to sell stand on the sawe 
footing, inasmueh as the latter, until it b ac .. 
cc>pteu by the other party, is in effect not!Jin:.: 
more than a proposition to sell on the terms 
ind icated. The accepta nce of the contract 1.Jy 
the party seek ing to en force it may always 1.Jc 
proved by eviuence ali uncle. 
The objections on wbic:b the defendants rely 
are twofold. The first is 1 hat the uote or 
memorandum does not set forth uvun its face, 
in such manner as to be understood by tile 
court, the esseuti:il elements or a contract. 
But this position is not tenable. Tbe natmv 
and description of the merchandise, the quan­
tity sold, the prke to be paid therefor, the 
terms of payment, and tbe t i me within whi<'h 
the article was to be clelivered, are all clearly 
set forth. But it is urged that the paper doPs 
not disclose which of the parties is the pur­
ch:lser and which tbe seller. and that no pur­
chaser is in fact named in the vaper. This 
would be a fatal objection if \Yell founue1l. 
There can be no contract or valid memoran­
dum or a contract which does not shew who 
are tbe contracting parties. But there is no 
such defect in the note or memorandum held 
by the plaintiffs. The stipulation is explicit to 
deliver merchandise to S. R. & Co. It cer­
tainly needs no argument to demonstrate that 
an agreement to deliver goods at a fixetl price 
and on specified terms of payment is an agree­
ment to sell. Delivery of goods at a stipu­
lated price constitutes a sale; an a�reemcnt 
for such delivery is a contract of sale. Xor 
can there be any uoubt raise•l as to the in­
trinsic import of the memorandum concerning 
the C'haracter or capacity in which the parties 
arc> intended to be named. A stipulation to 
cldi Yer merchandise to a person clearly indi­
cates that he is the purchaser, because ill every 
valid sale of goods deli>ery must be made by 
the vendor to the vendee. �Ve can therefore 
sec no ambiguity in the insertion of the name 
of the purchaser or seller. The ca!'e is mm·h 
stronger in fa Yor of the validity of the memo­
rantl nm in this rei<pect than that of Salmon 
Falls )fanuf. Co. v. Goduard. 14 How. 4-!li. 
There oulv the names of the parties were in­
serterl. without any word to inclil'ate wbil'h 
was the buyer anu which was the seller. It 
was this uncertainty in the memorandum 
which formed the main ground of the very 
able di;;senting opinion of )Ir. Justice Curtis 
in that case. So in the leading case of Bailey 
v. Ogden, 3 Johns. 399. there was nothing i n  
the memorandum to shew which o f  the mo 
parties named agreed to sell the merchandise. 
But in tbe ca!:'<e at bar. �iving to the paper a 
rea.o:;onable interpretation. as a brief tlocument 
: . .  ,,, . n:a l  from 
U NIVER SITY OF CALI FOR N IA 
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di-awn up In tlie haste of business and intend-
ed to express in a few words the terms of a
bargain, we cannot entertain a doubt that it
indicates with sufficient clearness that the
plaintiffs were the purchasers, and the defend-
ant the seller of the merchandise, on the terms
therein expressed. Indeed we can see no rea-
son why a written agreement by one party to
dehver goqds to another party does not as clear-
ly shew that the latter is the purcha.ser and
the former the seller as if the agreement had
been in express terms by one to sell goods to
the other.
The other objection to the memorandum Is
that the name of the party sought to be char-
ged does not appear on the face of the paper.
If by this is meant that the signatures of all
the pei'sons who are named as defendants are
not atlixed to the memorandum, or that it is
not signed with the copartnership name under
which it is alleged that the persons named as
defendants do business, the fact is certainly so.
But it is not essential to the validity of the
memorandum that it should be so signed. An
agent may write his o^vn name, and thereby
bind his principal; and parol evidence is com-
jietent to prove that he signed the memoran-
dum in his capacity as agent. On the same
principle, a partner may by his individual sig-
nature bind the firm, if the contract is within
the scope of the business of the firm, which
may be shewn by extrinsic evidence. Soames
V. Spencer, 1 D. & E. 32; Long, Sales, 3S;
Browne, St. Fraud, § 367; Higgins v. Senior,
S U. & W. 834; Williams v. Bacon, 2 Gray,
3S7, 393. Besides, in the case at bar. the ac-
tion is in effect against Flagler alone. He
only has been served with process and appears
to defend the action. Whether he signed as
'agent for the firm or In his individual capacity
is innnaterial. In either aspect he is liable
on tlie contract.
It is hardly necessary to add that the signa-
ture is valid and binding, though made with
the initials of the party only, and that parol
evidence is admissible to explain and apply
them. Phillimore v. Barry, 1 Camp. 513; Sal-
mon Falls JIanuf. Co. v. Goddard, ubi supra;
Barry v. Combe, 1 Pet 640. Exceptions over-
ruled.
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drawn up ln the ha te of business and intend­
ed to express in a few words the term of a 
bargain, we cannot entertain a doubt that it 
illdlcates with sufficient clearness that the 
plaintiffs were the purchasers, and the defend­
ant the seller of the merC'h:rndise. on the terms 
therein expressed. Indeed we can see no rea­
�on why a written agreement by one party to 
deli'l'er goqds to another party does not as clear­
ly shew that the latter is the purcha er and 
the former the seller as if  tbe agreement had 
l ieen in express terms by one to sell goods to 
the other. 
The other objection to the memoran1lum is 
that the name of the party sought to be ehar­
:.:ed does not appear on the face of the paper. 
If by thi is meant that the signatures of all 
the persons who are named as defendant· are 
not affixed to the memorandum, or that it is 
not signed with the copartnership name under 
which it is alleged thnt the persons nnmed a 
defen<lants do busine s, the fact is certainly so. 
But it is not c. sential to the validity of the 
memorandum that it should be so signed. A n  
agent may write bis own name, and thereby 
D ! ;;J ltlZ. by 
I NTE R �ET ARC HIV E  
llind bis principal ; and parol evidenC"e i s  coru-
1ietent to pro'l'c that he signe<l the memor:rn­
dum in his capacity as agent. O n  the same 
principle. a partner may by bis indi'l'iclu:ll sig­
nature bind the firm, if the contract is within 
the scope of the business of the firm. which 
may be shewn by extrinsic e'l'i<lence. Soarues 
v. Spencer, 1 D. & R. 32 ; Long, Sales, 3�; 
B1·owne, St. Fraud. § 367; Higgins v. Senior, 
:\I. & W. :14 ;  \\-illiarus v. Bacon, 2 Gray, 
3 7, 3!)3. Besides. in the case at bar, tbe ac­
tion i · in effect against Flagler alone. He 
only has been Set"l'ed with process and appears 
to defend the action. Wbether be sigucn a -
•agent for the firm or in bis indi'l'idual capacity 
is immaterial. In either aspect he is liable 
on the contract. 
It i hardly necessary to add that the signa­
ture is 'l'ali<l and binding, though made with 
the initials of the party only, and that parol 
e'l'idcnc:e is admissible to explain and apply 
them. Pbillimore v. Barry, 1 Camp. 513; Sal­
mon Falls ::.\Ianuf. Co. v. Goddard, ubi supra ; 
Barry v. Combe, 1 Pet. 640. Exceptions oYe� 
ruled. 
O ri i n l  frcrr1 
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EFFECT OF TIJK CON Tli ACT— SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTEL.
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COMMONT\'EALTH v. FLEMING.
(18 Atl. Rep. 622, 130 Pa. St. 138.)
Siiprpme Court of Pennsylvania. Nov. 4, ISSO.
Error to court of quarter sessions, Mercer
county.
The pliiintilT in error, Joseph Fleming, be-
ing a wluilcsiile liquor dealor, licensed and
carrying,' on bii.siness in Alleglii/ny county,
sold and sent from his place of business, 0.
O. D., to Moreer county, wliero he had no li-
cense, liquors ordered by persons in the latter
county. For this he was, at the court of
quarter .ses.sions of Mercer county, indicted,
tried, convicted, and sentenced for selling
liquor therein without a license. He now
brings error.
i3eioie Paxson, C. J., Stekrett, Green,
Clakk, Williams, McCollum and Mitch-
ell, JJ.
Georfje Shiras, Jr., a)id William S. Pier,
for plaintiff in error. 6? W. McBride, Dist.
Atty., /. A. atranahan, and S. H. Miller,
for the Commonwealth.
GUEEX, J. In the case of Garbracht v.
Com., 96 Pa. St. 449, wliich was an indict-
ment for selling liquor without license, we
lield that "the place of sale is the point at
wliich goods ordered or purchased are set
apart and delivered to the purcliasfr, or to a
common carrier, who, for the purposes of de-
livery, represents him." In tiiat case the or-
der for the liquor was solicited and obtained
by tlie defendant in the county of Mercer, but
was sent to his principal, who was a liquor
dealer in the county of Erie. The order was
executed by the principal, who, in the county
of Erie, at his place of business, separated or
set apart from his general stock the licjuor
ordered, and delivered it to a common carrier
to be forwarded to its destination in Mercer
County. We decided that this was no viola-
tion of the law prohibiting sales without li-
cense, althongli neither the defendant, who
was a traveling agent, nor his principal held
any license for the sale of liquor in Mercer
county. This decision was not changed in
the least upon a subsequent trial of the same
defendant on a different state of facts, as re-
ported in 1 I'enny. 471. In the case now un-
der consideration the liquor was sold upon
oiders sent by mail by the purchasers, living
in Mercer county, to the defendant, who is a
wholesale liquor dealer in Allegheny county.
The goods were set apart at the defendant's
place of business in Allegheny county, and
were there delivered to a common carrier,
consigned to the purchaser at his address in
Mercer county, and by the carrier transported
to Mercer county, and there delivered to the
purchaser, who paid tiie expense of trans-
portation. Upon these facts alone, the de-
cision of this court in the Case of Garbracht,
supra, is directly and distinctly applicable,
and requires us to reverse the judgment of
the court below, unless there are other facts
GRIF. PEKS.PROP. — 8
in the case which distinguish it from that of
Garbracht.
It is claimed, and it was so held by the
court below, that, because the goods were
niarUed "C. O. D.," the sale was not complete
until the delivery was made; and as tliat took
place in Mercer county, where the defendant's
license was inoperative, he was without li-
cense as to such sales, and becan)e subject to
the penalty of the criminal law. The argu-
ment by which this conclusion was reached
was simply that the payment of the price was
a condition precedent to the delivery, and
hence there was no delivery until payment,
and no title passed until delivery. The legal
and criminal inlerence was, the sale was made
in Mercer, and not in Allegheny. This rea-
soning ignores certain facts which require
consideration. The orders were sent by the
purchasers, in Mercer, by mail to tlie seller,
in Allegheny, and in the orders the purchas-
ers requested the defendant to send the goods
C. O. I). The well-known meaning of such
an order is that the price of tlie goods is to be
collected by the carrier at the lime of the de-
livery. The purchaser, for his own conven-
ience, requests the seller to send him the
goods, with authority in the carrier to receive
tlie money for them. This method of pay-
ment is the choice of the purchaser, under
sucli an order; and it is beyond ipiestion that,
so far as the puicliaser is concerned, the car-
rier is his agent for the receipt and transmis-
sion of the money. If the seller accedes to
such a request by the purchaser, he certainly
authorizes the purcliaser to pay the money to
the carrier, and tlie purcliaser is relieved of
all liabilities to the seller for the price of the
goods if he pays the price to the carrier. The
liability for the price is transferred from the
seller to the carrier; and whether the carrier
receives the price or not, at the time of deliv-
ery, he is liable to the seller lor the price if he
does deliver. Substantially, therefore, if the
delivery is made by the carrier, and he chouses
to give credit to the purchaser for the pay-
ment of the price, the transaction is complete,
so far as the seller is concerned, and the pur-
chaser may hold the goods. Of course, if the
seller were himself delivering the goods in
parcels upon condition that on delivery of the
last parcel the price of the wliole should be
paid, it would be a fraud on the seller if the
purchaser, after getting all the parcels, should
refuse to perform the condition upon which
he obtained them, and in such circumslances
the seller would be entitled to recover the
goods. This was the case in Henderson v.
Lauck, 21 Pa. St. .359. The court below, in
that case, expressly charged that if the seller
relied on the promise of the purchaser to pay,
and delivered the goods absolutely, the right
to the property was changed, although the
conditions were never performed; but if he
relied, not on the promise, but on actual pa}--
ment at the delivery of the last load, he might
reclaim the goods if the money was not paid.
The case at bar is entirely different. So far
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SALES.
as the seller is concerned, he is satisfied to
take the responsibility of the carrier for tlie
price, in place of that of the seller. He au-
thorizes the purcliaser absolutely to pay the
price to the carrier; and, if lie does so, un-
doubtedly thfe purchaser is relieved of all re-
sponsibility for the price, whether the carrier
ever pays it to the seller or not. But the car-
rier is also authorized to deliver the goods.
If he does so, and receives the price, he is of
course liable for it to the seller. 15 ut he is
equally liable for the price if he chooses to de-
liver the goods without receiving the price.
It cannot be questioned that the purchaser
would be liable also; but, as he had received
the goods from one who was authorized to de-
liver them, his right to hold them even as
against the seller is undoubted. In other
words, the direction embodied in the letters
"C. O.D.," placed upon a package committed
to a carrier, is an order to the carrier to col-
lect the money for the package at the time of
its delivery. It is a part of the undertaking
of the carrier with the consignor, a violation
of which imposes upon the carrier the obliga-
tion to pay the price of the article delivered,
to the consignor. We have been referred to
no authority, and have been unable to discov-
er any, for the proposition that in such a case,
after actual, absolute delivery to the purchas-
er by the carrier without payment of the
price, the seller could reclaim the goods from
tlie purchaser as upon violation of a condition
pri'cedent.
if, now, we pause to consider the actual
contract relation between the seller and pur-
chaser, where the purchaser orders the goods
to be sent to him C. O. ])., the matter be-
comes still more clear. U|ion such an order,
if it is accepted by the seller, it becomes the
duty of the seller to ileliver the goods to the
carrier, with instruction to the carrier to col-
lect the piice at the time ot delivery to the
)iurchascr. In such a case it is the duty of
the purchaser to receive the goods from the
carrier, and, at the time of receiving them,
to pay the price to tlie carrier. This is the
whole of tlio contract, so far as the seller and
the purchaser are concerned. It is at once
apjiarent that when the seller has delivered
the goods to the carrier, with the instruc-
tion to collect the price on delivery to tlie
purchaser, he has performed his whole duly
undrr the con tract; he has nothing more to do.
It the [lurchaser fail to perform liis jiart of
the contract, the seller's right of action is
comph-le; and he may recover the price of the
goods from the purchaser, where the pur-
chanor takes, or refuses to take, the goods
from the carrier. Hence it follows that the
paKs.igo of the title to Hie purchaser is not
pssi-ntial to tlie legal comjiletcness of the con-
tract of sale. It is, in fact, no ?nore than the
ordinary case of a contract of sale, wherein
the seller tenders delivery at Hie time and
place of delivery agreed upon, but the pur-
chaiter refuses p.rfcirmance. In such case it
is perfectly familiar law that tlie ]iiir('haser
ia legally ilalile to pay the price of the gouils
' although, in point of fact, he has never had
them. The order to pay on delivery is
merely a superadded term of the contract;
but it is a term to be performed by the pur-
chaser, and has no other effect upon the con-
tract than any other term affecting the
factum of delivery. It must be performed
by the purchaser, just as the obligation to re-
ceive the goods at a particular time or a par-
ticular place. Its non-performance is a breach
by the purchaser, and not by the seller, and
therefore cannot affect the right of the seller to
regard the contract of sale as complete, and
completely performed on his part, without
any regard to the question whether the title to
the goods has passed to the purchaser as upon
an actual reception of the goods by him. If
this be so, the case of the commonwealth falls
to the ground, even upon the most critical
consideration of the contract lietwecn the par-
ties, regarded as a contract for civil piirfioses
only. The duties which lie intermediate be-
tween those of the seller and those of the
purchaser are those only which pertain to,
and are to be performed by, the carrier.
These, as we have before seen, are the ordi-
nary duties of carriage and delivery, with
the additional duty of receiving the price
from the purchaser, and transmitting it to
the seller. The only decided case to which
we have been referred which presents the ef-
fect of an order C. O. D. to a carrier is Ilig-
gins v. Murray, 73 N. Y. 252. There the
defendant eiiqiloyed the plaintiff to manu-
facture for liiiii a set of circus tents. When
they were finished, the plainlilf shipped them
to the defendant C. O. I)., and they were de-
stroyed by lire on the route. It was held that
the defendant, who was the ]iurcliaser, should
bear the loss; that the plaintilf had a lien on
the tents for the value of his labor and ma-
terials, and his retaining his lien liy shipping
them C. O. D. was not inconsistent with, aiul
did not affect, his right to enforce the de-
fendant's liability. In the course of tlio
Opinion, Chief .Iiistico I'lii'itcH said: "Siip-
Iiose, in this case, that the defendant had re-
lused to accejit a delivery of the tent, his lia-
bility would have been the same, although
the title w;is not in him. The plaintiff had
a lien ujiou the iirticle for the value of his
lalior and materials, which was good as long
as he retained possession. * • * Hetain-
ing the lien wjis not inconsistent with his
right to enforce the liability for which this
aclion was brought. That liability was com-
pl le when the request to ship was made by
the defendant, and was not alTecled by com-
plying with the rei|uest, nor by retaining the
lien the same as when the request was uiado.
As the article was shipped at the request of,
and for the benellt of, the defendant, (assum-
ing that it was done in aci'ordance with the
directions,) it follows that it was at his risk,
and could not iiiqiair the right of the jilaiu-
tiff to recover for the amoiiiit due him upon
the ]ierformance of his contract. * • *
As before slated, the point as to who had the
Ullo is not decisive. It may be Hdmitlod
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
7:
38
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/u
c2
.a
rk
:/1
39
60
/t
90
86
js
3p
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
1 14 SALES. 
as the seller is  concerned, he is satisfied to 1 although , in point of fact, be has never bad 
take the responsibi l i ty of the carrier for the them. The onler to pay on del i ,·ery is 
price, i n  place of that of the seller. He au- merely a s uperadded term of the contract; 
thorizes the purchaser absolutely to pay the bnt it is a term to be performed by the p u r­
price to the carrier;  and, i f  he does so, un- chaser, and has no other effect upon the con­
doubteuly tire purchaser is relieved of all re- tract than any other term affecting the 
sponsibility for the price, w hether the carrier factum of delivery. It must be performed 
ever pays it to the seller or not. B u t  the car- by the p u rchaser, j u st as the obligation to re­
rier is also au thorized to deliver the goods. ceive the goods at a particular t i me or a par­
If he does so, and recei ms the price, he is of ticular place. Its non-performance is a breach 
course liable for it to the seller. B u t  he is by the p u rchaser, and not by the sellPr, a n d  
equally l iable for the price i f  he chooses t o  de- therefore can not affect the right of t he seller to 
l i rnr the goods w ithout receiving the price. regard t he co ntract of sale as complete, and 
H can not be questioned that the p u rchaser completely performed on bis part, w i thout 
would be liable also ; but, as he had recei ved any regard to the question wbethPr the t i tle to 
the goods from one w ho was authorized to de- the goods bas passed to the purchaser as upon 
l i ver them, h is r ight to hold t hem eYen as an actual reception of the goods by h i m .  H 
against the seller is u ndoubted . In other this be so, the case of the coinmon wPalth falls 
words, the d i rection embodied in the letters to tlie ground, e\•en u po n  the mo t cri tical 
" C. O. D., " placed upon a package commi tted consideration of t.he contract brtween the par­
to a carrier, is an "rder to t he ca rrier to col- t i es, regarded as a contract for c i vil pu rposes 
lect the money for the package at the t ime of only. The du ties which l i e  i n termediate be­
its del i Ye ry. I t  i s  a part of the u ndc>rtaldng tween those of the seller a n d  those of the 
of the carrier w ith the consignor, a violat ion p u rchaser are those only w hi ch pertai n to, 
of w h ich i m poses upon the carrier the obliga- and are to be performed by, the carrier. 
tion to pay the price of the article delivered, These, as we have before seen, are t he ordi­
to the consign or. We have been refrrred to nary d uties of carriage anu del i very, w i th 
110 authority, and have been unahle to discov- the additional d u ty of receiving the price 
er any, for the proposition that. in such a case, from the p u rchaser, and tr:in m i tti ng it to 
after actual, absol ute delivery to t he pure has- the seller. The only decided case to wh ich 
er by t he carrier without paymen t of the we have been referred which pre ents the e(­
price, the seller coulrl reclaim t he goods from feet of an order C. O. D. to a carrier is II i g -
t l w  Jlll r<"haser a s  upon violation of a condition g i n s  v .  M urray, 73 N. Y. 352. T h e re  t l i e  
p r,.cc1len t. defendant employed the plai n t i ff to manu-
H, now, we pause to consider the actual fact u re for h i m  a SPt of circus te n t s .  \\' hPn 
con tract relation between the seller and pur- they were fin ished, I.he pla i n t t  ff s h i pped them 
chasc�r. w here the p u rchaser orders t.he goods to the defemlant C. O. D., a111.l tht>y were uc­
to l.Je sent to h i m  C. 0. D . ,  the mat.Ler be- strayed by fire on the route. It was held Lhat 
l'Otl lf'S sLl l l  more clear. Upon such an onlcr, the defendant., w ho was the p u rchaser, should 
1(  1t 1 s  accepte1l by the seller, it. becomes the l.Jear I.he loss ; that t he plai n ti ff ! tad a l ien on 
d u ty of t.l ie sPl ler to dt'l i v  r the goods to the the te nts for the value of h is lalJur anu ma­
ranier, wi t. I t  1 m;t.ructiun to the carrier to cul- terials, and llis ret.ai n i ng hi· l ien l.Jy luppi ng 
lect. thr pnce at I.he t 1 n i o  ot del t \ ery to the them C. O. D. was uot i n consistent w i t h ,  and 
1 1 1 1 rrhasPr. I n  snch a case it is tho d U t) of d id not aJ.Iert, h is right to enforce the de­
t l tP p1ncl ia!lcr to rccd ve Uie goods from the fenuant's l i abil ity. Jn I.he course of tlto 
1 ·anwr, and , at t lw t i me of recei \  i ng them, opuiiou, Chief .1 11 l ice Cu m·n sail.I : "l-l up­
Lu pay thu p r ice to tltu earner. l'h1:1 is t.be {>USO, in this case, tlrnt I.he defendant. hau re­
w hole of the ront rac-1 . i;o far a s  the seller and f used to accept a deli very of t br tent, his J i  a­
t he pu rf'haser am cone: ·rnl.'d. ll is at once IJi l i ly would ha\' been the same, although 
appa nm t  t h at. w hen the seller has del t v ert>d the title was not in h i m .  Tho plai n l i [  lm1l  
t he goods to Llw ca rril'r, w i t h  L i te i n�trnc- a J i!'n upon the :nlicl for lht' val ue of his  11 
l ion to cul le1·t l i te  ptiee on dt• l i y  ry to the J labor and mal rri : i ls,  w hich was gootl as 1011 "' li 
pn rrhasPr, hi' ha� perfornwd hi�  whole d u t y  a� he retai ned JH lHSl'ssiun . * * * Helai n- �r 
1 1 11 1kr l l w r1111l1 af'L ; he has not h i ng m orc tu 1lo. i n g  l l ll' l i o n '' a� not i n consi�t!'nt. w i t h  ! t is ot 
It ll 1 1 ·  p 1 1 1 d1a�"' fa i l  to perfnr i 1 1  h i1:1 pnt t. ol right t o  en force th l iahi l 1 Ly for w h i ch th is 111 
lltn r·1 1 u t i al'l ,  tlrn llPllN'l:I right. of ndion is :IC'l ion wa'I l trn 1 1gltt.  '!'hat. l i abil ity \HIS com­
c·or11 plt I P ;  and he may n·cn\ l'l tho prico ol the pl tr '' lwn I.Ill' rcqnrsl to R h i p  wus mad<' by 
gond11 l i 1 1 1 1 i  t l w p t t rcha111·1-, w hero t ho p n r- t l l!' 1 ll'fl'n1 lan l ,  and waR not a!Trctrd by com­
cha r•r l a l  i·s • .  or 11•! 11111·11 t
.
o tal-c•, Llw goo1 l 11  t �IJi n g  w i t h  t h e  n•rptcs t ,  n o r  b y  rrt ai n i ng I.he 
from I h1•  ran 1 11 t .  J l 1�11rn it Jollow!I that. tho l ien t 11<' sau1 1• a11 \\ lwn Lhe rPr}IH'St was m ade. 
JiaS!l:tlo(
.
' or t h1• t i l lri to t llf'  11 1 1 1TIHt!ll'I is  not. As t he art 1l'lo wa11 :i h i ppt•d at  Lhe re1p1rst of, 
1•ase 11 t ta I to t lw lt•gal rom pll'I l'n l':'I� ol the rnn- and l or t ho lwnoll  t, of, lite dt•fl'ndant, ( assu m-
1 1 ,ll'L ot alt,. JL 1!!, in fal'l, no mon• than the i ng t hat 1t wa!I do no in ac1•onlance w iLb the 
11 1 r l i 1 1 :1 1 y  <':� 11 of a f'nn t 1 :11'L of 11alo, w lw 1 l' i n  d i rerlions,) i t  fol low� Lhat H was a t  his risk, 
t lrn e1·llrr tf'nr l 1• 1 s  dl' l i \· p r  at t ll!I  t i l l l  aud and C'nnld not, i mpai r  I.he right of the plarn­
pla•·1 o f  r l f'l i VPr) :tgt·r·r•d n pnn, hut th0 p u r- Li ll tn n•rovcr for th amount d t t ll h i m  • 1 pon 
di :i ·r l°l'ftl!lf 8 J ll'J'foJ t l l l l ll!'I'. J n  'l l l l'h  l';\!11' IL t ho porfni man or  hts {'l)Jtlr:\C'L. "' "' * 
ie J l'"i f1 •1•t ly f11 1 1 1 i l iar Ll\V t h at. ! Ill' p u n  h;1 .P1  11'1 lwforo Hl 11(1'< l .  t h  poi nt RR to who had the 
1 11  le H a l ly h.1!Jli tu p.1y f 1 1 1  pl lei' ot' the i,t1111 '  I i 1 1 <  H i  not. d l'i�1 v e .  .lt may be ad m i tted 
D i g 1t1zed by u rt g 1 rc 1  " u r 
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that the plaintiff retained tlie title as secu-
rity for the debt, and yet the defendant was
liable for the debt in a proper personal ac-
tion." It seems to us tliis reasoning is pei-
fectly sound. Practically, it was ruled that
the effect of the order C. O. D. was simply
the retention of tlie seller's lien, and tliat
such retention of lien is not inconsistent
with a rislit of recovery for the price of tha
ailicle, thoucrh, in point of fact, it is not de-
livered to the purchaser. In other words,
tlie literal state of the title is not decisive of
the question of liability of the purchaser, and
he may be coiuj)elled to pay fur the article,
though he never received it into his actual
possession. The chief justice propounds the
very question suggested, heretofore, of a re-
fusal by the pun-liaser to accept the article,
and holds that his liability would be the
same, though the title was not in him.
In Hutchinson on Carriers, at section 389,
the writer thus states the position and duty
of the carrier: "The carrier who accepts the
goods with such instructions [C. O. D.] un-
dertakes that they shall not be delivered un-
less the condition of payment be complied
with, and becomes the agent of tlie shipper
of the goods to receive such payment. He
therefore undertakes, in addition to his duties
as carrier, to collect for the consignor the
price of his goods." And again, in section
o90: "When the goods are so received, the
carrier is held to a strict compliance witli
such instructions; and, if the goods are de-
livered without an exaction from the con-
si;^uee of the amount wliicli the carrier is in-
structed to collect, he becomes liable to the
consignor for it." This is certainly a correct
statement of the position and liability of the
carrier. He becomes subject to an added
duty, — that of collection; and, if he fails to
perform it, he is liable to the seller for the
[irice of the goods. We have searched in
vain for any text-writer's statement, or any
decision, to the effect that in such case no
titli; passes to the purchaser. We feel well
assured none such can be found. But, if
this 1)6 so, the whole theory that the title
does not pass if the money is not paid falls,
and the true legal status of the parties re-
sults that the seller has a remedy for the
price of his goods against the earlier. In
other words, an order from a seller to a car-
rier to collect on delivery, accepted by the
carrier, creates a contract between the seller
and the carrier, for a breach of which by the
carrier the seller may recover the price from
him. So far as the seller and purchaser are
concerned, the latter is liable, whether he
takes the goods from the carrier or not, and
the order itself is a mere provision for the
retention of the seller's lien. While, if the
goods are not delivered to the purchaser by
the carrier, the title does not pass, that cir-
cumstance does not alfect the character of the
transaction as a sale; and the right of the
seller to recover the price from the purchaser,
if he refuse to take them, is as complete as
if lie had taken them, and not paid for them.
j Thus far we have regarded the transactions
between the parties in its aspect as a civil
i contract only; but, when viewed in its as-
' pect as the source of a criminal prosecution,
the transaction becomes much more clear of
j doubt. It is manifest that, when the pur-
I chaser ordered the goods to be sent to him
! C. O. D., he constitute 1 the carrier his agent,
both to receive the goods from the seller, and
to transmit the price to the seller. When,
thrrefore, the goods were delivered to the
carrier at Pittsburgh for the purpose of trans-
povlation, the duty of the seller was per-
formed, as we liave already seen, so far as
he and the purchaser were concerned, and as
between them the transaction was com;)Iete.
The duty of transportation devolved upon
the carrier, and for tliis lie was, in one sense,
the agent of the seller, as well as of the pur-
chaser; but, as it was to be at the expense
of the purchaser, the delivery to the carrier
was a delivery to the purchaser; and this
was ruled in Garbracht's Case. The injunc-
tion to the carrier to collect the money on de-
livery imposed an additional duty on the car-
rier, which the carrier was, of course, bound
to discliarge. This arrangement was a mat-
ter of convenience, both to the purchaser and
the seller, relative to the payment and trans-
mission of the price; but that is all. To con-
vert this entirely innocent and purely civil
convention, respecting tlie mode of collect-
ing the price of the goods, into a crime, is,
in our judgment, a grave perversion of the
criminal law, to which we cannot assent. As
a matter of course, there is an utter absence
of any criminal intent in the case. The de-
fendant had a license. The sale was made
at his place of business, and both the sale
and delivery were completed within the ter-
ritory covered by the license. If, now, a
criminal character is to be given to the trans-
action, it must be done by means of a tech-
nical inference that the title did not pass un-
til the money was paid; and thus that the
place of sale, which in point of fact was in
Allegheny county, was changed to Mercer
county, where no sale was made. Even
granting that, in order to conserve the ven-
dor's lien, such a technical inference would
be justified for the purposes of a civil con-
tract, it by no means follows that the plain
facts of the case must be clothed with a crim-
inal consequence on that account. So far as
the criminal law is concerned, it is only an
actual sale without license that is prohibit-
ed. But there was no such sale, because all
the essential facts which constituted the sale
transpired in Allegheny county, where the
defendant's license was operative. The car-
rier, being the agent of the purchaser to re-
ceive the goods, does receive them from the
seller in Allegheny county, and the delivery
to him for the purpose of transportation was
a delivery to the purchaser. This is the le-
gal, and certainlv the common, understand-
ing of a sale. The statute, being criminal,
must be strictly construed; and only those
acts which are plainly within its meaning,
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
7:
38
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/u
c2
.a
rk
:/1
39
60
/t
90
86
js
3p
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
116
SALES.
according to the common understanding of
men, can be regarded as prohibited criminal
acts. We cannot consider, therefore, tliat a
mere undertaking on the part of the carrier
to collect the price of the goods at the time
of his delivery to the puroliaser, tliough the
payment of the price be a condition of the
delivery, can siiihce to convert the seller's
delivery to the carrier for transportation and
collection into a crime. We therefore hold
that the sales made bj the defendant upon
orders, C. O. D., received from the purchasers
were not in violation of the criminal statute
against sales without license, and the con-
viction and sentence in the court below must
be set aside. The judgment of the court of
quarter sessions is reversed, and the defend-
ant is discharged from bis recognizance up-
on this indictment.
Williams, J., delivered a dissenting opin-
ion.
: k
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1 16 SA LES. 
accordin g to the common understanding of J orders , C. 0. D.,  recei \'ed from the purchasers 
men, can be regarded as prohibite•i cri minal were not in violation of the cri mi nal statute 
acts. We cannot consider, therefore, that a I agai nst sales without li cense, and the con­mere u ndertak i ng on tbe part of the carrier 1 viction and sentence in the court below m u st 
to collect the pri ce of the goods at the t i me be set aside. The j udgment of the court of 
of his  deli very to the purchaser, though the quarter sessions is reversed, and the defond­
payment of the price be a condition of the ant is d ischarged from bis recogn izance up­
del ivery, can suffice to convert the seller's on this i ndictment. 
delivery to the carrier for transportation and 
collection i nto a crime. We therefore bold WILLIAMS, J., delivered a dissenting opin-
that the sales made by the defendant upon ion. 
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GIBBS V. BENJAMIN.
(45 Vt. 124.)
Supreme Court of Vermont. Montpelier. Nov.,
1872.
*Book account. The facts reported by *125
the auditor sufficiently appear in the opin-
ion of the court. The court at the March term,
1871, Rutland county, WirF.iiLER. J., presiding,
rendered judgment on the rejiort for the plain
tiff for the price of the wood sued for. Excep-
tions by the defendant.
R. C. Abell, for plaintifif. Joseph Potter
and Edgerton & Nicholson, for defendant.
REDFIELD, J This action is book account
to recover the price of cord wood alleged by
the plaintiff to have been sold the defendant in
April, 1869. Most of the wood was piled on
the margin of Lake Champlain. on plaintiff's
farm, in Benson, in this state. Two small par-
cels of the wood were on the opposite shore of
the lake. About a week after the negotiation
(which plaintiff claims was a sale), the wood
was carried away by the flood of the lake, and
lost. The report of the auditor gives a minute
detail of every incident of the negotiation, and
submits them to the court to interpret their le-
gal effect.
*137 *The parties met at the instance of the
plaintiff, and inspected the wood; after
some discussion, it was agreed that the defend-
ant should purchase the wood at $8.50 per cord,
the defendant insisting that a portion of it was
less than four feet in length, and that some
abatement should be madefor such deficiency;
to which the plaintiff did riot assent. It was a
part of the agreement, that the parties should
meet and measure the wood, and accordingly,
on the ISlth day of April, 18G9, they proceeded to
measure the several piles of wood, each taking
memoranda of the measurement as it pro-
ceeded. The defendant measured the length
and still claimed some abatement therefor.
The plaintiff insisted that by the terms of the
agreement, the wood was to be assumed to be
four feet in length. "As it was getting dark
when the measurement was completed, the
parties went home, each with the figures for
having a computation of the quantity of wood
made therefrom"; and both parties expressed
their inability to make the computation at the
time. On the 21st of April, the defendant, with
his son, went to the plaintiff's house, to see if
they could agree about the quantity of wood
that had been measured. The plaintiff had
computed the quantity of wood at 3f)4 cords and
some feet; "but, by mistake, had omitted one
pile, containing some GO cords." The defend-
ant informed the plaintiff that he made the
quantity 24G cords, after abating five inches
for deficiency in the length of some portion of
it, and proposed to the plaintiff that he would
take the wood at 246 cords, as he made it, or at
204 cords, as computed by the plaintiff'. The
plaintiff replied tliat he might have it at 204
cords, and the defendant agreed to take it.
After the defendant left, the plaintiff discov-
ered the mistake, and immediatel\' notified the
defendant that he could not have the wood at
21)4 cords. The defendant sent back word that
he would again meet the plaintiff, and did so in
the afternoon of the same day. Plaintiff de-
clined to let defendant have the wood at 204
cords, but consented to throw off 5 inches in
length from two piles. Defendant refused to
take the wood, except at 304 cords. The audi-
tor has stated many other incidents; but this is a
substantial statement of the facts, as detailed
by the auditor. It is not claimed that the
two piles of wood across the lake were de-
*livered to the defendant, either actually *128
or constructively; so the controversy is
contined to the wood situate on the plaintiff's
farm in Benson.
I, The defendant agreed to purchase all the
wood piled on the plaintiff's farm on the mar-
gin of the lake, at .$3.00 per cord; and if this
comprised the whole case, it would be, in the
language of Lord Brougham in the case of Lo-
gan V. Le Mesurier, 6 J\loore P. C, 116 "Selling
an ascertained chattel for an ascertainable
sum"; and by the rule of law applied to the sale
of ponderous and bulky articles, such as wood,
logs, coal and the like, would effectually pass
the property to the vendee. Ilutf^hins v. Gil-
christ. 23 Vt. 88; Sanborn v. Kittrcdgo, 20 lb.
m<J; Birge et al, v. Kdgertou, 38 Vt. 291. But
this case has other elements which impress up-
on it quite a different character. It was part of
the contract that the parties should measure the
wood and ascertain the quantity. They met
for that purpose, and disagreed; and that disa-
greement was as to the substiTnce of the con-
tract. The plaintiff insisted that it was agreed
and part of the contract, that defendant should
take the wood at "running measure"; the de-
fendant claimed that he purchased solid cords;
and that issue grew into controversy, but was
never settled. The report does not state when
the price was to be paid; but in the absence of
any special agreement, it is to be assumed that
it was to be paid on delivery.
The principle is well settled, and uniform in
all the cases, that when any thing remains to
be done by either, or both, parties, precedent
to the delivery, the title does not pass. And so
inflexible is the rule that, when the property
has been delivered, if any thing remains to be
done by the terms of the contract, before the
sale is complete, the property still remains in
the vendor. Parker v. Mitchell, 5 N. H. 165;
Ward v. Shaw, 7 'Wend. 404. The contract
must be executed, to effect a completed sale,
"and nothing further to be done to ascertain
the quantity, quality, or value, of the property. "
Bknkett. .1., in Hutchins v. Gilchrist, sujira.
"The general rule in relation to the sale of
personal property, is, that if any thing remains
to be done by the seller before delivery, no
property passes to the vendee, even as between
the parlies." Pol.\nd, J., in Hale v.
Huntlev et al. 21 Vt. 147: Chit. *Con. 396. *129
This rule of law applied to the facts as re-
ported in this cu.se, retains the property in the
wood in the plaintiff, and leaves the contract
executory, and, as a sale, incomplete. The case
of Simmons v. Swift, 5 B. & C. 8.57, is much like
this, but much stronger in its facts. It was an
action for the price of a stack of bark sold at
£9 OS. per ton. After the sale, it was agreed
between the parties that the bark should be
weighed by two persons, each party to name
one. Part of the bark was weighed and de-
livered, the residue was much injured by a
flood, before it was delivered, and for that rea-
son, the buyer refused to take it. The court held
that the bark was to be weighed before deliv-
ery, to ascertain the price; and as that act had
not been done, the property remained in the
seller, and that he must bear the loss. This
was not a case where a portion was sold to be
measured or weighed from the bulk, which
would have no identity until severed and set
apart; but the whole stack was sold, and a por-
tion weighed and delivered. The subject^ of
the sale was "ascertained" and the price "as-
certainable;" yet the weighing was a thing to
be done before the property passed to the
purchaser.
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SALES.
In case of the insolvency of the defendant.
it could hardly be claimed that the wood be-
came part of his assets. Or if attached by his
creditor, such creditor could hardly show a
color of right, as against the plaintitf.
The plaintiff's counsel seem much to rely on
the case of Gilmour v. Supple. 11 Moore P. C,
531. reported in 7 Am. Law Reg. (old series).
240. in that case, the plaintilT sold a raft of
lumber for a fixed price per foot, with specifica-
tion of the measurement of each log. made by
a public officer appointed for that purpose un-
der the law of Canada, amounting in the aggre-
gate to 71,443 feet, '"to be delivered at Indian
Cove booms. " The seller conveyed the raft to
the place of delivery, made it fast to the booms.
and notitied the servant of the purchaser of the
delivery, who took possession of the same.
The judge charged the jury, that "if there was
an actual delivery at the place, into the posses-
sion of defendant's servants, the plaintiff was
entitled to recover." The jury found for the
plaintiff. Mr. .Justice Crf.ssweix, in delivering
the judgment, reviews, approvingly, the
*130 English^ cases of *Uanson v. Mever, 6
Kast. 014. Rugg v. Jlinelt. 11 lb. 210. and
'Wallace v. Breeds, 13 lb. 522. and Simmons v.
Swift, ut supra, and says: "If it appears that
the seller is to do something to the goods sold
on his own behalf, or if an act remains to be
done by, or on behalf of, both parlies, before
the goods are delivered, the property is not
chatiged." The learned judge then proccedslo
show that the rule of law, well established by
these cases, had no application to that case, and
in conclusion says: "There was. therefore, noth-
ing to be done by the seller on his own behalf;
he had ascertained the whole price of the raft
by the measurement previously made; he had
conveyed the raft to Indian Cove, and, accord-
ing to the finding of the jury, had delivered it
there. Nor was there anythinir further to be
done, in which both were to concur, as in Sim-
mons V.Swift." The jilalntiir recovered bo-
cause the sale was completed by delivery, and
nothing further remained to be done.
II. We think this case within the statute of
frauds. Our statute is a substantial re-enact-
ment of the 29 Charles II., and has received the
same construction given to the English statute.
Spencer v. Hale, 30"Vt. 314, was a book action
for the price of a quantity of fence posts, in-
spected and purchased by defendant, to be de-
livered on the cars at Shaftsbury. The plaintifl;
delivered the posts on the cars furnished by de-
fendant, at Shaftsbury. and they were conveyed
to the defendant's residence in New York.
The defendant claimed that he never "accept-
ed" them. The case turned upon the effect of
the statute of frauds. Chief Justice Redkielu
delivered the opinion of the court, holding that
the reception of the posts ou board the cars
furnished by the purchaser, and the forwarding
of them by the station man. who. for that pur-
pose, was his agent, was an acceptance; and
in defining the rule for compliance with the
statute of frauds, saj's: "It is undoubtedly true
that the defendant, at the time and place, had
a right to repudiate the posts after delivery.
In other words, in order to perfect the case un-
der the statute of frauds, something more is
necessary than a mere delivery of the goods.
In the language of the statute, the purchaser
must 'accept and receive part of the goods."
Authorities might readily be multiplied,
affirming the '*rule in substantially the *131
same language; but we recur to it as of ac-
knowledired authority in our own courts. If
we coulii hold in this case — considering the nat-
ure of the propertj' sold — that there was a con-
structive delivery; yet. under the statute of
frauds, "the purchaser had the right, at the
time and place, to repudiate the wood after de
livery. " And the auditor finds, distinctly, that
the defendant, while the measurement was be-
ing done (an act provided for by the contract
of sale), refused to take the wood upon the
terms and conditions prescribed by the plain-
tiff; and the plaintiff, as distinctly, refused to
let him have the wood upon the terms exacted
by the defendant. It is not important whicli
party was in the wrong. It is enough that the
purchaser refused to "accept" the wood, to
render the sale invalid under the statute of
frauds.
The judgment, therefore, of the county court
is reversed and judgment on the report for the
defendant to recover his costs.
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In ca e of t h e  in solvency of the defendant, 
it  could hardlv be cl ai med that the wood be­
came part of h i s  assets. Or i f  attached by h i s  
creditor, s u c h  credi t o r  could hardlv show a 
color of right. as against the pl a i nti ff. 
The plaintiff's counsel seem much to rely on 
the case of Gilm our v. Supple, 1 1  Moore P. C. , 
551 reported in 7 Am. Law Reg. (old series), 
246. J n  that case. the plaintiff sold a raft of 
l umher for a fixed price per foot. witb specifica­
t i o n  of the measurement of each log-. made by 
a publ i c  officer appoi nted for t h a t  purpooe un­
der t!Je law o f  Canada. amounting in the agg-re· 
gate to 71,4!3 feet . •· to be del ivered at I nll inn 
Cove booms. " The seller l'Onveved the raft to 
the place o f  del i very, m n1le i t  fast to the booms. 
and not ified the servant of the purchaser of the 
del i 1·ery, w h o  took possession of the same. 
The j udge ch:m�ed the j u r y ,  that " i f  there was 
an actuai del i1·  ry at the place, i n to the posses­
sion o f  defendan t ' s  sernrn ts. the plaintiff was 
entit lert to rec·o1·er. " The j u ry found for the 
plaint iff. J'ilr . .  J u stice CREsswEu . .  in deli veri n g  
t h e  j udgment, reviews. approvi ngly, the 
*130 English cases o f  *Hanson v. )lei er, 6 
Ea; L .  fi14. Rugg v. :M i n ctt, 1 1  lb 2(0, an<l 
'Wallace v. llreeds, 13 l b. 522. and immons v. 
._w i ft. ut supra. and says·  " If it appears that 
the seller is to do somet!Jing t o  the g-oods sold 
on h i s own behalf, or i f  an act rem a i n s  to be 
done by, o r  on IJchalf of, both parties. before 
the goods are del i vered, t h e  property is not 
chilTlged. " The learned j u dge then proceeds to 
show that the rule of law, well e tahl ished b1· 
these c:1sl's, bad no applic�tion to that en e. a n i l  
i n  conc·lusion savs:  " "1 here was, th erefore. noth­
in;:r to he done by the seller O U  his OIVD beh:ti  f :  
b e  hn<i ascertnined t h e  whole price o f  the raft 
b,r t!Je mensuremeot pre v i onsly m ad e ;  be h n d  
con 1·e1·f'<i the raft to Indian ( ' 0 1· e .  a n r l .  accord· 
i n �  t o  t h e  rin d i n g  o f  the j n n· ,  had dcli 1·cred i t  
there. . ·or was there an.rt h i n !!  fur1 her to he 
done. in 11hi<"h both were to 1·1 11wur, n� io �im 
mons v. wi lt. " The pl11 i n t 1 1I reco 1·crcd ho· 
can. e the sale wns completed b.v delivery, and 
n othi n� further remained to he doue. II.  \\ e think this case w i t h i n  the statute o f  
frn111ls. Our statute is a substantial re·en nl't· 
meut of the 29 Qbarles II . ,  an d  has received the 
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same construction given to the Engl ish statute.  
Spencer v. Hale, 30 Vt.  314,  was a book action 
for t h e  price o f  a quan tity of fence posts. i n ·  
spected a n d  p u rchased b y  defendant. t o  b e  de­
l i l'ered o n  the cars at Shaftsbury. The plai nti!I 
deliv ered the posts o n  the cars furnished by de­
fendant,  at ::;hnftsbury, a nd they were conveyed 
t o  the defendant's residence in New York. 
The defen dant claimed t hat he never " accept­
ed " them. The case turned upon the effect of 
the statute of frauds. Chief J ustice RED�'IELD 
delivered the o p i n i o n  of the court. hol<l ing that 
the rece ption of the posts on bonrd the cars 
furnished by the purchaser, av.ct the forwarrl ing 
of them by t h e  station man.  who.  for that pur­
pose, was his age n t, was an acceptance . and 
in delini n.� the rule for com pliance w i th the 
statute of frauds. says . .. It  is undoubtedl) true 
that the d e fendant,  at the time nn<l pince. h ad 
a right to repudiate t h e  posts a f ter delivery. 
In other words. in order to perfect the case u n ­
d e r  t h e  �t11tute o f  frauds. someth i n g:  more i s  
necessary than a mere deli very o f  t h e  goods. 
In the hrn!l'nage of the statute. the purchaser 
must 'nct·e pt nud receive part of the goods. · "  
Authori t ies might readily be mu l tiplied, 
amrming the "rule in ubstautially the *131 
samr langtiage ; but we recur to it  as of ac­
k nowledged anthoritv in o u r  own courts. I f  
w e  COii i d  hold i n  this case-con sidering the n nt­
ure of the property sold-that there was a con­
structive delive ry ;  yet, u n der t he statute o f  
frauds, " t h e  purchaser h a d  the righ t ,  nt t h e  
t i m e  a n d  place, t o  repudiate t h e  wood after <le·  
l i very. " Aud the a u d i tor fi nds.  dist inctly, that 
the defen d a n t ,  while the measurement wns be­
i n g  done ( an net proville<l for by the con trnl't 
of sale), refu ed to take the wood upon t he 
terms and cond i tions prescribed by t h e  pl ain­
t i IT ,  and the plain t i ff, as distin ctly, refused to 
let  h i m  bt\ve the wood upon thr terms e x n rterl 
by the defendant. It is not i m portant w h ich 
party was iu t he wrong. lt is eu ou�h that tho 
purchaser refused to " accept " tho wood. to 
render the sale i nvalid U lll er the statute o f  
frauds. 
'l'be j udgment, therefore, of th e county court 
is reversed and j udi.tment o n  the report ·for the 
defendant to recover his costs. 
Or 1 i r- I fro r 1 
UN V E R S ITY OF CALIFOR N  A 
EFFECT OF THE CONTRACT— SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTEL.
110
MELDUUII ut al. v. SNOW.
(9 Pick. 441.)
Supreme .Tudicial Court of Massachusetts. Suf-
folk and Nantucket. March Term, 18.30.
Replevin brought by the plaintiffs, who are
brewers in the city of Boston, to recover of
the defendant, a deputy of the sheriff of Suf-
folk, eighteen beer barrels, e.icU containing
about thirty gallons of beer, with their con-
tents, being in the collar recently occupied by
one Klein, in Market street; which the plain-
tiffs aver to be their property, and that the
defendant took and unlawfully detained the
same on the 1st day of August, 1S2S.
The defendant pleaded as to the beer, that
it was the property of Klein, and that he, the
defendant, had attached it as such at the
suit of Klein's creditors; to which the plain-
tiffs replied property in themselves, travers-
ing Klein's ownership, and issue was joined
thereon.
At the trial before Wilde, J., the plaintiffs
proved that the beer was .sent to Klein in
the spring, he being a retailer of beer, and
carrj'ing on his business in the cellar where
the beer was when it was attached by the de-
fendant.
The plaintiffs also proved, that according
to the universal usage of trade here, and in
other places in this country, the following
are the terms upon which retailers are sup-
plied by the brewers. In the spring, the
brewer sends to the retailer such quantity as
the retailer expects to vend, and at a stipu-
lated price, and in barrels belonging to the
brewer, which are returned to him when
emptied. The retailer pays for all that he
vends in the course of the season, at the price
at which it was originally furnished. If the
beer becomes sour or stale, or is lost by the
bursting of the casks, or by fire or other
casualty, the loss falls on the brewer. If any
beer remains unsold at the end of the season,
the retailer has a right to return it to the
brewer, but the brewer has no right to take
It without his consent Payment is never
made by the retailer in advance, but usually
in annual or semiannual settlements, when
what has been sold is paid for and the resi-
due is returned or remains a subject for fu-
ture adjustment The profits of retailing be-
long exclusively to the retailer, and all losses
by bad debts fall upon him. The brewer's
price of beer never varies. Beer cannot be
drawn off nor removed in warm weather
without injury and great danger of destroy-
ing it.
Sowden, a brewer in Boston, who has car-
ried on the business for twenty-two years,
testified, that he never considered the sale
absolute till the barrel was emptied.
It was testified that the custom was ob-
served by the plaintiffs in their dealings, and
that Klein was one of their customers.
The plaintiffs also produced an instrument
made and delivered to them by Klein on the
first day of August, previously to the service
of the writ, as follows:— "Whereas I haveal-
Avays holdcn tlie beer, now in the cellar re-
cently occupied by me, in the casks furnish-
ed by Meldrum & Co., as being of their prop-
erty unless paid for, and the same being
now atlacliod by ray creditors, ought of right
according to our contract, to be delivered up
to them; therefore and for good and valua1)Ie
considerations me thereto moving, I do here-
by assign and tiansfer ail my right, title and
property therein, unto the said Meldrum &
Co., they crediting me in account for what
they thus receive."
Horton, the attesting witness to the as-
signment, testified that he went with the
plaintiffs' clerk to the defendant, and that
the clerk produced this instrument and de-
manded tlie beer and barrels, but the defend-
ant refused to give them up.
As to the question, whether the i>roperty
in the beer was in Klein, the jury were in-
structed, that if they believed that he took
the beer of the plaintiffs on the terms of the
custom above stated, the property became
vested in him; that this was in fact a con-
ditional sale, and the beer could be attached
as belonging to him, and the only remedy of
the plaintiffs would be to recover of him the
price.
The jury found a verdict for the defendant.
The plaintiffs moved for a new trial, be-
cause the judge instructed the jury, that the
delivery of the beer, upon the terms of the
custom proved, constituted a conditional sale
to Klein, and vested in him the property in
the beer, subject to attachment for his debts;
whereas the plaintiffs contended, that such
delivery vested only a special property in
Klein for certain purposes; and tliat the gen-
eral property remained in the plaintiffs; so
that the beer could not be attached as the
propeity of Klein; and that by virtue of the
assignment to them of his special property,
they became entitled to the immediate pos-
session, and acquired the whole title, so that
the detention by the defendant after demand
made, was unlawful.
C. G. Loring and E. G. Loring, for plains
tiffs. S. D. Ward, for defendant
PER CURIAM. The principal question in
the case regards the ownership of the beer.
Evidence was given at the trial, of a cus-
tom among brewers to supply retailers with
beer in the manner stated in the report of the
judge. It is argued that this mode of deal-
ing is necessary, and it should seem to be
so; for in general the retailer would not be
able to purchase a large quantity of beer at
once, and it appears that beer must be sup-
plied to him in cold weather, as it cannot be
removed in warm weather without injury.
The question is, whether the beer is liable to
attachment as the property of the retailer.
The contract is very similar to that of sale
or return in England; and in the case of some
kinds of manufactures such a contract is re-
quired, owing to particular circumstances
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which take them out of the rules of ordinaiy
sales. It is on this cround that contracts of
sale or return are held valid; and it is uni-
formly considered that in such contracts the
property continues in the original owner; ex-
cept in cases under the statute of James, of
banliruptey, which is not in force in this com-
monwealth.
It is objected, that in the contract of sale
or return, the article is to be returned, unless
sold, but that by the custom under considera-
tion, it may or may not be returned, at the
election of the retailer. We are not clear
that there is any such distinction; nor is
there good reason for it. It is consistent
with the English law, that the beer shall re-
main the property of the brewer until the
election of the retailer sliall be made.
We place this contract on the same ground
as that of sale or return in England, and we
are glad to find authorities which sustain us;
but without authorities we should deem it
proper to uphold such a contract. Retailers
who take beer to sell are often persons of
very small property, and the custom appears
to be so general and well known, that the re-
tailer would not be supposed to be the own-
er of the beer; no injury therefore can arise
to creditors of the retailei'. And it being
beneficial to the community to introduce the
use of beer, public policy would justify us
in favouring the custom.
It is asked, how shall the beer be attached;
whether as the property of the brewer, or of
the retailer. It is not necessary for us to an-
swer this question. There are many cases
where cliattels cannot be attached as the
property either of the general or of the spe-
cial owner.
An objection is raised in regard to the pos-
session of the plaintiffs in replevin, the pos-
session and the right of possession being here
in the retailer. It is sufficient to remark,
that when the sale of beer is stopped by the
acts of the retailer, his right to retain ceases;
and further, in the case before us, the gen-
eral property being in the brewer, and the
retailer having assigned all his right in the
beer to him, the action may well lie.
New trial granted.
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which take them out of the rules of ordinary 
sa les. It is on this ground that contracts of 
sale or return are held valid; and i t  is uni­
formly con idered that in such contracts the 
property continues i n  the original owner; ex­
cept i n  cases under the statute of Jawes, ot 
bankruptcy, which i s  not in force in this com­
monwealth. 
It i objected, that in the contract of sale 
or return, the article is to be returned, unless 
sold, but that by the custom under con i<lera­
tion, it may or may not be returned, at the 
elect ion of the retailer. We are not clear 
that there is any such di tinction; nor is 
t here good reason for it. It is consistent 
with tile Engli h law, that the beer shall re­
main the property of tile brewer until the 
election of the retailer • hall be made. 
We place this contract on the same ground 
a that of sale or return in England, and we 
are glad to find authorities which su tain us;  
but without authorities we should deem i t  
proper t o  uphold such a contract. Retailers 
who take beer to sell are often persons of 
very small property, and the custom appears 
D i g 1t1zect by 
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' to be so general and well known, that tile re­
tailer would not be supposed to be tile own­
er of the beer; no inj ury therefore can arise 
to creditors of the reta iler. And it being 
beneficial to the community to introduce the 
use of beer, public policy would justify us 
in favouring t he custom. 
It is asked, how shall the beer be attached ; 
whether as the property of the brewer, or o f  
the retailer. I t  is not necessary for u s  t o  an­
swer this question. There are many cases 
where chattels cannot be attached as the 
property E'itller of the general or of the spe­
cial owner. 
A n  objection i s  raised in regard to the pos­
session of the pl aint iffs in replevin, the pos­
session and the right of possession being here 
in the r tailer. It is sufficient to rema1·k, 
that when the sale of beer is stopped by the 
acts of the retailer, his right t o  retain cea es ; 
and further, in the case before us, the gen­
eral property being in the brewer, and the 
retailer having assigned all bis right in the 
beer to h im, the action may well lie. 
New trial gra nted. 
O ru l'a l from 
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GUSHING et al. v. BREED et al.
(14 Allen, 376.)
Snpreme Judicial CJourt of Massachusetts.
Jan. Term, 1867.
Contract to recover the price of 500 bush-
els of oats sold and delivered. The answer
admitted the sale and delivery of 10.5 bush-
els, and offered judgment for the price there-
of, and denied the residue. It appeared
that the plaintifCs veere owners of a cargo
of oats, which, on being weighed, was found
to contain 6,605 bushels, and was stored in
the Merchants' Grain Elevator in Boston,
which belonged to persons whose business
it was to receive, elevate, store, weigh, and
deliver grain. The plaintiffs thereafter
agreed to sell to the defendants 500 bushels
thereof, and delivered to them the following
order upon the proprietors of the elevator,
dated June 23, 1864: "Please deliver Breed
& Co., or order, 500 bushels of black oats
from cargo, per schooner Seven Brothers,
storage commencing, to the person or per-
sons in whose favour this order is drawn,
June 29, 1864." This order was presented
on June 25, 1864, and accepted in the usual
manner. The order was entered in the
books, and on the same day 105 bushels of
the oats were delivered to defendants, and
before July 5, 1864, the whole cargo had
been sold and delivered and removed from
the elevator, except 1,274 bushels, which in-
cluded the 305 bushels agreed to be sold to
the defendants. On the 5th of July a fire
occurred, which rendered the oats which re-
mained in the elevator nearly worthless. It
was the general usage of dealers in grain in
Boston to place large quantities of grain In
elevators, where the same remained until
sold, by orders given to the purchaser, and
after such sale it was removed from the
elevator or kept therein, at the election of
the purchaser. After the acceptance of such
order by the proprietors of the elevator, the
grain covered thereby was treated by them
as the property of the purchaser; the ven-
dor had no further control over it, but the
proprietors held the same subject to the
order of the purchaser, received orders from
liim in the same manner as from the original
vendor, or weighed It out to him as he re-
quired, they guaranteeing to deliver out the
full number of bushels weighed into the ele-
vator, charging him with storage. Differ-
ent cargoes of the same quality, belonging to
different owners, were sometimes mingled
in the bins. Grain so bought was paid for
without regard to whether or not it had
been separated and removed from the ele-
vator, and all damage to grain so sold, from
internal causes occurring after the delivery
of the order, was borne by the purchaser.
All the above usages were known to the de-
fendants, but they objected to the evidence
to prove the same. The judge ruled that
there was no such change of title to the
grain, except as to the 105 bushels actually
removed by the defendants from the ele-
vator, as to make the defendants liable, and
found that the plaintiffs were only entitled
to recover the price agreed for the 105 bush-
els, with interest. The plaintifCs alleged ex-
ceptions.
W. Gaston and W. A. Field, for plaintifCs.
C. B. Goodrich and I. J. Austin, for defend-
ants.
CHAPMAN, J. The use of elevators for
the storage of grain has Introduced some
new methods of dealing, but the rights of
parties who adopt these methods must be
determined by the principles of the common
law. The proprietors of the elevator are
the agents of the various parties for whom
they act. When several parties have stored
various parcels of grain in the elevator, and
it is put into one mass, according to a usage
to which they must be deemed to have as-
sented, they are tenants in common of the
grain. Each is entitled to such a proportion
as the quantity placed there by him bears
to the whole mass. When one of them sells
a certain nunilier of bushels, it is a sale of
property owned by him in common. It is
not necessary to take it away in order to
complete the purchase. If the vendor gives
an order on the agents to deliver it to the
vendee, and the agents accept the order, and
agree with the vendee to store the property
for him, and give him a receipt therefor,
the delivery is thereby complete, and the
property belongs to the vendee. The ven-
dor has nothing more to do to complete the
sale, nor has he any further dominion over
the property. The agent holds it as the
property of the vendee, owned by him in
common with the other grain in the elevator.
It is elementary law that a tenant in com-
mon of personal property in the hands of
an agent may sell the whole or any part of
his interest in the property by the method
above stated, or by any other method equiv-
alent to it. Actual separation and taking
away are not necessary to complete the
sale. As to the property sold, the agent
acts for a new principal, and holds his prop-
erty for him. The law is the same, whetlier
the proprietors are numerous or the vendor
and vendee are owners of the whole. If
the vendee resells the whole or a part of
what he has purchased, his vendee may, by
the same course of dealing, become also a
tenant in common as to the part which he
has bought.
This is not like the class of sales where
the vendor retains the possession, because
there is something further for him to do,
such as measuring, or weighing, or mark-
ing, as in Scudder v. Worcester, 11 Gush.
573; nor like the case of Weld v. Cutler, 2
Gray, 195, where the whole of a pile of coal
was delivered to the vendee in order that he
might make the separation. But the prop-
erty is in the hands of an agent; and tlie
same person who was the agent of the ven-
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dor to keep, becomes the agent of the ven-
dee to keep; and the possession of the
agent becomes the possession of the princi-
pal. Hatch V. Bayley, 12 Cush. 27, and
cases cited. The tenancy in common results
from the method of storage which has been
agreed upon, and supersedes the necessity
of measuring, weighing, or separating the
part sold.
No delivery Is necessary to a tenant In
common. Beaumont v. Crane, 14 Mass. 400.
Upon these principles, the plaintiffs are
entitled to recover the amount due them for
the property thus sold and delivered to the
defendants. The damage occasioned to this
property by the fire must be borne by the
defendants, as owners of the property.
Exceptions sustained.
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dor to keep, becomes the agent ot the ven­
dee to keep; and the possession of the 
agent becomes the possession of the princi­
pal. Hatch v. Bayley, 12 Cush. 27, and 
cases cited. The tenancy in common results 
from the method of storage which has been 
agreed upon, and supersedes the necessity 
of measuring, weighing, or separating the 
part sold. 
D i g 1t1zed by 
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No delivery I s  necessary to a tenant In 
common. Beaumont v. Crane, 14 Mass. 400. 
Upon these principles, the plaintiffs are 
entitled to recover the amount due them for 
the property thus sold and delivered to the 
defendants. The damage occasioned to this 
property by the fire must be borne by thP 
defendants, as owners ot the property. 
Exceptions sustained. 
O ru P.a l  from 
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RHODE et al. v. THWAITES.
(6 liarn. & O. 388.)
Court of King's Bench. Hilary Term, 1827.
Declaration stated, tliat on the 3d Decem-
ber, 1S25, the defendant bargained for and
bought of the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs, at
the request of the defendant, sold to him cer-
tain goods, to wit, twenty hogsheads of
sugar, at 5(!s. 6d. per cwt., to be delivered
by the plaintiffs to the defendant upon re-
(iuest, and to be paid for at the expiration of
two months then following; and in consid-
eration thereof, and that the plaintiffs, at
the lilie request of the defendant, had under-
taken and faithfully promised the defendant
to deliver the goods to him, he, the defendant
undertook and faithfully promised the plain-
tiffs to accept the goods when he should be
requested, and to pay them, the plaintiffs,
for the same, at the expiration of the said
credit. Averment, that the price of the goods
amounted to a certain sum, to wit, &c., and
that although the plaintiff's had always been
ready and willing to deliver the goods to the
defendant, and requested him to accept the
same, and although the credit had expired,
yet the defendant did not, nor would, at the
time when he was so requested, or any time
before or afterwards, accept the goods or
pay the plaintiffs, or either of them, for the
same, but refused so to do. There was theu
an indebitatus count for goods bargained and
sold. The defendant suffered judgment to go
by default. Upon the execution of the writ
of inquiry the plaintiff's proved that a con-
tract for the sale of twenty hogsheads of
sugar was made on the 3d of December, 182.5,
at 56s. Gd. per cwt, but there was no suffi-
cient note in writing to satisfy the statute
of frauds. On that day the plaintiff had in
his warehouse on the floor, in bulk, a much
larger quantity of sugar than would be re-
quired to fill up twenty hogsheads, but no
part of it was in hogsheads. The defendant
saw the sugar in this state in the plaintiffs'
warehouse, and then made the contract in
question. Four hogsheads were filled up and
delivered to the defendant on the 10th of De-
cember, and a few days afterwards the plain-
tiffs filled up the remaining sixteen hogs-
heads, and gave notice to the defendant that
they were ready, and required him to take
them away; he said he would take them as
soon as he could. They were not weighed
till Februaiy, 1826, when the plaintiffs de-
livered a bill of parcels to the defendant.
The plaintiffs added to the bulk, from time
to time, as sales were made, and it did not
very distinctly appear whether the sixteen
hogsheads were filled wholly with the same
sugar which was in the warehouse on the
3d of Decejiber when the contract was made.
The four hogsheads which were first deliver-
ed were filled with that sugar. It was ad-
mitted that there was sufficient evidence of
a sale of the four hogsheads, inasmuch as
there was an acceptance of them by the de-
fendant. No contract in writing sufficient to
satisfy the statute of frauds having been
proved, it was insisted that there was no
evidence of any contract of sale of the six-
teen hogsheads of sugar, and that the plaiu-
tiffs could only recover for the four hogsheads
which had been actually delivered; but the
jury, under the direction of the under sheriff,
found a verdict for the value of the twenty
hogsheads. A rule nisi for setting aside the
writ of inquiry having been obtained by
Hutchinson in Trinity term,
F. Pollock now showed cause. Mr. Hutch-
inson, contra.
BAYLEY, J. 'Where a man sells part of a
large parcel of goods, and it is at his option
to select part for the vendee, he cannot main-
tain any action for goods bargained and sold,
until he has made that selection; but as soon
as he appropriates part for the benefit of the
vendee, the property in the article sold passes
to the vendee, although the vendor is not
bound to part with the possession until he is
paid the price. Here there was a bargain,
by which the defendant undertook to take
twenty hogsheads of sugar, to be prepared
or filled up by the plaintiffs. Pour were de-
livered; as to them there is no question, but
as to the sixteen it is said, that as there
was no note or memorandum of a contract in
writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of
frauds, there was no valid sale of them;
and that the plaintiffs in their declaration
having stated their claim to arise, by vir-
tue of a bargain and sale, cannot recover for
more than the four hogsheads which were
actually dehvered to and accepted by the
defendant; that in order to recover for the
others they ought to have declared specially,
that, in consideration that the plaintiffs would
sell, the defendant promised to accept them.
In answer to this, it is said, that there was
an entire contract for twenty hogsheads, and
that the defendant, by receiving four, had ac-
cepted part of the goods sold within the
meaning of the seventeenth section of the
statute of frauds. In fact, the plaintiffs did
appropriate, for the benefit of the defend-
ant, sixteen hogsheads of sugar, and they
communicated to the defendant that they had
so appropriated them, and desired him to
take them away; and the latter adopted that
act of the plaintiffs, and said he would send
for them as soon as he could. I am of opin-
ion, that by reason of that appropriation
made by the plaintiffs, and assented to by
the defendant, the property in the sixteen
hogsheads of sugar passed to the vendee.
That being so, the plaintiffs are entitled to
recover the full value of the twenty hogs-
heads of sugar, under the count for goods
bargained and sold. The rule for setting
aside this writ of inquiry must therefore be
discharged.
HOLROYD, J. The sugars agreed to be
sold being part of a larger parcel, the vendors
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were to select twenty hogsheads for the ven-
dee. That selection was made by the plain-
tiffs, and they notified it to the defeudaut.
and the latter then promised to take them
away. That is equivalent to an actual ac-
ceptance of the sixteen hogshe.ids by the de-
fendant That acceptance made the goods
his own, subject' to the vendors' lien as to the
price. If the sugars had afterwards been
destroyed by fire, the loss must have fallen
on the defendant. I am of opinion that the
selection of tlie sixteen hogsheads by the
plaintiffs, and the adoption of that act by
the defendant, converted that which before
was a mere agreement to sell into an actual
sale, and that the propeity in the sugars
thereby passed to the defendant; and. con-
sequently, that plaintiffs were entitled to re-
cover to the value of the whole under the count
for goods bargained and sold.
LITTLEDAl/E, J., concurred.
Rule discharged.
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were to select twenty hogsheads for the ven­
dee. That selection was made by the plaiu­
tiffs, and they notified it to the defendant, 
and the latter then promised to take them 
away. That is equivalent to an actual a� 
ceptance of the sixteen hogsheads by the de­
fenda nt. That acceptance made the goods 
his own, subject" to the vendors' lien as to the 
price. If tbe sugars bad afterwards been 
destroyed by fire, the loss must have fallen 
on the defendant. I am of opinion that the 
election of the sixteen hogsheads by the 
D i g 1t1zed by 
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plaintiffs, and the adoption of that act by 
the defendant, converted that which before 
was a mere agreement to sell into an actual 
sale, and that the property in the sugars 
thereby passed to the defendant ; and, con­
sequently. that plaintiffs were entitled to re­
co"l"er to the value of the whole under tbe count 
for goods bargained and sold. 
LITTLEDALE, J., concurred. 
Rule discharged. 
O ru r-a l  fro rn  
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FIRST NAT. BANK OP CAIRO v.
CROCKER et al.
(Ill Mass. 163.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suf-
folk. Nov., 1872.
Tort against Crocker, Smitl] & Co. for the
conversion of 100 barrels of flour. It appear-
ed on the trial that Ayers & Co., of Cairo, Il-
linois, had dealt with defendant corumission
mercliants in Boston for some years, shipping
them flour on consignment, for sale in Bos-
ton, and having an open general consignment
account with them. Ayers & Co., on August
23, 1870, consigned to them some flour, and
drew on them for more than its value, writing
them that they would make it all right in the
next shipment. The defendants paid the draft,
which left Ayers & Co. indebted to defendants
for about $1,500. On August 24, 1870, Ayers
& Co. shipped the 100 barrels of flour in dis-
pute to Boston, taking a bUl of lading "con-
signed to shipper's order Boston, Mass.," but
on which was written "St. Ijouis Mills and
Blackburn. For Crocker, Smith & Co., Bos-
ton, Mass." They then drew on defendants
with bill of lading attached, and discounted the
draft, which defendants refused to accept, and
it was returned to defendants with the bill of
lading. When the flour arrived in Boston,
September 12. 1870, it was accompanied by a
way bill, on which, under "Consignees," was
written "Crocker, Smith «& Co., Boston;" and
the flour was received by them and sold, and
applied to the account of Ayers & Co. Sep-
tember 14, 1870, Ayors & Co. drew a draft on
account of the 100 barrels of flour on Good-
win, Locke & Co. of Boston, in favor of plain-
tiffs, and attached to it the bill of lading. The
draft was accepted and paid when due. The
bill of lading was Indorsed in blank when de-
livered by Ayers & Co.. but when forwarded
by plaintiffs the words "Deliver within-named
flour to Goodwin, Locke & Company, or order,"
were written over the indorsement of Ayers
& Co.
A. Churchill and J. E. Hudson, for plaintiffs.
A. A. Ranney, for defendants.
AMES, J. It is manifest that the flour was
not placed in the hands of these defendants
for the purpose of securing an existing debt, or
indemnifying them for any advances that they
had made. It was not consigned to them in
order that it might be sold, and the proceeds
carried to the credit of Ayers & Company in
general account cuncnt. It is true that the
consignors knew that they had overdrawn
their account, and that they had expressly
promised to "make it all right" at the next
shipment. But that was an executory con-
tract. The proposed correction stood wholly in
agi-eemeut. A general promise to make the
matter right was not of itself suflicient to
vest in tlie defendants a title as absolute own-
ers, even of the goods forwarded at the .next
shipment, unless the circumstances indicated,
or at least were consisteut with, such au in-
tention on the part of the shippers. But in this
case, the consignment and the draft consti-
tuted one transaction. The bill of lading and
the draft came togetlier; and the defendants
understood that the flour was sent to thorn,
subject to a claim of $500 in favor of the hold-
er of the draft. They were to receive it upon
the trust that they were to pay that amount
out of the proceeds. The meaning of the trans-
action on the part of the shippers was that
the defendants were to receive it for that
purpose and upon that understanding only. It
was as if they had said, "You may take this
flour and sell it on our accotmt, provided you
will accept this draft" A bill of lading in-
doreed is only prima facie evidence of owner-
ship, and is open to explanation. Pratt v.
Parkman, 21 Pick. 42. This bill of lading was
provisional, and was not intended to vest the
property in the defendants, or to authorize
their taking possession of it, except upon the
condition of their acceptance of the draft. Al-
len V. Williams, 12 Pick. 297.
The act of the defendants, therefore, in tak-
ing possession of the flour was wholly unau-
thorized, and gave them neither valid title
nor lawful possession. AUen v. Williams, ubi
supra. In proceeding afterwards to sell it as
if it were their own, and appropriating the
proceeds, they were guilty of a wrongful con-
version. A cai'rier may be a mere bailee for
the consignor; and where by the tei-ms of the
bill of lading the goods are to be delivered to
the consignor's order, the carrier is his agent,
and not the consignee's. Moakes v. Nicolson,
19 C. B. (N. S.) 290; Baker v. Fuller, 21 Pick.
318; Mei'chants' Nat. Bank v. Bangs, 102
Mass. 291. On the refusal of the consignee to
receive the goods upon the terms and for the
purposes for which they were sent, he cannot
take them for any other purpose. Shepherd v.
Harrison, L. R. 5 H. L. IIG; De Wolf v. G,ard-
uer, 12 Cush. 19, 23; Allen v. Williams, 12
Pick. 297. The title to the flour therefore re-
mained in the shipper, wholly unafl:ected by
the consignment. Even in the case of a con-
tract of sale, the fact of making the bill of
lading deliverable to the order of the vendor,
when not rebutted by evidence to the con-
trary, is decisive to show his intention to pre-
serve the jus disponendi, and to prevent the
property from passing to the vendee. Wait v.
Baker, 2 Exch. 1; Van Casteel v. Booker, Id.
091. The case of a mere consignment to an
agent would be of course still stronger.
Upon the refusal of the defendants to accept
the consignment upon the terms proposed,
which refusal was sufficiently manifested by
the protest of the draft and this return of the
bill of lading, the owners of the flom-, Ayers &
Company, had a right to seek a new consignee,
and to make another attempt to obtain an ad-
vance by a draft to be charged against the
property. An arrangement was accordingly
made with the plaintifi's, who discounted their
draft of .flOO upon the security of the same
bill of lading that had been sent to the de-
fendants and returned by them. If this bill
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SALES.
of lading was (Jelivei-ed to the plaiutiffs, in-
dorsed in blank by Ayere & Company, (and
there is testimony to that effect.) the transac-
tion would operate as a ti-ausfer of their title
in the flour to the plaiutiffs, if such were the
intention of the parties. As the property was
at that time in Boston, it was of course in-
capable of actual delivery at Cairo, and the
delivery of the evidence of title, with the in-
dorsement upon the bill of lading, was all that
could be done for the transfer of the property
from the general owner to the new purchaser;
but it would be effectual for that purpose.
Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet 386, 445;
Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. oS4; Bryans v. Nix,
4 M. & W. 775, 791; Low v. De Wolf, 8 Pick.
101; Gardner v. Howland, 2 Pick. 599; Stan-
ton v. Small, 3 Sandf. 230; Pratt v. P.arkman,
24 Pick. 42. In Gibson v. Stevens, the court I
say, per Taney, C. .!.: "This rule applies to
every case where tlie thing sold is, from its
character or situation at the time, incapable of
actual delivery." To the extent of tlieir ad-
vance of money upon the draft, therefore, the
plaintiffs would be considered as purchasers,
and they would acquire a special property in
the flour for the purpose of protecting the
draft. At the time of this transaction, the
flour remained in the possession of the de-
fendants, and, with the exception of taking
possession, nothing had been done on their
part amounting to a wrongful conversion of it
to their own use. Tlicy had not put it out of
their power to replace the shippers in the
enjoyment of their rights.
It appears from the report, that, when the
bill of lading was forwarded the second time,
the name of the firm of Goodwin. I^icke &
Comiviny was written over the iudor.'^ement
of Ayers & Company. But we do not think
that this fact, whether the blank indorsement
were filled up after or before the discount
of the draft, would materially affect tlie plain-
tiffs' riglits. The bill of lading was altaolied
to the draft, and the sub.stunce of the trans-
action was that tlie draft was discounted up<m
the security of the merchandise Itself. It pur-
ports to be on aciMunt of the barrels of Hour
de.scrilied In the bill of lading. The flour, al-
though Intrusted to Go<idwiu, Locke & Com-
pany to sell, wa.s appropriated to the speclflc
purpose of the payment of this draft. The
bill of lading was put In (ho plaintiffs' hands
to enable them to hold the meirhandlse as
their necurlty. and the discounting of the draft
was the consideration for the transfer of the
projierty to llieni. It was eonvenlcnl so to
Indorse the bill of la<1lnK, as to make It man-
ifest that Goodwin, Locke & Company were
to receive and dispose of the goods; but they
were to do so ns trusleps ami ngenis of the
pInlnllffH, and not as proprietors In their own
right. They cerlalidy n<c|iilre(l nr) title In the
pHiperty until they had areepled the draft,
and when that event happened the giHxIs had
been dIspoHed of by (he defeiidaids, and had
gone Into the hands of bona tide holilers with-
out notice, 80 08 to be beyond recall. The ef-
fect of this transaction between the plaintiffs
and Ayers & Company was that the flour was
designated to stand as collateral security for
the draft. If the draft had not been accepted,
the plaintiffs clearly would not have lost their
title to the flour. It is not necessary to hold
that the plaintiffs became absolute owners of
the property; it is enough that they had a
right of property and possession to secure the
payment of the draft, and the right of Ayers
& Company as former owners of the specific
property had become divested, leaving them
only a right in the surplus money which might
remain after a sale of the flour and a payment
of the draft from the proceeds. De Wolf v.
Gardner, 12 Cush. 19, has in many respects a
close analogy with this case. There the gen-
eral owner of the flour was the plaintiff, and
the defendant was a party claiming under the
new consignee, and the court held that the
plaintiff had parted with the right of property,
and could not maintain his action. In Bank
of Rochester v. Jones. 4 N. Y. 407, as in the
case at bar, the plaint ilTs had discounted a
draft drawn by the owner of a quantity of
flour upon the defendant, who, as in the case
at bar, refused to accept the draft, and claim-
ed to hold the flour and sold it for the pay-
ment of a balance due from the drawer. In-
stead of a bill of lading, there had been a
carrier's receipt, which the drawer delivered,
unindorsed, to the plaintiff bank. The agree-
ment was that the bank sliould hold the flour
as security that the draft should be accepted,
but with power to sell it if the draft should
not be accepted. The court of appeals held
that the defendant could not acquire any prop-
erty in the flour, except by performance of the
condition imposed, namely, the acc(>ptance of
the draft; that the transaction between the
consignor and the plaintiff bank gave to the
latter a general or special property in tlie
flour; that the transaction constituted a sale
to the bank In trust for the fullillment of the
agreement; that the carrier's receipt, though
not indorsed, was sutlicient evidonco of the
plaintiffs right of possession; and that the
statute of frauds was not applicable, as the de-
livery of the receipt, in consi<leration of the
discount of the draft, was sutlicient to trans-
fer tlie title. In legal effwt, and for the pur-
l>ose of explaining what Is to be done wilh
the merch.'indlse, there lan be no subslanll.il
difference between a bill of lading and a
carrier's receipt.
We have then In this case an Intent of the
general owners of the flour to make use of It
as a s(>curlty for an advaiu'o of money from
the plalntltTs; a delivery of the bill of lading
In pursuaiH'o of that Intent; and a valuable
and executed (Hinslderatlon In the discounting
of the draft. The fact that the goods wore In
the custody of the defendants would not pre-
vent tills .'irrangement from having the cfl'oct
to transfer the title of Ayers & Comiiany to
the pljiliitlffs. Wliijiple v. Thayer, 10 Pick.
25; MeKee v. .liidd. 12 N. Y. 1VJ2. WlielluM- it
should be regarded as n sale, a pledge or a mort-
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
7:
38
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/u
c2
.a
rk
:/1
39
60
/t
90
86
js
3p
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
l ..�G 
of lauin1' was <leliYered to the pla int iffs. in-
11< r"l'll i n  blank lJ�· Ayer. & Com1iany, \and 
tlle 1 e  i t1 ·stimony to that eliec:t .) the transac­
tion would operate as a transfer of their title 
i n  tile tlow· to the plaintiffs, i f  such were the 
intention of the parties. As the property wa 
at that time i n  Boston. it was of course in­
�·a 1•allle of actual delivery at Cairo, and the 
deli>ery of tile evidence of title, with tile in­
uorseruent upon the bill of lading, was all that 
c:oulcl he done for the transfer of the property 
from thf' genera l owner to the new purchaser ; 
but it would be effectual for that DU!'l)OSe. 
Coua rtl 1·. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet. 3 6, -±45 ; 
G illson Y. Stevens. 8 How. ;; 4 ;  Bryans v. Nix, 
4 �. & W. 715, 'i'Dl; Low '· De Wolf. " Pick. 
101 ; Gardner v. Howland, 2 Pick. GUO; Stan­
ton >. Small, 3 :;:andf. :!30; I'ratt v. Parkman. 
�4 Pick. 4�. In Gibson v. Stevens, th<' court 
say, per T-J.ney, C . . T. : "This rule applie· to 
c:>ery case where the thing 1>nhl is. from its 
character or situation at the time. incapable of 
actual deli>ery." To the extent of U1eir ad· 
1·ance of n10uey upon the draft, therefore. the 
plaintiffs would be con idered as purchasers. 
ana t hey would acquire a special property i n  
the flour for the pm1JOse of proteet ing the 
<lraft. At the time of this transaction, U1e 
tlour remained in the possession of the de­
fenu:mts. and, with the exception or ta king 
pos>'Cf'sion. nothing bad been clone on tl1eir 
part amounting to a w ron�ful conl'ersion of it 
t•J their own use. They bncl not put it out of 
tltelr powe1· to r<'place the shippers in the 
•·ujoyment of their rights. 
It nppenr,; from the r<>110.rt . that. when the 
I.Jill of la1lin1' was forwardeu tile seconcl t i me. 
the nnme of the firm or nonclwiu. 1 ... d;:e & 
Company was written 0Yc1· the indor,;emcut 
of A) ,. .... & ompany. nur we uo not thin I{ 
that thb fact, wbl'ther the hl.'lnk i nclm·spmcnt 
wen! ll lle<l Ul> after o r  bl'fore tbe diseount 
of till' •l r:tft , would materially affC<.'t th!' plain 
t iffs' rights. The hill  of ladi ng was n t la <'hed 
to t hP d rn ft, n ncl  the suh.-ta nce of the t ra ns· 
artiim was tha t  t ht• d raft wnA dhwo11ntNl 11pnn 
t he security of t he 11wn·h11 11rllse itself. 1 t pur· 
11ort · t•J ))p nn a r·< ·•llllll of t he l ia rrcl>l of tlour 
drs1•ri l 1 1•d In the bill of Ja1 l l 1 1i;:. 'l'hc flour, al­
tl.Jnugh i 1 1t rn !Pd to Good w i n ,  Lnc·kp & Com­
pa 1 1y to i;dl,  wn.A a pprnpri:t ( l'!l to t lw !>)ll't'i llc 
pllrpn.,. nf t h,. pny11w1 1 t  of t h iA d ra ft '1'111• 
ul l l  •if lad i ng was put 1 1 1  t he plni11 t l ffR' ha 111ls 
to , . ri: 1 l ll r  f hl'lll  to hold t he 111<·1d1n 1 1 1 l lse n s  
t l 1 1  I r  t•r u r l t y .  a m !  t h!' d i  r·o1111 t lng of  l he d ra ft 
\\ 0  t l 11• 1 ·011 idr rn tion tor t hf' t ra 111;tPI' of 011• 
1 1ropt•rty tn t helll. T t  wn •·0111·1 nil'll(  1>n to 
l udot'8<' t he lil l l  nf ln1l i 11i.:,  :is to n wkP It 1111111· 
I r• t t h1 1 t  1 : oo< l wl n, Lori;" & Cr111 1p1111y wr.n' 
to 1 1·cl•lw• u nrl di 1 •n�" 111 t h1• �m11 1t1 : hut tlwy 
Wl'l"I' l r t  1 10 o 11 l r1 1 l t·11 1 1 1 1 1 1  ng .. 1 1 1  nf 1 hc 
plul 1 1 t 1rr , 1111rl 111 f 11 prnprli f o r .  i n  t lwlr ow11 
t h:hl 'l'h••y <'(' l'ln inly :u•q11 l n• r l  11<1 t l f lr• In 1 hr•  
1 11·n11erl y 1 1 11 l l l l h••.r hurl 1 1 1 ·1 ·  . .  pl 1·d t lu• d 111 fl , 
n nrl  11 1 11 1 1  t h:o l "' '' 1 1 1  h11p1 11•111 1 I  f h1• J:rt<ldB hnr l  
1 . .  :• ·11  d i  p •  ct l nf l oy l h1 r l • •f1 • 1 1d111 1 t  , a nd hur l  
i;:"'"' l n f tt t he 11:1 1 1 1 1  n f  ho1111 l l r lr• holrl1•re w i l h-
0111 not h·1�. 8'> us f o h1� hPp u11I  rr•1·n I I. Thi• rl • 
D i  itiz ... by 
I NTE R N ET A RCHIVE 
1 feet of this transaction between the plaiutiITs 
and Ayers & C-0mpany was that the flour wa:< 
designated to stand as collateral security for 
the draft. If tbe draft had not been act·l•11ted. 
the pla intiffs clearly would not have lost their 
title to the flour. It i not necessary to hoh1 
that the plainti ffs became absolute owners of 
the p roperty ; it is enough that tbey bad a 
right of property and possession to secure the 
payment of tile draft, and the right of Ayers 
& Company as former owner of the specific 
property bad become di>ested, lea •ing them 
only a right in tl.Je surplus money which might 
remain after a sale of the flour ana a payment 
of the draft from the proceeds. De 'Yolf v. 
Gardner. 1� Cush. 19, has in many res1)cets a 
close analogy with thi case. 'l'bere tile gen­
eral owner of the flour was the plai ntiff, a nd 
the defendant was a party claiming- under the 
new consignee. and the rourt hehl that the 
plaintiff had parted with tile right of property, 
and could not maintain his action. I n  Bank 
of Rochester v. Jones, 4 N. Y. 407, as in the 
1·ase at bar, the plaintilis bad di countea a 
draft drawn by the owner of a quantity of 
flour upon the defendant, who. as in the casi> 
at bar, refused to arcept the uraft, allll claim­
ea to holu the flour a ua sold i t  for t he pay­
ment of a balance clue from the drawer. In­
stead of a bill of laui ng, there had been a 
carrier's receipt, which t h e clrawe1· delivered, 
u n i mlorsed, to the 11laintiff b:rnk. 'l'he agrec­
nwn t wns that the bank should hold tl.Je fiom 
as ::;eeurity tha t the tlraft should he accepted. 
but \\ i tb power to sell it if 1 he d ra ft ishoultl 
not be arcepted. Tile court of appeals held 
tha t t he defendant could not a quire a ny prop­
erty in t be flour, exce11t by pt:'rforma nee or the 
coml i tiou im11ose<l. namelJ, 1 he :H·ePpta nee or 
the dr:l ft ;  that the tr:l nRa<'tion bet ween tbe 
conRignor and the pla intiff bn ul' �:11e to the 
lntter a g neral or spednl property in the 
tlour ;  that the tr:111;;action C(ltlstit uted a sale 
to the ba n l' In trn::;t for the ful till mcnt o f the 
agreemen t ; t hat the carrier's rc<.'ci]lt, thou�b 
not i ndors('cl , was sutlk len t eviclt'll<.'<' of the 
]Jl:t i n t il'l 's right or possrssio n ;  n nll t h n t  t bC' 
i-;ta t u t  of fr:tncls was not appl lcahle, as t he ue-
1 1 1  ery or tile r<'rt•ipt, in c:onsillcrntion or the 
ll ist·ouut or t be d rn ft , wn� s11tlldcnt to t r:rns­
fcr the t i t le. I n  lcg:t l efl'C'<'I, :11111 for t h<' l l \ 1 1" 
pnsl' of t"-.:plnlu ing whn t Is to he clo ne 1y i l h  
t hl' mcrd1n m l ise. t here 1·n n he no suhst n n t in l 
<I i ll'<'n.•nce het WN'll a bi ll  of Ind l ug and a 
1·a rri••r's rl'<'eipt. 
We h:\ \ e 1 1wn i n  t hiR rasp nn l n t pnt of t h!' 
gl' l lPl':l l owners of t he fln11r t n  rn:lk<' use' of f t  
llH a SP1·11 ri l J  fnr n n  :11ha 111 ·1• n f  111n1 1!') frnm 
l hP pla l 1 1 t llfs ; a clC'l il l'I')' of t hr l > l l l  of Jn1 1 i1 1g 
1 1 1  p11r�1tll llf'l' or t hn t  l n l c•nt : : 1 1 1 1 1  11 \":lluahlc' 
anr l  l ''\ 1•1·1 1 t Pd 1'<111shlt'r:t t lnn I n  1 111' dil-'1'011 nti 1 1 ::  
nf t hP d ra ft .  'l'lw f:wt f h:t f t he goo1!'1 werp I n  
t h1• n1sfml) of t he f lpfp11d:1 1 1 1 s  would not Jll"P 
1 P 1 1 f  t h lt1 :11T:t lll-(PlllPlll  frn111 hn Y ! ng- t he <'ffed 
lo t r:1 1 1.fl'I' l b<' t 1 1 1<' of Al erH & Compn llJ t o  
l hr• pln l 1 1 l i rl't1. ""hi ppie v .  ' l 'hnyer, 1 0  Pk'k .  
:.!rl:  \I1·1\.p1• 1 .l nc l cl ,  I �  ' Y .  11'.!'! "'lwl h!'r 1 t  
Hh111 1 l r l  hi' l'<'J:ll rdcd 111:1 n Mle, n p!Pd"e o r  n mort-
v 1 1 g i 1 I I I  I I 
U N  V E  s 1  o� CAUFOR 1 A 
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gage, there was a sufEcieut delivery to give
to the plaintiffs a special property, which they
could enforce by suit against any wrongdoer.
They had a right to transfer the propei-ty, sub-
ject to the same trusts upon which they held
it themselves, to their correspondent or agent
in Boston, and it may well be that, if the draft
had been accepted by Goodwin, Locke &
Company before the flour had been sold and
placed out of their reach, they would have
been the proper parties to have brought this
action. But the transfer to them for that rea-
son wholly failed to take eiJect, and they ac-
quired no title to the flour specifically. If
they had accepted the draft before the flour
liad been sold to a bona fide purchaser, the
case would have been almost exactly like
Allen V. WiUiams, above cited. That was a
case in which the consignee of merchandise
refused to accept the draft which accompanied
the bill of lading, and took possession of the
merchandise, claiming as in this ca.se the
right to do so in order to secure a balance
due to him from the consignor. The court
held that a new consignee could maintain
trover against him.
Our conclusion then is, that at the time of
the sale of the flour by the defendants, the
plaintiffs had a right and property in it,
which, whether general or special, and whether
as purchasers, trustees, pledgees or mortgagees,
gave them a right of possession as again.st
an wrongdoers; and that the defendants had
no title whatever and were mere wrongdoers.
The fact that the draft has been paid by
the new consignees does not prevent the
plaintiffs from maintaining the action for the
benefit and protection of the acceptors of the
draft, who without fault of their own have
been deprived of the security upon which it
was discounted.
Judgment for the plaintiffs.
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SALES,
MARVIN SAFE CO. t. NORTON.
(7 Atl. 418, 48 N. J. Law, 410.)
Supreme Court of New Jersey. Nov. 29, 1886.
On certiorari to Mercer common pleas.
On May 1, 1884, one Samuel N. Schwartz,
of Hightstown. Mercer county. New Jersey,
went to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and
there, in the office of the prosecutors, exe-
cuted the following instrument: "Jlay 1,
18Si. Marvin Safe Company: Please send,
as per mark given below, one second-hand
safe, for which the undersigned agrees to
pay the sum of eighty-four dollars ($84.)
seven dollars cash, and balance seven dol-
lars per month. Terms cash, delivered on
board at -Philadelphia or New York, unless
otherwise stated in writing. It is agreed
that JIarvin Safe Company shall not relin-
quish its title to said safe, but shall remain
the sole owners thereof until above sum is
fully paid in money. In event of failure
to pay any of said installments or notes,
when same shall become due, then all of
said installments or notes remaining unpaid
shall immediately become due. The Marvin
Safe Company may, at their option, remove
said safe without legal process. It is ex-
pressly understood that there are no con-
ditions whatever not stated in this memo-
randum, and the undersigned agrees to ac-
cept and pay for safe in accordance there-
with. Samuel N. Schwartz. Mark: Sam-
uel N. Schwartz, Hightstown, Now Jersey.
Koute, New Jersey. Not accountable for
damages after shipment." Schwartz paid
the first installment of seven dollars, May
1, 1SS4, and the safe was shipped to him
the same day. He afterwards paid two in-
stallments of seven dollars each, by remit-
tance to Philadelphia by check. Nothing
more was paid. On July 30, 1SS4, Schwartz
sold and doliveiod the safe to Norton for
$or). Norton paid him the purchase money.
He bought and paid for the safe without
notice of Schwartz's agreement with the
prosecutors. Norton took possession of the
safe, and removed it to his office. Schwartz
Is Insolvent, and has absconded. The pros-
ecutor brought trover agahist Norton, and
In the court below the defendant recovered
Judgment on the ground that, tlic defendant
Imviiig bought and paid for tlio sal'c l)ona
tide, the title to the safe, by the law of Penn-
Bylvanla, was traiisfcrrod to hini.
Before Justices IJHI'UE, DIXON, and
UK ED.
A. S. Appelget, for plMiiMIlT In riTtlorarl.
S. M. Schauck, contrn.
DEPUR, J. The contract exprcsped In the
writlen order of May 1, IRSI, Kignod by
Sr'hwnrli!, Is for Ihi- sale of the property to
him rondltlonnlly; the vendor reserving the
title, iiotwlthslniidlng delivery, until the con-
trn<'l price Bhould be jinld. The courlH of
PennHylvanla ninke a dlntlnctlon between
the bailment of a chattel, with power in the
bailee to become the owner on payment of
the price agreed upon, and the sale of a
chattel, with a stipulation that the title
shall not pass to the purchaser until the
contract price shall be paid. On this dis-
tinction the courts of that state hold that
a bailment of chattels, with an option in
the bailee to become the owner on payment
of the price agreed upon, is valid, and that
the right of the bailor to resume posses-
sion on non-payment of the contract price
is secure against creditors of the bailee
and bona fide purchasers from him; but
that, upon the delivery of personal prop-
erty to a purchaser under a contract of sale,
the reservation of title in the vendor until
the contract price is paid is void as against
creditors of the purchaser, or a bona fide
purchaser from him. Clow v. Woods, 5
Serg. & R. 275; Enlow v. Klein. 79 Pa. St.
488; Haak v. Linderman, 04 Pa. St. 499;
Stadtfeld v. Huntsman, 92 Pa. St. 53;
Brunswick, etc., Co. v. Hoover, 95 Pa. St.
508; 1 Beuj. Sales (Corbin's Ed.) § 440; 21
Am. Law Reg. (X. S.) 224, note to Lewis v.
McCabe. In the most recent case in the
supreme court of Peunsylvania, Mr. Jus-
tice Sterrott said: "A present sale and de-
livery of personal property to the vendee,
coupled with an agreement that the title
shall not vest in the latter unless he pays
the price agreed upon at the time appointed
therefor, and that, in default of such pay-
ment, the vendor may recover possession of
the property, is quite different in its etfect
from a bailment for use, or, as it is some-
times called, a lease of the property, coupled
with an agreement whereby the lessee may
subsetiuently become owner of the prop-
erty upon payment of a price agreed upon.
As between the parties to such contracts,
both are valid and binding; but, as to
creditors, the latter Is good, while the for-
mer Is invalid." Forrest v. Nelson. 19 Re-
porter, 38, tOS Pa. St. 481. The cases cited
show that the Pennsylvania courts hold the
same doctrine with respect to bona tide pur-
chasers as to creditors.
In this state, and in nearly all of our sis-
ter states, conditional sales— that Is, sales of
personal property on credit, with delivery of
possession to the pm'chnser, and a stipula-
tion tliat the title shall remain In the ven-
dor until the contract price is paid -have
been held valid, not only against the Imme-
diate purchaser, Viut also against his cred-
itors and bona lido purchasers from him,
unless the vendor has conferred upon his
vendee Indicia of title beyond mere posses-
sion, or has forfeited his right In the prop-
erty by conduct whU-h the law regards as
frandiiient. The cases are cited In Cole v.
IliTry, 12 N. J. Law, ."nS; Midland U. Co.
V. Hitchcock, 37 N. J. Ec]. r)50, !-)59; 1 HenJ.
Sales (Corbin's Ed.) 85 4:{7-1('.0; 1 Smith,
L. C. (Hth Ed.) 3:i SK); 21 Am. Law Reg. (N.
S.) 2"24, note to Lewis v. McCabe; 15 Am.
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MARVIN SAFE CO. v. NORTON. 
(1 At!. 418, 48 N. J. Law, 410.) 
Supreme Court of New Jersey. Nov. 29, 1886. 
On certiorari to :Uercer common pleas. 
On May 1, 1884, one Samuel N. Schwartz, 
of Hightstown, )!ercer county, New Jersey, 
went to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and 
there, in the office of the pro ecutors. exe­
cuted the following instrument: ")lay 1, 
1884. Marvin afe Company: Please send. 
as per mark given below, one second-hand 
,:ife, for which the unde1·signed agrees to 
pay the um of eighty-four dollars (.�84.) 
seven dollars cash. and balance seYen dol­
lars per month. Terms cash, deli'l"ercd on 
board at ·Philadelphia or );ew York, unless 
otherwise tated i n  writing. It is agreed 
that )Iarvin Safe Company shall not relin­
quish its title to aid safe, but • hall remain 
the sole owners thereof until above sum is 
fully paid in money. I n  e>ent of failure 
to pay any of said installment or note .. , 
when same shall become due, then all  of 
said installments or note remaining unpaid 
shall immediately become due. The )farvin 
Safe Company may, at  their optiou, remo"e 
said safe without legal process. It is ex­
pressly understood that there are no con­
ditions whatever not stated in this memo­
ranc1um, and the under igncd ag-rees to ac­
cept and pay for safe in accord:uwe there­
with. 'amuel N. Schwartz. ::lfark : , am­
uel X. �chwartz, llight town, :Sew .Jersey. 
Houte, - ·ew Jersey. �ot accountable f�r 
damages after shipment." Schwartz paid 
the fir t installment of sc"en dollars, )fa�· 
l, 1SS4, and the safe was shipped to bi� 
t he same day. Ile afterwards paid two in­
stallments of sc"en dollars each, by remit­
tance to Philadelphia by chec-1;:. Not h i ng 
more wns paid On .July 30, 1 !, chwartz 
S•>l<I :tncl dPlin•a•cl t he i:;afe to :\orton for 
.::;�,. Xorton paid him the 1mrchnse m01wv 
IJI' hnui:ht and paid for t he safe wlthot
.
1 t 
notice of :-iehwartz's agrN·111eut with the 
prospc•ulors. • ·orton took pnss1•ssion of the 
sa r1., :1 1111 rrmoveu It to his otllce. Seit\\ a rtz 
1:-; 1 1 1 .  11ln·11 ! ,  nncl huR n hR1·onclcd. '!'hr prns-
1·1·1 1 tor lir111 1� h t l rovt•r nga l nE<t ·orion, :uul 
I n  t l tP e1 1 1 1 r t  hPlnw 1hc cJpfPm l a n t  rccoverl'd 
j 11rli.:11w11  t on I hr. grnn nrl I ha t ,  1 IH' r l<'frm l a n  t 
hn \' 1 1 1 i;:  h1111i:ht :1 m l  pa lcl for t h «' ll:l 1'1• hona 
lldr" th ll l lt: to t hr! 1<a fe, by th1� Juw of Pcnu­
Hyln11 1 ln,  WflH ll"ll l ll!fl'JTPcl to 11 1 1 1 1  
f l,.forc J uslln•s l > J·: J ' lJ ID, D l .:\ O :\, n nu 
1 n : 1·: r >. 
A .  8. ,\ Pfw l g P t ,  for pl:i lnt l ll I n  <'Prtlomrl. 
8. ,\! ,  .'1•h:tn<'k, rnnt m .  
the bailment o f  a c hattel, w i t h  power i n  the 
bailee to become the owner on payment of 
the price agreed upon, and the sale or a 
chattel, with a stipulation that the title 
shall not pass to the purchaser until the 
contract price shall be paid. On this dis­
tinction the courts of that state hold that 
a bailrnent of chattels, with an option in 
the bailee to become the owner on payment 
of the price agreed upon, is valid, and that 
the right of the bailor to resume posses­
sion on non-payment of the contract price 
is secure against creditors of the bailee 
and bona fide purchasers from h i m ;  but 
that. upon the delivery of personal prop­
erty to a purchaser under a contract of sale. 
the resNT:l ti on of ti tie in the vendor un ti! 
the contract price is paid is "oid as again t 
creditors of the purchaser, or a bon:l fide 
pun:ba er from him. Clow '\" ,  \\o<'ds. ;; 
Serg. & R. 275; Enlow v. Klein. 19 Pa. St. 
4 ; Haak v. Linderman, 64 Pa. St. 49!! ; 
Stadtfeld v. Huntsman, 92 Pa. i::;t. 53; 
Brunswick. etc., Co. v. Hoo'l"er, 95 Pa. �t. 
::lO ; 1 Benj. Sales (Corbin's Ed.) § 446; 21 
Am. Law Reg. (�. S.) 224, note to Lewis "· 
)lcCabe. In the mo t recent rasr in the 
supreme court of Pennsyl"l"ania, )lr. .T us­
tice tcrrett said : "A present sale and dP­
liYery of personal property to the Yelllh'e, 
coupled with an agreement that the title 
shall not vest in the latter unless he pays 
t he price agreed upon at the time a11poiuted 
therefor, a nd that, in default of such pay­
ment. t he vendor may recover poss<'::<sion of 
the property, is quite di!Ier nt in its effect 
from a ba ilment for u ·e, or, as it i some­
ti mcs c·al led, a lease of the property, cou11lcd 
with an agreement w hereb�· the lesRee way 
subsequently become owner of the prop­
l'rty upon payment of a prire n�r('ed upon. 
As het ween the parties to such contracts, 
hotb are valid and binding; but, a' to 
creditors, the latter Is _good, while the for­
mer is im·aJid." l�orrl'st v. �1•Jsuu, l!> He­
y1orte1., 3 , 10".:i Pa. t. J 'l. The l':tses cited 
show t hat t he Pennsy lva n ia courts hold the 
s:i me doctrine with respect to bona llde p11r­
ch:is0rs as to cred l tont 
In th is st at e, and in 11C'f11·Jy nil o f  our sis· 
!Pr s t n l <'S, <'Oncl l t lonn l snlcs-t h a t  Ii:;, s:l l<'s of 
)lCl'SOll : l l  I H'lll l<'l'IY 011 C'l'l'<l i l ,  w i t h  dl'l iY 1'1')" OC 
1111ss1•ssl nn to t lw 1n11 ·c h:t H<'I', and n tst l pu ln. 
l ion t h a t  t he t i t le shall l'<'lll:l ln In t h <' Vt'll· 
1 l nr u n l l l  the c•onl rl\ct prll'I' l :-1  )l:l hl lmvc• 
!wen hPl!l vn l h l ,  not only nga h1lll t hc hnnH•­
l l l n l l' p11n·l 111 sC'1', but n lHo ngn hrnt hlA <'l'<'Cl­
lt on-1 n rn l  hon:t fide pnn•ha sc>rs frnm h i m ,  
unks:-1 l hl' Yenclor h n s  con f1•rrcd UJlOU his 
n•JH l l'e ln rl l<'ln or t i ll bl'yond mere pos1·H'S· 
Hlnn , or hn:-1 forf!'l t l'd his right I n  t he prop· 
!•rt y h} c•m11!11rt w h l<'h l h l'  l n w  rc�:t rrls n �  
frn11rl 1 1 1Pnt. 'l'hc CllRC'!I n re cltC'll l o  Cole v . 
T l1·1T) , I :.!  . J .  Ln w ,  :10..,; 1\ l l d la 1 1cl It Cn. 
,., l l l t d wnrlc, :l7 . . . T. l•)q ririO, rlriO; l H1'11J 
:-la ir  (C'orhln'H 1·:11 l ·� 1:11 HIO; 1 �m l l h , 
r .. ! '  r..,t h Ecl.l :1:1 no: :.' l  .\ 11 1. Ln w H l'g. ("'.'\. 
T I J�r tn:, .l . 'l'hc rnnlrad p:o;pr" Pr! In t he 
'�'rll f l ' l l  ordrr of .\ l :iy I ,  1 �  t ,  Hli.:1wd hy 
• · h w:i r t z, I fnr l hl' Hiii<' of l h l' propprf y t o  
h i m  r·11ml l t l<11111 1 l y ;  t l tr• n•111l or n •  ·1 •rvl1 1i.: l h P 
t l l lrt, 1 111t wl t h t u ur l l n g  r l "1 h ·1•ry, 1 1 11 1 1 1 t h r• 1•on­
t r11Pt flrlf'I' l!hllll !rl hr• p:t l d ,  'l°Ji1• <"r t l l l' f l!  of 
J ' 1 • 1 1 11syh·n 1 1 ln m u lH• II di l hw t l1111 hr • t w r·r·11 1 8.) :.!:! I ,  nott• to l .P 11 Ill v. 1\ l rl 'n hl' ; l !'i  . \ m 
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Law Rev. "SO, "Conversion by Purchase."
The doctrine of the courts of Peunsylvania
is founded upon the doctrine of Twyne's
Case, 3 Colie, SO, and Edwards v. Harben,
2 Term R. 5S7, that the possession of chat-
tels under a contract of sale without title
is an indelible badge of fraud,— a doctrine
repudiated quite generally by the courts of
this country, and especially in this state.
Runyon v. Groshon, 12 N. J. Eq. 8G; Broad-
way Bank v. McElrath, 13 N. J. Eq. 24; Mill-
er V. Pancoast, 29 N. J. Law, 2.5G. The doc-
trine of the Pennsylvania courts is disapprov-
ed by the American editors of Smith's Lead-
ing Cases in the note to Twyne's Case, 1
Smith, Lead. Cas. (8th Ed.) 33, 34; and by
Mr. Landreth in his note to Lewis v. McCabe,
21 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 221; but, neverthe-
less, the supreme court of that state, in the
latest case on the subject, — Forrest v. Nelson,
decided February 16, 1SS5,— has adhered to
the doctrine. It must therefore be regarded
as the law of Pennsylvania that, upon a sale
of personal property with delivery of posses-
sion to the purchaser, an agreement that title
should not pass until the contract price
should be paid is valid as between the origi-
nal parties, but that creditors of the pur-
ebaser, or a purchaser from him bona fide
by a levy under execution or a bona fide
purchase, will acquire a better title than the
original purchaser had, — a title superior to
that reserved by his vendor. So far as the
law of Pennsylvania is applicable to the
transaction, it must determine the rights of
these parties.
The contract of sale between the Marvin
Safe Company and Schwartz was made at
the company's office in Philadelphia. The
contract contemplated performance by the
delivery of the safe in Philadelphia -to the
carrier for transportation to Hightstown.
When the terms of sale are agreed upon,
and the vendor has done everything that he
has to do with the goods, the contract of
sale becomes absolute. Leonard v. Davis, 1
Black, 476; 1 Benj. Sales, § 308. Delivery
of the safe to the carrier in pursuance of
the contract was delivery to Schwartz, and
was the execution of the contract of sale.
His title, such as it was, under the terms of
the contract, was thereupon complete.
The validity, construction, and legal effect
of a contract may depend, either upon the
law of the place where it Is made, or of the
place where it is to be performed, or, if it
relate to movable property, upon the law of
the situs of the property, according to cir-
cumstances; but, when the place where the
contract is made is also the place of per-
formance and of the situs of the property,
the law of that place enters into and be-
comes part of the contract, and determines
the rights of the parties to it. Prazier v.
Fredericks, 24 N. J. Law, 162; Dacosta v.
Davis, Id. 319; Bulkley v. Hanold, 19 How.
390; Scudder v. Union Nat Bank, 91 U. S.
406; Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124, 1
ORiF.rF.i;s.n!oi'.— 9
Sup. Ct. 102; Morgan v. New Orleans, M.
&. T. R. Co., 2 Woods, 244, Fed. Cas. No.
9,804; Simpson v. Fogo, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 403;
Whart. Coufl. Laws, §§ 341, 345, 401, 403, 418:
Parr v. Brady, 37 N. J. Law, 201. The con-
tract between Schwartz and the company
having been made and also executed in Penn-
sylvania by the delivery of the safe to him,
as between him and the company Schwartz's
title will be determined by the law of Penn-
sylvania. By the law of that state the con-
dition expressed in the contract of sale, that
the safe company should not relinquish title
until the contract price was paid, and that on
the failure to pay any of the installments
of the price the company might resume pos-
session of the property, was valid, as be-
tween Schwartz and the company. By his
contract, Schwartz obtained possession of
the safe, and a right to acquire title on pay-
ment of the contract price; but until that
condition was performed the title was in
the company. In this situation of affairs,
the safe was brought into this state, and the
property became subject to our laws.
The contract of Norton, the defendant,
with Schwartz for the purchase of the safe,
was made at Hightstown, in this state. The
property was then in this state, and the con-
tract of purchase was executed by delivery
of possession in this state. The contract
of purchase, the domicile of the parties to
it, and the situs of the subject-matter of pur-
chase were all within this state. In every
respect the transaction between Norton and
Schwartz was a New Jersey transaction.
Under these circumstances, by principles of
law which are indisputable, the construction
and legal effect of the contract of purchase,
and the rights of the purchaser under it,
are determined by the law of this state. By
the law of this state, Norton, by his pur-
chase, acquired only the title of his vendor, —
only such title as the vendor had when the
property was brought into this state and
became subject to our laws.
It is insisted that inasmuch as Norton's
purchase, if made in Pennsylvania, would
have given him a title superior to that of
the safe company, that, therefore, his pur-
chase here should have that effect, on the
theory that the law of Pennsylvania, which
subjected the title of the safe company to
the rights of a bona fide purchaser from
Schwartz, was part of the contract between
the company and Schwartz. There is no
provision in the contract between the safe
company and Schwartz that he should have
power, under any circumstances, to sell and
make title to a purchaser. Schwartz's dispo-
sition of the property was not In conformity
with his contract, but in violation of it. His
contract, as construed by the laws of Penn-
sylvania, gave him no title which he could
lawfully convey. To maintain title against
the safe company, Norton must build up in
himself a better title than Schwartz had.
He can accomplish that result only by virtue
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CON D l TI O :N S  .AN D W A RIL\. :N T 1 ES. 12'.) 
Law Tie"I'. 380, "Conversion by Purchase." 
The uoctrine of the courts of rennsylvania 
Is founded upon the doctrine of Twyne's 
Case, 3 Coke, 80, and Edwards v. Harben, 
2 Term R. 5 7, that the possession of chat­
tels under a contract of sale without title 
is an indelible badge of fraud,-a doctrine 
repudiated quite generally by the courts of 
this country, and especially in this state. 
Runyon v. Groshon, 12 N. J. Eq. SG; Broad­
way Bank v. McElrath, 13 N. J. Eq. 24 ; :'11ill­
er v. rancoast, 29 N. J. Law, 23G. The doc­
trine of the Pennsylvania courts is disapprov­
ed by the American editors of Smith's Lead­
ing Cases in the note to Twyne's Case, 1 
Smith, Lead. Oas. (8th Ed.) 33, 34 ; and by 
::\Ir. Landreth in his note to Lewis v. l\IcCabe, 
21 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 224; but, neverthe­
less, the supreme court of that state, in the 
latest case on the subject,-Forrest v. Nelson, 
decided February 16, 1885,-has adhered to 
the doctrine. It must therefore be regarded 
as the law of Pennsylvania that, upon a sale 
of personal property with delivery of posses­
sion to the purchaser, an agreement that title 
should not pass until the contract price 
should be paid is valid as between the origi­
nal parties, but that creditors of the pur­
chaser, or a purchaser from him bona fide 
by a levy under execution or a bona fide 
purchase, will acquire a better title than the 
original purchaser had,-a title superior to 
that reserved by his vendor. So far as the 
law of Pennsylvania is applicable to the 
transaction, it must determine the rights of 
these parties. 
The contract of sale between the :Marv in 
Safe Company and Schwartz was made at 
the company's office in Philadelphia. The 
contract contemplated performance by the 
delivery of the safe i n  Philadelphia · to the 
carrier for transportation to Hightstown. 
When the terms of sale are agreed upon, 
and the vendor has done everything that he 
has to do with the goods, the contract of 
sale becomes absolute. Leonard v. Davis, 1 
Black, 476; 1 Benj. Sales, § 308. Delivery 
of the safe to the carrier in pursuance of 
the contract was delivery to Schwartz, and 
was the execution of the contract of sale. 
His title, such as it was, under the terms of 
the contract, was thereupon complete. 
The validity, construction, and legal effect 
of a conti-act may depend, either upon the 
law of the place where it  is made, or of the 
place where it  is to be performed, or, if it 
relate to movable property, upon the law of 
the situs of the property, according to cir­
cumstances; but, when the place where the 
contract is made is also the place of per­
formance and of the situs of the property, 
the law of that place enters into and be­
comes part of the contract, and determines 
the rights of the parties to it. Frazier v. 
Fredericks, 24 N. J. Law, 162; Dacosta v. 
Davis, Id. 319; Bulkley v. Hanold, 19 How. 
390; Scudder v. Union Nat Bank, 91 U. S. 
406; Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124, 1 
<GlF. • R - r'1t.QP.-!J 
c �1:: A t\ l. rl  v E 
Sup. Ct. 102 ; ::\Iorgan v. Xew Orleans, ::\I.  
& 'r. R. Co.,  2 Woo<1s, 2 14, Fed. Cas . •  ·n. 
0,80 1 ;  Simpson v. Fogo, D .Tur. (N. S.) -M)3 ; 
Whart. Confl. Laws, §§ 3 U ,  315, 401, 403, 418 ; 
Parr v. Brady, 37 }I". J. Law, 201. The con­
tract between Schwartz and the company 
having been made and also executed in P<'nn­
sylvania by the delivery of the safe to him, 
as between him &nd the company Schwa •·tz's 
title will be determined by the law of Penn­
sylvania. By the law of that state the con­
dition expressed in the contract of sale, that 
the safe company should not relinquish title 
until the contract price was paid, and that on 
the failure to pay any of the installments 
of the price the company might resume pos­
session of the property, was valid, as be­
tween Schwartz and the company. By his 
contract, Schwartz obtained possession of 
the safe, and a right to acquire title on pay­
ment of the contract price; but until tha t 
condition was performed the title was in 
the company. In this situation of affairs, 
the safe was brought into this state, and the 
property became subject to our laws. 
The contract of Norton, the defendant, 
with Schwartz for the purchase of the safe, 
was made at Hightstown, in this state. The 
property was then in this state, and the con­
tract of purchase was ex,ecuted by delivery 
of possession in this state. The contract 
of purchase, the domicile of the parties to 
it, and the situs of the subject-matter of pur­
chase were all within this state. In every 
respect the transaction between Norton and 
Schwartz was a New Jersey transaction. 
Under these circumstances, by principles of 
law which are indisputable, the construction 
and legal effect of the contract of purchase. 
and the rights of the purchaser under it, 
are determined by the law of this state. By 
the law of this state, Norton, by his pur­
chase, acquired only the title of his vendor.­
only such title as the vendor had when the 
property was brought into this state and 
became subject to our laws. 
It is insisted that inasmuch as Norton·s 
purchase, if made in Pennsylvania, would 
have given him a title superior to that of 
the safe company, that, therefore, his pur­
chase here should have that effect, on the 
theory that the law of Pennsylvania, which 
subjected the title of the safe company to 
the rights of a bona fide purchaser from 
Schwartz, was part of the contract between 
the company and Schwartz. There is no 
provision in the contract between the safe 
company and Schwartz that he should have 
power, under any circumstances, to sell and 
make title to a purchaser. Schwartz's dispo­
sition of the property was not in conformity 
with his contract, but in violation of it. His 
contract, as construed by the laws of Penn­
sylvania, gave him no title which he could 
lawfully convey. To maintain title against 
the safe col!lpany, Norton must build up in 
himself a better title than Schwartz had. 
He can accomplish that result only by v>rtue 
Jr.::1. r  f 
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of the law of the jurisdiction in which he
acquired his rights.
The doctrine of the Pennsylvania courts,
that a reservation of title in the vendor upon
a conditional sale is void as against creditors
and bona fide purchasers, is not a rule affix-
ing a certain construction and legal effect to
a contract made in that state. The legal ef-
fect of such a contract is conceded to be to
leave property in the vendor. The law acts
upon the fact of possession by the purchaser
under such an arrangement, and makes it
an indelible badge of fraud, and a forfeiture
of the vendor's reserved title as in favor of
creditors and bona fide purchasers. The doc-
trine Is founded upon consideration of public
policy adopted in that state, and applies to
the fact of possession and acts of ownersliii>
under such a contract, without regard to the
place where the contract was made, or its
legal effect considered as a contract.
In MacCabe v. BIymyre, 9 Phila. 615, the
controversy was with lespect to the rights
of a mortgagee under a chattel mortgage.
The mortgage had been made and recorded
in Maryland, where the chattel was when
the mortgage was giveu, and by the law of
JIaryland was valid, though the mortgagor
retained possession. The chattel was after-
wards brought into Pennsylvania, and the
Pennsylvania court held that the mortgage,
though valid in the state where it was made.
Would not be enforced by the courts of Pcun-
sylvania as against a creditor or purchaser
who had acciuircd rights in the property aftor
It had been brought to that state; that the
mortgagee, by allowing the mortgagor to re-
tain possession of the property, and bring it
into Pennsylvania, and exercise notorious
acts of ownershij). lost his right, under the
mortgage, as against an intervening Pennsyl-
vania creditor or purchaser, on the ground
that the contract was in conti'avention of
the law and policy of that state. Under
subslanlially the same state of facts this
court sustained tlio title of a mortgagee un-
der a mortgage made In another state, as
against a liona lido i)urchaser who had
bought till' properly of the mortgagor In this
state, for the leason that the possession of
the chattel by the mortgMgor was not in con-
travention of the public policy of this state.
Parr v. P.iady, ;{7 N. J. I-jiw, 2(11.
The public policy which has given rise to
the doclrlne of the Pennsylvania courts Is
local, ami the law which gives effect to It Is
also local, and has no extraterritorial effect.
In the case in hand, the safe was removed
to this state Viy Schwartz as soon as he be-
came the purchaser. His possession, under
the contract, has lieen exclusively in this
state. That possession violated no public pol-
icy,— not the public policy of Pennsylvania,
for the possession was not in that state; nor
the public policy of this state, for in this
state possession under a conditional sale is
regarded as lawful, and does not invalidate
the vendor's title imless impeached for actual
fraud. If the right of a purchaser, under a
purchase in this state, to avoid the reserved
title in the original vendor on such grounds
be conceded, the same right must be extend-
ed to creditors buying under a judgment and
execution in this state; for by the law of
Pennsylvania creditors and bona fide pur-
chasers are put upon the same footing. Nei-
ther on principle, nor on considerations of
convenience or public ijolicy, can such a
right be conceded. Under such a condition
of the law, confusion and uncertainty in the
title to property would be introduced, and
the transmission of the title to movable prop-
erty, the situs of which is in this state, would
depend, not upon our laws, Vnit upon the
laws and public policy of sister states or
foreign countries. A purcliaser of chattels
in this state Avhich his vendor had obtained
in New York, or in most of our sister states,
under a contract of conditional sale, would
take no title; if obtained under a conditional
sale in Pennsylvania, his title would be good;
and the same uncertainty would e.xist in the
title of purchasers of property so circum-
stanced at a sale under judgment and execu-
tion.
The title was in the safe company when
the property in dispute was removed from
the state of Penusylvauia. Whatever might
impair that title — the continued possession
and exercise of acts of ownership over it by
Schwartz, and the purchase by Norton — oc-
curred in this slate. The legal effect and
consequences of those acts must be adjudged
by the law of this state. By the law of this
state it was not illegal nor contrary to public
policy for the company to leave Schwartz in
possession as ostensible owner, and no for-
feiture of the company's title could result
therefrom. By the law of this state, Norton,
by his purchase, acipiired only such title as
Schwartz had under his contract with the
company. Nothing has occurred which by
our law will give hini a better title.
'I'lie Judgment should be reversed.
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of the law of the juris<liction in which be 
acquired bis rights. 
The doctrine of the Pennsylvania courts, 
that a rese1Tation of title in the vendor upon 
a conditional sale is void as aga inst creditors 
and bona fide p urchasers, is not a rule aflix­
ing a certain construction and legal effect to 
a contract made in that state. The leg-al ef­
fect of such a contract is conceded to lie to 
leave property in the vendor. The law acts 
upon the fact of possession by the purchaser 
under uch a n  arrangement, and makes it 
a n  indelible bac1g-e of frau<l, and a forfei t ure 
of the vendor' re erveil title as in favor of 
creditors and bona fide purchasers. The doc­
trine is rounded upon considera tion of puulic 
policy adopted i n  that state, and applies to 
the fact of posSC'!<sion antl acts of ownership 
under such a contract, without reg:tr1.l to the 
place where the eontract was wade, or its 
legal effect con ·idered as a contract. 
In )lacCahe Y. Illymyre, 9 Pbila. 615, the 
contru>ersy was ·with i espect to the rights 
of a lllortgagee under a cha ttel mortgage. 
The mortgage had been made and rccor<le<l 
in )faryland, where the chattel wa w hen 
the m ortgage was giYen, and by the law of 
:'ofarylan<l was rnlid, though the mortgagor 
rC'taine(l possession. Tile cha ttel wa::; aftcr­
war1ls brnught into l'cnusyha nia , an<l the 
l 'C'uusylYauia com't held t hat the lllln·tgage, 
t ltnng-h Yalid in the state whl'l"l' it was maue, 
wo11ld not he Pnl'orced by t h<' C'ourls or l'eun­
. y!Yania ns agninst a cred itor or purcbaser 
who l:atl ;H·•111i r1:ll rights in thl' property a fter 
it h:ul lJpcu brought to that state; that the 
11111rt�a.:.reP, hy allowing t he mortgagor to re­
tain lHlss<·ssiou of the property, aucl brin� i t  
i u to l'Pn n.·ylv:rn ia .  and cxerl'ise notoi·ious 
nC't.· of ownership, Jost bii:: ri:,:ht. under the 
11101·t�agl', as against an l n tencuing Pcnusyl­
':lllin ••n·di tor or purrhascr, on t be groun<l 
t ha t tllC' nmtra <" t  was in ennt mYeution of 
t lw law a n d  Jl<•lir•y or that state. Under 
s111o. t:1 1 1 t l n l l y  t hc> same sta te of facts this 
c•o 1 1 rt l"USta i 1 1 1•d t he> t it lc of :l lllOJ't;?:lgC!' Ull· 
dcr a 11111rt :.:a:.:" 11 1 : 1 1 11' in anot her sta te, as 
a :.:n l m;t a houa t ld" 1 1 11rl'liascr who bad 
l 11 1ugl1t  t l 1 t ·  prop• r t y  of t hc morlgngor in this 
i;ta (<', fur t 1 1•• n•a ·011 t ha t  the possc•ssion or 
t he rha tt(�l hy t l 11• mortgn "or was not In «on· 
l r:t\·p11 f lo1 1  o l'  t he publ i(' pol i ('� or tllls sta ll'. 
Purr , .. nrn<ly, :i; N . . J . Law. :.!O l .  
Th" p11hllC' pnlky \Vh l1'!1 has given rlM' t o  
t h<' rl111· � rl 1 11• Of l hl' J 'f'1111S)' l \ :l ll lU ('o\lr(s is 
hu·n l .  11 1 J 1 I  t l ll' lnw which glveH rfTcc•l to it Is 
u l  o lnl': i l ,  :1 1111  hnu no e. trn tcrrltorhtl cfl'cct. 
D i g 1t1zed by 
JTE RNET A R C H  V E  
In the case i n  band, the safe was removed 
to this ·tate by Schwartz as soon as lie be­
came the purchaser. His possession, under 
the contract, has been exclusively in tbi 
state. That possession Yiolated no public pol­
icy,-not the public policr of Penn y!Ya uia, 
for the possession was not in that state; nor 
the public policy of this state, for i n  this 
state possesi;ion under a conditional sale is 
rC'ganled as la.wful, and does not invalidate 
the Yendor·s title unless impC'ached for actual 
frand. I f  the right of a purcha ser, under a 
r>m·chase in this state. to a>oid the reserved 
title in the original vendor on such grounds 
be conceded, the same right must be extend­
ed to creditors buying under a judgment and 
execution in this state; for by the law of 
l'ennsylYania creditor and bona fide pur­
chasers are put upon the ame fooling. Nei­
ther on principle, nor on considerations of 
convenience or public policy, can such a 
right be conceded. Under such a condition 
of the law, confusion a nd uncerta inty in the 
t itle to property would be intro<lul·cd, and 
t he tmusm is.ion of the title to rnon1ble prop­
erty. tlic situs of which is in this state, would 
cl<>pcml, not upon our laws, but upon the 
laws and public policy of si ·ter stn tcs or 
foreign countries. A pmchascr of chattels 
i n  this slate which his vendor had obtained 
in �cw York, ot· i n  most of our sister states, 
unuer a contract of conditional sale. would 
t a ke no title; if olltained under a l'onllitioml 
sale in Pennsylvania, his title wou h l  tie good ; 
and the same uncertainty would t::'l.i ·t in the 
title or purchasers or property so ci r  'llltl· 
stanccd at a sale untler j uugment and execu­
tion. 
The title was in the safe eompany when 
t he property in dispute wa rcmo n•d from 
tile slate of Pcnns�· Irn nia. Whatever might 
impnir that ti tle-the continued possessitrn 
a.nd cxercis0 or acts of ow nership ovC'r il t>y 
Schwartz, and the purrha e by �orton-oc­
<'utTcd in this sta.te. The IC')!al C'ff<'<'t and 
l'Onsequeuc0s of those' acts mn::;t be adjll(lged 
hy th<' law of this state. By the law of t h is 
state it wa::; not illegal nor contrary to puhli<' 
pol iC"y for the compnn� to leave Schwartz in 
possession as ostensihl<' ow11c1·, and no for· 
feiturc or the com11nny's l i l lr <'O uld re�m l t  
t hert:from. D y  t he In "  o f  t h is ::;ta te, Norton, 
hy his lllll'<'h:ls<', a e q n i n•cl only such title ns 
�dr n 1u·tz had 11 11 11cr h is C'ontrnct with the 
1•n111pany. i\ol hin ;: h:i " ocrurrcd which by 
nur In w will glvP h l 1 1 1  a better title. 
Th<' J urlA"mrnt sho uld be re\"ersed. 
O ru l' a l  frorr 
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DEXTER V. NORTON et al.
(47 N. Y. 62.)
Court of Appeals of New York. 1871.
Action for damages for breach of a con-
tract to sell and deliver cotton. The opin-
ion states the facts. Judgment for defend-
ant dismissing the complaint.
James C. Carter, for appellant. Wm. W.
.Mcl'arlane, for respondents.
CHURCH, C. J. The contract was for the
sale and delivery of specific articles of per-
sonal property. Each bale sold was desig-
nated by a particular mark, and there is
nothing in the case to show that these marks
■were used merely to distinguish the general
kind or quality of 'the article, but they seem
to have been used to describe the particu-
lar bales of cotton then in possession of the
defendant. Nor does it appear that there
were other bales of cotton in the market of
the same kind, and marked in the same way.
The plaintiff would not have been obliged to
accept any other cotton than the bales speci-
fied in the bought note.
Tlie contract was executory, and various
things remained to be done to the one hun-
dred and sixty-one bales in question by the
sellers before delivery. The title therefore
iliil not pass to the vendee, but remained
in the vendor. Joyce v. Adams, 8 N. Y. 291.
This action was brought by the purchaser
against the vendor to recover damages for
the non-delivery of the cotton, and the im-
portant and only question in the case is,
whether upon an agreement for the sale and
delivery of specific articles of personal prop-
erty, under circumstances where the title to
the property does not vest in the vendee, and
the property is destroyed by an accidental
fire before delivery without the fault of the
seller, the latter is liable upon the contract
for damages sustained by the purchaser.
The general rule on this subject is well
established that where the performance of
a duty or charge created by law is prevent-
ed by inevitable accident without the fault
of the party he will be excused, but where
a person absolutely contracts to do a certain
thing not impossible or unlawful at the time,
he will not be excused from the obligations
of the contract unless the performance is
made unlawful, or is prevented by the other
party.
Neither inevitable accident nor even those
events denominated acts of God will excuse
him, and the reason given is, that he might
have provided against them by his contract.
Paradine v. Jane, Alejn, 27; Harmony v.
Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99; Tompkins v. Dudley,
2.-) N. Y. 272.
But there are a variety of cases where the
courts have implied a condition to the con-
tract itself, the effect of which was to re-
lieve the party when the performance had
without his fault, become impossible; and
the apparent confusion in the authorities has
grown out of the difficulty in determining in
a given case whether the implication of a
condition should be applied or not, and also
in some cases in placing the decision upon a
wrong basis. The relief afforded to the par-
ty in the cases referred to is not based upon
exceptions to the general rule, but upon the
construction of the contract.
For instance, in the case of an absolute
promise to marry, the death of either party
discharges the contract, because it is infer-
red or presumed that the contract was made
upon the condition that both parties should
live.
So of a contract made by a painter to paint
a picture, or an author to compose a work,
or an apprentice to serve his master a speci-
fied number of years, or in any contract for
personal services dependent upon the life of
the individual making it, the contract is dis-
charged upon the death of the party, in ac-
cordance with the condition of continued ex-
istence, raised by implication. Cutter v.
Powell, 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. .50.
The same rule has been laid down as to
property: "As if A. agrees to sell and deliver
his horse Eclipse to B. on a fixed future
day, and the horse die in the interval, the
obligation is at an end." Benj. Sales, 424.
In replevin for a horse and judgment of re-
torno habendo, the death of the horse was
held a good plea in an action upon the bond.
Carpenter v. Stevens, 12 Wend. 589. In
Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best & S. S3C, A.
agreed with B. to give him the use of a
music hall on specified days, for the purpose
of holding concerts, and before the time ar-
rived the building was accidentally burned.
Hold, that both parties were discharged from
the contract. Blackburn, J., at the close of
his opinion, lays down the rale as follows:
"The principle seems to us to be, that in
contracts in which the performance depends
on the continued existence of a given per-
son or thing, a condition is implied that the
imposslliility of performance, arising from
the perishing of the person or thing, shall ex-
cuse the performance."' And the reason giv-
en for the rule is, "because from the nature
of the contract, it is apparent that the par-
ties contracted on the basis of the continued
existence of the particular person or chat-
tel."
In School District v. Dauchy. 25 Conn. 530,
the defendant had agreed to build a school-
house by the 1st of May, and had it nearly
completed on the 27th of April, when it was
struck by lightning and burned; and it was
held that he was liable in damages for the
non-performance of the contract. But the
court, while enforcing that general rule in a
case of evident hardship, recognizes the rule
of an implied condition in case of the de-
struction of the specific subject-matter of the
contract; and this is the rule of the civil
law. Poth. Cont. Sale, art. 4, § 1, p. 31.
We were referred to no authority against
this rule. But the learned counsel for the
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DEXTEil v. :\Ol tTU� ct al. 
(-1 1 N. X. G2.) 
Court of Appeals  of New York. 1871. 
Action for damages for breach of a con­
tract to sell and deliver cotton. The opin­
ion states the facts. J udgment for defend­
ant tlismissmg the complaint. 
James C. Carter, for appellant. Wm. W. 
�kFarlane, for respondents. 
C'HURCH, C. J. The contract was for the 
!'<ale and deli>ery of specific articles of per­
sonal property. Each bale sold was clesig­
natccl by a particular mark, ancl thel·e is 
uotbing in tbe case to show tilat these marks 
wi·n· used merely to distinguish the general 
kind or quality of the article, but they seem 
to have been used to describe the particu­
lar bales of cotton then in possession of the 
<lC'fendant. Nor cloes it appear that there 
were other bales of cotton in the market of 
the same kincl, and marked in the same way. 
The pla intiff would not ha>e been obliged to 
:ll'l'ept any other cotton than the bales speci­
li ''I in the bought note. 
The contract was executory, and various 
things remained to be done to the one hun­
dred and sixty-one bales in question by the 
sellers before delivery. The title therefore 
dicl not pass to tlw vendee. but remained 
in the vendor. Joyce v. Adams, 8 N. Y. 291. 
This action was brought by the purchaser 
against the vendor to recover damages for 
the non-delivery of the cotton, and the im­
pnrta nt and only question in the case is, 
whether upon an agreement for the sale and 
•leliYery of specific articles of personal prop­
Pt'ty. under circumstances where the title to 
the property does not vest in the >endee. and 
the property is destroyed by an accidental 
fit·e before delivery without the fault of the 
seller, the latter is liable upon the contract 
for damages sustained by the purchaser. 
The general rule on this subject is well 
established that where the performance of 
a duty or charge created by law is preYent­
ed by inevitable accident without the fault 
of the party he will be excused, but where 
a person absolutely contracts to do a certain 
thing not impossible or unlawful at the time, 
be will not be excused from the obligations 
or the contract unless the performance i s  
ma11e unlawful, o r  i s  preYented b y  the other 
party. 
Neither inevitable accident nor eYen those 
('vents denominated acts of God will excuse 
llim, and the reason given is, that he might 
have provided against them by bis contract. 
I'aradine v. Jane, Ale3 n, �7 ; Harmony v. 
I�ingham, 12 N. Y. 99; Tompkins v. Dudley, 
�:i X. Y. 272. 
But there are a variety of cases where the 
courts have implied a condition to the con­
tract itself, the effect of which was to re­
lieve the party when the performance had 
without hi fault, become i m possible; and 
the apparent confusion in tbe anthol'ities bas 
[ 
ERNET A R C H IV E  
grown out o r  the cl ifficulty I n  detel'm iuin� in 
a given case whether tile i 1 J 1 [lli<'a t io11 .. r a 
condition should be appliecl or not, and al;;" 
in some cai;cs in pl,tcing tbc cfoci;;i<J11 11 1 1 1 1 11 a 
wrong basis. The !'('lief a!Tor<lccl to t 1 i  .. p:tl'­
ty in the cases referred to is not bai<<'ci upon 
exceplions to the general rule, but upon the 
construction of the contract. 
For instance, in the case of an ahsol11le 
promise to marry, the death of either party 
discharges the contract, because it is infer 
reel or presumed that the contract was ma<lc 
upon the condition that both parties should 
live. 
So of a contract made by a painter to paint 
a picture, or an author to compose a work, 
or an apprentice to serve his master a speci­
fied number of years, or in a ny contract for 
personal services dependent upon the life o f  
the inclh·idual making i t ,  the contract i s  dis­
charged upon the death of the pa rty. in ac­
cordance with the conditi,·m of conlinrn•<I ex­
istence, raised by implication. Cutter v. 
Powell, � �mith, Lead. Cas. 50. 
The same rule has been laid down as to 
property : ".As if A. agrees to sell and deliYer 
his l.JorsP Eclipse to B. on a fixed future 
day, a n d  the horse die in the inten-al, the 
obligation is at an end." Benj. Sales, 4'.!4. 
In replevin for a horse a nd judgment of re­
torno habendo, the death of the horse was 
held a good plea in an action upon the bond. 
Carpenter v. Ste>ens, 12 Wend. 58(). In 
Taylot• v. Caldwell, 3 Best & �.  83G, A. 
agreed with B. to give him the use of a 
music hall on specified days. for the purpose 
of holding concerts, and before the time a1·­
rived the building was accidentally burned. 
Helcl, that both parties were discharged fl'om 
the contract. Blackburn, J., at the close of 
bis opinion, lays down the 111le as follows: 
"The principle seems to us to be, that i n  
contracts in wl.Jich the performance depends 
on the continued existence of a gi>en per­
son or thing, a COil'lition is implied that the 
impossibility of performance, ari,;ing from 
the perbiling of the person or thing, shall ex­
cuse the performance . . , And the reason giv­
en for tlle rule is, "because from the nature 
of the contract, it is apparent that the par­
ties contracted on the basis of the continued 
existence of the particular person or chat­
tel." 
In School District v. Dauchy, 25 Conn. 530, 
the defendant had agreed to build a school­
house hy the 1st of May, and had it nearly 
completed on the 27th of April, when it was 
struck by lightning and burned ; and it was 
held that he was liable in damages for the 
non-performance of the contract. But the 
court, wllile enforcing that general rule in a 
case of evident hardship, recognizes the rule 
of an implied condition in case of the de­
strnct ion of the specific subject-matter of the 
contract; a nd this is the rule of the civil 
law. Poth. Cont. Sale, art. 4, § 1,  p. 31. 
·we were referred to no authority against 
this rule. But the learned counsel for the 
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appellant, in his very able and forcible argu-
ment, insisted that the general rule should
be applied in this case. While it is difficult
to trace a clear distinction between this case
and those where no condition has been im-
plied, the tendency of the authorities, so far
as they go, is to recognize such a distinction,
and it is based upon the presumption that the
parties contemplated the continued existence
of the subject-matter of the contract.
The circumstances of this case are favor-
able to the plaintiff. The property ^^■as mer-
chandise sold in the marliet. The defendant
could, and from the usual course of business
we may infer did, protect himself by insur-
ance; but in establishing rules of liability in
commercial transactions, it is far more im-
portant that they should be uniform and cer-
tain than it is to work out equity in a given
case. There is no hardship in placing the
parties (especially the buyer) in the posiliou
they were in before the contract was made.
The buyer can only lose the profits of the
purchase; the seller may lose tlie whole con-
tract price, and if his liability for non-deliv-
ery should be establislied, tlie eulianced val-
ue of the property. After considerable re-
flection, I am of the opinion that the rule
here indicated of an implied condition in
case of the destruction of the property bar-
gained without fault of the party, will oper-
ate to carry out the intention of tlio pnrties
under most circumstances, and will be more
lust than the contrary rule. The buyer can
of course always protect himself against the
effect of the implied condition, by a provision
in the contract that the property shall be at
the risk of the seller.
Upon the grounds upon which this rule is
bysed of an implied condition, it can malie
lio difference whether the property was de-
stroyed by an inevitable accident or by an
act of God, tlie condition being that the prop-
erty shall continue to exist. If we were cre-
ating an exception to the general rule of lia-
bility, there would be force in the consid-
erations urged upon the argument, to lim-
it the exception to cases where the property
was destroyed by the act of God, upon
grounds of public policy, but they are not
material in adopting a rule for the construc-
tion of the contract so as to imply a condi-
tion that the property w&s to continue in
existence. It can malce no difference how
it was destroyed, so long as the party was
not in any degree in fault. The minds of
the parties are presumed to have contem-
plated the possible destruction of the prop-
erty, and not the manner of its destruction;
and the supposed temptation and facility of
the seller to destroy the property himself
cannot legitimately operate to affect the
principle involved.
The judgment must be affirmed.
ALLEN, GROVER, and RAPALLO, JJ.,
concur. PECKHAM and FOLGER, JJ., dis
sent
Judgment affirmed.
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132 ALE , 
appellant, in his very able and forcible argu­
ment, insisted that the general rule should 
be applied in this case. While it is difficult 
to trace a clear distinction between this case 
and those where no condition has been im­
plied, the tendency of the authorities, so far 
as they go, is to recognize such a distinction, 
and it is based upon the presumption that the 
parties contemplated the continued existence 
of the subject-matter of the contract. 
The circumstances of this case are favor­
able to the plaintiff. The property was mer­
chandise sold in the market. The defendant 
could, and from the usual course of business 
we may infer did, protect himself by in ur­
ancc; but in establishing rules of liability i n  
commercial transactions, it is far more im­
portant that they should be uniform and cer­
tain than it is to work out equity in a given 
case. There is no hardship in placing the 
parties (e pecially the buyer) in the position 
they were in before the contract was made. 
The buyer can only lose the profits of the 
purchase; the seller may lose the whole con­
tract price, and if hi liability for non-deliv­
ery should be established, the enhanced val­
ue o f  the property. After considerable re­
flection, I am of the opinion that the rule 
here indicated o f  an implied condition in 
case o f  the destruction of the property bar­
gained without fault of the party, will oper­
ate to carry out the intention of the parties 
uuder most circumstances, and will be more 
ju t than the contrary rule. T'he buyer can 
of course always protect himself against the 
D i g 1t1zect by 
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effect o f  the implied condition, b y  a pro;ision 
in the contract that the property shall be at 
the risk of the sel1er. 
Upon the grounds upon which this rule is 
b:>sed of an impli�d condition, it can make 
no difference whether the property was de­
stroyed by an inevitable accident or by an 
act of God, the condition being that the prop­
erty shall continue to exist. If we were cre­
ating an exception 1.0 the general ruie of lia­
bility, there would be force in the con id­
<>rations urged upon the argument, to l i ru­
i t the exception to cases where the property 
was destroyed by the act of God, upon 
grounds o f  public policy, but they are not 
material in adopting a rule for the construc­
tion of the contract so as to imply a condi­
tion that the property whs to continue in 
existence. I t  can make no difference how 
i t  was destroyed, so long as the party was 
not in any degree in fault. The minds of 
the partie are presumed to have contem­
plated the possible dcstruc:tion of the prop­
erty, and not the wanner of its destruction ; 
and the supposed temptation and facility of 
the seller to destroy the property himself 
cannot legitimately operate to affect the 
principle invoh·ed. 
The judgment must be a ffirmed. 
ALLEN, G ROVER, and RAPALLO, JJ .. 
concur. PECKHAM and FOLGER, JJ., dis 
sent. 
Judgment affirmed. 
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DORR V. FISHER.
(1 Gush. 271.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suf-
folk and Nautucket. March Term, 1848.
This was an action to recover the price of
two tubs of butter. The plaintiff having
been allowed, against objection ou the part
of the defendant, to prove bis claim as a
book account, the defendant then introduced
evidence that In November, 1845, he offered
several kegs of butter to the defendant for
sale. On examining the butter, (two or
three kegs only,) the defendant told the
plaintiff that he was unable to decide wheth-
er it was good or not, but that he wanted it
of a flrst-rate quality. The plaintiff then
said that he called the butter first-rate, and
the defendant replied that. If it was good,
the plaintiff might leave him two tubs. The
two tubs were left at the defendant's store,
where they remained for about a week,
when the plaintiff came to the store, and
some conversation ensued relative to the
butter. The plaintiff was there again some
time afterwards and requested that the but-
ter should be put into the cellar. The prin-
cipal question was as to the quality of the
butter, and the evidence upon this point was
conflicting. The defendant contended that
the butter was sold under a warranty that
it was of the best quality, and that the bur-
den of proof was on the plaintiff to prove
that It was of such a quality. Judge in-
structed the jury that if the butter were
sold with a warranty as to quality, or with
a representation amounting to a warranty,
the burden of proof was on the defendant to
show that it was not equal to the warranty
or representation. The jury returned a ver-
dict against the defendant, who thereupon
filed exceptions.
T. Willey, for plaintiff. T. Wentworth, for
defendant.
SHAW, C. J. This cause has been argued,
on the part of the defendant, as if the suit
were brought upon an open, unexecuted con-
tract for the purchase of goods; whereas
the declaration is in indebitatus assumpsit
for goods sold and delivered. To maintain
this action, it is not necessary to set out the
contract of sale, with its conditions and lim-
itations; it is enough to prove an agreement
for a sale of the goods, at a fixed price In
money, or without a price, (in which case,
the law implies an agreement to pay so
much as they are worth,) and an actual de-
livery, whereby a debt arises. A delivery
by the vendor implies an acceptance by the
vendee. An offer, by the vendor, not ac-
cepted by the vendee, may be a good tender,
and a good performance on his part, but it is
not a delivery. If there are couditions an-
nexed to the agreement of sale, respecting
the quality, or other circumstances, which
are not complied with by the vendor, the
vendee should decline to accept the goods;
but, if he does accept them, the acceptance
is a waiver. And so, In an indebitatus a.s-
sumpsit, for goods sold and delivered, the
plaintiff must prove a delivery, or he will
fail in the action. And this is not confined
to the case of an implied assumpsit, on a
quantum valebat; if the sale be made by an
express contract, not under seal, and the
goods are actually delivered, it is sufficient
to allege that the defendant is indebted to
the plaintiff for goods sold and delivered,
and the law implies a promise to pay. No
matter, therefore, what may have been the
terms and conditious, under which goods
are sold and delivered; if nothing remain
but the obligation to pay for them, this is a
debt, the existence of which supports the al-
legation of being indebted, and supersedes
the necessity of setting out specially such
terms and conditions.
"Where goods have been sold and actually
delivered to the defendant, though under a
special agreement, it is in general sutficient
to declare on the indebitatus count, provid-
ed the contract were to pay In money, and
the credit be expired." 1 Chit. PI. 33S.
This is not a mere technical rule of plead-
ing, but a sound rule of law and justice,
growing out of the nature of a sale. Were
it otherwise, and were the plaintiff, after a
delivery of goods on a contract of sale,
bound to prove the terms and conditions of
such sale, and to prove affirmatively that he
had complied with those conditions, on his
part, the result would be, that the vendee,
having accepted the goods, as and for the
goods contracted for, and without offering
to return them, or giving notice to the ven-
dor, to come and take them back, might hold
and retain the goods, without paying any
thing for them. The vendor could not re-
cover them back in an action, because he
has delivered them to the vendee, in pursu-
ance of a contract, as his own.
It is asked, then, has the vendee no rem-
edy against the vendor, after delivery, if
the vendee fails to derive the benefits, ex-
pected and stipulated for on the sale? Cer-
tainly not. If he has been deceived, as to
the title, quality, or character of the thing
purchased, he may rescind the contract, re-
store or tender back the goods, and recover
back the purchase money; or he may be
secured by a warranty on the sale. The
law, on the sale of personal property, im-
plies a warranty of good title, so that if
the vendee be deprived of his purchase by
a paramount title, he has a remedy on his
warranty. Or he may take an express war-
ranty, as to the quality, condition, value,
age, origin, or other circumstances resiject-
ing the thing sold. But a warranty is a
separate, independent, collateral stipulation,
on the part of the vendor, with the vendee,
for which the sale is the consideration, for
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DORR v. FISHER. 
(1 Cush. 271.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of l\Iassachusetts. Suf­
folk and Nantucket. Ma1·ch Term, 1848. 
This was an action to recover the price of 
two tubs of butter. The plaintiff having 
been allowed, against objection ou the part 
of the defendant, to prove his claim as a 
book account, the defendant then introduced 
evidence that in November, 1845, he offered 
several kegs of butter to the defendant for 
sale. On examining the butter, (two or 
three kegs only,) the defendant told the 
plaintiff that he was unable to decide wheth­
er it was good or not, but that be wanted i t  
o f  a first-rate quality. The plaintiff then 
said that he called the butter fiL·st-rate, and 
the defendant replied that, if  it was good, 
the plaintiff might leave him two tubs. The 
two tubs were left at the defendant's store, 
where they remained for about a week, 
when the plaintiff came to the store, and 
some conversation ensued relative to the 
butter. The plaintiff was there again some 
time afterwards and requested that the but­
ter should be put into the cellar. The prin­
cipal question was as to the quality of the 
butter, and the evidence upon this point was 
conflicting. The defendant contended that 
the butter was sold under a warranty that 
it was of the best quality, and that the bur­
den of proof was on the plaintiff to prove 
that it was of such a quality. Judge in­
structed the jury that if  the butter were 
sold with a warranty as to quality, or with 
a representation amounting to a warranty, 
the burden of proof was on the defendant to 
show that it was not equal to the warranty 
or representation. The jury returned a ver­
dict against the defendant, who thereupon 
filed exceptions. 
T. Willey, for plaintiff. T. Wentworth, for 
defendant. 
SHAW, C. J. This cause bas been argued, 
on the part of the defendant, as if the suit 
were brought upon an open, unexecuted con­
tract for the purchase of goods; whereas 
the declaratio n is in indebitatus assumpsit 
for goods sold and delivered. To maintain 
this action, it is not necessary to set out the 
contract of sale, with its conditions and lim­
itations; it is enough to prove an agreement 
for a sale of the goocls, at a fixed price in 
money, or without a price, (in which case, 
the law implies an agreement to pay so 
much as they are worth,) and an actual de­
li very, whereby a debt arises. A delivery 
by the vendor implies au acceptance by the 
vendee. An offer, by the vendor, not ac­
repted by the vendee, may IJe a good tender, 
and a good performance on his part. but it is 
not a delivery. If there are conditions an­
nexed to the agreement of sale. respecting 
the qnnlity, or other circumstauces, which 
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are not complied with b y  the vendor, the 
vendee should decline to accept tLe :.;-oous ; 
!Jut, if he does accept them, the accevtance 
is a waiver. And so, in an indebitatus a..-;­
sumpsit, for goods sold and delivereu, the 
plaintiff must prove a delivery, or he will 
fail in the action. And this is not confined 
to the case of an implied assumpsit, on a. 
quantum valebat; if the sale be made by an 
express contract, not under seal, and the 
goods are actually delivered, it is sufficient 
to allege that the defendant is indebted t o  
the plaintiff for goods sold and ueli Yercu, 
and the law implies a promise to pay. No 
matter, therefore, what may have been the 
terms and conditions, under which goods 
are sold and delivered ; if nothing remain 
but the obligation to pay for them, this is a 
debt, the existence of which supports the al­
legation of being indebted, and supersedes 
the necessity of setting out specially such 
terms and conditions. 
"Where goods have been sold and actually 
delivered to the defendant, though under a 
special agreement, it is in general sufficient 
to declare on the indebitatus count, provid­
ed tile contract were to pay in money, and 
the credit be expired." 1 Chit. Pl. 338. 
This is not a mere technical rule of plead­
ing, but a sound rule of law and justice, 
growing out of the nature of a sale. Were 
it otherwise, and were the plaintiff, after a 
delivery of goods on a contract of sale, 
bound to prove the terms and conditions of 
such sale, and to prove affirmatively that he 
had complied with those conditions, on his 
p art, the result would be, that the vendee, 
having accepted the goods, as and for the 
goods contracted for, and without offering 
to return them, or giving notice to the ven­
dor, to come and take them back, might bold 
and retain the goods, without paying any 
thing for them. The vendor could not re­
cover them back in an action, because be 
has delivered them to the vendee, i n  pursu­
ance of a contract, as bis own. 
It is asked, then, has the vendee no rem­
edy against the vendor, after delivery, if 
the vendee fails to derive the benefits, ex­
pected and stipulated for on the sale ? Cer­
ta.inly not. If he has been deceived, as to 
the title, quality, or character of the thing 
purchased, he may rescind the contract, re­
store or tender back the goods, and recover 
back the purchase money ; or he may be 
secured by a warranty on the sale. The 
law, on the sale of personal property, im­
plies a warranty of good title, so that if 
the vendee be deprived of bis purchase by 
a paramount title, he has a remedy on his 
warranty. Or he may take an express war­
ranty, as to the quality, condition, value, 
age, origin, or other circumstances re�pect­
ing the thing sold. But a warranty is a 
separate, independent, collateral stipulation, 
on the part of the vendor, with the vendee, 
for which the sale is the consideration, for 
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the existence or truth of some fact, relating
to the thing sold. It is not strictly a condi-
tion, for it neither suspends nor defeats the
completion of the sale, the vesting of the
thing sold in the vendee, nor the right to
the purchase money in the vendor. And,
notwithstanding such warranty, or any
breach of it, the vendee may hold the goods,
and have a remedy for his damages by ac-
tion.
But, to avoid circuity of action, a warran-
ty may be treated as a condition subse-
quent, at the election of the vendee, who
may, upon a breach thereof, rescind the con-
tract, and recover bacli the amount of his
purchase money, as in case of fraud. But,
if he does this, he must first return the
property sold, or do every thing in his power
requisite to a complete restoration of the
property to the vendor, and, without this,
he cannot recover. Conner v. Henderson,
15 Mass. 319; Kimball v. Cunningham, 4
Mass. r>02; Perley v. Balch, 23 Pick. 2S3. Such
a restoration of the goods, and of all other
benefits derived from the .sale, is a direct
condition, without a compliance witli which,
the vendee cannot rescind the contract, and
recover bacli the money or other property,
paid or delivered on the contract.
But liis other remedy is by an action on
the warranty, or contract of the vendor, on
which, if there be a breach, he will recover
damages to the amount of the loss sustained
by the broach, whatever that may be. If it
be a warranty of the quality of goods, and
the breach alleged is, that the goods deliv-
ered were inferior to the goods stipulated
for, the damage will ordinarily be the ditTer-
ence in value between the one and the oth-
er. Such an action affirms instead of disaf-
firming the contract of sale, leaves the prop-
erty in the vendee, and gives damages for
the breach of such separate, collateral con-
tract of warranty.
This remedy Is so familiar, that It scarce-
ly rc'cpilres to be supported and explained
by authorities. l?\it It nat\irally requires an
action to be brought by the vendee against
the vendor, which. If the vendor Is at the
same time suing for the price, Is a cross
action.
But the KPneral tendency of modern Judi-
cial decisions has Ijoen, to avoid circuity
and niiiltliiliclty of actions, by allowing mat-
ters growing out of the same transaction to
be given In evidence by way of defence, In-
stead of requiring n cross action, when It
can be done without a violation of princi-
ple, or great inconvenience in practice.
And it has lately been decided, in this
court, after consideration and upon a re-
view of the authorities, that, when a cross
action will lie for a deceit in the sale of a
chattel, the deceit may be given in evidence
in reduction of the damages, in a suit for
the purchase money. Harrington v. Strai-
ten, 22 Pick. 510. And the principles, which
govern that case, are precisely applicable to
the case, where a cross action will lie to re-
cover damages on a breach of warrauty on
a sale, and the same may be given in evi-
dence, and a like amount deducted from the
purchase money, in assessing damages in
a suit by the vendor for the price. Poultou
V. Lattimore. 9 B. & C. 259; Perley v. Balch.
23 Pick. 2S3.
It appears by the report in the present
case, that these are the principles ou whiili
the trial of the action proceeded. The plain-
tiff must first have proved a sale and deliv-
ery of the two tubs of butter. Some ob-
jection was made to the plaintiff's account
book; but it was not alluded to in the argu-
ment. Indeed, the other proof tends to
show, that the defendant agreed to take the
two tubs of butter, and directed the plaiutiCC
to leave them at his store, which the plain-
tiff did the same day. No offer was made
afterwards to return the butter. No notice
was given to the defendant to take It away.
This was evidence, from which a Jury might
well infer a sale and delivery. The only
way. then, in which the defendant could
avail himself of proof of warranty of quali-
ty, and a breach of it, was in obtaining a re-
duction of damages, by way of set-off. in
nature of a cross action, and as a substitute
therefor. Had the defendant bmught his
action, it is quite clear, th.at the burden of
proof would have been on him to prove such
warranty and breach, and the damage sus-
tained by it. The burden was on him in the
same manner, when ho resorted to this line
of defence, as a substitute for a cross ac-
tion. We are of oi)inion, therefore, that the
direction of the judge was strictly correct,
that If the article was sold to the defendant
with a wiirranty as to Its quality, or with a
representation amounting to a warranty,
the burden of proof was on the defendant,
to show that it was not equal to the war-
ranty.
Exceptions overruled and Judgment on the
verdict
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SALES. 
the exi tence or truth of some fact, relating 
to the thing sold. It is not strictly a condi­
tion, for it neither suspends nor defeats the 
completion of the sale, the vesting of the 
thing sold in the vendee, nor the right to 
the purchase money in the •endor. And, 
notwithstanding such warranty, or any 
breach of it, the vendee may hold the goods, 
and ha•e a remedy for his damages by ac­
tion. 
But. to avoid circuity of action, a warran­
ty may be treated as a condition subse­
quent, at the election of the •endee, who 
may, upon a breach thereof, rescind the c_on­
tract, and reco•er b:11.:k the amount of bis 
purchase money, as in ca e of fraud. But. 
if be doe this, he mu t first return the 
property sold, or do e•err thin� in bis power 
requisite to a complete restorat ion of the 
propertr to the vendor, and. without this. 
be C'annot reco>er. Conner 'I'. Henderson, 
l::i "\l ;1 ss. 319; Kimball 'I'. Cunningham, 4 
�fas •. :;o�; Perley v. Balch. 23 Pick. 2'3. Such 
a restoration of the goods. ancl of all ot her 
benefits deri'l'ed from the sale, is a direct 
condition. " ithout a compliance with which. 
the Yen11Pe cannot rescind the coutrnct, and 
ret·oyer lmck the money or other property, 
paid or deli vered on the contract. 
But his other reweuy is by an action on 
the warranty, or contract of the vendor. on 
whid1, if there be a hreal'11, be will reco>er 
rla 111:l ;{<'S to t he amount of the loss sustained 
hy t l .P h:-P:ll'h. wlrnteve1· t ha t may he. If i t 
! Jr a warrnnty of the Quality of goods, and 
t he hn•ach allegcrl is. that t he goods deliY­
ere•l WPrl' in fe1·i1Jr to the good. stipnlatcrl 
for, t he cla mage will ordinarily be the differ­
erH·c In valut> het weC'n the ont• a nd the otll­
er. �ll<'h an ad ion aftir111s in stC':icl of di. af­
linn l u� t lr<' t•out r:lC'1 of sale. lea '·<':-: the prop­
ert y in the >emlee, and J?:lYP:-: d:uuages for 
the lirenl'!1 of stlt'b separate, cnlla tera.l con­
t rad of w a rra n ty. 
'l l t l  rPmPliy I s  l'O fn m i l lar. t ha t  I t  scarce­
ly n•qn h·i:>s t o  he >'llpp nrte<l a n d  l'XJ)laiued 
l iy a u t hnrlt iPR. H11 t it n a t nral l �· rcqni n•s a n  
a ••t l on to  l w  l1ro11�h t hy t h P  \' C'tlfl<'c a;.:a l n,.;t 
t lw " ' n <lor, wh ich, If the vendor Is at t h e  
R:t 1 1 1P t i me 1<11in� for t he price, h ;  n Pro1-1R 
:r <' l lnn . 
1 \ 1 1 1  t hr J?:l'llPl'Hl !Pl\1)1'!1!')" of ll1011t•r11 J ncll­
r!U J ilPt'I Ions h:1s hc<>n. t o  avohl <'l r<·n l t y 
:1 1111 1 1 1 1 1l t l plldty of nctlnnR, hy :t llowlni: mat­
t l' r  j.:l"Cl \l' l llJ?: nil! or t lJP 83111(' t rn mmct lon t o  
1 11•  ghPn I n  ,,, ldPn� hy wny o r  derenr·e, ln­
Rl l':i d or rNp t l rl n g  n croRR nct lon, when I t  
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can be done without a violation of princi­
ple, or great inconvenience in practice. 
And it has lately been decided, in this 
court, after consideration and upon a re­
>iew of the authorities, that, when a cross 
nction will lie for a deceit in the sale of a 
chattel, the deceit may be given in e'l'idence 
in reduction of the damages, in a suit for 
tile purcbase money. Harrington v. Strat­
ton, 22 Pick. 310. Aud the principle , "·llich 
goYern that case, are precisely applicable to 
the case, where a cross action will lie to re­
co•er damages on a breach of warranty on 
a sale, and the same way be given in evi­
dence, and a like amount deducted from the 
purchase money, in assessing damages in 
a suit by the •endor for the price. Poulton 
'I' .  Lattimore. !l B. & C. 259 ; Perley v.  Balch, 
23 Pick. �53. 
It appears by the report 1n the present 
case. that the e are the principles ou whkll 
the trial of the action proceeded. The plain­
t i ff  must first llave proveu a sale and deli>­
ery of the two tubs of butter. Some ob­
jection was made to the plaintiff's account 
book; but it was not a lluded to in the argu­
ment. Indeed, the other proof tends to 
show, that the defendant agreed to take the 
two tubs of butter, and directed the plaiutitl' 
to lea'l'e them at his store, which the pl:lin­
tiff did tile same day. No offer was made 
a.ftenYards to return the butter. No notice 
was given to the defendnnt to take it awa.y. 
This wns CY itlence, from which a j ury might 
well infer a sale aud deli'l'ery. The ouJ�­
way, t hen, In which the defendant coul<l 
a>ail himself of proof of warranty of quali 
ty, and a breach of it. was in obtaining a. l'l' ­
ductiou of damages, by way of set ·OIT. in 
nature of a cross action, and as a substitute 
t herefor. Ilad the defendant lrrn\J;!ht bis 
action, it is quite cle::i.r, that tl1e bunkn or 
proof would have been on him to pnl\ l' sud1 
wn rr:mty and brench. and the d:ima;!c :;us 
tninc,<1 by It. The lm nleu was on him In t lH' 
sa me man ner. wh n he rel:'orted to t his line 
of clcf011ce, as a substi tute for a cross <ll' 
tion. 'Ye a rc of op i n ion, t hc rl'fore. t ha t  the 
direction of the jmlge was s1rktly POl'l'l'Ct. 
t ha t  If t he n r t l C'lc w:ts sold to the dcfl'11 <ln n l  
w i t h  n wa na n l y :is t o  I t s  Quality, o r  with a 
reprC'RCnt a t ion a monn t i n .� to n wnrra n t y .  
the bUl'!l<'ll of prnnf \\':1 1-1 OU t he dC ft•nua n t ,  
t o  show t ha t  I t  w a s  u n i  <'<JUUi to tlle w:n­
ra nt)' 
Exc•ept Ions overruled and j ud�men t on I ht> 
''ercl lct. 
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GOULD V. BOUUGKOIS.
(18 Atl. Rep. 64, 51 N. J. Law, 361.)
Suiiremc Court of New Jersey. June 17, 18S9.
Rulo to sliow cause.
Error to circuit court, Atlantic county;
before .Justice Uked.
Ar<jued at February Term, 1889, before
Beasley, Chief Justice, and Justices De-
PUE, Van Syc'kel, and Knapp.
Lmming & Black, for tlie rule. D. J.
Pancoast, contra.
DEPTTE. J. This suit wns upon .1 prnmis-
sory note made by the defendant. The de-
fense was tlie want or failure of considera-
tion. The city council of Holly Beach City
proposed to build a brpalv water. The de-
fendant was an applicant for a contract to
do the worlc, and prepared and sent to the
city council an asreenieiit with the city to
that elfect. Members of tlie city council sent
woril to the dt^fendant tliat the city had al-
ready entered into a contract for tlie building
of the brealiwater with Gould & Downs, that
these parties could not fulfill their contract,
and that, if the defendant would ni:ike a sat-
isfactory arrangement with (jonld & Downs,
the city would give hiui tlie contract. Tlie
parties thereupon entered into negotiation,
the conclusion of which was a contract in
writing and under seal, whereby Gould &
Downs, for the consideration of a note for
;5375 and $500 in city bonds, assigned to the
defendant "all our right, title, and interest
in a certain contract entered into by the au-
thorities of Holly Beach City and ourselves
to build a certain breakwater ordered built
by a resolution passed April 14, 1887." Sub-
sequently, the city council, having obtained
the opinion of counsel that the city had no
power to build the breakwater, refused to
ratify the arrangement of the defendant with
Gould & Downs, and abandoned the project
of constructing the work. The note sued
on was given in compliance with the terms
of this assignment. There was no proof of
an express warranty by Gould & Downs of
the validity of their ccmtract, nor any evi-
dence from which fraud, either in represen-
tation or concealment on their part, could be
inferred. The power of the city to make the
contract was not mooted until after these
parties had concluded their arrangement
and the assignment had been made; and, if
tlie contract was invalid, its invalidity arose
from the city charter, — a public act equally
within the knowledge of both parties. The
defendant's contention was that, inasmuch as
there was a sale of the contract, a warranty
that the contract was a valid contract was im-
plied, and that, the contract being ultra vires
on the part of the city, and void, the considera-
tion entirely failed. If the proposition on
which the defense was rested be sound in
law, the defense was appropriate in this
suit. The doctrine of implied warranty of
title in the sale of goods applies as well to
the sale of a chose in action, and extends not
merely to the paper on which the those in
action is written, but embraces also the va-
lidity of the right purported to be transferred.
Wood v. Sheldon, 42 N. J. Eaw, 421. Nor
is there anything in the nature of the alleged
infirmity of the contract that would b;ir the
defense. In the ordinary case of a suit on a
breach of warranty of title the validity of the
vendor's title against the adverse claimant
is triable, if the purchaser has in fact lost
title, altliongh the transactions which deter-
mine tlie vendor's title are res inter alios
acta. If the contract which was the sub-
ject-matter of the assignment was in fact
ultra vires, a foundation was laid for this
defense, tlie city having repudiated the con-
tract in limine on that ground.
The validity of the defense offered and over-
ruled depends upon the fundamental propo-
sition whether, under the circumstances of
this sale, a warranty of title is implied in
law. The theory on which a warranty of
title is implied upon the sale of personal
property is that the act of selling is an af-
firmation of title. The earlier English cases,
of which Medina v. Stoughton, 1 Salk. 210,
1 Ld. Ilayui. 593, is a type, ailopted a dis-
tinction between a sale by a vendor who was
in possession and a sale where the chattel
was in tlie possession of a third person; an-
nexing a warranty of title to the former, and
excluding it in the latter. In the celebrated
case of Vasley v. Freeman, 3 Term R. 51,
BuLLEK, J., repudiated this distinction.
Speaking of Medina v. Stoughton, this
learned judge said that the distinction did
not appear in the report of the case by Lord
Raymond, and he atlds: "If an allirmation
at tlie time of the sale be a warranty, I can-
not feel a distinction between the vendor's
being in or out of possession. The thing is
bought of him, and in consequence of his
assertion; and, if there be any difference, it
seems to me that the case is strongest against
the vendor when he is out of possession, be-
cause then the vendee lias nothing but the
warranty to rely on." Nevertheless the En-
glish courts continue to recognize the dis-
tinction, with its incidents, as adopted in
Medina v. Stoughton, to some extent, at
least so far as to annex tlie incident of an
implied warranty of title on a sale by a ven-
dor in possession. Later decisions have
placed the whole subject of implied warranty
of title on a more reasonable basis. Mr.
Benjamin, in his Treatise on Sales, after a
full examination and discussion of the late
Englisli cases, states the rule in force in
England at this time in the following terms:
"A sale of personal chattels implies an affir-
mation by the vendor that the chattel is his,
and therefore he warrants the title, unless it
be sliown by the facts and circumstances of
the sale that the vendor did not intend to as-
sert ownership, but only to transfer such in-
terest as he might have in the chattel sold."
2 Benj. Sales, (Corbin's Ed.) §§ 945-961.
In this country tlie distinction between sales
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C (J \  l l l T  t)X .\. '\ 1 >  \\' .\  H IL\. X T JE�. 13:, 
GOt: LD v. LOUW EOIS. 
(18 At!. Rep. 64. 51 N. J. Law, 3Gl.) 
Sup re01e Court of New Jorsey. June 17, 1889. 
Rulo to sh ow cause. 
Error to c i rcuit  cou rt, Atlant ic con nty ; 
before .J nRtice Rr.:rm. 
Arg u ed at February Term , 1889, before 
BEASLEY, Chief J u stice, and J ustices DE· 
PUE, v AN SYCKEL, and KNAPP. 
L((nning & Black, for the rule. D. ;r, 
Pancoast, contra. 
DEPFE . .  J .  This  Rnit  wns npon a promis­
sory note macle by the defendant. The de­
fense was the want or fai l u re of considera­
t ion . The city cou n <' i l  of Holl y  Beach City 
proposed to b u i ld a bt·Pakwater. The de­
fendant was an a ppl icant for a contract to 
do the work , and prepared a n d  sPnt to the 
city co nncil  a n  agreement with the ci ty to 
that effect. l\Irm bers of the city co1 1ncil  sent 
won! to I he < l <>fendant that the city had al­
reatly en tered in to a contract for the bu i ld i ng 
of the breakwater with Gould & Do wns, that 
these parties co uld not f u lfill  t heir  contract, 
:rnd that, if the deft.>ndan t wun ltl m ake a sat­
isfactory arrangemen t with Go1 1 ltl & Dow ns,  
the ci ty wou ld giv e h i m  the contract. The 
varties thereupon entered i nto negotiation, 
the conclusion of which was a contract i n  
w riting and under seal, whereby Gould & 
Do wns, for the considerat ion of a note for 
$375 and $500 i n  city bonds, assigned to the 
llefendant " al l  our rig ht, Litle, a n d  i nterest 
i n  a certain contract entered into lJy th e au­
thori t ies of Ilolly Beach City and ou rselves 
to bu i ld a certain breakwater onlered b u i l t  
by a resolution passed April  14, 1887. " Su b­
seq uen tly , the city council,  having obtai ned 
the opinion of cou nsel that thl:l city had no 
power to b u i lll the break \\ater, refused to 
rat i fy the arrangement of the defe n d ant w i t h  
Gould & Downs, a n d  aba ndoned t h e  project 
of construct ing tile work . The note s u ed 
on was gi ven in compl iance w ith the terms 
of tliis assignment. There was no proof of 
an expn·ss warranty by Gould & Downs of 
the validi ty of their con tract, nor any evi­
dt>nce from which fraud, ei ther i n  represen­
tation or conceal ment on t heir part, could be 
i n ferred . The power of the city to make the 
contract was not m ooted until  after t hese 
parties had cone! uded thei r arrangemen t 
and the assign ment had been m ade;  and, i f  
the contract w as i n valid, its i nvalidity arose 
from the city clmrter,-a public act equally 
w i t h i n the k now ledge of both par ti es. The 
defenda nt ' s contention was that, inasm u ch as 
tlwre was a sale of t he contract, a warra nty 
that the contract was a valid contract was i m­
plied, and that, the contract bei ng ultra vires 
on the part of the city, and void. the considera­
tion enti rely failed. If the proposition on 
w hich the defense was rested be sou nd in 
law, the defense was app ropriate in this 
snit. The doctrine of i m pl ied warranty of 
title in th e sale of goods appl ies as well to 
[ ::o ·  . 
NTERNET A R. CHIVE 
the sale of a chose i n  action , and exte11tls 1101, 
n 1 erel y Lo the paper on w h ich the c hose in 
act ion is written, but emhraces also thr• va­
l i c l i ly o( LIH' right pn rport1•cl to \Je transf,.rre i l .  
Wood v. Sheldon, 4� N. J.  L a w ,  42 1 .  Xor 
is t l ! C're an_l't h i ng i n  the nat n rl' or the al legrll 
i 1 1 fi r 1 1 1 ity of the contract that won ltl bar the. 
defen se. In the ordi na ry casP of a s u i t  on a 
breach of warrantv of title t he rnlid itr of t he 
vendor's t i tle ag;\i nst the adverse claimant 
is triable, if the pu rchaser has i n  fact lost 
title, a lthough the transactions which detrr­
m i n e  the vendor's title are res inter alias 
a<'frr . H the contrart which was the suu­
ject-matter of the ass i gnment was i n  fact 
ul tra cires, a fou ndation was l aid for this 
cl efen�e, the c ity h av i ng rrprn l i ated the con­
tract in limine on that gro u nd . 
The valic'litv of t h e  clefensr offered and over­
ru iecl drpends u pon t he fu nrlamPnta l propo­
sition w hetlwr, u n der the circn mstances of 
thi s sale, a warranty of t itl e is implied i n  
l a w .  The theorv on w h i ch a warranty of 
t it le is i m p l ied upon the sale of personal 
property 1 s  ihat the act of sel l i n g is a n  af­
fi rmat i on of title. The earl ier En gl i sh cases, 
of w h i ch Med i na v. Stoughton, 1 :-;aJk. 210, 
1 Le'! . Ha_v:l1 . 5\:!3, is a type, adopted a dis­
ti nctilin 'between a sale by a vendnr w ho was 
i n  prn;spssion and a sale where the chattel 
w11s in the possrssion of a thi rd person ; an­
nexing a warra n ty of ti tle to the former, and 
excl u tl 1  ng i t  i n  the lat ter. In the celebrated 
case or .Pasley v. l!' rerman, 3 Term H.. ;; 1 ,  
HULLER, J.,  repud i ated th is d istin ct ion. 
Speakrng of Med ina v. Sionghton , this 
learned j udge saiJ that the d i sti nct i on did 
not appear in the report of the case by Lord 
Haymond , and he adds : "If an allinuation 
at the tune of the sale be a warra nty , I can­
not feel a d isti nctiou between the vendor' s 
bei ng i n  or out of possession . The thi ng i s  
boug ht o f  h i m ,  and i n  consequence of b i s  
assertion ; and, if there b e  any difference, it  
seems to me that the c11se is siro n gesi aga i nst 
the vendor when he is out of possess ion, be­
cause then the vendee has noth i ng but the 
warranty to rely on. " X e vert l 1eless the E n­
gl i sh courts continue to recogn ize the d is· 
t i nciion, with its i ncidents, as adopted i n  
l\1ed i na v .  Stoughton, to some extent, at 
least so far as to annex the i ncident of an 
irupl ied warranty of title on a sale by a ven­
dor in possession . Later decisions have 
placed the w hole su bject of im pl ied warranty 
of title on a m ore reasonable basis. �Ir. 
Benjamin, in his Treatise on Sales, after a 
ful l  exam ination and discussion of the late 
En glish cases, states the rule in force in 
E ngland at this t ime i n the fol low i ng trrms: 
" A  sale of personal chattels i mplies an anlr­
mation by the vendor that the chattel is his,  
and therefore he wanants the title, u n less i t  
b e  sho w n  b v  the facts an d  circumstances of 
the sale that· the vendor did not i ntend to as­
sert o wnership, but only to transfer such in­
terest as he might have i n  the chattel Rold. "  
2 Benj. Sales, ( Corb in' s Ed . )  § §  945-9!51. 
In this  coun try the d i sti nction bet ween sales 
• T. -· • 
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where the venJor is in ijoss'ssioii ami where
he is out of possession, with respect to im-
plied warranty of title, has been generally
recoL'nizeil; but the tendency of ialer deiis-
ions is against the recognition of such a fiis-
tinetion, and favorable to the molern En-
glish rule. Id. § %2, note 21. Bid. War.
§g •J46, 247. The American editor of the
ninth edition of Smith's Leading Cases, in
the note to Chandelor v. Lopus, after citing
the cases in this country which have held
that the rule of caveat emptor applies to
sales where the vendor is out of possession,
remarks that in most of them what was said
on that point was obiter dicta, and observes
"that there seems no reason why, in every
case where the vendor purports to sell an al)-
solute and perfect title, he should not be held
to warrant it." 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. (Ld-
son's Ed.) 344. In Wood v. Sheldnn, supra.
Chief .Justice Bfasm:y, in delivering the
opinion of the court, adoi)ted, in terras, the
rule stated by Mr. JJenjamin, and maiie it
the foundation of decision. The precise
question now under discussion did not then
arise. In Eichholz v. Bannister, 17 C. B. (X.
S.) 703-721, EiiLi:, C. J., said: "I consider
It to be clear upon the ancient authorities
that, if th" vendor of a chattel by word or
conduct gives the purchaser to understand
that he is the owner, that tacit representa-
tion forms |)art of the contract; and that if
lie is not the owner his contract is broken.
* * * In almost; all the transactions of
sale in common life, the seller, by the very
act of selling, holds out to the buyer that he
is the owner of the article he offers lor sale."
In that case it was lield that on the sale of
goods in an open shop or warehouse, in the
ordinary course of business, a warranty of
title was implied; but there is a line of En-
glish cases holding that, where the facts and
circumstances show that the purpose of the
sale, as it must have been understood by the
parties at the time, was not to convey an ab-
solute and indefeasible title, but only to trans-
fer the title or interest of the vendor, no
warranty of title will be implied. In this
proposition th(' fact that the vendor is in or
out of possession is only a circuuistance of
more or less weight, according to the nat-
ure and circumstances of the parti<'ular
transaction. Thus in ^lorley v. Attenbor-
ough, 3 Exch. 500, the holding wiis that
on a sale by a pawnbroker at public auction
of goods pli'ilged to him in the way of
business there was no implied warranty
of ab.iolute title, liic underlaKing of the ven-
dor being only that the subject, of the sale
wa.s a pledge, and irredeemablo by the pledge-
or. In Chapman v. Spcilh-r, 14 Q. B. I'>21,
llif ili'fendaitt bought goods at a BherilT's
sale fur I'lH. The plaintifT, who was pres-
ent at the sherifT's sale, bought of tlii" do-
femlant his barg.iin for C'i'.i. The iilain-
tllT was afterwards forced to give up the
goodn to the real owner. II" then sued
the defendant, alleging a warranty of title.
Xlio court belli that there Wius no imiilied
warranty of title nor failure of consideiaf 'on;
that the plaintifE paid the defendant, not for
the goods, but for the right, title, and inter-
est the latter had acquired by his purchase,
and that this consideration had not failed.
In Bagueley v. Hawley, L. R. 2 C. P. 625, a
like decision was made, where the defendant
resold to the phiintiff a boiler the former had
bought at a sale under a distress for poor-
rates, the plaintiff having knowledge at the
time of his purchase that the defendant had
bought it at such sale. In Hall v. Conder,
2 C. B. (N. S.) 22, the plaintiff, by an agree-
ment in writing by which, after reciting that
he had invented a method of preventing
boiler explosions, and had obtained a patent
therefor within the United Kingdom, trans-
ferred to the defendant "the one-half of the
English iiatent" for a consideration to he
paid. In a suit to recover the consideration
the defendant [deaded that the invention was
wholly worthless, and of no public utility or
advantage whatever, and that the plaintilf
was not the true and lirst inventor thereof.
On demurrer the plea was held bad, for that,
in the absence of any allegation of fraud, it
must be assumed that the plaintiff was an
inventor, and there was no warranty, ex-
press or implied, either that he was the true
and lirst inventor within the statute of James,
or that the invention was useful or new; but
that the contract was for the sale of the pat-
ent, such as it was, each party having equal
means of ascertaining its value, and each
acting on his own judgment. A like decis-
ion was made in Smith v. Aeale, 2 C. B. (N.
S.) 67.
Chief Justice Eule, in his opinion in Eich-
holz V. Bannister, describes Morley v. At-
tenborough. Chapman v. Speller, and Hall v.
Conder, as belonging to the class of cases
where the conduct ol the seller expresses, at
the time of the contract, that he merely con-
tracts to sell such title as he himself basin the
thing. Theopinion is valuable, in that, while
it rescues the eoiumon-law rule of implied
warranty of title from the assaults of distin-
guished judges who held that cai'eat emptor
applied to sales in all cases, and that in the
absence of express warranty or fiaud the
purchaser was remediless, it also placed the
rule under the just limitation that it sliouli'.
not apply where the circumstances showed
that tlie sale purported to be only a traiisler
of the vendor's title. Expressions such as
"if a man sells goods as his own, and the
title is delieient. he is liable to make good
the loss," (2 1!1. Comni. l.M.I or "if he sells
as )iis own, and not as the agent of another,
and tor a fair piice, he is uimerslood to war-
rant the title, " (2 Kent, Comm. 478,)— as a
statement of tin- principle on which the doc-
trine of implied warraidy of lille rests, is not
ineonsislent with thc^ principle adopted by
Chief Justice Kki.k. Stating the princii)lein
the negative form adopted in Mmli^y v. At-
lenborough, that there is no undertaking by
the vendor for tide unless there he an ex-
press warranty of tith", or an eciuivaleut to it
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136 SALE . 
where the vendor is in poss ·ssion anLI w h ere 
be is out of possessio n ,  w1tb respect to i m ­
pl i ed warranty o f  t i t l e, bas been generally 
recoc. n izeil ; b , 1t  t h e  tendencv of J •ter de 1s­
ion s i s  agai nst the re. o., n i tic)n of sn h a l is­
t i netion.  and fa\•orable to the mo lern E n­
gli h rule. Id. § 9ti2, note 21. B i d .  "\Yar. 
§� :!4ti, 247. The American editor of t he 
n i nth ed i t i on of "ruith's Leading Cases , i n  
the nnte to Chandelor v .  Lopus, after cit i n g  
t h e  ca�es i n  t h is country w h ich have held 
that t he rule of cai•eat emptor appl ies to 
sales where tbe vendor is  o ut of possPssion , 
remarks that i n  most of them what wa said 
on that poi n t was obitPr dicta, an<l observes 
" t hat t here seems no reason w hy, i n  e very 
ca e w here the vendor p u rpo r ts to srl l an ab­
sol ute and perfect Lille, he should not be held 
to w :irrant it. " I , mi th,  Lead. Cas. ( Ed­
son· Ed . )  3H. I n \\'ood v. 8held11 1 1 ,  su pra, 
Cl1 1ef .J us lice B F.\, LF.Y, i n  deli \'eri ng the 
opi n ion of the court, adopted, in terms, t h e  
ru le stated b y  hl r. Ben.1am i n ,  a n d  made i t  
t h e  foundation of decision. 'rhe precise 
q uestion n o w  u nder discussion did not t h e n  
ari,-e. In Eichholz v .  Bann ister, 17 C .  B. (:N'. 
::i. ) 70� -i�l,  E r�LE, C. J . ,  sai<l :  " I  con sider 
it to be c lt>a r upon the ancient authorities 
that, i f  t lJP venoor of  a <:hat tel by word or 
conduct gi ves the purchaser to u nderstand 
that he is the o w ner, that tacit represen ta­
t ion forms part of the cont1  ad. ; and t ha t  if 
he i s  noL the owner h is contract i s  bruken. 
* * * In al 11 1 0st all the tra nsartions of 
sale in com mon life, the sel ler, by the very 
act or sl'll ing, holds out to the J.iuyer that be 
is the ow rn•r of t he article he oITcrs for sale. " 
In that rase it w as held that. on the sale of 
goods i n  an open shop or warehouse, i n  t h e  
11nli nary rourse o f  h usi1wss, a wa rra n ty of 
t it le  was i m pl 1Pd : hut tht>rn is  a l i ne of En ­
g l ish <'a f'S l 1old i 11g tl 1at, whl're thtJ facts and 
c11cu 1 11"tanccs sho w that the pu rpose of the 
sal•., as it  rn ust ha\'e been u n  l er:>lllml by the 
pan ies at t he lime, was not tu com·ey an ab­
i;ul 11 l1} a nd in• ll'fca"ible tillr, li nt o n lr to trnns­
fer lh1i tit le or inlete�t of the v�ndor, no 
warr. 1nly of title w i l l  he i m plied . l n  t.his 
pn1pus1t ion t h ' fart that the vendor 1s in or 
1 1 1 1 t  of pu, 'l '!hlt 1 l l  I 01 i ly a d rc11 1 1 1stance of 
m ore or less weighl,  accord ing to the nat-
1 1 rP and c i rn 1 1 1 11 s la neri1 of the part i C'ular 
t ran�art io 11 . ThuR i1 1  '.lorll·y v. A tt1> 1 1bor-
0 11gh , :1 gxch. 1)00, llw h ol d i n g  was that 
1 111 .1 aaln hy a pawnhroker at 1 1 1 1hlic auct ion 
ol gon. fs plPdgrcl tu l 1 1 m  i n  the way of 
h11  i n c• s t.here \\ :IS no implied warranty 
1 1f a l 1  olulo t 1 t l l ' ,  ! 1 11• 11 1 1d1· 1 l a l 1 11;..: of till' \ l'tl­
d 1 1 r  I t  • I n ' on ly UmL t hr su l ijl'r'l• ol' lhP 11ale 
\\H ; 1  pJ,.c l µ:,., and ir11•<l••L•11Ja l ilo hy thP pl<•dgl'­
"I"· I n C 'h .1[>11Jan v • .'pc>lll•r, l1 Q. B. li:.! I ,  
I h•• rf,.I rnil . 1 1fl. hn1 1 g h t  g1111ds at 11 slw1  i lf's 
a l l' 111r £I . '! 'ho pla1 11 t i t1,  who \I ll!! pr<':i­
••nt. 11l lho 8111'n lf's Hill<', l in1 1gh t o( Llw <lr•­
fr•n •hnt h i !!  hari;a in for £2:J. Tho p la 1 1 1-
t i II was al l l'rwarr l 11  forrl'd t o  gi vo n p  t h o 
voorl l o  l lw r r•al O W IH r. I I  tlwn 111 1 1'11 
l h  f l ('fPllda n l ,  ;l) )r•gi1 1g II Wlllta ll ty Of I J I J r ' .  
'J h• riJurt. hr·lrl  that I horo \\ as no i 11 1 p l i 1 · r l  
D i g 1t1zed by 
I \JTE RNET ARCH VE 
\\· a1Ta nty o f  title nor fa i l u re o f  c0n�irl erat 'on ; 
that the plain tiff paid the defendant, not. for 
the goods,  but for the right, t i t le, and inter­
est t he latter had acquired by his p u rchase ,  
an<l that t h i s  consideral1on had n o t  failed. 
In Bagu eley v.  IIa wlPy, L. R. 2 C. P. 6�5. a 
like dec ision was made, w here the defendant 
resold to the plai ntifI a boi ler the former had 
bought at a sale u nder a distress for poor­
rates, tbe plai ntiff hav i n g  knowledge at the 
t i me of his p u rchase that the defendant had 
bought it at such sale. In Hall v. Cond er, 
2 C. ll. (N. S. ) 2:3, the plai ntiff, by an agree­
ment in w r i t i n g  by which,  after recitinl7 that 
he had i n vented a met hod of preve"n t i n l7  
boi l e r  ex plosions,  a n d  h a d  obtai n ed a patent 
therefor with i n  the U n i ted Ki ngdom, trans­
ferred to the defend a n t  " the one-half of the 
E ngli I i  patent" for a consiilerati0n to be 
paid. ln a s u i t  to recover the. considernliou 
the clefe n <lant pleaded that the inYent ion was 
wholly w o rLhless, and of n o  p u l> l i c  ut.H 1ty or 
advantage w hatever, and that the plainti ff 
was not the true and fi rst i n ventor t hereof. 
On dem urrer the plea was ht>l<l bad, for tl i;tt, 
i n  the absence of any al logation of fraud, 1 t 
m ust be a s u med that the plainti ff was an 
i n ventor, and there was no warrantv. ex­
press or i m p l ied, eiLher t hat he was l lie trne 
and first i n ventor w i th i n  the statute of James, 
or that the i n vention was useful or new ; b u t  
that t h e  contract was for t h e  sale o f  the pat­
ent, such as i t  was , each party having equal 
means of ascerta i n i ng i ts val ue, and each 
acting on h i  o w n  j LHl�ruent. A l ike deris­
ion was made i n  Smith v . .Neale, 2 C. ll .  (N. 
::3.) 67. 
Chief J ustice EHLE, in h i s opi ni on in E ich­
holz v. Dan n i ·ter, descri bl'S lllorl{'Y v. At­
tenborough, Chapm an v.  'prl ler, and Hall  v. 
Conder, as belo11g1 11g to the clas of case 
w here the conduct o( the seller e x presses, al 
the time of the contract, that he m ere! y con­
tracls to seil such title as he h i msrlf has
.
i n  the 
l h 1 ng. The opin ion is val uable, i a  that, wh i le 
i t  rescues the com mon - l a w  ru lo of i m pl ied 
warranty of t 1 tlo from the assa ults of distin­
g ubLed J lldges w ho lwld llmt caceat emptor 
applietl to sales i n  nil cases, and that in the 
absence of exprrss wananty or f1 atlll  the 
pu rchaser was rom!'di111ss, i t  a!Ro placrd tlH' 
rule u nder tho just l i m itatio n t hat it shn1 1 l1' 
not apply w heni tho c i rcumst a n ces showl'li 
that th<' sal e p urpor! c•c l Lo l ie• only a l ra n s l'c'r 
of tho n•mlor's ti t le.  E \ p rt•:;s inns such as 
" i f  a m an sel ls  goo.Jti as his 0\1 n, and t he 
tiLle i� clC'liC'it>11!.  lw is l i ahlP lo mako goorl 
l hr l o�!-1 , " (:.! HI .  < '11111 1 1 1 .  ·l !i l . )  11r " 1 1' Jw �wl Jq  
as his own, itnd not as Lhe agen t or another, 
and for a fa i r  p n c1·.  I i i' 1 !!  u 1 1 1 1 c·r.� t rn 11 l tn w ,1 r­
rnnt the l l lle, " (:.! K P n l, <'om m .  118,)  a s  a 
11L1lc111rnt of tlw pri nl'i p lc 011 wl iwh lhA dor· 
tr i ne of i m p l ied warra n t y  of t i t  lo rc�ls,  is not 
1 11 rnn�istPnt w i th th11 prineiplo  acloptoil by 
( ' Jiiol' .f l lRtice r•: 1 t 1 .I•'.. Htat 1 1 1 g  Lim pr i nci ple i n  
t ho 1wgat ivt� fo rm ncl opLcd in  Mn1 l<'Y v .  A t­
l!'nhoro 1 1 g h ,  t h at  I hf•rl'I HI no u nd<'rL1lld ng hy 
l ho v11n r ln r for I i i IP nn lrss thorn hu an ox­
p 1 1·ss �' ;u 1 a n  ty of t.1 lit', or an e11 n 1  valcn L to 1 t 
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by declaration or conduct, affects only the
order of proof. It was conceded in that case
that the pawnbroker selling his goods under-
took that they had been pledged, and weio
irrt'fli'rmable by the pledseor, and if it be as-
sumed, as I think ifraust be, that the act of
selling amounts to an afiSrmation of title of
some sort, but that its force and effect may
be explained, qualified, or entirely overcome
by the facts and circumstances connected with
the transaction, the difference between Mor-
ley T. Atlenborough and Eichholz v. Bannis-
ter will rarely be of any pratical importance.
The limitation above mentioned upon the
doctrine that the act of selling is an affirma-
tion of title has been adopted in this state.
In Bogert v. Chrystie, 24 N. J. Law. 57-60,
this court held that the general rule that the
vendor of goods having possession, and sell-
ing them as his own. is bound in law to war-
rant the title to the vendee, did not apply
where the vendor sells with notice of an out-
standing interest in a third party, and sub-
ject to that interest. In Hoagland v. Hall,
38 N. J. Law, 351, the vendor agreed in
writing to assign a lease he held upon cer-
tain premises, and to sell and transfer goods
and chattels mentioned in a schedule. The
premises were a licensed inn and tavern, and
in the schedule of the articles sold were
enumerated "the licenses of the house. " The
law under which the license was granted pro-
hibited the transfer of a license, and in the
purchaser's hands it would be void and value-
less. The court held that that circumstance
did not justify the purchaser in withdrawing
from his contract; that there was no war-
ranty by the vendor that the license, when
assigned, would be of any value to the pur-
chaser; and that the latter, having obtained
by the assignment what he had bargained
for, could not annul his contract unless he
showed fraud or misrepresentation with re-
spect to the subject-matter of the contract.
In Bank v. Trust Co., 123 Mass. 330, the de-
fendant had a contract" with B., Dledfiu" to
him certain tobacco, In which It waa recited
that the tobacco was B.'s own property, and
free from all incumbrances, and made an as-
signment to the plaintiff "of all his right,
title, and interest in and under the contract,
with all the property therein mentioned."
The tobacco was then in the defendant's pos-
session, and was delivered by him to the
plaintiff. Afterwards a third person de-
manded and recovered of the plaintiff part of
the tobacco as his property, which had been
pledged to the defendant without right. The
plaintiff then sued the defendant on an al-
legfd implied warranty of title. The court
ruled adversely to the plaintiff's claim. In
the opinion the court said that the written
assii,'nment did not purport to be a sale of
the goods, but of all the defendant's right
under the contract, and its obvious purpose
was to substitute the plaintiff in the place of
the original pledgee, and that the fact that at
the time of the transfer to the plaintiff the
goods were in the actual possession of the
defendant did not vary the case.
In the case in hand the circumstances con-
nected with the assignment, independent of
the words "all our right, title, and interest,"
etc., contained in it, preclude the implication
of a warranty of the validity of the contract.
Taken in connection with the words of the
assignment, the intention of the parties is free
from doubt.
The contention that the plaintiff was in
fault in that he made no delivery of the con-
tract to the defendant is without substance.
The contract was neither produced at the
negotiation between the parties, nor was it
required. The transaction was the purchase
of Gould & Downs' interest to consummate
an arrangement whereby those parties were
to be got rid of, that the city might give the
defendant a contract. The defendant ob-
tained by the assignment all he bargained
for. The defense was properly overruled,
and the rule to show cause should be dis-
charged.
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by declaration or conduct, affects only the 
order of proof. It was conceded in that case 
that the pawnbroker selling his goods under­
took that they had been pledged, and were 
irrec!ermable by the pledgeor, and if it be as­
sumed, as I think if must be, that the act of 
sell i ng amounts to an affirmation of title of 
some sort, but that its force and effect may 
be explained , qualified, or ent i rely overcome 
by the facts a nd circu mstances connected with 
the transaction, the difference between Mor­
ley v. Atten borough and Eichholz v. Bannis­
ter will rarely be of any pratical importance. 
The limitation above mentioned upon the 
doctrin e that the act of sell ing is an affirma­
tion of title bas been adopted in this state. 
In Bogert v. Cb rystie, 24 N. J. Law .  57-60, 
this court held that the gen eral rule that the 
vendor of goods having possession , and sell­
ing them as his own, is bound in law to war­
rant the title to th� vendee, did not apply 
where the vendor sells w i th notice of an out­
standing interest in a third party, and sub­
ject to that i n trrest. In Hoagland v. Hall, 
38 N. J. Law, 351, the vendor agreed i n  
w ritin g  to assign a lease he held upon cer­
tai n premises, and to sel l and transfer goods 
and ch attels mentioned in a schedule. The 
premises were a l icensed i nn and tavern, and 
in the schedule of the articles sold were 
enumerated " the licenses of the house. " The 
law under which the license was granted pro­
hibited the transfer of a license, and i n  the 
purchaser's bands it would 1'e void and value­
less. The court held that that circumstance 
::lid not j ustify the purchaser in wi thdraw i n g  
from h i s  contract ;  I.bat there was no war­
ranty by the vendor that the license, when 
assigned , would be of any val ue to the pur­
chaser;  and that the latter, havin g  obtained 
by the assignment what he bad bargained 
for, could not annul his con tract u nless he 
showed fraud or m isrepresentation with re­
'>pect to the subject-matter of the contract. 
In Bank v. Trust Co.,  123 Mass. 330, the de­
fendant bad a contract- with B., nledaina to 
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him certain tobacco, I n  which It  was recited 
that the tobacco was B.'s own property, and 
free from all incumbrancPs, and made an as­
signment to the p laint i ff " of all bis right, 
title, and interest in and under the contract, 
with all the property therein m entioned. " 
The tobacco was then in the defendant's pos­
session, and was deli vered by him to the 
plai ntiff. Afterwards a th ird person de­
manded and recovered of the plai ntiff part of 
the tobacco as his property, which had been 
pledge<! to the defendant w ithout right. The 
plainti ff then sued the defendant on an al­
legrd i mplied warranty of title. '.rhe cou rt 
ru led adversely to the plai ntiff's claim . In 
the opinion the court said that the written 
assignment did not purport to be a sale of 
the goods, but of al l the defendant's ri ght 
under the contract, and its obvious pu rpose 
was to substitute the plain tiff i n  the place of 
the original pledgee, and that the fact that at 
the time of the transfer to the plaintiff the 
goods were in the actual possession of the 
defendant did not vary the case. 
In the case i n  band the circumstances con­
nected w it h the assignment, i ndependent of 
the words " all o u r  right,  title, and interest, " 
etc., contained in it, preclude the i mpl ication 
of a warranty of the vali dity of the contract. 
Taken in connection with the words of the 
assignment, the intention of the parties is free 
from doubt. 
The contention that the plainti ff was i n  
fau l t  i n  that h e  made no dell very o f  the con­
t ract to the defendant is w ithout substance. 
The contract was neither produced at the 
negotiation between the parties, nor was it 
req ui red . The transacti on was the purchase 
of Gou ld & Downs ' interest to consummate 
an arrangement whereby those parties were 
to be got rid of, that the city might give the 
defendant a contract. The defendant ob­
tained by the assignment all he bargained 
for. The defense was properly overruled, 
and the rule to show cause sho uld be dis­
charged. 
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SALES.
MOOKE r. McKINLAY ct al.
(5 Cal. 471.)
Supreme Court of California. Oct. Term, 1855.
Appeal from the disti-ict court of the
twelfth judicial district, San Francisco coun-
ty.
Hoge & Wilson, and Cook & Olds, for ap-
pellants. Charles H. S. Williams, for re-
spomlent
MURRAY, C. J. This was an action In
the court below, to recover the amount paid
by the plaintiff to the defendants for the
purchase of an invoice of garden seeds.
It is in evidence, that after the arrival of
the vessel, the plaintiffs were requested to
open and inspect the seeds, but declined to
do so, and paid for them. They were after-
wards tested, and found to be almost wholly
worthless. In order to maintain this action,
the plaintiffs must show either an express
or implied warranty. The sale note is as
follows: "We have this day sold you two
shipments of seeds for arrival." &c.
The plaintiff maintains, that the word
"seeds" thus used, amounts to an express
warranty; that it has an express siguifl-
oation. importing an article which will germ-
inate or grow, and that it would be error to
apply this term to any seeds not possessing
these properties. And second, that if not an
express warranty, the law will imply a war-
ranty; or, in other words, raise the presump-
tion, that the article sold is merchantable,
and fit for the use for which It was sold.
At common law. the rule caveat emptor
applied to all sales of personal property, ex-
cept where the vendor gave an express war-
rantj", which is said to be such recommenda-
tions or afflrraations, at the time of the sale,
as are supposed to have Induced the pur-
chase. To constitute a warranty, no pre-
cise words are necessary; It will bo suffi-
cient If the Intention clearly appear.
During the time of Ix)rd Molt, the doctrine
was established, that to warrant, no formal
words were nec<>ssMry. and therefore a war-
ranty might be Imiilled. from tJie nature and
clrcumstMnccs of the ease, and the maxim
was thus Introduced, that a sound price Im-
portH a sound bargain or warranty.
This doctrine was afterwanls exploded by
Lord Mansfield, since wlilcli time It lias un-
dorgone some modllhatlons In the English
and American courts, tending In (he former
somewhat and in some of the states of the
Union, to the rule of civil law, which im-
plies that the goods sold are merchantable,
and fit for the purpose for which they were
bought.
The better opini-jn. however, I think, as
deduced from English and American deci-
sions, is that a warranty will not be im-
plied, except in cases where goods are sold
at sea, where the party has no opportunity
to examine them, or in case of a sale by
sample, or of provisions for domestic use.
In Hart v. Wright. 17 Wend., 2G7, Judge
Cowen reviews the former decisions of that
state as well as the English cases, and ar-
rives at the conclusion which I have stated.
This case was afterwards brought before
the court of errors of New York, and the doc-
trine approved.
In Moses v. Mead, 1 Denio, 385. the ques-
tion again came before the supreme court
of New York. In commenting on the deci-
sions on this subject, Judge Bronsou says,
"Some English judges have lately shown a
strong tendency towards the doctrines of the
civil law, in relation to sales, and have been
disposed to imply warranties where none ex-
ist. * * * I do not regret to find, that
there are men in Great Britain who can look
beyond the shores of that island; but I feci
no disposition to follow them in their new
zeal for the civil law, for the reason, that it
is not our law in relation to sales in the
best."
The same doctrine is maintained in Fraley
V. Bispham, 10 Pa. St. 320. and many other
American decisions. There have been no
departures from this rule in the decisions of
this court. In the case of Flint v. Lyon. 4
Cal. 17, the flour was describe^l as "Ilaxall "
and we held, that this amounted to a w:n
ranty, that the article sold was "Haxall.'
and not a different brand or quality of Hour.
In Rtiiz V. Norton, 4 Cal.. 3.")0. the sale note
described the rice as "sound rice," which it
was held amounted to a warranty.
Testing the present case by the rale which
we have deduced from the better authority
of com-ts, the plaiiififT cannot recover. T!ic
language used In the sale note cannot le
tortured Into a wan-anty. and the fact thiit
the plaintiff had an opportunity and declined
to liisjiect the seeds before accepting them,
takes the case from the operation of the rule
of Implied wan'nnty.
Judgment reversed, with costs.
ITFYDRNFELDT, J., concurred.
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
7:
38
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/u
c2
.a
rk
:/1
39
60
/t
90
86
js
3p
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
138 "ALES. 
l\IOO HE I'. Jld�l:\LAT et al. 
(5 Cal. 471.) 
upreme Court of Cal i fornia. Oct. Term, 18;:;;). 
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so mew hat a nd in some of the states of the 
"Cnion, to the rule of civil law, which im­
plie that the goods sold are merchantable, 
and fit for the purpose for which they wNe 
bought. 
The better opiui-Jn. however, I think. as 
deduced from En�lish and American deci­
sions. is that a warranty will not be im­
plied. except in cases where good are sci l 
at ea. where the party has no opportunity 
to examine them, or in case of a ak by 
sample, or of provi ions for dome tic use. 
In Hart v. Wright, 17 Wend., '.?GI, Jutl;..;e 
Jn:n nAY. C. J. This was au action i n  Co"·en reviews the former decision of t ha t  
t h e  court below, t o  recover t h e  amount llaid .ta le as well as the English cases. a n1l ar­
by the plaintiff to the defendants for the rives at the conclusion which I have stated. 
purchase of an invoice of garden seeds. Thi case was afterwards brought before 
It is in evidence, that after the arrival of the court of errors of New York, and the doc­
the vessel. the plaint iffs were reque tecl to trine approved. 
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do so, and paid for them. They were after- tion aga i n  came before the supreme court 
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SINCLAIR T. HATHAWAY.
(23 N. W. 409, 57 Mich. 60.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. May 13, 1885.
Error to Wayne; Jennison, Judge.
Chapman & Smith, for appellant. Robert
Laiillaw, for appellee.
CAMPBELL, J. Plaintiff sued defendant
for a balance claimed to be due for bread.
Defendant claimed that the account had been
balanced by bad bread returned, and by a
sum of $10 jiaid in settlement of accounts.
I'laiutifC was a baker, and defendant's busi-
ness was to supply bread to customers about
the city. It appears that for a period de-
fendant was employed by plaintiff to sell his
bread, and make returns and pay for the
bread furnished daily. Defendant claims
that on several occasions the bread furnished
was bad and unwholesome, and that he re-
turned it to a sufficient extent to overbalance
his jjayments, and that tliere was an uuder-
stauding to that effect. The parties are di-
rectly at variance on the facts. There was
a good deal of testimony showing that bread
was often made unfit for use, and that plain-
tiff had to sell it for feeding animals. He
swore there was never any such thing. The
court below rightly e.xcluded evidence of a
Sunday contract before the business was en-
tered into. But there was testimony of sub-
sequent dealings tending to prove the theory
of the defense.
The case being an appeal from a justice, it
was shown and seems to have been admitted
that in the justice's court plaintiff swore that
the amount due him was only $65, while in
the circuit he swore to $103.79, and recovered
it. The court was asked to charge the jury
that if plaintiff so swore below, and so
changed his testimony without explaining
why, that circumstance should weigh with
the jury against the good faith of the claim.
The court refused so to charge, but in the
charge the court made this remark: "De-
fendant also states that the complainant only
claimed $65 in justice court, but the com-
plainant undertakes to explain it by saying
that he made a mistake, as he did not have
hi.s books of account with him at the time."
This had a decided tendency to induce the
jury to regard the po'ut as of no consequence.
But it is not a small ma tier for a person
who goes into court to swear to his claim, to
pay so little regard to his oath as to take no
pains to find out wliat is due. And beyond
this, there is nothing in the plaintiffs testi-
mony to show any such explanation given
by him on oath. The error was material.
The court also refused to charge that plain-
tiff was .subject by law to an implied war-
ranty that the bread was wholesome, and in
the charge stated the defendant's objections
to apply chiefly to its marketable quality,
and to its being soiled externally by getting
dirty on the floor. There was, however, tes-
timony from several sources that the bread
was unfit for food, apart from its external
appearance. It was held in Hoover v. Pe-
ters, IS Mich. 51, tliat there is an implied
wai-ranty of wholosomeness in the sale of
provisions for direct consumption. This ques-
tion is not discussed, in plaintiff's brief, and
was left entirely out of view by the court,
and the only reference to it was in connec-
tion with an express contract.
In this case defendant was, as plaintiff
claims, in his employ as a peddler, bound to
pay for his bread, at a discount, and his con-
nection with the sales brings the case within
the same principle. Defendant cannot be
treated as a purchaser from a wholesale deal-
er of articles sold in the market for pui-poses
of commerce. Bread is an article sold for
immediate consumption, and never enters in-
to commerce, and as one of the prime neces-
saries of life is of no use unless it is good
for food. Defendant, as a mere middle-man
between the baker and the consumer, and
acting in his employment, had a right to ex-
pect bad bread to be made good, and the
court should have so held. Mere externals
he could see for himself, but bad quality
would not always be detected without such
a minute examination as the circumstances
of such a business would render it difficult
to make.
The judgment must be reversed, and a new
trial granted.
The other justices concurred.
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CO:N" D l T J ONS A.ND "\V A HR .\ N T I ES. 
SINCLAIR v. H ATHAWAY. 
(23 N. W. 450, 57 l\Iicb. GO.) 
Supreme Court of l\Ii<·bigan. l\lay 13, 1885. 
Error to Wayne; Jennison, Judge. 
Chapman & Smith, for appellant. Robert 
Laidlaw, for appel lee. 
CA�1PBELL, J. Pla inti ff sued defendant 
for a ba la nce claimell to be due for bread. 
Defendant claimed that the account had been 
ba la ncell by ball hreatl retul'lletl, and by a 
sum of $10 paid in settlement of accounts. 
Plaintiff was a baker, and defendant's busi­
ness was to supply bread to customers alJout 
the city. It appears that for a period ue­
fendant y;·as ewploycd by plaintiff to sell his 
1Jreat1, and make retul'lls and pay for the 
bread fum! shed daily. Defendant claims 
that on seYeral occasions the bread furnished 
was IJad and unw holesome. aHd that he re­
t urned it to a sufficient extent to overbalance 
bis payments, and that there was a n under­
standing to that effect. The parties are ui­
rectly at variance on the facts. There was 
a good deal of testimony showing that brea < l  
w a s  often m a d e  unfit for use, a n d  t h a t  plain­
tiff bad to sell i t  for feeding animals. He 
swore there was never a ny such thing. The 
court below rightly excluded evidence of a 
Sunday contract before the business was en­
tered into. But there was testimony of sub­
sequent dealings tending to prove the theory 
o f  the defense. 
The case being an appeal from a justice, it 
was shown and seems t o  ba ve been aclmi tted 
t hat i n  tbe justice's comt plaintiff swore that 
the amount due him was only Su3. while i n  
t h e  circuit he swore to $ 103.79, a n d  recovered 
it. The comt was asked t o  charge the jury 
that if plaintiff so swore below, and so 
changed bis testimony w i thout explaining 
wby, that circumstance should weigh with 
the jury against the good faith of the claim. 
The court refused so to charge, but in the 
charge tbe comt made this remark: "De­
fendant also states that the complainant only 
claimed $G5 in justice court, but the com­
plainant u ndertakes to explain it by saying 
that be made a mistake, as be did not have 
D 1 i;J 1tiz by 
NTE R JET ARCHIV E  
hii:: hooks o f  ac·<·onnt with him a t  thP t i nw." 
This had a rle<:ide<l tenrlenl'Y to inrlu<'e the 
jury to regard the vo; nt as nf no consl'<JlH!lll c. 
But it  is not a small 111attel' for a person 
who goes i n to comt to swear to his cla i m ,  to 
pay so little regard lo bis oath as to take no 
pains to find out what is du<>. And l.Jeyo111l 
this, there is nothing in the pl:1intiff's tPsti­
mony to show any such explanation l!inn 
by him on oath. The error \\ U s rnaterial .  
The court also refused to chal';;P tbat pla in­
tiff wns snhje<'t hy law to an imvlied wa r­
rnnty that the brcn<l \Yas wholes< me, arnl i n  
t h e  cha rgo stated tbe defen<la n t ' s  obj1:ctions 
to apply chidly to its m a rk< ta lJle quality, 
a ncl t o  its being soiled externally b y  getting 
cl i rty on the floor. There was, however, tes­
timony from several sources that tbe bread 
was unfit for food, apart from i t s  external 
appearance. It was held in Hoover v. Pe­
ters, 18 :\Iil:h. 51, that there i s  a n  impli ed 
warranty of wholesomeness i n  the sale o f  
provis.ons for direct consumption. This ques­
tion is not discussed. in pla int iff's biief, and 
was left entirely out of view by the court, 
a nd tbe only reference to it was in connec­
tion with an express contract. 
In this case defendant was, as plaintiff 
claims, i n  bis employ as a peddler, bound to 
pay for his bread, at a discount, and bis con­
nection with tbe sales brings the case withiu 
the same principle. Defendant cannot lw 
treated as a purchaser from a wholesale deal­
er o f  articles sold in the market for purposes 
of com merce. Bread is an a rticle sold for 
immediate consumpti on, and never enters in­
to commerce, and as one of the prime neces­
saries of life is of no use unless i t  is good 
for food. Defendant, as a mere middle-man 
between the baker and the consumer, and 
acting in bis employment, had a right to ex­
vect bad bread t o  be made good, and the 
court should have so held. l\lere externals 
h e  could see for himself, but bad quality 
would not a l ways be detected without such 
a minute exam ination as the circumstances 
of sucb a business would render it difficult 
to make. 
The judgment mu�t be reversed, and a new 
trial granted. 
Tbe other justices concurred. 
O rigi r3 1  from 
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FIELDER V. STARKIN.
(1 H. HI. 17.)
Court of Common Pleas, Trinity Term, 17S8.
This was an action on the warranty of
a mare, "that she was sound, quiet, and free
from vice and blemish."
Plea, non-assumpsit, on which issue was
joined.—
The cause came on to be tried at the last
assizes at Thetford, before Mr. Justice Asb-
hurst, and a verdict found for the plaintiff.
It appeared on the ti-ial, from the learned
jud^'e's report, that the plaintiff had bought
the mare in question of the defendant at
Winnel fair, in the month of March, 17S7,
for 30 guineas, and that the defendant war-
ranted her soimd, and free from vice and
blemish.— Soon after the sale, the plaintiff
discovered that she was unsound and vicious
^a), but kept her three mouths after this dis-
covery, during which time he gave her phys-
ic and used other moans to cure her. At the
end of the three months he sold her, but she
was soon returned to him as unsound. Aft-
er she was so returned, the plaintiff kept her
till the month of October 17S7, and then sent
her back to the defendant as unsound, who
refused to receive her. On her way back to
the plaintiff's stable, the mare died, and on
her being opened, it was the opinion of the
faiTiers who examined her, that she had been
unsound a full twelve-month before her
death. It also appeared that the plaintiff
and defendant had been often in company to-
gether during the Interval between the month
of March, when the mare was sold to the
plaintiff, and October, when he sent her back
to the defendant; but it did not appear that
the plaintiff had ever in that time acquainted
the defendant with the circumstances of her
being unsound. 'ITie juiT found a verdict for
the plaintiff with 30 guineas damages.
Adair, Serjt., shewed cause. Le Blanc,
Serjt., in support of the rule.
Lord LOUGHBOUOUGH— Where there Is
an express warranty, the warrantor under-
takes that It Is true at the time of nmUIng It.
If a horse which Is warrnnled sound at the
time of sale, be proved to have been at that
time unsound, it is not necessary that he
should be retm-ned to the seUer. No length
of time elapsed after the sale, will alter the
nature of a contract originally false. Nei-
ther is notice necessary to be given. Though
I the not giving notice will be a strong pre-
i sumption against the buyer, that the horse
at the time of tlie sale had not the defpct
complained of, and will make the proof on
his part much more difhcult. The bargain
is complete, and if it be fraudulent on the
part of the seller, he will be liable to the
buyer in damages, without either a retiu-n or
notice. If on account of a horee warranted
sound, the buyer should sell him again at a
i loss, an action might perhaps be maiutaiuoil
I against the original seller, to recover the dif-
i ference of the price. In the present case it
appears from the evidence of the farriers
who saw the mare opened, that she must
have been imsound at the time of the sale to
the plaintiff.
GOULD, J.— Of the s.nme opinion, remom-
bered many cases of express warranty, where
a retm-n was not held to be necessary.
HEATH, .L— If this had been an action
for money had and received to the plaintilT's
use, an immediate return of the mare would
have been necessary; liut as it is brought on
the cxpioss warranty, there was no necessity
for a return to make the defendant liable.
WILSON, J.— Of the same opinion, recol-
lected a cause tried before Mr. .Justice Biillor
at nisi prius, whore the defendant had sold
the plaintiff a pair of coach horses and war-
ranted them to be six years old, which were
In reality only four years old. It was con-
tended that the plaintiff ought to have re-
I turned the horses; but Mr. Justice Bullor
held that the action on the warranty might
be supported without a return. i As to part
of the evidence l)oing contrary to the ver-
dlce, the Jury have n right to use their dis-
cretion either In believing or disbelieving
any part of the testimony of witnesses.
Rule discharged.
J Soo Towers V. Hnrrptt, 1 Term R. p. 1.W,
and Bucbannn v. I'arnshaw, 2 Term U. 745.
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
7:
38
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/u
c2
.a
rk
:/1
39
60
/t
90
86
js
3p
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
140 SA LES. 
FIELDER v. STARK!�. 
(1 H. HI. 17.) 
Court of Common Pleas, 'l'rinity Term, 1788. 
time unsound, It Is not necessary that be 
should be returned to tile seller. No length 
of time elapsed after the sale, will alter tile 
nature of a contract originally false. Nei­
ther is notice n ecessary to be given. Tbou.�ll This was an action on the warranty of 
a mare, "that she was sounJ, quiet, and free 
from >ice and blemi h." 
Plea, :ion-assumpsit, on which i sue wa 
joiued.-
, the not giving notice will be a strong pre­
sumption ag-ainst the buyer, that the hor.-e 
at the t i m e of the sale bad not the dl'ft>l't 
complained of, and will make the proo( 011 
bis part much more d ifficult. Tile barga in 
is complete, and if it be fraudulent on 1 1.lc  
part o f  the seller, b e  will b e  liable to the 
buyer in damages, w i t hout either a return or 
notice. If on account of a horse warranted 
sound, t he buyer should sell him a;!ain at a 
loss. an action might perbups be maintained 
against the original seller, to recover the dif­
ference of the price. In tile present ca e it 
appears from the evidence of the farriers 
who saw the mare opened, that she must 
have been unsound at the time of the sale to 
the plaintiff. 
The cause came on to be tried a t  the last 
as::;izes at Thetford, before :\Ir. Justice Ash­
hurst. and a >erdict found for the plaintilI. 
It appeared on the trial, from the lea1·uetl 
jud;;c"s report, that the plaintiff hau bou;.:ht 
the mare in que tion of the defendant a t  
Winnel fair, i n  the month o f  :O.Iru·ch, 17 T, 
for 30 guinea , and t hat the defenuaut war­
ranted her sound, and. free from vice aud 
blemish.- 'oon after the sale, the plaintiff 
di co,·ered. that she was unsound and. >icious 
1a). but kept her three months after this dis­
co>ery, during which time he gave her phys­
ic and used other means to cure her. At the 
end of the three months he sold her, bul she 
was soon returned to I.Jim as unsotmll. Aft­
er she was so returneu. the plaiatilI l't'Jlt her 
till the month of October 17 7, aucl t heu ::;ent 
her back to the defendant a un ·ouud. who 1 
refuseu to receive her. On ller way back to 
t he 11laint iff's stable, tile mare died, and on 
her bciu;! opened, it was the opinion of the 
fa1Tiers wllo examined her, that she had been 
un.ounu a full twcln:--month before her 
1lcath. It also appear 'd t!Jat tile plaiutilI 
a m! <lcfcn!l:rnt bad hec11 often in comp:my to­
;.:ctht r <lnrini;{ the in term I bet ween the month 
of )lareh, wben the mare was sold to the 
plniutlIT, and October, wh<.>u he sent her back 
to the defendant; but it did not ap11t•ar tllat 
the plalnt ltr had ever in thnt time ac(1unluted 
th" defendant with the dn·nmstances of her 
hcin� 111isouud. The jury fou nd n Yerdlct for 
the plalutlll' witll 30 gulncns dama�es. 
.\<lulr. SPrjt . ,  shewed cause. Le Blanc, 
!-;crjt., In Hllf1port ot t ile ru le. 
Lord r.ouo nnono m : n  Where there Is 
un f!..'l: Pl"l'..!l warranty, the wan1rntor nndt>r­
tllkP thnt It Is true at the Orne or n111l< t n i:  It. 
Ir a hori;e which IR wnrmn ted Hou ml 11 t. t he 
time ot snle, be proved to have been nt that 
D i  itize by 
I NTE R N ET A R. CHIVE 
GOU LD, J.-Of t he- same opm1on, rcmC'm­
bered many cases of c:xpre><s warmnty, w llerc 
a retw·n was not held to be nece sary. 
IIEATII, J.-If tbi had been an action 
for motH'Y had and received to the plaiutiff"s 
use, an immediate return of the mare wouh1 
have been necessary ; but as it is brought on 
t he t·:x11n·R� warra nty, there was no nect•,;sity 
for a return to make the defendant liable. 
W I LSON, J.-Of the same opinion, rct'o1-
lected a cause tried before Mr. Justi<'e llnllt•r 
at uisi prius, where t he defendant had sold 
the plaintit:r a pair or coach horses n nc l  wa I'· 
rant<·d t hem to be six years old, which w<.>re 
in rc-a l i t �'  only four yea rs old. It wns <'Oll­
tendcd t hat tbe plain t i t:r ought to lluve n'­
turncd tbe horses ; but :'>Ir. Jn::<t ice Hnllt'r 
held t hat the nclion ou t h e  warranty 111!;.:ht 
be s11p11ort0d without a rcturn.1 As to part 
of t he CY ich'lll'C being- Contrary to l hl' Yl' l'· 
dice. t he jury h:1YC n ri;!hl to use th<.>ir cliA­
cretiou l'i t lll'r In bdh•\·ln;r or dlsh0llc,·ln;r 
nuy part or t he tr,;t imony of wit nesses. 
Huie t11:>chnri::cd. 
1 �•'I' '!'nwrrs v. Hu rrrtt, 1 Term R. p. t :�H. 
und Bu<'lrnnnn v. l'nrntihnw, 2 'l'erm U. 74fi. 
O ri i r - 1  fr 1 
UN VE S I  Of C UFOR 1 A 
PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT.
Ill
BLOXAM et al. v. SANDERS et al.
(4 Barn. & 0. 941.)
King's Bench, Michaelmas Term, 1825.
Trover to recover the value of a quantity
of hops from the defendauts. At the trial
before Abbott 0. J. at the London sittings,
after last Trinity term, the jury found a ver-
dict for the plaintiffs, damages £3000, subject
to the opinion of this court upon the follow-
ing case: The plaintiffs were assignees of
J. R. Saxby, a banki-upt under a commission
of bankrupt duly issued against him on the
5th January 1824. The act of banlimptcy
was committed on the 1st November 1823,
the banlu'upt having on that day surrendered
himself to prison, where he lay more than
two months. The defendants were hop fac-
tors and merchants in the borough of South-
wark. Previous to his bankniptcy the bank-
rupt had been a dealer in hops, and on the
7th, 16th, and 23d August purchased from
the defendants the hops (among others) for
which this action was brought. Bought notes
were delivered in the following form: "Mr.
John Robert Saxby, of Sanders, Parkes, and
Co. T. M. Simmons, eight pockets at 155s.
Sth August 1823." Part of the hops were
weighed, and an account of the weights was
delivered to Saxby by the defendants. The
samples were given to the bankrupt, and bills
of parcels were also delivered to him in
which he was made debtor for six different
parcels of hops, the amount of which was
£739. The usual time of payment in the trade
was the second Satui-day subsequent to a
pm-chase. Part of the hops belonged to the
defendants, and part they sold as factors, but
they sold all in their own names, it being
the custom in the hop trade to do so. It was
proved that the bauknipt had said more than
once that the hops were to remain in the de-
fendants' hands till paid for, and that he said
so when he was about buying one of the par-
cels of hops for which the action was
brought. The bankrupt did not pay for the
hops, and on the 6th September 1823 the
defendants wrote to the bankrupt, and de-
sired him to "take notice, that unless he paid
for the hops they had sold him, on or before
Tuesday then next, the defendants would
proceed to resell them, holding him accounta-
ble for any loss which might arise in con-
sequence thereof." Before the bankruptcy
the defendants did not sell any parcel of
hops without the bankrupt's express assent.
After the notice already stated the defend-
ants sold some parcels of the hops, but in one
instance the bankrupt refused to allow the
defendants to sell a parcel of hops to a per-
son named by them at the price offered, and
that parcel was accordingly sold by the de-
fendants, before Saxby's bankruptcy, to an-
other person by Saxby's authority. On an-
other occasion in the month of September
the banlirupt had employed a broker to sell
another parcel of the hops, but the defend-
ants refused to deliver them without being
paid for them. After the act of bankruptcy
the defendants sold liops of the bankrupt's
to the amount of £380 19s. 5d. The defend-
ants delivered account sales of the hops so
sold by them after the bankniptcy. The hops
were stated to be sold for Saxby, and he
was charged warehouse rent fi'om the 30th
of August, and also commission on the sales.
Besides the hops purchased from the defend-
ants, the bankrupt placed in their warehouse
nineteen pockets of hops for sale by them
(as factors), of which fifteen pockets were
sold on and after the 13th of January 1824
of the value of £77 19s. 5d., and of which
four remained in their warehouse at the time
of the trial, which four were of the value of
£14, and there were also unsold of the hops
purchased from defendants seven bags, fifty-
six pockets, of the value of £251 13s. 6d.
There was a demand by plaintiffs of these
hops, and a tender of warehouse rent and
charges, and a refusal on the part of the de-
fendants to deliver them, before action
brought. The jury found that the defend-
ants did not rescind the sales made by them
to the banlii'upt. This case was argued at
the sittings before last term, by
Evans, for the plaintiffs. Abraham, con-
tra.
BAYLEY, J., now delivered the judgment
of the court. This was an action of trover
for certain quantities of hops sold by the de-
fendants to Saxby before his bankruptcy,
and for certain other hops which Saxby had
placed in defendants' warehouses that di--
feudants in their character of factore might
seU them for his use, and the question as to
this latter parcel stands upon perfectly dis-
tinct grounds from the question as to the
others. This parcel consisted of nineteen
pockets; defendants sold none of them until
after Saxby's bankraptey, and then they sold
fifteen pockets, not for the use of the assign-
ees, but to apply the proceeds, not for any
debt due to them In their character of fac-
tors, but to discharge a claim they considered
themselves as having upon Saxby in regard
to the other hops; and the other foiu- pockets
they refused to deliver to the assignees. It
was candidly admitted upon the argument,
and was cleai beyond all doubt, that the de-
fendants were not waiTanted in applying the
proceeds of the fifteen pockets to the purpose
to which they attempted to apply them, and
that they had no legal ground for withhold-
ing the four pockets; and, therefore, to the
extent of these nineteen pockets, the value
of which is £91 19s. 5d., we think it dear
that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover.
The other quantities were hops Saxby had
bargained to buy of the defendants on differ-
ent days in August 1823, and for which de
fendants had delivered bought notes to Sax-
by. The bought notes were in this form:
"Mr. J. R. Saxby. of Sanders, Parkes. .nnd
Co., T. M. Simmons, eight pockets at 155s.,
8th August 1823." Part of the hop.s were
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
7:
38
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/u
c2
.a
rk
:/1
39
60
/t
90
86
js
3p
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
l,ERFORMANCE OF CON TRACT. 1 1 1  
BLOXAM et al. v. SA::\ DERS et al. 
(4 Barn. & C. 941.) 
King's Bench, Michaelmas Term, 1825. 
Trover to recover the value of a quantity 
of hops from the defendants. At the trial 
before Abbott C. J. at the London sittings, 
after last Trinity term, the jury found a ver­
dict for the plaintiffs, damages £3000, subject 
to the opinion of this comt upon the follow­
ing case; 'l'he plaintiffs were assignees of 
J. R. Saxby, a bankrupt under a commission 
of bankrupt duly issued against him on the 
5th January 1824. The act of bankruptcy 
was committed on the 1st November 1823, 
the banJu·upt having on that day surrendered 
himself to prison, where he lay more than 
two months. The defendants were hop fac­
tors and merchants in the borough of Soutb­
wa1·k. Previous to bis bankruptcy the bank­
rupt bad been a dealer in hops, and on the 
7th, 16th, and 23d August purchased from 
the defendants the bops (among others) for 
which this action was brought. Bought notes 
were delivered in the following form : "Mr. 
John Robert Saxby, of Sanders, Parkes, and 
Co. T. M. Simmons, eight pockets at 155s. 
8th August 1823." Part of the bops were 
weighed, and an account of the weights was 
delivered to Saxby by the defendants. The 
samples were given to the bankrnpt, and bills 
of parcels were also delivered to him in 
which be was made debtor for six different 
parcels of bops, the amount of which was 
£739. The usual time of payment in the trade 
was the second Saturday subsequent to a 
pUl'cbase. Part of the bops belonged to the 
defendants, and part they sold as factors, but 
they sold all in their own names, it being 
the custom in the bop trade to do so. It was 
proved that the bankrupt bad said more than 
once that the bops were to remain in the de­
fendants' bands till paid for, and that be said 
so when be was about buying one of the par­
cels of bops for which the action was 
brought. The bankrupt did not pay for the 
hops, and on the 6th September 1823 the 
defendants wrote to the bankrupt, and de­
sired him to "take notice, that unless he paid 
for the hops they had sold him, on or before 
Tuesday then next, the defendants would 
proceed to resell them, holding him accounta­
ble for any loss which might arise in con. 
sequence thereof." Before .the bankruptcy 
the defendants did not sell any parcel ot 
hops without the bankrupt's express assent. 
After the notice already stated the defend­
ants sold some parcels of the hops, but in one 
instance the bankrupt refused to allow the 
defendants to sell a parcel of hops to a per­
son named by them at the price offered, and 
that parcel was accordingly sold by the de­
fendants, before Saxby's bankrnptcy, to an­
other person by Saxby's authority. On an. 
other occasion in the month of September 
the bankrupt had employed a broker to sell 
another parcel of the bops. but the defend­
ants refused to deliver them without being 
D 
TE RNEl A R C H IV E  
paid for them. After the act of bankruptC'y 
the defendants sold bops of the bankrupt's 
to the amount of £380 lDs. 5d. The defend­
ants delivered account sales of the hops RI} 
sold by them after the bankruptcy. The hops 
were stated to be sold for Saxby, and be 
was charged warehouse rent from the �0th 
of August, and also commission on the sales. 
Besides the hops pUl'chased from the defen<l· 
ants, the bankrupt placed in their warebom;p 
nineteen pockets of bops for sale by them 
(as factors), of which fifteen pockets were 
sold on and after the 13th of January 1 24 
of the value of £77 19s. 5d., and of which 
four remained in their warehouse at the time 
of the trial, which four were of the value of 
£14, and there were also unsold of the hops 
purchased from defendants seven bags, fifty. 
six pockets, of the value of £251 13s. 6d. 
There was a demand by plaintiffs of these 
hops, and a tender of warehouse rent and 
charges, and a refusal on the part of the de. 
fendants to deliver them, before action 
brought. 'l'he jury found that the defend­
ants did not rescind the sales made by them 
to the banlu·upt. This case was argued at 
the sittings before last term, by 
Evans, for the plaintiffs. Abraham, con. 
tra.. 
BAYLEY, J., now delivered the judgment 
of the court. This was an action of trover 
for certain quantities of hops sold by the de· 
fendants to Saxby before his bankruptcy, 
and for certain other hors which Saxby had 
placed in defendants' warehouses that de­
fendants in their character of factors might 
sell them for his use, and the question as to 
this latter parcel stands upon perfectly dis. 
tiuct grounds from the question as to the 
others. This parcel consisted of n ineteen 
pockets ; defendants sold none of theru until 
after Saxby's bankruptcy, and then they sold 
fifteen pockets, not for the use of the assign­
ees, but to apply the proceeds, not for any 
debt due to them i n  their character of fac­
tors, but to discbarg·e a claim they considered 
themselves as having upon Saxby in regard 
to the other hops; and the other four pockets 
they refused to deliver to the assignees. It 
was candidly admitted upon the argument, 
and was clea1 beyo�d all doubt, that the de· 
fendants were not warranted in applying the 
proceeds of the fifteen pockets to the purpose 
to which they attempted to apply them, and 
that they had no legal ground for withhold­
ing the four pockets; and, therefore. to the 
extent of these ni neteen pockets, the value 
of which is £91 Hls. 5d., we think it clea r 
that the plaintiffs a.re entitled to recover. 
The other quantities were hops Saxby hall 
bargained to buy of the defendants on differ­
ent days in August 1823, and for which de 
fendauts had delivered bought notes to Sax­
by. The bought notes were in this form: 
"Mr. J. R. Saxby, of Sauders. Parkes. :in1l 
Co., T. M. Simmons, eight pockets at 133s., 
th August 1823." Part of the bops wen• 
J r."' : r  . from 
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weighed, and an aeeoimt delivered to Sas-
by of the weights, and samples were given
to Saxby and invoices delivered. The bought
notes were silent as to the time for deliver-
ing the hops, and also as to the time for pay-
ing for them, but the usual time for paying
for hops was proved to be the second Satur-
day after the purchase. It was also proved
that Saxby had said that the hops were to
remain with the defendants till they were paid
for; but as the admissibility of such evi-
dence was questioned, and in om* view of the
case it is luinecessai-y to decide that point,
I only mention it to dismiss it. (The learned
judge then stated the other facts set out in
the special case, and then proceeded as fol-
lows.) Under these circumstances the ques.
tion is, whether in respect of these hops the
plaintiffs are entitled to recover. It was
urged, on the part of the plaintiffs, that the
sale of these hops vested the property in
them in Saxby; that the hops were to be
considered as sold upon credit, and that de-
fendants had no lien therefore upon any of
them for the price; that if they ever had
any lien, it was destroyed as to those they
sold by the act of sale, and that the plaintiffs
were entitled to recover the full value of
what were sold, without making any deduc-
tion for the price which was unpaid. It is,
therefore, material to consider whether the
property vested in Saxby to any and to what
extent; and what were the respective rights
of Saxby and of the defendants. Where
goods are .sold and nothing is said as to the
time of the delivery, or the time of payment,
and every thing the seller has to do with
them is complete, the property vests in the
buyer, so as to subject him to the risk of
any accident which may happen to the goods,
and the seller is liable to deliver them when-
over they are deiiiaudod upon payment of
the price; but the buyer has no right to have
Iirissossion of the goods till he pays the price.
The buyer's right in respect of the price la
not a mere Hen which he will forfeit if he
parts with the possession, but grows out of
his original ownership and dominion, and
payment or a tender of Ihi' price is a condi.
tion precedent on tbe buyer's part, and until
he makes such payment or tender he has no
right to the iiossession. If goods arc sold
upon credit, and nothing Is agreed u]Km as to
the time of delivering the goo<ls, the vondeo
Is Immediately eiilllled to the possession, and
I lie right of i)ossosslon and the right of
property vest at once In hini; but his right
of possession Is not absolute, It Is U.-ilile to bo
dofoaled If he becomes Insolvent liefore he
iihtulns pfissesslon, 'I'ooko v. Uollirigsworth,
.". T. n. ^1.1.— Whether dcf.nilt In payment
when the credit expires will destroy his right
..f pdssesslou, If lie has not before that lime
obtained actual |M)Hsessloii. and juit him In
ilie same slluatlon as If there had been no
bargain for credit, it is not now necessary
to inquire, because this is a case of insol-
vency, and in case of insolvency the point
seems to be perfectly clear, Hanson v. Meyer,
6 East, 614. If the seller has dispatched the
goods to the buyer, and insolvency occurs, he
has a right in virtue of his original owner-
ship to stop them in transitu, Mason v. Lick-
barrow, 1 H. Bl. 357; Ellis v. Hunt, 3 T.
R 4G4; Hodgson v. Loy, 7 T. R. 440; Inglis
V. Usher wood, 1 East, 515; Bohtlingk v. In-
glis, 3 East, 381. Why'? Because the prop-
erty is vested in the buyer, so as to subject
him to the risk of any accident; but he has
not an indefeasible right to the possession,
and his insolvency, without payment of tho
price, defeats that right. And if this be the
case after he has dispatched the goods, and
whilst they are in transitu, a fortiori, is it
when he has never parted with the goods,
and when no transitus has begun. The buy
er, or those who stand in his place, may still
obtain the right of possession if they will
pay or tender the price, or they may still act
upon their right of property if any thing un-
warrantable is done to that right. If, for in-
stance, the original vendor sell when he
ought not, they may bring a special action
against him for the injury they sustain by
such wrongful sale, and recover damages to
the extent of that injm-y; but they can main-
tain no action in which right of properly and
right of possession are both requisite, unless
thej' have both those rights. Gordon v. Har-
per, 7 T. R. 9. Trover is an action of that
description, it requires right of property and
right of possession to support it. And this
is an answer to the argument upon the charge
of warehouse rent, and the uou-rcsciuding
of the sale. If the defeiiilants were forced
to keep the hops in tlioir warehouse longer
thau Saxby had a right to require them, they
were entitled to charge him with that ex-
pense, but that charge gave him no better
right of possession than he would have had
If that charge had not been made. Indeed
that charge was not made until after the
bankruptcy, and until the defendants Insisted
that tho right of possession was transferred
to their second vendee. Then as to tho non-
resclndlng of the sale, what can be Its effect?
It Is nothing more than Insisting that the
defendants will not release Saxby from the
obligation of his purchase, but It will give
him no right l)eyond the right his purchase
gave, and that is n right to have the posses-
sion on payment of the price. As that price
has not boon paid or tendered, we are of
oplnlciu that this action, which Is not an ac-
tion for special damage by a wrongfid sale,
but an action of trover, cnnnot, as to those
hops, be mainlalMed. The verdict must,
.therefore, be for the plaintiffs for the sum
of £91. lOs. 5d. only.
Judgment for the plalutlffa
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H2 ALE ...  
wei.:::bed. and an account deli >ered to Sax­
by or the weights. and saruples were given 
to Saxby and invoices deli•ered. The bought 
notes were silent as to the tirue for deli•e1·. 
in� the bops, and also as to the time for pay. 
in� for them. but the usual time for paying 
for hop was pro>ed to be the econd Satur­
day after the purch:ise. It was also pro-ved 
that �axhy bad said that the bops were to 
remain with the defendants till they were paid 
for; but a the admis ibility of uch e-vi­
lleuce was questi onec1, and in om· view of the 
<.':lse it i unnecessary to decide that point, 
bargain for credit, it i s  not now necessa1·y 
to i nquire, because this is a case of insol· 
vency, and in case of insolvency the point 
seem to be perfectly clear, Hanson v. Meyer, 
G E:ist, 6H. If the seller bas dispatched the 
g-oods to the buyer, and insol•ency occur , be 
bas a right in vil'tue of bis original owner­
sb ip to stop them in tran itu, :\Iason v. Lick­
barrow, 1 H. Bl. 3::i7; Ellis -v. Hunt, 3 T. 
R 46-!; Hodgson v. Loy, 'i T. R. +10 ; In�fo; 
v. Usherwood, 1 East, 51;); Bobtlingk v. In­
glis, 3 East, 3Sl. "Why ? Because the prop-
rty is vested in the buyer, so as to subjel't 
him to the risk of any accident ; but Ile has 
not an indefensible right to the pos ession. 
and his insolvency, without payu.ent or tho 
price. de fea t' that right. Aud if thi• be the 
1:ase after he has dispatched the goods, and 
whilst they are in transitu, a fortiori, is it  
when be bas never parted with the goods, 
and when no transitus bas begun. The buy­
er, or t hose who stand in bis place, may still 
obtain the right of possession if tlley will 
pay or tender the price, or they may still act 
upon their right of property if any thing u11-
w:irra n table is done to tha t right. If, ror i n  
stance, t h e  original venuor sell when be 
oug-llt not, they may lwin;.r a special action 
ng;ainst him for t he i nj u ry they su--tain by 
such wrou�rul sale, and rt.>rover damag;es to 
the extent of that inj tU'J ; llut they can main­
tain no action i n  which ri;.rht of pro1)erl y :mil 
right of possession are both requisi te, unlc>ss 
they have both those ri�hts. nor Ion v. I la1·­
l1Cl', 7 T. R. 9. Trover is a n  action or that 
descri ption, it requires right of property arnl 
ri;::llt or po�sc:::sion to supvort it. Auel t his 
is a n  nn:::wer t o  the ar�ument upon the char.:::l' 
of warehouse rent. a n1l the uon resl'inding 
or the sale. I f  the <k f•·n l:rn t s  wc>rc> fnrt·1•1l 
to keep the bops in t lll'lr "·:t r house lon;.rer 
t ha n  Saxby bad a r i ;.: h t  to require tllcm, thc•y 
were ent itled to l'ita rgc hi m w i t h  that ex­
pense. but t ha t  chn r.�e gave him no bett er 
right of posses ion t han be \Y01tld llllH' ha il 
If tha t  din r�c hacl not hl'C'n maclc. I n dt'c'cl 
that ch:t rge w:t::; not ma1 lc unt il  after t he 
hankrupll-r. :tncl unt i l  t he clefe!Hl a n t s  l nsl :::tecl 
that tho ri�hl of possl'Ss lon w:t::; t r:t ns fl'IT1'1l 
I only mention it to dismiss it. (The learned 
judge then stated the other fact' set out in 
the special case. and then proceeded a fol­
lows.) Under these circumstances the ques. 
tion i , whether in respect of these bops the , 
plaintiffs are entitled to reco-ver. It w:is 
ur:::ed. on the part of the plaintiffs. that the 
sale of tl.Jese hops vested the property in 
tlwm in :-;axLy ; that t ill• bop::: wPrc> to he 
c·on!'irlerell as sold upon credit,  and that de­
fendants bad no lien therefore uvon any of 
them for the price; that if they ver bad 
:iny lien, it was destroyed as to those they 
sold by the net or sale, and that the plainti!Is 
were entitled to reco•er the full value ot 
what were sold, w i t hout making any deduc· 
t ion for the price which wa unpaid. It is, 
therefore, material to consider wiletller tile 
property vested in Saxby to any and to whal 
l'Xtc>nt : and wb:it were t he re:pective ri�bt� 
of �axby and of the defen1l:mt \\'herl' 
''.001ls are solcl and not hin ::: is s:1it1 as to th!' 
time or the delh·ery. or the time or pa ymen t .  
and every t h i ng the seller h a  to llo with 
them is complete. the prnperty ve. ts in the 
buyer, so as to subject h i m  to the risk or 
any accident which may ha ppen to the goods, 
:i ncl the seller is Ji:il1le to deliver the111 when 
('\·er t hey are dl•lll:llllkrl upon 11ny 111e11t or 
t he price; but the bnyl'r has no rl;rht to h:ne 
pnss .. ssion of t he ::001b till he pays t he )lric•e. 
'!'he buyer' s rif:ht in respect of t hc> prke l !'I  
not a merC' lien wh i dt l w  w i l l  forfl'lt  i f  hl' 
i 1nrts with tlw poss,.sslon, hut ;.:rrm s nut of 
his n ri�1 11:1I o\\' l l l 'l'l'hlp a n d 1lnml11i1111, a 1 1<l 
pay1 rn n t  or n 1Pnd1•r of t h" )ll'i l'•' Is n cn111l1. 
lion fll'Pt'Pllf'nt nn thr hll� <'l"s pa rt , 1t 1HI un t i l 
lrn mnl,c·:; such payment or temlcr be hns no 
1·J::ht to t he ( lllS l'S;.11111 l r :11111ls :l l'l' sol1l 
11pon 1·rr.1l ll , a m! not h i n g  l!l a g :rl•e<l upnn : I s  to 
t he t lm,. of delh· .. rlng l l w goo1 ls, t h1•  Vl'lllh'll 
(!'! l rn 1 1 11·d l a ! Ply Pn t l t lrrl to t h r• 1111ssl's. Ion, a nd 
t ht• r igh t of J ilt Sl' :slnn 11 11 1 1 t lll' rig h t of 
pr11p11rty Ye r a t  r111n• I n  h i m ;  hut hlM right 
1 1f  1111. PS Ion I nrit n h o]llll', It Is ll ahlP to ht' 
t l 1 •fl: l l Pt l  If h<' h1·c·onu• l n soh !'nt hl 'l'nre hr 
1 1htnl m1  pos r •!Jsl on, 'l'ool I' \', l l o l l i n gMwort h, 
' to t hei r i>el'O!HI ventlce. '!'hen :t� to th<' non­
rrsrl n d i n �  of t h<' l:l:tlc, wh a t c•:tn he Its <'f!l>l'I '! 
T t  Is 110 t h l 1 1 g  ntnrl' t ha n  l n�ist i n� t ha t  t h e 
•l<'fPncl: 1 1 1 t s  will nnt rt'll':t�c :a ·1.J} fro 1 11 t he 
nbl l :.::t t lon of h i s  1m1·1·h:1 sP, hut I t w i l t  gln:o 
him 110 rli:;h t lll')'flllll t lw rii:ht bis p11 r1•ha st> 
i;n v l', a ncl thnt ls n rl"hl to have t l u• 1w::1sp,;. 
i;lnn on p:1 y 1 1w11t of t l w  prkr.. As t h :tl pr ke 
h:t� not hPPlt p:t l cl or t!'1tcl!'r1'1 1 .  \\!' 11 1'1' n f  
np ln l •  1 1  t h: 1 t  t h i s  H <'l lon , w h k h  Iii! not nu :l<'· 
t l1 1n  fo r 11rwelnl cln 11 1npe h) n \\Ton� ful sn i t ', 
hnl 1111  a rt lon o r  t rm !'t', 1•n 1111ot , ns t o t hosr 
hops, 111• 111:1 in t :\ lm•1l .  'l' hP vrrdlrt must, 
t lwrPforc'. br for t he 11111 Int llfs tor the l:llllll 
ot £! 1 1 .  l !ls. Gel. onl)·. 
,-; 'I', It. :! l ri \\' h<'lhf'r tlf ' f1 1 1 1 lt In p:1 .1 1 1 1 1 •nt  
w h"n t h •• crf'll i t " p l n •s \\ I l l  d1•sl rny h is rig h t 
1 1� po e � 11111, t r  hf' h11 uni l w fnrp 1 1 1 11 I t 1 n w  
ol 1 tal nf'rl 11rt 11n l l K• •'fl 101 1 ,  nnrl  ) l i l t  him I n 
t ile 611 lllf' It tin I Inn II I f  I hPl't' hnd hf'l' ll no 
D i g itize by 
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,J 11rli;ment for t lw 11l11 lntl!fe. 
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WOOD V. MANLEY.
(11 Adol. & E. 34.)
Court of Queen's Bench. Michaelmas Term,
1839.
Trespass for breaking and entering plain-
tiff's close. Plea, (besides others not ma-
terial here,) as to entering the close, that
defendant, before the time when, &c., was
lawfully possessed of a large quantity of
hay, which was upon plaintiff's close, in
which, &c., and that defendant, at the
times when, &c., by leave and license of
the plaintiff to him for that purpose first
given and granted, peaceably entered the
close, to carry off the said hay and did
tlien and there peaceably take his said hay
from and out of the said close, as he law-
fully, &.C., which are the said alleged tres-
passes, &c. Replication, de injuria.
On the trial, before Erskine, J., at the Inst
Somersetshire assizes, it appeared that tlie
plaintiff was tenant of a farm, iucludiug
the locus in quo; and that, his landlord
having distrained on him for rent, the goods
seized, comprehending the hay mentioned
in the plea, were sold on the premises; the
conditions of the sale being, that the pur-
chasers might let the hay remain on the
premises till the Ladyday following, (ISoS,)
and enter on the i)remises in the mean-
while, as often as they pleased, to remove
it. The defendant purchased the hay at
the sale: and evidence was given to show
that the plaintiff was a party to these con-
ditions. After the sale, on 2Gth January,
180S, plaintiff served upon defendant a writ-
ten notice not to enter or commit any tres-
pass on his, the plaintiff's, premises. In
February following, defendant served plain-
tiff with a written demand to deliver up
the hay, or to suffer him, defendant, to
have access thereto and carry it away;
threatening an action in default thereof.
The plaintiff, however, locked up the gate
leading to the locus in ijuo, where the hay
was; and the defendant, on 1st March,
ISoS, broke the gate open, entered the close,
and carried away the hay. The learned
judge told the jury that, if the plaintiff
assented to the conditions of sale at the
time of the sale, this amounted to a license
to enter and take the goods, which license
was not revocable: and he therefore di-
rected them to find on this issue for the
defendant, if they thought the plaintiff had
so assented. Verdict for the defendant.
Crowder now moved for a new trial, on
the ground of misdirection. The learned
judge appears to have considered that this
case fell within the principle laid down in
Winter v. Brockwell, 8 East, 308, that a
license executed cannot be revoked. There
the execution of the license took place by
the defendant building in pursuance of the
plaintiff's permission; so that the defend-
ant had incurred an expense, upon the faith
of the license, in doing the very thing which
was liceused: and the action was for the
thing so done. But this is not the case of a
license executed before revocation: the plain-
tiff revoked thepermission before the defend-
ant acted uiwn it at all. On these plead-
ings, the only question is, whether the act
done by the plaintiff was licensed by the
defendant. It may be that the defendant
was entitled to bring trover, or perhaps to
sue for breach of the conditions: but the
license was revoked before it was execut-
ed. [Lord DENMAN, C. J. If a man buys
a loaf, and part of the bargain is, that he
shall leave it at the baker's shop, and call
for it, can the baker prevent his entering
the shop to take the loaf?] Suppose a par-
ty agrees to sell merchandise; if he after-
wards refuse to sell, the buyer cannot take
it. [Lord DENMAN, C. J. But here the
sale was completed.] The ruling of the
learned judge, if correct, would show that
every case of contract created an irrevoca-
ble license. [Lord DENMAN, C. J. Here
the question is on the fact of the license.]
The revocation of a license need not be
specially replied: it may be shown under
a traverse of the license. Besides, the rep-
lication here puts the whole plea In issue;
and the plea alleges a quiet entry, which is
negatived by the gate being broken. A
right of way may, perhaps, in some cases
be enforced by violence, but not a license.
[PATTESON, J., referred to Tayler v. Wa-
ters, 7 Taunt. 381, (2 E. C. L. 405.)] The
Vjuestion there was. whether a license to
use real property could be given without
writing; and it was decided that it could.
Liggins V. Inge, 7 Bing. 682, (20 E. C. L.
304,) 1 is to the same effect.
Lord DENMAN, C. J. Mr. Crowder's ar-
gument goes this length;— that, if I sell
goods to a party who is, by the terms of
the sale, to be permitted to come and take
them, and he pays me, I may afterwards
refuse to let him take them. The law coun-
tenances nothing so absurd as this: a li-
cense thus given and acted upon is irrevo-
cable.
PATTESON, J. Tayler v. Waters, 7
Taunt. 374, (2 E. C. L. 405.) shows that a
license to use a seat at the opera-house,
paid for and acted upon by sitting there,
cannot be countermanded. Here the con-
ditions of sale, to which the plaintiff is a
party, are, that any one who buys shall
be at liberty to enter and take. A person
does buy; part of his understanding is that
he is to be allowed to enter and take. The
license is therefore so far executed as to
be irrevocable equally with that in Tayler
V. Waters. The case put by Mr. Crowder
is different. I do not say that a mere pur-
chase will give a license: but here the
license is part of the very contract.
1 See Bridges v. Blanchard, 1 A- & E. 536,
(28 E. O. L. R. 43.)
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PEHFOH.M A N CE OF CO ... T JL\.CT. 
WOOD v. l\IA.:NLEY. 
(11 Ado!. & E. 34.) 
Court of Queen's Bench. Michaelmas Term, 
1839. 
Trespass for breaking and entering plain­
tiff"s close. Plea, (besides others not ma­
terial here.) as to entering the close, that 
<lefen<lant, before the tirue when, &c., was 
lawfully possessed of a large quanti ty of 
hay, whic:h was upon plaintiff's close, in 
which, &c., and that defendant, at the 
times when, &c., by leave and license of 
the plaintiff to him for that purpose first 
given and granted, peaceably entered the 
dose, to carry off the said hay and did 
tllen and there peaceably take his said hay 
from and out of the said close, as he la w­
fu !ly, &c .• which are the said alleged tres­
passes, &c. Replication, de injuria. 
On the trial, before Erskine, J .. at the l::t st 
Somersetsllil'e assizes, it appeared that the 
plaintiff was tenant of a farm, including 
the locus in quo ; and that, his landlord 
l la Ying distrained on him for rent. the goods 
seized, comprehending the bay mentioned 
in the plea, were sold on the premises ; the 
conditions of the sale being, that the pur­
chasers might let the bay remain on the 
premises till the Ladyday following, (1838,) 
and enter on the premises in the mean­
while, as often as they pleased, to remove 
it. The defendant purchased the hay at 
the sale: and evidence was given to show 
that the plaintiff was a party to these con­
ditions. After the sale, on 26th January, 
1838, plaintiff served upon defendant a writ­
ten notice not to enter or commit any tres­
pa;;s on his, the plaintiff's, premises. In 
February following, defendant served plain­
tiff with a written demand to deliver up 
the hay, or to suffer him, defendant, to 
ba>e access thereto aml carry it away ; 
tbreatening an action in default thereof. 
Tbe plaintiff, however, locked up tl..le gate 
leading to the locus in quo, where the bay 
·was;  and the defendant, on 1st l\Iarcl.1, 
1838, broke the gate open, entered the close, 
and carried away the hay. 'l'he learned 
ju<lge told the jury that, if the plaintiff 
assented to the conditions of sale at the 
time of the sale, this amounted to a license 
to enter and take the goods, which license 
was not revocable: and be therefore di­
rected them to find on this issue for the 
defen<lant, if they thought the plaintiff bad 
so assented. Verdict for the defendant. 
Crowder now moved for a ne'v trial, on 
the ground of misdirection. The learned 
judge appears to have considered that this 
case fell within the principle laid down in 
Winter v. Brockwell, 8 East, 308, that a 
l icense executed cannot be revoked. There 
the execution of the license took place by 
the defendant building in pursuance of the 
pla intiff's permission ; so that the defend­
ant had incurred an expense, upon the fa ith 
of the l icense, in doing the very thing which 
D . .  ·-- t 
TE RNEl A R C H IVE 
was licensed: and the action was for tlle 
tl..liug so done. But tbis is not tl..le case of a 
license executed before revocation: the plain­
tiff revoked tbe permissiou before the defend­
ant acted upon it at all. On tbese plea<l­
ings, the only question is, whether the act 
done by the plaintiff was licensed by tb" 
defendant. It may be that the defendant 
was entitled to bring trover, or perhaps to 
I sue for breach of the conditions :  but the license was revoked before it  was execut­
ed. [Lord DEN.L\IAN, C. J. If a man I.Ju.rs 
a loaf, and part of the bargain iR, that he 
shall leave it at the baker's shop, and call 
I for it, can the baker prevent his entering the shop to take the loaf ?] Suppose a par­
ty agrees to sell merchandise; if he after-
wards refuse to sell, the buyer cannot take 
it. [Lord DEK.L\IA:\', C. J. But here tile 
sale was completed.] The ruling of the 
learned judge, if correct, would show that 
every case of contract created an irrevoca­
ble license. [Lord DENi\IAN, C. J. Here 
the question is on the fact of the license.] 
The revocation of a license need not be 
specially replied: i t  may be shown under 
a traverse of the license. Besides, the rep­
lication here puts the whole plea in issue ; 
and the plea alleges a quiet entry, which is 
negatived by the gate being broken. A 
rigbt of way may, perhaps, in some cases 
be enforced by violence, but not a license. 
[PATTESON, J., referred to Tayler v. Wa­
ters, 7 Taunt. 384, (2 E. C. L. 403.)] The 
'question there was, wbether a license to 
use real property could be given witbout 
writing; and it  was decided that it could. 
Liggins v. Inge, 7 Bing. 682, (20 E. C. L. 
30-!,) i is to the same effect. 
Lord DEN.L\IAN, C. J. Mr. Crowder's ar­
gument goes this length ;-tl..la t, if I sell 
goods to a party who is, by the terms of 
the sale, to be permitted to come and take 
them, and he pays me, I may afterwards 
refuse to let him take them. The law coun­
tenances nothin� so absurd as this: a li­
cense thus given and acted upon is irrevo­
cable. 
PATTE SON, J. Tayler v. Waters, 7 
Taunt. 374, (2 E. C. L. 405,) shows that a 
license to use a seat at the opera-house, 
paid for and acted upon by sitting there, 
cannot be countermanded. Here the con­
ditions of sale. to which the plaintiff is a 
party, are, that any one who bu:rs shall 
be at liberty to enter and take. A person 
does buy ; part of his understanding is that 
he is to be allowed to enter and take. The 
license is therefore so far executed as to 
be irrevocable equally with that in Tayler 
v. Waters. The case put by l\lr. Crowder 
is different. I do not say that a mere pur­
chase will give a license: but here the 
license is part of the very contract. 
1 See Bridges v. Blanchard, 1 A. & E. 536, 
(28 E. 0. L. R. 43.) 
O rig1 a 1  from 
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WILLIAMS, J. The plaintiff, having as-
sented to the terms of the contract, puts
himself Into a situation from which he
could not withdraw.
COLERIDGE, J. The pleadings raise the
Issne whether, when the act complained of
was done, the leave and license existed:
it did exist If It was Irrevocable; and 1
think it was irrevocable. Although no one
of the cases referred to Is exactly the same
as this, yet all proceed on the principle that
a man, who, by consenting to certain terms,
induces another to do an act, shall not aft-
erwards withdraw from those terms.
Rule refused.
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WILLIAMS, J. The plaintiff, having as- It did exist If It was Irrevocable; and I 
sented to the terms of the contract, puts think it was irrevocable. Although no one 
himself into a situation from which he of the cases referred to ls exactly the same 
could not withdraw. as this, yet all proceed on the principle that 
I a man, who, by consenting to certain terms, COLERIDGE, J. The pleadings raise the induces another to do an act, shall not aft­lssue whether, when the act complained of erwards withdraw from those terms. was done, the leave and license existed: Rule refused. 
D i g itized by O ri �  ra l  frorr 
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PAUL V. REB;D et al.
(52 N. II. km;.)
Supreme .Tndicial Court of Now Hampshire.
Sullivan. June, 1872.
Action by Azor Paul against Dexter G.
Reed, defendant, and Dana R. Moody, trus-
tee. Tlie trustee was held liable on the dis-
closure, and defendant took exceptions. Ex-
ceptions sustained.
The disclosure of Moody, the trustee, show-
ed that he succeeded defendant. Reed, as ten-
ant of a boarding house, and when he was
taking possession, and Reed was moving out,
he agreed to pui'chase from Reed a hog, some
sugar, and other articles. The agreed price
of the articles was as follows: One hog, $10.50;
flour, $7; butter, §10; bedstead, $1; sugar and
salt, $1.80. Reed made a memorandum of
the articles with the price carried out, and,
as he was adding it up. the sheriff served
the trustee summons on Moody. The hog had
already been removed by Moody to another
pen, and the sugar had been placed with
Moody's other sugar. When the summons
was served. Moody held the money in his
hand, ready to pay for the articles as soon as
the amount was ascertained. After service
of process. Reed asked Moody to give the
articles up, saying, "We can call it no sale,
and I can take my stuff," giving as a reason
that they were not yet paid for. Moody re-
plied that he would take counsel, and, if it
was safe for him to do so, he would give them
up. He was advised to let the matter stand,
as there would be a question as to his liability
to be tried. Defendant, Reed, claimed the
property, but the court held Moody to be
chargeable with the $30.30, and defendant ex-
cepted, and the question was reserved.
Mr. Bowers, for plaintiff. S. H. Edes, for
defendant and ti'ustee.
BELLOWS, C. J. Unless the principal de-
fendant had another hog and other provisions
or fuel, so that the value of his provisions
and fuel exceeded twenty dollars, all the ar-
ticles sold to the trustee were exempt from
attachment. As there is no proof that he had
another hog, or more provisions, or fuel, the
court cannot find that he had such; and, there-
fore, unless the title in these goods had vested
in the trustee so that he became indebted for
them, the trustee must be discharged.
The question then is, whether the goods
were deUvered so as to vest the title in the
trustee.
The proof tends to show that the sale was
for cash, and not on credit;— so the trustee
testifies, and this is just what would have
been intended had no time of payment been
stipulatetl. 2 Kent, Comm. *490, *4<J7; .Story,
Cout. § 796; Noy's Maxims, 87; Insurance
Co. V. De Wolf, 2 Cow. 105. The case, then,
stands before us as a contract of sale for cash
on dehvery: in such case the delivery and
payment are to be concurrent acts; and there-
fore, if the goods are put into the possession
GUIF. PEES. PROP. — 10
of the buyer iu the expectation that he will
inmicdiately pay the price, and he does not
do it, the seller is at liberty to regard the de-
livery as conditional, and may at once re-
claim the goods. In such a case the contract
of sale is not consummated, and the title
does not vest in the buyer. The seller, may,
to be sure, waive the payment of the p;ice,
and agree to postpone it to a futm'e day, and
proceed to complete the delivery; in which
case it would be absolute, and the title would
vest in the buyer. But in order to have this
effect, it must appear that the goods were
put into the buyer's possession with the in-
tention of vesting the title in him.
If, however, the delivery and payment wore
to be simultaneous, and the goods were deliv-
ered in the expectation that the price would
be immediately paid, the refusal to make
payment would be such a failure on the part
of the buyer to perform the contract as to en-
title the seller to put an end to it and re-
claim the goods.
This is not only eminently just, but it is in
accordance with the great current of author-
ities, which treat the delivery, under such cir-
cumstances, as conditional upon the immediate
payment of the price. 2 Kent, Comm. *107;
Chit. Cent. (9th Am. Ed.) "SoO, note 1, and
cases; Story, Cont. §§ 706, S04; Palmer v.
Hand, 13 Johns. 434; Marston v. Baldwin, 17
Mass. 605; Leven v. Smith. 1 Deiiio, 573. and
cases cited. So the doctrine was fully recogniz-
ed in Russell v. Minor, 22 Wend. 659. where,
on the sale of paper, it was agreed that the
buyer should give his notes for it on delivery,
and the delivery was in several parcels. On
delivery of the first, the seller asked for a
note; but the buyer answered that he would
give his note for the whole when the remain-
der was delivered, and the parcel now deliv-
ered could remain until then. When the rest
was delivered, the defendant refused to give
his note; and the court held that the delivei-y
of all the goods was conditional, and that the
seller might maintain replevin for all the
goods. The general doctrine is fully recog-
nized in this state in Luey v. Bundy, 9 N.
H. 20S, and more especially iu Ferguson v.
Chfford, 37 N. H. 86, where it is laid down
that if the delivery takes place when payment
is expected simultaneously therewith, it is
in law made upon the condition precedent that
the price shall forthwith be paid. If this con-
dition be not performed, the delivery is in-
operative to pass the title to the property, and
it may be instantly reclaimed by the vendor.
The question then is, whether the delivery
here was absolute, intending to pass the title
to the vendee and trust him for the price, or.
whether it was made with the expectation that
the cash would be paid immediately on the
delivery. This is a question of fact, but it is
submitted to the court for decision. Ordinarily
it should be passed upon at the trial term; but
where the question is a mixed one of law and
fact, as it is here, it may not be irregular, if
the judge thinks it best, to reserve the entire
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PAUL v. REED et al. 
(52 N. II. 13G.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of New Ha mpshire. 
Sullivan. June, 1872. 
Action by Azor Paul against Dexter G .  
Reed, defendant, and Dana R .  �1oody, trus­
tee. The trustee was beld liable on tbe dis­
closure, and defendant took exceptions. Ex­
ceptions sustained. 
The disclosure of Moody, tbe trustee, show­
ed that he succeeded defendant, Reed, as ten­
ant of a boarding house, and when be was 
taking possession, and need was moving out, 
be agreed to purchase from Reed a bog, some 
sugar, and other articles. 'l'he agreed price 
of the a rticles was as follows: One bog, $10.50; 
flour, $7 ; butter, $10; bedstead, $1;  sugar and 
salt, $1.80. Reed made a memorandum of 
the articles with tbe price carried out, and., 
as be was adding it up, the sheriff served 
the trnstee summons on Moody. The bog bad 
already been removed by Moody to another 
pen, and the sugar bad been placed with 
Moody's other sugar. When the summons 
was served, :Moody held the money in bis 
band, ready to pay for the articles as soon as 
the amount was ascertained. After service 
of process, Reed asked Moody to give the 
articles up, saying, "We can call it no sale, 
and I can take my stuff," giving as a reason 
that they were not yet paid for. Moody re­
plied that be would take counsel, and, if it 
was safe for bim to do so, be would give them 
up. H e  was advised to let tbe matter stand, 
as there would be a question as to bis liability 
to be t1·ied. Defendant, Reed, claimed tbe 
property, but the court held Moody to be 
chargeable witb the $30.30, and defendant ex­
cepted, and the question was reserved. 
Mr. Bowers, for plaintiff. S. H. Edes, for 
defendant and trustee. 
BELLOWS, C. J. Unless the principal de­
fendant bad another bog and other provisions 
or fuel, so that the value of bis provisions 
and fuel exceeded twenty dollars, all the ar­
ticles sold to tbe trnstee were exempt from 
attachment. As there is no proof that be bad 
a nother bog, or more provisions, or fuel, the 
court cannot find that he bad such; and, there­
fore, unless the title in these goods bad vested 
in the trustee so that be became indebted for 
them, the trustee must be discharged. 
The question tben is, whether the goods 
were delivered so as to vest the title in the 
trustee. 
The proof tends to show that the sale was 
for cash, and not on credit ;-so the trustee 
testifies, and this is just what woulcl have 
been intended bad no time of payment been 
stipulated. 2 Kent, Comm. *49G, *497 ; Story, 
Cont. § 796; Noy's :i.\Iaxims, 87; Insurance 
Uo. v. De Wolf, 2 Cow. 105. The case, tben, 
stands before us as a contract of sale for cash 
on delivery : in such case tbe delivery and 
payment are to be concurrent acts; and there­
fore, i�t)le. goods 
t
are put into the possession 
cMIF:ih . PilbP. - 10 
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of the l luyer in the e>xpeC'tatiou that be will 
immediately pay tbe 11ricc, and be does not 
do it, the seller is at liberty to regard the de 
livery as conditional, aIHl may at on<:e re 
claim the goods. In sucil a mse the contrar•t 
of sale is not consummated, and the ti!l<' 
docs not vest in tbe buyer. The seller, may. 
to be sure, waive the payment of the 1 ri•·e, 
and agree to postpone it to a future da� , an<l 
proceed to complete the dcliYery ;  in whid1 
case it would be absolute, and the title would 
vest in the buyer. But in order to have thb 
effect, it must appear that the goods were 
put into the buyer's possession with the in­
tention of vesting the title in him. 
If, however, the delivery and 11ayment wcrc> 
to be simultaneous, and the goods were deliv­
ered in the expectation that the price would 
be immediately paid, the refusal to make 
payment would be such a failure on the part 
of the buyer to perform the contract as to en­
title the seller to put an end to it and re­
claim the goods. 
This is not only eminently just, but it is in 
accorda nce with the great current of author­
ities, which treat the delivery, under such cir­
cumstances, as conditional upon the immediate 
payment of the price. 2 Kent, Comm. qg7 ; 
Chit. Cont. (Dtb Am. Ed.) *350, note 1, ancl 
cases; Story, Cont. §§ 706, 804 ; Palmer '· 
Hand, 13 Jobns. 434; Marston v. Baldwin, 11 
l\1ass. G05 ; Leven v. Smith, 1 Denio, :il3. arnl 
cases cited. So the doctrine was fully recogniz­
ed in Russell v. :\Iinor, 22 Wend. U5l>. wl!ere, 
on the sale of paper, it was agreed that the 
buyer should give bis notes for it on deli\ery, 
and the delivery was in several parcels. O n  
delivery o f  the first, the seller asked for a 
note; but the buyer answered that he would 
give his note for tbe whole when the remain­
der was clelirnred, and tbe parcel now deliv­
ered could remain until then. 'Vhen the rest 
was delivered, the defendant refused to give 
bis note; and the court held tbat tbe delivery 
of all  the goods was conditional, and that tl!e 
seller migilt maintain replevin for all the 
goods. The general doctrine is fully recog­
nized in this state in Luey v. Bundy, 9 ::\'. 
H .  208, and more especially in Ferguson v. 
Clifford, 37 N. H. 86, where it is laitl down 
tbat i� the delivery takes place wben payment 
is expected simultaneously therewith, it is 
in law made upon the condition precedent that 
tbe price sllall forthwith be paid. If this con­
dition be not performed, the delivery is in­
operative to pass the title to the property, and 
it may be instantly reclaimed by the \endor. 
The question then is, whether the delivery 
here was absolute, i ntending to pass the title 
to tbe vendce and trust him for the price, or. 
whether it was made with the expectation that 
the cash would be paid immediately on tbl' 
delivery. This is a question of fact. but it is 
submitted to the court for decision. Ordinarily 
it should be passed upon at the trial term ; but 
where the question is a mixed one of law and 
fact, as it is here, it may not be i rregular. if 
the judge thinks it best...,to i:eservfe tbe entirl' • 1 r  r- 1 - r-
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question for the -nbole court. Assuming tliat
tlie Questions both of law and fact are re-
served, we find tliat the goods were sold for
cash, and of course that the delivery of the
goods and the payment of the price were to
be simultaneous, and accordingly, when a part
had been delivered, and the seller was figuring
up the amount, and the buyer had talien out
his money to pay the price, the act was arrest-
ed by the service of this process.
The evidence relied upon to prove the de-
livery to be absolute and intended to pass
the title at all events, is simply and solely the
changing of the hog into another pen, and
mixing the sugar with other sugar of the buy-
er. Without this mixing of the sugar, the case
would be just the ordinary one of a delivery
of the goods with the expectation tha,t the buy-
er would at once pay the price; and we thinlj
that circumstance is not enough to show a
purpose to make the delivery absolute, but
rather a confident expectation that the buyer
would do as he liad agreed, and pay the price
at once. The case of Henderson v. I^auck, 21
Pa. St. 359, was very much like this. There
was a sale of corn, to be paid for on the de-
livery of the last load; and as the loads were
delivered, the corn was placed in a heap with
other corn of the buyer, in tlie presence of
both parties. On the delivery of the last lot
the buyer failed to pay, and the seller gave no-
tice that he claimed the corn, and brought re-
plevin, which was held to lie.— the court re-
garding the delivery as conditional, and the
plaintiff in no fault for the intermingling of
the corn. It is very clear that the inter-
mingling of the sugar does not, as matter of
law, make the delivery absolute: and I think,
as matter of fact, it is not sufficient to prove
an intention to pass the title absolutely. When
the buyer declined to pay the price, the seller
at once reclaimed the goods, and so notified
the buyer, who did not object to giving up the
sale if he could safely do so.
In respect to the question now before us, it
is not material for what reason the buyer de-
clined to pay for the goods, although the serv-
ice of the trustee process might shield him
from damages in a suit by the seller for not
taking and paying for the goods. For the
purposes of this question, it is enough that the
buyer did not pay the price, and thus gave
the seller a right to reclaim the goods, whioli
he did at once. The goods themselves were
exempt from attachment; and the fact that
the trustee process was designed to intercept
the i)rice of those goods, could not affect his
right to reclaim tliem when the buyer declined
to pay the price.
The exception must therefore be sustained,
and the
Trustee discharged.
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11ne tion for thl' \\hole court. A urning that 
the questions both of law anj fact are re­
:sen·etl, \\e find that the goods were sold for 
cash, and of course that the delivery of the 
goods and the payment of the price were to 
be simultaneous, and accordingly, when a part 
lrncl heen deli>ered, and tile eller was figuring 
up the amount, and the buyer had taken out 
his money to pay the price, the act was arrest­
ed by the service of this process. 
The evidence relied upon to pro>e the de­
li>ery to be absolute and intended to pass 
the title at all e>ents, is simply and solely the 
changing of the hog into another pen, and 
mixing the sugar with other sugar of the buy­
er. \Yithout tllis mixing of the :sugar, the case 
would be just the ordinary one of a deli>ery 
of the goods \\ith the expectation that the buy­
er would at once pay the price ; and we think 
tbat circumstance is not enough to show a 
1mrpose to make the deliYery absolute, but 
rather a confident expectation that the buyer 
wou11I do as he ha d agreed. aud pay the price 
a t  ouce. The case of Hender.on v. Lauck. 21 
Pa. St. 3:J!J, was Yery much like this. There 
was a sale of corn. to be paid for on the de­
li>ery of the Inst loacl ; and as the loads were 
deli•ered, the corn was placed i n  a heap with 
other corn of the buyer, in the presence o.I' 
!Joth parties. On the deli'l"ery of the last lot 
the buyer failed to pay, and tbe seller gave no-
D i g itized by 
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tice that he claimed the corn. and brought re­
ple,in, which was hekl to l ie,-tbe court re­
garding the deli>ery as conditional, and the 
plaintiff in no fault for the intermingling of 
the com. It is 'l"ery clea1· that the inter­
mingling of tbe sugar does not. as matter of 
law, make tbe deli'l"ery absolute: and I think, 
as matter of fact, it is not sufficient to prove 
a n  intention to pass the title absolutely. When 
the buyer declined to pay the price, the seller 
at once reclaimed the goods, and so notified 
the buyer, "·ho did not object to gi>ing up the 
sale if be could safely do so. 
In respect to the question now before us, it  
is not material for wllat reason the buyer de­
clined to pay for the goods, although the ser'l"­
ice of tbe trustee process might shield him 
from damages i n  a suit by the seller for not 
taking and paying for the goods. For the 
purposes of this question, it is enough that the 
buyer did not pay the price. a nd thus gaw 
tbe seller a right to reclaim the goods, wbicll 
he did at once. The goods themselves were 
exempt from attachment; and the fact that 
tbe trustee process was designed to intercept 
the price or those goods, could not afl'ect bis 
right to reclaim them when the buyer declined 
to pay the price. 
The exception must therefore be sustaine<l, 
and the 
Trustee discharged. 
O n  !"'a l fro m  
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STEDMAN V. GOOCH.
(1 Esp. 4.)
Court of King's Boneh. May 14, 1793.
This was an action of assumpsit for goods
sold and delivered: tlie defendant pleaded
1st, The general issue. 2dly, Coverture. Upon
the first plea issue was joined; and to the
second was a replication, "That at the time
of the cause of action accrued, the defendant
lived separate and apart from her husband,
and had from him a seiiarate maintenance."
Ujioii which plea, another issue was taken.
The defence relied upon on the general issue
by the defendant was, that the plaintiff in
discharge of her bill, which was for millinery
goods furnished to the defendant, had taken
three promissory notes of one Finlay, pay-
able at the house of a Mr. Browne, and
liad given the defendant a receipt to that
effect.
Lord KENYON was of opinion that it then
became incumbent on the plaintifC to prove,
1st, that she had used due diligence to get
the money from Finlay; and 2dly, that he,
after notice, had made default in the pay-
ment.
To shew that she had used due diligence
to get the money from Finlay, the plaintlfC
proved that she had sent Finlay's notes to
Browne, where they were made payable,
and that he had been applied to respecting
the payment: that in answer to that appli-
cation he had said that he knew Finlay, but
that he had no effects of his in his hands;
nor could he pay them unless he had.
Mingay, for the defendant, objected: That
these declarations of Browne were not evi-
dence of Finlay's default; that they were
not bills drawn upon him, which he was
bound to pay. but that he was only men-
tioned, as his house was the place where the
notes were to be paid.
Lord ICENYON said, that it was the con-
stant practice to make country bank bills and
notes payable at certain houses in London;
and though the persons at whose houses they
were payable were not parties to them, nor
personally liable, yet that an answer at such
houses as to the payment or nonpayment of
the bills or notes made payable there was
sufficient He therefore held Browne's dec-
larations to be admissible evidence of the
probable nonpayment of the notes in question.
To prove notice to this effect to Finlay,
the plaintiff called a witness, who proved
that she carried a letter from the plaintiff
to Finlay, inclosing the notes, and informing
him that they were returned as not being
likely to be paid: that she went to the house
where Finlay lodged, for the purpose of deliv-
ering the letter to him; that she enquired for
him from the woman who kept the house,
and was informed that he was not at home;
that she then left the letter inclosing the
notes with this woman, and that the next
morning the letter and bills were thrown
into the plaintiff's house by some persons
unknown. His lordship was of opinion that
this was sufficiently presumptive proof that
the letter had come to Finlay's hands, and
therefore allowed it to be read. It was to
the effect stated by the witness.
It was then objected by the counsel for the
defendant, that it appeared that these notes
had been returned before they were payable;
and that the plaintiff, having taken them in
discharge of her debt, for goods sold, could
not maintain an action on her original debt
for the goods, until an actual default in the
paj'ment of these notes given in discharge of
it, as the notes might be paid when they be-
came due; nor should the plaintiff be al-
lowed to judge of the probable or improbable
ability of the party to pay at a future day.
Lord KENYON overruled the objection. He
said that to this effect the law was clear, that
if in payment of a debt the creditor is con-
tent to take a bill or note payable at a future
day, that he cannot legally commence an ac-
tion on his original debt, until such bill or note
become iDayable. or default is made in the
payment; but that if such bill or note is of
no value, as if, for example, drawn on a persnu
who has no effects of the drawer's in his hands,
and who therefore refuses it, in such case he
may consider it as waste paper, and resort to
his original demand, and sue the debtor on it.
In proof of the issue arising on the second
plea, "that the defendant lived separate and
apart from her husband, and had from him
a separate maintenance," Erskine, for the
plaintiff, stated, that the evidence he had to
that effect was, fii'st, a sentence of the eccle-
siastical court, by which the defendant and
her husband were separated; and secondly, as
to the separate maintenance, that he would
prove that she received from her husband a
regular annuLty of £200 per ann., payable at
a banking house in London. To prove the
separation, he produced and proved the sen-
tence of the spiritual court, by which a di-
vorce a meusa & toro was pronounced be-
tween the parties.
Mingay objected to this, and obseiTcd that
the production of the sentence alone was not
sufficient evidence; that the libel and all the
proceedings in that court should likewise have
been produced.
Lord KENYON seemed disposed to be of
opinion that the sentence alone was sufficient,
but reserved the point.
In proof of the separate maintenance, the
plaintiff called the clerk of Messrs. 's
banking house. He swore that that house, by
the direction and on the account of Mr. Gooch.
the husband of the defendant, paid her £200
per annum quarterly. He was asked if this
payment was made in consequence of Mr.
Gooch's verbal directions, or if the witness
knew of anj' deed by which the payment of
that sum was secured to her. He answered,
that he knew of no such deed. Upon which
Mingay objected: that this evidence was in-
sufficient to support this part of the issue;
that in this action the wife was to be charged
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STED,1lAN v .  GOOCH. 
(1 Esp. 4.) 
Court of Kiug's Bt•ncb. May 1 1. 1703. 
This was an action of assumpsit for goods 
soltl a nd delivered: the defendant pleaded 
lst. Tlle general issue. 2dly, Coverture. Upon 
the first plea issue was j oined ; and to the 
second was a replication, "That a t  the time 
of the cau e of action accrued, the defendant 
li>cd sepa rate and apart from her husband, 
a uJ had from him a separate maintenance." 
C p on which l>lea another issue was taken. 
The defence relied upon on the general issue 
hy the defendant was, that the plai ntiff i n  
discha rge of lier bill, which was for millinery 
g-ood furnislled to tlle defendant, llad taken 
tllree promissory notes of one Finlay, pay­
a u le at the house of a Mr. Browne, and 
hnd given the defendant a recei pt to that 
effect. 
Lord KEXYO� ''"as of opinion that it then 
hecame incumbent on the plaintiff to prove, 
ht, that she bad used due dil igence to get 
the money from Finlay; and 2dly, that be, 
after notice, bad made default i n  the pay­
mrn r. 
To shew that she bad used due diligence 
to g-et the money from Finlay, the plaintiff 
prnved that she bad sent Fi nlay's notes to 
Browne, where they were made payable, 
a nd that he bad been applied to respecting 
the payment: that in answer to that appli­
•·ation be bad said that he knew Finlay, but 
that he had no effects of bis in his bands; 
nor could he pay them un less he bad. 
:Ji ingay, for the defendant, objected : That 
these declarations of Browne were not evi­
dence of Finlay's default;  that tllev were 
not bills drawn upon him, which he was 
hound to pay, but that he was only men­
tioned, a s  his house was the place where the 
notes were to be paid. 
Lord KE XYON said, that it was the con­
stant practice to make country bank bills and 
notes payable at certain houses in London · 
and though the persons at whose houses the; 
were payable were not parties to them, nor 
personally liable, yet that an answer at such 
houses as to the payment or nonpayment of 
the bills or notes made payable there was 
sufficient. He therefore held Browne's dec­
larations to be admissible evidence of the 
prnbable nonpayment of the notes in question. 
To prove notice to this effect to Finlay, 
t he plaintiff called a wit ness, who proved 
tllat she carried a letter from the plaintiff 
t� Finlay, inclosing the notes. and informing 
l11m that they were returned as not bein"' 
likely to be paid : that she went to the hous� 
where Finlay lodged, for the purpose of deliv­
ering the letter to him; that she enquired for 
him from the woman who kept the house, 
and was i nformed that be was not at home; 
that she then left the letter inclosing the 
notes n·itb this woman, and that the next 
morning the letter and bills were thrown 
iuto tht,: pla
. pt iff's house by some persons 
\I A t'i. J.... rl v i::: 
unknown. His lordsh ip was of opinion tbat 
this was sufficiently presumptive proof thn t 
ilH' letter bad come to Finlay's bands, anrl  
the refore al lowed it  to be read. It was to 
tile eITect stated by the witnPss. 
It wns then obj ected bv the counsel for the 
defendant, that it appea
.
rccl that these uotPs 
bad been returned before they were payable; 
and that the plaintiff, having taken them i11 
discha rge of her debt, for goods sold, coulll 
not maintain an action on her original debt 
for the> goods, until an actual default in the 
pa�·ment of these notes given in discharge of 
it, as the notes might be paid when tbPy be­
came due; nor should the plaintiff be al­
lowed to j udge of the probable or improbable 
ability of the party to pay at a future day. 
Lord KENYON overruled the objection. He 
said that to this effect the law was clear, that 
if in payment of a debt the creditor is con­
tent. to take a bill or note payable at a futme 
day, that be cannot legally com mence au ac­
tion on bis original debt. until such bill or note 
become payable. or default is made in the 
payment; but that if such bil l  or note is of 
no Yalue, as if, for example, drawn on a p rs11n 
who bas no effects of the drawer's in his hands, 
and who therefore refuses it, in such case he 
may consider it as waste paper, and resort to 
his original demand, and sue the debtor on it. 
In proof of the issue arising on the secornl 
plea, "that the defendant l ived separate anrl 
apart from her husband. a nd had from him 
a separate maintenance," Erskine. for the 
plaintiff, stated, that the evidence lie had to 
that effect was, first, a sentence of the eccle­
siastical court, by which the defendant and 
her husband were separated ; and secondly, as 
to tile separate maintenance, that be would 
prove t hat she received from her husband a 
regular annuity of £200 per ann., payable at 
a ba nking house i n  London. To prove the 
separation. be produced and proved the sen· 
tence of the spiritual court, by wbkb a di­
vorce a mensa & toro was p ronounced be­
tween the pa rties. 
l\Iingay objected to this, and obse1Ted that 
the production of the sentence alone was not 
sufficient evidence; that the l ibel and all the 
proceedings in that court should likewise have 
been produced. 
Lord KEXYON seemed disposed to be of 
opinion that the sentence alone was sufficient. 
but resened the point. 
In proof of the separate maintenance, the 
plaintiff ca lled the clerk of Messrs. --·s 
banking house. Ile swore that that house, by 
the di rection and on the account of :Mr. Gooch. 
the husband of the defendant, paid her £'.WO 
pe1· annum quarterly. He was asked if this 
payment was made in consequence of �Ir. 
Gooch's verbal directions. or if the witness 
knew of any deed by which the payment of 
that sum was secured to her. He a nswered 
that he knew of no such deed. Upon which 
�Iingay objected : that this e>idence was in­
suftiC'ient to support this part of the issue; 
that i n  this action the wi� �tkl ��··qhp.rged 
L � v E .3 TI OF CAL t u R NIA 
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as a feme sole; that a feme covert had been
so charged, by reason of her separate main-
tenance being properly subject to no control
from the husband, but exclusively her own;
that in the present ease what was paid tc
the defendant might be a mere gratuity re-
vokable at pleasure, and not a property inde-
pendent of the husband, by reason of which
only she could be charged with her own
debts; tbat in all cases of separate mainten-
ance which had come before the court, the
husband had secured by the intervention of
trustees a separate maintenance to his wife,
by which means only she could take from him
a separate and independent property. lie
therefore relied, that as no deed appeared in
this case, that the defendant could not be
deemed to have a separate maintenance in
law as should subject her to the payment of
her own debts.
Lord KEXYOX was of opinion tliat it was
necessary that the separate maintenance shoulil
be secured by deed; but as the point had never
been expressly decided, his lordship reserved it.
Mr. Erekine and Mr. JIarryatt, for plaintiff.
Mr. Mingay, for defendant.
In the next term the two points so reserved
came on before the court, when the other judg-
es seemed to concur in opinion with Lord
KENYON; but no judgment has been given.i
1 But see the case of Marshall v. Rutton, since-
determined, in B. R. 8 Term R. 545.
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SA.LES. 
as a feme sole; that a feme covert bad been 
so charged, by reason of her separate main­
tenance being properly subject to no control 
from the husband, but exclusively her own; 
that in the present case what was paid tr 
the defentlant might be a mere gratuity re­
voka ble at pleasure, and not a property inde­
pendent of the husband, by reason of which 
only she could be charged with her own 
debts; that in all cases of separate mainten­
ance which bad come before the court, the 
husband had secured by the intervention of 
tl'Ustees a separate maintenance to his wife, 
by which means only she could take from him 
a separate and independent property. Ile 
therefore relied, that as no deed appeared in 
this case, that the defendant could not be 
D i g itizeo by 
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deemed t o  have a separate maintenance i n  
law as should subject her t o  the payment of 
her own debts. 
Lord KEXYOX was of opinion that i t  wa 
nece sary that the separate maintenance shoultl 
be secured by deed; but as the point had ne>er 
been expressly decided, his lordship resen-etl it. 
Mr. Erskine and l\Ir. �Iarryatt, for plaintiff. 
Mr. Mingay, for defendant. 
In the next term the two points so rese1Ted 
came on before the court, when the other judg­
es seemed to concur in opinion with Lord 
KEX YO�; but no j udgment has been given.1 
i But see the case of l\Iarshall v. Rutton, since­
determined, in B. R. 8 Term R. 545. 
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PERLEY V. BALCH.
(23 Pick. 283.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Es-
sex. Nov. Term, 1839.
Assumpsit on a promissory note. At the
trial in the court of common pleas, before
Williams, J., the defendant introduced evi-
dence tending to prove, that the considera-
tion of the note was the sale of an ox by
the plaintiff to the defendant, with a war-
ranty, that the ox would fatten as well as
any one the defendant then had; that one
eye of the ox, which was then apparently
defective and diseased, was falsely and
fraudulently represented by the plaintiff to
have been hooked out, whereas, in fact, it
had been destroyed by a cancer; and that
this disease was incurable, and rendered the
ox incapable of being fattened and entirely
worthless for any other purpose.
It did not appear, that the defendant had
returned or offered to return the ox to the
plaintiff, or had ever notified to the plain-
tiff, that he was dissatisfied with the con-
tract, until after the commencement of this
action, which was several years after the
sale. The defendant kept the ox in his
pasture, &e., for several months, and was
at some trouble to ascertain whether it
would answer his purpose. It did not ap-
pear what became of the ox afterwards.
The defendant also offered evidence tend-
ing to show, that he purchased the ox for
the sole purpose of fattening it, and that
this was known to the plaintiff at the time
of the sale; and he contended, that, upon
these facts, there was an implied warranty
on the part of the plaintiff, that the ox
should be reasonably fit for that purpose.
The judge instructed the jury, that no
such implied warranty arose from these
facts; that if they were satisfied that the
plaintiff warranted, that the ox would fat-
ten as well as any one which the defendant
then had, and that the warranty was false,
or if they were satisfied, that the plaintiff
falsely and fraudulently represented the eye
of the ox to have been hooked out, where-
by the defendant was induced to purchase
it. and if they were further satisfied, that
the ox, if it had been returned to the plain-
tiff in a reasonable time, would have been
of no pecuniary value to him, the defendant
would be entitled to a verdict; but that,
otherwise, their verdict should be for the
plaintiff.
The jury returned a verdict for the plain-
tiff, and the defendant excepted to the in-
structions to the jury.
Mr. Lord, for plaintiff. Mr. Perkins, for
defendant.
ilORTON, J. The instruction, that there
■ was no implied warranty, is not now com-
plained of, and is undoubtedly correct. See
Emerson v. Brigham, 10 Mass. 197; Shep-
herd V. Temple, 3 N. H. 455. Every sale of
chattels contains an implied warranty, that
the property of them is in the vendor. But
it is well settled by authority as a general
rule, that no warranty of the quality, is
implied from the sale. The maxim, caveat
emptor, governs. 2 Kent, Comm. 478; Chit.
Cont. 133; Champion v. Short, 1. Camp. r>?,;
Bragg V. Cole, 6 Moore, 114; Stuart v. Wil-
kins, 1 Doug. 20; Parkinson v. Lee, 2 East,
314; Mockbee v. Gardner, 2 Har. & G. 170.
But the learned justice of the common
pleas further instructed the jury that if
there was a fraud in the sale, or an express
warranty and a breach of it. in either case,
the defendant might avoid the contract, by
returning the ox within a reasonable time;
or, if the ox would have been of no value to
the plaintiff, then without returning him.
Whether the jury found their verdict upon
the ground, that no fraud or express war-
ranty was proved, or that the ox was of no
value, does not appear. If therefore any
part of the instructions was incorrect, the
defendant is entitled to a new trial.
Where the purchaser is induced by the
fraudulent misrepresentations of the seller,
to make the purchase, he may, within a
reasonable time, by restoring the seller to
the situation he was in before the sale, re-
scind the contract, and recover back the
consideration paid, or, if he has given a
note, resist the payment of it. Here was
no return of the property purchased, but if
that property was of no value, whether there
was any fraud or not, the note would be
nudum pactum. The defendant's counsel,
not controverting the general rule, objects
to the qualification of it. He says, that the
ox, though valueless to the defendant, might
be of value to the plaintiff, and so the de-
fendant would be bound by his contract, al-
though he acquired nothing by it. But a
damage to the promisee is as good a consid-
eration as a benefit to the promisor. If a
chattel be of no value to any one, it cannot
be the basis of a bargain; but if it be of
any value to either party, it may be a good
consideration for a promise. If it is bene-
ficial to the purchaser, he certainly ought to
pay for it. If It be a loss to the seller, he
is entitled to remuneration for his loss.
But it is apparent, that a want of consid-
eration was not the principal ground of
defence. The defendant mainly relied upon
fraud or a warranty. And to render either
available to avoid the note, it was indis-
pensable, that the property should be re-
turned. He cannot rescind the contract, and
yet retain any portion of the consideration.
The only exception is, where the property
is entirely worthless to both parties. In
such case the return would be a useless cer-
emony, which the law never requires. The
purchaser cannot derive any benefit from
the purchase and yet rescind the contract.
It must be nullified in toto, or not at all. It
cannot be enforced in part and rescinded in
part And, if the property would be of any
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PERLEY v. BALCH. 
(23 Pick. 283.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Es­
sex. Nov. Term, 1839. 
Assumpsit on a promissory note. At the 
trial in the court of common pleas, before 
Williams, J., the defendant introduced evi­
dence tending to prove, that the considera­
tion of the note was the sale of an ox by 
the plaintiff to the defendant, with a war­
ranty, that the ox would fatten as well as 
any one the defendant then bad ; that one 
eye of the ox, which was then apparently 
defective and diseased, was falsely and 
fraudulently represented by the plaintiff to 
have been booked out, w hereas, in fact, it 
bad been destroyed by a cancer; and that 
this disease was incurable, and rendered the 
ox incapable of being fattened and entirely 
worthless for any other purpose. 
It did not appear, that the defendant had 
returned or offered to return the ox to the 
plaintiff, or bad ever notified to the plain­
tiff, that he was dissatisfied with the con­
tract, until after the commencement of this 
action, which was several years after the 
sale. The defendant kept the ox in bis 
pasture, &c., for several months, and was 
at some trouble to ascertain whether i t  
would answer bis purpose. I t  did not ap­
pear what became of the ox afterwards. 
The defendant also offered evidence tend­
ing to show, that be purchased the ox for 
the sole purpose of fattening it, and that 
this was known to the plaintiff at the time 
of the sale; and be contended, that, upon 
these facts, there was an implied warranty 
on the part of the plaintiff. that the ox 
should be reasonably fit for that purpose. 
The judge instructed the jury, that no 
such implied warranty arose from these 
facts; that if they were satisfied that the 
Dlaintiff warranted, that the ox would fat­
ten as well as any one which the defendant 
then bad, and that the warranty was false, 
ot· if they were satisfied, that the plaintiff 
falsely and fraudulently represented the eye 
of the ox to have been hooked out, where­
by the defendant was induced to purchase 
it. and if they were further satisfied, that 
the ox, if it bad been returned to the plain­
tiff in a reasonable time, would have been 
of no pecuniary value to him, the defendant 
would be entitled to a verdict ; but that, 
otherwise, their verdict should be for the 
ii lain tiff. 
'!'he jury returned a verdict for the plain­
tiff, and the defendant excepted to the in­
structions to the jury. 
�Ir. Lord, for plaintiff. Mr. Perkins, for 
defendant. 
�!ORTON, J. The instruction, that there 
was no implied warranty, is not now com­
plained of, and is undoubtedly correct. See 
Emerson v. Brigham, 10 l\Iass. 197; Shep­
herd v. Temple, 3 N. H. 455. Every sale of 
D 
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chattels contains a n  Implied warranty, tlrnt 
the property of them is in the vcn1lor. nut 
it is well settled by authority a� a �eneral 
rule, that no warranty of the quality, is 
implied from the sale. The maxim, caveat 
emptor, governs. 2 Kent, Com m. 478; Chit. 
Cont. 133; Champion v.  Short, l. Camp. r;:J ; 
Bragg v. Cole, 6 l\loore, 114; Stuart v. Wil­
kins, 1 Doug. 20; Parkinson v. Lee, 2 East, 
314; Mockbee v. Gardner, 2 liar. & G. 170. 
But the learned justice of the common 
pleas further instructed the jury that i f  
there was a fraud i n  the sale, or an express 
warranty and a breach of it, in either case, 
the defendant might avoid the contract, by 
returning the ox within a reasonable time; 
or, if the ox would have been of no value to 
the plaintiff, then without returning him. 
Whether the jury found their verdict upon 
the ground, that no fraud or eXDress war­
ranty was proved, or that the ox was of no 
value, does not appear. If therefore any 
part of the instructions was incorrect, the 
defendant is entitled to a new trial. 
·w11ere the purchaser is induced by the 
fraudulent misrepresentations of the seller, 
to make the purchase, he may, within a 
reasonable time, by restoring the seller to 
the situation he was in before the sale, re­
scind the contract, and recover back the 
consideration paid, or, 1f he has given a 
note, resist the payment of it. Here was 
no return of the property purchased, but if  
that property was of no value, whether there 
was any fraud or not, the note would be 
nudum pactum. The defendant's counsel, 
not controverting the general rule, objects 
to the qualification of it. He says, that the 
ox, though valueless to the defendant, might 
be of value to the plaintiff, and so the de­
fendant would be bound by his contract, al­
though he acqnired nothing by it. But a 
damage to the promisee is as good a consid­
eration as a benefit to the promisor. If a 
chattel be of no value to any one, it cannot 
be the basis of a bargain ; but if it be of 
any value to either party, it may be a good 
consideration for a prnmise. If it is bene­
ficial to the purchaser, he certainly ought to 
pay for it. If it be a loss to the seller, he 
is entitled to remuneration for bis Joss. 
But it is appa i·ent, that a want of consid­
eration was not the principal ground of 
defence. The defendant mainly relied upon 
fraud or a warranty. And to render either 
available to avoid the note, it was indis­
pen:;;a ble, that the property should be re­
turned. He cannot rescind the contract. and 
yet retain any portion of the consideration. 
The only exception is, where the property 
is entirely worthless to both parties. In 
such case the return would be a useless cer­
emony, which the law never requires. The 
purchaser cannot derive any benefit from 
the purchase and yet rescind the contract. 
It must be nullified in toto, or not at all. It 
cannot be enforced in part and rescinded in 
part. And, if the property would be of any 
I ., r t l 
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beneUt to the seller, he is equally bound to
return it. He who would rescind a con-
tract, must put the other party in as good
a situation as he was before; otherwise he
cannot do it. Chit Cont. 276; Hunt v. Silk,
5 East, 449; Conner v. Henderson, 15 Mass.
.319.
The facts relied upon by the defendant
to defeat the note, might, if proved, be
used in mitigation of damages. If there was
a partial failure of consideration, or decep-
tion in the quality and value of it, or a
breach of warranty, the defendant may
avail himself of it to reduce the damages to
the worth of the chattels sold, and need not
resort to an action for deceit, or upon the
warranty. Chit Cont. 140; Germaine v.
Burton, 3 StarUie, 32; Basten v. Butter, 7
East, 480; Poulton v. Lattimore, 9 Baru. &
C. 259; Bayley, Bills (2d Am. Ed.) 531, and
cases cited. But he is not bound to do this.
He may prefer to bring a separate action,
and he has an election to do so. The pres-
ent judgment will not bar such an action.
But however this may be. It does not ap-
pear, that any instructions were given or
refused upon this point The value of the
property to the defendant would have been
the true rule of damages. And had he de-
sired it, doubtless, such instructions would
have been given. But as he did not request
them, tie cannot complain of their omission.
Judgment of the court of common pleas
affirmed.
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SALES. 
benefit to the seller, be is equally bound to 
return it. He who would rescind a con­
tract, must put the other party in as good 
a situation as he was before ; otherwise he 
cannot do it. Chit. Cont. 276; Hunt v. Silk, 
5 East, 4-49; Conner v. Henderson, 15 :llass. 
pl9. 
The facts relied upon by the defendant 
to defeat the note, might, if pro"Ved. be 
used in mitigation of damages. If there was 
a partial fa ilure of consideration, or decep­
tion in the quality and value of it, or a 
breach of warranty, the defendant may 
avail himself of it to reduce the damages to 
the worth of the chattels sold, and need not 
resort to an action for deceit, or upon the 
warranty. Chit. Cont. 140; Germaine v. 
D i g 1t1zed by 
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Burton, 3 Starkie, 32; Basten v. But •cr. 7 
East, 480; Poulton v. Lattimore, 9 Barn. & 
C. 259; Bayley, Bills (2d Am. Ed.) 531. a!Hl 
cases cited. But he is not bound to do thi -. 
He may prefer to bring a separate action, 
and he bas an election to do so. The pres­
ent judgment will not bar such an action. 
But however this may be, it does not ap­
pear, that any instructions were gi•en or 
refused upon this point. The value of the 
property to the defendant would have been 
the true rule of damages. And had he de­
sired it, doubtless, such instructions would 
have been given. But as be did not reque t 
them, l;J.e cannot complain of their omission. 
Judgment of the court of common pleas 
affirmed. 
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GUION et ux. V. DOHERTY.
(43 Miss. 538.)
Siiprome Court of Mississippi. Oct., 1871.
Error to the circuit court, Yazoo county;
Campbell. Judge.
Hudson & Nye, for plaintiffs in error. Wil-
kinson & Bowman, for defendant in error.
SIMRALL, J. Patrick M. Doherty, sur-
vivor of the mercantile copartnership of P.
O'Donnell & Co., sued John O. Guion and
Mary, his veife, in assumpsit. The object of
the suit was to reach the separate property
of the wife, and subject it to the indebted-
ness to the plaintiff. The declaration con-
tains several counts: (1) On a promissory
note made by John O. Guion, given, as aver-
red, for sundry necessaries for the bonetit of
the family, and separate estate of the wife;
(2) on an account stated; (3) for plantation
and family supplies, sold and delivered; (4)
for similar supplies furnished in 1863.
Pleas: (1) Non assumpsit; (2) that the
plaintiff agreed to accept Confederate bonds
or treasury notes, but now declined to do so;
(3) by Mrs. Guion, coverture; (4) by Mrs.
Guion, that the goods were sold and deliv-
ered to John O. Guion on his sole credit, the
plaintiff knowing that she had a separate
estate, and with no intention to charge the
same to her or her estate; (5) that plaintiff
knew that she had separate property, and
allowed her husband, as agent, to appropri-
ate its proceeds to the support of the family,
etc., and, knowing this, gave him, and not
lier or her property, the credit, she being
feme covert. Notice was attached that de-
fendant would offer proof that the goods
were sold at Confederate prices, and to be
paid for in that currency. To the second,
third, fourth, and flfth pleas the plaintiff de-
murred, which was sustained to all except
the fourth and. fifth, to which there were
replications. The juiy found for plaintiff,
whereupon a motion was made for a new
trial, which was refused.
Sundry eri-ors are complained of, growing
out of the rulings on the pleadings, the in-
structions to the jury, and the refusal to
grant a new trial. The demurrer to the sec-
ond plea was properly sustained. The plea
sets up an agreement to take Confederate
and other depreciated cun-ency, and that de-
fendant, as soon as it could be obtained, in
pursuance of the agreement, got and pre-
sented to the plaintiff Confederate bonds or
currency, which he refused and still refuses
to take. Ti'eated as a plea of accord and
satisfaction, it is imperfect. Whilst it avers
the accord, it does not show satisfaction.
An accord, to constitute a bar, must be full,
perfect, and complete. Peytoe's Case, 9 Re-
ports, 79; Lynn v. Bruce, 2 H. Bl. 317; Bal-
ston v. Baxter, Cro. Eliz. 304. If accord is
relied on, it must be executed. 3 Bl. Comm.
15. Chief Justice Eyre, in Lynn v. Bruce,
said: "Accord, executed, is satisfaction; ac-
cord, executory, is only substituting one
cause of action in the room of another,
which might go on to any extent." In Alhn
V. Harris, 1 Ld. Raym. 122, the judge de-
clared the "contrary doctrine would over-
throw all the books." Also, 1 Bac. Abr. OS;
Kussell V. Lyles, 6 Wend. 391; Clark v. Dins-
more, 5 N. H. 139.
Nor is the plea suflicient as a tender. The
allegation that "the defendant had the same
in readiness and presentation for payment,"
etc., is not enough. If the thing is capable
of being brought into court as a specie, bank
notes, etc., the plea must be accompanied
with the thing originally tendered. To com-
plete the transaction, the tender must be
made, and the party must be semper para-
tus to pay if called on, and must repeat the
tender with his plea.
3. Nor is the plea of coverture a bar to the
action. The contracts set out in the second,
third, and fourth counts of the declaration
are such as a wife who has a separate estate
can make.
4. There was no error in not applying tlie
demurrer to the declaration. The argument
addressed to us could have no effect, except,
perhaps, as to the first count. But there
were three good counts, and the rule is, if
there be a demurrer to the entire declara-
tion, and one count be good, the demurrer is
not well taken.
5. The instructions granted at the instance
of the plaintiff clearly inform the jury what
contracts a wife, having a separate estate,
may make, so as to be oblig.atory on her
and her property; and conclude with the
direction that the jury must look to all the
facts in evidence to determine to whom the
credit was given, and to whom the plaintiff
looked for payment.
For Mrs. Guion, the court charged the jury
to the effect that if Mr. Guion bought the
goods on his own credit, and gave his indi-
vidual note for them, then they must find for
her, although part or all the goods were for
her benefit, her children, and property. The
jury must be satisfied that the credit was
originally given to the wife, and that the
plaintiff treated with and looked to her for
payment. The wife is not liable for neces-
saries, unless she expressly contracted for
and consented thereto, or gave her. express
consent to be charged therewitJ]. and the
credit was given to her at the time. The
duty of the husband is to provide for the
support of his family, and the wife is not
bound, unless she contracted for the same
on her own credit, and with her consent was
charged therewith, at the time. The jury
are the sole judges whether the credit was
given to the husband or the wife.
Thirty-odd instructions were proposed for
Mrs. Guion, nearly Ul of them granted in the
words selected by counsel. The central idea
in most of them was. to whom was the cred-
it given,— to the husband or to the wife?
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PB l U'< > I tMANCE OF CO� TH AC'f. 
GUIOK ct ux. v. DOHERTY. 
(43 l\lis�. !i38.) 
Supreme Court of l\Iississippi. Oet., 1871. 
Error to the circuit court, Yazoo county ; 
Campbell, Judge. 
Hudson & Nye, for plaintiffs in error. Wil­
kinson & Bowman, for defendant in error. 
Sll\IRALL, J. Patrick M. Doherty, sur­
'l"ivor of the mercantile copartnership of P. 
O'Donnell & Co., sued John 0. Guion nnd 
l\fary, bis wi fe, in assumpsit. The object of 
the suit was to reach the separate property 
of the wife, and subject it to the indebted­
ness to the plaintiff. The declaration con­
tains several counts: (1) On a promissory 
note made by John O. Guion, given, as aver­
red, for sundry n ecessaries for the benefit of 
the family, and separate estate of the wife; 
(2) on an account stated ; (3) for plantation 
and family supplies, sold and delivered ; (4) 
for similar supplies furnished i n  186:1. 
Pleas: (1) Non assumpsit ; (2) that the 
plaintiff agreed to accept Confederate bonds 
or treasury notes, but now declined to do so ; 
(3) by l\frs. Guion, coverture; (-l) by l\Irs. 
Guion, that the goods were sold and deliv­
ered to John 0. Guion on his sole credit, the 
plaintiff knowing that she bad a separate 
estate, and with no intention to charge the 
same to her or her estate ; (5) that plaintiff 
knew that she bad separate property, and 
allowed her husband, as agent, to appropri­
ate its proceeds to the support of the family, 
etc., and, knowing this, gave him, and not 
her or her property, the credit, she being 
feme covert. Notice was attached t hat de­
fendant would offer proof that the goods 
were sold at Confederate prices, and to be 
11aicl for in that currency. To the second, 
third. fourth, and fifth pleas the plaintiff de­
murred, which was sustained to all except 
the fourth and. fifth, to which there were 
replications. 'l'be jury found for plaintiff, 
whereupon a motion was made for a new 
trial, which was refused. 
Sundry errors are complained of, growing 
ont of the rulings on the pleadings, the in­
structions to the jury, and the refusal to 
grant a new trial. The demurrer to the sec­
ond plea was properly sustained. The plea 
sets up an agreement to take Confederate 
and other depreciated currency, and that de- 1 
fendant, as soon as i t  could be obtained, in 
pursuance of the agreement, got and pre­
sented to the plaintiff Confederate bonds or 
('Urrency, which he refused and still refuses 
to take. Treated as a plea of accord and 
satisfaction, it is imperfect. Whilst it avers 
the accord, it does not show satisfaction. 
An accord, to constitute a bar, must be full, 
perfect, and complete. Peytoe's Case, 9 Re­
ports, 79 ; Lynn v. Bruce, 2 H. Bl. 317 ; Bal­
ston v. Baxter, Cro. Eliz. 304. I f  accord is 
relied on, it must be executed. � Bl. C'omm. 
l5. Chief JusUce Eyre, in Lynn v. Bru1·e, , 
D 1 y 1Llt:. Dy 
JTE RNET A R C H  VE 
said : "Accord, exe<'nle>cl, is satisfaction ; :w­
cord, executory, is ouly substitutin� 1111e 
cause or action in the room of anoth .. r, 
which might g-o on to any extent." In All• n 
v. IIarris, 1 Lcl. Rayru. 1:!2, th<' judge de­
clare<.l tbe "toutrary doctrine would O\'<'r­
throw all the books." Also, 1 Bae. Abr :;� ; 
Russell v. Lyles
'
, 6 Wend. 3Hl ; Clark v. Dius­
more, 5 N. H. 139. 
Nor is tbe plea sufficient as a tender. The 
allegation that "the defenc1ant bad the same 
in readiness and presentation for payment," 
etc . .  is not enough. If the thin;:: is capable 
of being brought into court as a specie, bank 
notes, etc., the plea must be accompanied 
with the thing originally tenuered. To com­
plete the transaction, the tender must be 
made, and the party must be semper para­
tus to pay if callecl on, and must repeat the 
tender with bis plea. 
3. �or is the plea of coverture a bar to t h e  
action. The contracts s e t  o u t  in the second, 
third, and fourth counts of the declaration 
are such as a wife who bas a separate est<lte 
can make. 
4. There was no error in not applying the 
demurrer to the declaration. The argument 
addressed to us cou1d ha>e no effect. except, 
perhaps, as to the first count. B u t  there 
were three good counts, and the rule is, if 
there be a demurrer to the entire declara­
tion, and one count be good, the demurrer is 
not well taken. 
5. The instructions granted at the instance 
of the plaintiff clearly inform the jury what 
contracts a wife, having a separate estate, 
may make, so as to be obligatory on her 
and her property; and conclude with the 
direction that the jury must lool;: to all tl.!e 
facts in evidence to determine to ·whom the 
credit was given, and to whom the plaintiff 
looked for pa;yment. 
For Mrs. Guion, the court charged the jury 
to the effect that if  l\Ir. Guion bought the 
goocls on his own credit, and ga>e his incli­
'l"idual note for them. then they must find for 
her, although part or all the goods were for 
her benefit, her children, and property. The 
j ury must be satisfied that the credit -n·as 
originally given to the wife, and that the 
pla intiff treated with ancl looked to her foi· 
payment. The wife is not liable for neces­
saries, unless she expressly contracted for 
and consented thereto, or ga>e her express 
consent to be cha rged therewith. and the 
credit was given to her a t  the time. The 
cluty of the husband i s  to pro>ide for the 
su11port o f  his family, and the wife is not 
bound, unless she contracted for th� same 
on her own creclit, and with her consent was 
charg-ed therewith, at the time. The jury 
are the sole judges whether the credit was 
given to the husband or the wife. 
Thirty-odd instructions were proposed for 
:i.\Irs. Guion, nearly :...1 1  of them granted in the 
words selectecl by counsel. The central idea 
i n  most of them was. to whom was the crecl­
it  ;.:h en,-to tbe husband or to the wife ':  
O rig i ll'c l  from 
U N IV E R S ITY OF CALI FO R N IA 
SALES.
The purpose of the charges of the court is to
instruct the jury iu the law applicable to the
case. Whether this can be done better by
presenting the same, or nearly the same,
ideas, in various forms of language, is ex-
ceedingly doubtful. It might tend to em-
barra.ss and confuse the minds of noupio-
fessional men, as are jurors, rather than to
convey to them a clear comprehension of the
rules of law to be applied to the facts
proved. The jury could hardly have failed
to see that the point of the defense was that,
although Mrs. Guion owned separate proper-
ty, yet, if the goods were taken up for fam-
ily supplies, or for the use of her property,
she was not responsible, unless they were
bought with her consent, and on her credit.
0. The only remaining question is, does the
testimony prove or tend to prove that the
goods were for the use of the wife's planta-
tion, and of hereelf and family, and were
they sold on her credit? In reviewing the
verdjet of the jury, according to repeated de-
cisions of this court, we will not consider
the tostimon.v with the view of determining
whether our judgment would concur with the
jury, but only to see whether there was suffi-
cient evidence fairly to suppurt the verdict. If
there be conflict between the witnesses, the
jury were in more favorable circumstances
to elicit the truth than this court. The tes-
timony was that the wife owned a planta-
tion, used iu tlie cultivation of cotton; that
the plaintiffs were the merchants by whom
the business was done, the husband being
the'aotive manager. The business was con-
tinued through several years, the crops of
cotton being delivered to the plaintiffs, and
the proceeds applied as credits on the ac-
counts.
P. W. Doherty, plaintiff, describes the
transactions thus: .John O. Guion had no
property, and was engaged in no business
from which he realized an income. The
goods sold to him were solely on the credit
of his wife's separate property. The hus-
l)and owned nothing. From the beginning
of I lie business, the accounts made by Guion
were paid and settled by his wife's cotton,
sent to plalnlifTs for sale or shipment, and
the proceeds placed to credit of the accounts.
The purchase of supplies, and the shipment
and .sale of Mrs. Giilon's cotton, was done
through the hu.ibaiid. Neither husband nor
wife ever coniplniiied of this mode of doing
the busliii'ss. Plainlifl' kept accounts with
the husbands of a great many wives who
lind sepnnite estates, Just as the accrounts
were kept with .Mr. Guion. In nil such
enxps the credit was given on the faith of
the wife's properly. rialnlKTH knew that
Guion had no properly. The creillt was giv-
en on nccouiit of llie wife ;ind her jiropiM'ty.
No credit could have been given to the hus-
band. In payment of taxes on wife's prop-
erty, the receipts were taken In the name of
the hUHband.
John O. Guion, defendant, deposed that he
supposed credit was given to himself. Never
mentioned anything about wife's separate
property. Never told plaintiffs he was agent
for his wife. His wife never formally made
purchases, nor gave any orders. She never
authorized witness to Viuy anything on cred-
it. He bought all supplies on his credit, and
paid for them out of tJie proceeds of wife's
crops. Owned no land. Had, when married,
carriage and horses, and some money, etc.
Never owned any other property after the
marriage. Had no other business than to at-
tend to his wife's plantation. Shipped her
cotton, and drew drafts in his name. All
this was done with her knowledge and con-
sent, etc.
Aside from the other testimony, a jury
might well conclude from this witness' state-
ment that he had his wife's consent to buy
on credit and pay with her means. It would
not be a strained inference that he was recog-
nized by the wife as her agent to buy sup-
plies for the plantation and family on a
credit, and apply the crops in payment. He
deposes that such was his practice, with the
knowledge and consent of his wife. We have
referred to thus much of the evidence to
show that the jury were justified in coming
to the conclusion that they reached, and that
we would transcend the boundary whicli
divides the duties of judges and juries if we
should interfere with this verdict on the
ground of being against the great preponder-
ance of the testimony. It Is claimed that the
acceptance by the plaintiff of the promissory
note of John O. Guion was a merger of the
open accounts Into a security of higher dig-
nity, and therefore, if Mrs. Guion was orig-
inally liable, she has thereby been dischar-
ged. In the case of Peter v. Bercely, 10 Pet.
567, the executors of Peter gave notes to the
bank iu lieu of or renewal of the debts of
their testator. It was contended that there-
by the debt due from tlie estate of the tes-
tator was extinguished. Not so held the
court, unless the creditor accepted the notes
in satisfaction of the original debt, and look-
ed alone to the makers of the notes for pay-
ment
In James v. Hackly, 10 Johns. 277, Spen-
cer, C. J., for the court, said: "The accept-
ance of a negotiable note for an antecedent
debt will not extlngtiish such debt, unless it
Is expressly agreed that it Is accepted as pay-
ment."
In Glenn v. Smith, 2 Gill >^- J. r,OS. one
John Hcsllp received the notes of Ann Ilas-
lelt for a debt against the estate of Wm.
Ilaslett, deceased, and surrendered an ac-
count receli)ted. In the absence of all evi-
dence except I ho receipt writ! en at the bot-
tom of the account, it was said by the court
to be clear that (he note of Ann Ilaslelt did
not extinguish the claim agalii.st the estale.
The general rule Is slated to be, "that the
acceiitance of a secnrily of cquiil dignity Is,
of itself, no extinguishment of the antece-
dent debt."
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A LE . 
Tue purpose of the charges of the court is to 
in truct the j ury in the Jaw applicable to the 
ca e. Whether this can be done better by 
pre enting the same, or nearly the same, 
ideas. in 'l"arious forms of 1:1n!!;ua.ge, is ex­
ceedingly doubtful. It  might tend to em­
hanass and confuse tbe minds of no up. o­
f es. ional men, as are juror., rather than to 
conYe;v to them a clear comprehension of the 
rules of law to be applied to the facts 
pro'l"e<l. The jmy could hardly ha'l"e failed 
to see t bat the point of the defense '\\·a s  that, 
alt.hou::b :\Irs. Guion owned eparate proper­
ty. yet. if the goods were taken up for fam­
ily supplies, or for the use of her property, 
she was not re ponsible. unle they were 
bought with her consent, and on her credit. 
\3. 'Ihe only remaining question is, doe the 
testimony prove or tend to prove that the 
goods were for the use of tbe wife's planta­
tion. and of herself and family, and were 
the�- sold on her credit ? In reYiewing the 
\·ertlict of tbe jury, according to repeated de­
cisions of this court, we will not consider 
the testimony with tbe 'l"iew of determining 
"·hether om judg-ment would concur with the 
j u rr. hut only to see whether there was suffi­
cient e'l" idrnce fairly to supp •rt the verdict. If  
tllere be conflict between the witnesses, the 
j n ry were in more fa Yora!Jle circumstances 
to elicit the truth t !Jan this court. The tes­
timony was t hat the wife owned a planta­
tion. ust•d in the tulti\·ation of cotton; that 
the pla iut ilI · were the merchants by whom 
the Lusiness was done, the hush:r nd being 
the• atth·e manager. The business was con­
ti11uC'd through .·e'l"et�ll years, t h e  crops or 
cotton llcin ::: delivered to t he plaintif!'s, and 
t he p roce<·ll,.: a11plie11 as credi ts on the ac 
c·ounts. 
P. W. Doherty, pla inti f . de�rribes the 
tran�arti<us tlrns : .John 0. G u ion hall 1 10 
(lt'oJIPl'lY. and was r11:::1H.:ell i n  no lmsiness 
from w h ieh he n•a I i  :l.t'<l :1 n i lll'Ome. 'l'itl' 
�rnHls ·old to h i m  Wf'l'l' solely ou the c·rctl i t 
of his wife':; Sl'Jt:t l'ale proper!�·. The hus­
l tawl owne<l n11thi11g. l�r11m the hcgi 1 1 1 1 1ng 
or the lmi;hwss, t he ll<'l'UU ll t S  made by U uion 
WPl'e pnld : 1 11<1 t>l'ltkd hy his wi fe's c·utton, 
�wut tu pla l n t l tL· for :-ale or shipmc>n t .  arnl 
1 1 1 .. p roi:el·ds plar•1<l to  Pl'<'tl i t  ot" t he :t<'<'onnts. 
'l'he J l l l l'1•h11 Sl' of i;11ppl1 1  s ,  1 1 1 1d the s h i p 1 1 1 P1 1 t  
n nd : i l t· <1f l\lr11. I : 11 l1 1n's <"1 11  ton, was dullt' 
l h rnugh t h <' 1111.  h:1 1111. . '• • l t hl 1· l 1 11sh: 1 1ul nor 
w i fe ('\'••r c·o1 1 1 pl11 l rwd 111" t h l. 1 1 1 1 11 1 <• u f  doh1� 
th" l tuHlll l  s. l 'la l u t l IT ltPpt :ll'Cll\JlllS w i t h  
thl' J iu hn 11 1 IB o f  I I  gr1•: 1 l I J l l l l lY Wh'<'S \\' ho 
l 1 11 l l  sropn rn t e  •·. t n t • •s, Jusl  as t l 1c a 1 "<'01 1 1 1 t tt  
'' ' '"' l • p t w i t h  . I r. n 11 l1Jn. 1 11 a l l s11!'11 
• II l' t h ,. rr .. d i l  \\'II i;: i \·1•11 on t hr f a i t h  o f  
t h e• \\ l f,.'a pr11pcrl.\0• Pln l 11 t l trs l nc•w t h n t  
I : 11 1 01 1  h a d  J i i i  J l l'OJll ' I  t y. 'l'h<J 1•J'1•d l t  \\':1 8 i;lv­
( l f l  IHI l f l '('IJU! tl  of l Ill wl f•• 1 1 1 1 d  h l ' I' J l l'f•P"l't ,\'. 
• o • l'Ct l l t  l'r>ll l c l  1 11 1 \"I '  l 11•l ' f l  �h·r·n to t h!' ht r . • 
ha nd. I n  p11 y11w1 1 t  ol t11 x1•8 •Ill \\" l f1•'H pr<Jp­
Pr ly, t l11• 1 1 •1 1•lpt8 w11n• l a l, r • 1 1  111 l l t l' n11 1 1 1 e  111' 
t h e  l1u h:i r r rl.  
.J oh ll o. c : 1 1 lr111, "''' ·n• l :wt,  rl11po ··cl t h :t t 1 1 1• 
D i g 1t1zed by 
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supposed credit was given to himself. '.\"eyer 
mentioned anything about w i fe" separate 
property. Xever told plaintiffs he was agent 
for his wife. His wife never formally made 
purchases, nor gave any orders. She ne'l"er 
authorized witness to buy anything on cred­
it. He bought all supplies on bis credit, and 
paid for tllem out of the proceeds of w i (e"s 
crops. Owned no land. Had, when married, 
carriage and horses. a nd some money, etc. 
Xe'l"er owned a ny other property after the 
marriage. Had no other business than to at­
tend to bis wife's plantation. Shipped lier 
cotton, and drew drafts i n  his name. All 
this was done with her knowledge and con­
sent, etc. 
Aside from the other testimony, a jury 
might well conclude from t his witness' st ate­
ment that he had his wife's consent to buy 
on credit and pay with her means. It woultl 
not be a strained inference that he was recog­
nized by the wife as her agent to buy sup­
plies for the plantation and family on a 
credit, and a pply the crops in payment. He 
deposes that such was his practice, with the 
knowledge and consent of bis wife. w·e ba'l"e 
refened to thus much of the evidence to 
show that the jm,v were justified i n  coming 
to the conclusion that they reaclled, a nd that 
we would tm nscend the boundary wbi<'h 
divide the du t ies of judge- and juries if we 
should interfere with th is Yet·dict on the 
ground of being a "ainst the great prepond1>r­
ance of the testimony. It ls claimed that the 
acceptanre by the plaintiff of the protuissorr 
note of John 0. G uion was a merger of the 
open accounts into a security of higher dig­
nity. ancl t herefore, if i\!rs. Guion was orig­
inn lly liable, she has t hC>reby been discb:u'­
ged. I n  the ca e of reter v. Berccly, 10 Pct. 
5li7, tile executors of l'l•ter gave notes to the 
bank i n  lieu of or rene\\al of the <ll'bt s  of 
tbl'ir tcRla tor. It wa s contended that t here­
by the debt due from t he est.ate or the tes­
ta tut· was exlin:::11 1shed. Not so held the 
court, unless t l w creditor :icreJ)ted the notl's 
in satisfaction oC the original debt, and 1001,. 
eel alone to the makers of the notes 1'or pay­
ment. 
In .l a mes v. l lacltly, lG .Tohns. :!77. �pen 
cer, C . . r., for t he court, sa h l :  "The nct•e11t­
arwe or a 1wgot l n hll' not e J'o1· an : 1 1 1 l l'C'l'1h nt 
dl'11t will not C'X t l n  �uish i-;1wh 1lt· l l l .  un lei;i; it 
is l'XJ ll'P�slr ai.: rct·d t l 1a t  it ls :l<'t'eptl'1l 11,; 1rny­
mt•11 t ."  
I n  1 : Jr11 1 1  ' "  �111 1 1 1 1 ,  :.? (; I l l  & .T .iOR, one 
John l l esl i p  1·ec•pl\·rd the nnt1•s nl' ,\ 1 1 1 1  l l n :;­
lc> t l  l'1>r a deht n gnlnd thr c•st :t t l' of \Ym. 
1 1 :1 .Jpt t .  d 1·r1·as1·d. :uul Slll'l'C'l11l 1•r·<'d 11 11  :t<'· 
cou n t l'f'l'l'l p t P1l.  J n  the a l tserwl' nl' :ill CYl­
dP11<·c• <'X•·r1ll t he l'<'l'l'lpt. wrl t t l'n nt t h t• hot· 
f o lll or t he tlC'l'O l l l l t ,  I [  \\'llN l':l l rJ  by t h p <'Cllll't 
to I t" <'IP:t l' t ha t  I l i c  nntr nr .\ t ill 1 1 :1' h•t t d i d  
not 1 ·xl h1i.:11li.;h t hl' <'111 1 1 1 1  11 ·� 1 1 1 11,;t t h e !'st a l l' 
'1'111• i.:•·n pr·n I rul" 111 :> I n t Pd t o  111>, " t h a t  t h<' 
n•·n·p t : 1 1 1c ·p 1 1 1' n �:p1·111·i t ,\ nl' l'q t r : i l  d ign i t y 1"1, 
nf l t !l1• I J', no PX! 1 1 1c: 1 1 l  h nll'nt of lliu an tecc­
• k 1 1 t  ch•ht." 
O rt !' a l  tr rr 
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I'he acceptance, by a creditor, of the prom-
Issoiy note of his Uebtor for an antecedent
simple contract debt, does not extinguish the
uiiginal debt (for both are of equal degree in
legal contemplation), if it remains in the
hands of the creditor, unpaid, and he can
produce it to be canceled, or show that it is
lost. There are cases which hold the rule to
be the same if the note of a third person is
taken, unless the creditor parts with it, or is
chargeable with some laches with respect to
it. 5 Tei-m K. 513; Pinckford v. Maxwell, 6
Term R. 52; Bishop v. Rowe, 3 Maule &
S. 3G2.
If however, there be an agreement by the
creditor to receive it absolutely as payment,
and to incur the risk of its being paid, the
note, either of a debtor or of a stranger, oper-
ates as an extinguishment or satisfaction of
the precedent debt. T Term R. 60; Toby v.
Barbee, 5 Johns. 68; John v. Weed, 9 Johns.
310. In the case of Glenn v. Smith, 2 Gill &
J. 493, the expression, "in payment of the
above account," was held not to be sufficient
evidence of an absolute discharge of the
original debt. In the case cited from 6 Term
R. .j2. Lord Kenyon said: "If the bill which
is given in payment does not turn out to be
productive, and is not what the creditor ex-
pects it to be, it may be considered as if no
such bill had been given." It is claimed in
argument that the decisions of our predeces-
sors in the case of Slocumb v. Holmes, 1 How.
(Jliss.) 144, and Myers v. Oglesby, 6 How.
(Miss.) 50, declare a contrary doctrine. The lat-
ter case has no application, for in that case a
bond was executed for the parol debt, and it
was, therefore, the case of the merger of an
inferior into a higher security, which ex-
tinguished the former. Nor does the former
case, considered and construed by the facts
before the court, militate against the cur-
rent of authority from Westminster Hall
and elsewhere. "The plaintiff declared on a
promissoiy note, and also work and labor
done, and goods sold and delivered. Among
other matters, the defendant pleaded that the
account filed was closed by the note declared
on in the first count in plaintiff's declara-
tion." The controversy was whether the note
was given for the account, the plaintiff in-
sisting that the note had no connection with
the account, but rested on a ditferent con-
sideration. In this aspect of facts, the cir-
cuit court charged the jury that, if the note
was given for the account, then the plaintiff
could not recover on the account, which in-
struction was sustained as correct.
The case of Taylor v. Conner, 41 Miss. 728,
holds that neither the note of the debtor nor
that of a stranger will be a payment of the
antecedent liability, unless accepted as such.
Objection was made to the reading of the
note of Guion to the jury. The note of
John O. Guion created no liability on his
wife, and could not be evidence of any. The
first coimt does not disclose a good cause of
action against the wife. But the presence
of the note on the trial, and before the jury,
was proper enough as an element in the
cause. Whether this paper was in absolute
satisfaction for the goods sold and delivered,
it was a fact in the cause,— part of the res
gesta3 of the pleadings between the parties,
tending to help the elucidation of the propo-
sition whether the goods were supplied on
the sole credit and responsibility of the hus-
band or on the faith of the wife's property
and her credit
The suggestion was made at the bar by the
counsel for the plaintiff in error that there
were features in this case materially dis-
tinguishing it from others in this court which
dismissed the liabilities of married women,
and we were invited to a very careful con-
sideration of it. We have maturely exam-
ined the record and arguments of counsel,
and are well satisfied that justice has been
done, and that no eiTor has bien committed
to • the prejudice of the complaining party
which would warrant this court in setting
aside the verdict and judgment of the cir-
cuit coui-t.
Let the judgment be affirmed.
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The acceptance, by a creditor, of the prom­
i:;;sory note of his debtor for an antecedent 
iLUple contract debt, does not extinguish the 
original debt (for both are of equal degree in 
legal contemplation), if it remains in the 
bands of the creditor, unpaid. and he can 
produce it to be canceled, or show that it is 
lost. There are cases which hold the rule to 
be the same if the note of a third person is 
taken, unless the creditor parts with it, or is 
chargeable with some !aches with respect to 
it. 5 Term R. 513; Pinckford v. Maxwell, 6 
Term R. 52; Bishop v. Rowe, 3 Maule & 
S. 3G2. 
If however, there be an agreement by the 
creditor to receive it absolutely as payment, 
and to incur the risk of its being paid, the 
note. either of a debtor or of a stranger, oper­
ates as au extinguishment or satisfaction of 
the precedent debt. 7 Term R. 60; Toby v. 
Barbee, 5 Johns. 68; John v. Weed, 9 Johns. 
310. In the case of Glenn v .  Smith, 2 Gill & 
J. 493, the expression, "in payment of the 
above account," was held not to be sufficient 
e•idence of an absolute discharge of the 
original debt. In the case cited from 6 Term 
n. ;:;�. Lord Kenyon said: "If the bill which 
is gi•en in payment does not turn out to be 
productive, and is not what the creditor ex­
pects it to be, it may be considered as if no 
such bill had been given." It is claimed in 
argument that the decisions of our predeces­
sors in the case of Slocumb v. Holmes, 1 How. 
(:.\Iiss.l H4, and Myers v. Oglesby, 6 How. 
(:\liss.) 50, declare a contrary doctrine. The lat­
ter case has no application, for in that case a 
bond was executed for the parol debt, and it 
was, t herefore, the case of the merger of an 
inferior into a higher security, which ex­
tinguished the former. No1· does the former 
case, considered and construed by the facts 
before the court. militate against the cur­
rent of authority · from Westminster Hall 
and elsewhere. "The plaintiff declared on a 
promissory note, and also work and labor 
done, and goods sold and delivered. Among 
Qther matters, the defendant pleaded that t he 
D i g 1t1zed by 
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account filed was closed by the note declare<l 
on in the first count in plaintiff's declara­
tion." The controversy was whether the note 
was given for the account, the plaintiff in­
sisting that the note had no connection with 
the account, but rested on a d ifferent con­
sideration. In this aspect of facts, the cir­
cuit court charged the jury that, if the note 
was given for the account, then the plaintiff 
could not recover on the account, which in­
struction was sustained as correct. 
The case of Taylor v. Conner, 41 l\Iiss. 728, 
holds that neither the note of the debtor nor 
that of a stranger will be a payment of the 
antecedent liability, unless accepted as such. 
Objection was made to tbe reading of the 
note of Guion to the jury. The note ot' 
John 0. Guion created no liability on his 
wife, and could not be evidence of any. The 
first count does not disclose a good cause of 
action against the wife. But the presence 
of the note on tile trial, and before the jury, 
was proper enough as an element i n  the 
cause. Whether this paper was in absolute 
satisfaction for the goo<ls sold and delivered, 
it was a fact in the cause,-part of the res 
gestre of the pleadings between the parties, 
tending to help the elucidation of the propo­
sition whether the goods were supplied on 
the sole credit and responsibility of the hus­
band or on the faith of the wife's property 
and her credit. 
The suggestion was made at the ba r by the 
counsel for the plaintiff i n  error that t hPre 
were features in this case mate1ia.lly dis­
tinguishing it from others in this court which 
dismissed tbe liabilities of married women, 
and we were invited to a very careful con­
sideration of it. We have matm·ely exam­
ined the record and arguments of counsel, 
and are well satisfied that justice has been 
done, and that no e1Tor has bl:en committed 
to · the prejudice of the complaining party 
which would warrant this court in setting 
aside the verdict and judgment ot the cir­
cuit court. 
Let the judgment be affirmed. 
O rig i P.a l  from 
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SALES.
CLARK T. DRAPER.
(19 N. H. 419.)
Superior Court of New Hampshire. Hillsbor-
ough. July Term, 1S49.
TroTCr by one Clark against Aarson Draper
for a pair of oxen. A verdict was taken by
consent for plaintiff, on whicb judgment was
to be entered, or the verdict was to be set
aside and judgment entered for defendant, as
the opinion of the court should be upon the
whole case. Verdict set aside, and judgment
for defendant.
Plaintiff purchased the oxen in suit of de-
fendant for ^00. giving his note for that
amount, and defendant agreeing to keep the
oxen for plaintiff until the following Saturday.
At the same time defendant gave to plaintiff
some brass knobs, which he said the oxen wore
on their horns. Subsequently plaintiff sent for
the o.xen, and defendant refused to give them
up without receiving the money for them,
whereupon this action was instituted.
Jlr. Pierce, for plaintiff. Mr. Sawyer, for
defendant.
WOODS, J. This is an action of tiover, and
the plaintiff, in order to maintain it, must have
either a special or general property in the thing
demanded, together w-ith the right of imme-
diate possession. The property may be abso-
lutely his, yet another may have had such a
right to the possession of it when the demand
was made and the action brought, that the
plaintiiT could not, against the will of such
person, lawfully have talcen it into his pos-
session, and cannot, therefore, maintain the
present action, founded, as it is, upon the as-
sumption that his right to possess the chattels
has been violated by the defendant.
It appcar.s that In the month of September,
1S47, the plaintiff bought the oxen of the de-
fendant for sixty dollars, who agreed to keep
them till the following Satiuday for the plain-
tiff, at his re(iuest. No money or other thing
wa.s paid for the oxen, and no credit was stip-
ulated for. Now that transaction constituted
a sale of the chattels from the defendant to
the plaintiff, who thereupon became the owner
of them. A loss or desliiiction of them, or
any damage happening to them afterwards,
would have been the loss or detiiment of the
purcha.ser and not of the seller, and the claim
of the latter tor the price would have been In
no wise affected by such an occurrence. 1
Inst. LM,.'!.
Hut niitwithst.'indhig such change of prop-
erly or ownerRlilp, the vendor had a right to
retain the oxen till the price was paid. This
lieu of the vendr)r uimn the goods sold for the
payment of the purchase' money, lins been
jmlversally rrcognlzcd at rnnunon law, and its
Iirlncliiit-s sonu'wluit extensively disius-si'd In
the cases. It will be sullli'ient to cite one or
two of them.
A hop merchant sold to H. on diverse days
In August, various jiarcels of hops. Part of
them were welglu'd jind an account of the
weights, together with samples, delivered to the
purchaser. The usual time of payment with
the trade was the second Saturday subsequent
to the sale. B. did not pay for the hops at the
usual time, whereupon A. gave notice that un-
less they were paid for by a certain day they
would be re-sold. The hops were not paid for.
and A. re-sold a part, with the consent of B..
who afterwards became a banknipt. and then
A. sold the remainder of the hops without
the consent of B. or his assignees. Account
of the hops so sold was delivered to B., in
which he was charged warehouse rent from
the oOth of August. The assignees of B. de-
manded the hops of A., and tendered the
charges of warehouse rent, &e., and on the
refusal of A. to deliver them, brought trover.
it was holden that the assignees could not
maintain the action, because the party must
have for that purpose, not only a right of prop-
erty but a right of possession; and that al-
though a vendee of goods acquires a right of
property by the contract of sale, yet he does
not acquii'e a right of possession to the goods
until he pays or tenders the price. Bloxam v.
Sanders, 4 B. & C. 941, 10 Eng. G. L. Rep.
SOS.
Nor as between the original vendor and ven-
dee is the lien of the former divested by his
giving to the vendee a delivery order for the
goods sold, but remaining in the vendor's ware-
house rent free, altliough it appeared that by
the usage of trade in I.iveipi'ol, where the par-
ties dealt, goods sold while in warehouse are
delivered by the vendor's banding to the ven-
dee a delivery order, and that the helder of
such order may obtain credit with a purchaser.
as having possession of the goods. Townley
V. Crump, 4 Ad. & El. 5S.
To the same effect is tlie case of Tooke v.
Hollingworth, 5 Term R. 215.
The doctilne is fully established in this state
by the case of Williams v. Moore, 5 N. H. 235.
That there was no actual delivery in this
case, so as to destroy the lien, of the defendant
for the price, is clear. And the delivery of
a part as and for the whole, or a symbolical
or constructive delivery, if suHiclent for such
an effect, is not made out by the delivery of
the brass knobs that had been worn upon the
horns of the oxen. They were not delivered
with the intention of thereby making a tradi-
tion of the oxen, which Is the essence of a
symbolical delivery. But the cases plainly
show that the lien Is presen'ed upon all and
every parcel of the goods sold which actually
remain In the hands of the vendor.
Nor can the giving of the note for the price,
payable on deuiaiul, in any view, be consid-
ered as n payment of the price. The doctrine
on this hojid was fully considered and settled
In .lalTrey v. Corni.sh, 10 .\. II. .">05, where It
was held th.'it a luomlNsory note given for the
amount of n parly's taxes, was not a payment
of the taxes for the purpose of gaining a set-
tlement. The l.'ililiig (if a note Is In no case
the paynieiit of a debt, unless there be a spe-
cial agreement to lli:it elTect. The present 1»
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CLARK > .  DP.A PER. 
(19 �. H. 419.) 
uperior Court of :'\ew Hampshire. Hill!<bor­
ough. July Term. 1849. 
Trover by one Clark against .A.arson Draper 
for a pair of oxen. A verdict wa taken by 
consent for plaintiff, on which judgment was 
to be entered, or the verdict was to be set 
aside and j udgment entered for defendant, as 
the opinion of the court should be upon t he 
wiloh• ca e. Yerdict set aside, and juJgruent 
for defonda n t. 
Plaintiff purchased the oxen in suit of de­
fendant for ::;GO. giving his note for that 
amount, and defendant agreeing to keep the 
oxen for plaintiff until the following Saturday. 
At tile same time defendant gave to plaintiff 
some brass knobs. which he said the oxen wore 
on their horns. Subsequently plaintiff sent for 
the oxen. and defendant refused to give them 
up without receiving the money for them, 
whereupon this action was instituted. 
i\lr. Pierce, for plaintiff. Mr. Sawyer, for 
defendant. 
WOODS, J .  This is an action of trover, and 
the plaintilI, in o rder to maintain it, must ha Ye 
either a special ot· general property in the thing 
demanded, togetile1· with the right of imme­
cliate possession. The property may be abso­
lutely bis, yet another may llave had such a 
ti�ht to the possession of it when the clemand 
was made and t he action brought, that the 
vlaintiff coulcl not, against the will of such 
person, lawfully have taken it into bis pos­
session, and cannot, therefore, maintain the 
present action, founded, as it  is, upon the as­
smuption that bis right to possess the chattels 
has lleen violated by the defendant. 
It appear.- that in the month or Se1)tember, 
18! 7, the plalutifC bought the oxen of the tle­
feuclant for sixty dollars, who agreed to keep 
them t l l l  tbe followin� Suturcl::tJ for tbe plnin­
tifl', at his request. Xo moue;y or other thing 
was pai<.l for the oxen, and no cred it was st i p­
ula !<-cl for. l\ow thn l trnnsnclion coust ituled 
a s:ile of t he chattels from t he cl<:>fencl:111t to 
the plaint iff, who thereupon b<:>l'n me the owner 
oC thrm. A lo�s or destl"Ul'tion of t hem, or 
any rlnrn111�e happen l ui: to t llClll a fterwa rds, 
would hn\•c hl'cu the loss or cletrimPnl of the 
pmdmsrr a 111l  uot of t ile scllrr. n nll  t he claim 
or the lnt l!'r for the pric'e \VOUld ha\'e hf'eO In 
110 wi ,. a lfPl'ted hy surh an occuncncP. 1 
I 11 t. :! I ,  ::. 
l : ut 1 1ot.w i t hs l : i 1u l i 11� such chang-e of Jll"OJl 
1•rty <11' O \\"llf'l'ship, t he \'t•111lor hnrl  a rli:bt to 
J<·luln tl11· o:i::Pn t i ll the prkf' wn11 pn lr l .  'l'hlH 
1 1 1· 11 of I h • \'f'111Jor upon till' gnnrhi !lnlrl fnr the 
Jlll.}' 11 1 <' 1 1 1  nf t lll' Jlll l'l'llflBI' l l l OJll'y, lmi; hl'l'll 
111 1h 1•rs: 1 l ly l'<'<'ngnlz••!l nl 1•n1 1 1 1 11rm l n w ,  : 1 1 11 1  l l H  
1 1 1  l 1 1 d plPB "1111•11·h11 t •• X l < ' l l!!in•l.v rlit..u·11 1 · d  I n  
I h r ·  rHRf'q, I t  w i l l  hr• 1 1 1 1 ld"11( l o  C'l l P  n 11r• 01• 
(WO of I lil'lll, 
/I hnp rn1·rd1111 1t  Fnlrl to n. on rl l\'l'l'Hr. cl a y s  
1 1 1  /1 1 11-:11111, ra rh111R Jllll'<'<'IS n f  hOp!!. f 'n rl of 
U1r•rn W•·ro wf'igl:r·d :1 111! :1 11  1w1·0 1 1 11 t  nf t hr• 
D i g itized by 
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·weights, together with smuples. <leliverccl to thl"' 
purchaser. The usual time of payment with 
the trade was the second Saturday snbse.1nent 
to the sale. B. di<l not pay for the bops at the 
usual time. whereupon A. ga>e notice that un­
less they were paid for by a certa in day they 
would be re-sold. 'l'he hops were not paid for. 
and A. re-sokl a part, with the consent of B . . 
who afterwards bL><:ame a bankrupt. and then 
A. sold the remainder of the hops without 
the consent of B. or bis as.ignees. Account 
of the bop so sold was deliYered to B., in 
which he was charged warehou e rent from 
the 00tb of August. The as ignees of B. de­
mander.1 the bops of A., and tendered the 
charges of wa rehouse rent, &c., and on the 
refusal of .A.. to deliver them, brought u·oyer. 
It was holden that the assignees could not 
maintain tbe action, because the party must 
bave for that purpose. not only a right of prop­
erty but a ri;!ht of possession; and that al­
though a Yenclee of goods acquires a right of 
property by the contract of sale, yet he dues 
not acquire a right of r)Qsscssion to the goods 
until he riars or teuder:s tbe price. Bloxuru v. 
Sunders, 4 B. & C. 941, 10 Eng. C. L. Rep. 
8U8. 
Xor as between tbe original veu1lor and veu­
dee is the lien of the former divc·te<l by bis 
giving to the \•enc1ee a del iYery order for tbe 
goods sold, but remainin� in the vendor's ware­
house rent free, althoup;h it appeared that by 
the usage of trade in LiYe111uol, where tile par· 
ties dealt. goods sohl while in warelll)u,.;e are 
delivered by the vendor's handinl-! to the Yen 
dee a cleJiyery order, and that the hnltlt'r or 
such order may obtain credit with a purchaser. 
as h::t'l"ing po scs.ion of tile goods. Townley 
v. Crump, 4 Ad. & El. 38. 
'l'o the same effC'ct is the case of Tooke v. 
Hollin�worth, 5 'l'erm H. �Ui. 
Tile doctrine is ful l�· established in this tate 
by the ca e of Willi:nus v. :\Ioorc, 5 N'. II. 2�;;. 
'l'hal there was no actual del ivery in this 
<:lSl', SO US to des(l'O)" t he lien, Of tbe defenrlant 
for the price. is dear. Ami t he dcliyery of 
a part ns alltl for the whole, or a symbolii'al 
or cnnst rnctiv<' clelin'ry, if su tliclent for such 
an effect, is not m:Hll' out by the llellycry of 
the brass knobs tbat hnd been worn unon th<> 
horns of the oxen. 'l'hr) were not del lvereil 
w i t h  t he.' intent ion of t hcn·b�· mnkin� a tratll· 
tlon of t he oxen, whkh Is the essence or n 
l'�·mhnl ka l tl<'l l \·e1T. Hut the caS<>s plainly 
!'how t h:i t I hl' l lrn IA preserYe<I UJ101l a I I  ancl 
every 1i:1 1·r·1•l r•f ! 11<' �oorls :;nlcl whic'h actunlly 
rema i n In t he hnndH of t h<' H'111 !11r. 
Nnr rn n th e gl\ I n� of the' noll' fnr t he prlcC', 
pnyn hlP 011 d1·m : 1 1 1d ,  in nnj· view, be cnnHhl· 
ert>rl as n p:1� nwnt of t he prlr'P. 'l'h<.' 1Jn<'trln1· 
on t h is hPa r l  \YllH fully ron;;id Pn'i l :uul setU!.'11 
In . T a ll rrj· '· C 'nrnli-:h, 10 :"\. J l . :;n;;, where It 
wnH held t h a t  a prnmlHsory not e i.:,IYen for tbt> 
a mnunf or n part y's tn xrs, wns not a )lnym<'n t 
of t h!' f ll '\ l'R fol' tht' p 1 1 rpni;e of gnln \ng a i;et• 
f 1 1·1 1 w 1 1 t .  Thi' t ak ing of n not!' 111 In no C':t sl' 
thl' J ii i .i 111r11t nf II dr h t ,  11n)ro;H th1•r1• hp :t l'(lt'• 
dnl ugn•f'mr•nt lo that  rfTi•rt. 'l'he 1irpsrnl I!!-
O ri 
U N IV E R S I  FO N 
lUGIITS OF SELLER AGAINST GOOl^S— VENDOR'S LIEN.
15
a strong nnd clear case for the application of
tbat doctriue; and distinct proof that tlie par-
ty taking the note intended thereby to part
with his lien upon the property, would be re-
quired.
The conclusion, therefore, is, that the pres-
ent action cannot, upon the evidence reported,
be maintained; that the verdict must be set
aside, and there must be
Judgment for the defendant
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SALES,
CUSACK et al. v. ROBINSON.
(1 Best & S. 299.)
Queen's Bench,- Trinity Term. May 25, ISCl.
Declaration for goods sold and delivered,
and goods bargained and sold. Plea, never
indebted. At the trial before Blacliburn, J.,
at the Liverpool winter assizes in ISUO, it
appeared that the defendant, who was a Lon-
don merchant, on the 24th October, ISGO, at
Liverpool called on the plaintiffs, who are
importers of Canadian produce, and said he
wanted to buy from 150 to 200 firkins of Ca-
nadian butter. He then went with one of the
plaintiffs to their cellar, where he was shown
a lot of 15G firkins of butter, "ex Bohemian,"
belonging to the plaintiffs, which he then had
the opportunity of inspecting, and in fact he
did open and inspect six of the firkins in that
lot. After that examination, they went to
another cellar to see other butter, which
however did not suit the defendant. At a
later period of the same day the plaintiffs
and the defendant made a verbal agreement
by which the defendant agreed to buy that
specific lot of 150 firkins at 77s. per cwt.
When the price had been agreed on, the de-
fendant took a card, on which his name and
address in London were written, "Kdnnmd
Robinson, 1 Wellington Street, London
Bridge, London," and wrote on it "15G firkius
butter to be dehvercd at Fenning's Wharf,
Tooley Street" He gave this to the plain-
tiffs, and at the same time said that his
agents Messrs. Clibboru, at Liverpool, would
give directions how the goods were to be for-
warded to Fenning's Wliarf. The plaintiffs
by Clibbom's directions delivered the butter
to Pickford's cai'ts to be forwarded to the
defendant at Fenning's Wharf. The plain-
. tiffs sent an invoice dated the 25lh October,
ISOO, to the address on the defendant's card.
They received in answer a letter purporting
to come from a clerk in the defendant's of-
fice, acknowledging the receipt of the Invoice,
and stating (hat on the defendant's return
he would no doubt attend to it. There was
no evidence that the writer of this letter had
any authority to sign a memorandum of a
contract. On the 27th October llie plaintiffs
In Liverpool received a telegram from the de-
fendant in London, In effect asserthig tliiit
the butters had been sold by the plaintiffs
subject to a wairanty that was equal to a
sample, but tliat tliey were not eipial to sam-
ple, and therefore would be returned. T)ie
Iilaliitlffs replii'd by telegram that there was
no such warranty, and I hey must bo kcjit.
A clerk at Fennlngs" Wharf proved that
Messrs. Fennlnp stored goods for their cub-
touiers, and hail a butter wareliouse; that
the defendant had used the wari^liotise for
fifteen ycari, and was In the habit of keeping
hlH buttora there till he sold them. On the
2Cth October I'Ickford & Co. had dcllvorcil
a part of the 1."<! Ilrklnn In question nt the
warehouse, and delivered the residue on I lie
tnornlng of the 27tb October. The wltuews
could not say whether any one came to in-
spect them or not. but he proved that the.v
were delivered up by Penning to Pickford iV
Co. under a delivery order from the defend-
ant dated 27th October. The defendant's
counsel admitted that it must be taken tluit
the sale was not subject to any warranty;
but objected that the price of the goods ex-
ceeded £10. and that there was nothing prov-
ed to satisfy the requisitions of the statute of
frauds. The verdict was entered for the
plaintiffs for £420 10s. Id., with leave to the
defendant to move to enter a nonsuit, If there
was no evidence proper to be left to the jury
either of a memorandum of the contract or of
an acceptance and actual receipt of the goods.
In Hilary term, 1S61, Edward James ob-
tained a rule nisi. Mellish and Quain shew-
ed cause. Milward, in support of the rule.
BLACKBURN, J. (After fully slating the
facts his lordship proceeded.) It was not
contended that there was any sufficient mem-
orandum in writing in the present case; but
it was contended that there was sufflciout
evidence that tlie defendant had accepted the
goods sold and actually received the same;
and on consideration we are of that opinion.
The words of the statute are express that
there must be an acceptance of the goods or
part of them, as well as an actual receipt;
and the authorities are veiT numerous to
sliow that both these requisites must exist,
or else the statute is not satisfied. In the
recent case of Nichol.son v. Bower, 1 E. &
E. 172, which was cited for the defendant,
141 quarters of wheat were sent by a rail-
way, addressed to the vendees. They aniv-
ed at their destination, and were there ware-
housed by the railway company under cir-
cumstances that might have been held to put
an end to the unpaid vendor's rights. But
the contract was not originally a sale of spe-
cific wheat, and the vendees had never agreed
to take tliose particular quarters of wheat:
on the contrary it was shewn to bo usual,
before accci)ling wheat thus warehoused, to
compare a sample of the wheat with tlio
sample by which It was sold; and it appeared
that tlio vendees, knowing that they were in
embarrassed circumstances, purposely ab-
Rtalnod from accoi)ting tlie goods; and eadi
of tlie judges mentions that fact as the
ground of I heir decision. In Meredith v.
Meigh. 2 10. & B. Ml, the goods, wlilch were
not si)ecilicd In the original contract, had
been selected by the vendor and put on board
ship by the directions of the vendee, so that
they wore In the hands of a ciirrler (o con-
vey them from tlie vendor to the vendee. It
was tliere held. In conformity wllli Hanson
V. Arinllage, 5 B. & Aid. .557, that the car-
rier, though named by the vendee, had no
authority to acceiit the goods. And In this
we qnlfo agree; for though the selection of
the g Is by the vendor, and putting them
lu tianslt, would but for the statute ha\o
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SA LES. 
CL'SACK et al. v. ROBINSON. 
(1 Best & S. 299.) 
Queen's Bench,. Trinity Term. J\Iay 25, 18Gl. 
Declaration for goods sold and delivered, 
and goods bargained and sold. Plea, ne,·er 
i ndebted. At the trial before Blackburn, J., 
at the Liverpool winter assizes in lSliO, it 
appeared that the defendant, who was a Lon­
don merchant, on the 2-!th October, lSGO, at 
Liverpool called on the plaintiffs, who are 
importers of Canadian produce, and said be 
n-auted to buy from 1;::;0 to 200 firkins of Ca­
nadian butter. He then went witll one of the 
plaintiffs to their cellar, where he was shown 
a lot of l;:JG firkins of butter, "ex Bohemian," 
belonging to the plaintiffs, wbicb be then bad 
the opportunity of inspecting, and in fact he 
did open and inspect six of the firkius in that 
lot. After that examination, they went to 
another cellar to see otller butter, \"Vhich 
bowe•er did not suit the defendant. At a 
later periotl of the same day the plaintiffs 
and the defendant made a verbal agreement 
by wbicll the defendant agreed to buy tbat 
specific lot of l:iG firkius at 77s. per cwt. 
'1i-hen the price bad been agreed on, the de­
fendant took a card, on which his name and 
address in Loudon were written, "Edmund 
Uohinson, 1 Wellington Street, Loudon 
Briilge, London," and wrote on it "156 firkius 
butter to be deli•ered at Fenning's '1i'llarf, 
Tooley Street." Ue .�a ,-e tllis to the plain­
tiffs, and :. t t he same time said that bis 
a.::ents '.\Ic»sn.. lihhorn, at Liverpool, would 
:.:h-e directions bow the goods were to be for­
warded to lt'enuing·s Wharf. The plaintiffs 
by Clibborn's directions delh·cred the butter 
to Pickford's earls to be forwarded to the 
defendant at Fenuin�·s 'iYh:nf. The Illain­
. t i ffs sent an invoice dated the ::?:ith Octolwr, 
1 GO, to the ad1lre::;s on the defenda nt's carcl. 
The�· received in answer a letter purportiug 
to t·o111e from a clerk in the defetulnut's of­
fice>. aelmowle1l�ing the recei11t or tile lnvokt'. 
aud stati 11:.: that on the defenclaut's return 
be wonltl no doubt a t tend to it. 'l here was 
no evidPnce that the writer of t his letter had 
any antlwrl ty to Hign a ll1P t1101·n111 lu111 of n 
contract. On the 2itb October t he plai ntiffH 
In Lh c:>rpool f!'ceh·Pcl a tcle;;rnm from t h e de­
f(' 1 1 la1 1t  in Lonilon, I n Pll°l'c·l nHscrt in:.: t h at 
•ht• lmtt ('J·s had Ileen sold by t he pln l n t l ff;i 
ubjtC't to n warrn uty tbnt wa eqnnl t o  n 
am1 1ll', llllt that they wt•re 11ot equa l to 1;a 1 1 1-
1 •l<', and t ltP l'l'fore wonlrl 1 11• rl' ! 1 1n11'11. 'l'hl' 
pl:i 1 1 1 t l ff  1·r·1 •l h·1 l 1.>y teh•;!r: 1 111 t hnt t hPl'P waR 
no t;ttr'h w11 n n nty, nnd t lwy 1 1 1 11 t h<' k1•pt 
A "11•rlc al Froning• ' "'hnrf prnvrd t hat 
'.\[( I'S. Fu1 11Jn � t • H'l'c l !"oods for t hl'l r  <'llti· 
touwr • nuu had fl hut I l'l' wa rt •homw ; t ha t  
t11P tll'fc•nr l 1 1 1 1t  hncl nsed t h P  wa n·honse for 
tl rt• •n ym r11. and wns In t l w hnlilt  of l\p1•pl 1 1 "  
h i ll  llll t t c•rs t hPm t I l l  h e  sold l lll'tn. O n  1 1 11• 
:u:r 1t Octolil'r Pkl< ford & Co. had rlcl lH•n•d 
n part nf t hr• 1 r.1; tl rl<l n11 I n  fJlll' tlon n t  1 1 11' 
w1 t ••hrrnsc, 1111<1 d1· 1 lv1 •rf'd t h� 1..-id1h1� on 1 1 1 1• 
rn m i n . or lit•' :.!il h ()( l ol ll'r, 'l'hl' \\'l l lll'  ti 
D i g itized by 
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could not say whether any one came to in­
spect them or not. but he proved that t hey 
were delivered up lly Fenning to Pich:[onl S: 
Co. under a. delivery order from the defe1111-
ant dated 27th October. The defendant's 
counsel admitted that it must be taken t h�n 
the sale was not subject to any wana n t .r :  
but objected that the price of the gomls t•x­
ceeded £10, and that there was nothing prur­
ed to satisfy the requisitions of the statute or 
frauds. The verdict was entered for the 
plaintiffs for £420 10s. ld., with leave to the 
defendant to move to enter a. nonsuit, i f  there 
was no evidence proper to be left to tbe jury 
either of a. memorandum of the contract or of 
an acceptance and actual receipt of the goods. 
In Hilary term, 1861, Edward James ob­
tained a rule nisi. l\Iellish and Quain shew­
ed cause. J\lil ward, in support of the ruie. 
BLACKBURN, J. (After fully stating the 
facts his lordship proceeded.) I t  was not 
contended that there was any sufficient mcm­
urnudum in writing in the present ca e;  bnt 
it was contended that there was sufficicut 
eviclence that the defenda nt had accepted t h e 
goods sold and actually received the sam e :  
a n d  on considenHion we are o f  that opinion. 
The word of t he statute are expre s that 
th('!'C must be an acceptance of tlle good, ot· 
part of them, as well as an actual receipt ;  
and the nutllorities are very numerous to 
shmv that both these requisites must exi:st, 
or else the statute is not satisfied. I n  t he 
recent case of Nicholson v. Bower, 1 K & 
E. 172, which was cited for the defen1la 11t, 
Hl quarters of wheat were sent by a ra i l ­
way, addressed t o  t h e  vendees. They a n  i l·­
ed at their destinat ion, and were there wa r•'· 
housed hy the railway company under dr­
cmnstances that might lln,·e been beltl to put 
an eud to the unpaid Yendor's rig-ht . Hut 
the contract was not orip;i ua lly a sale of spe­
cific wheat, aud t he venc1<'cs had nerer :t ;!l'1•e1l 
lo take U1m:e part icular quarters of whea t :  
o n  the con trary i t  was shewn to hl' 11:-;ua l ,  
before :H·l'L' p t i n;::- " lwat thus wa rehonsed , to 
compnn' a sample ol' the whC':lt w i th t h<' 
sample hy wblcll it was sold ;  nud It t1P!l<'111·1•1l 
t hnt t h<' Yl'ndees, knowlnp; tllat they were i n  
em harrassec l c i t\•11 mstn nccs, purposely n h  
i-;tnl rwcl from n eet•pl ing l he �oocls ; and t':lt·h 
Of t he jud�cs UHmliClll9 tbnl fnct Hs 1 11 1' 
irround of t ht>lr dPdsion. I n  Jl(cred l l h  v. 
�!l'i · h, :.? M. & U. ;1<; I, t he g-ouds, which were 
no t spPl'l llt>cl In the orl�lnal co1 1 ! ract, had 
hc:>en selPdt•tl hy t lw ' c ndnr nncl put 011 hoanl 
Hh l p hy t h !'  c!lrc•c•l [om; oC t he Vl' I J C leC', H!1 t hn t  
lhPY WPl'l' I n  l ht• h:111dH o f  ll t':t l'l'lt•l' t o  C'Oll· 
n•y t hem from t he \•e111!11r t o t h e> Yl'IHI<'<'. I t  
waH tlwrc hl' ld,  I n  co11forml 1 y  w i t h  l l :1 1 1son 
v. ,\ rmll:l!'P, f1 H. & Aid r;r. , ,  t h a t  t h r c·11 r· 
rlPr, t hough nn mPd hy t hP \'cnd1•t'. had nn 
n n l l tnrlty t o  n c-rc •pt t h!' i:;-omls. And I n  l h lH 
WI' qnltn U �l'PI ' ;  for t hough th t<C'lpc•t lon of 
t h <' good>i hJ t hP Y<'tll lnr, :rnd p u t t i ng t l 1p1 1 1  
I n  1 1 :1 111:111 ,  would hut for the stntule h:t \ I' 
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been a sufficient flclivery to vest the proper-
ty in the vendee, it could not be said that the
selection by the vendor, or the receipt by the
carrier, was an acceptance of those particular
goods by the vendee.
In Baldey v. Parker, 2 B. & C. 37, which
was mucli relied on by Mr. Milward in argu-
ing in support of this rule, the ground of the
decision was that pointed out by Holroyd, J.,
who says (page 44): "Upon a sale of specific
goods for a specific price, by parting with
the possession the seller parts with his lien.
The statute contemplates such a parting with
the possession; and therefore as long as the
seller presei-ves his control over the goods
so as to retain his lien, he prevents the ven-
dee from accepting and receiving them as his
own within the meaning of the statute."
The principle here laid down is, that there
cannot be an actual receipt by the vendee so
long as the goods continue in the possession
of the seller as unpaid vendor so as to pre-
serve his lien; and it has been repeatedly
recognized. But though the goods remain in
the personal possession of the vendor, yet if
it is agreed between the vendor and the ven-
dee that the possession shall thenceforth be
Ivept, not as vendor, but as bailee for the pur-
chaser, the right of lien is gone, and then
there is a sufHcient receipt to satisfy the stat-
ute. Marvin v. Wallis, 6 E. & B. 726; Beau-
mont V. Brengeri, 5 C. B. 301. In both of
these cases the specific chattel sold was as-
certained, and there appear to have been acts
indicating acceptance subsequent to the f jree-
ment which changed the nature of the posses-
sion.
In the present case there was ample evi-
dence that the goods when placed in Fen-
ning's Wharf were put under the control of
the defendant to await his further directions,
so as to put an end to any right of the plain-
tiffs as unpaid vendors, as much as the
change in the nature of the possession did
in the cases cited. There was also sufHcient
evidence that the defendant had at Liverpool
selected these specific 156 firkins of butter
as those which he then agreed to take as his
property as the goods sold, and that he di-
rected those specific firlcins to be sent to
Ijondon. This was certainly evidence of an
acceptance; and the only remaining question
is, whetlier it is necessary that the acceptance
should follow or be contemporaneous with
the receipt, or whether an acceptance before
the receipt is not sufHcient. In Saunders v.
Topp. 4 Exch. 390, which is the case in which
the facts approach nearest to the present
case, the defendant had, according to the find-
ing of the jury, agreed to buy from the plain-
tiff forty-five couple of sheep, which the de-
fendant, tlie purchaser, had himself selected,
and the plaintiff had by his directions put
them in the defendant's field. Had the case
stopped there, it would have been identical
with the present. But there was in addition
some evidence that the defendant, after see-
ing them in the field, counted them, and said
it was all right; and as this was some evi-
dence of an acceptance after the receipt, it be-
came unnecessary to decide whether the ac-
ceptance under the statute must follow the de-
livery. Parke, B., from the report of his ob-
servations during the argument, seems to
have attached much importance to the selec-
tion of pai'ticular sheep by the defendant:
but in his judgment he abstains from decid-
ing on that ground, though certainly not ex-
pressing any opinion that the acceptance
must be subsequent to the delivery. Tlie
other three barons— Alderson, Eolfe, and Piatt
—express an inclination of opinion that it is
necessary under the statute that the accept-
ance should be subsequent to or contempo-
raneous with the receipt; but they expressly
abstain from deciding on that ground. In the
elaborate judgment of Lord Campbell in Mor-
ton V. Tibbett, 15 Q. B. 428, in which the
nature of an acceptance and actual receipt
sufHcient to satisfy the statute is fully ex-
pounded, he says (page 434): "The accept-
ance is to be something which is to precede
or at any rate to be contemporaneous witli
the actual receipt of the goods, and is not to
be a subsequent act after the goods have
been actually received, weighed, measured, or
examined. The intention of the legislature
seems to nave been that the contract should
not be good unless partially executed; and
it is partially executed if, after the vendee
has finally agreed on the specific articles
which he is to take under the contract, the
vendor by the vendee's directions parts witli
the possession, and puts them under the con-
trol of the vendee, so as to put a complete
end to all the rights of the unpaid vendor as
such. We think therefore that there is noth-
ing in the nature of the enactment to imply
an intention, which the legislature has cer-
tainly not in terms expressed, that an accept-
ance prior to the receipt will not suflSce.
There is no decision putting this construction
on the statute, and we do not think we ought
so to construe it.
We are therefore of opinion that there was
evidence in this case to satisfy the statute
and that the rule must be discharged.
Rule discharged.
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SALES.
BABCOCK V. BONNELIi.
(80 X. Y. 244.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. Term,
ISSO.
Action by the administratrix of Babcock
against Bonnell for an accounting for the
proceeds of a policy of insurance taken out
on the life of Babcock, and delivered to de-
fendant as collateral security for two prom-
issory notes of Babcock & Co. for $4,6TS.4S.
Bonnell afterwards received from one
Wheelright $925 in full satisfaction of the
notes, which were delivered to Babcock & Co.
and destroyed.
Wm. W. Niles, for appellant. Julien T.
Davis, for respondent.
CHURCH. C. J. The finding of the trial
judge that the policy was taken out and de-
livered to the defendant as collateral securi-
ty for the payment of the indebtedness of
Babcock & Co. to him was warranted by the
evidence. Xo other conclusion could be ar-
rived at, and the evidence is substantially
undisputed.
Some years afterward Mr. Babcock ex-
pressed a desire not to be regarded as hav-
ing an Interest, and stated that the entire
interest was in the defendant; but I do not
think that this expression, under the circum-
stances, would have the effect of a release,
or create an estoppel. There is no dispute
that at the time the policy was taken out,
there was an indebtedness in favor of the
defendant against Babcock & Co., evidenced
by two notes, amounting to $4,678.48. The
policy was isstied in Februaiy, 1870, and it
is claimed and found that in April, 1870,
these notes were compromised and settled,
and that the defendant received from one
Wheolright, on behalf of Babcock & Co.,
.$025 in money, in full satisfaction and dis-
charge of said indebtedness, and delivered
and surrendered said notes to him, and that
they were afterward delivered up to Bab-
cock & Co., who destroyed and canceled
them. Wheelright testified that he i)urchased
the notes of the defendant, and paid his
own money, and delivered them to lialicock
& Co. upon being repaid that amount and
his expenses. In either view we think the
debt was discharged. It was an executed
accord. Nothing remained executory, and It
I'perated as a full satisfaction. A mere
promise to accept less than the full amotmt
of a debt although the sum prnniised has
been paid ha.s been held not H\illlricnt; but
when the sectn-lty lias been surrendered, or
some act done of a like nature, there Is no
reason In law or morals, why the party
should not be boiuid. Kronicr v. Helm, 75
N. Y. ri74.
It may be that the dofendant Intended to
hold tin- policy of liiHurance to Indcmiiiry
hini ffir the dellciciicy, but there was no
Qgroement to that elTect, and the defondanl's
letters indicate that he had regarded the
debt fully released and canceled. The de-
fendant claims also to hold the policy as se-
curity for the balance of an additional in-
debtedness of $1,226.44 and interest, after
applying the proceeds of a cargo of coal, the
finding in respect to which is here inserted.
"Fourth. On the 15th day of November, 1SG9.
the defendant sold a cargo of coal to said
Charles A. Babcock & Co., and took a note
in payment therefor of $1,226.44, due March
15, 1S70; the said last-mentioned cargo of
coal was shipped to said Charles A. Bab-
cocl; & Co. by the schooner Hepzibah, on or
.nbout the 21st day of February. 1870, the
defendant through his agent, Edward Gul-
lager, stopped the said last-mentioned cargo
of coal in transitu, took possession thereof
and disaffirmed the contract of sale therefor,
and on the 4th day of May. 1870, sold the
said last-mentioned cargo of coal to one E. S.
Farrar." If this finding can be sustained as
a finding of fact, it disposes of any claim for
the debt. If the disaffirmance of the con-
tract of sale of the coal depends as matter
of law upon the stoppage of the coal in
transitu, then a more difticult and doubtful
question is presented. Kvery intendment is
in favor of the findings of facts, and findings
may be implied if warranted by the evidence
to sustain a judgment. The evidence as to
the stoppage of the coal, as to the possession
of the defendant, and the sale thereof by
him does not present the facts as clearly as
would be dcsn-able upon this question. If
the defendant took possession of the coal in
the exercise of the right of stoppage in trans-
itu, and sold the same without notice to
Babcock & Co., and without their consent,
and especially before the debt was due, an
inference of an intention to disaffirm the
contract of sale might be drawn, because
upon the theory that this riglit is to enforce
.a lien, as clnime<l by the defendant, he must
hold the property until the expiration of the
credit, and be able to deliver it upon pay-
ment of the price, and the vendee has the
right to pay the price and take the property.
According to that theory the credit Is not
abrogated, nor the sale, but the vendor Is
permitted to re-take the possession of the
pnipcrty, and hold It as security until the
price Is paid. If not paid at the time stipu-
lated the vendor. In analogy to other cn.ses
of lien, may sell the property upon giving
notice.
Tlie general rule upon the theory of n lion
must be that the vendor having exercised
the right of stoppage In trausllu. la restored
to his iHisltlon before he parted with the pos-
session of the properly. The properly is
vested In the vendee, and the vendor holds
possession as security for the payment of
the purchase-price. If therefore the defend-
ant sold the coal without notice or consent,
or If witli coiiHciit of the vendees wllli the
understanding that the sale was to be
deemed rescinded the finding wotilil bo jus-
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B AIWOC'K '°· IlO:'\ :\'ELL. 
( U X. L :?44.) 
Court of A.ppeals of New York. Jan. Term, 
1880. 
A.ction by the administratrix of Babcock 
a:::ainst Bonnell for an accounting for the 
proceeds of a policy of insurance taken out 
on the life of Babcock, and delivered to de­
fendant as collateral security for two prom­
issory notes of Babcock & Co. for $4,678.48. 
Bonnell afterward recei\·ed from one 
\Yheelri:::ht �D:?5 in full satisfaction of the 
notes. wllil'.h wc1e <lelivered to Babcock & Co. 
anu ue.stro,red. 
·wm. \\. �mes. for appellant. Julien T. 
Davis, for respondent. 
CIH.JRCII. C'. J. Tbe finding of the trial 
judge that the poliey was taken out and cle­
l iYered to the defeuclaut as collateral securi­
ty for tlle payment of tlle indellteuncss of 
Ballcock & Co. to him was wal'l'anted by the 
eYi<lence. ::\o othe1· conclu ·ion could be ar­
ri ,·ed at, and the evidence is substantially 
undi ·puted. 
�ome }cars n flcrwanl �Ir. Baucoek ex-
1n·cssed a desire not to be regarded as hav­
ing an interest, ancl stated that the entire 
interest was in  the defendant ; but I do not 
think tha t this exprcs::;ion, under the circum­
stances. would hn'l"e the effect of a. release. 
or <'n•ntc> au estoppel. There is no d is1rnte 
t hat at tlle t i m e  t he policy was taken out, 
t h<'re was an inclebtedness in fa \'Or of tlH' 
defendant a;::ai nst Babcock & o., e\'iclcnel•ll 
l iy two notes. amount in;r to ::;.LU7S..t '. The 
policy was issued In February, 1 "iO, nod it 
is clairuecl arnl found t hat in A 11ril,  1 �70, 
these untcs were compromised and sd tied. 
n u<! t h:tt the clefcncl:tnt rcl·eiYed from one 
\Yhel•lri .:::ut, on beha l f of J\nhcoek & Co., , 
.'!I:.?:; in m1111e�·. lu full Ra l i sfaction an1l rl is­
"11:1n:e of sairl i n cl Ph! edncss, and dPl i \'cred 
11 111! s111Tc111lcrP<l s:i i1 l notes to h i m .  and t h:it 
t h<')' \\'Ne aftcr \\':l l'f l d<'li \'Cl'P!l UJI to H:t b· 
<'•1dc & Co., who c l 1 •st 1·oyPcl :incl c·nnr•plcd 
t hem. \\' hC<:'l right kst ilic ' < I  t ha t  he purC'lia sc'd 
t h e notes of t h <'  cll'l'1 • 1 1da11t,  and pa ic l h l H  
<1\\'ll mOllP,\", :1111  <lcl i n� l'C cl t h l'lll t n  l la l wcwlc 
& 'o. 1 1 1 11111 hci u;.: r1·11: 1 id t h n t  ::1 11111 11 1 1 1  a ncl 
h is <'XJ><.:ll s1•N. In Pit  I H•t• dew we thin le t lw 
i l eht was di ·1•h:i r�PCl . It wns an executed 
1w1'<•l'<l. :->ot h l n g  1·p1 1 1a f 1 1 ,.1l l'.'c>rutory, ancl I t  
" i "'l'll t •·cl n 11 full n t l  fnl'f ion. /I. 11wre 
p1•0 1 1 1 l s  • tn n 1·r·Ppt lr·ss t h a n  t l 11• full : 1 1 1 1 n 1 1 n t  
1 1 !' n 1l1 •hl n i t  h1111i,:h t hf' 1m 111  p1·1 11 11 is!'d h : t H  
h••('11  pa id hn · 1 11 · 1 • 1 1  1 1  .. 1 1 1  not tt 1 1 l ll 1 • iP 1 1 t : hut 
\\ l l l 'n  I hf' r·r·u rl l )' ha l 11•p11 Hll l'l'P l l l l t•n•d, or 
om•• n<'I <111111• of 11 l l ltP 1 1 :1 t 11rr" t lll'l'<' lH no 
tt>ll 011 1 1 1 l u w  or mura lH, wh,I' t h r pn 1· t y  
hnuhl n o t  h<' hn11 1 1 c l .  l\r1 1 1 1 1 r •r  \', I I r  I m ,  7:i 
. ". \' . . •  i I .  
I t  inny I ><• t h u l  t h ' d r • f• l l l l fl n t  i n l ! • 1 1 c l cd I n  
hol•l  l ht •  J l(Jl lr•y o f  l 1 1 H 1 1 1•: 1 1 1r·1• t o  l 1 1dP1 1 1 1 t l f.,· 
b l m  for t h e  r f p J(r•f, .rir·y, h 1 1 J  1 hPn• w:u1 1111 
o�r •r>n11•11t I•• t hn l  f'tli•r• t ,  n n <I l h<' rl1•f,.1 1 1 l 11 1 1 t '11 
D i gitize by 
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letters indicate that he had rcganled the 
debt fully released and canceled. The cle­
fendant claims also to bold the poliey as se­
curity for the balance of an addilional in­
debtedness of $1,?26.·H and interest, a fter 
applying the proceeds of a cargo of coal, the 
fiml i n g  i n  respect to which is here in erted 
"Fourth. On tlle 15th day of November, lSLiU. 
the defendant sold a cargo of coal to sai1l 
Charles A. Babcock & Co., and took a note 
in payment therefor of , l ,::!:::!G.44, due ..\larch 
13, 1 70; the said last-mentioneu cargo or 
coal was shipped to said Chn 1·les A. Bab­
cock & Co. by the schooner Uepzibah. on or 
a bout the �1st clay of February, 1 70, the 
defendant througll his agent. Edwa rd Gul­
lager, stopped the said l:u;t-me11tioned l':lrgo 
of conl in trausitu, took posse· ·ion thereof 
a nd disa mrmcd the coutraet of snle therefor. 
and on t he 4th day of ..\fay,  1 70, sold the 
said last mentioned cargo of coa l to one E. S. 
Farmr." If this finding can be su tai ned as 
a finding of fact, it dispo es or any clai m  for 
t he dellt. If the disaffit·mnuc·e of t he con­
tract of sale of the coal de11c11 1 l !>  as ma t t er 
of law upon tlle stoppn!!'e of t he coal in 
transitu. then a more d i fticul t anc l  dou bt fu l 
question is pn'sentetl. EYery intend111cnt i:-;  
in favor o f  lhe  f:iml ingc; of  faets. a n d  findi n:.;s 
m a �- he imp lied if warran I C'd bs t he e\ i den�c 
\o s nstai u a. j udgment. The evidence as t o  
t h e  sto11page of the coal. as  t o  t h e llOSscssion 
of the defrncl:mt. a111l t h e  sa le t hereof br 
him doc::> not 11re ·e11t the  fads :is clearly a:-; 
would be desirable upon this quest ion. I f  
t he clcfend n n t  took posscs..;ion o f  the l'O:l l i n  
t he c.-<'rc1se ot' the ri�ht o f  stoppa;.:e in t ra ns­
i t n .  a 11 1 l  snlcl tlle same without llLltice t n  
Hat.cud.;: & C'n .. and without t hei r  eonscut. 
nncl cspecia ll) before the debt was due. nu 
in fc>l'f'I H'e of nn intL•11ti nn to clisallinn tlw 
··nnt r:t<'t of sale mi �h t be clra w n ,  hl'•':tll sl' 
1 1 pn 1 1  t he th<'nrr t hat t h i R ri.:.:h t I s  to l'nfon ·p 
:t l i<'n, :ts 1•l :t ime<l hy t he <lefr11 1 l a 1 1 t. he m ust 
hole! t it<' property unti l  t he expir:1 t inn of the 
c·re<l i l . :1 nil hc a hle to 1l<'liYcr It u pon pa)·-
111enl n l' t hC' price, aucl t he Y<'tHkP ha s t h e  
rig-ht t n  l HlY t h e price nncl t a k e  t lw prnperty. 
,\ r•t•r11·t l i 1 1g- to t h :1 t. t hrory th<' cre1 l i t  i s  nnt 
a h rn ;: :t f Pd. nor t he s:t ll', hut t h e  venclo1· Is 
Jll'l' l l i l l t l 'cl fO l'C'· ( : t l\C t Jl\' JlCl!'Sl'SSlnll O f  t he 
propert y, : incl hnlcl i t  : t s  se1•u ri t y 1 1 11 t i l t he 
prlc'I' Is pa id. T l' not p:t l t l  :i t t h l' t i tnt' st lpn­
l:t f p1] t hl' ' c>nclnr. I n  :111:1  logy tu nt  hi'!'  t':1 Sl'S 
nJ' l l Pn, lllll) l:il'Jl t h l' fll'OJll'l' l y  \ 1 ( 10 1 1  g l \' J 1 1 g  
1 111! kc. 
'I'll<' �l'lll'l':t l rill<' 11 1 1011 I he t lwnry of n 1 1 1•11  
1 1 1 1 1 s t  hi'  t h:t  t t hr•  Y<'IHIOI' ha \" I n g  ('.'l' l'!'lsPd 
t h· ·  right  of 1:1 1 1 1) 1 ) 1:1 ;.tl' 111 l l':t l l  1 1 1 1 .  Is l'l 'StOl'l'd 
I n  h if;; p1 1sl t lnn l u•fon• hr p:1 1'l l'd \\ I t h  t l 1 1• poi< 
"" !! l n 1 1  of t h P prnp<'!'ty.  'l'h<' pr11111•rl y i s  
\1'81 1•1! h i  t hi' \ l'IH lC'C', n n r l  (hp ' l' I H IOI' hnl1)H 
pnss••Rs lnn nq ""' n rl t )  for t h l' f i:t ) lllt'nt of 
t hl '  p 1 1 n· h:H·<' pr lr·I' , 1 f t la•rf'l"1 1 1'1' t he• d l' fl' 1 1 tl ­
: 1 1 1 t  s11ld t l w r•nn l w i thout nnt kc• nr en11sP 1 1 t , 
or If w i t h r •n11<1 .. 11t  or t l w \ 1 • 1 11 I PPH \\ I t h  t hf' 
1 1 1 1 r 1 ,.,. t:1 111 l t n ;:  t h n t  t h r 1-:i l 1• \\ :t"I t n  ht' 
rl 1 •1 • 1 1 1 Pd l'PtH' l n r l r r l  th<• llnr l l n o;  would hi' J 1 1s-
O r1 i r- ! f 
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I i lied, aud the defendant would have no
claim upon this note.
The coal was sold to one Parrar, and a bill
of sale thereof made by the defendant, and
he received the pui'chasc-mouey. The coal
was sold and the bill of sale and payment
were not made until April, after the note
bucame due, aud there is some conflict in
the evidence whether it was made witli the
linowledge or consent of Babcock & Co., or
not.
As to the legal question, although the
right of stoppage in transitu has been recog-
nized in England for nearly two hundred
years, there is great confusion in the books
as to the origin of the right, and the princi-
)iles upon which it is founded. As late as
1S41 Lord Abinger said, that "although the
question of Stoppage in transitu had been as
frequently raised as any other mercantile
question within the last hundred years, it
must be owned that the principle on which
it depends has never been either settled or
slated in a satisfactory manner.
"In courts of equity it has been a received
opinion that it was founded on some prin-
ciple of common law. In courts of law it
is just as much the practice to call it a
principle of equity which the common law
has adopted."
Mr. Parsons, in his work on Admii-alty,
says, there are three ways, in either of
which it might be supposed that the law
of stoppage entered into the law of Eng-
land. One that it is based upon the civil
law by which, in case of a sale, the prop-
erty does not pass to the buyer until he
has possession of the goods. It would fol-
low that the seller would continue the own-
er until they reach the buyer, and that by
the insolvency of the latter the goods would
remain the property of the former. By the
common law a sale does of itself pass the
property to the buyer, without delivery.
Another way is by implying a right of re-
scinding the contract of sale in case of in-
solvency, and that the act of stoppage was
an exercise of that riglit, and a third way
is by Implying constructive possession in
the seller for the purpose of a lien, to be
enforced by the act of stoppage, or, in oth-
er words, that this right is an enlargement
of the common-law right of lien. Pars.
Adm. 479.
The rule seems not to have been settled in
1S4J. Parke, B., said: "What the effect of
stoppage in ti'ansitu is, whether entirely to
rescind the contract, or only to replace the
vendor in the same position as if he had
not parted with the possession, and entitle
him to hold the goods until the price be
paid down, is a point not yet fully decided,
and there are difficulties attending each con-
struction."
Mr. Bell, in his Commentaries on the
Law of Scotland, favors the doctrine of
rescission. He says: "Although there are
many difficulties either way, it appears, on
the whole, most consistent with the great
lines of this doctrine of stoppage in trans-
itu, that the seller's security over the goods
sold, though perhaps in a large sense of
the nature of a lien, is given by equity
originally on the condition that the seller
shall take back the goods, as if the con-
tract were ab initio recalled."
There are some other authorities favor-
ing the same view, and there are others
that favor the theory of a lien. Feise v.
Wray, 3 East, 03; Ex parte Gwynne, 12
Ves. 379; Lickbarrow v. Mason, 6 East, 21,
note.
Mr. Parsons says that the earlier Eng-
lish cases sustain the doctrine of a lien,
and intimates that later authorities changed
the ground to that of rescission, but that
the latest returned to the original doctrine.
Pars. Adm. 481. Whatever uncertainty
there may be as to the rule in England,
the decisions In this country are quite pre-
ponderating in favor of the theory of a
lien. Rowley v. Eigelow, 12 Pick. 307; Stan-
ton V. Eager, 16 Pick. 467-475; Arnold v.
Delano, 4 Gush. 33, 39; Newhall v. Vargas,
I 13 Ble. 93, 15 Me. 314; and cases cited;
I Rogers v. Thomas, 20 Conn. 53; Jordan v.
! .Tames, 5 Ohio, SS-98; Harris v. Pratt, 17
N. Y. 263. The elementary writers favor
the same view. 2 Kent, Comm. 541; Pars.
Adm. 483: Pars. Cent. 598. The question
has never been, that I am aware, definite-
ly decided in this state. As an original
question the doctrine of rescission com-
mends itself to my judgment as being more
simple, and in most cases, more just to
both parties than the notion that the act
of stoppage is the exercise of a right of
lien, but in deference to the prevailing cur-
rent of authority, I should hesitate in at-
tempting to oppose it by any opinion of
my own, and for that reason I do not deem
it necessary to state the grounds which
influence my judgment.
It is found as a fact that the policy was
delivered to the defendant as collateral se-
curity for the payment of the first two
notes referred to only, "and that the de-
fendant never acquired or had any inter-
est in said policy or in the moneys to ac-
crue or become payable thereon, except as
a creditor of the said firm, and to the ex-
tent of his claim upon the aforesaid two
notes against the said firm." The evidence
justified his finding. The letter of the de-
fendant of March 1, 1876, shows that he
did not then suppose that he had any le-
gal indebtedness against Babcock & Co.
At the time the policy was issued the car-
go of coal for which the last note was
given was in possession of the defendant
as he claimed, and had not been disposed
of, so that the balance, even if Babcock &
Co. were liable for it, could not then be
known, and in March after, in a letter to
the defendant, introducing Mr. Wheelright,
Babcock & Co. say: "We will avail our-
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selves of the opportunity to have him ar-
range for the settlement of your claim
against us, leaving in abeyance the cargo
of Hepzibah, and the note given in settle-
ment of the same."
The testimony of the Insurance agent is
to the effect that the policy was delivered
to secure a fixed indebtedness, which could
only refer to the first two notes. 'We are
of opinion therefore that the defendant has
no lien upon this money to secure the bal-
ance of the note given for that cargo of
coal, even if Babcock & Co. are liable for it.
It follows that the judgment must be af-
firmed.
All concur, except EARL, J., dissenting.
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selves of the opportunity to have him ar­
range for the settlement of your claim 
against us, leaving in abeyance the cargo 
of Hepzibah, and the note given in settle­
ment of the same." 
The testimony of the Insurance agent is 
to the effect that the policy was delivered 
to secure a fixed indebtedness, w hich could 
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only refer to the first two notes. "IT"e are 
of opinion therefore that the defendant bas 
no lien upon this money to secure the bal­
ance of the note given for that cargo of 
coal, even if Babcock & Co. are liable for it. 
It follows that the judgment must be af­
firmed. 
All concur, except EARL, J., dissenting. 
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KIXCMAN et al. v. DENISON et al.
(48 N. W. 26, 84 Mich. 608.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. Feb. 27, 1891.
Error to circuit court, Keut county; Wil-
liam E. Grove, Judge.
Replevin by Kingman & Co. against Wil-
liam C. Denison and the McCormick Hai'-
vesting Machine Company. There v^as a
judgment in defendants' favor, and plain-
tiffs bring error.
Taggart & Denison. for appellants. Sweet
& Perkins, for apisellees.
LONG, J. On July 8, 1889, defendant Den-
ison wrote the plaintiffs at Peoria, 111., or-
dering 5,000 pounds of twine. No dealings
had ever been had between the parties prior
to that time. The plaintiffs received the let-
ter next day, and at once wrote Denison:
"We have entered your order, and twine
will go forward to-morrow." On July 11th
the twine was shipped to W. C. Denison,
Grand Rapids, Mich., plaintiffs taking ship-
ping bill from the railroad company there,
and on the same day sent it to Denison,
with statement of account for value of the
twine. The twine was received at Grand
Rapids by the Grand Rapids & Indiana Rail-
road Company, July 17th, and on the ISth
they turned it over to a teamster, who deliv-
ered it at the store which was occupied by
Denison at the time the order was made.
It appears that on July 9th the Grand Rap-
ids Savings Bank caused an attachment to
be levied upon Denison"s property. On that
evening Denison gave the bank a chattel
mortgage on all the goods in the store and
at a warehouse there, and a store situate
at another place outside of Grand Rapids.
July 10th, 11th, and 12th he gave mortgages
on the same property to several other cred-
itors, two of them being given to the defend-
ant the McCormick Harvesting Machine
Company. The goods mortgaged were held
in the store by the agents of the bank until
they were sold under one of the mortgages,
which was about July ISth, at which time
the defendant the McCormick Harvesting
Machine Comiiany bid the goods in, and con-
tinued to occupy the store, putting Mr. Deni-
son in as its agent. The McCormick Har-
vesting Machine Company mortgage con-
tained a clause, after a description of the
property mortgaged, as follows: "And all
additions to and substitutes for any and all
the above-described property." On Septem-
ber 7th plaintiffs, who had no notice or
knowledge of the changed condition of Mr.
Denison's affairs, drew on him at sight for
the amount of the bill. This draft was not
paid, and on September 14th plaintiffs wrote
him for prompt remittance, which was not
made. On September 19, 1889, plaintiffs
brought replevin against the defendants for
the twine, finding about one-half of it; the
balance having been sold out of the store by
citii'.rKiiS. ruop. — 11
the JlcCormick Harvesting Machine Com-
pany. On the trial of the cause the defend-
ants waived I'cturn of tlu! property, and had
verdict and judgment against the plaintiffs
for $351.01, the value of the twine taken,
and costs. Plaintiffs bring error.
The plaintiffs asked the court to Instruct
the jury that plaintiffs were entitled to a
verdict; and in the ninth request aske<l an
instruction that "if Mr. Deui.son did not in
fact receive the twine at liis store, but was
not there when it was delivered, and never
received and accepted it for his use in any
way, except that, finding it in the store, he
allowed the mortgagees to assume control
of it, plaintiffs could retake it as against
him." And in the fourteenth request it was
asked that the jury be instructed that the
McCormick Company, as mortgagee, is in
no better position than Mr. Denison. Its
mortgage does not cover this twine, nor is
it a bona fide purchaser. Several requests
were also asked for instructions to the jury
relating to the insolvency of Mr. Denison at
the time of the purchase, and his intent not
to pay for the twine at the time of Its pur-
chase, or at the time when it was received
at the store, on the 18th of July. These
last-named requests we do not deem it nec-
essary to set out here for an understanding
of the points involved. The requests set
out were refused by the trial court, and up-
on such ruling the plaintiff' assigns error.
The court, in its charge to the jury, stated:
"Plaintiff claims the right to the possession
of these goods at the time this suit was
commenced — First, Because as counsel
claiiiis, the goods were ordered, were pur-
chased, by Mr. Denison at a time when he
was insolvent, and knew that he was insol-
vent, and h.ad no intention, or at least no
reasonable expectation, of paying for them
according to the terms of the contract; and
the plaintiff's counsel also claims the right
of stoppage in transit. All I need to say in
regard to the latter claim is that I think the
right of stoppage in transit, under the facts
of this case as shown by the evidence, has
no application whatever; there is no such
right existing." This part of the charge re-
lating to the right of stoiipage in transit is
assigned as error. The court was in error
in refusing these rdquests to charge and in
the charge as given. It is not seriously
contended here but that, under the evidence
given on the trial, the defendant Denison
was insolvent at the time the goods were
ordered. At least this was a question of
fact which should have been submitted to
the jury; aud, if so found, the question of
the right of stoppage in transit was an im-
portant question in the case. The right of
stoijpage In transit is a right possessed by
the seller to reassume the possession of
goods not paid for while on their way to the
vendee, in case the vendee becomes insol-
vent before he has acquired actual posses-
sion of them. It is a privilege allowed to
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the seller for the particular purpose of pro-
tecting him from the insolvency of the con-
signee. The right is one highly favored in
the law, being based upon the plain reason
of justice and equity that one man's prop-
erty should not be applied to the payment
of another man's debts. Gibson v. Carruth-
ers. S ilees. & W. 337. But it is properly
exercised only upon goods which are in
passage and are in the hands of some inter-
mediate ijerson between the vendor and
vendee in jDrocess, and for the puriiose of
delivery, and this right may be exercised
whether the insolvency exists at the time of
the sale or occurs at any time before actual
delivery of the goods, without the knowl-
edge of the consignor. O'Brien v. Norris, 16
Md. 122; Reynolds v. Railway Co., 43 N. H.
5S0; Blum v. Marks. 21 La. Ann. 2CS; Bene-
dict V. Scaettle, 12 Ohio St. 515. This right
of stoppage in transit will not be defeated
by an apparent sale, fraudulently made,
without consideration, for the purpose of
defeating the right. There must lie a pur-
chase for value without fraud, to have this
effect. Harris v. Pratt, 17 N. Y. 249. In
the present case it appears that the goods
arrived in Grand Rapids July 17th, and were
taken to the store on the 18th. Mr. Deni-
son was not in the store at the time they
were taken in. Jlr. Talford was in posses-
sion of all the goods and of the store at this
time for all the mortgagees, and after the
sale under the mortgage the JlcCormick
Company took possession, and was in pos-
session at the time this replevin suit was
commenced. The testimony tends to show
that at tlie time demand was miide upon
I lie McCormick Compnny and Mr. Denison
fur tlie twine Mr. Denison stated that he
thought the plaintiff, haviug heard of his
financial affairs, would not ship the twine,
and that lie did not know it had been ship-
ped until it was in the store; and he was
very sorry It had come, under the clreum-
stajDces. The McCormick Company claimed
that by the terms of their mortgage they
were entitled to hold the twine. The court
was in error in not submitting to the jury
the question whether the goods had come
actually to the possession of Mr. Denison.
The circumstances tend strongly to show
that he never had actual possession of them,
and never claimed them as owner. He had
made the order, and was notified that they
would be shipped; but from that time for-
ward it is evident that he made no claim
to them. The McCormick Company claim-
ed that they passed to it under the terms of
its mortgage". It however, stood in no bet-
ter position than Denison. If the goods
never actually came into the possession of
Denison as owner, the mortgage lien would
not attach, even under the clause in the
mortgage covering after-acquired property.
It does not stand in the position of a bona
fide purchaser of the property. The right
of stoppage could not be divested by a pur-
chase of the goods under the mortgage sale.
The transit had not ended unless there was
actual delivery to Mr. Denison. These were
questions of fact for the jury, which the
court refused to submit. If the jury had
found that Denison was insolvent at the
time the order was made, or became insol-
vent at any time before the claimed deliv-
ery of the goods, and that the goods wore
never actually delivered to the iwssession
of Mr. Denison. then the vendors' rights
would have been paramount to any right
which the McCormick Company could have
acquired at the mortgage sale. Underbill v.
Booming Co., 40 Mich. OGO; Lentz v. Rail-
way Co., 53 Mich. 444, 10 N. "W. 13S; "White
V. Mitchell, 38 Mich. 31)0; James v. Griffin,
2 Mees. & W. 023. In the view we have
taken of tlie case, we think the other ques-
tions raised are unimportant, and we will
not pass upon them. Tlie judgment of the
court below must be reversed, with costs,
and a new trial ordered. The other jus-
tices concurred.
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t he seller fol' the pal'ticular purpo e of pro- I 
tecting him from the insol>ency of the con­
-ignee. The right is one highly favored in 
the law, being based upon the plain reason 
of justice and equity that one man's prop­
erty should not be applied to the payment 
of anothel' man·- debts. G ibson v. Carruth­
el's. )lees. & W. 337. Ilut it is properly 
exerci ed only upon goods w h ich are i n  
p a  ,age and are in the bands of some inter­
media re per on between the -rendor and 
>endee in proce . . and for the purpose o f  
deli>ery, a n d  t h i  right m a y  b e  exer<.:isetl 
whether the in oh-ency exists at the 1.ime of 
the sale or occurs at any time before actual 
tleli>ery of the goods, w i thout the know!- I 
edge of the cou -ignol'. O'Brien v. Norris, 16 
:\Id. 1'.!'.! ; Reynold v. Railway Co., 43 N. II. 
3 O ;  Blum >. )l arks, 21 La. Ann. '.!() ' ; Bene­
dict v. Scaettle. 12 Ohio St. 515. Thi right 
of stoppage in transit w i ll not be defeated 
by an apparent sale, fraudulently made, 
without con icleration. fOl' the purpose of 
defea t i ng the right. There mu t be a pur­
cha e for value without fraud, to have this 
effect. Hani v. Pratt. 17 N. Y. 249. I n  
the> pl'e ent case i t  appt>:us t hat t h e  good 
ani>ed in G rand Rapid J u ly 17th, and were 
taken to the store on the 1 'th. )Ir. Deni-
on was not in t he store at the time they 
"-ere taken in. ;\Ir. Talford was in pos es­
:<inn of all the good and of the tore at this 
t i me for all the mo rtgagees, and after the 
sale under t he mortgage the l\IcCormick 
C.'om11:rny took po ession, and was in pos­
sc,sion at the time thi replevin uit was 
e11mmenced. 'l'he testimony tend. to how 
t h:it at tbe t i me demand wa made upon 
t he :-.re ormick Comp:1 ny and "'fr. Denison 
f11r the twine ;\ I r. Deni on stated t hat he 
thnu;::ht the pla iul ifr, bavin;:: heard of bi 
fi nancial a ffairs. woulcl not h i p  the twine, 
and that be clid not lrnow it bad been ship­
ped until it was in tbe store; and he was 
very • orry It had come, under the clrcum­
�ta nces. The M<'C'ormlclc Company claimed 
D i gitize by 
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that by the terms of their mortgage they 
were entitled to hold the tw ine. The court 
wa in error in not submitting to the j ury 
the question whether the good bad come 
actually to the possession of i\lL". Denison. 
The circum tances tend strongly to show 
that he never had actual posses ion of them, 
and never claimed them as owner. Ile had 
made the order. and wa not i fied that they 
would be shipped; but from that time for­
ward it is e>ident that be made no claim 
to them. 'l.'he )!cCormick Company claim­
ed that t hey pas eel to i t  under the terms or 
its mortgage: It howeYer, stood in no bet­
ter position than Deni on. If the good -
ne>er actually came into the po ession of 
Denison as o w ner, the mortgage lien would 
not attach, even under the clause i n  the 
mortgage covering after-acquired property. 
It does not stand in the position of a bona 
fide purchaser of the property. The rigbt 
o f  stoppage could not be clive ted by a. pur­
chase o f  the goods under the mort;::age sale. 
Tbe transit had not ended unless there was 
actual deli very to ;\Ir. Deni.on. These were 
question of fact for the ju ry, wh ich th 
comt refused to ubmit. If tbe j ury had 
found t ha t  Deni on wa in olvent at t lle 
t i me the order was made. or bcrame insol­
vent at any t i me before the clai med del iY ·  
ery o f  the goods, and t h a t  t h e  good w re 
never actually delive red to tbe pos essiou 
of i\Ir. Deni on. then the vendor ' righ t s  
would have been paramount to a n y  right 
which t he "'IcCormick ompany oulcl have 
acquired at the mortga :::-e sale. Underhill v.  
Booming Co.,  40 ;\I ich. GGO; Lentz v .  Rail­
wa.1· o.,  53 �Ilch. 4U, rn . W. 1:{ ; Whit ' 
v. Mitchell, 3 ;\ l lch. 390; James v. Gritlin, 
2 Mees. & W. G2:�. In the ' i e'v we ha Ye 
taken or the ca e, we think the other que:o:­
tlons raised are unimportant, and we will  
not pass upon them. Tbe j udgment of the 
court below must be reversed, with co ts, 
and a new trial ordered- The other j us­
tices concu rred. 
O ri i r- ! fror 1 
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lUGUT.S OF .SKLLEH AGAINST GOODS— STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.
108
TUFTS V. SYLVESTER.
(9 Atl. 35T, 79 Me. 213.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. March 1,
1SS7.
On report from supreme judicial court,
Franklin eounty.
Trover by the vendor of merchandise
against the messenger of the insolvent ven-
dee. The opinion states the facts.
S. Clifford Belcher, for plaintiff. H. L.
Whiteomb, for defendant.
PETERS, C. J. The plaintiff sold a bill of
soods to be shipped at Boston to the buyer
at Farmingtou, in this state. The buyer,
becoming insolvent after the purchase, coun-
termanded the order, but not in season to
stop the goods. Before tlie goods came, he
liad gone into insolvency, and a messenger
liad talien possession of his property. An
express company bringing the goods tendered
them to the buyer, who refused to receive
them, but the messenger accepted the goods
from the carrier, paying his charges thereon.
After this, but before an assignee was ap-
pointed, the seller made a demand upon both
the carrier and the messenger, attempting
til reclaim his goods. The question, upon
these facts, is whether the goods were sea-
sonably stopped in transitu to preserve the
plaintiff's lien thereon. We think they were.
The right of stoppage in transitu is favored
by the law. It is clear that the goods did not
go into the buyer's possession. He refused
to receive them. He had a moral and legal
right to do so. Such an act is commended
by jurists and judges. He in this way makes
reparation to a confiding vendor. "He may
refuse to take possession," says Mr. Benja-
min, "and thus leave unimpaired the right
of stoppage in transitu, unless the vendor be
anticipated in getting possession by the as-
signees of the buyer." Benj. Sales, § 858.
In Grout v. Hill, 4 Gray, 3G1, Shaw, C. J.,
says: "Where a purchaser of goods on credit
finds that he shall not be able to pay for
them, and gives notice thereof to the vendor,
and leaves the goods In possession of any
person, when they arrive, for the use of the
vendor, and the vendor on sucli notice ex-
pressly or tacitly assents to it, it is a good
stoppage in transitu, although the bankrupt-
cy of the vendee intervene." See same case
at page 3G9; 1 Pars. Cont. *590, and cases.
The decision of the case, then, turns upon
the qtiestion whether the messenger could ac-
cept the goods, and terminate the lieu of the
vendor. We do not find any authority for it.
A bankruptcy messenger acts in a passive
capacity; is intntsted with no discretionary
powers; acts under mandate of court, or does
certain things particularly prescribed by the
law which creates the oflice; is mostly a
keeper or defender of property, — a cus-
todian until an assignee comes; and he can
neither add to nor take from the banl<rupt's
estate. He is to take possession of the "es-
tate" of the insohent. These goods had not
become a part of the estate. He was not at
liberty to affirm or disaffirm any act of the
insolvent. The law imposes on him no such
responsibility. Chancellor Kent says that
the transit is not ended while the goods are
in the hands of a carrier or middle-man.
A messenger has no greater authority, ex
ottlcio, than a middle-man, excepting as the
insolvent law expressly prescribes. In Hil-
liard's Bankruptcy (page 101) the office of
a messenger is likened to that of a sheriff
under a writ. He becomes merely the recip-
ient of property. The title of the assignee
when appointed, dates back of the appoint-
inent of a messenger. Until appointment of
assignee, the bankrupt himself is a proper
person to tender money for the redemption
of lands sold for taxes. Hampton v. Rouse,
22 Wall. 203. See Stevens v. Palmer, 12
Mete. 464. The case cited by the plaintiff.
Sutro V. Hoile, 2 Neb. 186, supports this con-
tention.
Defendant defaulted.
WALTON, VIRGIN, LIBBEY, EMERY,
and HASKELL, JJ., concurred.
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CHATTEL MOUTGAGES.
BEEMAN V. LAWTON.
(37 Me. 543.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 1854.
On exceptions from nisi prius; Rice, Judge.
Trover for tlie conversion of a piano forte.
Botli parties claimed under one Bartlett who
mortgaged it to defendant, in February,
1S51, which mortgage was recorded, and
some months .ifter (November 4, 1851,) gave
a bill of sale of it to plaintiff, but he could
prove no delivery or possession. Xhe plain-
tiff introduced evidence tending to show that
the mortgage was made with the design of
defeating the creditors of Bartlett. The de-
fendant proved by his partner in business
faftcr a release by him of all his interest in
the piano) that in Jlay, 1851, Bartlett wish-
ed him to become surety for him on a poor
debtor's bond. He declined. Bartlett then
said to defendant: "You have that piano.
If you will sign the bond, and I don't hold
you harmless, you take the piano, and sell
it or keep it, as you see fit." The defend-
ant and his partner signed the bond. In
the succeeding fall the defend.iut took the
piano into his possession. In the spring of
18.53 the witness paid the execution upon
which the bond was given out of the part-
uershij) funds, amounting to $140. The
judge instructed the jury that, if Bartlett
authorized the defendant to sell or keep the
piano in consideration that his partner would
sign the bond, then the release of said wit-
ness to defendant discharged the dofcmlant's
claim. Tlie verdict was for plaintiff, and
defendant excepted.
I'aine & CUiy, for defendant. Danfurlh &
\Yoods, for plaintiff.
APPLETON, J. It appears that on Feb-
ruary 27, 1851, one Bartlett, from whom both
parties derive title, executed a mortgage of
the piano in dispute to the del'enilanl, who
in the fall following took the same Into his
possession. The plaintiff's bill of sale was
dated November 4, 1851. As between these
opposing titles, that of the del'endant was
I>rior, and possession was acquired inider it,
Init it was resisted on the ground th;it it was
fraudulent. No excepllons having been tak-
en to the Instructions on this branch of the
case, they must be deemed correct. Indeed,
It was conceiled that the Instructions given
did not apply to the written mortgage, so
that the (luestjon to be considered Is wheth-
er they are erroneous In reference to the
Hiiliject-mattor to which they were specially
jippli( able. The verdli't of the Jury, which
WHS for the pliilnllfr. temls to establish the
fact that the wrillen iTiorlgage was fraudu-
lent or Invalid for simie other cause, ns, nn-
le88 such had been the rase, the defendant,
being In piiHHesslon under n title prior to the
plaint Iff. iniiHt neeessailly have been entitled
to a verdict.
It appears that in May, 1851. Bartlett call-
ed on S. W. Lawton, a witness in the case,
with his brother, the defendant. Bartlett
wished the witness to execute as surety for
him a poor debtor's bond, which he declined.
He then turned to the defendant, and said:
"Ton have the piano, and if yo\i will sign the
bond, and I don't hold .you harmless, you
take the piano, and sell it or keep it, as you
see fit." The witness signed the bond.
Last spring the witness paid the execution
uiwn which the bond was taken, out of the
joint funds of the defendant and himself,
they being partners. The amount paid was
.'!;140. It is in reference to this transaction
that the instructions complained of wore
given.
It is to be observed that at this time the
defendant was not in possession, so that the
conversation related to a piano of which he
neither had possession nor (the mortgage be-
ing for some cause void) the right to posses-
sion. The del'endant claimed that this trans-
action constituted a mortgage, but such was
not its character. By Kev. St. c. 125, § 32,
no mortgage "shall bo valid against any
other persons than the parties thereto, unless
possession of the mortgaged property be de-
livered to and retained by the mortgagee;
or unless the mortgage has been or shall be
recorded by the clerk of tlio town where the
mortgager resides." A delivery of personal
property for security is not a transfer on
condition, and does not constitute a mort-
gage thereof, but a pledge merely. Eastman
V. Avery, 23 Me. 248. So that, even if the
piano had been delivered for the purposes of
security, the defendant could not have held
the property as mortgagee. Much more will
it not constitute a mortgage when the prop-
erty is neither present nor delivered.
The defendant shows no right to retain the
property as a pawn or pledge. To consti-
tute a pawn or pledge, there must be a de-
livery and retention of the possession of the
thing pawned. If the pawnee give up the
l)ossession to the pawner, his rights are gone.
The element of possession fallitig, there can
be no pawn nor pledge. Story, Ballm. § 3(WI;
Haven v. Law, 2 N. H. Ifi; Bonsey v. Ainee.
8 Pick. 23(5. II can at most be viewed only
aa a mere executory agreement, conferring
no rights of possession or property over the
Uilng to which II related.
The witness I>awlon, was neither mort-
gag(>e, pawnee, nor vendee, and coidd confer
no right on the di^fendant to retain posses-
sion, nor would his rele.'ise be of any avail.
Ah by the transaction of May no rights were
acipiircd by the defenilant or the witness,
and ns the Instructions related thereto, they
must 1)0 regarded as Immaterial. Excep-
tions overruled.
SIIEPLKY, 0. J., nnd TENNEY and CUT-
TING, JJ., concurred.
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BEE.MA....� v .  LA WTO:N. 
(3i J\le. 543.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 1854 .. 
On exceptions from nisi  prius; Rice, J udge. 
Trove1· for the con version of a piano forte. 
Both parties claimed under one Bartlett who 
mortgaged i t  to defendant, in February, 
1851, which mortgage was recorded, and 
-=;ome months :ifter (November 4, 180 1 ,) gave 
a b i l l  of sale of it to pla i ntiff, but be could 
pro>e no deli very or pos ession. :r'he pl ain­
tiff introduced evide nce tcuding to ,bow that 
the mortgage was made w i th the design of 
uefeating the credi tors of Bartlett. The de­
fendant proved by his partner in bu:>iness 
l<lfter a release by bim of a l l  his interest i n  
t h e  pia no) t h at i n  i\Iay, 185 1 ,  Ba rt lett n- ish­
ed him to become surety for h i m  on a poor 
debtor's bond. He declined. B<H t lett then 
said to defendan t :  ··You have that pia no. 
I f  you will sign the bond, and I don't hold 
you ha rm less, you take the piano, and sel l  
i t  or keep i t, as y o u  see fit." Tlie defend­
ant a nd bis partner signed t he bond. I n  
the succeed ing fa l l  t h e  defem1ant took the 
p i a no i nto his possession. In the spring of 
1853 the 'l"l" i t ncss pa id the execut ion upon 
which the bond w a given o u t  of tb part­
nersh ip fund. , a mounting to $140. The 
j udge iust rncted the jury that. i f  Bartlett 
a n tl1orized the def ndant to sell or keep the 
pia no in consideration that his pa rtner would 
sign the hond, then the release o f  sa id wit­
nei:;s to defendant d i sch a rged t h e defendant's 
C'la im. The >err1 ict was for pl ai u t iff, a nd 
defen dant excepted. 
Paine c' Cla y, for defendant. Da nforth & 
Woo<ls, for pla i n t i f . 
A l 'P LI�TON, J .  I t  n ppears t l rn t  on Feb­
rna r.v :27, 1 51, one B:nl ll'tt, from " l lnm bot h  
parlie derive t i t le, executed a mort ::-airc o f  
t hP. pi a no i n  di sp ute t o  t h e  defe m l a 1 1 t . who 
in the fa ll fol lowlnA" took the sa m I n t o  l t ii:;  
posiwssion . Tile pla i n l i lI's !Ji l l  oC sale w:is 
r 1a lP• l  • 'o n•m he r l, l :il. As bctW<'C'll thl'sc 
opposi ng t i t le!!, t h at of tile rkfcnr 1 : 1 n t  w:is 
p rio r, n n < l  po;;scssion was a c q u i rC'd nntler i t ,  
lJUt i t  w a s  rcRi s t N I  o n  t h P g-1·0 1 1 1 H l  1 l l : 1t i l  " :ts  
fran<1 UIPnt. No :x c ·C' p l lo ns h a 1  In;.( 1 1!'<'11 t a k­
en t o  t he l nstnwtlons on t hl� hrn 11"11  of t he 
c·ase, t lwy m ust hP ck mec1 C'nt·rc< 'l .  I ndeed. 
I t  wa,., rn!lC'Pderl t h n t  the l rn -t rnc t lon R g- i l <' l l  
r 1 i t l  n o l  u ppl y t o  t h<' writ t Pn mort g-n g-e, Ro 
t h at t l w qu <'st ion t o  l ie> C'o1 1s l < l e>1·ccJ I s  wll<'t l l  
"l'  t l lPy :l l'P PJT0111 • 1 1 1 1>1 I n  l'Pfl'l'C'JlC 'l' to t lH' 
Hl l hJN· t mnt tcr t o  wh ld1 I h<'Y were t-iP<'C'ln l l y  
11 ppl1" n hlr'.  Th" \"rl'd id of t l w j u ry, \\  h iC ' l l  
Wll'I fqr th<' pl;t l n l l tf, t Pl l < ( S  t o  Ps l a hl lH b t h  
fn<'t t h n t  t l w \\ rl l l P n  mort irnit<' w n s  fn1nrh1  
lrnt o r  l n n 1l lcl for sn11w nt hl'r 1·n 1 1sP, ! IH,  1 1 1 1  
) PS� H U I'  h hn r l  1 11 ' ! ' 1 1  t i t!' rn HI', t hr' c l C 'fc · l l c l  :1 11  t '  
hP! n g In pnHHf'HHlon 1 1n c l 1>r n 1 1 1 1 < '  p ri o r t n  t h r 
pln l n l lff, m 1 1Ht UCl'l'iiHH l'l ly bn\'c l wPn •n t l l lc r l  
to u vcrd lcL 
D i g itiz ct by 
I NTE RNET ARCHIVE 
I t  appears that i n  May, 185 1 ,  Ba rtlet t rail­
ed on S. W. Lawton, a witness i n  t he case, 
'l"l" itb his brother, the defendant. Bartll'tt 
w ished the witness to execute a s  surety for 
him a poor debtor's bond, which be derliued. 
He then tu rned to the defenda nt. and saill : 
"You ba>e the piano, and i f  you w i ll igo tbP 
bond, and I don't hold you ba rm le s, you 
take the piano, and sel l it or keep it, a you 
see fit." The w i tness signed the bond. 
La t spring the w itness paid the execut ion 
upon which the bond was taken, out of t he 
joint funds of the defendant ancl biwself. 
they being partners. The amount pa i d  wns 
:;;Ho. It is in reference to this transaction 
th at the in struct ions complai ned of were 
gi YCD. 
I t  is to be ob eHed tllat a t  this t i me the 
defendant was not i n  possession, so t hat t he 
con•e rsa t ion related to a piano of ·1yhil'h be 
nei t her 11::1 < 1  poss ssion nor (the mortg:lge hc­
i ng for some cnuse >oic1) the right to llo>:sc'­
sion. The c1e fendn ut claimed t ha t  t h i s  trans­
act ion const i t u tccl a mort gage, but sudl \Y;l S 
not its character. By Hev. t. c. l:!:i. § 3:2. 
no mortgag-e " lla l l  be v a l i d  aga i n. t a ny 
ot her persons tlla u the va rties thereto, u n h':;;s 
pos ession of ti.le mortga ""Cc! prope rty be d<'­
l i vered to a n d  reta i n c l  by t he m1w t ;�a.:.:1•t• ; 
or u nless t h  rnortgagc h a s  beeu or , ha 11 he 
recorded by the clerk oC t h  tow n  wlwt" ti le  
mortgager r sides." A d l i Yery of 1wrsnual 
property t'nr ,ecu ri t y i not a t r:rnsf\'r n u  
condi t ion, : incl  does not con t i tu te a mort­
gage thereof, but a plet 1 ge merely. Ea, tma 11 
v. Avery, 23 :\ I e. 2i So t h at, even if t ile 
piano llac1 l>een deli ,·e r  <1 for t ile pnrpo. es or 
seC'uri ly , t he clefc nd n nt could not btlYe hcl 1 1 
t he 1n·o 11erty as mo rtgng-ee. :\l uch mo1·e w i l l  
it not cou t i t ute a mortgage wbcn the prnJl· 
er! y is neit her pre.c nt nor c1el iYcrc11 . 
'l'he dC'fen11nnt shows no right to retain the 
pw pC'rty as n pa w n or pledge. To rn nst i­
t n l L '  a pa w n  or plt>11gc, t h ere mu st be a 1 1 t•­
l i \ ery a nc1  ret n t ion or the possessio n nC t h<' 
thing paw ncd. I C  t h  p:nv ne giv u p  t hC' 
J l!1i<H1•s:- io11 to t he pa wnC't', his riA'll ts a rc ·"' HIP. 
ThC' I mc11t or po�Rrsi:;ion fa i l in g-, there C':lll 
hP no pa wn nor 1 1lP11 �C'. Rt ory, B:1 i l m .  § ::01 1 :  
J l n Yen v. Ln w, 2 r . J I . J fl ;  Ho usey v. A m Pl'. 
8 l ' iclc :.?:ln. J I  C'l l n  :1! most he YiC wt'd on!�· 
as n mC'rc cxp1 · 1 1 t ory :1 ;:r ree men t, cnnfC'tTin:: 
1\0 rig h ls of JlOSl'l'SSion Ol' lll'Ol Jerl y O\'t'r l hC' 
thing- to " h klt  lt rPl: t t P1 1 .  
'l'h w l t 1wss T,n w l n n ,  waR UC'i t h er mnrt 
g:1gC'P, JHl w neC', 1 101' \ C ' l l r lCP, :1 1 1 ( 1  cn11ld ('(l l l  1'1 1' 
no ri ght on t he 11P f1•111 l a n t  to rC't :t l n pnss<'s· 
Hlnn, nor won l c l  h l R  l'Pll'tHiP hf' of :l i ly :n a i I .  
A s h.\' the l n1 1 1Ha ct iou or l a y  no i·l g h t s  W! 'l'P 
:wq ulrNl h.v t h!' < l c>fP11 1 l n n t  o r l l l < '  w l t n  .. :< s .  
n n r l  ns t i l l '  ln st rurt lnns r J n tcr1  t l ll'l'l'tn. t h• '.' 
1 1 1 1 1st  hc> rPr:n rdNI as l m m n l e rln l .  l1h < 'ep 
t Iona O\C 'lTl l l c >d .  
� f l f� l ' f , l•J Y.  0 . . T., n n <l 'l'l!JN lDY and C U T­
T l � G ,  JJ.,  cou ' l l l'l'Cd. 
O ri g i r a l  frr r1 
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HARDING T. COBURN.
(12 Mete. 333.)
Snpicme .Tmlicial Court of Massaehusetts.
Marcli Term, 1847.
This was an action of trespass against a
deputy slioi-iff for taking and carrying away
one wagon carriage, ironed, one wagon body,
partly fluislied, tive hundred felloes, two hun-
dred carriage hubs, one cab body, one wheel
jack, two axle-bar arms, one set of axle bars,
a lot of scrap iron, and one hoop; all of the
value of $420.
At the trial in the court of common pleas,
before Ward, J., the defendant .iustified un-
der a writ against Rufus Rowell, as whose
property the defendant attached the chattels
described in the plaintiff's writ. The plain-
tiff claimed the chattels under two mortgages
made to him by said Rowell. The first mort-
gage was dated July 13, 1S43, and described
the mortgaged property as follows: "All and
singular the stock, tools, and chattels belong-
ing to me, in and about the wheelwright's
shop occupied by me, situated on the easterly
side of the Dorchester turnpike, in that iiart
of Boston called South Boston." The second
mortgage, dated .Tune 12, 1844, was of "the
following described stock, chattels, and arti-
cles, situated and being in and upon the
land and buildings occupied by me on the
Dorchester turnpike, in that part of jjostou
called South Boston, viz.: Six hundred hubs;
four thousand feet of ash plank; two thou-
sand feet of oak plank; four thousand feet
of bass wood; four thousand feet of spokes;
ten sots of wheels; ten wagon bodies; four
exijress wagons; ten wagcin carriages; a
blacksmith's shop; all my tools and imple-
ments in my wood shop, paint shop, and
blacksmith's shop; and all other my personal
property situated as aforesaid, together with
all other personal property which I may put
on said premises during the term hereinafter
mentioned [one year] in the place of property
above enumerated, which may be sold and
delivered by me during said term."
The plaintiff gave in evidence the following
demand on the defendant, and statement of his
claim against Rowell:
"To Daniel J. Coburn. Deputy Sheriff: I,
Wilder Harding, of Boston, do hereby de-
mand payment of, and indemnity for, the
amount stated in the following account, viz.:
Rufus Kowell's duebill to me, dated Feb-
ruary 37tli, 1>44, for $ 4 50
Kufus Rowell's note to me, dated May 2d,
lS4i, for 325 .50
Rufus Rowell's note to me, dated Mav
tilh, 1844, for ". 174 83
Rufus Rowell's note to me, dated May
6th, 1844, for 270 00
Rufus Rowell's note to me, dated May
29th, 1844, for 835 50
Rufus Rowell's note to me, dated July
19lh, 1S44, for 63 00
$1,173 33
"All the above demands are now due and
payable from said Rowell to me.
"I also demand of yon Indemnity for my
liability as indorser. for the acconimodalion
and beuetit of said Rowell, of the following
described notes of hand, viz.:
Rufus Rowell's note to me, due October
8th, 1S44 J 352 67
Rufus Rowell's note to me, dated Nov.
3d, 1843, pavable in one year from date,
for ". 1,000 00
Rufus Rowoll's note to me, due Decem-
ber 1st, 1844 304 8:i
$3,830 8:i
"The foregoing demand is made on you
in consequence of an attachment made by
you, on a writ in favor of Phineas E. Gay
and C. E. Stratton against Rufus Rowell, re-
turnable at the next October term of the
cotu't of common pleas for the county of
Suffolk; which property I claim to hold un-
der two mortgages executed and delivered
by said Rowell to me,— the one dated July
13th, 1843, recorded in the registry of mort-
gages for the city of Boston, lib. 3.5, fol.
23'J; the other dated June 12th. 1844, and
recorded in said registry, lib. 40, fol. I'.i.
"Boston, September 23d, 1844.
"Wilder Harding."
It was admitted that no part of the proper-
ty attached was specifically described in the
last mortga,ge. But the plaintiff contended
that it passed under the general clause in
the mortga.ges.
It appeared that Rowell was extensively
engaged in carriage building at South Bos-
ton, and there occuisied one large lot of land,
having distinct shops thereon for the differ-
ent branches of his business, but all con-
nected together, so as to make one range of
buildings; and that the mortgaged property
was in these premises.
The plaintiff called witnesses to show that
the identical property attached was on said
premises at the date of the last mortgage.
This evidence was admitted, though objected
to by the defendant; but the judge ruled
that no articles passed under the mortgage
but such as were on the premises at the date
of the mortgages.
The plaintiff's evidence then tended to show
that two axle arms, $2; one cab body, ?40;
one hundred and twenty-five hubs, $62.50;
and one hundred and seventeen felloes, .$4.68,
—were the property of Rowell. on his prem-
ises, at the date of the second mortgage, and
were included therein, under the general
clause; that, besides the one hundred and
twenty-five hubs above named, there were
six hundred other hubs, specifically named
in said mortgage, and not attached by the
defendant; that the cab body was on the
premises, at the date of the mortgages, un-
finished, and that work and materials had
been added to it since.
The plaintiff introduced evidence tending
to show that his claim against Rowell, under
the mortgages, was substantially correct, as
stated in his demand upon the defendant.
The defendant's counsel then made the fol-
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CIIATTEL MOB.TG 1\ G ES. 
HARDI TG v. COBURN. 
(12 Mete. 333.) 
. upremc .Judicial Court of l\Iassachusetts. 
l\Iarch Term, 1847. 
This was an action of trespass against a 
deputy sheriff for taking and carrying away 
one wagon carriage, ironep, one wagon body, 
partly finished, five hundred felloes, two bun­
c lred carriag-<' bubs, one cab body, one wheel 
jack, two ax le-bar arms, one set of axle bars, 
a lot of scrap iron, and one hoop ; all of the 
\"alne of $420. 
A.t the trial  in the court of common pleas, 
before Ward, J., the defendant justified un­
tler a writ against Rufus Rowell, as whose 
prnperty the defendant attached the chattels 
clescribed in the plaintiff's writ. The plain­
tiIT claimed the chattels under two mortgages 
made to him by sa id Rowell. The first mort­
gage was dated July 13, 1843, and described 
the mortgaged prnpert�· as follows: ".All and 
iugular tile stock, tools, and chattels belong­
ing- to me, in and about the wheelwright's 
shop occupied by me, situated on the easterly 
side of the Dorcbeste1· turnpike, in that part 
of Boston called South Boston." The second 
mortgage, dated .June 12, 1844, was of "the 
following described stock, chattels, and arti­
cles, situ:l ted and being in and upon the 
lantl :ind buildings occupied by me on the 
Dorc:lJester turnpike, in that part of .oostou 
called South Boston, viz. : Six hundred hubs; 
four thousand feet of asb plank ; two thou­
sand feet of oak pla nk;  four thousand feet 
of bass wood ; four thousand feet of spokes ; 
ten ets of wheels ; ten wagon bodies ; four 
express wagons ; ten wagon carria;;es; a 
blacksmith's shop; all my tools and imple­
ments in my wood shop, paint shop, and 
blacksmith's shop ; and a l l  other my personal 
property situated as aforesaid, together with 
all other personal property which I may put 
on said premises during the term hereinafter 
mentioned [one year] in the 11lace of property 
abo,-e en umerated, which may be sold and 
delh·ered by me during said term." 
The plaintiff gave in evidence the following 
demand on the defendant, and statement of bis 
claim n.gainst Rowell :  
. . To Daniel J .  Coburn, Deputy Sheriff: I, 
Wilder Harding, of Boston, do hereby de­
mand payment of, and indemnity for, the 
a mount stated in the following account, viz. : 
Rufus Rowell's auebill to me, dated Feb-
ruary 2ith, h44, for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 4 50 
Rufus Rowell's note to me, aatea A.lay 2a, 
1 H, for. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 50 
Rufus Rowell's note to me, dated May 
lith, 1844, for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . li4 82 
Rutus Rowell's note to me, dated May 
61 b, 1844, for . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270 00 
Rufus Rowell's note to me, aatea .May 
29th, 1844, for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 50 
Rufus Rowell's note to me, aated July 
19th, 1844. for. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  f\3 00 
$1, 173 32 
"All the above demands are now due and 
paynble from said Rowell to me. 
c · ::i · �·-- -z 
'TE RNET A R C H  V E  
" I  also demand of you Indemnity for my 
l ia hil ity a s  inclorsc>r, for the> a<·c·ommo<la t ion 
and benefit of said Ilowc>ll, or t he following­
clescribed notes of hand, viz. :  
P.ufus Rowell's n o t e  t o  me, d u e  October 
Stb, 1 �44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $ 352 67 
Rufus Rowell's note to me, aated Nov. 
3d, 1843, payable in one year from date, 
for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000 00 
Ru fus Row,ill's note to me, due Decem-
ber 1st, U>44 . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . . . . • • . . • • 304 3:3 
$2,b::lO 8·� 
"The foregoing demand is macle> on yo11 
in consequence of an attachment made by 
you, on a writ in favor of Phineas E. Gav 
and C. E. Stratton against Rufus Howell, r�­
turnable at the next October term of the 
court of common pleas for the county of 
Suffolk; which property I claim to bold un­
de1· two mortgages executed and delivered 
by said Rowell to me,-tbe one cla ted .July 
13th, 1843, recorded in the registry of mort­
gages for the city of Boston, l ib.  35, fol. 
23U; tbe other dated June 12th, 1844, and 
recorded in said registry, lib. 40, fol. ll.J. 
"Boston, September 23d, 1844. 
"Wilder Harding." 
It  was admitted that n o  part of tbe propi>r­
ty a ttached was specifically described in t b e  
last mortgage. But . t h e  plaintiff conten ded 
that it passed under the genera l clause in 
the mortgages. 
It appeared that Rowell was extensivelv 
engaged in carriage building at South Bo�­
ton, and there occupied one large lot of land, 
having distinct shops thereon for the differ­
ent branches of bis business, but al l  con­
nected together, so as to make one range of 
bui ldings; and that the mortgaged property 
was in these premises. 
The plaintit:!' called witnesses to show that 
tbe identical property attacheu was on said 
premises at the date of tbe last mortgage. 
This evidence was admitted, though objected 
to by the defendant;  but the j udge ruled 
that no articles passed unde1· the mortgage 
but such as were on the premises at tbe date 
of tbe mortgages. 
Tbe plaintiff's evidence then tended to show 
that two axle arms, $2; one cab body, $40; 
one hundred aud twenty-five bubs, $62.50; 
and one hundred and seventeen felloes, $4.GS, 
-were the property of Rowell, on his prem· 
ises, at the date of tbe second mort,!!;age. a nd 
were included therein. under the general 
clause; that, besides the one hundred an<l 
twenty-five h ubs above named, tllc>re wer!' 
six hundred other bubs, specifically nameu 
in said mortgage, and not attached by the 
defendant; that the cab body was on the 
premises, at the date of the mortgages, un­
finished, and that work and materials bad 
been added to it since. 
The plaintiff i ntroduced evidence tendini: 
to show that bis claim against Rowell, under 
tile mortgages, was substantially correct. as 
stated in his demand upon the clefenclant. 
'.l'he defendan rs counsel then made the fol 
J r. ::f , r  I f, UI I 
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lowing objections to the maiuteuauce of tlie
plaintiff's action: (1) That the first mortgage
was void. The court so ruled, and the plain-
tiff abandoned that mortgage at the trial.
(2) That the second mortgage passed no prop-
erty besides that which was specilically and
particularly described. But the .iudire ruled
that the property situate on the premises at
the date of the mortgage, and included iu the
general description in the mortgage, might
pass, though not specifically set out. (3) That
the specific enumeration of six hundred hubs
in the mortgage excluded the other one hun-
dred and twenty-five hubs from passing un-
der the general clause. But the judge ruled
that they might pass, if such was the inten-
tion of the parties at the time. (4) That
said mortgage should not cover any property
which had been changed by mamrfacture
since the date of the mortgage. But the
judge ruled, and instructed the jury, that if
so much labor and new material had since
been added by Rowell to any article mort-
gaged as substantially to change it. or so
that the subsequent additions of labor and
material became an important part of its
present value, it would not pass to the mort-
gagee; but that, if it remained substantially
the s;ime, it might pass. (5) That the plain-
tiff's demand and statement in writing were
in form insufficient. But the judge ruled oth-
erwise. ((!) That the plaintiff's said demand
was insufliciont, because his claim, as proved,
and that set out in his written statement,
were not the same in amount. The judge
ruled and inslnicted the jury that it was in-
cumbent on the plaintiff to prove his written
statement to be substantially true and cor-
rect; that any fraudulent or substantial er-
ror in his statomcnt would defeat his action;
but that no slight, innocent, and immaterial
niisslatemeut would defeat his action, if the
Jury were satisfied tliat his statement was
substantially correct and true.
It appeared that the defendant, before mak-
ing the atUichment, took copies of the two
mortgages to the premises of Rowell, and
laying aside, by the assistance of Rowell. all
tlie articles specifically enumerated In the
,><cenn(| mortgage, attached all other articles
Ilieie found. And It also appeared that Row-
(•II, after making the moiigages, coullnticd
to conduct his business as usual, remaining
in possession of the property, and changing
It by manufacture, and for other proi>erty,
and nii.xing it with biB other newly-purchased
properly.
Tlu" plnlntirr clahncd to hold nil the pmp-
erly, new and old, by virtue of hl.s ninrtgiiges.
The ilefeii.lanl objected that the pliilnliff.
not having iiointed out and demanded the
preelse arlleles which he cl»lm<>d, and hav-
luK perinltled the mortgagee (o remain Iu pos-
session, and to mix the mortgaged propeity
with lil.H newlya<'ipilred property of the same
kind, the action of lr(>spa,sH coiilil not be
inaliilalned. I'pon thin point (it being adiiilt-
li'd that the plaiiilKT <'laliiii'd b>>na tide the
whole of the property as covered by his
mortgages, the newly-acquired as well as the
old property) the judge ruled against the de-
fendant.
The defendant also objected that the plain-
tiff's demand was insufficient, because it did
not distinguish the property claimed imder
each mortgage, nor the amount of the plain-
tiff's lien on each part of it, but was gen-
eral on both mortgages. B>it the judge over-
ruled the objection.
It was agreed by the parties that the jury,
if they should find for the plaintiff, might
I'eturn a verdict specifying as to what ai-
ticles they found. The jury found the de-
fendant guilty as to the four items above
mentioned, viz. two axle arms, one cab body,
one hundred and twenty-five hubs, and one
hundred and seventeen felloes, and assessed
damages at $109.18; and not guilty as to the
other articles mentioned in the plaintiff's
writ. The defendant alleged exceptions to
the foregoing rulings and instructions of the
judge.
D. A. Simmons, for plaintiff. Mr. Ellis, for
defendant.
DEWEY, J. The first point arising upon
the mortgage under which the plaintiff
claims to hold the property iu controversy
is as to the validity of a general descriji-
tion of the property mortgaged; such as "all
my tools and implements in my shop in B.,"
or other equally general words of descrip-
tion. It is insisted by the defendant tliat
such general description has no legal force
and el'l'oct. and that nothing short of a spe-
cific dcsiription of the various articles mort-
gaged can avail a mortgagee relying upon a
recorded mortgage, and the possession re-
maining with the mortgagor. No direct au-
thorities are cited to establish this position.
although some cases are referred to giving
some couuteuani'e to such doctrine. But
the argument principally pressed upon oiu'
consi<leration was that of the importance of
such construction of the law as tlie only one
that would give pffeclual notice to all con-
cerned of wliat was actually intended to be
conveyed by the mortgage.
AVe all feel the force of this argument, and
the great importance of requiring as mueli
cert.'iinly In contracts of this nature as the
case will reasonably admit. If It were prac-
ticable to set forth, on tlie face of the mort-
gage, with entire precision, all the speeilie
articles enibr.'iced in It in such a manner
that the iuspei-tlon of the mortgage, without
reference to any other evidence or .source of
Informal Ion, would enable one to ascertain
with certainty the jiroperty mortgaged. It
wo\dd lie highly Important anil useful tiiat
Bllch description of the itroperly sln'Uld be
required to be given In every case. But a
Utile conslderath)!! has sutislled us, and mtist
satisfy any one, that In a large portion of
the cases resort must be had to parol evi-
dence to ascertjiin the Identity of the prn|i
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C l U.T T E L  .MO H T G A G E � .  
lowing object ion t o  the maintenance o f  tbe 
plaintiff"s action : (1) That the first mortgage 
wa voi d.  The court so ruled, and the plain­
tiff abandoned tbat mortgage at the tri al.  
(2) That the second mortgage pa sed no prop­
erty be,ide that which wa specifica lly and 
particularly described. But the juclge ruled 
that the property situate on the p l'emi ·e· at 
the flate of the mortgage, and i ncludetl i n  the 
:renernl description in the mortgage. might 
pa ·s. though not specifically set out. (3) Tba t 
the pecific enumera tion of six hundred hubs 
in the mortgage excluded the other one hun­
dred and twenty-five bub· from passing un­
der the genera l clause. But the judge ruled 
that they might pass, if such was the inten­
tion of the parties at the time. (4) That 
said mortgage should not cover any property 
which had been changed by manufa d ure 
si nce the date of the mort,ga,ge. But the 
judge rulecl. and i nstructed the j u ry, that i f  
·o much labor and new material had since 
been added by Rowell to any article mort­
gaged a substa ntially to change it. or so 
that the ub ·equent additions of labor and 
material beca me an im portant pa.rt of its 
I> l'esent value, it would not pass to the mort­
;!agee; but that. i f  it remained ub tantially 
the sa me, it migllt pass. (5) That t he plain­
tiffs demand and statem nt in writing were 
in fol'W in ufficient. But the ju dge ruled oth­
erwi ·e. (u) That the pla int i ff' - �aid demand 
was in uflicient, because his c: laim, as p1·ov ed . 
and t h at et out in bi wri t ten tatement, 
1wre not t he ame in amount. Tbe j u dge 
rnle1l a n d inst rncted t he ju ry tbat it was i n­
cmnl leut on llle pla i n t i IT to proYe bis wl'itlcn 
statc•ment to be sub·ta utially true a nti cor­
rect ; that any fraudulent or subst antial er­
ror in h is statcuwnt would defe:ll ll l  action; 
but that no ::;li�llt, innn ·ent, and i mmn t c>ria l 
1Uiss1 atctllcut wouhl defeat llis al'tinn. i C  th<' 
j u ry were sat i;;fleil t h a t b l  slat ment was 
s11b� t a n t in l l� t•otTel't and trne. 
It : t ( IJ >l':u·pd that t lle dcfencla nt ,  bcfor<' mak­
ln:: lhl' alt:lehllH.'nt, toolc CClll i<'S of  t he \WO 
lllort:::u.::e...:; to tl.w 11re 1 1 1 is<'s of Rowell, a 1 1 < l  
layln;..:: nsl1lP. h J  t he assistanc<' of Howell, all 
t hr :tl'l idt>s sp1·1'l !kn l lr enumera t ed In t he 
""""11<1  mort i:a�e. ntl:tdwd a l l  ot her :J l'l l cl >s 
1 1 1 1'1 "<' found. ,\ ncl It also appPnre1l t hat Hn11 -
"ll, a ftf'r ma l• i n i.r  t he mnrli.r:t ;:('s, 1·out 1 1 1 1 1cd 
l o  1·1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1<·1  hl� h1 1  ·tn<'ss as 1 1s11a l ,  n• 1 1 1 . 1 i 1 1 i 1 1:.! 
i n  poi; cs. 101 1  u f  t h«' lJroperty, n rn l changln:: 
I t  hr 1 1 1 : 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ..i 1 1r<', and ror otht•r 1u·opt•rt.r. 
1 1 1 1< 1  1 1 1 i x l r 1g- 11 11 I t h  bis other 11Pwl.r· 1111 1Th:ls1•rl 
) 1 1'0 ) 11 • r ly .  
' 1 ' 1 1 1 •  pl:d n l lff da l nwd I n  hnld :i l l  t h <' prop· 
l ' l f.I", I i i >\\' 11 1 1 r l  nlrl ,  hy l" lrl t1<' of his 1 1>urt g:1i: . . :-1. 
'I h t •  1 ) 1  f( ' 1 1 1 l:i 1 1 I  ohj<'r'll'C I l hnt t lw pl11 l 1 1 t l lf, 
nr>I  h11 \• l ng p1 1 l 1 1 l <'d out n n r l  1 1 <  1 1 1:1 1 1d 1 d t h r• 
pn•r•I 1• 1 1rl 1 " 1 "  whl1• h  hi' rl11 I 1 1 1 1 ·d, a n d h: 1  \" • 
Ing 1 11•r 1 1 1 l l l <'d l h<' 1 1 1ort i.;11 i;1•f' t o  n•1 1 1 a l 1 1  In p11t1· 
t• l • JU ,  nnrl t 11 ml t h«• 1 1 1 11rl i;:-ni;1·rl prop• rt r 
Wi l h  hi Ill'\\ l)'•ll<'tp l l f"l•d fll"OJ>!'l'I.\" or f lll' 1!11 1 > 1 1' 
k i nd,  l lw IH'l lnn <of t rP JHI  rn11 ld nut hr 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l a l r1 l ' t l  l ' pon ! h i  J > ( 1f 1 1 t  ( I I  l w l 1 1 i,:  : i i l n > l l ·  
t · d  t ha t  t h f> pl:i l 1 1 l l lf d n l r n  · r l  l on1 1a lldr 1 111' 
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whole of tbe property a s  con�red by l l 1s 
mortgages, the newly-acquired a well as the 
old property) the judge ruled aga i n  t tlle <k­
fend:m t. 
The defendant also objected that the pla in­
tiff's demauu was insufficient, becau·e it ll ill 
not distinguish the property cla i med undL·r 
each mortgage, nor tbe amount of the pla in 
t i ff's lien on e-acb part of it, but wa - gen­
ernl on both mortgages. But t he j udge over· 
ruled the objection. 
It was agreed by the part ies that the j ury, 
if they should find for the pla intiff. mi"ht 
return a verdict specifying a s  to w lla t a r­
ticles they found.  The j u ry found the de­
fendant g u i l t y  as to the four items above 
mentioned, viz. two axle a rm , one cab body. 
one hu ndred and twenty-five hubs, and one 
hundred and seventeen felloes, a nd a s  e sed 
dn mages a t  $109.18; and not gui lty as to the 
other art itles mentioned i n  the pla i nti1:r­
writ. The defenda n t  alleged exceptions to 
t lle foregoing rul ings a nd in tructions of the 
j udge. 
D. A. Simmons, for pla intiff. )fr. Ell i·. for 
defendant. 
DEWEY, J. The first point ari i.J1c- upon 
the mort.zage u nder which tbe pla i n t i fC 
claims to hold the property i n  contr0Ye1'sr 
i a to tbe valid ity or a genel'nl descrip 
Uon of t lle property mortgaged ; such a ":lll 
wy tool· aud implement in my shop i n  B.," 
o r  ot ller qua l ly general words of descrip­
t ion. It I i nsi ted by the defendant t hat 
such �eu ra l description ha' no kC"al fon:e 
and C'!'ft.'d. and that nothing hort of a "'Ill'· 
cillc clesc n p t  ion of tlle vn rions a rt ic les uwn 
ga::cd ca n a n1 i l  a mortgng-el' rel y i ng upt>n a 
rccn 1"1 1C'cl mort;.:agc, ancl th JHlssL•ssion n'­
mai 1 1i 1 1 ;.;  11 i t ll the mot'tga�or. • 'o di n'i't �1 11-
tlloritie • ;H'e ci te<l to e ·ta hl is ll th is po,;i t i 11n. 
a l t llou""b some ca cs a re rcfetTl'll to .�i  1· i 1 1:,: 
Mlllll' coun t pn:1 11 1 ·e to ·ud1 doct ri nc. But 
t lw :i r�Ullll'llt Jll·iudpn l ls pressed u 11011 011r  
c·nnsuh•r:i t iun w a s  thnt  of t l H' i l n po 1·1:1 1h·l· o f  
s11 1  h '"11 1s1 I 'l l < ' ! 1 0 1 1  0 1'  the l a w  a s  t he ll l l ly Olll' 
that would ;.; i ll' <'ll'ecl 11a l notice to a l l  con 
c·<' rnctl of 11 h:i t was net uall3· intPndl'd to lll' 
c:on n')l'd h) t hr mortga�e. 
\\ c n i l  fPl'l t he foree of t his  a r;.:t 1 1 l l l' l l 1  :i 11 1 l  
th e>  �1·c•n t 1 11 1 1mrt : 1 J 1cc o f  l"l'q 1 1 i r i 1 1 g  :1>< w11l ' l 1  
c·crl n i nt) I n  l'11 1 1 t raet;; of t h iH na t ure as t l w 
C":1Sl' II i l l  l"l': l SOll:thly :ld mi t .  l f  I t  \I l' l"e pr:1<'· 
tlc·ahlc to sl't fort h ,  011 1 hL• f11c:e ol' t he> 1 1 1or1 -
gaµ-1', w l l h  < ' l l l irP pn•dsion,  a l l  t he s1u•1 • i l i 1 •  
nrt kll'H P 1 1 1 h r: 1 1 «•d 1 1 1  1 1  I n  s 1 1d1  a 1 1 1 : 1 1 1 1 ll · 1· 
1hat  t he 1 1 1  pl'd ion of t h l' 1 1 1 1 1r 1 g: 1 g<' .  1\ i 1 hu1 1 1  
rcf<'l'l'll!"<' lo  : 1 1 1.r o t lH'I' l ' \  ldl ' t l < " • '  1 1 1' s•llll'l'•' nf 
1 1 1 f1 1r 1 1 1 : 1 t l1 1 1 1 ,  11 u11 ld l'lll l h l <' o u l' t o  a ,..,.,.r1 a i 1 1  
w l l h 1'1'1 ' 1 : t l 1 1 t .r  1 11 1' p1·op1'1' 1 Y  1 1 1nrl :.:-:1 :,:l'd. 1 1  
would l w  h i g h l y  l r u pnrt : 1 1 1 t  n 1 1d 1 1sl'f 1 1 l  t h: 1 t 
Ht l l 'h d1•:-!!'l'l pl loll of ( hi' ) 11"1 1 ) 11'1'( sJr 1 1 1 1 l1l 1 11 •  
I n·qu lrN I  tn l ol' J.:h «' l l  1 1 1  1' 11'1 ')" ! ' l lHC. ll 1 1 1  I I  
l i t  t ic comilch•rn l lon hnH i>n t l :-1 l 1 Pd 1 1:-1, n nrl  u 1 1 1 s 1  
1ml lsr.v u ny Olll'. t hrt t In n l a rge norl lou 0 1  
t h!' <'ll >ir>H rr1:1ort rnuHt lw h11 r l  t o  par11l " ' I· 
!ll' ll<'e to 11  C'l'l'l a l n  tlJC l r l l ' l l l i l y  of l h c  Jll"" I '  
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ei-ty niortgagod. Most personal property
must, from the nature of the case, be de-
scribed in such general terms as to leave no
other altci-native but to resort to parol evi-
dence to identify it. Apparently it seems a
more bald description to say "all my house-
hold furniture" than to enumerate the ar-
ticles, and describe them as "two dozen of
chairs, Ave tables," etc.; but in reality the
latter will require extrinsic evidence to iden-
tify the property as much as the former
would. Or take the case of a mortgage of
live stock on a farm. The general descrip-
tion would be, "all my stock on my farm."
The particulars are, "ten cows, two yoke of
oxen," etc.; but in both you must rely upon
other sources than the mortgage for the
identity of the property mortgaged.
There is nothing in the statute itself (Rev.
St. c. 74) prescribing the form of mortgages
of personal property. The statute deals with
them as instruments known and recognized
by the common law, and only provides as
to the possession of the property being re-
tained by the mortgagee, or that the mort-
gage be recorded in the proper otfice. The
statute leaves in full force a mortgage at
common law, if the mortgagee takes and
continues the possession in himself. Such
mortgages, with general descriptions of the
articles, have ever been considered good.
Several cases have been before us which
were open to the objection now raised, and
so far, therefore, as a silent acquiescence in
such cases by counsel would furnish any in-
ference that the objection was untenable,
the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of it.
Perhaps no very strong inference should be
drawn from that circumstance. But the
case of Winslow v. Insurance Co., 4 Jletc.
(Mass.) 30G, seems to have raised the pre-
cise question we are considering. It was a
mortgage of "all and singular the goods,
wares, stock, iron, tools, manufactured ar-
ticles, and property of every description, be-
ing situate in or about the shop or building
now occupied by me in Hawley street." The
mortgage in that case was not only liable to
the objection that it was general in its de-
scription of the property, but also to the fur-
ther objection that it was imperfect and in-
complete, and contemplated something fur-
ther to be done, inasmuch as it also provided
that "a particular schedule of the property
shall be annexed hereto as soon as conven-
iently may be." No such schedule, how-
ever, was annexed; but the court held the
general description of the property sufficient
to entitle the mortgagee to hold the same.
Nor will the enumeration of certain specific
articles prevent others of like kind, if in-
eluded in the general description, from pass-
ing under the mortgage.
The next question raised relates to the
ruling as to the property In certain articles
that had undergone a change by manufac-
ture, after the date of the mortgage and be-
fore the attachment by the defendant. The
ruling upon this point was, we think, suffi-
ciently favoiablc to the defendant; perhaps
too much so in reference to the effect of sub-
sequent additions of labor and material in
divesting the mortgagee of his right of prop-
erty. We understand this instruction to
have been that the article must remain sub-
stantially the same in order to preserve the
property in the mortgagee; and, if such iden-
tity was continued, additions, not making
an important part of its whole present value,
would not divest the mortgagee of his Inter-
est.
The defendant further objects to the suffi-
ciency of the demand of the plaintiff, and
his statement of the amount due on the mort-
gage. To sustain the objection he rehes up-
on the case of Moriarty v. Lovejoy, 23 Pick.
321. We think the cases distinguishable,
and particularly in this: that in the case
cited the statement of the mortgagee did
not allege that it was a mortgage of the
property then attached, and in the hands of
the oflicer, which latter averment is substan-
tially found in the present statement, and to
the extent of the property then actually at-
tached and in the defendant's possession;
and this is a sufficient demand.
It is next objected that the ruling of the
court was erroneous upon the question of a
supposed variance between the plaintiff's
statement of the amount of his claims under
the mortgage and the actual sum which, up-
on a just and true account, the jury would
find due, upon the evidence in the case. The
question before us is "not as to the weight of
the evidence upon this point, or whether the
jury found a verdict against the weight of
the evidence; but whether the verdict was
found under proper instructions from the
court.
If the amount stated might, upon the evi-
dence, have been found a just and true ac-
count of the liability arising under the sec-
ond mortgage, then the finding was well au-
thorized. We understand the ruling of the
court to have required the jury, before re-
turning a verdict for the plaintiff, to find
that there was no material misstatement of
the amount due from Rowell to the plaintiff;
and this implies that it was not overstated.
If it were so to any amount proi^er to be re-
garded in a court of justice, the defendant,
under this ruling, must have had a verdict
In his favor. The instruction seems suffi-
ciently guarded. This subject has been be-
fore us recently in the case of Rowley v.
Rice. 10 Mete. (Mass.) 7, to which we refer.
Applying the principles of that case to the
present, if there were an overstatement of
the amount due to the ijlaintiff in the de-
mand made by him, yet the whole facts
would present a case where, under that deci-
sion, no damage had accrued to the defend-
ant by the overstatement, as he would have
had no inducement to redeem the property
if the amount due had been statetl with the
most serupulous accuracy; the property in
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erty mo rtgaged. Most personal properly 
must, from the nature of the case, be de­
scrib('d in such general terms a to leave no 
other alternative but to resort to parol evi­
uence to identify it. Apparenlly i t  seems a 
more bald descriplion to say "all my house­
hold furnit ure" than to enumerate tbe ar­
ticles, and describe them as "two dozen or 
chairs, five tables," etc. ; but in reality the 
latter will require extrinsic evidence to i<len­
tify the property as much as the former 
would. Or take the case of a mortgage of 
live stock on a farm. The general descrip­
tion would be, "all my stock ou my farm." 
The particulars are, "ten cows, two yoke of 
oxen," etc. ; but in both you must rely upon 
other sources than the mortgage for the 
identity of the property mortgaged. 
There is nothing in the statute itself (Rev. 
St. c. 74) prescribing the form of mortgages 
of personal property. The statute deals with 
them as instruments known and recognized 
by the common law, and only provides as 
to the possession of the Property being re­
tained by the mortgagee, or that the mort­
gage be recorded in t he proper office. The 
statute leaves in full force a mortgage at 
c:ommon la. w, i f  the mortgagee takes ancl 
continues the possession i n  himself. Such 
mortgages, with general descriptions of the 
a rticles, have ever been considered good. 
Se>eral cases have been before us which 
were open to the objection now raised, and 
so far, therefore, as a silent acquiescence in 
such cases by counsel would furnish any in­
ference that the objection was untenable, 
the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of it. 
Perhaps n o  very strong inference should be 
urawn from that circumsta nce. But the 
case of ·winslow v. I nsurance Co., 4 :Jietc. 
(:'>Ia.ss.) 306, seems to have raised the pre­
cise question we are considering. It was a 
mortgage of "all and singular the goods. 
wares, stock, iron, tools, ma nufactured ar­
ticles, and property of every description, be­
ing situate in or about the shop or building 
no'"' occupied by me in Hawley street." Tbe 
mortgage in that case was not only liable to 
the objection tha t it was general i n  its de­
scription of the property, but also to the fur­
ther objection that i t  was im perfect and in­
complete. and contemplated something fur­
ther to be done, inasmuch as it also provided 
that "a particular schedule of the property 
!'ball be an nexed hereto as soon as conven­
iently may be." Xo such schedule, how­
e>er, was annexeu ; but the court held the 
genera l cl('scription of the property sufficient 
to entitle the mortgagee to hold the same. 
�or will the enumeration of certain specific 
articles pre>ent others of like kind, if in­
cluded i n  the general description, from pass­
ing under the mortgage. 
The next question raised relates to the 
ruling as to the property in certa in articles 
that had undergone a change by manufac­
ture, after the date of the mortgage and be­
fore the a t ta<:hweut by the defeutla ut. T u e  
D 1 gmze o oy 
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ruling upon this point was, w r  t h inl,, snfli ·  
ciently favorable t o  the defe n<la u t ;  perha ps 
too much so in referenC"e to the Pffcet of sub­
sequent additions of labor and n1at <'rial in 
dive ting the mortgagee of bis right o r  prop­
erty. 'Ne unclcrstaucl this inst rnrtion to 
have been that the article musl remain suh­
stan ti ally the same i n  order to pre.·cne 1 lw 
property in the mortgagee ; and, if suc:h iden­
tity was conti nued, additions, not making 
an important part of its whole present value, 
would not divest the mortgagee of his i nter­
est. 
The defendant further objects to the suffi­
ciency of the demand of the plaintiff, and 
his statement of the amount due on the mort­
gage. To sustain the objection be relies up­
on the case of Moriarty v. Lovejoy, 23 Pick. 
321. \Ye think the cases distinguishalJle, 
and particularly in this : that in the case 
cited the statement of the mortgagee did 
not allege that it was a mortgage of the 
property then attached, and in the hands of 
the officer, which latter a. verment is substan­
tially found in the present statement. and t o  
the extent of the property then actually at­
tached and i n  the defendant's possession ;  
and this is a sufficient demand. 
It is next objected t hat the ruling of the 
court was erroneous upon the question of a. 
supposed varia nce between the plaintiff's 
statement of the a mount of his claims under 
the mortgage and the actual sum which, up­
o n  a j ust and true account, the j u ry "·oulcl 
fi n d  due, upon the evidence in the case. The 
question before us is "not as to the weight of 
the evidence upon this point, or whether the 
j u ry found a verdict against the weight of 
the evidence ; but whether the verdict was 
found under proper instructions from the 
court. 
If the amount stated might, upon the evi­
dence, have been found a j ust and true ac­
count of the liability arising under the sec­
ond mortgage, then t he fi nding was well au­
thorized. We unflerstand the ruling of the 
court to have required the j ury, before re­
turning a verdict for the plaintiff, to fiml 
tha t there was no material misstatement of 
the amount due from Rowell to the plaintiff: 
and this implies that it was not overstated. 
If it were so to any a mount proper to be re­
garded in a comt of ju stice, the defendant, 
under this ruling, must have bad a verdil't 
in his favor. The instruction seems sufli­
cientlY guarded. This subject bas been lJe· 
fore us recently in the case of Ro,yley '· 
Rice. 10 �!etc. (:\lass.) 7, to wbicb we refer. 
Applying the principles of tba t c:ase to the 
present, if there were an oyerstatement of 
the amount due to the plaintiff in the <le· 
mand made by birn, yet tbe whole facts 
would present a case where, u mler that deci­
sion, no damage bad accrued to t b e  defend­
ant by the oversta tement, as he would ha>e 
had no inducement to redeem the llropert;I' 
if t h £>  amount due ba<l heen stated wi' b tlH. 
1 1 1 0 ,, t  sc:rupuluus : t \Tl l  t :w.1· ; t lH• l •roperty iu 
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controversy being of much less value than
the debt secured by the mortgage, supposiug
the amount had been truly stated.
It is further objected that the plaintiff can-
not maintain the action, although he may
have been the owner of sundry articles taken
by the defendant by virtue of a writ of at-
tachment against the mortgagor; inasmuch
as the articles now claimed by the plaintift'
were found in possession of the debtor, and
interuiiugled with various other articles that
were not mortgaged, and which were prop-
erly attached as the property of the debtor,
and the plaintiff not having pointed out the
precise articles claimed by him. To a cer-
tain extent the principle here relied upon by
the defendant has been sanctioned by the
court. The leading ease was Bond v. Ward,
7 Mass. 123. This was followed by Sawyer
V. Merrill, 6 Pick. 478, and Shiimway v. llut-
ter, 8 Pick. 443. The principle settled by
these cases was that, if the goods of a third
person in possession of the debtor, and so
intermingled with the debtor's goods that
the otiicer, on due inquiry, cannot distiuguish
them, the owner can maintain no action
against the otticer, until notice, and a de-
mand of his goods of the oflieor, and a re-
fusal by him. All these cases presented this
point as arising upon one species of property,
viz. household furniture. They were cases
wliere no dilticulty existed in pointing out
the precise articles claimed, and where the
omission to do so, as it tended to entrap a
public officer in the diseliarge of his duty,
might reasonably be held to bar his right of
action. They were cases where the owner
knew the precise nature and extent of his
claim, and the articles owned by him; where
he had it in his power to designate and point
out those articles, in distinction from other
articles to which be made no claim. And
the rules of fair dealing may well require,
under such circumstances, that the particu-
lar articles claimed by him be pointed out
and demanded before the officer is sued for
taking and detaining them. To this extent
this rule may be a reasonable and proper
one, but care must be taken not to apply it
beyond those cases where such pointing out
of specific articles may be reasonably re-
quired of the party. As it seems to us, the
rule should not be applied here. The plain-
tiff held a general mortgage, which, in its
terms, covered all the articles on certain
premises named in the mortgage, with tlie
further provision that the mortgage should
also embrace "all other personal property"
which the mortgagor might "put on said
premises," etc. This last provision, thougli
of no effect to pass subsequently acquired
property (10 Mete. 481), might well be suii-
posed by the plaintiff to have tliat effect;
and a general claim made by him to all tlio
property, uuder such mortgage, might not fur-
nish any evidence of a design to mislead tlie
officer. Uuder these circumstances, we think
the plaintiff was guilty of no such nonfeas-
ance in not pointing out the articles to which
the mortgage did attach, and disclaiming all
others, as should bar him of his right to
recover for such of the articles as are now
shown to belong to him.
Exceptions overruled.
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C'ontro•ersy being of much less value than 
the debt ecured by the mortgage, supposing 
the amount had been truly stated. 
It is further objected that the plaintiff can­
not mainta i n  the action, although he may 
have been the owner of undry articles taken 
by t he defendant by virtue of a writ of at­
ta('liment again t the mortgagor; inasmuch 
a tile a rticles now claimed by the plaintiff 
were found in possession of lhe debtor, and 
intermin.!{led with various other art icle that 
were not mortgaged, and 1''hich were prop­
erly attached as the property of the debtor, 
and the plaintiff not ha •ing pointed out the 
precise articles claimed by him. To a cer­
tain extent the principle here relied upon by 
the defendant has been sanctioned by t he 
court. The leading case was Bond v. "·ard. 
7 ::.Ia.s. 123. This was followed by Sawyer 
v. ::.rerrill, 6 Pick. 47 . and Shnmway v. Rut­
ter, Pick. 4-!3. The principle settled by 
these ('ase wa that, if the goods of a third 
person in po session of t he debtor, and so 
i nterm ingled with the debtor's goods that 
t he officN', on due inquiry, cannot di tiugui b 
them. the owner ca n maintain no action 
again t the ollicer. until not ice, and a de­
mand of bi. goods of the officer, and a re­
fu al by llim. All the. e cases pre ented this 
point as arising upon one species of property, 
viz. household furniture. They wc1· cases 
wlwre no di rftculty exi ted in pointing out 
the preci:;e articles claimed, and where the 
omission to do o, as it tended to en t rn p  a 
pulJlic ofticer in the discharge of bis duty, 
might reasonably be held to bar bi right of 
action. They were cases where the owner 
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knew the precise nature and extent of his 
claim, and t he articles owned by hi m ;  where 
be had it in h is power to designate and point 
out those articles, in distinction from other 
articles to which he made no claim. And 
the rules of fair dealing may well require, 
under such circumsta nces, that the p:uticu­
Jar artides claimed by him be pointed out 
and demanded before t he officer i' sued for 
taking and detaining them. To this extent 
thi rule may be a reasonable and vropcr 
one, but care must be taken not to apply it 
beyond those cases where such pointing out 
of pecific articles may be rea onably re­
quired of the party. As i t  seems to u . the 
rule should not be applied here. The plain­
titr held a general mortgage, which, in i t  -
terms, covered all t he arti ·les on C'ertaiu 
premise named i n  the mortgage. with the 
further provi ion that the mortgage shout,! 
also embrace "all other personal propert�" · 
which t he mortgagor might "put on aid 
premises," etc. This last provision, though 
of no effect to pa ubscquently acquirrd 
property (10 "!etc. -1 l), might well be sup­
posed by the plaintiff to have that effc ·t ; 
an<l a general clai m  made by him to all  t he 
property, under such mortgage, might not fur­
nish any e' idcnce of a de·iirn to misl ad t hr 
officer. Under these circum 'la nces, we thin l' 
the pla int i f  was guilty oC no such nonr a .-­
ance in not pointing- out the articles to which 
t he mortgage did attach. and disclaiming ull  
other,, a should bar him of his right to 
recover for such of the articles as are now 
shown to belong to him. 
Exceptions overruled. 
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FIRST NAT. BANK OF MARQUETTE et al.
V. WEED et al.
(50 N. W. 8(>4, 89 Mich. 357.)
.Suprome Court of Michigan. Dec. 22, 1891.
Appeal from circuit court, Gogebic county,
iu chancery; William D. Williams, Judge.
Action by the First National Bank of Mar-
quette aud others against Alfred Weed and
others. From the judgment of the court below
complainants and several of defendants ap-
peal. Modified and atlirmed.
J. E. Ball and Ball & Hanscom, for appel-
lants. Flower, Smith & Musgrave and Tom-
kius & Jlerrlll (C. F. Button and Benton Han-
chett, of counsel), for appellees.
LONG, J. The bill in this cause was filed
for the purpose of declaring a certain bill of
sale, given by A. Weed & Co. to Hoxie & Mel-
lor. a chattel mortgage as security for certain
.accommodation paper made aud indorsed by
Hoxie & Mellor. aud used by A. Weed & Co.
in their business, and to decree the same to be
a lien upon the logs described in said bill
of sale, and the lumber and other material
manufactured therefrom, and that the same
lie declared a trust fund for the payment of
such accommodation paper; to declare the ar-
ticles of agreement or sale by said A. Weed
ic Co. to the South Branch Lumber Company
null and void as against said bill of sale given
to Hoxie & Mellor; that the bill of sale be
decreed to be a lien upon said property in the
nature of a chattel mortgage prior to the pm'-
chase of the said South Branch Lumber Com-
pany; that a certain chattel mortgage held
by the First National Bank of Ashland, Wis.,
lie declared to be a lien subsequent to the
lien of the complainants upon said property;
and that the accommodation paper held by
the complainants be first paid out of the pro-
ceeds realized from the sale of the logs. The
bill asked for an injunction against defend-
ants restraining them from interfering with,
removing, or disposing of the logs, lumber,
lath, shingles, or timber, and for the appoint-
ment of a receiver. Upon the hearing in the
court below, a decree was made from which
foniiilaiiiants and several of the defendants ap-
peal. On November 28, 1889, A. Weed &
Co., composed of Alfred Weed and Paul Weed,
who were engaged in the business of getting
out logs, manufactm'ing them into lumber, and
selling the lumber, made with Hoxie «& Mel-
lor the following ■ contract: "Antigo, Wis.,
Nov. 28, 1SS9. This agreement witnesseth
that Hoxie & Mellor, in consideration of two
promissory notes of A. Weed & Co., for $2,500
each, dated to-day, one due July loth next,
and one due Oct. loth next, without interest,
hereby agree to advance to A. Weed & Co.
their notes for such amounts and at such times
as will be necessary to carry on A. Weed &
Co.'s business at Ramsay, and for the pur-
pose of logging a certain four million tract
at Ashland. Hoxie & Mellor also agree to in-
dor.se A. Weed & Co.'s notes for .$14,<XJ0, for
payment of purchase price of above fom- mil-
lion feet of timber. It is agreed between both
parties that the amount of notes advanced for
Ramsay business shall not exceed .fTO.tXJO in
all at any one time, and that the amount ad-
vanced for Ashland business shall not exceed
$30,000 in all at any one time, including the
indorsement of $14,000 for purchase price of
limber. A. Weed & Co. agree to use Hoxie &
Mellor paper at such places as will not inter-
fere with the conducting of their (Hoxie &
Mellor's) other business, and also agree that
all notes shall be taken up by them before
Dec. 31st, 1890, out of the proceeds of sales
of stock. Hoxie & Mellor. A. Weed & Go."
Under thi.s contract notes were advanced by
HoxJe & Mellor to A. Weed & Co., and re-
newals of such notes were made by Hoxie &
Mellor up to April 5, 1890, amounting to $108,-
000.
On Jlarch 30, 1890, Paul Weed, who acted
for A. Weed & Co., wrote to Mellor, who acted
for Hoxie & Mellor, the following letter:
'Ashland, AVis., March 30, 1890. Mr. E. W.
Mellor, Antigo, Wis.— Dear Sir: We Inclose
the last $3,o00 note for signature and return,
as per my letter of recent date. We fin-
ished the last of our logging oijerations on
April 2, and they have been very satisfactory.
As fast as we market our lumber we shall
retire the notes out, but that will not begin un-
til June or July. We have arrangemeuts to
take care of our renewals In the meantime.
I did not see Bishop but a few minutes, ow-
ing to a mistake, and we having a lawsuit
on our hands the following day. Did he take
the logs? Youre, truly, Paul Weed." To this
letter Mellor replied by letter of April 5th,
as follows: "Antigo, Wis., April 5, 1800. Paul
Weed, Ashland, Wis. — Dear Sir: Your favor
of the 30th ult. came while I was away; hence
the delay in replying. I return the note here-
with, as it is Impossible for me to sign it under
existing circumstances. Will explain more ful-
ly when 1 see you. Expected to see you ere
this, and, if you are not coming down soon,
let me know, and I will go up there, as I
must see you ere long. I inclose you also
your note which was renewed. Yours, truly,
E. N. Mellor."
After receiving this letter, Paul Weed went
to see Mellor at Antigo, and there executed to
Hoxie & Mellor the bill of sale which com-
plainants, by their bill, claim was iutended
lis seciH'ity for certain notes indorsed, and
thereafter to be indorsed, by Hoxie & Mellor.
This bill of sale is as follows: "Know all
men by these presents, that A. Weed & Co.,
of Itamsay, Gogebic count.v, Michigan, of the
first part, for and in consideration of the sum
of seventy thousand dollars lawful money of
the United States to me in hand paid, at or
before the ensealing and delivery of these
presents by Hoxie «& Mellor, of the second
part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowl-
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FI TIST NAT. BA:NK OF MA RQUETTE et al. 
v. WEED ct al. 
(50 N. W. U<!, 89 Mich. 357.) 
Supr<>me Courl o.f Michigan. Dec. 22, 1891. 
Appeal from circuit court. G<>gebic county, 
in chancery ; William D. 'Williams, Judge. 
Action by the First National Bank of l\!ar­
quette and others against Alfred Weed and 
others. From the judgment of the comt below 
complainants and se\·eral of defendants ap­
peal. :\lodified and atlinned. 
J. E. Ball and Ball & Hanscom, for appel­
lants. Flower, Smith & i\Iusgrave and Tom­
kins & i\lerrill (C. F. Button and Benton Han­
chett, of counsel), for appellees. 
LONG, J. The bill in this cause was filed 
for the purpose of decla ring a certain bill of 
sale. g1Yen by A.  'Yeed & Co. to Hoxie & Mel­
lor. a chattel mortgage as security for certain 
accommodation paper marle and indorsed by 
Hoxie & :\Iellor. and u eel by A. Weed & C'o. 
in their business, and to decree the same to be 
a l ien upon the log de cri be1l in said bill 
of sale, and the lumber and other material 
manufactured therefrom, and that the same 
he declared a trust fund for the payment of 
su('I! accommodation paper; to declare the ai·­
tic:les of agreement o r  sale by sa id A .  ·weed 
& Co. to the South Branch Lumber Company 
null a nd void as against said bill of sale given 
to Hoxie & Mellor; that the bill of sale be 
decreed to be a lien upon said property in the 
nature of a chattel mortgage prior to the pur­
chase of the :;:aid South Branch Lumber Com­
pany; that a certain chattel mortgage held 
by the First National Bank of Ashland, Wis., 
he declared to be a lien subsequent to the 
lien of the compla inants upon said property; 
and that the accommodation paper held by 
the complainants be first paid out of the pro­
ceeds realized from the sale of the logs. The 
bill asked for an injunction against defend­
ants restraining them from interfering with, 
remo'l"ing, or di posing of the logs, lumber, 
lath, shingles, or timber, and for the appoint­
ment of a receiver. Upon the hearing in the 
court below, a decree was macle from which 
<'OllJ]llainants and several of the defendants ap­
peal. On :No'l"ember 28, 1 889, A. '\Yeed & 
Co .. composed of Alfred WC'ecl and Paul Weed, 
who were engaged in the business of getting 
out logs, manufacturing them into lumber, and 
selling the lumber, made with Hoxie & Mel­
lor the following · contract: "Antigo, Wis., 
Nov. 28, 18Stl. This agreement witnesseth 
that Hoxie & Mellor, in consideration of two 
promissory notes of A. Weed & Co., for $2,500 
each, dated to-day, one due July 15th next, 
a nd one due Oct. 15th next, without interest, 
hereby agree to advance to A. Weed & Co. 
their notes for such amounts and at such times 
as will be necessary to can-y on A. Weed & 
Co.'s business at Ramsay, and for the pur­
pose of logging a certain four million tract 
D 1 ;;1 1t1z by 
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a t  Asllla ml. Hoxie & J\{ellor also agree to in­
dorse A. Weed & Co.'s notes for $ 14,000, for 
payment of purchase price or above row· lOi!­
lion feet of timber. It is agreed 1Jetween holh 
parties that 1.be amount of notes advauce<l for 
Ramsay business . ball not exceed $70,000 in 
all at any one time, and that the amount a1l­
vance\l for Ashland business sha ll not excC'1·1l 
$30,000 in all at any one time, including the 
i ndot""ement of $H,OOO for purchai:;e pril·e of 
ti mber. A. '\Yeed & Co. agree to use Hoxie & 
)Jellor paper at such places as will not inter­
fere with the conducting of their ( Hoxie & 
:\Iellor's) other business, and also agree that 
all  notes shall be taken up lly them before 
Dec. �1 st, 1890, out of the proceeds of :-:ales 
of stock. Iloxie & :\lellor. A. Weed & Co." 
Under this contract notes were advanced by 
Hoxie & Mellor to A. Weed & Co., and re­
newals of such notes were made by Hoxie & 
Mellor up to April 5, 1890, amounting to $108,-
000. 
On March io. 1890. Paul Weed, who a<:ted 
for A. ·weed & Co .. wrote to :\lellor, who actell 
for Hoxie & Mellor, tile following letter: 
"Ashland, 'Tis., :\larch 30, 1 00. ?.Ir. E. W. 
Mellor, Antigo, Wis.-Dear Sir: We inclose 
the la t $3,300 note for signatUI'e and return, 
as per my letter of recent date. We fin­
ished the last of our logging operations on 
April �. and they have been very satisfactory. 
As fast as we market our lumber we shall 
retire the notes out, but that will not begin un­
til June or July. ·we have arrangements to 
take care of our renewals in the meantime. 
I did not see Tiishop but a few minutes, ow­
ing to a mistake, and we having a lawsuit 
on our bands the following day. Did be take 
the logs ? Yours, truly, Paul "'eed." To this 
letter Mellor replied by letter of April 5th, 
as follow : ''Antigo. Wis., April 5, 18!.lO. Paul 
Weed, Ashland, '\Vis.-Dear Sir: Your favor 
of the 30th ult. came while I was away ; hence 
the delay in replying. I return the note here­
with, as it is impossible for me to sign it under 
existing circumstances. 'Vill  explain more ful­
ly when I see you. Expected to see you ere 
this, and, if you are not coming clown soon, 
let me know. and I will go up there, as I 
must see you ere long. I inclose you also 
your note which was renewed. Yours, truly, 
E. N. :\lellor." 
After receiving this letter, Paul Weed went 
to see J\Iellor at Antigo, and there executed to 
Hoxie & Mellor the bill of sale which com­
plainants, by their bill. claim was intenclecl 
:is security for certain notes indorsed. a rnl 
thereafter t o  be i ndorsed, by Hoxie & :\lellor. 
This bill of sale is as follows: "Know all 
men by these presents, that A. Weed & Co.., 
of Hamsay, Gogebic county, J\lichigan, qf the 
first part, for and i n  consideration of the sum 
of seventy thousand dollars lawful money of 
the United tates to me in hand paid, at or 
before the ensealing and deli very of these 
presents by Hoxie & Mellor, of the second 
part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowl-
O rigi r3 1  trom 
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edged, have bargained, sold, granted, and '
conveyed, and by these presents do bargain,
sell, grant, and convey, unto the said parties
of the second part, their executors, adminis-
trators, and assigns, twenty-eight tliousand
pine saw-logs, scaling seven million feet, more
or less. Said logs are now lying and being in
the Black river, near Ramsay, Gogebic coun-
ty, Michigan. To have and to hold the same ,
unto the said parties of the second part, their
executors, administrators, and assigns, for-
ever. And we do, for our heirs, executors,
administrators, and assigns, covenant and
agree, to and with the said parties of the sec-
ond part, to warrant and defend the same de- \
scribed goods, hereby sold unto the said par-
ties of the second part, their exccutoi-s, ad- '
ministrators. and assigns, against all and ev-
eiy ijerson and persons, whomsoever. In wit-
ness whereof we have hereunto set our hands
and seals the fifteenth day of April, A. D.
1S90. A. Weed & Co. [Seal.] Signed, seal- !
el, and delivered in the presence of George [
R. Fraser." j
When this bill of sale was made the logs
were where they had been banked. The driv-
ing of them had not commenced, and A. Weed
& Co.'s men were on the ground prejiaring for
the drive. They continued the work, and j
drove the logs. The drive started about the
17th of April, and was linished about the 4th
of May. A. Weed & Co. began sawing the
logs aljout May 5th, and continued sawing
ihcm until some time in September, when all
I he logs in controversy had been sawed. The
bill of Siile before set out was not tiled until
the loth day of May, 1890. On the 11th of
.Tune following, A. Weed & Co. made a con-
tract of sale to the .'^outli Branch Lumber Com-
pany of all the merchantable white pine lum-
ber which linil then been sawed from the logs,
and all which they should saw from the logs,
as follows: "Chicago, 111., ,Iune Utli, ISOO.
South Branch Lumber Company, Chicago, III.:
We will sell you all the merchanlabic while
pine lumber now piled at our mill at Itamsay;
also the Uunber from logs now in Black river
and tributaries, and to be sawed at our mill
In It.'imsay,— the cnlire cut being about seven
million feet,— for the sum of $11 per M ft.,
board measure, f. o. b. cars at our mill. Tlie
10 ft. c. and belter to go in at the s;ime price,
and the <! and S ft. c. and better at .$10 per M
feet. The mill culls, and l>, 8, and 10 ft. com-
inou and poorer, are not n parcel of this
agi'e<'inent. The lumber to be nil cross-piled,
and grado.s kept sepanitc, as directed by you.
We will also sell you our exira Hiar shingles
ut .$1.7,'), and the dlmeiislim dear shingles
at ?'J.'JO per M, f. o. b. ears at Itains.iy. Lum-
ber to be seKled for on the basis of ,$i;{ per
.M on MeCllntoek'H cstlm;ile, llic Hrst of each
iiii>nlli, and you to glvt; n« your nliu'ty-day
paper for the same, 'i'lie iundier to be mnnn
faelured from lime to time as directed by
you or your representative; and we shall l:\Ur
proper care in piling and covering sjinn' t'>
prevent staining, and see that no lumber is
piled nearer than 150 ft. of the mill, to pro-
tect you in insurance. When estimates are
taken, each pile to be marked, 'The property
of the South Branch I^umber Company.' We
also agree to make good to you any expense
or loss that you may be put to by any claims
or otherwise made against this lumber by oth-
er parties. Final settlement to be made as
per the price of $14 on the completemeut of
the shipment of all the lumber. Lumber to be
inspected by C. M. E. McClintock, each pay-
ing one-half of the same. We also agree to
hold this lumber in piles until reduced in
weight not to exceed 2,500 lbs. per M. ft.
You also have the privilege of letting this
lumber remain here as long as you wish, pro-
viding that it does not interfere with the ne-
cessities of our mill for piling room. Very re-
spectfully yours, A. Weed & Co. We accept
the above. The South Branch Lumber Co.
B. F. Ferguson, Treas."
After this contract had been made, and
the parties begun to act upon it, and to siiip
lumber under it to the South Branch L\uu-
ber Company, a further agreement was
made that the South Branch Lumber ComiKi-
ny should take the lower grade of lumber
which should be piled in the piles of lum-
ber made under the contract of 3\\ue lUh.
and this became a part of the contract. On
September (jth the lumber which had been
thus sawed, and which is the lumber in con-
troversy between the complainants and the
South Branch Lumber Company, was deliv-
ered into the possession of the defendant
the South Branch Lumber Company, and
continued in its possession until it was seiz-
ed by attachment on September 16th and
17th. The lumber at this time had been es-
timated by McClintock. It appears tJiat aft-
er the lumber had been estimated, ami had
been taken possession of by the South
Branch Lumber Company, and on Septem-
ber ICilh, In a suit by the First NatiDual
Bank of Bessemer against Iloxie & Mellor
an<l A. Weed & Co.. the lumber was seized
by attachment, and on the 17th of Septem-
ber it was again attached in a suit brought
by Ihi" complainant the First National Bank
of Mar(iuelle against lloxle & MoUor and A,
Weed & Co. On the 21th of September the
South Branch lamdier (^ompauy replevied
the hnnber from the sheriff, who held it un-
der these wi'its of allaehmcnt. The defend-
ant the Scuith Branch Lumber Company, up-
on Its contr.Mct of purchase of the lumber in
controversy from A. Weed & Co.. executed
and delivered to A. Weed & Co. lis nei:otla-
ble promissory notes to the amouni of iS.'iS,-
(H»0. These notes were made and delivered
(o A. Weeil iV: ("o., as follows: About June
•Jlst, the sum of $'.',".,0( lO ; August 1st. $1S,-
l)(K); SepRMuber 1st, $15,000. The flrst pay-
ment was made ui)on the certilleale of the
Inspector agreed uiion In the contract. The
last two payments were made without any
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C H A T T E L  .MO H T G ..lGE '.  
ed.ge1l. ha ve lln n::ainc1l. sold, granted, and 
C'onveyed. and by thc-e presents do bargain,  
ell .  grant. and convey, unto the said parties 
of the secoud part, tllcir executors. adminis­
trators, and a igns, twenty-eight thou and 
pine saw-logs, scal ing seven million feet, more 
or le s. Said Jogs are now lying and being in 
the Black river, near Ramsay, Gogebic coun­
ty, l\Iichigan. To have and to hold the ame 
unto the aid parties of the second part, their 
executor', administrators, and a icrns, for­
ever. And we do, for our heirs, executor .. 
aclmini ·trators, and assigns, covena nt and 
agree, to and with the said partie of the ec­
ond part, to warrant and defend the same de-
cribed goods, hereby sold unto the a id par­
ties of the second part, their executors, ad­
ministrator , a nd as,ign , again t aJJ and ev­
ery person and per on , whomsoever. In wit­
nes �·hereof we ha Ye h0reunto et our baud' 
and seals tlle fifteenth day of April, A. D. 
1 90. A. Weed & Co. [Seal.) igned, eal­
el, and delivered in the pre ence of George 
R. Fraser." 
\"\hen thi bill of ale was made the Jog. 
were where they hacl been bank d. The driY­
i ug of them had not commenced. and .\. Weed 
& 'o.' men were on the ground preparing for 
the drive. They continued the work, and 
clroYe the log . The driYe tarted about the 
17th of April, and wa fini  heel about tl.ie 4th 
1 1f  :.\Iay. A. W eel & Co. began sawing the 
lnAS about l\Iay 5th, and eoutinuecl sawing 
t he111 until ome time in September, when a l l  
t he Jog in conu·oYet· y had been sawed. '!'he 
hill of sale berore .et out wa not filccl u n t i l  
t he 1 0th day o f  l\Iay, 1 UO. O n  the 11th of 
.June follo,vinp;, A. \Ye d & Co. made a :on 
t ract of ·ale to the South Brnnch Lumber 'om 
Jia u) of all  t l 1e ruen·ha n t a llle while pine luw­
l ier " h k h  h:i t l  t beu been a wed from the Jo�s. 
and a l l  wbkh t hey 1<hould snw from t he logs . 
as follo\Ys: "Cbkago, 1 1 1 . .  .J une 1 1 t h , lS�IO. 
South Brnncb Lumhcr 'ompany, l'hka�'" I ll . :  
\\'e will  sell you all  t he rnen:hn nt ahl<> whi t e  
pine lnmbcr now p i l ed a l  om· m i l l  a t  J : : 1 1 11s:i) . 
a lso t he lu l llhl'r frnm logs now in Bind;. l'i \'l'l' 
n n d trlbula rles, a 11< l to he sawed a t  1111r m ill 
In Ham�a)', -the < ' I l l  Ire eut heln;.! : t l ,. >11t 1<t>\ <'lt 
million fect,-for th • sum of .: I I p< ·1· -'l ft., 
ho:i rel mras11n•, r. o. h. <·:ns I\ t n11r mill .  'l'lw 
J (J ft. C'. ; 1 w l  l 11·l t <'r to go 111  :i t  the sa me }lril'c', 
: t n i l  l hl' q :mtl s I I. c·. awl hrt tc•t' : 1 t ., 1 0 J!Pl' .\ I 
fr•PI. 'l'h1• 1 1 1 1 1 1  "1 1 ! 1i;, and Ii, , a rn l JO fl. 1•1 11 1  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1  awl 11111 1r1•r, an· not n 1 m rn·l of t h i'l 
a g n •, . 1 1 1"1 1 1 .  ' 1 ' 1 1 1 •  l 1 1 1 1 1 h< ' l' to 111• a l l  <'I'< • �·pll < 'd,  
a nd g1 ndP ''''Pl Pparatl', ns dlrr>l' tPd l iy ) " 11,  
\\'r• W i l l  1 1 ls 1 1  I ' l l  you 0111• 1 •  · t rn  st11 1· f: h i 1 11-:I"" 
nt • •  I ;;;, 1 1 1 1 tl t l u• Ii d l 11w11 l•m "11 ; 1 1· i; h i u:.;11 s 
at ;:.:.:.:o J i"I' ,\ I ,  I n. h. 1 ·: 1 1  a t  J : a 1 1 1  ...  1 .1 , l . 1 1 1 1 1  
I J1•1• lr1 hi' !' •l t l  • 1 !  1111• 0 1 1  t ht• i1:t1!i ol .� t : :  J IPI' 
I • Il l  ,\ lc ·l ' 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1"1 's <' I l 1 1 1: i  " "  t 111• tln:1I ot c•: t < ' h  
1 1 10 1 1 1  h,  n nd ) 1 1 1 1  l o  gh " 1 1  �·<Jnl' 1 1 hwl ,\'·d11� 
Jlll J •< ' r  l'or t i t•• :1 1 1 11•. 'l'h<• 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11•1· to hr 1un 1 1 1 1  
f11rt 11 n·d fr• 1l l l  1 1 1 1 11> t o  t l nl< '  a s  t l l l'l'l' I Pd h.1 
y.111 or your l'"J >I • 1 • 1 1 l 11 t l n • ;  nnr l  \\'I' . hn l l  t : l l, 1 •  
pn1r1"r <'urn I n  p l l 1 1 1g 111111  c·o \f·rl 1 1i; i-a 1 1 1 1 •  ' "  
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prevent staining, and see that no lumbL·r i<:  
piled nearer than 150 ft .  of tlle m ill,  to pro­
tect you in insurance. When estimatl'' :He 
taken. each pile to be ma rkecl, 'The property 
of the South Branch Lumber Company.' '\Ye 
al o agree to make good to you any ex.pen e 
or Joss that you may be put to by any claims 
or otherwi e wade again t thi lwnber by oth-
1 er parties. Final settlement to be made a 
per the price of $ H  on the completement of 
tl.Je hipment of a l l  the lumber. Lumber to be 
in pected by C. l\I. E. �IcCJi ntock, each pay­
i ng one-balf of the same. We al o agree to 
hold this lumber in piles until reduced i n  
weight not to exceed 2,500 lbs. per �I. ft. 
You al o have the pri vi lege of letting ti.Ji· 
lumber remain here a long as you wi h, pro­
vidiug that it doe not i nterfere with the ne­
cessities of our m i l l  for piling room. Very re­
spectfully your , A .  Weed & Co. We accc11t 
the above. 'l'he Sou t h  Branch Lumber Co. 
B. F. Ferguson. Treas." 
After this contract bad been made. and 
the parties begun to act upon it, and to h i p  
l u 1 1 1 ber under i t  t o  the outh Branch Lnw­
ber Company, a further agreement w a s  
m a d  t h a t  the South Branch Lumber Compa­
ny slloulcl take 1.he lower gralle or Jumher 
wbicll hould be pi led iu t he pile of lum­
ber mad under t ile cont ract of J une 1 1 th. 
and this beca me a part of the contract. On 
eptember 6th t he l u mber whkb bad been 
1.hus sawed, a ucl wh ich i the lumber in cnu­
troversy between tbe co mpla ina n t s  all<l t h C' 
oulh Rran ·h Lumber Company, was del i \  -
erecl i n t o  t h e  pos e •• ion of t.lw def01hlnnt 
th �ont h Brauch L11mh0r Com pan� . a nd 
eont i u uecl in its possl'ss ion u n t i l  i t  was 'ciz­
ecl hy a t ta d1 m c n t  on Sl'JHember 1 6t h  an1l 
1 7th. The l u mber at this time bad bt'L'D es­
ti m:tted by l\kC l i n tnc·k. It a p 1 wn rs tl1:1 t :i ft­
er the lumber h:Hl hccu est i mated. a 11 1 l  lla 1 l 
been ta l;:eo po session of b�T t he> So n t h  
Bra nC'l1 L n m her 'om 1 1:1 ny.  anti  on Sept\'111· 
ber Hit h, In a nit h� t he l•' irst 'i'a t inu:1 l 
nn nk of Ht sscmer n :w i n s t  l l oxh' & � l rlln r  
a 1 1<1  .\ . \Y t>l'r l ,\;. C o  . .  t lw lumber was sci.1,,. 1!  
hy n t t a C' h nl C' n t .  n nrl 1111 t lw 1 7 th or Septern 
bl'1' i t  w:is a;.::1 1 1 1  a t 1 :1 1 ' 1 1ecl In 11 S\llt  brou:.::ht 
h)· t hr> ro11 1 p l n i n n 1 1 t  t h e> F i rst .:'\:i t l o u a l  Bank 
of .\l:l rq 1 10t t t• a;.::l inst I ln :\ lr & '\[pl lor :tn•I .\. 
"'l'P1l ,\ Co. On t he :! U h  of �rptcm hl'I' t n e  
8111 1 !  h Br:i 1wh Lnmh0r Compa u)· l'Pple\•ietl 
t hP l l 1 mhPI' fl'n 1 1 1  t hP sh"rlff, who lwld It  u 1 1-
1h•r t l 11·sl'  \\Tl l s  o f  : 1 1 1 1 1 " 1 1 m P n t .  'l' l iP  d t'l't>111l­
:1 1 1 I  t h1 •  Sn1 t l h  l l r: i 1 1 1 · h  L 1 1 1 1 1 hl'r t'o 1 1 1 p:rn y, up-
11 1 1  I f s  l'O l l l l':ld or J l l l l 't l t :JSP or t h t' l 1 1 m hl't' i l l  
1 •1 1 1 l t l'n\'l'l's.1 l'1'11 t l l  ,\ \\ l't'cl & Co . l'Xl'< 'U!l' i l  
: 1 1 1 < !  cl!' l i \'Pl'C'd t o  A \\'<'Pel " f'n. i l s  Ill' n t ! n ­
J i l , .  J ll 'l l l l l l"Rlll'� nnfrR t o  t i 1 1 •  :1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  o f  :<i:iS,­
l ll lll 'l'hP�I' l 1nl 1'- \\ f ' l'I ' l l l : l c l t • :l l l d  t ! ! ' l t\'1 •J'f'tl 
to \ \\'P!'d ,\; l 'n ,  a. f1 1 1 l 1 1 \Y R '  .\ h11ut .T 1 1 1 1 e  
" 1 " 1 ,  t l l l '  1\ 1 1 1 1 !  n t !:' '  >.1 11 11 1 ,  \ 11 " 1 1 '  t 1 st. � 1S,. 
011 0 ;  S1• p t !' 1 1 1 hP1 1 s t ,  :;; 1 . .. 1 101 1 ' l ' h P  11 t.,.,t pnr-
1 1 1  .. ut \\ I H •  n111 dl' 1 1 pn 1 1  t l w l'l'l'l l l k:i l l'  ot' t h!' 
1 1 1 i '""tor :1 1• n •pd upo n  1 1 1 t h f' l'on t rn rt. Thl' 
l u s t  t \\ u  p:1 y 1 1 1 1• 1 1 t R  w 'l'C 1 1 1n d  • \\ l t ho u t  u u y  
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sucb certificate, or any inventory of Mr. Mc-
Clintock, that being waived by both pnrties.
All those notes have been paid by the South
Kvanch Lumber Company. The complain-
ants are the holders of a part of the notes
made by A. Weed & Co. and Hoxie & Mel-
lor under the contract of November 28. 1889.
All such notes held by the complainants
were made after the sale of .Tune lltli by A.
Weed & Co. to the South Branch Lumber
Company. Some of these notes are renew-
als of notes made prior to that date. The
complainants bought them in open market
for a valuable consideration, and without
knowledge of the existence of the bill of
sale from A. Weed & Co. to Ho.'cie & Jlellor,
heretofore set out, given April 1.5. ISilO. As
the holders of these notes, the complainants
claim by their bill to be subrogated to all
the rights of Hoxie & Mellor under the bill
of sale, with the right to foreclose the same
as a chattel mortgage given to secure such
notes. The issue between the complainants
and the South Branch Lumber Company is
whether, under the contract of June 11th.
the South Branch Lumber Company has ae-
(juired such rights in the lumber that it
could hold the lumber as against the foreclo-
sure by the complainants of the bill of sale
of April 15th.
Some considerable testimony was given to
show what the agreement and understand-
ing was between A. Weed & Co. and Hoxie
& Mellor at the time the bill of sale was ex-
ecuted, which, taken with the bill of sale,
would constitute a security, and what were
the terms. The South Branch Lumber Com-
pany contends that when the bill of sale was
executed it was the understanding and
.Tgreement between A. Weed & Co. and Hox-
ie & Mellor that A. Weed & Co. should con-
tinue in possession of the logs, drive them to
their mill at Ramsay, manufactiu'e them in-
to lumber, sell the lumber, and, by moans
of the proceeds, pay the notes indorsed or
signed, and to be indorsed or signed, by
Hoxie & Mellor, and that Hoxie & Mellor
would continue to indorse or renew notes for
A. Weed & Co. to enable A. Weed & Co. to
do that business; and that in doing that
busiuess A. Weed & Co. made sale of the
lumber in question to the defendant by the
contract of June 11th. It appears that ,?lit,-
725 of the notes given by the South Branch
Lumber Company was directly applied to
the payment of the notes made or guaiau-
tied by Hoxie & Mellor, and by them given
to A. Weed & Co., under their contract of
November 28, 1889. The bill was filed in
this cause October 1, 1890, setting up that
the complainants were holders of the notes
made or guarantied by Hoxie & Mellor for
the accommodation of A. W^eed & Co., and
(hat the bill of sale was given for the pur-
pose of securing Hoxie & Mellor .against any
loss they might suffer by reason of the fail-
ure of A. Weed & Co. to pay the promissory
notes in accordance with the understanding
of the parties, or to secure the several par-
ties and persons by whom the said notes
were purchased; and designated that all
the property described in and covered by the
bill of sale was to be and form a fund to se-
cure the ijayment of such notes. The South
Branch Lumber Company filed its answer
and cross-bill, denying that the bill of sale
was given either to secure Hoxie & ^Mellor
or the notes; setting up the contract of No-
vember 28, 1889; alleging that the bill of
sale was not intended to interfere with the
manufacture of the logs into lumber, and the
sale thereof; setting up that the sale to the
South Branch Lumber Company by A. Weed
& Co. was made with the know-ledge and
consent of Hoxie & Medor; that $10,725 of
the $58,000 which it had paid under its con-
tract had been applied by A. Weed & Co.
to the payment of the notes made by Hoxie
& Mellor for the accommodation of A. Weed
& Co., and which were outstanding on the
date of the making of the bill of sale or giv-
en to renew notes then outstanding; setting
up that A. Weed & Co.. and all the members
thereof, were residents of Ashland in the
state of Wisconsin; that the larger part, if
not all, of all the logs which the parties iu-
tended to cover by the bill of sale w'ere in
the tow'uship of Ironwood. in the county of
Gogebic, at the date of the execution and de-
livery of said bill of sale, to-wit, the 15th
of April, 1890: that the bill of sale was nev-
er filed in the township where the property
was at the date of the execution and deliv-
ery thereof; and that the logs out of whi<h
the lumber in controversy had been manu-
factured were not in Black river, near Ram-
say, on the date of the execution and deliv-
ery of the bill of sale. By way of cross-bill,
the South Branch Lumber Company claimed
that, the parties being before the court, the
rights of all parties should be determined in
tJiis cause, and asked to have the further
prosecution of the attachment and replevin
suits enjoined and the bonds discharged.
For the purpose of showing that the bill of
sale was in fact intended as a chattel mort-
gage, Mr. Mellor, of the firm of Hoxie &
Mellor, was railed as a witness, and testi-
fied that on April 15th there w^ere outstand-
ing notes made or indorsed by Hoxie & Mel-
lor for A. Weed & Co. in the sum of .5108.-
000; that up to that time no security had
been given; that this was all accommoda-
tion paper, and made for the accommodation
of A. Weed & Co. He testified that Paul
Weed called upon him at that date. April
15th. and wanted to renew this paper when
it fell due. He w-as then asked: "Q. What
did you say to that? A. I said to him that
if he wanted to renew any more of that pa-
per we wanted security. Q. What security
did you get? A. Security on logs at Ram-
say. Q. State what occurred in regard to
the giving of the bill of sale, on or about the
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C I I A T T E L  .i\! OHTG AG E '.  1 1 1  
sucb certificate, or any inventory of Mr. Mc­
Cli ntock, tbat being waived by botb parties. 
All these notes have been paid by the Sou t b  
Branch Lumber Company. The complain­
a n ts a re the holders of a part of the no t e s  
m:ule b y  A .  Weed & Co. a n d  lloxie & :,\'.I 1-
lor uncler tbe contract of November 2 . 18 'l:l. 
All sucb notes held by the compla i 1 1a 1 1 ts 
W('re macle after the sale of J une 11 th by A. 
\\"eed & Co. to the South Branch Lumber 
Company. ome o f  the e notes are renC'w­
als of notes made prior to that datC'. The 
complainants bought them in open market 
for a valuable consideration. a nd ,y i t hout 
know ledge of the existence of the bill of 
sale from A. Weed & Co. to Hoxie & :-. r ellor, 
heretofore set out, given April 15. 18!10. A s  
t he holders o f  these notes, the com p'a ina nts 
c - l a i m  by their bill to be subrogated to :i ll 
the rights of Hoxie & Mellor under the bill 
of sale. with tbe right to foreclose t he sa me 
a a chattel mortgage given to secure such 
notes. The issue between the complaina n t s  
a nd t h e  South Branch Lumber Company is 
whether, under the contract of June 1Hb. 
the South Branch Lumber Company has ac­
quired such rights in the l umber that it 
could hold the lumber as against the foreclo­
sure by the complainants of the bill  of sale 
o f  April 15th. 
Some considerable testimony was given to 
show what the agreement and understan1l­
ing was between A .  Weed & Co. and Hoxie 
& Mellor at the time the bill o f  sale was ex­
ecuted, w h ich, taken w i t h  the bill of sale, 
would constitute a security, and what were 
the terms. The South Branch Lumber Com­
pany contends that when the bill o f  sale was 
executed it was the understanding and 
agreement between A. Weed & Co. and Hox­
ie & :-.rellor that A. Weed & Co. should con­
ti nue in possession of the logs, drive them to 
their mill  at Ramsay, manufacture them in­
to lumber, sell the lu mber, and, by means 
of the proceeds, pay the notes i ndorsed or 
signed, and to be indorsed or signed, by 
Hoxie & l\Iellor, ancl that Hoxie & Mellor 
would continue to inclorse or renew notes for 
A. Weed & Co. to enable A. Weed & Co. to I do that business; and that i n  doing that 
husi ness A. Weed & Co. made sale o f  the 
lumber i n  question to the defendant by the 
contract of June 11th. I t  appears that $-!fl.-
72:1 of the notes given by the South Brand1 
Lumber Company was di rectly ap11liecl to 
the payment o f  the notes made or gua1 a n ­
tiecl by Hoxie & :-.rellor. a n d  b y  them given 
to A .  'Yeerl & Co., under their contract of 
:\°oYember 2 , 1 SU. The bill was filed in 
this cause October 1, 1800. setting up that 
t he com plainants '"ere holders o f  the notes 
11 :ule or guarantied by Hoxie & :-.rellor for 
tlle accommoda t ion o f  A. Weed & Co., and 
t h at t h e> bill of sale was p;iv<'n for the pur­
pose of securing Hoxie & :-.rellor agai nst any 
los:< tlwy m ight suffe1· by reasPn of the fa i l ­
ure of A .  \\'eecl & Co. t o  pay the prom1:<sury , 
[.. , �  �·�t UJ 
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notes i n  accordance with the unclers tan<l i 11g 
of the parties, o r  to secure the sevPral par­
ties and persons by whom the sai 1l  notes 
were purchased ; and designaterl that all 
the property described in and covered by the 
bill of sale was to be and form a fund to se­
cure the payment of such notes. 'file Sout h  
Branch Lumber Company filed its a nswer 
and cross-bi ll, denying that the bill of sale 
was g i l·cn ei ther to secure Hoxie & :'>Idl"r 
o r  the note ; setting u p  the contract of ::\o­
vember 2', 18 l:l;  alleging- t hat t he bill ., f 
sale was not intended to interfere with t he 
manufacture of the log-s into lu mber, and the 
. ale thereof; setting u p  that t he sale to the 
South Branch Lumber Company by A. Weed 
& Co. was made w i t h  the knowledge a n d  
consent o f  lloxie & :'>Ie1lor; tha t $40.72:-i o f  
the $:>8,000 which it bad paid under i ts con­
tract bad been applied by A. Weed & Co. 
to the payment of the notes made by Hoxie 
& :-.Iellor for the accommoclation o f  A. \\'eecl 
& Co., and which were outstanding on the 
1late of the making of tbe bill o f  sale or giv­
en to renew notes then outstanding; setting 
up that A. Weed & Co., and all the membPrs 
thereof, were residents of Ashland in the 
state of W iscons i n ;  that the la rger part. i f  
not all, o f  a l l  t h e  logs wh ich the parties i n­
tended to cover by the bill  of sale were in 
the townsh i p  o f  Iromvootl. in the county o f  
Gop;ebic, at the date of the execution a n1 l  <IP­
l i very of said bill of sale. to-wit, tbP l�1th 
o f  A pril, 1890 ; that the bill  of sale was nCY­
er filed in the township where the property 
was at the date of the execution a nd deliY­
ery thereof; and that the logs out of whkh 
the lumber in controversy bad been manu­
factured were not i n  Black river. near R'lm­
say, on the date of the execution a n1l delh·­
ery o f  the bill  o f  sale. B y  way o f  cross-b i ll. 
the South Branch Lumber Company claimP1l 
that, the parties being before the court. the 
1·igllts of all parties should be determined in 
U1is ratrne, and asked to have the furthPr 
prosecution o f  the attarh ment ancl replevin 
suits r njoi necl and the bonrls cl i ,;c:hargecl. 
For the purpose o f  showing t ha t  the bill of 
sale was in fact i ntend!'ll as a chattel mort­
gage, l\Ir. :'>Iellor, of the fi rm o f  H11xiP & 
:-.Iellor. was ca lled as a witm'""· a n1l tl':-;ti­
necl tba t on A pril 1:-ith then' wcrp outstanrl­
i ng notes nrn 1le or in llnrsP1l hy Iloxip & :'>frl­
lor for A. Weed & Co. in tbe sum of $10.-.. -
000; that up to that t ime no secnritY bail 
I leen given ; that this was all accom n101la­
t io n  paper, and made for the accommo1lation 
o f  A. Weed & Co. H e  testi fied that Paul 
\\'cecl called upon him a t  that 1late. April 
l:>th. and wa ntecl to renew this pap<>r when 
it fell due. He was then aske1l : "Q. "'bat 
did you say to t ha t ?  A. I sa id to bir 1 that 
if he wanted to renew any more o f  th.I r pa­
per we wanted security. Q .  "-hat !'eeurit�­
clid you get ? A .  t>ecurity on lo�s at Rarn­
sn y. < J . �ta te whnt occnrre1l in re�ar1l to 
the ;!. i Y i ng of the bill  of sale, on or about tl e 
V I I  I I  I T1 I 1 
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15th of April. 1S90. A. Paul Weed came
(lowu here to see rue about renewing more
of tiiat paper, and I told him I was very
sorry we had gone into that deal, and I did
not want to renew any more without securi-
ty. He asked me what security we wanted,
and I told him we wanted a bill of sale of
the logs there at Ramsay. He said. 'AH
right, you can have it.' I went out in the
other room, and got a blank bill of sale, and
tilled it out, and he signed it, and signed the
name of A. Weed & Co. * * * Q. Did this
bill of sale contemplate the security of all
pajier that was outstanding at the time it
was given, and any renewals that might be
issued of such original paper? A. That was
what the bill of sale was given for. It was
for the security of the notes that were out-
standing at the time* and any renewals of
those notes. Q. Did you have any conver-
sation with Paul Weed on that point,— about
the renewal or securing renewals, etc.? A.
I did have a conversation about that. Q.
What did he say? A. lie said that, of
course, the bill of sale was given to secure
any renewals that might be made. Q. Did
.vou have any conversation with Paul Weed
by which it was agreed between you that
you were to renew au.v stated amounts of
paper then outstanding? A. Yes. sir; we
had. Q. State what that conversation was.
A. He said he would probably want to re-
new most of the pajier that was outstanding
at that time. Q. Did you make any agree-
ment with I'aul Weed not to lilo this bill of
sale? A. No, sir." The witness further tes-
tified that he afterwards filed the bill of sale
in the town-clerk's oftice in the township of
Bessemer, and that at the time of filing the
logs covered by the bill of sale were in Klack
river, at Itamsay; that the head of the jam
was at the mill at Ramsay, and that he un-
<lerstood the logs were in a solid jam; that
A. Weed & Co. were doing business at Ram-
say, operating a sawmill, manufacturing
lumber, and were doing a logging business,
and that their otHce was situate at Ramsay,
and tliat they were also doing business at
Asldand, Wis.; that after the bill of sale
was given they renewed other notes, and
some new ones wore given, but that they
wiTe for renewals, though given for difTer-
ont amounts when they were renewed. The
witness also testified to having received a
letter from Paul Weed, dated May 124, IS'.Hi,
In which \\'ced wrote lilin that he IucIosimI
• crtalii notes for renewal, and furl her stal-
fd: "Please ; ign or hnlorse, ns the case may
be, and send them back to nin In Inclosed
envelope. Wc d«i not know yet whether we
shall need to rciii'W much In .Itily or not.
We expect wc sold our Ramsay stock to-<lay:
shall know ne-xt week. If we did. It will
run Into tnone.v fast. W(> send one other
note of .<:!.i>0(), to renew note of same amount
duo at Rank of Antlgo, ,Inly 'J1. I hope we
Hhnll not bave to trouble yon much more.
Everything running well with us. Yours,
truly, Paul Weed." The witness further tes-
tified that he first learned of the sale made
to the South Branch Lumber Company on
July 3d, which was by letter; tliat he nev-
er authorized the sale, and never had any
talk with A. Weed & Co. about it. 'I he wi -
ness stated that, prior to this time, he sig'c I
the bond in certain attachment proceed. ugs
for A. Weed & Co. to get the logs restoiel
to those parties, and that he expected them
to proceed and manufacture the logs and
sell the lumber; that they were to take caie
of the notes as fast as they could sell the
lumber off; that, at the time he signed the
bond to release the logs from the attacii-
ment, A. Weed & Co. had spoken of the
South Branch Lumber Company as a possi-
ble buyer; and that at that time he entered
no protest against A. Weed & Co. making
a sale to the South Branch Lumber Compa-
ny. The evidence shows that all the notes
referred to were thus signed and indorsed
by Hoxie & Mellor under the contract of
November 28, 1880. Mr. Mellor, in making
this contract, understood that the notes re-
ferred to therein were to be carried along
by renewals of their indorsements until the
fall of IS'.K), and that A. Weed & Co. by th > r
contract agreed to take care of them till
Decendier .-.l, LSiK), and that Hoxie i»i Mellor
were to continiie their indorsements until
that time. No other arrangements were ev-
er made in regard to these notes. Mr. Mel-
lor also understood that the original agri e-
ment provided that A. Weed & Co. were to
saw the logs and sell the lumber and take
up the notes by that time.
It is evident from this testimony, and the
interpretation which Mr. Mellor gave the
conti'act, and his undcrslanding of the ar-
rangement between himself and Paul Weed.
a<tiMg for A. Weed .<t Co., that the bill of
s!ile was given to secure the performance
by A. Weed & Co. of the contract of No-
vember 28, 1S.S0. By the terms of this con-
tract, which was not changed, or under-
stood between the parties to h.ave been
changed. In any respect, A. Weed & Co.
were to manufacture the logs into lumber,
sell the lumber, and out of the proceeds
take up the noli's before December :il, 1>S:K),
and tlie bill of sale was given to secure
Hoxie & Mellor for the faithful perform-
ance of this contract; and It Is evident that
It was the Intention of the parlies that.
80 long as A. Weed & Go. went forward
and exec\il(<d the contract, they would not
be Interfered with by lloxie .t Mellor, but
that, should they fall to perform the coii-
trnct according to these terms, then lloxlo
& Mellor would h;ivc their remedv under
the chattel mortgage to enforce jH-rform-
iinc(>. It Is illllic'ult to underslnnd from the
testimony of Mr. Mellor or of Mr. Paul
Weed (which we have not set out here)
how It can be claimed that Uoxle & Mel-
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l:itb of .\ pril . 1 90. A. Paul Weed ca.me 
cl1H\'U here to see me about renewing more 
of that pa per, a nd I told him I was \ery 
orry we ball gone into that deal. a nd I did 
not want to renew a ny more without securi­
t�-. He asked me what security we wanted, 
nud I told him we wa nted a bill of :::a le '1 f  
the lO!!"S there a t  Ram ay. H e  said, 'All. 
ric:bt. you ca n ba\e it.' I went out in the 
other room, and got a blank bill of sale, and 
filled it out. and he igned it, and si gned the 
name of A. Weed & Co. • • • Q.  Did this 
bill of sale contemplate the security o f  a l l  
pa,per that was outstanding a t  the time it 
was gi\en. and any renewals that might be 
i sued of such original paper? A. Tha t was 
what the bill of sale was gi,en for. It wa 
for the security of the notes that were out­
standing at the t ime. and any renewal of 
those notes. Q. Did you ha 'e a ny con,er­
sation with Paul Weed on tha t poiut,-about 
the renewal or securing renewals. etr. ? A. 
I did ha.Ye a conYersation about that. Q. 
What did be say ?  A. Ile said that, o f  
<·ourse. the bill o f  sale wa gi'I" n t o  securr 
any renewals that m ight be made. Q. D;d 
you have any con,ersation with Paul '1\'eed 
by which it was agreed betw en you that 
you were to renew any state<l a mounts of 
pa ver then outsta nding'! A..  YPs. sit·;  we 
harl. Q . •  tate wbnt that conversation wa . 
A. Ile said he would prohably w n n t  to re­
new most of the paper that was outstanding 
n t that ti Ill" Q. Did you make n ny agrre­
ml'n t with l 'aul Weed not to file this bill of 
:::ale'! A. �o • •  ir.'' The witn gg furt her tes­
t i fa·tl that be afterward. fi led t he bill of ale 
in the town-cleric's office in t h e township of 
Bessemer, and tbat at the tinw of filing the 
Joi:s e:o�er cl by the b i l l  of salr were i o  Hind: 
rin•r. at Ha msa.y ; that the hC'ad of the jam 
was at the mill at Ham:::ay, and that hC' nn­
• lerstood t hP Jo.:.:s werP in n sn l i cl j a m ; that 
.\. \Yee•l & 'o. \Y!'t'<' <lo i n :.:  bnsinC'!lS nt Ram­
say. 01 11·1 .. 1 t i n :.:  a sn w 11 1 i l l ,  m:1 n u fnet 1 1 rl n :.:  
111 1 1 1 1 11•1', n ml were clo rn:.: n lng-:.:ln� husinrss, 
a n d t hn l  t hrir oCH<'e was sltnn t P  a l Ham�ny, 
: 1  nd t ha t I IH'y were also doin:.: husl nl'S" at 
,\ :-hla 111 l , Wis. ; tha t  Hfll'r t h P hill of snle 
wa _;.: l \ Pn t h P.I" renewc>d o l hPr n n t r>i. n ncl 
f;fl l l lf' 1 1 1 ·\\' <>I ll'" Wl'l'P g(Yl' l l ,  hnt t ha t  1 ! 11•y 
\\'Pl"t' for l'<'ll <'Wn ls. I hn11i.:h :.:I Y l ' l l  for c l i ffpr­
l ' l l l  :t 111n1 1 1 1 t >i  Wh<'ll l hl'y \\"Pl"P 1°el l ! ' \\0l'!L ' 1 1 1<' 
wlt n ,.ss n lsn t 1 "Rt l 1l 1 ·d to h a r l n :.:  1·1•<'<'iH'<I n 
l • ' l t .. 1· fr1 1 1 1 1  l 'n u l \\•!'<'<I, d:i l rd ;\lay :.! L l S'. 1 11, I 1 1 1 \\ h l"1 1 \\'••f'rl \\ rnt P 1 1 1 1 1 1  t lrn t lw Im l111<t•d 
• t •rli i l n  11ot 1 •  for n•1wwa l.  a nr l  furl lwr H l a l ­
••tl : " l ' lt•: 1  " i i.: n 1 1 1' l n r l111•1'•'. n s  1 11 1 •  c·ns1• m : i y  
I ll'. :i 1 1 r l  C' 1 1 1 I  t l wm h:i •·k 1 1 1 1 1 1 1' 1 11 l 1 1 < 1 1 1Hrd 
1 n \ 1•l11r11•. \\·,. d" 1 1 1 1 1  lt n 1 1 \\" yl't wl u l lu · r  wt> 
l t .1 1 1  """rl to 1 . .  1 1 P W  1 1 1 11 1 •h  In .1 1 1 1 .1 or 1 1 1 1 t  
\\'e ,, f l""' \\'1• l'nlrl our J t :i 111 11 � 11 1 11"1 t •Hla�· . 
h n l l  k llll\\' Ill  I \\"f'P({, I f  \\'I' r l l r l ,  II w i l l  
1'11 1 1  l l1 t r1 1 1 1111 1 <•y f:ri; t .  \\'1 •  1'1•11d 11 11<• 1 1 1  hPI' 
1 1 .. t l '  ••f ;:,01111, t o  r•' lll'\\' nol <• nr ·n111 1 •  1 1 1 1 101 1 1 1 1  
'Inf'  :i t H:t n l· n f  .\ n l lw 1, .f 1 1 ly :.! 1 .  I h 1 1pt· \\"P 
l1'1 l l  not hu \"C to lru11 lil•• ) 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 w h  1 1 1on:. 
D i g 1t1zed by 
I JTERNET A R C H  V E  
Everything running well w i th us. Yours. 
truly, Paul \\'eed.'' Tbe w i t ness further tes­
tified that he first learnecl of the sale made 
to tbe Sout h  Branch Lumber Company 0 1 1  
July 3d, wbicb w a s  by letter; t h a t  be 1wY­
er authorized the a le. and m»rr ba d au�· 
talk with A. Weed & Co. a bout i t .  The w i  -
ne s tatecl that, prior to 1 h is t i me. be si :! ' l '  I 
the bond in certain attarbmeut procC'ed ui::s 
for A. Weed & Co. to get tbe lop;s resto1 e I 
to those partie , and that he expected t b!'m 
to proceed and ma nufacture t b e  Jogs anr l  
sell tbe lumber; that they were to ta ke carr 
of the notes as fast a they coul d sell t h0 
l u mber off; that, at the t ime be signeu t h(' 
boncl to release tbe log from the attach­
ment. A. \\'eed & Co. had spoken of t he 
South Branch Lumber Company a a poso;i­
ble buyer; and that at that t ime be enterl'd 
no prote t again t A. Weed & Co. makin;.r 
a sale to the South BranC'b Lumbt>r Compa­
ny. The evidence shows t h a t  a l l  t i.le notrs 
referred to were tllu signed and i ndorsed 
by Hoxie & J.\IC'l l<H· under the e:on tract nf 
No\ mbcr 28, 1880. :\fr. :Mel lor. in makill!!" 
t h i s  c o n t ract. u u tle rstoocl tbat t hP notes rl'­
frrred to t herei n were to be c·a 1Tied n long 
by l"l' IH'\Y:t ls of t heir inclorSC'JU('ntg unt i l t h <' 
fa l l  or 1 '00, and that A .  Wretl & Co. by th · r 
c·ont ract n;:;reetl to take care of them t i l l  
DeC'emhcr :n . 1 800, and that Hoxie & J.\l0llnr 
were to co n t i n ue t heir indorsem0nts u n t i l  
t hat time. Xo other arrangemC'nts were ei-­
er made in regard to these notes. J.\ l r. l\Il'l­
lot· a lso under. toocl that the origi na l a;::(l'l e­
ment p1·ovi<lerl t ha t  A.. Weed & Co. wer0 to 
saw t he log and .ell the lumber and toke 
up the note by that t ime. 
I t  is \i(lrnt from th is testimony, and t hi' 
intC'rpre t at ion wbic:b l\fr. Iellor "'ave t he 
c·nB t r:1 .. t. :1 1 1 tl bis n n dersl a ndin� or tbe a r­
ra n.::-1•111P11t lle l " r"n h i msel f a nd ra ul ' l'<'<l .  
:t<·t i 1 1;: for A .  "'eccl & �o., tlin t the bi l l  nt' 
l'ltle wng �i l'en ln secu re tlle p!' 1 ·rormn nn' 
hy A. \\eccl & Co. of t ile ron t rnct of :-lo­
YC'lllill'r :.?S. L S!l. ll)' thC' I Nms o f  thi::: ('on­
t ral't, whil'b wn uot (•ha ngl'<l, or t11Hkr­
stootl l iPl wern the i1a rt les to h:nt' lll'C'll 
<'l1:1 11�eil, In n n y  re>ipC'rt, A. \VC'ecl & C1 1. 
\H'l"l' to 111:1 n 1 1 fn d 1 1 rC' t he lo;:A I nto l u m lwr,  
sl' l l  t lw l u m l H' r. a 1 1 < l  01 1 !  of t bC' lH"Ot"eec ls 
tn lw 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 1• not 1 •>i hl' l°nt·p l ll't'<' l llhcr :n . 1 14:10, 
11 11<! t lw hill or ,.-:1 1<' was gh I'll t o  SN'll rl' 
I l nx l l' ,\ ;\ f l' l lnr 1 0 1· t he f:1 i t h fu l pl'rform­
n n c•p nf t h is 1 ·011t r:1 1"l ; a n cl i t  I ::: eY ldt'11t t l 1 : 1 t  
It wns t h • l n t !'nl lon of till� pn rt il's t l ra ( .  
so 1011� n i-1  A .  \\'Pl'd & c �n. \H� n t l'nrwn n l  
n nr l  <'"'<' l t l f ' c l  t l H' l'nnt raC"t, t ll <'Y w n n h l  u o t  
h r  1 1 1 t r .rf1 •r<'<l w i t h h)' J l 1 n i1 '  ,\ !\ J p l lor, hnt  
t h n t ,  s h n u l r l  t h !'.\" fa l l  I n  1wrl'or111 t lw 1 ·01 1 · 
I rtl ! ' t  n 1•1·ord i 1 1i; to t lrl'St' l l'l " l l l�, t hPn l l nx lt' 
& :\I < 'I  l 1 1 r  " 011 Id hn 1 "  t 111'1 r n• nwr l y 1 1 1 1 1 1 <'1' 
1 111'  c · lrn l t < ' l  1 1 1n1·t i.::1;:<' t n  P l l fnrc ·!' prrform 
: 1 1 1 1 · < '  T l  Is d l lli r  1 1 l t  l o  1 1 1 1 r l 1 • rs t 1 1 1 1 1 I  from t l rr 
I P>< l l 11 1 1 1 1 1 .1· n l' i\l r !\ I C ' J lnr or nf J\ l r. 1 '1 1 1 1 1  
\\'rf'd ( w  h lrh WC' h11 \'<' n o t  HC't n u t  h 1 • 1'Pl 
how I t  (': 1 1 1  he c:ln l 1 1 1c<I  that l ioxle & i\ 1 1'1· 
O ri !'a l fro 
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lT:i
lor had a rif,'ht iiiidor tliis bill of sale—
wLicU, by tlie airaiitiuiueut between the
parties at the time of its execution, was
intended and understood as a security—
to interfere with A. Weed & Co. in driving
these logs to the mill, manufacturing them
into lumber, and selling and disposing of
the lumber for the purpose of talking care
of these notes or renewals, when it must
be conceded that they were to have until
December 31, 1890, to pay and take up
such notes, and the renewals thereof, by
Hoxie & Mellor. who were to carry them
along upon such renewals until that time.
By the terms of the contract of November
28, ISSO, A. Weed & Co. were to have un-
til that time to pay and take up these notes.
No change was made in that contract, and,
by the testimony of Mr. Mellor himself,
the chattel mortgage into which the bill
of sale was converted by parol agreement
was only intended to secure the perform-
ance of this contract. By the arrangement,
then, between Hoxie & Mellor and A. Weed
& Co. they were to have the right to man-
ufacture and sell this lumber for the very
purpose of meeting these notes. In this
view of the case, A. Weed & Co. had the
right to sell and convey on .Tune 11, 1800,
all of the lumber manufactured at their
mill from these logs to the South Branch
Lumber Company, and the claim of the
South Branch Lumber Company would
have priority over any claim which Hoxie
& Mellor had under the bill of sale, or any
claim which the complainants might have
as the holders of these notes by way of
subrogation. There is nothing upon the
record to show that the South Branch Lum-
ber Company had any notice or knowledge
of the bill of sale held by Hoxie & Mel-
lor. The only claim of notice to the South
Bi-auch liumber Company is that the bill of
sale was filed in the township of Bessemer,
Gogebic county. It was executed on April
15 and filed May 10, 1890. A. Weed & Co.
were non-residents of this state.
The ouestion of the place of filing the
mortgage does not become important in
determining the rights of the South Branch
Lumber Company. But in determiuiug the
rights of the defendant the First National
Bank of Ashland, Wis., it does become Im-
portant. About September 6, 1890, the firm
of Hoxie & Mellor failed, and made an as-
signment for the benefit of creditors, Charles
V. Bardeen, one of the defendants herein,
being assignee. About the same time A.
Weed & Co. became insolvent. On Septem-
ber 15. 1890, A. Weed & Co. assigned their
contract with the South Branch Lumber
Company to the First National Bank of
Ashland, as security for notes to the amount
of $56,130, held by said bank, including $41,-
130 of the said accommodation notes, the
said bank to pay said indebtedness, and
the surplus, if any, to A. Weed & Co., after
paying expense of carrying out the contract.
The First National Bank of Ashland hel<l
$41,1.30 of the said accommodation paprr.
.fO.UL'j of which was discounted Ijy said
bank. May 3, 1890, and tlie remaiuder at
sundry times from May 31 to August i:!,
1890. On September 15, 1890, A. Weed &
Co. also executed and delivered to the Fir.st
.\ational Bank of Ashland a chattel mort-
gage to secure said notes, amounting to
.fSG.lSO, covering the logs and lumber in
auestion, besides other property. At the
same time other mortgages and securities
were turned out to said bank, but not sufli-
cient in value to cover the indebtedness.
The amount of the accommodation paper
now outstanding and held by parties to
this action is $86,232.50, some of which are
renewal notes, the balance being notes dis-
counted and the monej' used in whole or
in part to pay up old notes. The First Na-
tional Bank of Ashland paid out in the
sawing and taking care of the property
and carrying out the contract with the
South Biunch Lumber Company after it
took possession under its assignment of
contract and chattel mortgage, the sum of
$11,804.11, and for taxes on the lumber
.$456.92. The particular parts of the decree
to which the First National Bank of Ash-
land excepts are those which find: "That
the lien of said bill of sale is prior to the
lien of the said First National Bank of
Ashland created by its said chattel mort-
gage dated September 15, 1890. * * •
That the said First National Bank of Ash-
land, the First National Bank of Bessemer,
and the comi>lainants herein, excepting the
First National Bank of Appleton, are en-
titled to share pro rata (provided, however,
that the said First National Bank of Ash-
land shall first exhaust its other security
obtained by it as security for the said notes
and other demands) in the surplus tliat
shall remain after satisfying the said sum
so ascertained to be due to said bank as
aforesaid, and for which it has a first lien.
And that they shall so share, to the amoimt
and extent onl.y of the notes, respectively,
held by them, and secured by said bill of
sale of April 15, 1890, namely, notes then
outstanding, signed or indorsed by Hoxie
& Mellor for the accommodation of said A-
Weed & Co., and renewals of said notes."
The court having found that the bill of
sale from A. Weed & Co. to Hoxie & Mel-
lor was never recorded in Ironwood town-
ship, where the logs therein intended to be
described were situated, and that the con-
tract of the South Branch Lumber Com-
pany is prior to the lien of said bill of sale,
the First National Bank of Ashland con-
tends that it was error in the court to hold
that the lien of the bill of sale is prior to
the lien of the First National Bank of Ash-
land.
It is urged on behalf of defendants that
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lor hn d a right uuclcr th is bill of sale­
which, by the arran;.;cmeut belween the 
partie:;; al  the lime of its excculiun, was 
intended and uuclerslood as a security­
to iu tel'fere with A. Weed & Co. in driving 
these logs to the mill, manufacturing them 
into lu mber, aud selling and disposing of 
the lumber for the purpose of takiug care 
of these notes or renewals, when it must 
be conceded that they were to have until 
December 31, 1800, to pay and take up 
such notes, and the renewals thereof, by 
Hoxie & Mellor. who were to carry them 
along upon such renewals until that time. 
By the terms of the contract of November 
28, 1880. A. Weed & Co. were to have un­
til that time to pay and take up these notes. 
No change was made in that conlract, and, 
by the testimony of Mr. l\Iellor himself, 
the chattel mortgage into which the bi l l  
o f  sale was converted by parol agreement 
was only intended to secure the perform­
ance of this contract. By the arrangement, 
then, 'between Hoxie & Mellor and A. Weed 
& Co. they were to have the right to man­
ufacture and sell this lumber for the very 
purpose of meeting these notes. In this 
view of the case, A.  Weed & Co. had the 
right to sell and convey on June 11, 1890, 
all of the lumber manufactured at their 
mill from these logs to the South Branch 
Lumber Company, and the claim of the 
South Branch Lumber Company would 
have priority over any claim which Hoxie 
& l\lellor had under the bill of sale, or any 
claim which the complainants might have 
as the holders of these notes by way of 
subrogation. There is nothing upon the 
record to show that the South Branch Lum­
ber Company had any notice or knowledge 
of the bill of sale held by Hoxie & Mel­
lor. The only cla im of notice to the South 
Brauch Lumber Company is that the bill of 
sale was filed in the township of Bessemer, 
Gogebic county. It was executed on April 
15 and filed May 10, 1890. A. Weed & Co. 
were non-residents of this state. 
The a uestion of the place of fil ing the 
mortgage does not become important in 
determining the rights of the South Branch 
Lumber Company. But in determining the 
rights of the defeudant the First :National 
Bank of Ashland, Wis., it does become im­
portant. About September 6, 1890, the firm 
of Hoxie & l\Iellor failed, and made a n  as­
signment for the benefit of creditors, Charles 
V: Bardeen. one of the defendants herein, 
being assignee. About the same time A. 
Weed & Co. became insolvent. On Septem­
ber 15, 1890, A. Weed & Co. assigned their 
contract with the South Branch Lumber 
Company to the First National Bank of 
Ashland, as security for notes to the amount 
o f  $56,130, held by said bank, including $41,-
130 of the said accommodation notes, the 
said bank to pay said indebtedness, and 
the surplus, if  any, to A. \\'eed & Co., after 
C 1  I LIL IJ'f 
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paying expense o f  ca rr� i11g out the crn1trwt 
The First Nalional llauk oJ Ashland J11·lcl 
$-!1, 130 of the said accom moda tiou pap• r 
$!.l,U:!::i of which was discounted IJ�· :-;;i i1l 
bank, l\lay .S, 1 no, and the remaimh•r a t  
sundry times from M a y  31  to August i::. 
1800. On September 15, 1800, A. \Yccd & 
Co. also executed and delivered to the Fir:<t 
National Bank of Ashland a chattel mort­
gage to secure said notes, aruoun ting w 
$5G,130, covering the logs and lumber i11 
cuesliou, besides other property. At the 
same time other wortgag-es anll sccuritie$ 
were turned out to said bank, but not suffi­
cient in Yalue to cover the indebtedness. 
The amount of the accommodation paper 
now outstanding and held by parties to 
this action is $8G,232.50, some of which are 
renewal notes, the balance being notes dis­
counted and the money used in w hole or 
in part to pay up old notes. The First ::'\;t ­
tional Bank of Ashland paid out i n  thl' 
sawing and taking care of the property 
and carrying out the contract with t he 
South Branch Lumber Company after it 
took possession under its assignment of 
contract and chattel mortgage, the sum of 
$11,804.11, and for taxes on the lumber 
$456.92. The particular parts o f  the decree 
to which the First Kational Bank of Ash­
land excepts are those which find : "That 
the lien of said bill of sale is prior to the 
lien of the said First National Bank of 
Ashland created by i ts said chattel mort­
gage dated September 15, 1890. * * * 
That the said First National Bank of Ash­
land, the First ::\'ational Bank of Bessemer. 
and the complain::tllts herein, excepting the 
First National Bank of Appleton, are en­
titled to share pro rata (provided, however, 
that the said First National Bank of .Ash­
land shall first exhaust its other security 
obtained by it as security for the said notes 
a nd other demand ) in the surplus that 
shall remain after satisfying the said sum 
so ascertained to be due to said bank as 
aforesaid, and for which it has a first l ien. 
And that they shall so share, to the a mount 
and extent only of the notes, respectively. 
held by them, and secured by said bill of 
sale of April 15, 1890, namely, notes then 
outstanding, signed or indorsed by Hoxie 
& l\lellor for the accommodation of said A. 
Weed & Co. , and renewals of said notes." 
The court having found that the bill of 
sale from A. Weed & Co. to Hoxie & :\Iel-
101· was never recorded in Ironwood town­
ship, where the logs therein intended to he 
described were situated, and tbat the con­
tract of the South Branch Lumber Com­
pany is prior to the lien of sa id bill  of sale. 
the First National Bank of Ashland eon­
tends that it was error in the court to hold 
that the lien of the bill of sale is prior to 
the lien of the First National Bank of Ash­
land. 
It is urged on behalf of defenda nts that 
u 1 1 y 1 r  t11 f1 m 
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the bill of sale was void ns to third parties,
lieLUUSe the description did uot cover the
property iuteuded to be conveyed, the bill
of sale calling for logs "in the Blaciv river,
near Ramsay," while a large portion of the
logs in question were not in the river, but
in roll-ways on the banks of the river, and
six miles from Ramsay. It is also contended
that the mortgage was void as to the First
National Banli of Ashland, for the reason
that it was not filed in the proper town-
clerk's office. It is conceded that the mort-
gage was never filed in the to\vn-clerk"s
office where the logs were situate at the
time the bill of sale was executed and de-
livered; that is, in the township of Iron-
wood. But couusel for complainants claim
that the mortgage having been filed in the
town-clerk's office of the town of Bessemer,
and the logs having been floated into that
township, and being in that town at the
time the mortgage was filed, such tiling was
proper. Section GIO.'!. How. St., provides:
"Except when the mortgagor is a non-resi-
dent of the state, when the mortgage, or a
true copy thereof, shall be filed in the office
of the township cleric of the township, or
tlie cit.v clerk of the city, or city recorder of
cities having no officer known as 'city
clerk,' whore the property is." The same
section requires chattel mortgages made by
residents to be filed in the townships where
the mortgagors reside. Under this statute
there is but one place for tlie filing of a
cliattel mortgage when the mortgagor is a
non-resident of the state, and tliat is the
townsliip or city where the property is, and
tlie filing would uot be constructive notice,
unless so filed. It is plain that it is the in-
tent of the statute that the filing should be
in the townsliip or city whore the property
is at the time of the execution and delivery
of the mortgage, and not in soiue other town-
snip or city to which the property may bo
removed after such execution and delivery.
It was tlie intent of tlie legislature to fix a
rule bj' which all inorlgagos should be filed
and by which all must be governed. This
precise question has never, until tlie present
ipi'caslou, been before this court. In nuiiiy
of the slates it is provided by stalule that,
in case of non-rosideut mortgagors, the filing
shall be In the township or village "where
the property may be at the time the mort-
gage Is e.\ei-nled." The statute of Massa-
claiselta formerly provided that ii eliatlel
mortgage should be recorded whore llie
moilgagor resided "at the time of making
the .snnii'." By a revision of the si a lute, the
word.s, "at the lime of making the same,"
wore oniilled. In William v. Itntterlield, (i
("ii-sli. 217. the court of .MassachuHetlH, speiik-
liig or tills omission In the revision, said:
"TIiIh laller clnusc Iimh been slrh'ken out In
the Revised Statutes. Whether this wa*i
done for precision merely, or was Intended
to chniige the law In a material point. Is
left wholly in doubt, and has rendered that
uncertain which was before certain." The
point was not decided; but the court, even
when the statute had been changed, was
doubtful if it were not done simply for pre-
cision. Under our statute no such doubt
can arise. This statute has been earned
upon the statute books for a great many
years, and no one has ever doubted that the
time of the execution and delivery of the
mortgage fixes and determines the place
where such mortgage must be filed.
We need not discuss the other questions
raised by counsel, as this must be decisive
of the rights of the complainants and the
First National Bank of Ashland. The bank
and its officers had no actual knowledge of
the execution of this bill of sale which we
have denominated the chattel mortgage, and
the filing in the township of Bessemer can-
not be construed as constructive notice.
The order and decree of the court below
were substantially: (1) That the bill of sale
was given to secure the payment of the
notes, and all renewals thereof, but that it
was uot valid as against the South Brjinch
Lumber Company, because uot filed in Iron-
wood township, where the logs were at the
date it was given, but not at the date it was
filed. (2) That the contract between the
South Branch Lumber Company and A.
Wood & Co., of .Tune 11, 1890, was an ex-
ecutory contract for the purchase of lumber
upon which the South Branch Lumber Com-
pany had advanced i?.'.8,0tK). (If) That the
lien of the bill of sale is prior to tlie mort-
gage to the First National Bank of Ashland.
(I) 'I'hat the First National Bank of Ash-
land was entitled to be reimbursed to the
amount of .flLCKX), for iiviney expended in
protecting and manulacluring the lumber,
and a reference is ordered to ascertain
wliether It is eutitled to more, (o) That the
First National Bank of Ashland, the First
.National Bank of Bessemer, the Security
.'Savings Bank of Ashland, and the complain-
anis are enlilled to share pro rata In the se-
c urily, after the First National Bank of
.Vshliind shall exhaust Its other security,
cvept that the First National Bank of Ap-
plclim Is not entitle*! to participate. (Gi
That a receiver be appointed, that the luiu-
iier be .sold, and thai lhi> contract witli the
:<iiulli Branch Lumber Company be carried
nut, and that the receiver settle with the
Stmlh llraueh Lumber ("Company tlierefor.
i7) That a reference be made to ascertain
llio dani.'iges to the South Branch Lumber
I'ompaiiy on account of this liijiiiiclion.
The Scmlh Branch Lumber Company is
enlilled to hold all that lis contract called
lor Willi A. \A'ecil iV: Co., and Is In no manner
affecled by the bill of sale of complainants,
or any claim whiih llie First National Hank
may assert. The First National Bank of
.\sliland, after that, Is eutitled to have Us
claim allowed for moneys advanced In car-
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1 14 C H . \ T T E L  .:'.IO H TGAGE 
1 ill' l•i l l  o f  snle was >oid a to t h i rd parties, 
ht'l<l ll"e tlle !le c:ript i o n  diil uot c:over the 
p rn11erty i u teuued to he con 1· eyeu. tlle bill 
ur sale calling for logs "in tlle Black river, 
nenr Ramsny," wllile a large portion of tlle 
l t >g' in que tion were not i n  tlle river, but 
iu roll-ways on tlle banks of the river, and 
s i x  m iles from Ramsay. I t  i s  also contended 
tlla t the mortgage was void as to tlle First 
:'\ational Bank of A bland, for tlle reason 
tliat it was not filed in tlle proper town­
derli.'s office. It i s  conce!lell that the mort­
:.:a :..e 1Yas ne 1-e 1· filed iu the town-clerk's 
olli<:e 1y1Jere t he logs were situate at the 
time the bill of sa le ""1s executed and de­
l in '! red ; tba t is, in the township of I ron­
wood. But couusel for compla i na u ts claim 
that tile mortgage IJa >ing been filed i n  tile 
town-clerk's office of the town of Bessemer. 
:incl the logs having been floated into t iJat 
t u \\'llShi p .  :lUU bei ng i u  that tOWU a t  the 
t i me the mortgage was tiled. suc:IJ t i l ing was 
proper. :::>ection GUJ:l, How . 't., pro1·iue : 
" Exc:ept when the mortgagor is a non-re i-
1 lent of the state, when the mortgage, or a 
nue copy t hereof, ball be filed in the office 
.. r the town h i p  ·Jerk of the town hip, or 
the c i t y clerk of the ci ty. or city recorder of 
<'itie" ha'l' i ng no ofiker lmowu as 'city 
..Jerk." w here the property i . " The a m e  
:<cetion requires cha t tel mortgage made b.I' 
t'<'sic.le nts to be filed in the town llip wbere 
t h r mortgagors resi de. Unc.ler this t a t u t e  
t hl'l'C is !Jut one place for the filing or a 
..J1a rte! mo1·tgage when tlle mortgagor i - a 
non-1·c,,icknt of the state, nnd that i t lle 
t ow nsh i p or city wllere t he in·operty is, and 
the C i l iug- would nol be c:onstrm·til·e not ic:e. 
un less so lileil .  I t  i s  pla i1J that i t  is tlle i n ­
t e1 1 t  or the sta t ute that t he fil i n g  should bl' 
in tlle to1Ynship or c i ty where th<' prn 11cr t�' 
is a t  t h e  time or the xecu t i on and <lcl h ery 
1 1 l' t h •  m111·tg:i;.rr. and nut in some ot her towu­
sii i p or d t .' to w h i ch t he pro 1 1crt .1· 1 1 1 : 1 y  be 
1·,.1 1 101·cd aft<  1· sw·h exel'llliou a m l  del i 1cry. 
I L  was tlw i 1 1 1 t· 1 1 t ot' t he Jegisla t me t o  fi.· a 
rnl<' tis w l t ic:h a l l  mort;.:agcs should I.le ftle<l 
a nc.l by wlticll n l l  m ust be go1ernc1l. 'l'hi,.; 
predse r1urstion ltns ucn·r, 1 1 1 1 t i l t he presen t 
•wc·a.·ion, h en h fore this 1·ourt. ln l l l :t l l )  
o r  t ll!' s t :t lPS i t  is ( l l'll\' illctl U )  st a l n l c  t ha t . 
! 11 c·nse of non rrsi<lPnt  1 1 1nrlg:ig1n·s, t he l i l l n;.: 
s.J 1: t l l  l.Je I n t hl' t u w n  ... h 1 p  or 1 i l l : i g< '  " 11 hc1· . . 
t l w  1 11·op1•rt r  m a y  h e  a t  the t l l l l  • lh mort 
;.:;1;.:" ls 1 • x r•1 • 1 1 t NI." 'l'hC' s l a l u t  ol' \! as:<:t 
< 'Int. < ' I t s  fnn 1 1 Prl.1 pro1 l<l<'cl l hn l  n !'h:t l t <'i 
1 1 111rtga ;..:c should be l'f 'c·11 1·<l!'d whe1·1· l l w 
1 1 11 1 1·1 ;..: : i ;..:or l'<'<if<led "nt t h e t l mt• o t' 1 1 1 ; 1 k l 1 1 ;.:  
l i t<'  ,'! 1 11 1 1 '. "  l ly n l'f'\' l!llon or t h r  st: t t n l e, t ill' 
w11rd!!. ":t i t i t<' t i l n P  n l'  1 11 :i l< l1 1g t i t" sa me," 
\\'f.:rt• 01 1 1 1 1 1 <'11, 1 1 1 \\' i l h11 1 n  1·. l \ 1 1 t 1 1 • rl 1P ld,  r; 
1 ' 11  h. :.! l i. t h !' C'Olll'I of ,\ l a  r:<:l r 'h l l  f' l l H, >' J ll ' : lk  
l u g"  <Jf t l tl 1 > 1 1 1 IHsl 1 1 1 1  1 1 1  t l l l '  l'<'l"blo1 1 ,  �m i d  
"'I  h i l:t t l r • r  " 1 : 1 1 1 � , .  hll ' 1 Jp 1 • 1 1  Hl t'l1•k f ' 1 1  nut I n 
thr H"d "'' .' t a l 1 1 t cs. \\'h,.t.hr1· t hl H w11s 
rlr1111< fnr I Jl'f't•I 11111  mPl'P ly, or W:t"! l n l P 1 t t l Pd 
l<1 rh11 1 1i:" t l i P  l u w  lu o. m a t Prlul point, I i;  
D i g itized by 
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left wholly i n  doubt. a nd has rendered th at 
uncertain which was before certa iu." Tile 
point was not decidec.l ; but the court, even 
wben the statute had been cha uged, was 
doubtful if it were not done simply for pre­
c:ision. Under our statute no such doubt 
ca n a rise. This statute bas been carried 
upon the statute books for a great many 
years, and no one bas ever doubted that the 
time of the execut ion and delh·ery of the 
mortgage fixes and determines the place 
where such mortgage must be filed. 
Vi'e need not discu s tile other que-tioos 
raised by counsel, as this must be decisive 
oe the rigiJts of the complaina nts and the 
F i rst :\ational Bank of A lllautl. Tl.le baul;: 
a nd its officers had no actual know ledge of 
the execut i on of tbis bill of sale which we 
ha'l'e denominated the chattel mortgage, ailll 
t he filing in the township of Bes,emer ca n­
not I.le construed as constructive notice. 
Tile orc.ler and decree of tile court below 
were ubstantially: (1) TIJat the bill of sal ' 
was given to secure the paymen't of t h e  
note , a nd all renewal thereof. but tllat i t  
\\'as not 1'alid as again�t t he outlJ Brauch 
r,umber om pan y, bee<Hlse not filC'd in Irou­
wood towu hip, where the logs were at the 
date it  wa given, but not a t  the date i t  wa::; 
t iled. (2) That the contract between the 
. outh B ra n ciJ Lumber om pa ny and A. 
IYecd & o., of .T une 11, 1 90, wa - a u  ex­
<'l'Ulory con tra ct for thr pll l'l'ila -e or lumber 
u p1 1 1 1  whil'h the South Brn nc:h Lumher Com­
pa 11y ha d a d 1·a nced $:i�.ooo. (:l) That the 
li!'n of tile b i l l  of sale i s  prior t o  U1e mo rl­
;.ragc> t o  t h!.' l •'i rst :\' n t i ona l Hank of A hla n1 1 .  
l� )  Tha t t he Fir,.;t J\ational Bank of Ash­
l :unl \\'a:-; c>t l l i t kil to be reimburs<'d to tllc 
: 1 1 1w11 n t  ot' . · 11.000, for nv1 1H'Y expended In 
prot el't inl' :i ncl ma u11r:1 " 1 1 1 r i ng- t he 1 1 1 1 1 1 hl'I', 
: t tHl a t'l'fcrc> 1 1ce ls ordc: t'l 'll t11 a st'l't't:t i n  
whether I t  is l'll t i t lL'tl to 1111 1rc. (3) That U1c 
F i rst Xntional  llauk: of Ashlaucl. the F i rst 
\ation: l l  Bank of Be·semcr, t he �Cl' ll l' i t�  
�:n in;:::< Hank of A sltl:1 llu, a nd t he compla i n 
a n ts a rl• Pn t i l lL>tl to sh:ne pro rata iu the s 
n1 ri l_r, :1 l'ter the F l i"t Natio na l Bank ot' 
\shln ncl :;lt:1 1 l  exhaust I ts other sec u r i t y .  
• ' V '<'PL t ha t  t h<' First �atloual Hanle of A p  
pl f 'l 1 1 n  ls 1 1 n t  Pn t i t l l'd to pnrtlclpa t e. (Lil 
That n t'< " ' " i l 1•r hc> n p poi nt c>!l , t h a t  t he tum· 
l i < ' r  lw i;1 1 l <l .  : t nd t l t:i t l i t<'  c>nn l r: t \'I 11  I t h  Utt• 
'0 1 1 l h Ht':l ll<'lt  J , 1 1 1 1 1 l w1· ( 'o l l l p:l l l ,\' hp C:l t'l'!Cd 
· 1 1 1 ,  : 1 1 u l  t hn t  l hl' l'l'<'<'h r sel t le w i t h l l 1e 
:-; ..  11 t h  1 1 t·n 1 1 C ' l 1  Lumher Compnny t hc> rc 1 1 1r 
r i )  Tha I a rrfPl'<'llC'l' he made to a s«l'l't :t 1 1 1  
t l w c l n 1 1 1 : t �PH t n  l h c Sl1ut h ilnt nclt L u 1 1 1 l l  • 1· 
1 ·1 1 1 1 1 1 1: 1 1 1 .1 on :t < '< 'n t t n t or t l t i H lnjund 1011.  
' l 'h< '  :-;011 l l t  l l rn nrh J , 1 1 1 1 1 t w r  l 'o1 1 1 pn1 1y i H  
1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 «1] t o  h o l t l  : t l l  t h : t l  l t H  1•onl r: 1 c t  c•a l l Pd 
r111· 11 i l i t \ ,  \\ < •f 'd ,\ < 'o., :i nd IH I n  no run 1 1 1 1 < •r 
: i l i'l ' r · l rd h,1' t l tr hil l  of sa l r ol' cmn pln l nn nl H, 
1 1 1· n u y  ! ' l a l t n  whlc-h t l w  lt'lr,.;t :'\:t l inn : t l  1 1: 1 1 1 1; 
mny n�i;c1·t. 'l'hr l•' l rHt 1 a l lonnl Ua n k  1 1 1' 
\ � hl n nd , a ft er U rn ! ,  IH cntl l l NI lo have i t :<  
. .t n l m  n llowcd Cor ll10l l<'Y8 ndvn nccd I n  car· 
O ru r-a l tro . 
UNI  ERSI  O F  CALI FO 
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i:
lyiu-^ on the business of A. Weed & Co.;
:iii(l its claim under its chattel mortgage is
held prior to any claim which the complain-
.nits may assert under the bill of sale to
Hoxie & Mellor. The appointment of a re-
ceiver is eonflnned, and he shall settle with
the parties from the proceeds of the sales
in accordance with this opinion. The South
Branch Lumber Company will recover its
costs against complainants. The First Na-
tional Banli of Ashland will also recover its
costs against the complainants. The decree
of the court below must be moditied in ac-
cordance with this opinion.
CHAMPLIN, C. J., and MORSE and Mc-
GRATH, JJ. concurred. GRANT, J., did
not sit.
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C H A TTEL nlOltTG A G ES. l i5 
l"y iu� on the busi ness of A. Weed & Co. ; 
aud its claim under its chattel mortgage is 
held prior to any claim which the complain­
a n ts may assert under the bill of sale to 
Hoxie & Mellor. The appointment of a re­
ceiver is confirmed, and he shall settle with 
the parties from the proceeds of the sales 
in accordance with this opinion. The South 
Branch Lumber Company will recover its 
D i g 1t1zed by 
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costs against compl aina nts. The l•' l rst :'\a­
tional Bank of Ashland will also recover its 
costs against the complainants. The decree 
of the court below must be modified in ac­
cordance with this opinion. 
CHAMPLIN, C. J., and MORSE and �Jc­
GRATH, JJ. concurred. GRANT, J., did 
not sit. 
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WELCH V. SACICETT et al.
(12 Wis. 213.)
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. June Term, 1860.
Error to the circuit court, Dane county.
The plaintiffs below, who composed two
firms doing business under the names, respec-
tivel.v, of Sackett, Belcher & Co. and Widde-
lield, Cohn & Co., sued the defendant Welch
for trespass in taliing and carrying away from
a building occupied as a store by one Hard-
ing certain goods, alleged to belong to the
plaintiffs.
The answer was: (1) A general denial. (2)
As to a part of the goods, particularly de-
scribed, that the defendant took the same as
the agent of J. Dahlman & Co., by virtue of a
mortgage executed to them by said Harding,
and tiled on the ISth of December, 1S5S, in
the othce of the clerk of the city of Madison,
where said Harding resided; and as to the
residue of said goods, that the defendant sein-
ed the same on the 23d of December, ISoS, by
virtue of sundry writs of attachment against
the property of said Harding duly issued out
of the circuit court of Dane county on that
day. and delivered to the defendant as shcrilf
of said county, to be executed; that said goods
were, at the time of s;iid seizure, the property
of said Harding; that tlie plaintiffs claim to
be the owners of said goods by virtue of two
mortgages, bearing date December 20, 1S5S,
pui'i)orting to be executed by said Harding,—
<iue in favor of Sackett, Belcher & Co., and
the other in favor of said Widdefield, Cohn &
Co., — but that said mortgages were made by
.«aid Harding, and lilcd withcjut the request,
assent, or knowledge of the plaiiililTs; and
that at tlie time of said seizure said mortgages
had not been delivered to the plaintiffs, or
eillior of them, nor to any agent or attorney
aullioiized by them to receive the s;ime, nor
had they any knowledge that the same had
been executed, or ever assented to or ralilied
the same. The defendant further alleged in
his answer the rendition of judgment against
Ki\(\ Harding on the 20lh of January, l,s.")',t, in
each of the actions in which said warnints of
attachment were issue<l, the issuing of exe-
i-ullirns upon such judgments, the sale of the
pr()p('rty attached, and the ap|)liiali<)n of the
pnxecds first to the sallsfactiiin of Ihe mort-
gage to Dahlman & Co., and the residue, pro
rata, upon said execnllons.
The jirlnclpal ipiesllon lu controversy be-
twei'u the parties was whether there liad been
a delivery of the niorlgiiges to llu! plaintiffs
Jirlor to the levy of the nttadinienls. Upon
the trial of the cause the plalnlllTs gave In
evidence three notes executed by said Hard-
ing,— one dated August 11, IS.'iS. jHiyable to
Wlfldefield, (John & Co. for .$27H.(>2, at six
miinlliH lifter dale; and two dated Angtist 0,
IViS, payable to Saikelt, Belcher & ("o., one
for ^Hl.'i.l.S, at four montlm after dale, and
the otlier for ?(i.'i!).10 at six inontlis after date,
—and also two mortgages upon all the goods,
etc., described in the complaint, made by said
Harding, one to Widdefield, Cohn & Co., and
the other to Sackett, Belcher & Co., for thr
security of the notes held by them respective-
ly, each of which moilgages bore date Decem-
ber 20, 1858, and contained a clause authoriz-
ing the mortgagees to take possession of the
goods whenever they should deem that their
interest or the safety of the debt required it.
The defendant objected to the introduction ol
the notes and mortgages in evidence, upon the
ground that they showed that the plaintiffs
had not a joint interest in the goods described
in the complaint; but the court overruled the
objection, and the defendant excepted. The
defendant admitted, for the pui7)oses of the
trial, that on the 23d day of December, lSr)>.
he took and carried away the goods described
in the complaint. The proof as to the execu-
tion of the mortgages under which the plain-
tiffs claim title was substantially as follows:
Harding, the mortgagor, testified that the
mortgages were executed by him in Madison,
on the 20th of December, IS.'iS; that the jilain-
! tiffs resided in the city of New York, and
were not present at the time of making tlir
mortga.ges; that the witness employed Mi.
Haskell, an att(U'ney, to draw them up. and
paid him for them; that the plaintiffs did unt
know of the making of the mortgages until a
I letter could reach them; that he told the firm
of Collins, Atwdod <fc Haskell to write to all
the parties to whom the mortgages were given;
that at the time the defendant took the goods
under the attachments, on the 2,3d of Deceni-
I ber, the witness had not heard from the plaiii-
tilTs; that a letter cannot go to New York and
back in three days; thai the debts for which
the mortgages were given were all honest and
bona fide; that at the time of the execiUiun of
the mortgages to the plaintiffs he executed
another tipon the same goods to Swift & C"..
who afterwards gave up the mortgage, and h:id
} an attachment levied on the goods, and au-
' other mortgage to riicliis. Bliss & Co., which
! has bet>n iiai<i; all the mortgages amounting to
.fl'i.dOO and upwards, and the morlgngcMl proji-
erty iM'Ing worth between f2,100 and ;i;2,200,
at retail piices, at Madison.
Mr. Haskell testified, In substance, as fol-
lows: "I drew the chattel mortgages from
Mr. Harding to Ihe pIjiiidilTs on Ihe 20tli day
of December, 1K.")S. They were made In oiu'
ollice. After they were signed, I attached the
schedules, and then li:inik><l the inortgnges t<i
Mr. Harding, and said to him: 'Here. Mr.
Harding, are your nmrlgnges. Tlie.v are now
at your dlspnsjil.' Mr. Harding then said: T
su|)poHe they nuist be delivered, must they
notV I deliver the mortgages to you for the
mortgagees.' And then he delivered them to
me. He also recpiesled me to nntlfy the New
York credKors (hat he had exe<'Uled these
morlgiiges to them, and to see that they were
filed. 1 handed the mortgages to (ieorge E.
Woodward, and re<iuesti'd him to carry them
to Ihe ilty clerk's ollice, and see that they weie
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176 CH ATTEL MORT G .\ G E  • 
WELOH v. SACKETT et al. 
(12 W is. 2-13.) 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. June Term, 1860. 
Error to the circuit court, Dane county. 
The plaintiffs below, who composed two 
firms doing business under the names, respec­
ti"vely, of Sackett, Belcher & Co. and Wid<le­
field, Cohn & Co., sued the defendant \Telch 
for trespass in taking and carrying away from 
a building occupied as a store by one Hard­
ing certuin goods, alleged to belong to the 
plaintiffs. 
The answer was : (1) A general denial. (2) 
As to a part of the goods, particularly de­
scriiJed, that the defendant took the same as 
the agent of J. Dahhuan & Co., by virtue of a 
mortgage executed to them by said Ifarding, 
and filed on the 18th of December, 1 38, in  
the otfic:e of  the clerk of the c:ity of  ::\ladisoo, 
�-here said Harding resided ; and as to the 
residue of said goods, that t he defendant seiz­
ed the same on the 23d of December, 1 3-:;, by 
virtue of sunclry writ of attachment against 
t he propert y of said Ilanling d uly is ue11 out 
of the circuit court of Dane county on that 
day. ancl dcliYered to the defendant as heritI 
of said county, to be executed ; that sai<l goods 
were. at the time of s:iid eizure. t he propert y 
or aid Ilarding; that the plainti ff claim to 
be the owner, of said goocl by Y i itue of t wo 
mOJ t!!agcs. bearing elate December �o. 1 3 , 
purporting to be executed by aid Ila rcl ing,-
1 111e in favor of Sacl•ett, Belcher .,. o., and 
t he ot her in  fayor or sa id Widcl field, Coho .,. 
'o . .  -but that said mortga�cs w('rc ma<le by 
sa id Ilarding, and filed w i t hout the reque t ,  
ai:;sen t, o r  knowledi;:e o f  t he pla i n t i ff, ; a nc l  
t h a t  at the t ime of  said sc>izme sa id !llOrtgagC's 
Imel not heeu del iYen•1 l  to the pla i n t i ffs, or 
cit lH'r of t hem, nor lo any :igl ' 1 1t  01· at tomcy 
: i ut hol'ized by them to recc i l  c the same, nor 
had t he) any kno wledge t hat l be . ame ha cl 
hcl'll rxrcutecl, or ''e1· assen ted lo or rn t i liecl 
t he sain<>. '!'be defcu llanl further a l leged in  
h is answer t h e  rendi t ion of juclgmcut agai nst 
;;aicl Ila rclinA' OD lbe 2Gtlt Of .Ja nuary, J H:in, i n  
eac·h nf thr aetions Ju  whil'h sn id wa rra nL'l of 
n ll :wh11H•1 1t w<·re issuC'd, t he issuing of exe­
r·11t lo11s upon surh jucl�11w11t:-1, t he sale of t he> 
J H'•>JIPl'ly at t : H'hPcl,  nnd the a pp I kn t inn nf t hr 
pr11c·pnls f i rst to t he sa t lsfndlon nf t hi' mnrt 
1t:1i.:r· to 0:'1hl1 1 1 1 1 1 1  & C 'u. ,  n n c l  t lw reslc lm', pro 
1': 1 1 : 1 ,  UlJOll i;a i 1 l  l'Xl'f' l l t loll8. 
'l'he> prlndp:i l q 1 1!'sl lon In C'o n t royprs.v b -
I W<'l'll t he partl<':-1 \1·:1s whrt her t lwre h:id hrrn 
ll r l t•l 1 1·ery Of t he l l Hll'tgagrH I O  t he pl;1 J n t l ffH 
prior to t lw leYJ of t h1• 11 t t :whnw11 t s. IJ p1 1 1 1  
1 1 11• t rlul  of t he <·: 1 1 1  ·1· t h" pln l n t l l rs ga''" I n  
1 1· i c l r · 1 1 1·p I l 1 1 1•p nnt f's P.Xf'f'l l l Pc l  h.V 1111l r l  J I n rd­
l ng, 011p dnt c·cl A 11�w•I 1 1 .  J H:iS, pn � n hlf' t o  
W i clrlr•llPlrl,  Cohn ,\ Co for ::;:!iH.ll:.!, n t  t<lx 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t h. u fl 1· r  d11 t 1 • ;  n n rl t wn da t Pll .\ 1 1i.:11sl fl, 
I 18, J U l ) ll l 1lr• to :-ln<l"·l t ,  l l r - lt h•·I' ,\ C 'n. , Oii!' 
rm· ., 8 1 !1.• I�. nl lo ur mnn l h11 11 1 1Pr d n l c>, 1t 1 1 C I  
thP ntllf'r for $0�11J. l O  Il l '4lx 111r 1 1 1 t hK a rtrr rln l l', 
-and al!io two morti;11g1·s 11po11 all t hl' i,:nod!I, 
D i g 1t1zed by 
I JTERNET A R C H  V E  
etc., clescribed i n  thE' complaint. mane by saiil 
Harlling, one to W illdefield, Co!Jn & Co .. anti 
the other to Sackett. Belcher & Co . .  for tile• 
security of the notes held by them res11ati,·�­
ly, each of which mortgages bore date Decem­
ber 20, 1858, and contained a cla use autho1iz­
ing the mo1tgagees to take pos e.siou of the 
goods whene\er they should deem that thl'ir 
interest or tbe safety of the debt required it. 
The defendant objected to the introduction of 
the notes and mortgage> in e\idence, upon t he 
ground that they showed that the plainti ffs 
1.tad not a joint interest i n  tbe good' de crilwd 
in the compla int ;  but the court O\ rrnle1l the 
objection, and the dc>fendant excepted. The 
defendant aclmittecl, for the puq)oses of the 
t ria l .  that ou the :::!;1tl clay of D ecember, 1 3". 
he took anll carried away the goods d scribe1l 
in the compla int. Tbe proof as to tl1e execu­
tion of the mortg;ages under 'IVhkh the plain­
tiffs claim t itle was snl.J tantially a follows: 
Ifarding, t he mortg:i gor, tc-ti fiell that the 
rnortga,A'c were executed by him in :lfa11isou. 
on Urn :!Oth of December, lS:iS ; that t he> pla i n­
tiff re.i<led in the city of New York. and 
were not present at t he time of mal•in:,: the 
mortgagE>s ; t hat the wit nc>s cmplo�·c>d :Ill. 
Ila�kell, a n  n ttnrney. to llraw them up. a u1l 
pa id him for them ; thnt the plaintiffs clid nut 
k now of tbe ma kin� of the mortgages nut il a 
letter co u l d  reac·b thc>m ; that he told l be firm 
o r  oll ins, A l  wood & Haskell to write to al l  
th partic> to " hom the mort i:: 1g(' were g;iYen ; 
t hat at the t ime the> defc>nclant took the goods 
nncler th a ttad1 ments, o n  t he �M of Dt'l'Cm­
ber, tbe witness hnd not hc>anl from t he pla in· 
tiffs ; thnl a letter eannot go to ?\cw York a1Hl 
hal'k in three clays ; that t ile dc>bl • for whil'l 1 
th ruor1 g:1ge were g;i\·en were nil ho11c>st :ind 
boua fi1 l e ;  t hat a t  l hC' t i ut of the eXC'l'll(inn 1 1 1' 
the 11101·tgagrs to t he> pln intiffs he c>xc>1•ukt l 
anot her 11pou l l le .a 11 1c> gnmls to i:'\wifl ,\ Cn . . 
\Yho a ftNwarcls !!;ave np t he mortg:1gc>, :1 1111 h:l tl 
n n  a t l :tl'hnwnt IC'\ it'rl on lht gnocls. n 11 1 I  an 
ot her mml!!;age to l 'hl'lps. l \ l iss & co., whid1 
hns b('{• n ll:l i « l ; all  t he mortgagps :1 1 11011 1 1 t ing to 
!):l i,1 100 :rncl 111m a n ls, and t h r 1 1 1nrt gag-1'1l Jll'OJ l· 
Prl.1 hrln� \\ Ort h  hehn'l'll $�. LOO and :i;:!,:.!1 10, 
al rct n i l  plie1•s, n t  :'l f n 1 l lson. 
;\ f r. l l askell t l'l t l llt•1l,  in i-;11hst : l 11<'l'. as fol 
lnws: ..  l 1hr11 t hr 1 ' 11 n t tl'l  mortgn1!1•s from 
' I r. J l: m l l ng to l lw J lln i n l i lls on t he :.!Ol h t iny 
of P1•1·P1 1 1 h,.r, 1 "�'"· Tht'.I were ma!l1• 1 1 1  n11r 
of lkt'. .\ f(l'I' t hc>y \\Cre sig1w1 !, l n t t :1rlw1l t hl' 
s<'hPr lulrs. :Hii l  t hc>n h:1 1 1 1k'i l  t he mort!!;!I J.!\'S t o  
;\ I r. J l n r 1 l i 11�. and sa l 1 !  to h i m :  ' ll p rr . .\ I r. 
J i n r1 l 1 11g, :irP � onr 1 1 11 1 r l gngPs. '!'hr�· Ifft' unw 
:1 1 your rl is)ln"lt l ' \Ir. l l nrd i ng t hc>n i-<: t i d :  ' I  
S l l J ! J IO�I' t IW.\ 1 1 1  \ I S i  11<' d!'lh C'l'C'd, 11 1 1 1SI t Ill')' 
not ·1 I r !Pll vrr t he m01· t g:1 ,:1•s to �·ou for t ht' 
1 1 1orti:it.l!!'l'H.' 1\ nrl t hen ht• c l!'l lvc>rc>c l thc>m I n  
mr. 1 ! 1• nlso r q twstrd mr t n  no t t ry t hr '.'lc>w 
Yorlc c•rrrl l l ors t h:it  h • hncl  \ 'X!'<'U l c>d l ht>St' 
111<11 tgagf't< to t l l l ' l l l ,  n n r l  fn Sl'C' t ha t  ! l H•y WCI'!' 
11 ll'r l .  I hll l l r lNI t hi' 1 1 1ort i,:ngr11 lo C l  rorgc> IO. 
\Voor lwnrrl, 1 1nrl  rNpwi<tr!l h i m  to en rry t hem 
to t he l ' l tl  cl •rk't1 nl lkc, u uu 1:1ce t hut they Wl'l'C 
O r1 r-a l  tr r 
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filed. The mortgages read In evidence are the
same mortgages. We wrote to the mortgagees
on the 22d of December, 1858, informing them
of the maliing of these mortgages, and on that
day I deposited in tlie post otlice at Madison
the letters, postpaid, directed to the creditors
in New York. 1 gave the mortgages to Wood-
waid to file, because it was time for me to
go to dinner, and I thought it would make no
difference who canied them to the clerk's of-
fice. Woodward is the son-in-law of Harding.
1 acted as the attorney of Harding in' draw-
ing tlicse mortgages. In reply to his question
asking if they must not be delivered, I told
him it would be a sufficient delivery of the
mortgages if he put them on file in the city
clerk's office, and told the clerk what they
were for, and wrote to the mortgagees; or
that, if he chose, he might deliver them to
me, and that I would see them filed, and notify
the mortgagees. When he delivered the mort-
gages to me, he said, 'I deliver them to you
for the mortgagees,' or possibly, instead of
the word 'mortgagees' he used 'creditors,' or
'them'; but some word meaning the same
thing. I saw the letter that my partner, Mr.
Atwuod, wrote to Swift & Co. The ones that
I wrote were substantially the same. He
wrote two of the letters and 1 wrote two. I
did not advise Mr. Harding that, in order to
render the mortgages valid to the creditors,
they must first do some act to accept them. I
advised Harding to make a delivery of the
mortgages, because I understood that a deliv-
ery was essential to their validity, but I did
not advise him to appoint me the agent of the
mortgagees. Up to the time of delivery, I was
acting for Harding, and the New York credit-
ors had not employed me to act for tliem."
George E. Woodward testified that at the
time the mortgages were executed Mr. Haskell,
in the presence of Mr. Harding, requested wit-
ness to file the mortgages, and he took them
to the city clerk's office a little after noon of
that day, and filed them.
Mr. Harding, being recalled by the plaintiffs,
further testified as follows: "I delivered the
chattel mortgages which have been introduced
in evidence to Mr. Haskell, for the use of the
mortgagees. I asked Haskell if it was not
requisite to deliver them, and he said I might
deliver them to the city clerk, or to him for
them. Then I handed the mortgages to Has-
kell, and said, 'I deliver these to you for the
mortgagees.' I never have had or controlled
the mortgages since that time, and have never
seen them since until I saw them here."
The defendant read in evidence a letter
from Messrs. Collins, Atwood & Haskell to
Swift & Co., of New York, dated December
22d. 18.58. in which, after informing them
that Mr. Harding had, on the 20th instant,
executed four chattel mortgages of even
date, on his stock, to the four New York
firms hereinbefore mentioned, they say: "Mr.
Harding is confident you will ratify the pro-
ceeding, and he is now professing to act as
GRIF. rEHS.PKOP. — 13
your and their agent, and keeping the funds
arising from sales apart, for the purpose of
applying them pro rata in payment of the
claims of the above named houses. An ac-
ceptance of the security given, would not, of
course, bar your right to assert your whole
claim. We would therefore suggest that
some action be taken by you to avail your-
selves of the mortgage security. We have
written a like letter to each of the above
firms." The defendant also proved the ex-
ecution of the chattel mortgage to Dahlman
& Co., referred to in the answer, and also the
several warrants of attachment, judgments,
and ex(_cutions mentioned in the answer, and
that he levied upon and sold the goods, etc.,
by virtue of said writs, as in the answer al-
leged.
After the testimony was closed, the de-
fendant's counsel requested the court to give
the jury the following instruction: "If the
jury believe from the evidence that Harding
made the mortgages read in evidence by the
plaintiffs in the absence and without the
knowledge or consent of the islaintiffs at the
time of the execution thereof, and that they
were not delivered to some of them, or some
person authorized by the plaintiffs to act
for them, then the plaintiffs cannot recover
in this action, unless thej' have also proven
that they did some act approving and rat-
ifying the delivery of the mortgages to Jlr.
Haskell, before the defendant made the
levies under and by the attachment in his
hands;" which instiaiction the court refused
to give in terms, but did qualify the same as
follows: "But if you find that the mortgages
were delivered to a third person for the sole
use and benefit of the mortgagees, then the
assent of the mortgagees will be presumed or
Implied, if you find that the mortgages were
beneficial to them, and it is a sufficient de-
livery." The defendant also asked the court
to instruct the jury as follows: "The placing
of the mortgages read in evidence by the
plaintiffs in the office of the city clerk, by
the said Harding, or his agent or attorney,
without the knowledge of the plaintiffs, and
without any direction or intimation to said
clerk by Harding or his agent or attorney so
placing tbem on file that the mortgages were
placed on file to remain there under his
charge for the use and benefit of the mort-
gagees, is not such a delivery and filing of
said mortgages as will entitle the plaintiffs
to hold the goods mentioned therein against
creditors attaching before the plaintiffs had
knowledge of the making of said mortgages,
or had I'atifled the acts of Harding or his
said agents;" which instruction the court re-
fused to give in terms, but qualified the same
by adding thereto as follows: "Unless yon
find that the mortgagor, Harding, caused the
mortgages to be so filed with the intention of
a full delivery of the mortgages in this way,
and for the sole benefit of the mortgagees."
The defendant's counsel also asked the fol
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filed. Tbc mo11 g-ages read I n  evidence are the 
same mortgages. We wrote to the moiigagees 
on tbe 22d of December, 1858, informing them 
of tbe making of these mortgages, and on that 
day I deposited in tile post office at Madison 
the letters, po tpaiu, directed to the creditors 
in ·ew York. 1 gave the mortgages to Wood­
wru·d to file, because it was time for me to 
go to dinner, and I thought it would make no 
difference who canied them to the clerk's of­
fice. \V oouward is the on-in-law of Harding. 
I actetl as the attorner of Harrliug in draw­
ing these mortgag-es. In reply to bis question 
asking if they mu t not be delivered, I told 
him it would be a sufficient delivery of the 
moitguges if he put them on file in the city 
cle1 k's office, and told the clerk what they 
were for, and wrote to the mortgagees ; o r  
that. if h e  chose, h e  might deliver them to 
me, and that I would see them filed, and notify 
the mo11:gagees. When he delivered the mort­
gages to rue, he said, 'I deliver them to you 
for the mortgagees.' or possibly, instead of 
the word 'mortgagees' he used 'creditors,' o r  
'them ' ;  b u t  some word meaning the same 
thin)?;. I saw the letter that my partner, i\1r. 
Atwood, wrote to Swift & Co. The ones that 
I wrote were substantially the same. He 
wrote two of the letters and I wrote two. I 
did not advise l\Ir. Harding that, in order to 
render the mortgages valid to the creditors, 
they must first do some act to accept them. I 
advised Harding to make a delivery of the 
mortgages, because I understood that a deliv­
ery was essential to thei1· validity, but I did 
not advise him to appoint me the agent of the 
mortgagees. Up to the time of delivery, I was 
acting for Harding, and the New York credit­
<>rs had not employed me to act for them." 
George El. Woodward testified that at the 
time the mortgages were executed Mr. Haskell, 
in the presencP. of Mr. Ha rding, requested wit­
ness to file the mortgages, and he took them 
to the city clerk's office a little after noon of 
that day. and filed them. 
l\1r. Harding, being recalled by the plaintiffs, 
further testified as follows : "I delivered the 
chattel mortgages which have been introduced 
in evidence to l\Ir. Haskell, for the use of the 
mortgagees. I asked Haskell if it was not 
requisite to deliver them, and be said I might 
deliver them to the city clerk, or t o  him for 
them. Then I banded the mortgages to Has­
kell, and said, 'I deliver these to you for the 
mortgagees.' I never have had or controlled 
the mortgages since that time, and have never 
seen them since until I saw them here.'' 
The defendant read in evidence a letter 
from l\Iessrs. Collins, Atwood & Haskell to 
Swift & Co., of New York, dated December 
22d, 1858, in which, a fte1· informing them 
that Mr. Harding- had, on the 20th instant, 
executed four chattel mortgages of even 
date, on bis stock, to the four New York 
firms hereinbefore mentioned, they say: "Mr. 
Harding is confident you will rat ify the pro­
ceeding, and he is now profes ing to act as 
GRIF. PERS. PHOP. - 1 2  
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your a n<l their agent, anu keeping the ruuus 
a risiu� from sales apart, for tbe purpose of 
applying them pro rata i u  payment of the 
d a i m s  or the above named houses. An al"­
ceptance of the security given, woulu not, of 
course, bar your right to assert yom· wholP 
cla i m .  \Ye would therefore suggest that 
some action be taken by you to avail J our­
seh·es of tbe mortgage secmity. \Ve ha vc 
wri tten a like letter to each of the a bo,·e 
firms." The defendant also provetl the ex­
ecution of the chattel mortgage to Dahlman 
& Co., refetTed to in the answer, and al :so the 
severa I "·arrants of attachment, judµ;1uen ts, 
and exLcutions mentioned in the answer, anu 
that be levied upon and sol(I the goods, etc., 
by virtue of said writs, a s  in the answer al­
leged. 
.After the testimony was closed, the de­
fendant's counsel requested tbe court to give 
the j UIT the following instruction: "If the 
jm·y believe from the evidence that Harding 
made the mortgages read in e>iclence by the 
plaintiffs in the absence and without the 
knowledge or c011sent of the plaintiffs at the 
time of the execution thereof, and that tbcJ· 
were not delivered to some of them, or some 
person autllorized by the pla int iffs to act 
for them, then the plaintiffs cannot recover 
in this action, unless they have also proven 
that they did some act approving and rat­
ifying the delivery of the mortgages to :\ I r. 
Haskell, before the defendant maue the 
levies under and by the attachment in his 
han ds;" which instruction the court refusecl 
to give in terms, but did qualify the same as 
follows: "But if you find that the mortgages 
were deli vered to a third person for the sole 
use and benefit of the mortgagees, then t he 
assent of the mortgagees will be presumed o r  
implied, i f  y o u  find t h a t  the mortgages were 
beneficial to them, and it is a sufficient de­
livery.'' The defendant also askecl the court 
to instruct the jury as follows: "The placing 
of t be mortgages read in evidence by tbe 
plaintiffs in the office of the city clerk, hy 
the said Harding, or his agent or attorney, 
without the knowledge of the plaintiffs, ancl 
without any direction or intimation to said 
clerk by Harding or his agent o r  a ttorney so 
placing them o n  file that the mortgages were 
placed on file to remain there under bis 
charge for the use and benefit of tbe mort­
gagees, is not such a delivery and fil ing of 
said mo rtgages as will entitle the plaintiffs 
to bold tbe goods mentioned therein against 
creditors attaching before the plaintiffs hacl 
knowledge of the making of said mortg-ages, 
or had ratified the acts of IIarding or bis 
said agents;" which in truction the court re­
fused to give in terms, but qualified the same 
by adding thereto as follows: "Unless you 
find that the mortgagor, Harding, cause(! the 
mortgages to be so filed with the intention ot 
a full delivery of the mortgages in this way, 
and for the sole benefit of the mortgagcei-:. ' 
Tbe defendant"s counsel also asked tbe fol 
O rigi n3 1  from 
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lowing Instructions: "If the jury believe
that Harding was entitled to the possession
of the goods mentioned in said mortgages at
the time the defendant made the levy upon
them by virtue of an attachment against the
goods of Harding, then the plaintiffs cannot
recover;" and: "Although the jury should be-
lieve that the mortgages were valid between
Harding and the plaintiffs, .vet, if Harding
was entitled to the possession of the goods at
the time of the levy by the defendant, then
the defendant was authorized by the attach-
ment in his hands to take possession of the
goods, and hold and sell the interest of Hard-
ing therein, and this defendant is not liable
to the plaintiffs In tliis action," — which in-
structions the court refused to give in terms,
but did (lualify the same as follows: "Un-
less you find that the plaintiffs, at the time
of the commencement of this suit, were en-
titled to the possession of this property, or
were the owners thereof. In this state the
mortgagee of chattel is entitled to the pos-
session at any time after the execution of a
mortgage, unless it is stipulated that the
propertj' shall remain in the possession of
the mortgagor."
To the refusal uf the court to give the said
instructions in the terms asked for, and to
the said qualiQcations attached thereto, the
defendant excepted.
Tlie defendant also asked the court to in-
struct the jury that if the plaintiffs, on the
L'3d day of December, 1858, and before the
levy of the attacliment by the defeudant,
were not in possession of the goods mention-
ed in the mortgages, they could not recover
in this case; which instruction was refused,
and the refusal excepted to. The court, in
its general charge, instructed the jury as fol-
lows: "The (juestion whetlier tlie mortgages
were delivered to the mortgagees before the
levy of the attachments Is one of some dif-
ficulty. If tlicy were not delivered before
the levy, they are of no avail In this suit.
Tliey do not become effectual for any pur-
pose until deliven^d. I'pon this question I
charge you that, if you find that Harding,
the mortgagor, executed the mortgages, and
delivered them to Mr. Haskell with the di-
rection to place them on lile in the city clerk's
oftlce for the use and bcnellt of the niori-
gagces, and that such was llie declared inten-
tion of the mortgagor, and that they wore so
li!<'d In the city I'li-rk's office before the levy-
ing of the attachtiionts. It was a good and
valid delivery of the mortgages, even though
the niortgjigccs themselves hiid no knowUnlgc
thereof, and had given no. direction coikthi-
Ing sMih nKJrtgagcM until after the attach-
iiienis In this case were levied upon the prop-
<i ty. If you find that the niortgagcH were
made In good faith, and were so delivered
and filed In the city clerk's ofllce before the
levy of the atlaclnnenlH, (he plaliitllTs .-ire en-
titled to recover," -to the giving of which In-
btnictlou Iht defondaul also excepted. The
jury found a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiffs for ^1,860, and judgment was rendered
thereon.
Smith. Keyes & Gay, for plaintiff in er-
ror. Collins, Atwood & Haskell, for defend-
ants in error.
DIXOX. C. .T. The first question involved
in this case, I think, was correctly decided.
It seems to nie clear that the concurrent exe-
cution and delivery of the two chattel mort-
gages made the mortgagees tenants in com-
mon of the property conveyed. The legal ef-
fect was the same as it would have beeu if
the goods had been mortgaged to them by
one instrument, to be held by them as se-
curity for their respective claims, and the pro-
ceeds in case of a sale to be divided between
them in proportion to the amounts thereof
severally. If au absolute sale of a chattel
were to be made at oue and the same time
to two different persons, by instniments iu
writing, purporting to convey the whole of it,
e.xecuted and delivered to each at the same
moment, each having a knowledge of the
sale to the other (a transaction, perhaps, not
likely to happen, but nevertheless not im-
possible), I imagine that we should find little
dilliculty in saying that the vendees thereby
became tenants in common, each holding an
undivided moiety of the article purchased.
Neither having any superior right or equity,
but both standing on au equality in tliose re-
spects, tlie property would be divided. The
same would be true of conveyances of real
estate under the same circumstances. It can
make no difference that the sales or convey-
ances are conditional. Their elTect in this
respect is the very same, except so far as the
interests of the several vendees or mort-
gagees are limited and determined by the
amount of the demands due to each. The de-
fendants iu error (plaintiffs below) wore,
therefore, not only enabled, but It was incum-
bent upon them, provided the plaintiff In er-
ror so insisted, lo join la their action. Hill
V. Glbbs, 5 Hill, 50.
The second question has been detenulned
adversely to the plaintiff In the case of Frls-
bee V. l.angworlhy (decided at the present
term) 11 Wis. Sir,. We there held that a
mortgagee of personal properly, not Iu ac-
tual po.ssesslon, might maintain replevin
against a person taking tlio same in defiance
of his right, where, by the terms of the mort-
gage, he was entitled to take possession
whenever he deemed that his Interest or the
safety and security of the debt required.
SiK'h was the case of the present mortgagees.
The (piestlon which was considered by far
the most lini)orlant, and upon which the
counsel bestowed the most attention, citluf;
nearly all the Kngllsh and American author-
ities, c.'ills for the delernilnatlon, in a caao
wher(,' a mortgage of |)ersonal property from
a debtor to a creditor is executed In the ab-
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lowing Instructions: "If the j u ry believe 
that Harding was entitled to the possession 
of the goods mentioned in said mortgages at 
the time the defendant made the levy upon 
them by virtue of a n  attachment against the 
goods of Harding, then the plaintiffs cannot 
recover;" and: "Although the jury should be­
lieve that the mortgages were valid between 
Harding- and the plaintiffs, yet, if Harding 
was entitled to the possession of the goods a t  
the time of the levy by the defendant, then 
the defenda n t  was a utborii.ed by the attach­
ment in hi hands to take possession of the 
goocls, and bold and sell the interest of Hard­
ing therein, and this defendant i s  not liable 
to the pla intiffs In this action,"-which in­
structions the court refused to give in terms, 
but did qualify the same as fol lows: "Un­
less you find t hat the plaintiffs, at the time 
of the commencement of this suit, were en­
titled to the possession of this property, or 
were the owners thereof. In this state the 
mortgagee of chattel is entitled to the pos­
se sion at a ny t i me after the execution of a 
m ortgage, unles it is stipulated that the 
property shall remain in the possession of 
the mortgagor." 
To the refusal of the court to give the said 
instructions in the term aske<l for, and to 
the said qualifications a t tacbeu thereto, t he 
defendant excepted. 
The defendant also aslrnd lhe court to in­
. · trnct the j u ry t h a t  if the plaintiffs, on the 
:!:1d day of December, 1 58, and before the 
levr of the attacbment by the defendant, 
were not in posses ion of the good mention­
ct1 in the mortgages, they could not recover 
i n  this case; wh ich instrul'tion wa refused, 
1uu1 t he refu al excepted to. 'l'he court, in 
its general <'bn rge, instructed t he j u ry as fol­
lows: "The q uest i on whel lH'I" the mortgage 
were deliYcred to the mortgn�<'Ps befnre tbe 
levy or t l1P a l tn< " l 1 1ue1 1 t s  l · one of some dif­
liculty. I f  they were not t lcl i vc>rccl before 
t he le,·y, they are of no n Y all  I n  this suit.  
Th".r <lo nnt heC'Omc effcc· l ua l  for any pu r­
pose 111 1 1  i i  dPllYert><l. l po11 ll11s quesUon I 
dia ri::e :.·ou that. i f  yon fi nf1  that I l ard i n�. 
t he n1orl;:n i.:nr, ! 'XeC"n t e<l t he mortga i::Ps, an d 
clell n·n·il t hem to 1\ I r. l l nslccll w i th the ell 
rPf·t lun to place them oo file I n  t he city clerk's 
11 tll1•e for t he Ut-l(' !ll ltl bcnclJl Of the mort­
gngPes, a u cl t hat s1wb wus ! be <1 da red i u leu­
t lon of the mort i::n i::or, n n d that t lley were so 
J i l f' ( l  in t l l ' ·ily c-IPrk's o f lif'r hc>fnre t h  I vy­
i n g of thr n t t n1 ·h 111ent8, It waH a. good und 
\ lt l ld  dPl l n · rs of t he 11 1or t gn g •s, even though 
the 111nrti;:ai::1•c>i t hPIO"PI YC>l hnd no lrnowkclge 
t hr>r• nf, n n d  hntl given no dlrPctlon c·onePrll 
Ing R1 1d1  1 1 1 1 1 rt g11�Ps u n t i l  n rter t lw n t l ncl i  
1 1 1  .. 1 1 111  I n  t hi s  <'I I  1\ NP lcvl  cl n pnn th  1 1rop 
1 · 1  l.\', I r  :. 011 f i n d  t h11 t 1 lll' mo rl gn j!PS Wl'I' • 
m n r l "  In good fn l t h ,  11 1 1 c l  Wl'r<' 110 d l l vPrPd 
1 1 1 1 <1 ll lr-r l In t lw rlty d1 ·rk' olllcP hrfnr • t he 
J t • \'Y nf t h e ll l t ll f' h l llPll l S, 1 111' pl11 J n t ll'f n re Pll­
t l t l f 'd tn rl'f•n \ f'r," In t lw i: l v l 11g or w h ic h  In 
1:1tn 1t•llou 1 h 1.; rl 1 ·f,. 1 1 1 l: 1 1 1 t also cxc·1•p l c•d. ' l  llf' 
D i g itized by 
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jury found a verdict i n  favor or the 11Jain­
tiffs for $1, 60, and j udgment was renderetl 
thereon. 
Smitb. Keyes & Gay, for plaintiff in er­
ror. Col l ins, Atwoo<l & Haskell, for deff>n<l­
ants in error. 
D I::S:O:N". C. J. The first question in volved 
in tbi ca e, I tbin k, was correctly decide<l. 
It seems to me clPar that tbe concurr nt exe­
cution and tlel i >ery of tbe two chattel mort­
gages made t b e  mortgagee tenants in com­
mon of the prope1ty conveyed. The legal ef­
fect was the same as it would have been if 
I the good had been mortgaged to them by 
one instrument, to be bel<l by them as se­
curity for tbeir respective claims, and tile pro­
ceeds in case of a sale to be div ided between 
them in proportion to the amounts t bercot' 
se>era lly. If au ab olute sale of a cht1ttel 
were to be made at one and tbe same t i me 
to two different person , by in truments in 
writing, purpor t i ng t o  convey tbe whole of it, 
executed and delivered to cacll a t  tlle same 
moment, eacb having a knowletlge of the 
sale to t he otber (a transa ction, perhaps, not 
likely to happen, but nevert heless not i m­
po sible), I imagine that we houltl find littl 
d i l licul t y  in ,ayin" that the vendees t h erchy 
beC'ame tenants in common, eacb bohling- a n  
u n d ivided moiety o f  t h e  article purcl mst•<1 .  
Neither having any superior right or quity . 
but botb standing on an equality in those re 
spects, t ll e  property would be 11ividet1. The 
same would be true or conveyance of rea l 
estate under the same •ircumsta nces. It ca n 
make no difference t h a t tbe sale or ·onvey­
ances a re con<li l iona l . Their effcet in t h is 
r • pect ls t h e  very same. except so fa r as t he 
interests oe t be eYeral vend e' 01· mort ­
gagee. are l i m i t cl anti det ermi ned by ! ht' 
amount of the dPmands due t o  each. 'l'he tk­
fenda n t :;  iu error (pl:1 i n l i ITs b low) were. 
t herefore, oot only enabled, but lt was i ncu m­
hent u11on t hem, 11rovidcd t be pla intiff in er· 
ror so i u sislt>11 ,  to join In U1eir action. H i l l  
v. G i bbs, 5 l I ill, !iO. 
'l'he st•1·• m< I qnesl lon has be n detem1 lnrd 
acherscl.r l o  t h e  pln l n t i !'C In t be c11 e or FJ'ls­
bcc Y. La ni:wortby (decided at t be present 
t rm) 1 1  Wis. 3ifi. We t h ere held t lrn t a 
mortJ.;:1gc r pt·r�o n:1 l  properly, not I n  llC· 
t u n !  poH1:1cH1:1lon, ml;.;-ht m a i n ta i n  rcplcvln 
n;?n I nsl a perimn ta kl ng th same l o.  dcflnnC'e 
nt' his righ t ,  wht>rc., hy t he t rms or t he mort­
gaA'r, he '' ns cnt il lPtl to take posMCsslou 
\\ h<·ne1 er he 1ke1 1 1 c>c l t h:1 t his I n terest or Ulc 
s:1 f; ot y n n d  NCC'11rlty of t h  cl bl req u i red. 
'nrh '' ns t h e C'HH<' or th Jll"<'licnt mortgngeC'H. 
'l'hc q 1 H'Nl Ion w h l<'h waH 1•ouHldcrecl b�· fnr 
the most l 1 1 1 pnrt : 1 n t ,  a n d 1 1 1m n  which tbl' 
('Oll l lHPl bPHIO\\ Pfl 1 111' lllORt :ti t n t lon, rttlug 
nearly 11 1 1  th Ji} ngl i sh n rnl A merlcau author­
l t  lc>s, rn l l H for t hl' r l PI N m l n n l lou, In a co.so 
'' hPn· n nmrl g-nJ!<' of p1•r1111nal p rope rl y from 
u dPhlnr tn a c • rpd l l o r I s  ex1•t· 1 1 t  d lo tile ab· 
O ri 
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sence and without the knowledge of the lat-
ter, and delivered to a stranger for his use
of the time at which the title to the property
mortgaged vests in the mortgagee, as be-
tween him and another creditor of the mort-
gagor who acquired an interest in it by at-
tachment between the time of the delivery
to the stranger and the time when the mort-
gagee actually received notice of and accept-
ed it. Whilst it must be admitted that there
is some conflict in the adjudications upon
this subject, still both natural reason and the
weight of authority tend to the same conclu-
sion, which is, that the title in such case only
vests from the time there is an acceptance
in fact on the part of the mortgagee. On
principle, I think it may be laid down as an
indul>itable proposition in such case that the
title does not vest in fact until the mort-
gagee has actually assented to the convey-
ance; and, consequently, that until such as-
sent it remains in the mortgagor. While all
the courts aclcnowledge the correctness of
principles which lead unerringly to this re-
sult, and clearly and positively exclude any
other, it is somewhat strange that any should
have been found to adopt a conclusion di-
rectly opposed to it. All agree that it is
necessary to the validity of every deed or
conveyance, that there be a grantee who is
not only willing, but who does in fact, accept
it. It is a contract, a parting with property
on the part of the grantor, and an accept-
ance of it by the grantee. Like every other
contract, there must be a meeting of the
minds of the contracting parties, the one to
sell and convey and the other to purchase
and receive, before the agreement is con-
summated. If there be anything in legal
principles, or in common sense, it is an un-
pardonable absurdity to say that a contract
can be completed in the absence and utter
ignorance of one of the contracting parties;
that he can or does, under such circum-
stances, assent to or agree to become botind
by it. The idea that a contract could be
thus made, and that title to property could
pass into a party without his knowledge or
consent, and out of him, without any mo-
tion or act of his signifying his willingness,
but merely by his refusal to receive it at all,
had its origin at a period in the history of
I lie common law when the legal mind, in-
stead of being governed in its conclusions by
a steady application of the clear and rational
I)rinciples of the law to plain matter of fact,
and by arguments to be drawn therefrom,
was too frequently influenced by a mysteri-
ous and fanciful logic, that depended for its
support tipon artfully devised fictions and
falsehoods which for the most part were as
i-epugnant to reason as they were unneces-
sary to the proper administration of justice.
The discovery that such things could be
done is, I believe, attribtitable to the in-
ventive skill of .Justice Ventris, as exhibited
in the case of Thompson v. Leach. 2 Vent.
108. decided about the year 1G90. At least
several courts and Judges since that time,
with many complaints, have agreed in giv-
ing him the credit of having proved some-
thing on this subject which none of them
could understand. The substance of his
proposition is that a deed of lands made to
a party, without his Ivuowledge or consent,
and placed in the hands of a third ijerson
for his use, is a medium for the transmission
of the title to the grantee, and takes effect
so as to vest it in him the instant the deed
is parted with by the grantor; and if the
grantee, upon receiving knowledge of it, re-
jects it, such rejection has the effect of re-
vesting the title in the grantor by a species
of remitter. Inasmuch as this is the only
attempt at sustaining it by argument to be
found in the books, the more recent cases
having, without discussion, gone oJf almost
entirely on the strength of the authorities, I
proi^ose to examine some of the positions as-
sumed by him, upon which his argument
mainly depends, and from which, I think, its
fallacy and the incorrectness of his conclu-
sions will be clearly made to appear. He
admits, what is universally conceded to be
an indispensable element of every grant,
namely, that it should be accepted by the
grantee; and says "that an assent is not only
a circumstance, but it is essential to all con-
veyances, for they are contracts, actus con-
tra actum, which necessarily suppose the as-
sent of all parties"; but avoids the difficulty
into which the admission of tliis well-set-
tled principle brings him, by saying "that
because there is a strong intendment of law
that for a man to take an estate is for his
benefit, and no man can be supposed to be
unwilling to that which is for his advan-
tage," therefore the law will presume that
the grantee has accepted a conveyance be-
fore a knowledge of its execution and deliv-
ery has come to him. Upon the foundation
of this hypothesis, misnamed by him a pre-
sumption of law, the falsity and unreasona-
bleness of which are so .self-evident that rea-
soning can hardly make them plainer, he pro-
ceeds to the erection of his superstructure.
Assent or acceptance on the part of the gran-
tee or other party to a deed or other instru-
ment, by means of wliich the title to prop-
erty, whether real or personal, is to be trans-
ferred to him, or by which he is in any other
manner to become bound, is a fact, the truth
of which is to be established by competent
evidence, before such deed or other instru-
ment can be adjudged to have a legal exist-
ence. Like every other fact, it may be es-
tablished by direct evidence, or its existence
may be inferred or presumed from other
facts already in proof. But I deny that the
existence of one fact is to be inferred or pre-
sumed from the existence of others when the
connection between the former and the latter
is stich that, according to the course of na-
ture, it plainly appears that the former can-
not exist. In other words, I deny that the
existence of any fact may be shown by
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CHATTEL MORTG A G E� l 'i'V 
sence and without the knowlc<lge of the lat­
ter, and delivered to a stranger for his use 
of the time at which the title to the property 
mortgaged vests in the mortgagee, as be­
tween him and a nother creditor of the mort­
gagor who acquired an i nterest in it by at­
tachment between the time of the delivery 
to the stranger and the time when the mort­
gagee actually received notice of and accept­
ed it. Wllilst it must be admitted that there 
is some <'onfiict in the adjudications upon 
t his s:ubjc · t ,  still both natural reason and the 
,,-eight of authority tend to the same conclu­
sion, wbich is, that the title in such case only 
Yest from the time there is a n  acceptance 
in fact on the part of the mortgagee. On 
principle, I think it may be laid down a s  an 
indubitable proposition in such case that the 
title does not vest in fact until the mort­
gagee has actually assented to the convey­
:rnce; and, consequently, that until such as­
sent i t  remains i n  the mortgagor. \'i' hile a l l  
t h e  courts acknowledge t h e  correctness o f  
principles which lead unerringly t o  this l'e­
sul t, and clearly and positively exclude any 
ot her, i t  is somewhat strange that any should 
ha•e been found t o  adopt a conclusion di­
rec:tly opposed to it. All agree that it is 
ne<.:essary to the validity of every deed or 
<.:011\eyance, that there be a grantee who is 
not only willing, but who does in fact, accept 
it.  It is a contract, a parting with property 
on the part of the grantor, and an accept­
a nce of it by the grantee. Like every other 
contract, there must be a meeting of the 
minds of the contracting parties, the one to 
sell a nd con•ey and the other to purchase 
and receive, before the agreement is con­
summated. I f  t here be anything in legal 
principles, or in common sense, it i s  an un­
pardonable absurdity t o  say that a contract 
can be completed in the absence and utter 
ignorance of one of the contracting parties; 
that he ca n or does, under such circum-
tances. assent to or agree to become bound 
uy it. The idea tha t a contract could be 
thus made, and that title to property could 
pass into a party without his know ledge or 
consent, and out of him, without any mo­
tion or act of his signifying his willingness, 
but merely by his refusal to receive it at all, 
had its origin at a period in the history of 
t he common law when the legal mind, in­
stead of being governed in its conclusions by 
a steady application of the clear and rational 
principles of the law to plain matter of fact, 
and by arguments t o  be drawn t herefro m .  
w a s  too frequently influenced b y  a mysteri­
ous and fanciful logic, that depended for its 
snpport upon artfully devised fictions and 
falsehoods which for the most part were as 
repugnant to reason as they were u nneces­
sary to the proper administration of j ustice. 
'l'he discovery that such things could be 
done is, I believe, attributable to the in­
•entive skill  o f  Justice Ventris, as exhibited 
in the case of Thompson v. Leach. 2 Vent. 
108. decided about the year 16BO. At least 
D 
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several courts and judges since that time, 
with many complaints, bave a�ree<.l in giv­
ing him tbe credit o f  having proved some­
thing on this subject which none of them 
could understand. The substance of his 
proposition is tha t a deed of l a nds made to 
a party, without his knowledge or consent, 
and placed i n  the hands of a tbird person 
for bis use, i s  a medium for the transmission 
of the title to the grantee, and takes c!Ie<:t 
so as to vest i t  in h im the instant the deed 
is parted with by the grantor; and if tbe 
grantee, upon receiving knowledge of it, re­
jects it, such rejection bas the effect or re­
vesting the title in the grantor by a species 
of remitter. Inasmu ch as this is the only 
attempt at sustaining it by argument to be 
found in the books, the more recent cases 
having, without discussion, gone off al most 
entirely o n  the strength of the authorities, I 
propose to exa m i ne some of the positions as­
sumed by him, upon which his argument 
mainly depends, and from which, I think, its 
fallacy and the incorrectuess of his conclu­
s:ions will be clearly made to appear. He 
admits. what is universally conceded to l>e 
an indispensable element of every grant, 
na mely, that it should be accepted by the 
grantee; and says "that an assent is not only 
a circumstance, but i t  is essential to all  con­
veyances, for they are contracts, actus con­
tra actum, which necessarily suppose the as­
sent of all pa rties'' ;  but avoids tbe difficulty 
into which the admission of this well-set­
tled principle brings him, by saying "that 
beca use there is a strong intendment of law 
that for a man to take an estate is for bis 
benefit. and no man can be suppoi:;ed to be 
unwil ling to that which is for bis ad•an­
tage," therefore the law will presume that 
the grantee bas accepted a conveyance be­
fore a knowledge of its execution and deliv­
ery has come to him. Upon the foundation 
of tbis hypotbesis, misna med b y  him a pre­
sumption of law, the falsity and unreasona­
bleness of which are so self-e• ident tbat rea­
soning can hardly make them plainer, he pro­
ceeds to the erection of his superstructure. 
Assent or accepta nce on the part of the gran­
tee or other party to a deed or other instru­
ment, by means of which the title to prop­
erty, whether real or personal, is to be trans­
ferred to h i m ,  or by which be is in any other 
manner to become bound, is a fact, the trutb 
of which i s  to be e tablished b y  competent 
evidence, before such deed or other i nstru­
ment ca n be adjudged to ha\e a legal exist­
ence. Like every other fact, it  may be es­
tablished b;\' di rect evidence, or its existence 
may be inferred or presumed from other 
facts already in proof. But I deny that the 
existence of one fact is to be inferred or pre­
sumed from the existence of others when the 
connection between the former and the latter 
is such that, according to the course of na­
ture, it plainly appears that the former can­
not exist. In other words, I deny that the 
existence of any fact may be shown by 
I r f 
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proving others ■which conclusively show its
non-existence, or that the legitimate mode of
establishing the truth of a matter is by iU'
dubitably proving its falsehood. Justice does
not require, nor does the law tolerate, such
an absurdity. The learned justice says that,
where a deed is executed by the grantor and
delivered to a stranger for the use of the
grantee, without the previous advice, direc-
tion, or authority of the grantee, and with-
out his knowledge, the law will presume that
the grantee assents to it the moment it is de-
livered to the stranger. Assent is an act of
the mind,— that intelligent power in man by
which he conceives, reasons, and judges, and
of which it is a primary, invariable, and
most familiar law that It cannot act with
reference to external objects, until through
the medium of the senses, it is impressed
with or knows their existence. Hence,
without such impression or knowledge, there
can be no assent, no actus contra actum;
and to presume it in opposition to the facts
is to presume that which is impossible,
which the law, the rules and precepts of
which arc in conformity with the unchanging
truths of nature, will never do.
"A presumption," says Jlr. Starkie, "may
be deliued to be an inference as to the exist-
ence of one fact from the existence of some
other fact, founded upon a previous experi-
ence of their connection. To constitute such
a presumption, It is necessary that there be
a previous experience of the connection be-
tween the known and inferred facts, of such
a nature that, as soon as the existence of the
one is establishc<l, admitted, or assumed, the
inference as to the existence of the other im-
mediately arises, independently of any rea-
soning upon the subject." I'rcsuniplions
thus deliued, he says, are either legal and
arllliclal or natural, and may be dividtMl into
three i^lasses: (1) Legal itrcsumptions made
by the law itself, or prcsnniiilions of mere
law; (2) legal ])resmiip(ions made by a jury,
or i)rcsumptions of law and fact; (">) mere
natural presumi)lions, or )ircsuinplions of
mere fact. The dclinltion wliiili he so <lcar-
ly and accunitoly gives, although applied by
him to nil presumptions, Is perhaps more
strictly applicable to tlio latter class. The
assent to a deed or other Inslrumeiil by the
grnnlec or other parly, being a mailer of
mere fact, It Is obvious that to tlu'latterclass
also would belong a presumption In relation
to such assent, in a case wIkm'c such jire-
Mumptlou could properly be Indulged. I'.ul.
whether the prcsumiillon be assigned to the
one or the other of these classes, the posi-
tion of the Iciiriicd Justice Is e(iiuilly untena-
l)le; for In no Insl.ince, not even the most
arllliclal and iirlillr.iry, does the law Indnlgc
In presumptions which are directly coiilr,'!-
dlcted by the facts on which thi'y are prcill-
caled. The known fa<'ls, though ofti'ii In
Hiillli'lent, of their own natural force ami
"■lllciicy. to genernte In the irdnd a conviction
or licllif of those which jirc Inferrcrl, jirc
always, to say the least, not inconsistent
with or oijposed to them. If, for example,
we take the case instanced by Mr. Starkie,
of the presumption of the satisfaction of a
bond after the lapse of twenty years, without
payment of interest or other acknowledge-
ment of its existence, while, if a single day
less than the twenty years has elapsed, such
presumption does not arise, we find it to be
extremely arbitrary and technical. No natu-
ral reason can be given why the lapse of the
last day should operate to produce in our
minds a conviction of belief of payment,
while the lapse of all the days and years pre-
ceding it does not so operate. Such is not
its effect. But as, from common experience
of the affairs of men, there arises in the
mind, after tlie lapse of many years without
payment of interest or other acknowledge-
ment a strong probability that a debt has
been satisfied, and as the law loves certainty
and industriously avoids doubts, it has from
these motives arbitrarily fixed a period of
time at the expiration of which this proba-
bility shall ripen into and take effect as a
presumption of law, and at which tlie rights
and position of the parties in reference to
such debt, flowing from tlie mere lapse of
time, unaccompanied by other circumstan-
ces, shall become determinate and certain.
This presumption which is in so many re-
spects artificial, is in no respect inconsistent
with the fact from which it is said to arise.
On the contrary, though not conclnsivel.v sus-
tained, it is strongly corroborated by the
fact; since experience teaches that it is very
improbable that the holder of the bond
would, unless it were satisfied, permit such
a space of time to elapse without receiving
the interest or obtaining from the maker
some other evidence of its non-payment.
The same is true of that most purely arti-
ficial presumption that a bond or other spe-
cially w.is executed upon a good considera-
tion, which Is so peremptory and absolute in
its nature that It cannot be rebutted by evi-
dence; whilst the consideration of another
Instrument, executed and delivered under
precisely the same circumslancos, and in the
same words, btit not under seal, may hi'
freely in(pilred Into and impeached; yet
there the conclusion that it was made upon
a good consideration is entirely consistent
with the facts from which It Is drawn, for
there Is much n^ason for supposing th;it with-
out a good consideration It would not h;ive
been scaled and delivered. Without nnilll
plying illnstrallons, I thiidc It will be found
that In no lnst;iiice (iiidess the present casi'
Is to form an exce|)tlon) does the Law Infer
the existence of facts In clear and direct op-
position to those ui)on which the Inference
rests. It iloes not do so here. Iteason re-
bels !igalnst it, jiud neither Justice nor ei|uity
deni.'inds It. The oidy result of <lropiiing the
absurdity will be that, as In the i)r<'seMt
c .'ise. In .'i ctintesl between two equ.'illy meri-
torious [i.-irlics, the lilh' to ilie properly of
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180 CIL\. T T E L  .\l O H T l U.GE · • 
pro•ing others which conclusi•ely sbow its 
non-exi tence, or that the legitimate mode of 
establ ishing the truth of a matter is by i n. 
dubitably pro•ing its falsehood. Justice does 
not require. nor does the law tolerate, uch 
an absmcl ity. Tbe learned justice ays that, 
where a deed is executed by tbe grantor and 
deliYered to a stranger for the u e of the 
grantee, w ithout tbe pre•ious advice, direc­
tion, o r  authority of the grantee, and with­
out his lmowledge, the law will pre ume tha t 
the grnntee assents to it the moment it is de­
li \ered to the stranger. Assent is an act of 
the mind,-that intelligent power in m a n  by 
wh ich he concei•es, reasons, and j udges, and 
of "IY h ic h  it i s  a. prima ry, invarialJle, aud 
most familiar law that it cannot act with 
reference to external objects, until  th rough 
the medium of the senses. i t  is impressed 
with or knows t heir existence. Hence, 
without such impres ion or knowl edge, there 
can be no assent, no act u s contra actum ; 
and to presume it in oppo i t io n  to the facts 
is to presume that which is i m pos ible, 
w h ic h  the law, the rules and precept of 
w h ic h  a re in conformity with the unchanging 
truths of nat ure. will never do. 
"A presu mption," says :'Ill'. Starkie, "may 
be defined to be an in( rcnc·e a s  to the exi L­
enee of one fact from the exist ence of some 
other fact. founded upon a prev ious xperi­
enee or their connection. To cou. t i t ule sue h  
a presumption, it i s  necessary that there be 
a previou experience of the connection be­
t ween the k no 1Yn a n cl iuferrc>d faets, or such 
a nature that. as soon as t he exi. t nee of tbe 
one is establ ishccl,  a dw i tted, or assumed, the 
inf ren ·e a' to the exi stence of the o t her im­
ruecliately arises, in llt•pencl otly of a n y  rcn­
son i n� upon t bc . u hjcc:t." !'resumptions 
t h us dc6necl, lie sap;, a r  either IPg-a l and 
a rt i fi d a l  o r  na t u ra l . a tH l  may be d h  ic ll'!l i n to 
tlu·ee d a io;ses: ( 1 )  Le�a l presu m pl ious m:tc le 
h.1· the l a w  I t sel f', or prcs 1 1 1 1 1ptiu11  of mrrc> 
la w ;  (2) le�nl presumpt ions m:tcll' by a j 1 1 ry, 
o r  prNrnmpt ions of I n  w a n d fn f't; Pl u11•re 
uat 1 1 1 ·n l lH'esumpt ions, or 1 1 1·1·s1 1 1 1 1pl io1 1s or 
1 1 1 ! ' 1'1' faet. 'l'bc c ] p fi n l t lon " h id1 he Ho d<': l r­
ly a n < l  n(•t·1 1 1·n tcly �hc•s, n l t hou�h ;1 pplicd hy 
h i m  to a l l  1 1 1·eHu 111pt ionA, I A  11l·1·hnps more 
strict l y  appl lcuhlc to t he In l t P r  d : t ss. 'l'lw 
nssP 1 1  l t fJ a ! Ired o r  o t  hrr Inst r 1 1 1 1w11 I hy l lw 
gm u t c· or ot brr pn rt y, lll'l 1 11! n ma t t  Pr o f  
nwrc fad, I t  IH  oln lo us t ha t  t o  t h '  l n t tl'rclass 
11 l so wo1 1 l r l  l wlong 11 J l l'!'H l l l l l ) lllon In rrl n t lnJJ 
t o  HIH'h a. Hrnt, In a rnsr whr1·r H I H' h  J l l'P 
H l l m p t lon r·nu l r l  prn1 11'rly hr i tH l l l l A'P!I. J l 1 1 t .  
w l 1Pt her t l w  J ll'P,.. 1 1 1 1 1 p t lnn l w  assll{ll!'cl lo t lu ·  
<•II<' or thr nl  l tPr n r  t l H' �U' d n ssrs, l l w  J 1nHl-
1 ln11 o r  I h e  l1•11 rn1•d J !IHI Ir!' I H  rqun l l .v I I  1 1  t !'llll­
hl•·: for In nn 1 1 1  t . 1 11rr, not r•vrn t h P most 
n rt l l l f ' i a l  untl u rh l l r:i ry, c ln!'l:I t hf' l11w l 1 1 ! l 1 1 ll!<' 
In prt•. 1 1 m p t lo11s \\ hlrh fl l"P d l rrl'l ly c·n11 l l'll· 
d l r t rr l  h.v t I l l' fnr t 1111  \\ h lrh t lH'.r n rr pn•dl·  
1·n t r ·r l .  TIH'  Jen o\\ n fn rtH,  t hn11i:h nfl <'n I n  
11 lli• 1 ..  1 1 1 ,  of thrl r n1\ 1 1  1111 t 1 1 rn l  lorc·r· 1 1 1 1 d  
< ' l llr•1wy, tn l{•·rwrn tr. I n  t h 1• m i nd n <'O i l \  1< '1 1 1 1 1 1  "lb\glfi�e;'.' b�" c• \I hlr•h a rr •  l n fPl'l'l'l l ,  a rr 
I NTE RNET A R C H  V E  
a l  ways, t o  say the least, not lnconsi!<tent 
with or opposed to them. If, for exa mple, 
we take the case instanced by l\lr. Starkie, 
of the presumption of tbe satisfaction of a 
bond after the lapse of twenty years, without 
payment o f  interest or other acknowledge­
ment of its existence, while, if a single day 
less than the twenty years bas elapsed, such 
presumption does not a rise. we find it to be 
extremely a rbitrary and technica l . No natu­
ral reason can be gi.-en why the lapse of tlll' 
last clay should operate to produce i n  om· 
minds a conviction of belief of payment. 
wh i le the lapse of all  tbe days and year prl'­
ceding i t  does not so operate. Such is not 
its effect. But as, from common experience 
of the affairs o f  men, there a1·ises in t h e  
ruinu, a fter the lapse of many years w i thout 
pa�·lllcnt of interest or other aclmowlellge­
ment a strong probability that a debt has 
been sa ti fic\l, a ncl n t h e  l a w  loYes certainty 
a nc l  i ndustrio u s l r  a·rni\l doubt s, it has from 
these mot i ves a rhitr:t rily fixed a period of 
tillle at the expiration of w h ich t h i s  )lrnha 
b i l it�· sha l l  ripen into and take e1Icct as a 
pr su mption of l a w . a nd a t  w h ich tlle righ t s  
a n d  posi t ion of tbc partil'S in referenct' tn 
nch debt, flow i ng from the mere 1 :1 pSt' of 
t i me, u naccompanied b�· oth r circum:l :rn­
cc', sha l l  become d<'tc>rm i n a t c  and cert:1 i n .  
This presumption whkh is i n  s o  m a n y  r<'­
spcc t s  a rt i ficia l ,  i s  i n  no r\'.'s11cc:t i ncons istent 
w i t ll the fnct from w h ich it i said tn ari "\'. 
On the contrary, t hough not conclu, ivcly sus­
tained, it i s  strongly conoborn ted b�· till' 
fact; s i ne expcricnre teaches t ha t  it is very 
i m 1n·oha blc that t h  hol der of th bornl 
woulc l .  u n lc>ss it were> sa t i  ·tied, perm i t  uch 
a sp:.ll'e of time to l a pse w i t hout recei Y i n;.:­
tbc i n tPrcst or obt:1 ining from the maker 
some ot her eviclence or its uon pa �·nH'nt. 
'J'hc SUllll' is trne O f  that lllO t purc>ly :ll'( i ­
l\c i:i l JH'<'s 1 1 1 11pt ion t ha l  a bond or o t lwr SJlt'­
C'i a l t �  11 n s  <'XCl'n tccl  upnn a good con si cl c m­
t inu, w h id1 is so per mp tory a nd abso l n l �  iu 
i t s  n:i t urc> t hn t  It c·n nnot bl' rebutted by l'' i-
1 l c> t1r<'; \Y h i lst the co osldemt ion of a1;11t her 
I nst l'll lllPllt, exccutNl and dcl l verc\l u nckr 
prrl'isl'ly t ile' a 1 11e dtT\l lllAl.n nccs, a n c l  i 1 1  t he 
H:1 111c \1·orc ls ,  hut nol u n der Ren ! .  m a y  hi' 
fr ely l nq n l recl l n t n  and i m p  acbcd ; yet 
t hc>rl' t he c·ond11si 1 1 1 1  t hat I t  was mad ' upon 
n goocl c·mi:-•i c l l'rntlnn Is n t l rl ly <'O lll'l isll' 1 1 l  
w ith t he farts from 11 h k b  I t  I s  r im 1vn, fnr 
l h<'l'e IR muc-IJ  rPnson for s11 p110H l llA' tha t wit h· 
out n g"oocl co nsld! 'l':i t lon It  would n o t  h:i 11• 
hN>n 1u•:t l < 'd  a nd d d hr rl'f l .  \\' l thnut  1 1 1 11 1 1 1 
p l y l nl{ l l l uHl rn t ln1 1H,  l t h i n k  It w i l l  hP 1'0 1 1 1 1 1 1  
l h a l  I n  n o  l nsl : 1 1w<' ( 1 1 1 1 h'HH the> prrs1•11l c ·a:'" 
IH to f1 1r1 1 1  nn <'Xcl'p l l n J 1 )  clncR t l1 c  law l n f"r 
t h e rxl st c > 1wc of fuc> t s  In clP1u · n n d c l l n·d op 
pn1-1 l t l n 1 1  to t hos!' 1 1 pn11 which thr l n t'Pl'C ll < ' l '  
l'!'H(H. It  drws nnt do so lwrC'. H l':I snn I'•'· 
l 11 • l s  : t l!n l i 1 1-1 t  I t ,  l l 1 1 C I  1wl t l wr j 1 1 H t lc•r nnr <'! ) l l i t , · 
dPlll l l l H I H  I t .  Thc• 0 1 1 1 .1 rc •s 1 1 l l  of c l roppl nA' t l 11• 
n hH 1 1 rc l l ty w i l l  hi' t l w l .  ns In t ill' pn•sP1 1 t  
f ' : I SC', 1 1 1  I I  <'Ollt l'HI IW( \l'!'r'll t wo C'C] \ 1 : 1 1 1.Y l l l ! ' l ' i  
t n rlo111-1 1 11 1 r l i<'", t lw t l t ll' t o  l l 1 r  1 m 1 prrty 1 1 f  
u ERSI  OF CA I FO N 
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wliiili a conveyance was soufrlit to be made
will be adjudged to be in biiu wboin reason
designates as tbe true owner.
The mistake of tbe learned justice con-
sisted in bis carrying the presumption of law
so far as to say tbat it presumes that a per-
son has consented to tbat of which be knows
nothing, which is an impossibility, instead of
saying, what was more truly said by tbe
more logical and cautious courts and judges
of his time, and by Lord Ellenborough, in
Stirling V. Vaugbn. 11 East. 023, namely,
that, if nothing appears to tbe contrary, tbe
law presumes that be will accept tbat which
is for bis beneflt, when he is informed of it,
which assent, in tbe absence of intervening
rights or equities will have relation back to
the time of delivery lor his use, and make
bis title good as from that date. After a
brief argument of this sort, he proceeds to
say "that very odd consequences and incon-
veniences would follow if suiTenders should
be ineffectual till an express consent of the
surrenderee," and that most disastrous ef-
fects upon estates and conveyancing in Eng-
land would ensue, unless her courts adopted
and ujiheld his absurdity. It Is said that
one eri'or surely gives rise to another and a
greater. This saying was never more aptly
and forcibly illustrated than by the fantastic
feats which the learned justice makes the
common law, tbe sober common sense of
ages, perform by way of getting the title
back again into the grantor in case tbe gran-
tee refuses to accept the conveyance. He
says tbat after, by this kind of one-sided
contract, it has got into him without bis
knowledge, it remains with him without his
consent until he absolutely rejects and
spurns the offer; and that then, by some
magical power of tbe law, such rejection,
without deed or other writing, becomes an
instrument of conveyance, by which tbe le-
gal title to land is conveyed from one who
has it to one who has it not, against the
expi'ess wishes of the latter, and in despite
of bis own deed, the highest and most sol-
emn act known to tbe law by which he
could rid himself of it. It is not surprising
tbat tbe learned and logical Chief Justice
(5ibson, in Read v. Robinson, 6 Watts & S.
329, while commenting upon what he calls
"the masterly arguments of Justice Ventris
in Thompson v. Leach," says that "the diffi-
culty is to comprehend how tbe remitter can
take effect without displacing intermediate
interests springing from the rejected deed";
and then, as if in despair of ever compre-
hending it. he dismisses the subject from his
mind by saying. "But tbe authorities con-
clusively prove that it may." All agree that
neither the grantor nor the stranger who
consents to receive and hold the deed can,
by their acts, bind tbe grantee, and that the
latter may, on receiving notice of it, repudi-
ate it altogether. If the title vests in the
grantee at once, it must, of course, vest ac-
cording to tbe terms of the conveyance; and
in the case of an absolute conveyance he
would have an absolute title. If, after de-
livery to the stranger, and before notice to
the grantee, a creditor of the latter should
fasten upon the proijerty by execution or at-
tachment, no reason can be given why he
could not bold it. If it is tbe properly of
the grantee, it follows, as of course, that tbe
creditor would have bis right, and tbat he
would at once acquire a lien to the e.vtent
of his demand. Suppose, after this is done,
that the grantee, on receiving notice, refuses
to accept the conveyance, what becomes of
the property? Roes the refusal mibind and
set the property free from tbe seizure of tbe
creditors, and remit the title at once back
to the grantor? Or does the intendment of
Justice Ventris step in in liebalf of tbe cred-
itor as well, and say, because the grant is
presumed beneficial to the grantee, and he
might at some future period accept it, that
therefore he shall be deemed to have accept-
ed it before tbe seizure, and at a time when
he was utterly ignorant of it, and thus en-
able the creditor to withhold tbe property
from tbe grantor, by wbicli means it would
happen that, although it was neither bought
nor sold, the grantor would, without consid-
eration, lose it, and tbe grantee enjoy tbe
full benefit of it on the same terms? Know-
ing of no rational or satisfactory answers
which can be given to these and various sim-
ilar questions which will readily suggest
themselves to the reader, I leave them to be
replied to by tliose wlio maintain tbat the
title to property, real or personal, may, v.itb-
out words written or spoken, or other act of
transfer, be thus mysteriously passed and
repassed between parties by contract. I
deny tbat it may be. It seems to me verj'
plain that it does not pass in fact until the
grantee has actually consented to receive it,
and as of course that it remains with the
grantor, who is unable without such consent
to vest it in the grantee. No other conclu-
sion is consistent with the doctrine tbat a
grant is a contract, and that tlie assent of:
the grantee 'S necessary to give it validity.
The justice assumed tbe question in contro-
versy by saying tliat the execution and de-
livery of tbe deed to tbe stranger passed tbe
title out of tbe grantor, and then be was un-
der the necessity of resorting to these fur-
ther absurdities in order to account for it;
for he says "that it is not a slight matter,
but what tbe law much considers, and is
very careful to have the freehold fixed," and
not "under such uncertainty as a stranger
that demands rigbt should not know where
to fix bis action." If be had considered tbat
the operation of tbe deed was suspended, or
that it did not take effect until the grantee
had assented, be would have been saved the
trouble of drawing so largely on his imagi-
nation to show where the title was, and how
it was thereafter to be controlled. It is a
matter of no small moment, and of just
pride to the bench of England, that Justice
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C H A T T E L  �J O l{'J'Q ,\ G E'.  un 
whi<'11 a conveyance was sought to be made 
" i ll be arljuclgecl to be in him whom reason 
designates as the true owner. 
The mistake of the learned justice con-
• is tecl in bi s carrying t he presumption of law 
so fa r as to say tha t  it presumes that a per­
son has consented to that of which he knows 
nothing, which is an impossi bility, instead of 
sa y i ng, what was more truly said by tl.ie 
more logical and cautious courts and j u dges 
of his ti me, and by Lord El lenborough, in 
Stirling v. Vaughn. 11 East, 6�3, namely, 
that, if nothing appears to the contrary, t lle 
law presumes tlla t he w i l l  accept that whi ch 
is for bis benefit, when he i s  in formed o r  it, 
w h ich assent, in the absence o f  intervening 
rights or equities will  have relation back to 
the time o f  cleliYery ior his use, and make 
b i::: title good as from that date. After a 
brief argument of this sort, he proceeds to 
say "that very odd consequences and incon­
veniences would follow i f  su rrenders should 
be ineffectual till  a n  express consent of the 
surrenderee," and that most disastrous ef­
fects upon estates and conveyancing in Eng­
land would ensue, unless her courts adopted 
and upheld bis absurdity. It i s  said that 
one error surely gives rise to another and a 
greater. This saying was never more aptly 
and forcibly ill ustrated than by the fantastic 
feats which the learned j ustice makes the 
common law, the sober common sense of 
ages, perform by way of getting the ti tle 
back again into the grantor in case the gran­
tee refuses to accept the conveyance. He 
says that after, by this kind of one-side<l 
contract. it  bas got i nto h i m  without bis 
knowledge, i t  remains with h i m  without bis 
consent until be absolutely rejects and 
spurns the offer; and that then, by some 
magical power o f  the law, such rejection, 
without deed or other writing, becomes a n  
instrnment o f  conveyance, b y  w h ich t h e  le­
gal title to land is conveyed from one who 
bas it to one who bas it not, against the 
exp:·ess wishes o f  the latter, and in despite 
of his own deed, the highest and most sol­
emn act known to the law by which be 
could rid h imself of it. lt i s  not surprising 
that the learned and logical Chief Justice 
Gi bson, in Read v. Robinson, 6 Watts & S. 
329, while commenting upon what be ca lls 
"the masterly arguments o f  Justice Yentris 
in Thompson v. Leach," says that "the diffi­
culty is to comprehend bow the remitter can 
take effect without displacing intermediate 
interests springing from the rejected deed" ; 
and then. as i f  i n  despa i r  of ever compre­
hending it. be dism isses the subject from bis 
mind by saying, "But the authorities con­
clusively p!·ove that it may." All agree that 
neither the grantor nor the stranger who 
consents t o  receive and bold the deed can ,  
b y  their acts, bind t h e  grantee, a n d  that the 
latter may, on receiving notice o f  it, repudi­
ate i t  altogether. If the title vests i n  the 
grantee a t  once, i t  must, of course, vest ac­
cording to the terms of the conveyance ; and 
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i n  t h i>  case or a n  absolute conveyan<'e he 
would have an absolute titlP. l f. a ftc>r cle>­
l i ve1-y to the stranger, ancl before notice tri 
l he gran tee, a creditor of the lat ter 1:<houl1 l  
fast n upon the property by execut ion or at­
tachment, n o  reason can be gi ven why be 
could not bold it.  I f  it is the property of 
the grantee, it follows, as o f  course, that the 
creditor would have bis right, and that he 
would at once acquire a lien to t he ex tent 
of bis demand. Suppose, after th is is clone, 
that the grantee, on receiving notice, refuses 
to accept t h e  conveyance, what becomes o f  
l h e  properly ? Does the refui,;al uuhi rnl awl 
set the property free from the seizure o f  the 
creditors, and remit the t i t le at once back 
to the granter? Or d:>es the intenclment o f  
Justice Yentris step i n  i n  behalf of t h e  cred­
itor as well, and say, because the gm nt is 
presumed beneficial to the grantee, and be 
might at some future period accept it, that 
therefore be sha l l  be deemed to ha \'e accept­
ed it before the seizure, and at a time when 
be was utterly ignorant of it, and thus en­
able the creditor to w i t h bokl the property 
from the granter, by which means it would 
happen that, altbuugb it was neither bou�bt 
nor sold, the gra nter would, w i t hout consid­
eration, lose it.  and the grantee enjoy the 
ful l benefit of it on the same terms ? Know­
ing o f  no ra t ionn.l or satisfactory answers 
which can be given to these and various sim­
ilar questions w hich w i l l  readily sug,gest 
t hemselves to the reader, I leave them to be 
replied to by those who ma intain that the 
title to property, real or personal, may, \-V ith­
out words w ritten or spoken, or other act o f  
transfer, b e  t h u s  mysteriously passed a n d  
repassed between parties b y  contract. I 
deny t h a t  it may be. I t  seems to me very 
plain tlla t it does not pass i n  fact until  the 
grantee bas actually consented to recc>i\'e it.  
and as o f  cour.e that it remains with the 
grantor, who i s  unable without such consent 
to vest i t  in the grantee. �o other conclu­
sion is consistent with the doctrine that a 
grant is a contract, and that the assent ot 
the grantee is necessary to give it valiclity. 
The j ustice assumed the question in contro­
versy by saying tllat the execution aml de­
livery of the deecl to the stranger passed t he 
title out of the g-rautor, and then be was un­
der the nece ity of resorting to these fm­
tber absurdities i n  order to account for it;  
for be says "that i t  is not a slight matter. 
but what t h e  law much consi1lers, and i. 
very careful to have the freehold fixed." ancl 
not "under such uncertainty as a stran�er 
that demands rigct should not know " here 
to fix bis action." I f  be bad considered t ha t  
t he operation o f  the deed w a s  suspended. or 
that i t  did n o t  take effect until  the grantee 
bad assented, be would have been saved thP 
trouble of drawing so largely on bi i wag-i­
nation to show where the title was, and bow 
it was thereafter to be controlled. It is a 
matter of no small moment, and of ju�t 
priue to the bench o f  England, that Justice 
O r1g1 � 1 rror1 
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Ventris, at the time he wrote this wonderful
arjrumeut, dissented, and the other mem-
bers of the court of common pleas, viz. Pol-
lexfen, chief justice, and Powell and Rolveby,
associates, were of opinion in the case "that
there was no surrender till such time as the
suiTcnderee had notice of the deed of surren-
der and agreed to it," and that it was so
adjudsed by that court; and that the ease
was afterwards taken by writ of error to
tlie kius's l^ench, of which Lord Holt was
at the time chief justice, and the judsment
of the common pleas "was there attirmed by
the unanimous consent of the whole court."
It was afterwards brought by error into the
house of lords, where, as it is said, upon the
reasons contained in Justice Ventris' argu-
ment, the judgment pronounced in both su-
perior courts was reversed. Thus we have
on the one side the legal learning, and al-
most the unanimous opinion, of the courts,
and on the other the judgment of reversal of
the house of lords, the great majority of
whom Ijnew very little, and cared less, about
the correct settlement of legal principles.
The argument is of a piece with that kind
of reasoning once employed to prove that
titles to estates were "in abeyance," "in nub-
ibus," and "in greniio legis," the folly of
which is so thoroughly exposed and exploded
liy the severe and searcliing logic of Mr.
Foarne in his admirable treatise on Re-
mainders. See pages 3(i0 to 3G4, inclusive.
It was lield, in case of a lease to one person
for life, remainder to the right heirs of an-
other still living, tliat no estate remained in
the grantor; and, because tliere was no
heir, for the reason that no one can be heir
during the life of his ancestor, but only after
his <leath, and I5ecau.se tlie tenant took only
a life estate, the remainder was said to be
In abeyance, in the clouds, or in the Imsoin
of the law. These opinions were founded
upon the very same assumption as that of
.Justice Ventris, namely, tliat the remainder
fiassed out of the donor at tlie time of llv-
erj', and conseiiuonlly tliat no estate re-
mained in him tliereaftor; and, because the
title must always be somewliere, the advo-
cates of the doctrine sent It to tlio clouds,
"lliough," says Mr. Feame, "by some sort
of compromise between common sense and
tlie supposition of an estate [lassing out of
a man, when then; Is no person In reniin
natura, no object beside hard and hardly In-
telligible Words, for the rece|itlon of It at
the lime of the livery, they are compelle<l to
admit such n species of Interest to remain
In the grantr>r a.s uiion the determln:ill<iii of
the estate bcfoic the conlingent rnnalnder
can lake place entitles the grantor, or his
heirs, tri enter and rciSHiinie the estali>."
The (piestlons are so closely allied, and
the HiiliHtrala of the two follies are ho exact-
ly alike, that Mr. I''earn<"'s reasoning Is fidly
In point. And It Is certainly refreshing, aft-
er a iicrplcxlng and vain cITort to undi-isl.'ind
that which never was and never will be In-
telligible, to take up an author, who, like
Mr. Fearne, treats the subject upon the
principles of common sense. He intimates a
conviction that, instead of the title to es-
tates being in the clouds, there is a much
stronger probability of caput inter nubilia
condit, of the head of the inventor of the
fiction having been burled or hidden in
them. He says: "I cannot but think it a
more arduous undertaking to account for
the operation of a feoffment or conveyance
in annihilating an estate of inheritance or
transferring it to the clouds, and afterward
regenerating or recalling it at the becli of
some contingent event, than to reconcile to
the principles as well of common law as
of common sense, a suspension of the com-
plete, absolute operation of such feoffment
or conveyance, in regard to the inheritance,
till the intended channel for the reception
of such inheritance conies into existence."
The .same is true of the delivery of a deed
to a third person for the use of the gran-
tee, without his knowledge or previous di-
rection. It is far more compatible with
common law and eomnion sense to say that
its operation is susiiriiiied until the hap-
pening of tlie event indispensable iu the law
to its validity, namely, an acceptance by
the grantee, than to make the law perform
the wonderful exploits of vesting and re-
calling the title contrai-y to its best set-
tled and soundest principles. I am of opin-
ion, therefore, tliat the defendants in error
took no interest iu tlio goods In auestion
by virtue of their mortgages, until after
the plaintiff in error had seized them ui»in
process of attachment, and, conseiiuently.
that they cannot maintain their action.
JIucli was said in this case, about the
manner in which the mortgjiges were de-
livered. There can be no doubt that, so
far as the mortgagor was concerned, the
delivery was good. They were placed by
him In the hands of a stranger, to be by
him delivered to the mortgagees, and thus
passe<l beyond his reach and control, un-
less the mortgagees, within a rea.sonable
time after notice, should refu.se their as-
sent, nils made the delivery, as to the
mortgagor, valid and binding, which Is nil
1 understand the author of the Touchstone
to mean, when he says that a deed "may
lie delivered to anj- stranger for and in
behalf and to the use of him to whom it Is
made." Itnt a delivery by the donor to n
third jierson, for the use of the donee, and
an aci'eptnnce by the latter, are two very
different things. By the former the donor
signifies his willingness to part with flic
properly, whilst by the latter the donee
makes known his assent to receiving It, and
bolii muNt cniienr lid'ore the title Is ch.in-
ged or affected. It was formerly, and may
p<>rliiips by some he still, supposed, that
there can bo no delivery without at the
snmi- time an aei'cplaTici'; that they are
correlative, lnse|iaralilc parts of the same
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CHATTEL AIO U T G A.GE'. 
Yentris, a t  the time he wrote this wonderful 
argument, dissented, and the other mem­
bers of the court of common pleas, viz. rol­
lexfen, chief j ustice, and Powell and Rokeby, 
associate , were of opinion i n  the ca e '"that 
there was no urrender till such t i me as the 
u r enderee had notice of the deed o f  surren­
der and agreed to it ." and t llat it  was so 
acljncl�ed by t bat court; and that the case 
was afterwards taken by wri t of error to 
tlic ki u.i(s bench, of which Lord Holt was 
at the t i me chief j ustice, a n d  the j udgment 
of the common pleas · · was t here a t:Ii rruPd by 
the unanimou. consent of t h e  whole court." 
I t  was a ftenvards brought by error into the 
house of lords, where, as it  i s  said, upon the 
reasons contained i n  Justice Ventris' argu­
ment, the j udgment pronounced in both su­
perior courts was reversed. Thus we have 
on the one side t h e  legal learni ng, and al­
most the unan i mous opinion, o f  the courts, 
and on the other the j udgment of reversal 01' 
the house of lords, t h e  great majority of 
w hom knew very l ittle, and cared less, about 
the correct settlement of lega l principles. 
The a rgument is of a piece with that l•ind 
of rea oning once employed to prove that 
ti tles to estates were "in a beyance," "in nub­
ibus,'' and "in grernio legis," the folly of 
whic·h is o thornugllly exposed and exploded 
hy the evere and searc h i ng logic of :\Ir. 
Fcarne in his admirable treat ise on Re­
mainders. 8ee pages 3CJO to 3G-!, inclusive. 
rt was held, in ca e of a lrase to one person 
for l i fe, re m a i nder to the right heirs of an­
other t i l l  l iYi ng. that no estate remai ned i n  
t he grantor; and, because tllere w:r n no 
heir, for t h e  rea::;on that no one can be lleir 
<luring the l i fe of b i s  ancestor, but only after 
his <1eatb , noel because the tenant tool' only 
a l ifr pstate, the remainder was :m icl to be 
i n n Ile� nnce, in the clouds, 01· i n  t he hosom 
or t he law. 'l'h<':->e opinion were. fo u nded 
u pon t he YCtT same as. u m p l ion a::1 t hat or 
.T u�t ic-e Yen t ri s, na mel y, t h a t  t he remainder 
p:u�scd out of t h e  donor nl t he tlm of l i v­
rry, and conser j l t c n !i)' t hn t  no estn tl' re 
rn11 i 1 1r<l  in h i m  t h ereafter; anr l ,  beea u ;;C' the 
t i tle 11 1 11st n l wn ys be somewher<', the nd vo­
<':t I <'.· of thr dort rine sent It  to th<' C'ln11cls, 
"I h<1 1 1�h," sn .1 s ;\ [ r. F'cn rne, "by so m<' sort 
nf <·omprnm i ;:;t' hrl ween common Sl'llsc a n d  
f l l f '  s 1 1 ppnsl t i n11  o f  un l•slale pnssin� n u t  o f  
n 1 1 111 1 1 ,  w lw 1 1  t h <'r<' ts nn pPr:·wn I n  1·rn 1 1 1 1  
nnl 1 1 rn ,  no ohJ<·d hrslrl<' hnrcl n n< l  h n r< l l y  l n­
l f ' l l i r.: i h lr wunls,  for t he rec•rpt lon of It a l  
l hr 1 1 1 1 1 <' o f  t h<' l l n• r.1', t h ry 11 1'1' c•nm ppllrd t o  
t t d m t t  fltlC'h II Hf H'c'IP!'I o f  l u l < 'l'Psl l o  rrmn l n  
1 1 1  t l w  r.: rn n l n r  IHI 1 1 pnn f hP c l P ! <'l' l l l l l l : t f lo1 1  nf 
1 1 11• <'Sf l l l P  IJPfnrP t h l' c·o n l h11!l'lll n · 1 1 1 n l t 1 c l<'I' 
r·:n 1 t :1 l, P  plnr'P Pl l t l t lr·H t h r V'r:l l l l or, 01· h i s  
1 1 1 · ! 1· • t o  P l l f f'I' ll l ld l'l'll H ll lllf' l hl' f'Rl:t f r." 
Th<• q 1 11•st lr 1 1 1H Il l'<' Hn rlnHPly u l l l Pd, n n d 
t l w 1 1 h  t ra t :i nf l l w t wo fnl l l Ps n n• Ho rxnrt  
l y  :1 1 1 1 '"  t h n t  ;\ f r. Ji',.n r 11 1 ·'s l'Pll 'ln n l 11 1t  IH fnl ly 
I n  po l 1 1 t .  ,\ 1 1d It IR <'Pl'fll l l l l ,\' l'l' frc•. hh1 1!, a ft  
P l'  :i p1•rpJ, . :1: l nr.: n n r l  nl l 1 1  r > ll'o r t  t o  1 1 1 1 r J, . r.,.t : 1 1 1e l 
I ha l II l i ld1  1 1 1' \'f ' I' \\':t!I ll l l r l  lll'\ l'l' II I l l  1 11' I n  
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telligible, t o  take up an author, who, like 
Mr. Fearne, treats the subject upon the 
principles of common sense. He int imates a 
conviction that. instead of the t itle to es­
tates being in the clouds, there is a m11C'h 
stronger proba bility of caput inter nubilia 
condit, of the llead of the inventor oi the 
fiction ha Ying been buried or bidden in 
them. He say s :  " I  cannot but think it a 
morn arduous underta k i ng to account for 
the operation of a feoffruent or com·erau1:e 
in annillil:t t i ng an e<;t:tte of inheritance or 
tran ferring it to t he clouds, and aft enY:l l'd 
regenerating or recalling i t  at the beck of 
some contingent eYeut,  tllan to reconcile to 
the principles as well of common law as 
o f  common sen e, a suspen ion of the com­
plete, absolute opera t ion of 'ucll feoff rueut 
or conveyance, in regard to the inl.l •ritau1:e. 
till the i n tern.led channel for ti.le reception 
of such inheritance comes i n to ex:isten1:e . ..  
Tile same i s  true of tile deli very of a deed 
to a third person for the use of the gran­
tee. w i thout his knowledge or pre' i< 11:0: 1l i­
rect ion. It i far more compa t ible w i t h  
common law a n d  common s use to say t i.la t  
its operation i suspcuded until the lla 1 1-
pe u iug of the event incli'pen able i n  the la w 
to its va lid ity, narucl y, au arcc1itance 11�· 
the grantee, tllan to make th e la w perform 
the wonderful exploit of v sting- and n'­
ca l l i n g  the t i t le contrary to i t s  best set­
tled a nd soundest pri ncipl es. I a m  of opi n­
ion, lllerefore, t ha t  th defendants i n  en.,1r 
took no interest i n  the goo1ls in a ue:;t io1 1  
by Yi rt u or theit' mortgages, until  art1'r 
the pl a in t iff i n  error had seized t lw m upon 
process of a t tachment, and, couseque11 t 1 � . 
UlUt. tl ley cannot maintain their nl'tiou. 
� l ucll was said i n  this case. n ho u t  t h e  
man nPL' i n  which t he mort.:.n1 g-1'li 1 1  erl' dt•­
l i \  cn•tl. There can b no l.lou ht t ha t ,  i;n 
fa r as the mort gagor was n nc1·1·1w1l, t hl' 
d1•l iYery " a .:; g-ootl . They w re 11laced l iy 
him lu t ht' ha nds oC a s t 1·nn�c1', lo lll' hy 
h i m  drl l 1·erP1l t o  ti le  mortira ;..: 'l'S. and t i n ts 
pnsspcl h<'Y OLH l hi:; reach aud co n t rn l ,  un­
less th<' 1110 r t �1 �ees, w i t h i n n n•: 1 s1 1 1 1 : 1 h l e  
t i m e  a ft r not ice, shoulcl l'l' fn:->t• t lw i r  a s­
RPnt. 'J'h ls m a d  t h  drl h l'r� , n s  1 1 1  t he 
mort g-agor, va l id and bincl ln A', whkh is n i l 
1 unc lc rst :rncl tll a u t ltm· ol' t he 'l'ntl <'h1< t o 1 w  
to Ill : i n,  w hen h S:l ) S t hat a <h•cd "m:ty 
hf' dPl lvrn'<l to a ny st 1·n n;..:l'l' for a m t  1 1 1  
l w l t : t l f  a n d  t o  t h r use o C  h i m  t o w ho m  i t  i s  
mild<'." H 1 1 t  a clpl l very hy t he clo1101· t o  n 
t h i rd pr1·s011 ,  for t h e ni;c of t he dnn rl', : t 1 H l  
n n  ll<'<'<' J l l l l rH'r h y  t i re l:il t l't'. a n' t wo ' ""�' 
r l l ffrrent t l t i n;..:H. ny f hp fo r l lll'r t hi' donnr 
sl ;..:1 1 1 f1 PH h l H  w l l l l n .�nrss I C\ pa rt wi t h  t l w 
prn1 wrt y,  " hl lst hJ t he ht t l c> r  t lw dnl !Pr 
1 1 111 1\l'S k n o w n  his n ssrn l to l'<' •el Yl 1 1:;- I t .  1 1 1 1d 
h11 l  ll 1 1 1 1 1 H t  rn 1w11 1· l w forc 1 h<' 1 1 1 1 1• Is ! ' 1 1 : 1 1 1 -
,:.rrcl or n rt'Prtecl.  J l  wns formerly, n n cl rn a y  
J!Prhn ps hy Sl l l l ll' h r  Hi i i ! ,  ! H I J !JlrlHCd, t h a t  
t lt< 'l'I' c•:t n ht' u n  r l P l l \'rl'} w i t hou t a t  I h i '  
Slt l l l f '  t l 1 1 1r 1 1 1 1  : J f'f'l ' J I L l lWP; t h a t  t h Py :t rr 
c·ntT<'l<t l l l l' ,  l 1 1 s1•p:t rn l ilP J • : t r l s  of t l w !-i:t 1 1 1 e  
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transaction, and must both occui- at the
snmu instant of time; and hence, in part,
the fiction of relation, by which, in case
of a delivery by the grantor to a stranger,
the subsequent acceptance by the grantee
was carried bacli in legal contemplation to
the time when the grantor gave the deed
to the stranger, in order to save the logic
of the law and to preserve "the eternal fit-
ness of things." It seems to mo that every
case lu which It has been adjudged that
there may be a delivery to a stranger, and
that a subsequent ratitication by the gran-
tee will make the instrument effectual for
the purposes intended, falsifies this notion,
and proves that in every such case there
may be, what there is in fact, a delivery
by the grantor at one time to a third par-
ty, and an acceptance by the grantee from
such third party at a subsequent and dif-
ferent time. Such is the common sense of
the transaction; and it is better and more
rationally disposed of without than with
the aid of the fiction. But if the fiction
must be employed, then the maxim, "In
fictione legis semper subsistit e'quitas," ap-
plies, and it will not be allowed to operate
when it infringes or violates the rights of
sti-angers. It is only resorted to in fur-
therance of justice and to prevent injury.
In this case the plaintiff in error is a stran-
ger to the mortgages. He represents the
rights and interests of the creditors of the
mortgagor, who in good faith sued out and
levied their attachments upon the goods,
thereby lawfully acquiring a lien upon
them; and it cannot be said to be in fur-
therance of justice to postpone their de-
mands, thus legally secured, to those of the
mortgage creditors, which are in no sense
more equitable or just. The struggle is be-
tween innocent persons, to prevent loss,
and the fiction ought not to be resorted to
for the purpose of helping one as against
the other. The transaction must be left to
stand upon its simple and naked truth.
It Is unnecessary for me particularly to
refer to the cases cited by counsel. Those
cited for the plaintiff in error in their prin-
ciples substantially sustain the view-s which
I have taken. Many of those cited by the
counsel for the defendants in error are not
directly applicable, whilst some of them
clearly and positively uphold the opposite
doctrine. Of this latter character, besides
the English, are Buft'um v. Green, 5 N. H.
71; Wilt V. Franklin, 1 Binney, 502; and
Merrills v. Swift, 18 Conn. 257. In the
first it does not clearly appear whether
notice of the execution of the deed or the
service of the process of attachment took
place first. Both happened on the same
day, but the court seem to adopt the theory
that the title vested before notice to the
grantee, and therefore the time of the serv-
ice of the writ, being immaterial, is not
particularly noted. The principle upon
which the doctrine rests is not discussed
at all. The same is true of the case in 18
Conn. In both it is taken for granted that
such is the effect of a delivery to a stran-
ger. In Wilt V. Franklin there was a dis-
senting opinion of Justice Braekeuridge, in
which the fallacy of the reasoning of his
two as.sociates is so calmly and clearly
brought out that it would be folly for me
to do more than refer the reader to it. The
case of Doe ex dem. Garnons v. Knight, 5
Barn. & C. 671, 12 E. C. L. .351, was de-
termined upon the binding authority of pre-
vious adjudications. The question having
hitherto remained undecided in this state,
no such obstacle to its correct determina-
tion exists.
In the case of Cooper v. Jackson, 4 Wis.
5.37, it was expressly ruled that "it is es-
sential to the legal operation of a deed
that the grantee named therein assents to
receive it, and there can be no delivery with-
out such acceptance; but such acceptance
need not be in person; it is sulficient if au-
thorized or approved by the grantee." In that
case the title of the grantee was hold to be
good as against the judgment creditor of the
grantor upon the express ground that there
was a previous understanding between the
grantor and grantee that the deed should
be executed by the grantor and delivered by
him to the register of deeds, to be recorded.
This, the court says, constituted the regis-
ter the agent of the grantee for the purpose
of receiving it. Upon this subject the fol-
lowing language Is used: "The case at bar
falls fully within the principle of Hedge v.
Drew [12 Pick. 141, previously noticed, and
commented upon in the opinion]. Here the
grantee saw the deed after it was drawn,
and the parties came to the understanding
that the deed should be executed and left
with the register to be recorded. There
was an absolute divesting by the grantor
of his estate in the land, and the deed was
delivered to the register, who pro hac vice,
may be considered the agent of the gran-
tee to receive it. It is readily distinguish-
able from the cases where the grantor exe-
cutes the deed without the knowledge of
the grantee." In the case of McCourt v.
Myers, 8 Wis. 2,3G, there was no attempt
by the mortgagor to deliver the chattel
mortgage to the city clerk, or any third
per.son, for the use and benefit of the mort-
gagees, and consequently no question up-
on the effect of such delivery arose. The
only point adjudicated was that the mere
act of the mortgagor in causing the mort-
gage to be filed in the otHce of the clerk was
not such a delivery as would operate to give
the mortgagees any title or interest in the
goods specified iu the mortgage.
The judgment of the circuit court is re-
versed, and a new trial awarded.
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transaC'tion, and must both occur at the 
s:H ne i rrnlant of time; and hence, in part, 
the fiction of i·ela tion, by which, in case 
of a delivery by t l.J e  grautor to a stranger, 
the subsequent acceptance by the grantee 
was canied back in legal contemplation to 
the time when the grantor gave the deecl 
to the strallger, in order to save the logic 
of the law and to preserve " t i.Jc eternal fit­
ness of things." It seems to me that every 
case in whkh it bas been adjudged that 
t here may IJe a clcliY<.'ry to a stranger, and 
that a subsequent ratification by the gran­
tee 'vi i i  make the inslru rneul eITeclual for 
t he pmposes intended, falsifies this notion, 
and proves that in eYe1·y such case there 
may he, what there is  in fact, a delivery 
by the grantor at one time to a third par­
ty, and an acceptance by the grnntee from 
such thircl party at a subsequent and dif­
ferent t i me. Such is  the common sense of 
the transaction ; and it is better and more 
rationally disposed of without than with 
the aid of the fiction. But if the fiction 
must be employed, then the ma xim, "In 
fictione legis semper subsistit e'quitas," ap­
plies, and it will not be allowed to operate 
when it infringes or violates the rights of 
strangers. It is only resorted to in fur­
therance of justice and to prevent injury. 
I n  this case the pla intiIT in error is a stran­
ger to the mortgages. He represents the 
rights and interests of the creditors of tbe 
mortgagor, who in good faith sued out and 
levied their attachments upon the goods, 
thereby lawfully acquiring a lien upon 
them ; and it cannot be said to be in fur­
therance of justice to postpone their de­
mands, thus legally secured, to those of the 
mortgage creditors, which are in no sense 
uiorc equitable or just. The st ruggle is be­
t ween innocent persons, to prevent loss, 
and the fiction ought not to be resorted to 
for the pm·pose of helping one as against 
the other. The transaction must be left to 
stand upon its simple and naked truth. 
I t  is unnecessary for me particularly to 
refer to the cases cited by counsel. Those 
cited for the pla intilI in error in thei r prin­
ciples substantially sustain t he views which 
I have taken. l\Iany of those cited by the 
counsel for the defendants in error are not 
directly a pplicable, whilst some of t he m  
clearly a n d  poi:;itively uphold the opposite 
doctrine. Of this latter cha racter, besides 
t he Eno-Jish, are Buffum v. Green, 5 N. H. 
7 1 ;  Wilt v. Franklin, 1 Binney, 502; and 
Merrills v. Swift, 18 Conn. 257. In the 
first it does not clearly appear whet her 
notice of the execution of the deed or the 
service of the process of attachment took 
place first. Both happened on the same 
day, but the court seem to adopt the theory 
that t he title vested before notice to the 
grantee, and therefore the time of the serv­
ice of the writ, being immaterial, is not 
D 1 :;11t1z 
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particularly 
. noted. The principle U)JOn 
which the doctrine rests is not 1 J iscmssecl 
at all. 'l'he same is true of the case in l ' 
Conn. In both it ls taken for gra nted · that 
such is the effect or a delivery to a Rtrau­
ger. In "'ilt v. ll'ranklin there was a dis­
sen ti ng opinion of Justice Brackcuri<lge, i u  
whicll tile fallacy o f  the reasou iug o f  his 
two associates is so calmly and rl<'arly 
brought out that it would be folly for rue 
to do more than refer the reader to it. Tlw 
case of Doe ex dem. Garnons v. Knight, ;; 
Barn. & U .  671, 12 E. C. L. 3:il, was de­
te1·mined upon the binding authority of pre­
vious adjudications. The questiou having 
hitherto remained undecided in this state, 
no such obstacle to its correct determina­
tion exists. 
In the case of Cooper v. Jackson, 4 Wis. 
;J37, it 'vas expressly ruled that "it is es­
sential to the legal operation of a deed 
that the grantee named therein assents to 
receive it, and there can be no delivery with­
out such acceptance ; but such acceptance 
need not be in person ; it is sufficient if au­
thorized or approYed by the grantee." In that 
case the title of the grantee was held to he 
good as a gainst the judgment creditor of the 
gt·antor upon the express ground that there 
was a previous understanding between tile 
grantor and grantee that the deed should 
be executed by the grantor and deli verctl by 
him to tbc register of deeds, to be recunlecl. 
This, t he court says, constituted the regis­
ter the agent of the grantee for the purpose 
of receiving it .  Upon this subject t he fol­
lowing language is used : "The case at bar 
falls fully w ithin the principle of Hedge '· 
D rew [12 Pick. 141, previously noticed. and 
commented upon in the opinion]. Here t he 
grantee saw the deed after it was drawn, 
and the parties came to the understanding 
Urn t the deed should be executed and left 
with the register to be recorded. There 
was an absolute divesting by the grantor 
of his �state in the land, and the deed was 
delivered to the register, who pro hac vice, 
may be considered the agent of the gran­
tee to recei•e it. It is readily distinguish­
able from the cases where the grantor exe­
cutes the deed without the knowledge of 
the gra ntee." In the case of �I<:Court v. 
l\lyers, 8 Wis. 236, there was no attempt 
by the mortgagor to delh·er tbe chattel 
mortgage to t he city clerk, or any tllird 
person, for the use and benetlt of the mort­
gagees, and consequently no question up­
on the effect of such delivery a rose. The 
only point adjudicated was that the mere 
act of the mortgagor in causing the mort­
gage to be filed in the office of the clerk was 
not such a delivery as would operate to giYe 
the mortgagees any title or interest i n  the 
goods specilied in the mortgaA"e. 
The judgment of the circuit court is re­
Yersed, and a new trial awarded. 
O rigi r::i l  from 
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FORBES V. PARKER.
(16 Pick, -m-^.)
Supreme Judicial Court of JIassachusetts.
March Term, 1835.
This was a case against a deputy sheriff for
taking foity-eight swine, which had been
mortgaged to the plaintiff by Edward A\'ulk-
er, ou July 5, 1833, to secure the payment of
a promissory note of the same date, payable
in six months from that time.
The mortgage deed, which was duly record-
ed on the day of its date in the records of the
town of Charlesto\vn, where the mortgagor
then resided, contained a stipulation that, un-
til there should be a default in the payment
of the note after it became due, the mort-
gagor should retain possession of the swine,
for the pui-pose of fattening and preparing
them for market. On the next day after the
mortgage was executed, the defendant at-
tached the swine, on a writ in favor of
Nathan Tufts & Co., who were alleged to be
creditors of the mortgagor, and sold them un-
der such attachment, without pursuing the
provisions of St. 1829, c. 124 (Rev. St. c. 90,
§ 78). This attachment and sale were the
cause of the present action. The defendant
objected that case was not the proper form
of action, but tliis objection was overruled.
There was no evidence offered by the plain-
tiff of any actual delivery of the property in
question; and the defendant contended that
without such evidence the action could not
be maintained. In this stage of the cause it
was taken from the jurj'. Upon these facts
the court were to order a nonsuit or default,
as law and justice should require, reserving
to the defendant, in case of a default, the
right of being heard on the question of dam-
ages.
Fletcher & Tufts, for defendant.
PUTX.'VM, J. The question whether an ac-
tion will lie for damiiges to a reversionary in-
terest in personal property was settled in the
alllrniative by the case of Ayer v. Cartlett,
9 IMck. lOT. We have re-examined that case,
and liave no desire to disturb the decision.
AVilliiii n few months after it was pro-
nounced, the legislature passed "a bill re-
lating to mortgages and pledges of personal
property and i)ropertj' subject to any lien
created by law." St. 1829, c. 121. And the
mortgage mentioned In the case at bar was
made more than two years after the passing
of the act.
There Ih no Riiggestlon of any fraud In the
cane. The plalnlllT was the mortgagee, and
by his permission the swine nioitgagcd were
to rciii.'ilti In the posHcsslon of the mort-
(jngor six montljH, and until default of pay-
ment, "for the piupDsr of fattening and pie-
parlng tlioin for market." Now, we say In
tlilH cH.MO, ns was said by the court In Ayer
V. Pnrllelt. that the creditors can be In no
iK'ili'r condlllou than tlio debtor would be In
regard to the plaintiff. If Walker, the mort-
gagor in possession, would have had no right
to sell the property before the expiration of
the time of payment of the debt, it is clear
that his attaching creditors would not have
any stich right. Such an act on the part of
Walker might, according to Farrand v.
Thompson, 5 Barn. & Aid. 826, have been
considered as putting an end to the contract
on his part, and a revesting of the right of
possession in the mortgagee, so as to enable
him to maintain trespass or trover against
the vendee. But the proceedings against
Walker were in invitum, and therefore the
contract may not have been rescinded. If
it were not, then the action of trespass upon
the case would be the proper remedy for the
plaintiff, the mortgagee, whose reversionary
interest was so destroyed.
Then it is objected for the defendant tliMt
the plaintiff's rights ai'e to be determined as
they existed at the commencement of his ac-
tion, which was immediately after the mort-
gage, and six months before his debt became
due; that it could not then appear but that
the moitgagor would pay the debt when it
would become due; and that, if he did. llicu
the plaintiff would have suffered no damage
from the acts of the dct'cndant. The answer,
we think, is that the plaintiff should be put
in as .good a situation as he was in when the
property 'vas thus taken away by the de-
fendant. This is a special action of the case,
and the plaintiff would have a right to be put
into the possession of as much property as
had been taken from him. The plaintiff
would hold the money subject to the just
claim of the mortgagor, or of his legal as-
signs, for an account. That would seem to
be the Just and ecpiitable rule of the common
law apiiiicable to the case. But the legisla-
ture has ))rovided, by the statute before re-
cited, ample remedy for the creditors of the
mortgagor. The act is predicated upon the
conlhmation of the contract between the
mortgagor and mortgagee. If there should
be any benelicial interest in the former re
maining after paying the debt, it might be
secured by the jirocess of foreign atlaclunenf,
or by an attachment tipon the property Itself
subject to the Hen; In which latter case the
court might order and decree that on pay-
ment or tender of the debt to the mortgagee
the property should be delivered over to the
otilccr.
But the dltllciilty In the case nt bar prob-
ably was that the projierly mortgaged would
not have been more Ihtin sulllcleni to pay
the debt, and therefore no benellt would have
arisen from the trustee i)rocess, or tli.'it there
was no benctii'ial Interest in the mortgagor to
arise from keeping and fattening the swine
In the six months during which the mort-
gagor was to possess them. If the contract
were faithfully in'rfornied by the mortgagor,
the property mortgaged would be nmcli In-
creased In value; and If It were made snlll-
cli'Mt to pay the debt when due, the mort-
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FORBES v. PARKER. 
(lG P ick. ·Hl�.) 
Supreme Judidal Court of )fa sachusetts. 
:IIarch Term, 1835. 
Thi was a ca e against a deputy sheri ff  for 
taking forty-eight swi ne, which had been 
mortgaged to the plaint iff by Edward "\Yalk­
er. on July 5, 1833, to secure the payment of 
a promissory note of the same date, payable 
in six months from that time. 
The mortgage deed, which wa duly re(;ord­
ed on the day of its date in the record of the 
town of Charlestown, where the mortgagor 
tben resided, contained a tipulation that, tm­
t i l  there should be a default in tbe payment 
of the note after it became due, tbe mort­
gagor should reta in posses ion of the swine, 
for tbe purpose of fattening and preparing 
them for market. On the next day after the 
mort�age was executed, the defendant at­
tached the swine, on a writ in favor of 
:\athan Tufts & Co., who were alleged to be 
creditors of the mortga�or, and sold them un­
der such attac·bment, without pursu ing the 
provi ·ioni; of t. 1829, c. 1 2-1 (Rev. St. c. 90, 
§ 7 ') . Thi attachment and sale were the 
cause of the present action. The defendant 
objected that case was not t he proper form 
of action, but this  objection \Yas overruled. 
There was no evidence offered by the plain­
tiff of any actual del ivery of the property in 
que- l ion ; and tbe defendant contended that 
wit hout uch evidence tile action could not 
be maintained. In t h i  stae:e of the cause it 
was taken from the jury. Upon these facts 
tbe court were to order a nonsuit or defaul t ,  
as law and justice should require. resen•ing 
to t ile defemlant. in case of a defa ult. t he 
ri�ht of being bean! on the quc l ion or dam­
ages. 
Fletcher <" Tufli;, for deCen clnnt. 
PUT. T ::\!, J. The question whet her an ac­
t ion will  lie for damages to a n'YC'rsionary In­
ter st in personal property wa ett lecl in t he 
H m nua.liYC by t he ca:-;e or Aye1· v. Bart let t, 
9 Pit>k. 1 :-10. "'e hnYe rc-exn 1 1 1il1C'cl t llll t < ·nst\ 
n n rl hn re no <le:-;lre to dist urb the clel'.ision. 
\\' l t h i n n few mon t hH :t ft !'r lt waH pro· 
110111 el'd, 1 he lr:.:isla t 11 l'e p:tsSl'<l "a bi l l n'­
l:t t i u �  to 111ort :.:a:.:c.· a11el pl!'<l!;PS of l)Cnmn:t l 
11r111 11•rty a ud property s 11hje1· l to 1un• ll ' 1 1  
< ·n·:1 1 Pd hy lnw. " St.  I S:?!l, t' .  1 :? 1 . ,\ ;1 1 1  t ill' 
mnrt g:1 gr 11w n t lo11Pd In l hc> l':tsc a t har wnH 
1 1 1 1 1dP 1 1 111rP t ha n two .n •: i n! a f t l ' r  t he pass i n g  
• •  r 1 1 1 . .  :wt 
'l'h•·rr IH no Rllg'J.!f'<,t l on or 11 11y rrnud 1 1 1 t i l t' 
<'llH'. 'f'hr pl:i l n t l ll' w:H t h f' n1ort l.".n�·1•c', a nd 
1 1)' h(!I p1•rr1 1 i'IHl011 t ( 11• H\\' 1 1 1 1 •  1 1 1 1 1 1  l i,:ll �l'd Wl'l'O 
lo r••1 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 i l l  t h l' "" !'1•.fil 1 1 1 1  or f l u• 1 1 1 1 1r l ­
i;11gor i:;ix mont hs, a nd 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Jrf:mlt of  pay-
1111•1 1 1 ,  "for t l ll' pnrpr1 , . ol fn f 1! ' 1 1 1 t 1i; n n d pn•· 
pnrlni: 1 l 1 1•rn l11r 1 1 111rl . .  t." :\11\\', WC' 1m�· i l l  
t h l <·n ••, n!! W l l H  i;:1 ld h,r l h P cou rt In .\ y1·r 
Y. I :  t 1 1 • t i ,  t h:i l f l u• 1•r,.d l l 11rR 1•11 1 1  1 11' In ° 1 10 
lwl t •  r ' "1 1 d l t ! . 1 1 1  t h:i n t l 11•  d1 •hl"r w11 1 1 l d  1 11•  1 1 1  
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regard to the plaintiff. I f  Wa lker. the mort­
gagor in possession, 'vould have had uo right 
to ell the property befot·e the expiration of 
the t ime of payment of the debt, it is clear 
that bis attaching creditors would not have 
any such right. Such an art on the 11:ut of 
Walker m ight. accord ing to Farra nd v. 
Thompson, 5 Barn. & .Aid. c26, have been 
consider·ed as putting an end to the contract 
on his part, and a reve ting of the ri:.:ht of 
possession in the mortgagee, so as to enable 
him to maintain trespa - or trover again t 
tbc vendee. Bnt the proceedings again, t 
"\Yalker were i n  invitum, and therefore the 
contract may not have been rescinclerl. I f  
it  were not, then t b e  action o f  trespass upon 
the ca e would be t be proper remedy fot· t he 
plaintiff, the mortgagee, whose rever"'iouary 
interest was so dest royed. 
Then i t  is objected for t he defen<la nt t h: 1 t  
tbe plainti ff's rights ru·e to b e  determined as 
they existed at the commencement of bi' ac­
tion, which was immediately after the mort· 
gag , and six month before his dellt beca me 
due; that it could not t hen a ppear but t h :l t 
t he mOLtgagor would pay tbe debt when i t  
would become due ; autl that, i C  be d id , t hm 
the plaintiff would ha ve u1I red no dama.:?e 
from t he acts of the defernla nt. The answer, 
we t hink, is  that the plaiut i !I should be pnt 
in a good a s i t ua t ion as b was in wlleu t he 
property •yas thu t n k  n a way by t he de· 
fendanl. T h i  is a specia I act ion of t he case. 
and the plaintiff would h:lYe a right to be put 
i nt o  the po ession of a much propert�T a s  
bad been taken from him. Tbe plai n t i tl' 
would hold the money subject t o  t h  just 
claim of tbe mort;rngor, or of hi' legal as· 
si�ns, for an account. T h a t  woul d :::eem t o  
be the just and qni tablc rule or t h  cnrnmou 
Jaw applit'ahle to t he ca,e. Bnt t he l l'gisla­
ture ltas Jll'OYidecl, by t he s t a t u t e  llrfore re­
cited, ample remecly for U1e <"rcdi t ors of t he 
mort ;:mgor. The act is pre1l i < -a t ed uJ)mt t h <'  
con fi rmn t i  on o f  t be cnn t r:t l 'l brt w • 1 1  t lw 
!llortgngor ancl mortg:tgce. If there sllOuld 
be any ben fid::r l intcn'sl in t he fornH'r I '  
m n i n i n g  a fter payin g  t he cleht, I t  m h �h t be 
SC'C'UI" cl by t h  JH"Ol'l'�l'I Of forC'lgll :t t l :tl' h l l lC'll ( ,  
o r  by a n  a t t :wh rnl'u l upon t l w prnpcrl y i t �!'lf 
subject to t ile lien ; In whlt'h la t t er c·:ii;e t he 
conr't might ur<ler a nd 1 ln·n·c t ha I 0 1 1  J l:I .\ 
nwnt or h'llC Irr of t Ill' dl'hl to I he mo rt i::1 :.:l'C 
t hr prnperty ::;houhl he d c l i Yl'n'<l on•r to the 
oll lr•1•r. 
1 \1 1 1  t lw 1ll llknlty In t hC' l':ls<' nt hnr proh· 
ahly wnH t ha t t h<' prnperty mml·'.1 .1•d wm1ld 
nol lune h '<'H mon' t hn n  H1 1 1 lkl<•1 1 I  to J l l l.Y 
t hr dPh l ,  11 1 1 1 1  l h t>n•rore no hcn e l l l  wn11 l t l  1 1 : 1 ' "  
n rls!' l l  from t l w t nu.;t l'C' 1 1 1·oc·r�s. ur I h a t  I h1 ' l'1• 
w n H  no hC'DPfki:i l l n l !'r!'Hl In t l w mortg:igor t o  
n ri ow fro111  kc•C'plng a n t i  fn l t 1• 1 1 l 1 1 g t h<' I<\\ l r 1 1 '  
In I he 1-1i · monl hH dnrlng w h lC'h t he' 1 1 111rl 
g:igor W:l!I I n  1 11 11-1�rt<H l h!'lll.  I f  l lH' cnn t r:l < 't  
W< 'r<' f: 1 i l  l r f 1 1 l l.r 1 11•rfor11H•d hy t hi' 1 1 1nrl g11 gnr, 
1 1 w J irnpNl.Y mnrl <!llL'.l'd would he 1 1 1 1 1 ! ' 1 1  In 
rn.,1 •w1l in Y:t h 1 1 · ;  a nd 1r it wPre 1 1 1ndr H11 fll 
d 1 • 1 1 t  to pns t l w d1· l •I " 1 1 1 • 1 1  < 1 11 1" t h • 1 1 101·1 -
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gagor would have had recompense for liis
expense, care, and labor; if more, the mort-
gagor would have the excess. But a creditor
of the mortgagor, who had attached the prop-
erty, and substituted himself ia the place of
the mortgagor, might, for aught that appears,
have been at great expense, and the benefit
would have accrued to the mortgagee, if, after
all, there had not been a surplus. Be these
conjectures as they may, the remedy for the
creditor of the mortgagor pointed out by St.
1829, c. 124, should have been pursued. He
should either have summoned the mortgagee
upon the trustee process, according to the
first section, or attached the property subject
to the lien created by the mortgage, accord-
ing to the second section, which provides
"that the person for whose benefit the same
attachment is made or execution levied, shall
first pay or tender to the mortgagee, pledgee
or holder, the full amount of the demand for
which the said property is mortgaged, pledged
or subject to any hen as aforesaid." But in-
stead of this, the creditor of the mortgagor
has adopted a course which deprives the
mortgagee of all benefits from his morUjage.
He has caused the property to be attached
and sold for his own security or payment,
without making any provision for the pay-
ment of the debt due to the plaintiff, the
mortgagee. We all think that it is not for
such an attaching creditor of the mortgagor
thus to disturb and usurp the rights of the
mortgagee. And we think that the mort-
gagee has a right to recover damages pres-
ently for the value of the property, not ex-
ceeding, however, the amount of his just
claim against the mortgagor, with all the
damages sustained in the vindication of his
rights.
The objection that there was no actual de-
livery cannot be maintained, as the recording
of the mortgage deed in the records of the
town of Charlestown, where the mortgagor
resided, was legally equivalent to an actual
delivery. That point has been recently de-
termined in the caso of Bullock v. Williams,
16 Pick. 33. Therefore, according to the case
reported, the defendant is to be defaulted,
and the damages assessed by the jury.
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gagor would have bad recompense for bis 
expense, care, and labor; if more, the mort­
gagor would have the excess. But a creditor 
of the mortgagor, who had attached the prop­
erty, and substituted himself in the place of 
the mortgagor, might, for aught that appears, 
have been at great expense, and the benefit 
would have accrued to the mortgagee, if, after 
all, there had not been a surplus. Be these 
conjectures as they may, the remedy for the 
creditor of the mortgagor pointed out by St. 
1829, c. 124, should have been pursued. He 
should either have summoned the mortgagee 
upon the trustee process, according to the 
first section, or attached the property subject 
to the lien created by the mortgage, accord­
ing to the second section, which provides 
"that the person for whose benefit the same 
attachment is  made or execution levied, shall 
first pay or tender to the mortgagee, pledgee 
or holder, the full amount of the demand for 
which the said property is mortgaged, pledged 
or subject to any lien as aforesaid." But in­
stead of this, the creditor of the mortgagor 
bas adopted a course which deprives the 
D i gitized by 
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mortgagee of all benefits from his mortgage. 
He has caused the property to be attached 
and sold for his own security or payment, 
without making any provision for the pay­
ment of the debt due to the plaintiff, the 
mortgagee. We all think that it is not for 
such an attaching creditor of the mortgagor 
thus to disturb and usurp the rights of the 
mortgagee. And we think that the mort­
gagee has a right to recover damages pres­
ently for the value of the property, not ex­
ceeding, however, the amount of bis just 
claim against the mortgagor, with all the 
damages sustained in the vindication of his 
rights. 
The objection that there was no actual de­
l ivery cannot be maintained, as the recording 
of the mortgage deed in the records of the 
town of Charlestown, where the mortgagor 
resided, was legally equivalent to an actual 
delivery. That point has been recently de­
termined in the casP. of Bullock v. Williams, 
16 Pick. 33. Therefore, according to the case 
reported, the defendant is to be defaulted, 
and the damages assessed by the jury. 
O rigi n-a l  from 
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DORSEY v. HALL et al.
(7 Neb. 4(50.)
Supreme Court of Nebraska. July Term. 187S.
This case came up from Cumins county.
Heard there upon a demurrer to the petition
before Valentine, J. Demurrer sustained,
and cause dismissed. Plaintiff appeals.
Uriah Bruner and K. F. Stevenson, for ap-
pellant. Crawford & McLaughlin, for ap-
pellees.
MAXWELL, C. X On the 1st day of
May, 1S77, the plaintiff commenced an action
in the district court of Cuming county to
foreclose a certain mortgage e.xecuted by
Robert Hall. Kate H. Hall, his wife, and
David H. Winyall and Lina D. Winyall, his
wife, to Thomas Wilson, on the 4th day of
October, 1875, upon the N. W. 14 of section
14, in township 23, range 5 E.: and also up-
on parts of lots 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17, in
block 30, in the city of West Point,— to secure
the payment of the sum of ?1,950, according
to the tenor of three promissory notes ac-
companying said mortgage, the last of which
notes, calling for the sum of .$1,200, was due
and payable on the 1st day of April, 1877,
which note was duly assigned by the said
Wilson to the plaintiff, who brought this ac-
tion thereon.
The petition alleges that in the year 1873
.John D. Neligh sold to Thomas Wilson lots
1:!. 14, 15, IG, and 17, in block 30, in the city
of West Point, and that in pursuance of
said contract of purchase said Wilson, on or
about the 1st day of September, 1873, took
possession of said lots, and erected thereon
a large livery and feed stable; that under
the contract Noligb was to hold tlie legal ti-
tle to said i)rcraises in trust for said Wilson,
until said Wilson or bis assigns should re-
quest a deed for said premises. It is also
alleged that on the 1st day of October, 1875,
Wilson sold the premises in (piosliou to Rob-
ert Hall and David H. AVinyall. and took the
mortgage In (luestion from said parties; said
Neligh Btlll continuing to hold the legal title
to said lots. On the 2(;th day of Atigust.
187(i, Hall sold bis interest in said premises
to James Gallen, who had actual notice of
the existence of the mortgage; and on the
same day Nellgb and wife, in pursuance of
the contract with Wilson, executcil and de-
livered to Winyall and Gallen a warr.uily
deed for said picinlses.
The petition further alleges that on the
Kith day of December, 187(1, (inlleii and wife
conveyed the undivided half of said prem-
iBCH to one George Gullen, with a view to
defraud Hall and Wilson out of llielr Just
rights, and tluit on the lOlb day of February,
1877, the said Ci-orgc (Jalleii conveyed by
deed the undivided half of said premises to
the wife of .lami'S il.'illen. It Is also alleged
that certain defendnnlH recovered Judgments
ngniiiHt .Nellgb after the Ist day of Seplein
bcr, 187.'}. The tenth paragiapb of the pe-
tition was stricken out on motion of the de,
fendants as being redundant and irrelevant.
The paragraph is as follows: "That said
Robert T. Hall and David H. Winyall were
the owners of said lots 13. 14, 15, 16. and
17, In the city of West Point, on the 4th
day of October, 1876, as fully as if the le-
gal title thereto had been in their names;
and as such owners had the right to and
were legally entitled to convey the same to
the said Thomas Wilson by mortgage deed
at that time, and incumber the same in all
respects as if they held the legal title in
their names; and that the said James Gallen
and his assigns, the said George Gallen and
Katie Gallen, have and hold the same sub-
ject to and with full knowledge of said mort-
gage."
It is ditiicult to perceive upon what grounds
the motion was sustained. If it is urged
that the averments are mere conclusions of
law, still where a legal deduction or con-
clusion of law contains a fact constituting a
cause of action, or one which is essential
to enable the plaintiff to maintain bis action,
the proper motion is to make definite and
cerlaiu, and not to strike out. As the de-
fendants deny the validity of the mortgage,
the plaintiff projicrly sets forth in his peti-
tion the authority of the mortgagors to exe-
cute the same. The court therefore errc<l
in sustaining the motion.
After the motion, striking out the tenth
paragraph of the petition, had been stistain-
ed, the defendants demurred to the petition
upon the ground that it stated no cause of
action. The demurrer was sustained, and
the cause dismissed. The case Is brought
into this court by api)eal.
In support of the judgment of the court be-
low It was urged by defendants' counsel on
the argument of the case that the trust
created by the contract between Wilson
and Neligh was absolutely void, and that,
therefore, the plaintilf acquired no lien by
bis mortgage, and therefore the petition
stated no cause of action. The petition,
however, Includes the N. W. Vi of section
14, township 23 N., of range 5 E., which is
not In dls))ute, and upon which. If the facts
stated In the petition are true, the plalnlifi'
Is enlilled to a decree of foreclosure. This
dls|)osos of the c:ise, but, inasmuch as the
question of the vulldity of the mortgage
ujjon the lots heretofore described will
again come before the district court, we
have tbongbt It best to review that branch
of I he case.
It Is a well-established principle of e(]uity
that, where a contract Is made for the sale
of re.'il estate. It considers the vendor as a
trustee of the pni'<'ba8er for the estate sobl.
and the purchaser as u trustee of the pur-
chase money for the ven<l(U\ Malin v. Ma-
llii. I Wend. (')25; Champion v. Hrown, li
.lobns. Cb. 402; Wnlson v, Le How, (> Harb.
481; Wlllard, Eq. 010. And the trust In
such case atlaibcH to the liuiil, and binds
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DOTISEY v. HALL et al. 
(7 X eb. 460.) 
upreme Court of Xe\Jraska. July Term. 1878. 
This case came up from Cumin� county. 
Heard there upon a demurrer to the petition 
before Yalentine, J. Demurrer sustained, 
and cau e di missed. Plaintiff appeals. 
"Griah Brnner and R. F . • tevenson, for ap­
pellant. Craw ford & �IcLaughlin, for a p­
pellees. 
:\IA X W E LL, C. J. On the 1st da:v of 
:\lay, 1 77, the plaintiff commenced an a�tion 
in the di tri.c:t court of Cuming county to 
foreclose a certa i n  mol'tgage executed by 
Hobert Hall, Kate H. Hall,  hi wife. a nd 
David H. Winyall and Lina D. Winyall, his 
wife. t o  Thomas W i lson, on the 4th day of 
October. 1 '73. upon the N. W. 14 of section 
H, in township 23, range 5 E. ; and al o up­
OQ. parts of lots 13, H. 13, 16. and 17, in 
block 30, in the city of West Point,-to secure 
the payment of the sum of $1,950, accord ing 
t o  the tenor of three pl'omissory notes ac­
companying said mo1·tgage. the last of which 
note , calling for the sum of $1.200. was due 
and payable on the 1st day of April, 1 77, 
whieh note was duly a igned by t he said 
Wilson to the plaintiff, who brought this ac­
t ion thereon. 
The peli lion a lleges that in the yea r 1S7� 
. J ohn D. :Neligh sold to Thomas Wilson lots 
i :i. 1-l, 1 :;, IG, and 17, in blo ·k 30, in the city 
o f  \\"<•st Point, a nd that in pursuance of 
said tontract of purchase said \\' i i  on, on or 
a hout the 1 st day of eptember, 1 73. took 
possC>ssinn of said lots, and rected th rcon 
a large l i Ycry and feecl stable; that unde1· 
the c·on t ratt "\'eligh wa. to bold tbe legal ti­
tle t o  said premises in trnsl for aid \\'ilson, 
until said "' ilson or bis a ssig-ns hould rc­
r 1 uest a deed for aid lWcmi ses. It is al so 
a l l ep•d tha l on tbe 1st day of Ol'tohel', 1 '7:i, 
\Vilson sold the premiAes in C J 1H'St ion to llob­
rrt Hal l and Da v id II. \\ i n �·a i l , a n d  took t he 
morl1"age In quest ion from sa i d  pn1·Ues; said 
• 'clig-h sti l l  cont i nuin� to hold t he lt>�:t l t i t l e 
to Raid lots. Ou the :.!l ith cl a y  of .\ 11�1 1st. 
1 76, Hall Rold hie; l n !err!'it in said pn'm l:-;e� 
to JnnwR C1a llrn, who had a1'1 1 1nl  not ice or 
t h e r.xlst ence or t lle mortl:':t .�l' ; a n d on t he 
i;:um· clay i'>cll�h and w i re, In 1 1 1 1 1·s1 1:1 nc·r or 
t hr <'Ollt r:wt w i t h  'V llHnn, excc u t t'd n rn l  dl'­
l l \·Nr•<I t o  "' l n �· n l l  u n c l  Ga l lcu n warra n t y  
rlN•cl fol' Rnlrl 11n• 1 1 1 l�l'H 
'l'hr> ( 11'1 1 1 1011 fnrt hPr n l lP1'PS t hn t  on t hr 
HH h r l 1 1y of l >cr·Pmhrr, 1 S71i, C :n l l  •11  :t ml " l fp 
•'011\"<'.\ 1·< 1 1 1 11• 1 1 1 1 d l v l ! J r·rl h u l r  of sn hi  prrm· 
I 1• lo 1 1 11 1 •  C i Pori:r 1 : 1 1 l l r > 1 1 ,  w i t h  a \" l f ' W  t o  
r iPfrn 11d l l : t l l  nm! \\' l l tm n  nut  o f  1 1 1 1 ' 1 1 " j 1 1H I  
r l1'hts,  n n d  t hn t  nn t i ll '  l !ll h rl ny of l·'p l 1n111 r) , 
1 877, l hf' ·n ld 1 :  .. org1• < : 11 1 1  . .  11 rn1n·1',\ l'd hy 
d••l'fl 1 111' 1 1 1 1 1 l l l· ld 1 ·d hu l l' nt' tm l r l  prr>mlRl'H t o  
1 1 11• W l fl' nf . 1 1 1 1 1 1" 1 : : 1 1 1 ,. 1 1 .  I t  l fol  : r i m  n l l f'lo:"f'cl 
t h n l  <'r•rl 11 l 1 1  r 1  . . r, .ml 1 1 1 1 l s  rc•f'nvrrf'd j 1 1 r i1: 1 1w n l H  
UJ:'ll l n  I . ' 1 • l l1th 11 r t P r  1 111' 1 t r ln)· n f  �1· p l P l l l  
l 11•r, 1 , ::, 'l'hl' l 1 •n t h  pn r:i i;rnph o f  t h, .  p•·  
D ig 1t1ze-ct by 
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tition was stricken out on motion ot the de. 
fendants as being redundant a n d  irrele>ant. 
The paragra p h  is as follows : "That sa id 
Robert T. Hall and David H. Winya l l  were 
the owners of aid lots 13, 14, 15, 16, and 
17, in t he city of West Point, on the -!th 
day of October, 1 76, as fully as if the le­
gal title thel'eto had been in their na llles : 
and as such owners had the ri .,.ht to and 
were le�ally entitled to convey the same tu 
the said Thomas Wil on by mortgage deed 
at tha t time, and inrnmber the same in all 
re pects as if they held the le�al title i n  
their names ; a n cl  t h a t  t h e  said Jame. Gallen 
a nd h i  assigns, the said George Gallen a n d 
Ka tie Gallen, have and hold the same sub­
ject to and with full knowledge of said mol't­
gage." 
It is difficult to perceive upon w h a t  grounds 
the motion was sustained. If it  is Ul";.;'<'<1 
t h a t  the averments are mere conclu ions or 
l a w ,  !>till where a !<:>�al deduction or cou­
clusion of law contain a. fact const itutin� n 
cau e of action. or one which is e seu1 i a l  
to enable t h e  plaintiff t o  maintain h i s  nctiou. 
the 1wo1wr motion is to make definite a ml 
c·erta in, a n d not to strike out. As t he dl'­
feu<la n t  deny the val idity of the mortgagt'. 
the pla i nt iff properly ets forth in hi peti­
tion t h e  aut hority or the mortgagors to t'X l'· 
cute the same. Tile court t herefore err 11 
in susta ining the motion. 
A fter the motion, t1·ik i ng out the t('n ! h  
paragraph of the petition. had been • u ·ta i n ·  
ed, the d e f  nda nts demurred t o  t he petition 
upon the �round that it  stated no cau e or 
actiou. The demurrer was su,taiu ('d. and 
the cause dismi sea. The case is brou�bt 
into this coul't by np11eal. 
I o  support o r  tlle j ml�mcnt or the <'0 111't he· 
low It was Ul'ged by def mlants' cou1 1sl'l on 
the a rg-umeut of t he c·a·e tha t t ltt• trust 
created by the contra •t l1et w en \\ ilsu11 
and Nel igh was absnlutelj' Yllld, and t h a t ,  
tiler fore, t he pla i n t i tf acqui red n o  l i r u  b� 
bis mortgng , and t herefore t he pet it ion 
stat cl 110 t:1 1 1se or nction. '.rhe iict it 101 1 .  
howeYer, l n l 'ludeS the l\. "\\'. 1:1 or Sl'l' t l o1 1  
14, townsh ip :.!3 :N.,  o r  r:t n:.;c ri K. w h kh is 
not I u cl i spu te, and upon w l r lt'h, if t he f:1 1 · t  s 
stn t ed 1 1 1 t h e  pet i t ion arc t rne ,  t he pia l 1 1 1 1 11· 
Is ent i t led lo a decl'ee oC foreclosure. T h i s  
d l spusrR o r  t he cas , b u l ,  I n asmuch ni; l ht• 
ques t ion of t be vu l l ll l ty or t he mm·t�:1i.:1• 
upon t he lot s heretofore drHcri lwd w i l l  
again c·nmr hrfor ' t he dlst l'I · t  court, ,,,. 
h n n• t h11 1 1�ht It  be1:1t lo re Y lew t hat bn1 11d1 
or t I ll'  rUM'. 
I t  I s  n well <'� l ahl l she cl prlnrlplc of C'q1 1 l l s  
t ha t ,  wh r n c·ont 1·a<'I 1 11  mncl  for t h!' s:t l <' 
or l't't l l t'Hl :t l c, It cnn11ld el't1 t he H'JH IOI' :tH ;1 
t rusl l'f' of t l ll' pllrC'h:tHCr fol' t hr l'H(:t( i-;o\d, 
anti t lw p11rr·hn sel' a11 a t r1111tPP o l'  t i.J c  lllll'· 
dl:I HC nHllll 'J for l hC' vrndor. :\ l a l l n  v. l\ l :t 
1 1 1 1 ,  1 \\'l'nll .  li:.!�1 ;  Ch n 1 1 1 plon v. I l l-own, fl 
.J ohn11. C 'h .  Ill:! ; "'n i t-ion v. Le How, G Hn rh. 
1� 1 ;  W l l l :ml,  Mri C l l O. A mi t he t rust 1 1 1 
""" t'll'-<' n l L 1r  hr In t l l f• l : 1 1 1 d ,  a n d  l>h 1 d H  
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the heirs of the vendor. Seton v. Slade, 7
Ves. 2G4; Swartwout v. Burr, 1 Barb. 495;
Sutphen v. Fowler, 9 Paige, 280. And a
subsequent purchaser from either the ven-
dor or vendee, with notice, becomes sub-
.lect to the same equities as the party would
be from whom he purchased. Trinnere v.
Bayne, 9 Ves. 209; Macki-eth v. Symmons,
15 Ves. 329; PoUenfax v. Moore, 1 Atk.
573; Green v. Smith, 1 Atk. 572; Davie v.
Beardsham, 1 Ch. Gas. 38; Champion v. Brown,
C Johns. Ch. 403; Seaman v. Van Rensselaer,
10 Barb. 83; Story, Eq. 789.
In the absence of a contract, therefore, if
the allegations of the petition are true, Ne-
ligh became a trustee for Wilson, or his as-
signs, of the lots in question. He has ad-
mitted the validity of the trust by carrying
the same into effect, and it may be ques-
tionable if any of these defendants are in
a position to deny Its validity. The convey-
ance to James Gallen was made in pursu-
ance of the terms of the agreement, and
after the execution and recording of the
mortgage. As to tjie judgment creditors.
It is well settled In this court that the lien
of a judgment upon real estate is subject to
all prior liens, either legal or equitable.
Metz V. Bank. 7 Neb. 10"; Colt v. Du Bois.
Id. 391. If, therefore, there was an actual
sale of the lots in question to Wilson, al-
though the legal title remained in Neligh at
the time the judgments were recovered, yet
the lien attached only to the unpaid pur-
chase money, if any. Filley v. Duncan, 1
Neb. 134; Uhl v. May, 5 Neb. 157.
As to the authority to mortgage the prop-
erty in question, it is sufficient to say that
all kinds of property, real or personal, whieli
are capable of absolute sale, may be mort-
gaged. 2 Story, Bq. Jur. § 1021; 4 Kent,
Comm. 144; 1 Pow. Mortg. 17-23; 2 Bouv.
Diet. 198.
As Hall and Winyall were in possession
of the lots in question as owners thereof, at
the time of the execution of the mortgage,
they had unquestionable authority to exe-
cute the same; and if there is a defect in
the description of the lots it may be cor-
rected to confoi-m to the actual intention of
the parties. Galway v. Malchow, 7 Neb.
2S.J.
For the errors herein refeired to the judg-
ment of the district court is reversed, and
the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
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the heirs of the venclor. Seton v.  Slade, 7 
Ves. 2tH ; Swartwout v. Burr, 1 Barb. 405; 
Sutphen v. Fowler, 9 Paige, 280. And a 
subsequent purchaser fl'om either the Ycn­
dor or vendce, with notice, becomes sub· 
ject to the same equities as the party would 
he from whom he purchased. Trinnere v. 
Bayne, 9 Ves. 209 ; l\Iackreth v. Symmons, 
15 Ves. 320; Pollenfax v. l\1oore, 1 Atk. 
573; Green v. 8mitb, 1 Atk. 572; Davie v. 
Beardsham, 1 Ch. Cas. 38; Champion v. B rown, 
G Johns. Ch. 403 ; Scaman v. Van Rensselaer, 
10 Barb. 83; Story, Eq. 789. 
In the absence of a contract, t herefore, i f  
the allegations o f  the petition are true, Ne­
ligh became a trustee for Wilson, or hi as­
signs, of the lots in question. He bas ad­
mitted the valiclity of the trust by carrying 
t he same into effect, and it may be ques­
t ionable if any of these defenda nts a re in 
a position to deny its validit.v. The conYey­
ance to James Gallen was wade i n  pursu­
ance of the terms of the agreement, and 
after the execution and recording of the 
mortgage. As to t,be j udgment creditors, 
it is well settled in this court that the lien 
of a judgment upon real estate is subject to 
all prior liens, either legal or equitable. 
D i gitize by 
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l\letz v. Bank, 7 Neb. Hi:!; Colt v. Du P.ois. 
Id. 301. If, t herefore, there was an actual 
sale of the lots in question to W i lson.  al· 
though the legal title remained in :\eli�lJ at 
the t ime the jutlgments were recon.>rPtl. yet 
the lien attached only to the unpaitl pur­
chase money, if any. Filley v. Dunc·an, 1 
Neb. 134; Ubl v. �Iay, f> i\cb. l:i7. 
As to the authority to mortgage the prop­
erty in question, it is sufficient to say t h n t  
all kinds of property, real or persona l, \YhiC'h 
are capable of absolute >:a le, may be uuir1 -
gaged. 2 :Story, Eq . . Jur. § 10'..! l ;  4 Kf'llt, 
Comm. 144 ; 1 Pow. �Iortg. 17-23; 2 Bom-. 
Diet. l DS. 
As Hall and Winyall were in possession 
of the lots in question as owners tbereof, at 
the time of the execution of the mortgage, 
they bad unquestionable autbority to exe­
cute the same; and if  there is a defect i n  
t h e  description of t h e  lots i t  may b e  cor· 
rected to conform to the actual intention of 
the parties. Ga lway v. l\Ialcbow, 7 Neb. 
') -- .). 
For the errors herein referred to the judg­
ment of the district court is reversed, and 
the cause remanded for further proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded. 
O rigi na l  from 
U N IV E R S ITY OF CALIFORNIA 
1«3
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THRASH et al. v. BENNETT.
(57 Ala- 156.)
Supreme Court of Alabama. Dec. Term, 1876.
Appeal from circuit court, Dallas county;
George H. Craig, Judge.
Action of ti'over by Armistead Bennett
again.st Tbrasb, Day, and Cochran, for tbe con-
vereion of 4,71-t poiuids of seed cotton upon
wbicb plaintiff claimed a mortgage. Tbe de-
fendants bad seized the cotton under what is
called in the record a search warrant. Tbe
court cliarged tbe jury that tbe search warrant
was void; and if Tbrasb took cotton on which
Bennett bad a mortgage, and the other de-
fendants aided bim in it, by going on his bond,
and having tbe cotton sold by Bardie & Rob-
inson, etc., plaintiff would be entitled to re-
cover of all the defendants. The defendants
then requested the following charges in writ-
ing: "(1) If the jury believe from tbe evi-
dence that the cotton alleged to have been
taken by tbe defendant was raised by Dennis
Cochran, upon tbe land rented from the plain-
tiffbysaid Dennis fortbeyear,audas plaintiff's
tenant, then the plaintiff had a landlord's lien
on said cotton, and had no such interest or
property in said cotton as would authorize bim
to recover in this action, and the jury must
find for tbe defendant. (2) If the jury believe
from tbe evidence that tbe substance of the
contract between Cochran and plaintiff was
that plaintiff was to furuisli Cochran with
land, and a mule, and supplies while cul-
tivating said land, and that said Dennis
agreed to give the plaintiff one bale of cotton,
and such other jxirtion of sucb crops as would
be sullicient to pay for said supplies, then the
plaintiff has no such interest in tbe cotton
alleged to have been taken from Cochran as
will authorize bim to maintain this suit. (3)
If the jury believe from the evidence that any
portion of the cotton belonging to the defend-
ant had been by the owner or by tbe plain-
tiff willfully mi.xcd with the cotton alleged to
have been taken by defendant, without the
knowledge, fault, or consent of defendant, so
that the cotton belonging to tbe defendant
could not be separated from tbe cotton alleged
to have been taken bj" the defendant, and that
said cotton, so mixed, is herein sued for, then
the jury cannot liiid for the plaintiff. (-1) If
the Jury believe from tbe evblence that the
cotton alleged to have been taken by defend-
ant was taken under and by virtue of a search
Wiirrnnt, Issued In accordance wllli law, by an
olllccr duly iiuiliorlzed to Issue tbe same, and
executed by an olllcer duly authorized to do
80 by seizing said cotton, iind that the cotlon
HO seized Is that a1!i .mmI to have been taken by
defendant In thib ai tlon, and that said cotton
was rarrlc'il before the olllcer Issuing s)il(l
scnrcli wariiint, ami that sold olllcer or mag-
istrate Ims never disposed of said jiroperly by
trial, then tbe plaintiff cannot recover In this
action." The court refii.sed to give either of
tlirse clinrgcH, iiiul the <lifcMdnnls duly except-
imI. There was a verdict and Judgment for
plaintiff, from which tbe defendants appeal.
The other facts sufficiently appear from tbe
opinion.
Reid & May, for appellants. Pettus, Daw-
son & Tillman, contra.
STONE. J. We propose to consider only
the questions raised by tbe assignments of
error. There was certainly no error in exclud
ing from tbe jury evidence that 12 of the
persons composing tbe grand jury at a cer-
tain term were colored men or freedmen.
Sucb testimony could have shed no legitimate
light on any question raised by this record.
The controlling matter of contest was wheth-
er the cotton belonged to Bennett, the plain
tiff, or Thrash, one of the defendants. The
tendency of the testimony offered would
have been to multiply the issues unduly, and
to confuse the jury in their deliberations.
The whole action of the grand jury, first and
second, presented questions foreign from the
issues being tried, and, if objected to. should
have been excluded. Governor v. Campbell.
17 Ala. 566; 1 Brick. Dig. p. 80!», § 81; Mo-
bile Marine Dock, etc., v. McMillan, 31 Ala,
Til; Crews v. Tbreadgill, 35 Ala. 341.
There is no exception reserved to the af-
firmative charge given which justifies us in
considering it. Gager v. Gordon, '2d Ala. 341.
To authorize the reversal of a cause on ac-
count of charges asked and refused, the
charge asked must assert a correct legal
proi)osition in view of the evidence before
the jury; must not be abstract, ambiguous,
or calculated to mislead; and must be true
and consistent with flie evidence in all its
postulates of law and fact. If it be wanting
in any one of these particulars, it Is the
privilege, if not the duty, of tbe court to re-
fuse it. 1 Brick. Dig. pp. :r.S. XV.). §S 41. 4S,
59-61, 65; McLemore v. Nuckolls, 37 Ala. 675.
Among tbe questions raised by the charges
asked is the legality of what is called in the
record !i search warrant. The grounds on
which such warrant may be issued, and the
manner of suing it out, are shown in Uev.
Code, § 4377, and sections following. Section
4377 <leclares on what grotmds a search war-
rant may bo Issued. An examination of the
allldavit and warrant of search will show
that tJjey charge no criminal offence, and siiec-
Ify none of I he groiuids mentioned In the
staluto. Seel Ion 4;!7.S declares that such
search warrant "can only be Issued on proba-
ble (■;iuse, supported by allidavit. naming or
describing the person, and particularly de-
scribing tbe i)r()i)erly and place to be search-
ed." Sections i;'i7!), 4.'iS<), declare what pre-
liminary proof shall be made; and section
4.381 gives dlreilions for tbe issue of the
warrant. The allldavit and wsirrant In tbe
present record are so manifestly Imperfect
that we deem It uiiTiecessary to specify the
Imperfections. They are void. Duckworth
V. .lolinson, 7 Ala. 578; Sullivan v. Kobin-
Hon. 3!) Aln. <'>13.
Two witnesses examined In Ibis cause tes-
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THRASH et al. v. BENNETT. 
(57 A.la. 156.) 
'upreme Court of .Alabama. Dec. Term, 1876. 
Appeal from circuit court, Dallas county; 
George H. Craig, Judge. 
Action of trover by Armistead Bennett 
again t Tbrasb, Day, and Cochran, for the con­
Yersion of 4, 7H pounds of seed cotton upon 
which plaintiff claimed a mortgage. The de­
fendants had seized the cotton under what is 
called in the reconl a search warrant. The 
court charged the jury tbat the earcb warrant 
was void; and if Tbrasb took cotton on wbicb 
Bennett bad a mortgage, and tbe other de­
fendants a ided him i n  it, by going on bis bond, 
and having the cotton sold by Hardie & Rob­
inson, etc., plaintiff would be entitled to re­
cover of all the defendants. The defendants 
then requested the following charges i n  writ­
ing: "(1) If the jury believe from tbe evi­
dence that the cotton al leged to have been 
taken by the defendant was raised by Dennis 
Cochra n, upon the land rented from the plain­
tiff bs�aid Dennis for the year, andas plaintiff's 
tenant, then the plaintiff bad a landlord's lien 
on aid cotton, and had no such i nterest or 
property i n  said cotton as would authorize bim 
to reco;er in this action, and the jury must 
find for the defendant. (2) If the jury believe 
from tbe evidence tbat the substance of the 
contract between Cochran and plaintiff was 
that plaintiff was to furni h Cocbran with 
land, aud a mule, and supplies while cul­
ti rn ting said land, and that a id Dennis 
agrel'd to give the plaintiff one bale of cotton ,  
and i::uch other portion of such crops a would 
be sutli<.:ient to pay for said supplies, then the 
plaintiff bas no such i nterest in the cotton 
alleged to have been taken from Cochran as 
will authorize him to maintain this suit. (3) 
If the jury believe from the evi<lence that any 
portion of t ile cotton belonging to the defend­
ant had l>el'll uy the owner or by the plain­
tiff willfully mL�ed with tlle cotton alleged to 
h:n·e hc>en taken by defendant, wi thout the 
lmowlP<lge, fault, or consent of defendant, so 
r hat the c·otton belonging to tile defendant 
mul1l not lie i:;epar·ated from the cotton al ll'A' d 
to Jia n• hcl'n t a ken by the defenda nt, a ud t h at 
!'a ir! r·ot t n n ,  so m l x ccl ,  ls llerel n sued for, then 
t hi' J lll".\" C'U llllOt fi nd for tbe plaintiff. ( l) I f  
t he j u ry ! Jel i e,·e frolll tile ' l clem·e tbat t he 
eoltnu n l lPgPtl to h n \'e been t a lwu by def ml­
ant wa-; 1:J i· " 1 1  un c l • r  n nrl  b y  vi rtue or 11 Reurcll 
\\ ll lT:t l l l ,  h;:m·1l I n  ac·c·onln11 c•(' \\ I t h  lnw, hy :i n 
11lllc11r rl ul,r n 1 . r  hnrlzed tn lssnc> l lw i<a na>, :i ncl 
"x' f'Ul c·tl hy a n  o fllrPr cluly uuthnrl)'.1•cl to do 
ri hy � . .  1,,,1 1 1 .i.: t<:t lcl r·n t t o n, n n rl t h tll t hP <'ol t n n  
o PIZl'd I r hn t  n l lP •1 •rl t o  have ht'!'U t u kPn hy 
1lc-ff'f11l:t 1 1 t  I n  !hit; , 1 1  1 1< 111 , n n cl t hat l':t ld cn t l nn 
w11 •·nrrlr·rl ) Jl ' fon• t l 11• o!llrrr i ·su l ni;: "1 1 l cl 
H a rl'! 1  w11 n 1 1 1 1 t ,  1 1 1 1 1 1  ! h u t  l'tt l rl n!llr c•r nr 1 1 1 1 1 .i.:· 
I 1 1 a t l'  1111'1 m·vl'r di pmwd nf m i d proprrty hy 
t ri a l ,  t hPn t h  1 1ln l n t JJf  r·a n uol rr•rovpr I n  t h lR 
m•t ltrn." 'I hr r·o1Ht rPfll "" to �I\' Plthcr of 
! I t"�" Phn rg •1', 11 1 1 1 1  t l w dr •f1·1 1 1 l11 1 1 t  r l 1 1 l )  X<'l'Pt 
• I. '1  J11•r" wns u \ Ptdll'! a n d Jt11 li;t 1 l!'nt  t or 
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plaintiff, from whicll the defendants appea l .  
The other facts sufficiently appear from tbe 
opin ion. 
Reid & May, for appellants. Pettus, Daw­
son & Tillma n, contra. 
STOXE. J. We propose to consider only 
the questions raised by the assignment i;:: of 
error. There was certainly no error in e:x<.:l ud 
ing from the jury evidence that 12 of the 
persons composin" the grand j ury a t  a cer­
tain term were colored men or freedmen. 
Such testimony could have bed no legitimate 
light on any question raised by thi record. 
The controlling matter of contest was wheth­
er the cotton belonged to Bennett, the plai n  
tiff, or Thrash, one o f  the defendants. Tbe 
tendency of the testimony offered would 
have been to multiply the issues unduly, a ncl 
to confuse the jury in their deli berations. 
The whole action of tbe grand j ury, lit·st a nd 
second, presented questions foreign from thl' 
issues being tried, and, if objected to. should 
have been excluded. Governor v. Ca mpbell . 
17 Ala. 566; 1 Brick. Dig. p. 09, § 1; )l o· 
bile l\Iarine Dock, etc., v. Mc)f il l:rn, 31 Ala. 
'i'll; Crews v. Tbreado-ill,  35 Ala. 341. 
There is no except ion reserved to the n f­
firmati-re charge given wllicb ju tifies us i n  
consiclering it. Gager v. Gordon, 29 Ala. 34 l .  
To a uthorize the reversal of a cause o n  ac­
count of cha rges asked a nd refused, t he 
charge asked must assert a correct 1 ga l 
proposi tion in v iew of the evidence before 
the j ury ; must not be abstract, ambiguou , 
or calculated t o  m islea d ;  a nd must be t rue 
and on i tent w ith the evid nee ln al l i t s  
postulates o r  law and fact. I f  i t  be wanti n g­
i n  a ny one o f  these particulars, it l t 1 11•  
pri v i l  ge, if not the duty, of the <'Ourt t o re 
fuse i t .  1 Bride Dig. pp. �:'l , :tl!l. ** 4 1 .  IS. 
59-Gl, 65; McLemore v. Nuckolls, 37 Ala. G75. 
Among" t ile questions raised by t lle cha rg"Ps 
a ked is t he lega l i ty of what is a i led in t h e 
record a search wa rra nt. The grounrls on 
whkh .ucb warrant mn y be issued, and t hc 
manner of suing it out. a re sllown i n  Hl'Y. 
Cod , * cl377, a nd sectinus following. Scrtinu 
4377 ckdares on what g-rounds a 'Carch w:i r­
rau t ma)' he lssuerl. A n  xn 111 i n n tion of t l w  
n fl! 1 l n v l t  n nrl wa rra n t  or scnr<'h wil l  show 
t h nt llll'y rhnrg no c•rl m i nal offence, nnd spc1·­
l fy nonl' of 1 hr ;:ro11 11 < ls ruent loncd In l hl' 
s t a t u t e. cr t i on ·J:l7S dednr s t ha t stl< 'h 
s n rch " a rrn n t  "<'n n on ly be lsi;11ccl  on prohn­
bl ( ':1  use, Sll(lJlOrt l'Cl hy n Llicln \' I t ,  l l:\ l l l i l lg" or 
dcsrrl hl ng l hl' 1wnmn, and p1u·t k u t u rly <11• 
S<' rl hl n g t ile propl'rl y 11 1H I !)in cl' to h Rrn r<'h ­
erl ." H r  •tlom; 1 :11n, cJ:lSO, deC'lar w lla t J)I'<' 
l l m ln:ny proof s hn l l he mnclc; nncl  sPC ' l lon 
438 1 glvc1:1 r l l rp1·t lo1 1R  for t i ll' il'H\1 o f  t he> 
wn rr1rn t .  The n l llr l n v lt n n rl \\ : 1 1T11 n t  I n  t h<' 
111·p1:1p1 1t  rC'<'orc l n re 1:10 1 nr 1 n l fPl'l t l y l 1 1 11w rfrt · t  
tlrn t WC dPf'lll I t  \ l ll l lt'('C'l'li"ll r} t o  H( wC' l ry 1 11 1 '  
l m prrfc>ct l o n l'l. 'l'hey a re void. J J1 1 elt wo 1· 1 h 
v . . Joh n so n ,  7 A la .  07 ; S ull lvn n v. Ho hi1 1-
1:1on.  :m .\ I n .  f l l �. 
Two w 1 l 1 1I '  s1•1"1 •;-. : 1 1 1 1 l 1 1 NI 1 11 l h il'l ca use t <'l'l· 
UNI  
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tlfy that Dennis Cochran rented land from
Bennett, the plaintiff, and became his ten-
ant. They also testify that Cochran exe-
cuted a mortgage to Bennett on his crop to
be grown, to secure the agreed rent, the hire
of the mule, and for advances to be made
by Bennett; and that the last two items re-
mained unpaid when the present action was
brought. There was no objection or excep-
tion to this evidence, and we are not in-
formed whether the mortgage was in writ-
ing or was oral. A mortgage of chattels,
however, is good in either form. Morrow v.
Turney, 35 Ala. 131. And a mortgage on a
crop to be grown is good; and, when pro-
duced, the mortgagee is entitjed to the pos-
session, and may maintain an action for its
recovery. 2 Brick. Dig. p. 245, §§ 9, 11; Doe
V. McLosky, 1 Ala. 70S; Knox v. Easton, 38
Ala. 345; Mansony v. Bank, 4 Ala. 735; Book-
er V. Jones, 55 Ala. 266.
The first charge asked entirely ignored the
question of mortgage, and was rightly re-
fused on that account. True, if only the re-
lation of landlord and tenant had existed,
the charge would have asserted a correct le-
gal proposition. But the charge withdrew
from the consideration of the Jury all the
testimony tending to prove a mortgage.
If the word "substance," In the second
charge, be emphasized or if it had said, if
the jury believed there was no other contract
than the one supposed in the charge, then, on
a technical criticism, the charge might be
pronounced correct, as far as it goes. But
it, like the first, ignores the proof of mort-
gage. Its tendency was to mislead, and the
court did not err in refusing it.
The third charge contains a singular re-
pugnancy. Its language is: "If the jury
believe from the evidence that any portion
of the cotton belonging to the defendant
[Thrash] had been by the owner [Thrash] or
by the plaintiff [Bennett] willfully mixed
with the cotton alleged to have been taken by
the defendant," etc. It is manifest that if
the cotton was mixed, and the confusion pro-
duced by Thrash, this could not defeat Ben-
nett's suit. This charge was correctly re-
fused on this ground, if for no other.
In declaring the search warrant void, we
have, in effect, said the fourth charge should
not have been given. It was abstract. Af-
firmed.
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CHATTEL MORTGAGES. 
ti!y that Dennis Cochran rented land frnm 
Bennett, the plaintiff, and became bis ten­
ant. They also testify that Cochran exe­
cuted a mortgage to Bennett on his crop to 
be grown, to secure the agreed rent, the hire 
of the mule, and for advances to be made 
by Bennett; and that the last two items re­
mained unpaid when the present action was 
brought. There was no objection or excep­
tion to this evidence, and we are not in­
formed whether the mortgage was in writ­
ing or was oral. A mortgage of chattels, 
however, is good in either form. Morrow v. 
Turney, 35 Ala. 131. And a mortgage on a 
ct·op to be grown is good ; and, when pro­
duced, the mortgagee is entit)ed to the pos­
session, and may maintain an action for its 
recovery. 2 Brick. Dig. p. 245, §§ 9, 11; Doe 
v. McLosky, 1 Ala. 708 ; Knox v. Easton, 38 
Ala. 345 ; Mansony v. Bank, 4 Ala. 735; Book­
er v. Jones, 55 Ala. 266. 
The first charge asked entirely ignored the 
question of mortgage, and was rightly re­
fused on that account. True, if only the re­
lation of landlord and tenant bad existed, 
the charge would have asserted a correct le­
gal proposition. But the charge withdrew 
D ig'tize by 
NTERNET A R CHIVE 
from the consideration o r  the jury all the 
testimony tending to prove a mortgage. 
If the word "substance," In the seC'onrl 
charge, be emphasized or if it had sairl, i f  
the jm-y believed there was n o  other coutra ct 
than the one supposed in the charge, then. on 
a technical criticism, the charge might b<' 
pronounced correct, as far as it goes. But 
it, like the fi rst, ignores the proof of mort­
gage. Its tendency was to mislead, and the 
court did not err i n  refusing it. 
The third charge contains a sinp:ular re­
pugnancy. Its language is : "It the jury 
believe from the evidence that any portion 
of the cotton belonging to the defendant 
[Thrash] had been by the owner [Thrash] or 
by the plaintiff [Bennett] willfully mixecl 
with the cotton alleged to have been taken by 
the defendant," etc. It is manifest that i f  
the cotton was mixed, and the confusion lffU­
duced by Thrash, this could not defeat Ben 
nett's suit. This charge was correctly re­
fused on this ground, if for no otber. 
In declaring the search warrant void, we 
have, in effect, said the fourth charge should 
not bave been given. It was abstract. Af­
firmed. 
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JOXES V. RICHARDSON.
(10 Mete. 4ol.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Oct. Term, 1846.
Assumpsit on the receipt and promise set
forth in the award hereinafter stated. The
action was referred to an arbitrator, under
a rule of cotu-t which contained this provi-
sion: "He shall, at the request of either par-
ty, state in explicit terms, upon the face of
his award, the exact evidence and facts in
respect whereof either of the said parties
shall think fit to state or raise any le^al ob-
jection or question, whether upon the admis-
sibility or competency of any evidence or
witness, or upon any question of law. The
case is to be heard and determined upon the
principles which should govern a coiu't and
jury." The arbitrator's award was as fol-
lows:
"The subscriber, named as referee in the
fore.iroiui; rule, met the parties thereto, by
their counsel, on the 3d of July, 1843, at Bos
ton. The plaintiff gave in evidence, to sup-
port the demand made by him on the defend-
ant, the following written instrument:
" 'Xorfolk— ss. : Sept. 9th, 1842. Received of
Xatlian Jones, deputy sheriff for the county of
Norfolk, the porsdual property coutaincU in
the sclicdule hereafler written, which were
this day attached by said Jones as the prop
eriy of Addison Richardson, at the suit of
E. Wusson, Henry Peirce, Rufus Clements,
and on several other writs vs. said Richard
son and others; the writs being returnable
at the next court of common pleas at Boston,
in the county of Suffolk, on the first Tuesday
of October next; and having received of said
Jones one dollar in full for my services, I
do promise to keep said goods safely, and de-
liver the same to said Jones, in good order,
on demand.
" •.Schedule. The whole of the remainder
of said Uich.'inlsnn's stock in trailo now In
said Lewis Richardson's house, consisting of
broadcloths. oiIht wonllcii ;.'oo(ls. c(illon
goods, crockery ware, hardware, silk goods,
and all other goods of every description,
which were removed to my place by sai<l
Addison Rlclianlsou. Said goods are coulain.
otl In several boxes, except the crockery ware,
estimated at the value of nriecn hundred dol-
lars, lycwls Richardson.'
"The plaintiff also gave evidence, and It
was adniltlcd by the defendant, that ho de-
iiiaudcHl a delivery by tin? defendnni of tlio
above-mentioned goods, in the month of
June, ISl.'J. an<l that llie dcfcniliint refused
to deliver tlicm. Tlio defiMulatit nlTcreil to
prove, mill the plaintiff ndmillcsl, that when
the ncllon which In the Hubjecl of this rcf-
cri'uco was coMimen<i'(l, the muUh on which
said goods were ntlachcd were not disposed
■ if, bill were pending In court; and the de-
fendant thereupon objected that this action
was prematurely bruuKht and could not be
maintained. The subscriber deemed this ob-
jection groimdless.
"The defendant then gave in evidence the
following mortgage to him. which was re-
corded by the clerk of the town of Medway.
on the 7th of September, 1842: 'Know all
men by these presents, that I, Addison Rich-
ardson, of Medway, in the county of Nor.
folk, and commonwealth of Massachusetts,
in consideration of two thousand dollars, to
me in hand paid by Lewis Richardson, of
said Sledway, the receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged, do hereby bargain and sell
unto the said Lewis the following personal
property, viz. the whole stock in trade of
said Addison, as well as each and every arti-
cle of merchandize which the said Addison
this day bought of Timothy Walker, being
in a store formerly kept by said Walker in
said Medway, as every other article consti-
tuting the said Addison's stock in trade, in
the shape the same is and may become in
the usual course of the said Addison's trade
and business as a trader. To have and to
hold the same to the said I^wis, as his own
proper goods and chattels. The condition of
the above sale is this: If the said Addison
pay the said Lewis a note of hand, this day
given by him, for two thousand dollars, and
interest thereon, then this shall be void; oth-
erwise to remain in full force. In witness
whereof I, the said Addison, have set iny
hand and seal this seventh day of October,
A. D. 1840. Addison Richardson. [Seal.]'
"It was stated by the plaintiff and admit-
ted by the defendant that the goods whicli
are the subject of this reference were for-
merly the stock in trade of said Addison Rich-
ardson, but that only a part of them was
owned by him until after he made said mort-
gage.
"The plaintiff did not deny that the note of
iwo thousand dollars mentidiicd in said nioi't
gage was justly due from said Addison to the
said Lewis, .and was wholly unpaid. But the
plaiiililT insisted that said mortgage was, on
the face of It, fraudulent, and wholly void as
against other creditors of .said Ad<iisoii. or,
if not wholly void, that it was void as to all
the goods which were not a part of siild Ad-
dison's stock ill trade when tlic nmrlgage
was executed. The defendant thereupon of-
fered to introduce evidence that he had tak-
en possession of all Ihc goods which are the
subject of this reference, before they were
attached by the plaintiff, for the purpose of
foreclosing the moitgage. But the subscrib-
er, deeming such evidence Irrelevant, refused
to ri'celve It. He also was of opInUui that
the mortgage was valid as to all the goods
which were attached by the plaintiff. 'I'he
defendjint then proposed to give evidence
that the true value of the goods which were
attached was much less than tlftccn hundred
dollars: but the subscriber. bi'Ing of opinion
that the defcMidaiil w;ih aimwerable to the
plalntllT, it' at all, for the sinii at wlilrli the
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JOXES v. R lCHA HDSO�. 
(10 i\Ietc. 401.) 
upreme Judicial Court of :\lassachusetts. 
Oct. Term, 18·!6. 
A:;:, umpsit on the receipt and promise set 
forth in the award hereinafter stated. The 
action was referred to an arbitrator, under 
a rule of court wh ich contained this provi­
sion: "He shall ,  at the request o f  either par­
ry, state in explicit terms. upon the face ot 
hi a ward. the exact eYi dence and facts in 
respect whereof either of the said parties 
shall think fit to state or raise any lega l ob­
jection or question. whether upon the admis­
sibility or competency of any evidence or 
\Yitne s, or upon any question of law. The 
.:ase is to be heard and determined upon t he 
principles which should govern a court and 
j ury." The arbitrator·s a ward was a fol­
low : 
··The sul>scriber, named as referee In t h G  
forC';:ni u :..: rule, met the parties t hereto. by 
their counsel, on the 3d of July, 1 45, at Bos 
ton. The plaintiff gave in e• idence, to sup­
port the demand made by him on the defend. 
ant, the following written instrument: 
· · ·xorfolk-ss. : Sept. 9th. 1&12. Received of 
Xatliau Jones, deputy sheriff for the county of J Xorfolk. the p rsoual prov i-tT contained iu 
tho scbctlule hereafter written, which were 
this day attached by said Jone as th prop 
l'l'IY or Addison Richardson, at the suit or 
E. \Ya son, Ilenry Peirce, Rufus Clement , 
a 11 1 l  on several other writs vs. said R ichard· 
sou a n<.l otbe1·s; the writs being retu rnable 
al t l 1e next court of common picas at Bo ton, 
in the county of • uffoll;: , on the first Tue clay 
of October next ; a n d havio� received of ,aid 
.Jones one dollnr i n  full for my ervices, I 
ilo promisf:' to keep sui<.l goods a fely, and de· 
l i\·er t he :-;nme to said Jones, i n  gooll ord r, 
ou !kllla 1111.  
. . · �··h r1 l 11 le. Thr whole of the 1·emn i n der 
of s:ti «l  J t ieh:1 r1ls11 1 1 ·s  RtOC'k in tra1lt> now ln 
snhl Lewis HiC'ha nlson's house, consisting of 
l 1 ro:1• ld11ths. 01 1 1 1  ll • 1 1 >l l P l l  ,.11ods. 1·1il l 1 1 1 1  
go<ids, crockery wnrc, ilard wnre, silk p;oo<.ls, 
unrl a l l  other ;.:oods ul' !'H'l'). <.l '"l'l 'ipt iou, 
wh ich \\'r1·e rl'mOYecl to my pince by sa irl  
,\ d i l is<•n H ir·h:i nl s·m . . : i ld goocls nrc c·1 1 1 1 t n Jn. 
"" in Sl'\'1'1111 bnxrs, !'XePpl th crnr'lu.•r,r \\' : I r<'. 
, . · 1 i 1 1 1 a t N J nl t he v o l u  of fl rteen h un dr('d clol· 
Ju rs. J,cwlH H.i<'hn nl'<on: 
· 'Tiu• plai n 1 1 1T  nl1-10 i:n vP Y l c J p nc·r. and It 
wa,.; a•lm l t h·d h.\' t he defen1l n1 1 t ,  l hnl he dr 
1 1 m 1 11IP1l n rle>l l \' rry h,r t l H· rk frnrl n 1 1 1 or t h  
a l 111\'1• nwnl ln1wrl gonrl H, I n  t h r mon t h o.f 
.1 1 1 1 1 1 >, 1'< I :\, n n r l thn t l h r r lrfr 1 1 1 l a 11 1  r!' f1 11<rcl 
to ddi n·1· t h , . 1 1 1 .  Thr dr fPtH lan t nffl'l'C'f l l o 
prn\'•". n nd f l w  pl n l n t l lT n d 1 1 1 ll l r ll ,  t h a t  \\ hrn 
t h<' : 11 ' 1 1011 w h l r h  If! t hr 1-111hjrrt of thlR n•f 
f ' l'l'IH'" Wll!I C'l t l l l lllf'll< I 'd,  f ill' Kii i ! -.  on w h leh 
:i l r l  gnndH Wl'rP 11 t 1 11 rlwcl wrr1• not rl 1Hpn1-1l'cl 
· •f, hnt ,,.,.r,. J ll 'll r l l n c  In rnn r1 ;  a nd t l w ck 
fl'11dn11t t hr•n·1 1p1 1 n  nhJrrf Pd 1 1 111 1 t hi 11rl Inn 
\\ II pr1•11 1 ; i l 1 1 rr • l y  liro1w h t  : 1 1 1 1 1  1·n11lc l  not l w  
D i g 1t1zed by 
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maintained. The sub criber dee>men t h i s ob­
j ection groundless. 
"The defendant then gave in evidence the 
following mortgage to him, which was re­
corded by the clerk of the town of Med way. 
on the 7th of September, 1842: 'Know all 
men by these presents, that I, Addison Rich· 
ardson, of l\Iedway, i n  the county of Nor. 
folk, and commonwealth of Massachusetr. 
in consideration of two thousand dollars, to 
me in hnnd paid by Lewis Richardson, of 
said Medway, the receipt whereof is hereby 
acknowledged, do hereby bargain and sell 
unto tile said Lewis the following persona l  
property, viz. the whole stock i n  trade of 
said Addison, as well as each and every arti­
cle of merchandize which the said Addison 
this day bought of Timothy Walker, licin::: 
in a store formerly kept by said Walker in 
said Medway, as every other article const i­
tuting the said Addison 's stock in u·ade, in 
the shape the same is and may become in 
the usual course o f  the said Addison's trade 
a nd business as a trader. To have and to 
hold ·the same to the said Lewis, as his own 
prnper goods and chattels. The condition or 
the above sale is this:  I f  the said Addi 011  
pay the aid Lewi a note of hand. thi day 
given by him, for two thou a n d  dollars, an1l 
interest thereon, then this shall be voi d ;  otb­
erw i  ·e to rema i n  i n  full for ·e. In w i t oe<os 
whereof I, the said Addison, have SC't m.r 
band a n d  sC?nl tbi se,·en t h  day of October, 
A. D. 1 .J.O. Addison Richard on. [ ea !.]' 
' 'It was statcu by the pla i n 1 i tI anu a u m t t ·  
t e d  by the deCendaot t ha t t he goods whirh 
are tile subject of this reference were for­
merly th toe!� iu trade of said .A ddison Rich­
ardson, but t lln t on ly a pn rt or thl'lll was 
ownccl by him u n t i l  a fter h made said mort-
t;a�C\ 
"The pla inl i IT  dicl not lkny t lrn t  t h e  note o l' 
, wo thons:i ml 1 l o l l:i rs u1C?nt ionl'll in sa i d  mo1·1 
gage was j u  tly due from s:i i d  Addison to t he 
sa ltl Le\vls, and was wholly unpaid. But the 
plain t i fC insist d that aid worlga:::e was. on 
t he fal'e of it, frnmlul nl. a nd wholly \•old : i s  
ng-ninst ot her cn•cl i tors or sn i 1 l  A d d i so n .  or, 
if not w hol ly void, that It wn YOld ns lo nil 
t h  �oods whic'h w re not n 11111'1 o f  Hald Ad 
dlson 's Rt ock 1 1 1  t r: i r k  w h r n  t h r mor t i;: a ;;r 
wns l'xccutecl. 'J'hc defcncln n t  thereupon of­
t'l•rc•cl l o  l n l roduc ' c v i d!'IH'C t hn t  h '  h a d  t : 1 k  
l'll  poHst•ssiou o f  n i l t h l' goods w h il'h n r  t h e  
H11hject o f  this n· rl'l"l'lll'l', be fore t hl'y wrrc 
n t l!lC'hrcl by t he p l a l n l i IT. for the p u rpoHr n C  
fnrl'closlng t h e mortgage. Hut t h  sn hH<'l' i h  
l'I', r lpp1 1 1 l n g" surh \' l ! lcnc lrrclr\•1t n t ,  rrfllsl'rl 
to n·1·!'hl' It. l l !' n lso wns of op i n ion t h a t  
t h r mn rt gn g!' W:t!-1 \ U l l d  l \ H  t o  n i l  t h<' g-nr11 ls 
,, l t k h  wrrC' n t t n C'll<'1l hy t h  pln i n t t rr. ' l ' lw 
l ll'fl ' 1 1 d n  nl  t hPn 1 11·n posPr l t o  gl l•c cv l r ll'rlC'!' 
t hn l  t ho t r1 1t1 v1 1h1P  ol' t lw gnorls wh lc'h \\'rrr 
a l l n f 'l 1cd wnR m1wh kHR t h: i 1 1  t l fl <'c' n h u rn l rr r l  
dnl l n r1-1 ;  hnl t hr A11h1<crlhrr, lwl n g  of opinion 
t h a t  t i\ ! '  r lrf< ' n r l n 1 1 1  wnH n nR wcrn hl r  t o  1 hc 
pl1 1 l 1 1 t l ll' , l f  al 1 1 1 ! ,  for I ll ! '  1:11 1 1 1 1  ut w h ll'h t he 
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fcoods were osti mated in tho defouflant's re-
ceipt, refused to receive such evidence.
•■The defendant next insisted that by the
true construction of the defendant's receipt,
taken in connection with said mortgage, the
plaintiff attached only so much of the mort-
gaped property as should be found to re-
main after payment therefrom of the debt
for which it was mortgaged, to wit, the
mortgagor's right in equity to redeem said
propeity. But the subscriber was of opin-
ion that the plaintiff neither did nor could
make such attachment, and that the whole
property in said goods was attached by him,
and was included In the receipt given to him
by the defendant.
"The defendant then gave in evidence a
written demand delivered by him to the
plaintiff, after said attachment was made and
said receipt given, but on the same day. of
the following teuor: 'Be it known to you
that I, the subscriber, have a mortgage on
the goods and property which Addison Rich-
ard.son has put in my keeping, to the amount
ijf two thousand dollais and interest. I
hereby demand the same sum of you, to be
paid within the time specified by law, as you
liave attached said property. Lewis Rich-
ardson. September 9th, 1842.'
"It was admitted by the plaintiff that he
liad paid nothing to the defendant after said
demand; but he denied that said demand,
and his omission to pay anything to the de-
fendant, were sufficient in law to dissolve
the attachment. The subscriber was of
opinion that the defendant was entitled by
law to defend this action under his mortgage,
and that the said demand made on the plain-
tiff by the defendant was good and suffi-
cient, at least for tbe sum of two thousand
dollars, which exceeds the value of the
goods attached, as estimated by the parties.
The subscriber, therefore, on the foregoing
statement, is of opinion, and accordingly
awards, subject to the opinion of the court
to which this award is returnable, that the
plaintiff has no cause of action against the
defendant, and that the defendant recover
of the plaintiff costs of court, to be taxed by
the coiu-t, and also the costs of reference.
"Theron Metcalf."
G. M. Brown, for plaintiff. Richardson &
Lovering, for defendant
WILDE, J. This case, at a former term,
was referred to the determination of an ar-
bitrator, who was required, at the request
of either party, to state the evidence and
facts in respect whereof either of the parties
shciuld think fit to raise any legal question,
lu pursuance of this reference, a hearing of
the parties has been had before the arbitra-
tor, and the case comes before us on his re-
port.
At the hearing, it appeared in evidence
that the plaintiff claimed the property in
question l»tween the parties by virtue of an
attachment tliereof a.s the property of one
Addison Richardson, and that the defendant
claimed the same under .i mortgage to him
from the said Addison, made and recorded
before the said attachment; and the principal
question submitted to tlie court by the arbi-
trator is whether the said mortgage is valid
against the creditors of the mortgagor. The
property mortgaged is thus described in the
deed: "The whole stock in trade of said Ad-
dison, as well as each and eveiy article of
merchandize which the said Addison this
day bought of Timothy Walker, as every
other article constituting the said Addison's
stock in trade, in the shape the same is and
may become in the usual c-ourse of the said
Addison's trade and business as a trader."
And it was admitted that the goods in ques-
tion were, at the time of the attachment, the
stock in ti'ade of the said Addison, but that
only a part of them was owned by him un-
til after he made the said mortgage. It has
been contended by the plaintiff's counsel
that the mortgage was in law fraudulent and
void against bona fide attaching creditors;
or, if not wholly void, that it was void as to
all the goods which were not a part of the
mortgagor's stock in trade when the mort-
gage was executed. There seems to us to be
no ground for the argument that this mort-
gage was wholly void, as being fraudulent on
the face of it, or as having* been made with
an intent to defraud the creditors of the mort-
gagor. It was not denied that the mortgage
was given to secure a large debt due from the
mortgagor to the mortgagee; and no evi-
dence was introduced at the hearing tending
to prove that the mortgage was not made
bona fide. The question, therefore, is re-
duced to this, namely: whether the defend-
ant has acquired any v;Uid title, under the
mortgage, to the goods purchased by the
mortgagor subsequently to the mortgage
That a person cannot grant or mortgage
property of which he is not possessed, and to
which he has no title, is a maxim of the law
too plain to need illustration, and which is
fully supported by all the authoritit's. Ter-
kins, § 65. says, it is a common learning in the
law that a man cannot grant or charge that
which he hath not. Bac. Abr. "Grants," D, 2;
Com. Dig. "Grant," D. It is true that a per-
son may grant pereonal property of which he
is potentially, though not actually, possessed.
A man may therefore grant all the wool that
shall grow on the sheep which he owns at the
time of the grant, but not the wool which shall
grow on sheep not his, but which he after-
wards may buy. So a parson of a church may
grant his tithes for years, for, although they
are not actually in him at the time, yet they
are potentially; and the same exception to the
general rule extends to giants of crops grow-
ing on lands of the grantors at the time of the
grants. Lunn v. Thornton. 1 Man.. G. & S.
oS3, and the authorities there cited. Not deny-
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goods were est i mated in tbe defendant's re­
ceipt, refused to receive such evidence. 
"Tbe defendant next insisted that by the 
true constrnction of the deCendant's receipt, 
talrnn i n  connection with said mortgage, the 
11ln inliff attached only so much of the mort­
gagC'd property as sbou!U be found to re­
ruain after payment therefrom of the debt 
for which it was mor.tgaged, to wit, the 
mortgagor's right in equity to redeem said 
property. But the subscriber was of opin­
ion that the plaintiff neither did nor could 
make sucb attachment, and that the who!<: 
property i n  said goods was attached by him, 
and was included in the receipt given to him 
1 1y the defendant. 
'·The defendant then gave in evidence a 
written demand del ivered by him to the 
plaintiff, after said a tt!lchment was made and 
said receipt given, but on the same day, of 
t ile follo\ving tenor: 'Be it known to you 
lhat I, the subscriber, have a mortgage on 
the goods a nd prope1ty which Addison Rich­
a rd on has put in my keeping, to the amount 
•>f two thousand dollars and i nterest. I 
hNeby demand tbe same sum of you, to be 
paid within the time specified by law, as you 
ha•e attached aid property. Lewis Rich­
al'dson. September 9th, 1842.' 
• ·rt was admitted by the plaintiff that he 
hnd paid nothing to the defendant after said 
demand ; but be denied tbat said demand, 
and his omission to pay anything to the de­
fendant. were sufficient in law to dis olve 
tbe attachment. The subscriber was of 
opinion tbat the defendant was entitled by 
law to defend this action under his mortgage, 
.1 nd that the said demand made on the plain­
tiff by the defendant was good and su.fli­
tient, at lea.st for the sum of two thou a.nd 
dollars, which exceeds the value of the 
goods attached, as e timated by the parties. 
The subscriber, therefore, on the foregoing 
stMement, is of opinion, and accordingly 
awards, subject to the opinion of the court 
to which this a ward is returnable, that the 
plaintiff bas no cause of action against the 
llefendant, and that the defendant recover 
or the plaintiff costs of court, to be taxed by 
t be court, and also the costs of reference. 
"Theron l\letcalf." 
G. �I. Brown, for plaintiff. Richardson & 
Lovering, for defendant. 
W'ILDE, J. This case, at a former term, 
was referred to the determ iDatiou of an ar­
bitrator, who was required, at the request 
of eithe1· party, to state the evidence and 
facts i n  respect whereof either of the parties 
should think fit to raise any legal question. 
In pursuance of this reference, a hearing of 
the parties has been bad before the arbitra­
tor, and the case comes before us on his re­
port. 
At the hearing, it appea red in evidence 
that the pla intiff c:laimcd the property iu 
Dy 
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question l>clween the parties by virtue of a n  
atlachmenl thereof a s  the JJJ'operty o f  on<' 
Addison R ichardson, and thn.t the defendant 
claimed the same under a mortgage to him 
from the said Addison, made and recorded 
before the said attachment; a nd the principal 
question submitted to the court by the arhi­
tmtor is whether the said mortgage is valid 
against the creditors of the mortgagor. The 
prope1ty mortgaged is thus described in the 
deed : "Tbe whole stock in trade of said Ad­
dison, as well as each and every article of 
me1·chandize which the saitl Atltli::;on this 
day bought of Timothy Walker, as every 
other article constituting the said Addison's 
stock in trade, in the shape tbe same is a nd 
may become in the usual comse of the said 
Addison's trade and business as a. trader." 
A nd it was adm itted that the goods iD ques­
tion were, at the t i me of the attachment, the 
stock in trade of the said Addison, but that 
only a part of them was owned by him un­
til after be made the said mortgage. It has 
heen contended by the plaintiff"s counsel 
that the mortgage was in law fraudulent and 
Yoicl against bona fide attaching creditors; 
or, if not wholly void, that it was void a.s to 
all tbe goods which were not a part of the 
mortgagor's stock in trade when the mort­
gage was executed. There seems t o  us to be 
no ground for the argument that this mo1t­
gage was wholly void, as being fraudulent ou 
the face of it, or as having' been made with 
a.n intent to defraud the creditors of the mort­
gago1·. It  was not denied tba t the mortgage 
was given to secure a large debt due from t he 
mortgagor to the mortgagee; and no evi­
dence was introduced at the hearing tendiu� 
to prove that the m o1tgage was not ma.de 
bona fide. The question, therefore, is re­
duced to this, namely: whether the clefend­
ant has acquired any valid title, uucler the 
mortgage, to the goods purchased by the 
mortgagor subsequently to the mortgage. 
'.l.'hat a person cannot grant or mortgage 
property of which he is not possessed, and to 
which he bas no title, is a maxim of the law 
too plain to need illustration, and which is 
fully supported by all the authorities. Per­
kins, § 65. says, it is a common lea ming i n  tbe 
law that a man cannot grant or charge that 
which be hath not. Bae. Abr. " G rants," D, 2 ;  
Com. Dig. "Grant," D. It is true that a per­
son may grant personal prope1ty of which he 
is potentially, though not actually, possei::i:;e<I. 
A man may therefore grant all the wool that 
shall grow on the sheep which he owns at tbc 
time of the grant, but not the wool which sllall 
grow on sheep not his, but which he a fter­
wanls may buy. So a parson of a church may 
grant his titlles for years, for, although they 
are not actually in him at the time, yet they 
are potentially ; and the same exception to the 
general rule extends to grants of crops grow­
ing on lands of tbe granters at the time of the 
gra nt . Lunn v. Thornton. 1 )Inn .. G .  & 
:3 '3, aml the a.uthorities there cited. �ot deny-
O rrg1 r3 I  tram 
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ing these principles, tlie defendant's counsel
contend tliat, altbongli the mortgagor could
not convey or create a charge on property to
wliicU he had no title nor possession, actual or
potential, yet when he, after the mortgage,
added to his stock in trade by new purchases,
the property vested immediately in the mort-
gagee, without any other act or conveyance
on the part of the mortgagor, by virtue of the
previous agreement to that effect contained in
the mortgage deed. One of the cases cited in
support of this argument is Mitchell v. Wins-
low, 2 Story, 6o0, Fed. Cas. No. 9,C73. But
that case was decided on principles of equity,
and on the construction of the United States
bankrupt act of 1S41 (chapter 9), on which
it was held "that (except in cases of fraud)
assignees in bankruptcy take only such rights
and interests as the bankrupt himself had, and
could himself claim and assert at the time of
his bankruptcy; and consequently that they
are affected with all the equities which would
affect the bankrupt himself, if he were as-
serting tliose rights and interests." "It is ma-
terial here to state," says the learned judge,
in giving his opinion, "that the present is not
a controversy between a first and second mort-
gagee as to property acquired and in esse after
the execution of the lirst mortgage, and before
the execution of the second mortgage, both the
mortgagees being purchasers for a valuable
consideration. That might at law present a
very different question." The decision, there-
fore, in that case, is of no authority in favor
of the defendant in the present case, but seems
rather to be an authority impliedly in favor of
the plaintiff, who claims under an atlachment
by a bona fide creditor of Addison lUcliardson,
the mortgagor. The same remark may be
made as to the case of Fletcher v. Morey, 2
Story, 5r>5, Fed. Cas. No. 4,SG4. That was a
case in equity, in which the plaintiffs relied on
nn equitable lien on certain shipments, and
the proceeds thereof, in the hands of the de-
fendant, the assignee of .lames Head & Co., as
collateral security for advances made to tlx-m
by the plaintitfs. And this Hen was adjutlgcd
valid, as an e(iuitablc charge on tlie property,
constituting a trust But these decisions have
but little bearing on the question under con-
sideration. Many things are held by court.s of
equity to be assignable which are not so held
by courts of liiw. So the legal distinctions
between executory and executed contract.s are,
in many cases, disregarded by courts of equity.
I'.ut the present case Is to be decided accord-
ing lo the ))rlnclplcs of the couunon law. The
((uestlon Is, what arc the legal rights of the
rmpwtlvo parties to the property In (lucstion?
One of the principal cases relied on by the
defendant Is that of Macoinbcr v. rnrker, 11
I'lck. ID". In that case It nppearc<l that Ihuit-
Ing & Ijiwrence were IcKsees of a brickyiird.
and entered Into a contrjict with .loseph lOvans,
by which he was to make for them n certain
number of brlckH on certain tenns. and to
Hhare the profit or loss between them, one-half
each; Evans agreeing that Hunting & Law-
rence should have full power to retain Evans'
part of the bricks or money, to the amoimt of
all sums of money due or which might become
due from him to them. Hunting & Lawrence
afterwards assigned to the plaintiffs all their
property, including the brickyard, and their
rights under the contract with Evans, to which
Evans assented, and agreed to act as agent for
the assignees. This unquestionably was a
good assignmeut, upon the principles already
stated. Hunting & Lawrence not only had a
potential possession, but they owned the clay
of which the bricks were to be made, subject
only to the right which Evans might after-
wards acquire by his contract. The transmu-
tation of the clay into bricks did not change
the right of property; so that Evans could not
acquire an absolute legal title to his share of
tlie bricks uutil he paid the balance due to the
plaintiffs. Upon this view of the case, the
question as to the right which might be ac-
(luirod by pledging or hypothecation of prop-
erty was not material to the decision of the
case. But, if it were otherwise, the doctrine
laid down by the learned judge who delivered
the opinion of the court in that case is not ap-
plicable to the present case. For if, when a
party agrees to pletlge property afterwards to
be acquired, and, when it is acquired, delivers
over the same to the pledgee, the right of the
pledgee would then attach, it does not follow
that tlie same doctrine would apply to a mort-
gage sale. A mortgage is an executed con-
tract; and it is clear that nothing passed by
the mortgage deed in this case besides the
stock in trade which the mortgagor had at the
time the mortgage was executed. But in .\b-
bott V. Goodwin, 20 Me. -lOS, it was held that,
where certain goods were mortgaged, and the
mortgagor afterwards exchanged some of the
goods mortgaged for other goods, the mort-
gagee thereby acquired a title to the goods
taken In excliange. And the ca.se of Macomber
V. Parker was cited by the learneil judge who
delivered the opinion of the court as a strong
case in supixirt of this decision, without notic-
ing the distinction between the two cases.
We cannot, however, concur In the principles
upon which the case of Abbott v. G(X)dwin
w!is decided. It was laid down In that case
that "all persons coining In under the mort-
gagor stand by snlisiiiulidii In his place, c<iual-
ly affected by the contiact, whether notified of
Its existence or not." liut the defendant In
that case had allaclied the property as the
propeiiy of the mortgagor; and, though ho
clnlnic<l under lilm, he might show that the
mortgage and the exchange of i)ro]ierty were
void as to the creditors of the mortgagor,
though they might bo valhl against him by
w;iy of estopiiol or otherwise. And that case
S(vnis to be Impliedly, though not expressly,
overruled by the case of (ioodenow v. l>unn, 21
Me. 80. And we fully concur with Whitman,
C. .^., In the principles laid down by him In
deciding the latter case. In the former case
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ing these principles. the defendant's counsel 
cvntenll that, a lthough the mortgagor could 
not convey or create a charge on property to 
which he hac1 no title nor pos e sion, actual or 
potential, yet when he, after the mortgage, 
added to his stock in trade by new purchases, 
the property vested immediately in the mort­
gagee, without any other act or conveyance 
on the part of the mortgagor, by virtue of the 
previous agreement to that effect contained i n  
the mortgage deed. One o f  the cases cited i n  
;upport o f  this argument i s  lllitcbell v .  Wins­
low, 2 Story, 6a0, l;-ed. Cas. No. 9,673. But 
that case was decidell on principles of equity, 
and on the con truction of the United States 
bankrupt act of 1 .n (chapter 9), on which 
it wa held "that (except in ca es of fraud) 
assignee i n  bankruptcy take only such rights 
• and i ntere ts as the bankrupt himself bac1, and 
could himself claim and assert at the time of 
his bankruptcy ; and consequently that they 
are a ffected with all the equities which would 
affect the bankrupt hiw elf, if be were as­
se1ting tho e rights and interests." "It is ma­
terial here to state,'' says the learned judge, 
in giving bis opinion, "that the present is not 
a controversy between a fu-st and second mort­
gagee as to property acquired and in esse after 
the execution of the lir t mortgage, anll before 
the execution of the second mortgage, both the 
mortgagees being purchasers for a valuable 
considerntion. '1,'hat might at law pre ent a 
very ll ilINent que tion." The deci ion, there­
fore, in that case, is of no authority in favor 
of tile defendant in Urn present ca e, but seem 
rather to be an authority inlpliedly in favor or 
the pla int iIT, who claim uuder an a t tachment 
lly a bona fide creditor of Addison Hicbard on,  
t he mortgagor. The same reru:HL;: ruay be 
made as to the case of Fletcher v. !\lorey, 2 
Story. r.n:>, Fed. Ca . No. 4., G!. Thal was a 
<·ase in equity, in which the plainl ifis relied on 
an equi ta ble lieu o n  certain bipment , aml 
t he p1·ut·ccds thereof, in the bands of the llC­
fcnrlaut, t he assig-uec of .J ame Reacl ,. Co., n 
tolla tcral security for adva nces made to them 
hy the plaint i ll's. And lhis lien wa adjml;.rcll 
vn licl ,  as nn cquit a!Jlc cha rge on th propert y, 
conl'li l ul l ng a t rust. But these decisions have 
h11t lit  t lP hea ring on the q uest ion m11lcr c:on­
l"tdc-rn1 iu11. :.\funy thi ngs arc held hy c·ourts of 
r q u l t y  lo IJ a..;signnhlc w hil'1 1 are not l':O l l C'ld 
hy 1"11urts of l:t \I'. �o t he lrgnl c l ist lud iu11s 
l tetwccu e'l.ct·utor�· noel cxrcutl'cl c·ont r:wts n rc, 
In man�· c1H<c:s, dist rgo rdecl by courts of c<1nlly. 
1 : 1 1 1  t hr prPse>nt t·ai;c IH to be clcf'h lPd :lC'eorc l­
lni.: to 1 1 1£' prln C'l plc·s of l i te> ro 1 1 1 m11 1 1  lnw. 'l'IH' 
qllf'l'llon l!'l, wh1\t u re Uu• lc·gn l l'lghls of t h!' 
11 J IP<'llvr pnrllf'H t o  t he propC't'ty l t t  f ! l lPstlnn '/ 
( ) JH• nf t lH' prl ndpa l C'llHl'H rC'llecl 011  hy t hr 
dc•ffond11 1 1 t  IH t hn l of ;\l : t f 1 1 1 1 1hPr v. l 'n l'krr, I t  
l 'l<'l\. !!Ji. I n  t h nt rns" l l  n ppen re<l t hn t l l n n t  
I n g ,\· L n  w n·11<"c "'''"" I P,...< ' c "l o f'  n hrlr •kynn l, 
n m l  r•ntPn·d ln t n 11 c·ontnl < ' t  w i t h  .lcr•rph g\'U llA, 
hy whlr'h he wn11 to mnl<e tor t h  m 11 c rta l n  
n11mhr-r or hrlrlcs on C'f'rtn l n  trnm1, ll ncl to 
h11rc thr. p1 ollt  or 10ti11 ut• t \\ ('1•1 1  tht·111, onc· h n l f  
D i g itized by 
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each; Evans agreeing that Hunting & Law­
rence should have full power to retain Evans' 
part of the bricks or money, to the amount of 
all sums of money due or which might become 
due from him to t hem. Hunting & Lawrence 
afterwards assigned to the plaintiffs all their 
property, including the brickyard, and their 
rights under the contract with Evans, t o  whicll 
Evans a seuted, and agreed to act as agent for 
the assignees. This unquestionably was a 
good assignment, upon the p1inciples already 
stated. Hunting & Lawrence not only bad a 
potential posse siou, but they owned t he clay 
of which the bricks were to be made, ulJjed 
only to the right which Evans might after­
wards acquire by his contract. The trau nrn­
tation of the clay into bricks did not change 
the right of property ; so that Evans could not 
acquire an absolute legal title to his share of 
the bricks until he paid the balance due to the 
plai n t i Cfs. Upon this view of the case, the 
que lion as to the right which might be ac­
(}Uired by pledging or hypotheca tion of prop­
erty was not material to the deci ion of the 
case. But, if i t  were otherwise, tlle doctrine 
laid down by the learned judge who delin�rcd 
the opinion of the court in that ca e is not ap­
plicable to the pre ent ca e. For if, wheu :1 
party agrees to pledge property afterw:trds to 
be acquired, and, when it is acquire1l. delivers 
over the same to the plc<lgee, the right of the 
pledgee would then attach, it does not follow 
that the awe do ·trine would apply to a mort­
gage sale. A mort�agc is an executed cou­
tmct ; and it is clear that nothing pas ed by 
the mortgage deed in ti.ti case bl' ides the 
stock. in trade which the mortgagor bad a t  the 
l i me the mortgag-e was ex 0cutcd . But in  .\ b­
bott v. Goodwin, 20 :.\le. 10 ', it '"as llchl tha t .  
where certain goods "·ere mortgaged, a u d  tht• 
mortgagor afterward exchnn�c<l some of t he 
goods mo1igaged Cor other goods, the mnn­
gagee thereby acq u i red a t i t le to the �und:l 
tat;: u i n  exch:ln�t'. . \ n d  t he ca:le ol' ?.l: 1 1•mnher 
v. Parlrnr was cit d ll.r t he l m ruC'd j ml;.:-e who 
deliver d the op inion of the comt as a ::itroug 
c:lse in su111)(lrt of t h is drdsinu, wit hnnt notic­
i ng- the distinct ion l>el wl'Cll t he two cases. 
"'c cannot. bow Yer, t'U llt'UI' lu the principl<'R 
upon which t he cn:o:e ol' A l rho t t  v. Go d\\ i n  
was dccidccl .  l t  " :Is la id d o "  n I n  that case 
t hat "nil  perso ns <·nmin:;: lo 1 1 11der t he mol' l ·  
gn:;:or s t a nd h y  subst i t u t lc m  l n  his pl:1<·e, c< ]u:1 l­
ly a ffected by t he c·01 1 t r:1 l'I , \\  hellwr not l l iccl oC 
Its exist nee 01·  nnt." But t he dl'frndant In 
t hat <'nsc h:ul n t t :rC"hcd t he proper t y as the 
1 11·opp1·t �· of t he mortg:1gnl'; n ncl, t hough he 
rl n l r n rcl  11 !JC1Pr h im, he might show that t he 
mo r t gag • and I he xC'hn ngc or vroprrty werP 
\'Ohl  us to t hP ct· r l l tors of the nuwtgagor, 
t houg-h t l lC'y m ight be vnlld against llhn by 
way of stoppC'I or otht'l'\\ Isl'. A nd Urnt ('Ilse 
ArrmH to he lmpl lc>d l� , t houg h not .x pr ssly, 
O\'C'l 'l lllPd hy t h!' C'(\He Of < l oOd llOW V. ) ) 11un, :.! l  
I'll • 80. A nrl  w e  fu l l y oncur wltll Whltrnun, 
C . . T . .  I n  t h  prl nrlplPR l n lrl dnwu by blm In 
l1Pcltl l 1 1g ti.Jc lat  tcr cu1:1c. In the former cusc 
O n  r-a l tr 111 
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the mortgage deed had no reference to any
property afterwards to be acquired by the
mortgagor, and the case seems to have been
decided on the assumed fact that the property
mortgaged was afterwards exchanged for the
property in dispute, with the assent of the
mortgagee; but it does not appear that the ex-
oliange was made with his assent, or that
there was any agreement to this between the
mortgagor and the mortgagee. In the case of
Tapfleld v. Hillman, 6 Man. & G. 2^5, the
construction and legal effect of a similar mort-
gage were considered, and it was decided that
the mortgagee had no title to any property ac-
quired by the mortgagor subsequently to the
date of the mortgage. There was a clause in
the mortgage, giving power to the mortgagee,
upon nonpayment of the debt, to enter into
the mortgaged premises, and "to take, possess,
hold and enjoy all and eveiT the goods, chat-
tels, effects and premises." And it was held
that the mortgagee had no right to take any
property but what was on the mortgaged prem-
ises at the date of the mortgage. It was, how-
ever, said by Tindal, C. J., that "it would have
been very easy so to have framed the power
of entry as to make it extend to all effects
found upon the premises at the time that such
power should be enforced, if such was the in-
tention of the parties." From this the defend-
ant's counsel infer that such a power would
have been upheld by the court. And it would,
undoubtedly, have been a good defence in that
action, if the mortgage had contained such a
ix)wer; for it was an action of trespass by
the mortgagor against the mortgagee.
But although the mortgagee, with such a
power, would be justified in seizing the
goods of the mortgagor, purchased by him
subsequently to the date of the mortgage,
it would not vest the property in the mort-
gagee. And so it was decided in the case
of Lunn v. Thornton, 1 Man., G. & S. 379,
which afterwards came before the same
court, and was decided in February, 1845.
The plaintiff In that case had a bill of sale
from the defendant of "all and singular his
goods, household furniture, plate, linen, chi-
na, stock and implements of trade, and oth-
er effects whatsoever, then remaining and
being or which should at any time there-
after, remain and be in, upon or about his
dwelling-house," etc. And it was held that
future-acquired property would not pass by
such a conveyance, unless the grantor should
ratify the grant after he had acquired the
property therein. The counsel for the de-
fendant relied, among other authorities, on
Bacon's Maxims, Reg. 14, "Licet dispositio
de interesse futuro sit inutilis, tamen potest
fieri declaratio prascedens, quae sortiatur ef-
fectum, interveniente novo actu." A strong
case in support of the rule is cited by Ba-
con. "If I mortgage land, and after cove-
nant with I. S., in consideration of money
which I receive of him, that after I have
entered for the condition broken, I will
GBIF. PERS. PROP. — 13
stand seized to the use of the same 1. S.,
and I enter, and this deed is enrolled, and
all within the six months, yet nothing pass-
eth; because the enrolment is no new act,
but a perfective ceremony of the first deed
of bargain and sale; and the law Is more
strong in that case, because of the vehe-
ment relation which the enrolment hath to
the time of the bargain and sale, at what
time he had nothing but a naked condition."
4 Bac. Works (Ed. 1803) 55.
It was contended on the part of the plain-
tiff, in Lunn v. Thornton that the bringing
of the goods on the plaintiff's premises,
where they were seized after the execution
of the bill of sale, was the new act done by
the plaintiff, which gave the declaration
contained in the previous bill of sale its ef-
fect. But the court held clearly that it
could have no such effect. "The new act,"
Lord Tindal said, "which Bacon relies upon,
appears, in all the instances which he puts,
to be an act done by the grantor, for the
avowed object and with the view of carry-
ing the former grant or disposition into
effect." This adjudication, which appears
to us to be founded on well-established
principles, is decisive against the defend-
ant's claim as to the property purchased
by the mortgagor after the mortgage. He
did not prove, nor offer to prove, any act
done by the mortgagor, after the mort-
gage deed was executed, by which he rati-
fied the same as to the subsequently ac-
quired property. All he offered to prove
was that he had taken possession of the
goods before the attachment. But this evi-
dently was irrelevant, as it was held to be
by the ai-bitrator. But if he had proved
that the mortgagor had delivered possession
to him of the goods in question, to hold the
same under the mortgage, that it would not
have availed him against the plaintiff, al-
though it might be good against the mort-
gagor. By Rev. St. c. 74, § 5, it is provided
that "no mortgage of personal property
shall be valid against any other person than
the parties thereto, unless possession of the
mortgaged property be delivered to and re-
tained by the mortgagee, or unless the mort-
gage be recorded by the clerk of the town
where the mortgagor resides." Now, it is
clear, we think, that the record of the mort-
gage deed is no sufficient notice of a legal
incumbrance as to subsequently acquired
property, because by law no such property
could be sold or conveyed thereby; and it
would furnish no notice that any property
would be afterwards purchased, or, if pur-
chased, that any act would be done to rati-
fy the grant in that respect. As to such
property, therefore, the mortgage could not
be valid except as between the parties
thereto, unless such goods were delivered
by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, with the
intention to ratify the mortgage, and the
mortgagee retained open possession of the
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the mortgage deed bad no reference to any 
property afterwards to be acquired by tbe 
mortgagor, and tbe case seems to bave been 
decided on the assumed fact that the property 
mortgaged was afterwards exchanged fot· the 
property in dispute, with the assent o f  the 
mortgagee; but it does not appear that the ex­
change was made with bis assent, or that 
there was any agreement to this between the 
mortgagor and the mortgagee. In the case of 
Tapfield v. Hillman, 6 Man. & G. 2-15, the 
construction and legal effect of a similar mort­
gage were considered, and it was decided tllat 
tbe mortgagee bad no title to any property ac­
quired by the mortgagor subsequently to tbe 
date of tbe mortgage. Tbere was a clause in 
the mortgage, giving power to the mortgagee, 
upon nonpayment of the debt, to enter into 
the mortgaged premises, and "to take, possess, 
hold and enjoy all and every the goods, chat­
tels, effects and premises." And it was held 
tbat the mortgagee bad no right to take any 
property but what was on the mortgaged prem­
ises at the date of the mortgage. It was, how­
ever, said by Tindal, C. J., that "it would bave 
been very easy so to have framed the power 
of entry as to make it extend to all effects 
found upon the premises at the time that such 
power should be enforced, if such was tbe in­
tention of the parties." From this the defend­
ant's counsel infet· that such a power would 
have been upheld by the court. And it would, 
undoubtedly, have been a good defence in that 
action, if the mortgage bad contained sucb a 
power; for it was an action of trespass by 
the mortgagor against the mortgagee. 
But although the mortgagee, with such a 
power, would be justified in seizing the 
goods of the mortgagor, purchased by him 
subsequently to the date of the mortgage, 
it would not vest the property in the mort­
gagee. And so it was decided in the case 
of Lunn v. Thornton, 1 Man., G. & S. 379, 
which afterwards came before the same 
court, and was decided in February, 1845. 
The plaintiff' in that case had a bill of sale 
from the defendant of "all and singular his 
goods, household furniture, plate, linen, chi­
na, stock and implements of trade, and oth­
er effects whatsoe\"er, then remaining and 
being or which should at any time there­
after, remain and be in, upon or about his 
dwelling-house," etc. And it was held that 
future-acquired property would not pass by 
such a conveyance, unless the grantor should 
ratify the grant after be bad acquired the 
property therein. The counsel for the de­
fendant relied, among other authorities, on 
Bacon's Maxims, Reg. 14, "Licet dispositio 
de interesse futuro sit inutilis, tamen potest 
fieri declaratio prrecedens, qme sortiatur ef­
fectum, interveniente novo actu." A strong 
case in support of the rule is cited by Ba­
con. "If I mortgage land, and after cove­
nant with I. S., in consideration of money 
which I receive of him, that after I have 
entered for the condition broken, I will 
GRUl'.PERS. PROP.-13 
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stancl seized to the use or the same 1. S., 
and I enter, and this deed is enrolled, and 
all within the six months, yet nothing pass­
eth ; because the enrolment is no new act, 
but a perfective ceremony of the first deed 
of bargain and sale; and the law ls more 
strong in that case, because of the \"Ci.Jc­
ment relation which the enrolment hath to 
tbe time of the bargain and sale, at wllat 
time be bad nothing but a naked condition." 
4 Bae. Works (Ed. 1803) 35. 
It was contended on the part or the plain­
tiff, in Lunn v. Thornton that the bringing 
of the goods on the plaintiff's premises, 
where they were seized after the execution 
of the bill of sale, was the new act done by 
the plaintiff, which gave the declaration 
contained in the pre\"ious bill of sale its ef­
fect. But the court held clearly that it 
could have no such effect. "The new act," 
Lord Tindal said, "which Bacon relies upon, 
appears, in all the instances which be puts, 
to be an act done by the granter, for the 
avowed object and with the view of carry­
ing the former grant or disposition into 
effect." This adjudication, which appears 
to us to be founded on well-establi�bed 
principles, is decisive against the defend­
ant's claim as to the property purchased 
by the mortgagor after tbe mo1igage. Ile 
did not pro>e, nor offer to prove, any act 
done by the mortgagor, after the mort­
gage deed was executed, by which he rati­
fied the same as to the subsequently ac­
quired property. All be offered to pro>e 
was that be bad taken possession of the 
goods before the attachment. But this evi­
dently was irrelevant, as it was held to be 
by the ru:bitrator. But if be bad proved 
that the mortgagor bad deli\"ered possession 
to him of the goods in question, to bold the 
same under the mortgage, tbat it would not 
have a>ailed him against the plaintiff, al­
though it might be good against tl.Je mort­
gagor. By Rev. St. c. 74, § 5, it is provided 
that "no mortgage of personal property 
shall be valid against any other person than 
the parties thereto, unless possession of the 
mortgaged property be delivered to and re­
tained by the mortgagee, or unless tl.Je mort­
gage be recorded by the clerk of the town 
where the mortgagor resides." Now, it i s  
clear, w e  think, that the record of the mort­
gage deed is no sufficient notice of a legal 
incumbrance as to subsequently acquired 
property, because by law no such property 
could be sold or conveyed thereby ; and it 
would furnish no notice that any property 
would be afterwards purchased, or, if pur­
chased, that any act would be done to rati­
fy the grant in that respect. As to such 
property, therefore, the mortgage could not 
be valid except as between tl.Je partie 
thereto, unless such goods were deli>ered 
by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, with the 
intention to ratify the mortgage, and the 
mortgagee retained open possession of the 
O rigin3 1  from 
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same until the time of the attachment.
Whether such proof would be sufficient
against creditors, it is not necessary to de-
cide, as, according to the report of the arbi-
trator, no such question has been raised.
As to the other questions raised, we think
the decisions of the arbitrator were correct,
and that upon the whole matter the plain-
tiEE is entitled to recover the estimated val-
ue of the goods in question, which were not
the property of the mortgagor when the
mortgage was executed, and no more. The
case, therefore, is to be recommitted to' the
arbitrator, to ascertain what goods were
mortgaged, unless the parties should agree
as to this matter.
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same until the time of the attachment. 
1Yhether such proof would be sufficient 
against creditors, it is not necessary to de­
cide, as, according to the report of the arbi­
trator, no such question has been raised. 
As to the other questions raised, we think 
the decisions of the arbitrator were correct, 
and that upon the whole matter the plain-
D i g itized by 
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tiff is entitled to recover the estimated val­
ue of the goods in question, which were not 
the property of the mortgagor when the 
mortgage was executed, and no more. The 
case, therefore, is to be recommitted to· the 
arbitrator, to ascertain what goods were 
mortgaged, unless the parties should agree 
as to this matter. 
O n  r-a l tra m  
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WILLIAMS v. BRIGGS et al.
(11 R. 1. 47G.)
Supreme Court of Rhode Island. March 3,
1877.
Trover, heard by the court, jury trial being
waived.
Tillinghast & Ely, for plaiutiff. Benjamin
N. Lapham and Daniel R. Ballou, for de-
fendants.
DURPEE, C. J. Tills is an action for tro-
ver for the conversion of certain articles of
personal property, vphich the plaiutlfl: claims
to own as administrator on the estate of the
late William B. Lawton. The title of Wil-
liam B. Lawton accrued to him under two
mortgages, executed to him by the defend-
ant Nicholas C. Briggs, and dated, respective-
ly, January 1, 1807, and July 2, 1870. The
second mortgage purports to convey to Law-
ton "all and singular tlie tools, fixtures, stock
in trade for the manufacture of carriages,
and also all carriages made or in process of
manufacture, now in my carriage factory.
No. 254 High street, in said city [Providence],
together with all my right, title, and interest
in and to tlie land and building used for and
in connection with said factory. And also
all and every article and thing that may be
hereafter purchased by me to replace or re-
new the articles and things hereinbefore con-
veyed, and also all stock, fixtures, and car-
riages, vi'hether manufactured or in process
of manufacture, that may be hereafter pur-
chased by me to be used in or about my busi-
ness of buying and selling, making and re-
pairing carriages." On the 14th of August,
1S75, the defendant Nicholas C. Briggs made
to the defendant Edwin Winsor a general as-
signment of all the property of which he was
the lawful owner, excepting only what and
so much as was exempt from attachment by
law, in trust for the equal benefit of all his
creditors. Under this assignment the said
Edwin Winsor took possession of the assign-
ed property, among which was the property
for the conversion of which this action is
brought. It appeared at the trial, which
was had before the court, jury trial being
waived, that only a small part of the prop-
erty which is in controversy was in the pos-
session or ownership of the said Nicholas C.
Briggs at the time the second mortgage was
made, the larger part of it having been sub-
sequeutly acquired for the purpose of renew-
ing or replacing the stock and property
which the said Nicholas C. Briggs then hatl.
The case, therefore, raises the question
whether a mortgage of property to be subse-
(tuently acquired conveys to the mortgagee
a title to such property when acquired, which
Is valid at law as against the mortgagor or
his voluntary assignee. The question is one
which, so far as we know, has never been de-
cided in this state by the supreme court sit-
ting in banc.
We think such a mortgage Is ineffectual to
transfer the legal title of the property subse-
quently acquired, unless when acquired pos-
session thereof is given to the mortgagee, or
taken by him under the mortgage. This view
is supported by numerous oases in Massachu-
setts: Jones V. Richardson, 10 Mete. (Mass.)
481; Moody v. Wright, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 17;
Barnard v. Eaton, 2 Cush. 294; Codman v.
Freeman, 3 Cush. 300; Chesley v. Josselyn,
7 Gray, 489; Ilenshaw v. Rank of Bellows
Falls, 10 Gray, 508. By cases in other states:
Otis V. .Sill, S Barb. 102; Milliman v. Neher,
20 Barb. 37; Hunt v. Bullock, 23 111. 320;
Hamilton v. Rogers, S Md. 301; Chynoweth
v. Tenney, 10 Wis. 397; Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co. V. Commercial Bank, 11 Wis. 207;
Single V. Phelps, 20 Wis. 398. And by cases
in England: Gale v. Burnell, 7 Q. B. 850;
Lunn V. Thornton, 1 C. B. 379; Robinson v.
McDonald, 5 Maule & S. 228; Congreve v.
Bvetts, 10 Exch. 298; also in 20 Eng. Law
& Eq. 493. The reason on which the cases
rest is expressed in the maxim, "Nemo dat
qtiod non habet." No person can grant or
charge what he has not. The maxim in its
strict sense is confined to cases at law. There
are cases in equity which hold that such a
mortgage is effectual to charge the property
when acquired with an equitable lien, or to
create an equitable title In It in favor of the
mortgagee against the mortgagor, and even,
as some of the cases maintain, against at-
taching creditors, especially where they have
actual notice of the mortgage. Holroyd v.
Marshall, 10 H. L. Gas. 191; Mitchell v. Win-
slow, 2 StoiT, 030, Fed. Cas. No. 9,073; Pen-
nock V. Coe, 23 How. 117; Galveston R. Co.
V. Cowdrey. 11 Wall. 459; U. S. v. New
Orleans R. Co., 12 Wall. 302; Butt v. Ellett,
19 Wall. .544; Smithurst v. Edmunds. 14 .\,
J. Eq. 408; Tedford v. Wilson, 3 Head, 311;
Sillers v. Lester, 4S Miss. 513; Seymour v.
Canandaigua & N. F. R. Co., 25 Barb. 284.
The ground of these decisions is that the
mortgage, though inoperative as a convey-
ance, is operative as an executoi-y contract
which attaches to the propeity when acquir-
ed, and in equity transfers the beneficial in-
terest to the mortgagee, the mortgagor be-
ing held as trustee for him in accordance
with the familiar maxim that equity consid-
ers that done which ought to be done. But
in the case at bar the plaintiff Is not suing
in equity, but at law in an action of trover
for the tortious conversion of the property;
and is suing, not a mere wrongdoer, but the
persons having the legal ownership of the
property, and certainly, therefore, caimot pre-
vail without proof of something more than a
merely equitable title or interest. He ought
to prove that he has the legal title or owner-
ship, either general or special, and the right
of present possession. Fulton v. Fulton, 48
Barb. 581; Herring v. Tilghman, 13 Ired.
392; Klllian v. Carrol, 13 Ired. 431; Lons-
dale V. Falrbrother, 10 R. I. 327.
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WILLIAMS v. BR I GG S et al. 
(11 R. I. 47G.) 
Supreme Court of Rhorle Island. March 3, 
1877. 
Trover, heard by the court, j ury trial being 
waived. 
Tillinghast & Ely, for plaintiff. Benjamin 
N. Lapllam and Daniel R. Ballou, for de­
fenclants. 
DURFEE, C. J. Tllis is an action for tro­
l"er for the conversion of certain articles of 
personal property, which the plaintiff claims 
lo own as administrator on tile estate of tile 
late William B. Lawton. The title of Wil­
liam B.  Lawton accrued to him under two 
mortgages, executed to him by the defend­
ant Nicholas C. Briggs, and dated, respective­
ly, January 1, 1867, a nd J uly 2, 1870. The 
second mortgage purports to convey to Law­
ton "all and singular the tools, fixtures, stock 
in trade for the manufacture of carriages, 
and also all carriages made or in process of 
manufacture, now in my carriage factory, 
No. 254 High street, in said city [Providence], 
together with all my right, title, and interest 
in and to the land and building used for and 
in connection with said factory. And also 
all and every article and thing that may be 
hereafter purchased by me to replace or re­
new tbe articles and things bereinbefore con­
veyed, and also all stock, fixtures, and car­
riages, whether manufactured or in process 
of manufacture, that may be hereafter pur­
chased by me to be used in or about my busi­
ness of buying and selling, making and re­
pairing carriages." On the Hth of August, 
1�75, the defendant Nicholas C. Briggs made 
to the defendant Edwin Winsor a general as­
signment of all  the property of which be was 
the lawful owner, excepting only what and 
so much a s  was exempt from attachment by 
law, in trust for the equal benefit of all bis 
creditors. Under tbis assignment the said 
Edwin Winsor took possession of the assign­
t!d property, among which was tbe property 
for the conversion of which this action is 
brought. It appeared at t he trial ,  which 
was had before the court, jury trial being 
waived, that only a small part of the prop­
erty which is in controversy was in the pos-
ession or ownership of the said Nicholas C. 
Briggs at the time the second mortgage wa s 
made, the larger part of it having been sub­
�equently acquired for the purpose of renew­
ing or replacing the stock and property 
which the said Nicholas C. Briggs then bad. 
'fbe case, therefore, raises the question 
whether a mortgage of property to be subse­
quently acquired conveys to the mortgagee 
a title to such property when a.:quired, which 
is valid at law as against the mortgagor or 
bis voluntary assignee. Tbe question is one 
which, so far as we know, has never been de­
cided in tbis state by the supreme court sit­
ting in bane. 
D 1 g 1tiz. by 
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We tllink such a mortgage Is ine>ffectual to 
transfer tile leg-al title of tlle property subse­
quently acquired, unless when acquired pos­
session thereof is given to the mortga�<H?, or 
takf:n uy him under the mortgage. This Yiew 
is supported by numerous t'ases in lllassa d1u­
setts: Jones v. Richardson, 10 Mete. (�Iass.J 
481 ; 1\Ioody v .  \'i'right, 1;� l\Ietc. (:\lass.) 1 7 ;  
Barna r el  v. Eaton, 2 Cush. 2 04 ;  Co<lman v .  
Freeman, 3 Cusb. 30G; Cllesley v . . Josselyn, 
7 G ray, 4 O ;  llenshaw v. Bank of Bellows 
Falls, 10 Gray, GG8. By cases in other states : 
Otis v. Sill, S Barb. 10:!; �Ii l l iman Y . .Neher, 
20 Barb. 37; Hunt v. Bullocl;:, :!3 Ill .  3:!<.l; 
Hamilton v. Rogers, 8 llld. 301 ; Chynoweth 
v. Tenney, 10 Wis. 307 ; Farmers' Loan & 
Trust Co. v. Com mercial Bank, 11 Wis. 207; 
Single v. Phelps, '.?O Wis. ;ms. And by cases 
in England : Gale v. Burnell, 7 Q. B. 830; 
Lunn v. Thornton, 1 C. B. 370; Robinson v. 
McDonald, 5 l\Iaule & S. 228 ; Congreve v. 
Evetts, 10 Exch. 298; also in 26 Eng. Law 
& Eq. 403. Tbe reason on whh.:h the cases 
rest is exvressed in the maxim, "Nemo clat 
quod non babet." No person can grant or 
charge wbat he has not. Tbe maxim in i t s  
strict sense i s  confined t o  cases at law. Tllere 
are cases in equity which hold tbat such a 
mortgage is effectual to charge tbe property 
when acquired with an equitable lien, or to 
create an equitable title in it in favor of the 
mortgagee against t be mortgagor, and even, 
as some of tbe cases maintain, against at­
taching creditors, especially where they have 
actual notice of the mortgage. Holroyd v. 
i\Iarshall, 10 H. L. Cas. lDl ; i\Iitcbell v. W i n­
slow, 2 Story, G30, Fed. Cas. No. 9,G73 ; Pen­
nock v. Coe, 23 How. 117; Galveston R. Co. 
v. Cowdrey, 11 Wall. 450; U. S. v. Xew 
Orleans R. Co., 12 Wall. 362 ; Butt v. Ellett, 
19 Wa ll.  544 ; Smithurst v. Edmunds. 14 '\. 
J. Eq. 408 ; Tedford v. Wilson, 3 Head, 311; 
Sillers v. Lester, 48 l\liss. 513 ; Seymour '" 
Canandaigua & N. F. R. Co., 23 Barb. 284. 
The ground of these decisions is that tbe 
mortgage, though inoperative as a convey­
ance, is operati\'e as an executo1'Y contract 
which attaches to the property when acquii·­
ed, and in equity transfers the beneficial in­
terest to the mortgagee, the mortgagor be­
ing held as trustee for bim in accordance 
with the famil iar maxim that equity consid­
ers that done which ought to be done. But 
in the case at bar the plaintiff is not suing 
in equity, but at law in an action of tro;er 
for the tortious conversion of the property ; 
and is suing, not a mere wrongdoer, but the 
persons having the legal ownership of tbe 
property, and certainly, therefore, cannot pre­
Yail without proof of something more than a 
merely equitable title or interest. He ought 
to prove that he bas the lega l title or owner­
ship, either general or special, and the right 
of present possession. Fulton v. Fulton, 48 
Barb. 5 1 ;  Herring v. Tilghman, 13 Ired. 
392; Killian '" Carrol. 13 Ired. 431; Lons­
dale v. Fairbrother, 10 R. I. 3:!7. 
O rigi n3 1  from 
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It is true, language was used in some of
tlie cases above cited, decided in tlie supreme
court of the United States, wbicli seems to
go beyond what we have stated to be the ef-
fect of the cases; but the cases referred to
were cases in equity, and we presume, there-
fore, the language was designed to express
the rule in equity, and not at law, except in
so far as the rule at law had been modified
by statute; or, the cases, being railway cases,
in so far as the rule may be regarded as
modiUed by considering the rolling stock and
equipment of a railroad as fixtures. And see
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Hendrickson,
25 Barb. 4S4; Pierce v. Emery, 32 N. H. 4SL
The plaintiff's counsel claims that there
are cases at law upon the authority of which
he is entitled to recover. He cites Chapman
V. Woimer, 4 Ohio St. 481; Carr v. Allatt, 3
Uurl. & N. 904; ChideU v. Galsworthy, G C.
B. (N. S.) 470. In these cases possession of
the after-acquired property had been given
to the mortgagee, or lawfully taken by him
under the mortgage and it was for this rea-
son that the mortgagee was held to have ac-
quired the legal title, and not because it was
supposed the mortgage itself was effectual
to transfer it. There are numerous cases
which liold that, though the mortgage per se
is inoperative to transfer the legal title, pos-
session so given or taken under it transfers
the legal title to the mortgagee, being the
"novus actus interveniens" required by Lord
Bacon's maxim to give effect to the mort-
gage as a declaratio praecedens. The max-
im is, "Licet dispositio de intoresse futuro sit
iuutilis, tameu lieri potest declaratio praece-
dens quoe sortiatur effectum, inlerveuiente
novo actu." Broom, Leg. Max. 498; Hope v.
Hayley, 5 El. & Bl. S30. Also in 34 Eng.
Law & Eq. 189; Langton v. Horton, 1 Hare,
.">49; Congreve v. Evetts, 10 Exch. 2'JS. Also
in 2i; Eng. Law & Eq. 493; Baker v. Gray, 17
C. B. 402; Carriugton v. Smith, 8 Pick. 419;
Uowley V. Rice, 11 Melc. (Mass.) 333; Rowan
v. Sharp's Ultlo Manuf'g Co., 29 Conn. 2S2;
Titus v. Mabee, 25 111. 257; Chapin v. Cram,
40 .Me. 001; Bryan v. Smith, 22 Ala. .531;
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Commercial
Bank, 11 Wis. 207. In the case at bar the
plainlift has never acquired the legal title In
this way, for he has never been in possession
of the property.
The plaintiff also claims to be entitled to
recover upim the authority of Abbott v.
Goodwin, 20 Me. 409. The mortgage In that
case was not a mortgage of jiropcrty to be
HUbsequcutly acquired. It was a niorlgage
given to secure tlie payment of certain notes
upon a stock of goods tiien in the possession
of the mortgagor, and contained a stipulallon
tliat the mortgagor shoulil retain iiohschnIou
of the goods, "and pay over and account for
the proceeds of all salcH of said goods to
I hem [the niortBng<M>8j, to be applied In pay-
ment of said notcR, or directly to apply said
proceeds to the payment of said uoluu, at the
discretion" of the mortgagees. The action
was trespass for taking four hundred casks
of lime, obtained by the mortgagor in ex-
change for goods or the proceeds of goods
mortgaged to the plaintiffs. The court sus-
tained the action, holding that the lime must
be considered as substituted for and repre-
senting the goods which were mortgaged,
having been exchanged for them or their
proceeds, by the mortgagor acting as the
agent of the mortgagees.
In the case at bar there was no stipulation
reserving to the mortgagee control of the
proceeds of the property sold by the mort-
gagor, and, moreover, there is no evidence
that the new property was paid for out of
the proceeds of the old, or, in fact, that it
was paid for at all, though there is evidence
that it was acquired to renew or replace the
old. We think, therefore, the case of Ab-
bott V. Goodwin, 20 Me. 408, is not an au-
thority which can control the case at bar.
And see Rhines v. Phelps, 8 III. 455; Holly
V. Brown. 14 Conn. 255, 205; Levy v. Welsh,
2 Edw. Ch. 438; Chapin v. Cram, 40 Me. 561.
In Hamilton v. Rogers, 8 Md. 301, it was
held that a mortgage of goods in a store,
"together with all renewals and substitutions
for the same or any part or parts thereof,"
did not convey subsequently acquired goods
so as to give the mortgagee an action at law
against a party seizing them. And Rose v.
Bevan, 10 Md. 400, maintains that the rule is
the same, even though the new goods are
paid for out of the proceeds of the old. And
in JIassachusetts such mortgages have been
repeatedly condemned as inelfectual to con-
fer any title to the goods subsequently ac-
quired, though acquired in the usual course
of business, and by way of substitution for
goods which were mortgaged. Jones v. Rich-
ardson, 10 Mole. (Mass.) 481; Moody v.
AVrlght, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 17; Barnard v. Ea-
ton, 2 Cush. 294. And see Codman v. Free-
man, 3 Cush. 300. In the case at bar the
only fact proved Is that the new goods were
acquired In the usual course of business to
replace the olil. We do not think this Is
enough to give the mortgagee the same title
In the new goods wliich he had In the old,
or in fact to give him any legal title in them.
The plaintiff contends tliat the defendants
are estopped from denying his title. The
facts set up by the defendants are not In
contradiction of, but in conformity with, the
mortgages. The mortgages contain uo ex-
press covenants of title. The case, there-
fore, discloses no ground for the appllcnfion
of tho doctrine of estoppel. Chynoweth v.
Tenney, 10 Wis. ;{97. We decide tiiat the
plaiiitilT cannot recover In this action for
goods acquired after the mortgage was given,
The court .•ilso llnd tlu- defendants not guilty
of converting the ri'inainder of the property.
The evidence shows tliat the defendants re-
fused to surrender all the properly to the
plalnlilT. It docs not show to the eatisfac-
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
7:
38
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/u
c2
.a
rk
:/1
39
60
/t
90
86
js
3p
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
196 CHATTEL 1110IlTGAGES. 
It i s  true, language was u ed in some of 
the cases above cited, decided in the supreme 
court of the United States, which seems to 
go beyond what we have stated to be the ef­
fect of the cases; but the cases referred to 
were cases in equ ity, and we presume, there· 
fore, the language was designed to express 
the rule in equity, and not at law, except i n  
so far a s  the rule a t  law bad been modified 
by statute; or, the cases, being railway cases, 
in so far as tbe rule may be regarded as 
modified by considering the rolling stock and 
equipment of a railroad as fixtures. And see 
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Hendrickson, 
25 Barb. 484; Pierce v. Emery, 32 N. H. 484. 
The plaintiff's couu el claims that there 
are cases at law upon the authority of which 
he is entitled to recover. He cites Chapman 
v. "'eimer, 4 Ohio St. 481 ; Carr v. Allatt, 3 
IIurl. & N. 9tH; Chidell v. Galsworthy, 6 C. 
B. (X. S.) 4i0. I n  these cases posses ion o f  
the after-acq uired property had been given 
to the mortgagee, or lawfully taken by him 
under the mortgage and it was for this rea­
son that the mortgagee was held to have ac­
quired the legal t i tle, and not because it was 
supposed the mortgage itself was effectual 
to trnnsfer it. There are numerous cases 
which bold that, though the mortgage per se 
is inoperatiYe to transfer the legal title, po -
session o g h-en or taken under it transfers 
the legal title to the mortgagee, being the 
"novus actus iutervenicn " required by Lord 
13acon·s maxim to give eIT ct to the mort­
gage as a declaratio praececlen . The max­
im i , "Licet disposilio de interc se futuro sit 
inutil is, tamen fieri potest declaralio praece­
clens quce sorl iatur ea:ectum, i o tervenienle 
110vo actu." Broom, Leg-. Max. ·.lD ; Ilope v. 
Ilayle.1•, 5 El. �'-' DI. ':30. Also in 3! Eng. 
La w & gq. 1 ! J ;  Langton v. IIorton, 1 Hare, 
ot-10;  Congreye Y. Evetls, 10 Exch. 2U . Also 
in :w Eng. Law & Eq. W3; l3a lrnr v. G ray, 1i 
C. U. 4G2; Canington v. Smitll, 8 Pick. 11(); 
Rowley v. Rice, 11 :.fotc. (:\lass.) 333; RO\\ :l ll 
"· Sharp's Hitle :.1anul"g Co., 20 Conu. ::?s::? ; 
Tilus Y. ;\I:lliee, 23 I l l .  :!37 ; b;1 pin v. ra m, 
·lO :'I l e. ::iO l ;  Bryan v. Smit l.J, :!:! Ala.  G:l I ;  
Fa rme rs' Loau & Trust Co. ,.. 'om merd:tl 
1Ja nlc, 11 W is. 207. In t lw eaHc uL bur t he 
plui n t l n: ho!-! never acqu l r 'd the I •ga l tit le I n  
this way, for h e  has nc\'er lleen i n  poHHessiou 
o! t h e• I Jl'OfH'rly. 
Thr. p la l n t i tl nhio cln l m H  to lie entlllccl  to 
reeo\·r1· 1 1 1 1011 the auth o r i t y  of A hhult v. 
n onrl w l n, :!O .\Ie. -100. 'J'he mortgage In t hn t 
<'a ·" waH not n mnrl JZa J.:"t' ol' J l l"OJl!'l'ty to he 
!1llliS1•qlll'llt l_r !1<'1 ) 1 l l l'f•d, f l  \\ : IH  H 1t 1orl g:lgC' 
.:Inn to fief't l l'c l hr> pa� mPnt or cert a i n  nol s 
l l J H • I J  u Hl<H'k nl' g1111d I t lw n In t he IHIHHeHlilou 
< if ! hr> 111nrl i.;ago 1-. : i nd ro n l n l rwd u s t l p 1 1 l a lln11 
t l tnt tlll' n101·tg1 1 1{1 1 1' hn 1 1 l c l  t'l ' l a l u pnHH<'HHlno 
of I.he i.:0011 , "a nd puy o\ PI' a n d llCf'O l l l l l  fnr 
t lw prm t•1•rl11 of 11 I I  sn IPli of Hf\ Id goorlH to 
l l l f 'rn l t l w 11 111rt gng1·Psj, t o  hP n ppl l Pd In pn y 
t l l L ' l l t  r if "H id nntl'S, or d l n·d ly to a ppl y A: t lr l  
I ' '"' ' " '" to l hc 1111l J 1 l l ' l l l  o! l:ill hl uolcl!, at Luc 
D i g 1t1ze<f by 
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discretion" of the mortgagees. The action 
·was trespass for taking four hundred cask 
of l ime, obtained by the mortgagor in ex­
change for goods or the proceeds of goods 
mortgaged to the plaintiffs. The court sus­
tained the action, holding that the lime must 
be considered as substituted for and repre­
senting the goods which were mortgaged, 
having been exchanged for them or their 
proceeds, by the mortgagor acting as the 
agent of the mortgagees. 
In the case at bar there was no stipulation 
reserving to the mortgagee control of the 
proceeds of the property sold by the mort­
gagor, and, moreover, t here i s  n o  evidence 
that the new property was paid for out of 
the proceells of the old, or, in fact, that it 
was paid for at all,  tl.Jough there is evidence 
tl.Jat it was acquired to renew or replace the 
old. We t hink, tl.Jerefore, the ca e of Ab­
bott v. Good w in . 20 ;\Ie. 40 , is not an au­
thority 'v hic:l.J ca n control the case at bar. 
And sec Rhine '· Phelp', Ill. 433; llolly 
v. Brown. H Conn. :!33, 2G:i ; Le>y v. \\.l'lsh, 
2 Edw. Ch. -138 ; Chapin v. Cram, 40 l\Ie. 561. 
In Hami lton v. Rogers, 8 )Id. 301, it was 
held that a mortgage of good in a tore, 
· · t ogether with all renewals and substitutions 
for the ame or auy part or parts thereof." 
did not convey subsequently acquired goods 
so as to giYe the mortgagee an action at la w 
again. t a party seizing them. Aud Ho.e v. 
Be, an, 10 l\Id. 4llG, maintains tllat tl.Je rule is 
the same, eYen though the new good are 
paid for out of the proceeds of the old. And 
in l\!as acbusctts such mortgages have bL·cu 
repe::i tcdly couclem ned as ineliectual to con­
fer any title to tl.Je goods sulJsequently ac­
quired, though acquir d in the u -ual couri:ie 
of busint>ss, nud by way of sub tltution for 
goods wl.Jicl.J were mortgaged. Jone v. Rich­
al'<lsou, 10 )Jrt c. Plass.) 4 1 ;  l\Ioody ''· 
W right, 1:1 :'lll'l<'. (:.lass.) 17; Barnard v. I�a­
ton, 2 Cush . ::?: 1 J .  And s<'e Cod man v. l�ree­
man, 3 ush. 30G. 1 11 tl.J case at bar t h e  
only fact proYccl I s  that tl.Je new goods were 
ac111 1 irccl  in t h '  usual course o f  bnsln s s  to 
r place the old. We do not think this is 
cnougl.J t o  gh t he mortgagee the sa m e  title 
i n  t he ne" gooc ls w h !d1 he bad I n  t he old, 
or I n  fad t o  gh C' him any legal till i n  t hem. 
The !)lal u lil'C ('0 1 t ( P1Hls that t l.Je clci'enda n t s  
arc estopped from deny i ng b i s  tit le. '!' he 
Cal'tl:i !:let up by tile cl •fcu dn nts are not In 
co u t mdl tlou of, hul I n conform ity wi t h, t l lP 
mo rtgngc11. The mortgages co ntain 110 <'X­
pl'CliH COH' l la o t s  or t i t l e. The C':\S(', t l.Jl'l'<' 
l'o 1·p, d li:wloi;Ps no ground for t h  :i ppl l<'1t t io11  
or t ho doc·trlnc or cstoppel. Ohyoowctb Y • 
'fp n n <'y, 10 " I:.;. :m7. ' clcddc t ha t t l 11' 
11l:t i 1 1 t l ff c·a n nn t  l'C'cc n cr In t h ll:l n r t lon fnr 
goods acc 1 1 1 l rNl 1t f l P r  th <' mortgage was g l \ 1• 1 1 .  
'fht' court : t h w  fi nd t h<• c l  fl' n d n n !H n o t  g u l l l .V  
of c·o n \• c•rt lng t l w rrm:t l n c l l ' I' of t h e prope r l y .  
'l'hl' \' l c l P l ll'C HhO\\ H t h n t  t he c l  fl'IH l : tntH l'P­
fnsPcl to HlllTPl l c l f ' I ' :i  11 I hi' j ) l'O J lPl ' t.V l o t hf' 
plalntl ll'. H cJoel! uol r; how to the 1:m l l s l'ac-
O ru r-c l tr m 
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tion of the court that they refused to surren-
der so much of the property as was ou baud
when the mortgage was given.
POTTER, J. While I cannot concur in all
the statements of law in the opinion of the
majority of the court, I concur in the result.
So long as we maintain the system of forms
of actions which we have inherited from
England, and by which justice is so often
sacrificed to mere technicalities, we must
hold that an action of trover cannot be sus-
tained in a case like the present. Judgment
for the defendant for his costs.
After the foregoing opinion had been given,
the plaintiff filed a bill in equity against
Winsor and Briggs to establish his lien un-
der the mortgage on the property acquired
subsequent to its execution. The court
granted the relief prayed for. See Williams
V. Winsor, 12 R. I. 9.
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tion of the court that they refused to surren- 1 hold that an action of trover cannot he sus­
dcr so much of the property as was on hand tained in a case like the present. Judgmcut 
when the mortgage was given. for the defendant for bis costs. 
POTTER, J. While I cannot concur in all 
the statements of law in the opinion of the 
majority of the court, I concur in the result. 
So long as we maintain the system of forms 
of actions which we have Inherited from 
England, and by which justice is so often 
sacrificed to mere technicalities, we must 
D i g 1t1zed by 
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After the foregoing opinion had been given, 
the plaintiff filed a bill in equity against 
Winsor and Briggs to establish his lien un­
der the mortgage on the property acquired 
subsequent to its execution. The court 
granted the relief prayed for. See Williams 
v. W insor, 12 R. I. 9. 
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LANDERS et aJ. v. GEORGE et al.
(49 Ind. 309.)
Supreme Court of Indiana. Nov. Term, 1S74.
Appeal from ciicuit court, Tiptou county.
J. E. McDonald, J. M. Butier, W. R. Har-
rison, and W. S. Shirley, for appellants. J.
Hanna, F. Knefler, and C. L. Holsteiu, for
appellees.
DOWXEY, J. This record presents two
cases between the parties; one commenced
by the appellants against the appellees, and
the other commenced by the appellees against
the appellants. It presents also a question as
to the operation and effect of a judgment in a
third case between the parties, which was ter-
minated before the comnieufement of the oth-
er two. This last-named action, which we wUl
for convenience designate as number one,
was brought by Landers and others against
George, sheriff of Tipton county, for the re-
covery of the possession of personal property,
consisting of a stock of dry goods, groceries,
provisions, etc., of which it was alleged the
plaintiffs were the owners and entitled to the
possession, and which had been wrongfully
taken, and were unlawfully detained by the
defendant. The gofids were alleged to be of
the value of eighteen himdred dollars. Judg-
ment was asked for the recovery of possession
of the property, and for ten dollars damages
for the detention thereof.
The defendant answered: (1) A general de-
nial. (2) Property in Ilarlin and Boulden. (3)
l*roi)orty in the defendant. (4) That certain
judgments had been rendered against Harlin
and Boulden, on which executions had been
issued to the said George, as sheriff, which
be had levied on the goods, which he alleged
were at the time the goods of Ilarlin and
lioulilen, in their possession, and subject to tlie
executions; that the executions were still in
his hands, and the goods subject to the lieu
thereof.
The second and third paragraphs of the an-
swer were struck out on motion of the plain-
tiffs, and tlii-ro was a reply to the fourth, a
demurrer to which was filed by the dcl'ondaiits
and sustained by the court. The record In the
cause then proceeds as follows:
•'.\nd the iilalntlffs falling to except f\nlhi-r,
tills rause Is now submitted to the court lor
tri.al as to the value of the property menllon-
ed In the inniphilnt; and the court h.'ivliig
heard and examined all tlie evMence, au<l be-
ing HUlllchMilly advised In the preuilHcs docs
Ilnd lli:il (he priijierly mentioned In the enin-
plniiit Is of the valuer of two thousiind nine
h\niilrc<l (IoIImi'h, and that the defendnnt Is en-
titled to have the same reiuniod to him, and
upon failure of the plalntHTs so to return the
Hanie, Is entitled to recover the value thereof;
and the court as.Hosses the dnmages of the <lo-
fendnnt agaliiHt the plalntllTs, on acetiunt of
the <letentlon of wild i)n)[ierty, nt the huiu of
one dollar. It Is therefore cnnsldiMed by the
court, that the defendant recover of the plain-
tiffs the sum of one dollar, his damages as-
sessed by the court, and all costs and charges,
etc.; and, further, that he recover of the plain-
tiffs the property mentioned in the complaint;
and upon failure of the plaintiffs to return to
the defendant said property, that he recover
of the plaintiffs the value thereof, viz. the sum
of two thousand nine hundred dollars." The
residue of the entry relates to the prayer for,
and the granting of, an appeal to this court.
This appeal was perfected, and, in this court,
the judgment below was aflirmed. See 40 Ind.
160.
Before the appeal was taken in that case,
however, a suit on the replevin bond, which
we may designate as number two, was insti-
tuted by the appellees in this case, the sheriff
and the plaintiffs in the executions which he
held, against the appellants herein. The com-
plaint sets out in detail the recovery of the
several judgments against Ilarlin and Boul-
den, the issuing of executions, their levy on
the property, the institution of the action of
replevin, the execution of the bond, the issue
and judgment in the replevin suit, the fail-
ure of the appellants herein to return the
goods according to the judgment in the re-
plevin suit; concluding with a prayer for
judgment for the value of the goods, two
thousand nine hundred dollars.
M'hile the appeal in the replevin suit was
pending in this court, the suit on the replevin
bond, number two, was suspended. After the
case number one was decided on appeal, the
defendants in that action answered, In number
two, on the replevin bonds:
(1) A general denial.
(■J) The second paragraph was held bad on
dcmmrer, after a portion of it had been struck
out; no (luostion is made as to this ruling.
(3) In the third paragraph, as to part of the
amount demanded, the defendants alleged,
tlint before the issuing and levy of the execu-
tions, on the ir«tli day of .Tanuary, 18(i9, Ilar-
lin and Boulden were the owners of the stock
of giiods. etc., and wore Indebted to the de-
fenilants In certain amo\mts mentioned, and
being Ro Indebted they, on the day and year
aforesaid, cxeoited to the defendants a bill of
sale of the stock of goods, etc., to secure the
imyuicnt of said debts; that the same was
duly acknowledged and recorded on the day
of Its date In the olllce of the recorder of
Tipton county, etc., being the county In which
the said goiids, etc., were then sltujited, and in
which the mortgagees resided; that said Ilar-
lin and ll'iulden f.'illed to iiay said debts, and
the condition of the bill of sale was broken be-
fore the Issuing of the said executhins or ei-
ther of them; and that the lien of .sale en-
titled the defendniits. uiion said foifellure, to
possession of so much of said stock of goods.
Wlierefore, tlie defendants say, as to so nmch
of the value of said goods, etc., as was neces-
sary to satisfy said debts, the said jilalntllTs
are not entitled to any judgment upon said
undertaking, being the .'iiii' uiil aforesaid.
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
7:
38
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/u
c2
.a
rk
:/1
39
60
/t
90
86
js
3p
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
198 CII ATTEL .MOB TGAG ES. 
L.A .. XDERS et al. v. GEORGE et al. 
(49 Ind. 309.) 
Supreme Court of Indiana. Nov. Term, 1874. 
.Appeal from circuit court, Tipton cowity. 
J. E. �IcDonald, J. l\I. Butler, W. R. Har­
rison, and W. S. Shirley, for appellants. J. 
Hanna, F. K nefier, and C. L. Holstein, for 
appellees. 
DO "\\'XEY, J. This record presents two 
cases between the parties; one commenced 
by the appellants against the appellees, a nd 
the other commenced by the appellees against 
the appellants. It presents also a question as . i  
to the operation and effect o f  a judgment in a 
third case between the parties, which was ter­
minated before the commencement of the oth­
ei· two. Tills la t-named action, ''hich we will 
for con•enience designate as number one, 
was lirought by Landers and ot hers against 
George, :shel'ilf of Tipton county, for the re­
cornry of the possession of personal property, 
cousistiug of a stock of dry goods, groceries, 
proYisions. etc., of which it was a lleged the 
plaintiffs were the owners and en titled to the 
possession, and which had been wrongfull�· 
takL·n. and were unla wfully detai neu by the 
rlefendant. Tbe g0<.1ds were alleged to be of 
t he Yalue of eig-hteen hundred dollars. Jurlg­
ment wns asked for the recoYery of possession 
of lhP property, and for ten dollars damage 
fr r tbe detention thereof. 
The rlefeu<lant a nswered : (1) A genera l de­
nial.  C:!) Property in H a rlin and Boulllen. (:3) 
l 'ropPrty i n  tbe defendant. (4J '!'hat rerta in 
j ucl�1 neuts had been rendered again�t lla rlin 
am! BouJden, on which executions bad been 
iss u1•1 l to tile said G eorge, as sheriff. which 
he harl leYie<l o u  the goods, wllicll be al leged 
were at tile time the good:s of lfarlin ancl 
H11ul1len, In t heir possession, and suhjcct to the 
cxccut iom1 ; that t he exccut inns were still  I n  
h is hands, and the goods sullject to tile lieu 
tilC'l'l·OL 
'l'l!c H'c·ond and third paraJ,?;raphs or the a n­
swl•r were sl nwk out on motion of t he plain­
t i ffs, a nd t ill'rn was a re11Jy to the fourth, n 
rl<'Tnl!lTer to wh l<'i1 wns filed h:y the <!P f('1 1 1 l a n t s 
a 1 1rl  . 11 t n hwli 1 1)' the rnnrt. 'l'he 1·econ l  lu t he 
I'll \ISP t hPll I H'O('l't'dS us fol lows : 
",\ nr l  l l H• pJ:1 i 1 1 t l ff� fa l l l 1 1J.?:  lo exc<>pt furl lwr, 
l hl �  r·a 11 ·" I!! 11ow suhml tted to t he court for 
I rln I :t t11 t lir• \':t i ll!:  of t he proppt·Ly lllf'llt !t ill· 
"'' ht t he •·otnpl:l l n t ;  nnrl t lw 1·0111t h:nlnJ,?; 
J 1 P:i rd a 1 1 r l  <' X n m l 11Prl all tlw r.\'lrlPtH'P, nurl  1 1<'· 
l t1i.: 1< 1 1 1llr•l , . 1 1 l ly n • h  I 1 · rl  I n t ll l '  prr•mh�es dnPH 
f 1 1 1d tf. .: i t  1 1 11' 1 1rripr·rly 111,. 1 1 t l<1 1 1 1'r l In t hf' 1·1 1 1 1 1  
pln l l l l  I 11f t he \':t hlP nl' t wr >  l holl :t l l l l  J J i l lf' 
l t 1111 1 ln'll  rloll:1 n�. 11 1 1 ! 1  l hn t  t he r lPll'1 1 1 l n 1 1 t  I Pll·  
t l t l 1 • < l  t o  hll \ f' t lir• Hll l l l l '  l'Pt 11r1 1 rorl t f J  h i m ,  : 1 1 1 1 1  
I J J IOll I nl I 11n• of t hr. pl:t I n f  I rrs Ho to I'!'( lll'll t hr> 
8:1l l lf', IH r>l l t l t lr·rl lo n•i·11vr•r t h!' \'nlm: th1•rpnf; 
11 11rl  1 1 11• i·nurl 11 �' ·p" t hr· rln mnJ.:r•s of f lu• r lro· 
fp111 l11 1 1 t  11 i.:11 l nst t lw pln l n t l lfR, on nrwmnt of 
l hro 1h•I P11l 1011 of •i lrl prn 1 11 •rl .\', fl l 1 1 11• 811111  of 
<Jnr• rl•Jll:1 r, It  I!! t hr•Jr fon• r•on lrl1·n·r l hy t lll' 
D i g itized by 
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court, that the defendant recover o f  the plain­
tiffs the sum of one dollar, h is damages as­
sessed by the court, a nd all costs and charges, 
ete. ; and, further, that he recover of the plaiu­
t i !Is the property mentioned i n  the complaint; 
and upon failure of the plaintiffs to return to 
the defendant said property, that be recoYer 
of tbe plaintiffs the value t hereof, viz. the sum 
of two thousand nine hundred dolla1·s." Tile 
residue of the eutry relates to the prayer for, 
and the granting of, an appeal to this court. 
This appeal was perfected, and, in this court, 
the judgment below was affirmed. See 40 Intl. 
160. 
Before the appeal was taken in that case, 
boweYer, a suit on the replevin bond, which 
we way designate as number t n· o, was insti­
tuted by tlle appellees in this ca ·e, the sllerifI 
and the plaintiffs in the ex:ct:utions which he 
held, again t tlle appellants herein. The com­
plaint sets out i n  deta il the recoyery o f  th,• 
sc,·cr:11 judgments against Harlin and Boul­
den, the i suing of executions, their leYy o n  
t he property, the i nstitution o r  tl..te actiu n  t\f 
reple'l'in, the execution Of the bond, the issu • 
and judgment in the reple-rin suit, the f:l il­
ure of tile :1fll1Cllants herein to return the 
goods according t o  the judgment i n  the r -
pl<'-riu sui t ;  concluding witll a prayer for 
judgment for the >aluc of ti.le goods, two 
thousand n i ne hundred dollars. 
While the ap11ea l in the rcple,·in suit was 
pt>nding in this court, the suil on the replevi n  
bond, number two, was su-pended. After the 
<·a�e number one wa decided on amwnl. the 
defendants in that action a nswered, in n umller 
two, ou the n• pil'Yin hands: 
(1) A gc11crnl tlenial. 
('.!) 'l'be second paragraph wns held bad on 
clemnrrer, nfter a portion of it had lH'l'll stnwk 
out ; no question is made as to this ruling. 
(3) In the third parngrnph, ns to pnrt or the 
amount r l em:inded, the defendants a l lcgctl. 
thn t before l!H• issuing and lcv)· of the exe. n-
1 lions, on the l :ilh dny of Jnnuary, 1 (](), I l a r­
l i n  :t ml Bnul1kn \Yere the owners or the sto<'l;: 
of gr rub, etc., :lllfl were luclelltcd to the de­
fendan t.::; In ccrf :l l n  amounts menllonl'<I, 1lllcl 
hPlng RO l nclrhtrd till'), on t h e  day :i nd yra r 
n fore::;nl c l ,  cxrrntl'cl to t he dcfcml:rnt::: a h i l l  o f  
si 1 J c  of t lw i;f t1<'k nf goodR, e t c . ,  to SCl'\l l'e t he 
pa) 11wnl of :::aid clchts ; thnt t he i>n me was 
du!�· nC'lmow!Prlgcrl ancl reronkd on the clay 
or Its ela t e  I n  t he otllcP of t he rl'c•onler or 
'l' l p t n n  c·o 1 1 n t y ,  Pl<'.,  bring t he t"nunty In whkh 
thP :::al r l  go11 rll', rte'., wcrr t hen i;l t n:l t Nl,  n111l  In 
which t h1• 111ort ::a i.:Prs rr'< ldPr l ; tha t R:tld l ht r· 
J in  n nrl J 11 111 ldro11 fa ll <'<! to pny RH ld dPhls, a nd 
t he C'ntu l l t Ion or t he hill of Rn le wnR hr11kP11 ht• 
fon• t hr l"1m l 1 1 J.?:  of t he Rnl r l  <'XPr11t lon"I or cl­
t lll'I' of t l w 1 11 ; : 1 1 1 1 1  t h n t  the• l i l' l l  of �n il' !'ll­
t l t l 1 · r l  t h < '  dl'l'r 1 1 1 ! 11 1 1 1 "1, 11pn11 �a id f11rfr lt 111'!', 1o 
Jlll'-'1'""11>11 of :::n 1 1 1 1 t r 'h of ::,a id Ht rl!'lc of g1 1ndH. 
\V lwr<'forl', 1 1 11• dt'f1•11tl:u1IH I'll}, lltl to so much 
of t he \ 11 i tlf' of l'rl I r !  J.:OOdH, etc., UH WllH nl'l'PH­
Rll l'Y to tu l t lHfy Hllhl rlcht11, t h e snld 11 Jn lntl lfH 
n rP not Pnl l t ll'fl to a n y  .11111 ,::mrnt upon i-a l r l  
1111rlNl n ld 1 1g, J 11• l 1 1g t lw :l l l l " l l n t  a fnrP�n l r l .  
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(4) This paragraph does not present any
question wliich at all affects the case, as it
comes before us.
(5) That it is true the plaintiffs brought
their action of replevin and exi^cuted the un-
dertaking, etc., as set fortli in the complaint,
and that judgment was rendered against these
defendants, the plaintiffs in said action. But
these defendants say that the only matter,
question, or issue submitted to the court up-
on the trial and final hearing of said action
of replevin, and the only matter, question, or
issue in said action which was competent and
lawful for said court to try, upon the submis-
sion of said cause for trial, as shown by the
record therein, was the matter, question, and
issue as to the value of the property men-
tioned in the complaint therein,, and that the
title and ownership of the property and the
right to the possession of said property were
not, nor either of them, submitted to or tried
or determined by said court in said cause.
And they aver that at and before the time of
the execution of said undertaking, and at the
time of the said submission to trial of said
matter, the said plaintiffs In that action were
the owners, had the title, and were entitled
to the ownership of said ijroperty and the
proceeds thereof; that they were so the own-
ers thereof and entitled to the possession
thereof and to the proceeds thereof, by vir-
tue of a mortgage made by Harlin and Boul-
den to them, a copy of which is alleged to
be filed, and of the delivery of said goods to
them, in discharge of the debts secured by
said mortgage, after the execution of said
mortgage upon the maturing of said debts,
they not having paid said debts or any part
thereof, or in any other manner than by the
delivery of said property.
The paragraph then professes to make a
copy of the mortgage, and a transcript of the
judgment and proceedings in the action of
replevin parts thereof. It is further alleged
that the delivery of the said property to them
by Harlin and Boulden, in pureuance of the
mortgage, was before the time of the rendi-
tion of the said judgments stated in plain-
tiffs' complaint, or any of them, and long be-
fore the issue or service of any of said execu-
tions, and that said property was of no great-
er value than the amount of the debts due
from said Harlin and Boulden to said Lan-
ders and others; that all the matters involved
and embraced in jilaintiffs' complaint herein
are involved and embraced in the complaint
of the defendants against the plaintiffs in
this action now pending in this com-t, and
can and must be determined in said action,
and they therefore ask that this cause be
consolidated, tried, etc., in and with that ac-
tion. Wherefore, etc.
The plaintiffs demurred to the third and
fifth paragraphs of the answer. The demur-
rer to the third was overruled, and that to
the fifth was sustained. Reply in denial of
the third paragraph of the answer.
Cause number three was commenced last
In order of time, and was by the appellants
against the appellees. In the complaint it is
alleged that on the 15th day of January, 1809,
at, etc., Harlin and Boulden were indebted
to the plaintiffs, stating the amounts, and
copies of the notes are alleged to be filed and
made part of the complaint; that they were
then the owners of the goods, etc., and mort-
gaged the same to the plaintiffs, and a copy
of the mortgage, it is alleged, is filed, which
was duly recorded, etc., on the day of its
date; that afterward, in January, 1SG9, Har-
lin and Boulden delivered the goods to the
plaintiffs, in pursuance of the mortgage, they
having failed to pay said debts, etc., to en-
able the plaintiffs to sell and dispose of the
same, and out of the proceeds, to satisfy their
debts; that at the time of such delivery, the
said goods, etc., were of no greater value than
the amount of said debts of Harlin and
Boulden to the plaintiffs; that the plaintiffs,
in the most careful and economical manner,
sold the goods and received therefor about
eighteen hundred dollars, and no more; that
the expenses of such sale were about one
hundred and forty dollars, leaving the net
sum of about sixteen hundred and sixty dol-
lars, and no more. The dates and amounts
of the judgments of the defendants are then
stated, and it is alleged that on the .5th day
of February, 1S69, executions were issued on
each of said judgments to the defendant
George, then sheriff of said county, which
were then levied on the said goods, etc.;
that such proceedings were had that after-
ward, in the replevin suit, naming the par-
ties, on the 8th day of May, ISGO, these plain-
tiffs were ordered and adjudged to deliver
said merchandise to the said George, as sucl
sheriff, but before that time these plaintiffs
had, in pursuance of their said mortgage and the
delivery and transfer to them of said goods,
etc., by Harlin and Boulden, fully sold and
disposed of said goods, etc., as before aver-
red. They aver that they yet have in their
posse.ssion the said sum of sixteen hundred
and sixty dollars, the net sum realized from
the sale of said goods, which they aver be-
longs to them by virtue of said mortgage and
transfer of merchandise to them. They al-
lege that the lien of said executions upon said
merchandise has been fully and wholly dis-
charged, by reason of the fact that the pro-
ceeds of the same were wholly applied to pay
their said mortgage, which was a lien on said
goods, etc., prior to the judgments and ex-
ecutions of the defendants. Prayer, that the
plaintiffs be adjudged the owners of the sum
of money realized from the sale of said
goods, etc.; that the defendants be adjudged
to have no lien on the merchandise by virtue
of their judgments and executions or the levy
thereof; that defendants be enjoined from
enforcing said judgments for the return of
said merchandise, or from having any action
or proceeding arising out of, or connected with
said judgments, etc. The mortgage, a copy
of wliich is filed, is in the usual form of
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CIL'\.TTEL MORTGAGES. 
(4) This pa ragraph does not present any 
quest ion whicll at all  atfeets tbe case, as it 
come� llefore us. 
(;J) 'l'bat it is true the plaintiffs brougllt 
theil' action of replevin and executed the un­
dertaking, etc., as set forth in the complaint, 
and that judgment was rendered against these 
defendants, the plaintiffs in said action. But 
these defendants say that the only matter, 
question, or issue submitted to the court up­
on the trial and final hen.ring of said action 
of replevin, and the only matter, question, or 
issue in said action which was competent and 
lawful for said court to try, upon the submis­
sion of said cause for trial, as shown by the 
record therein, was the matter, question, and 
issue as to the value of the property men­
tioned in the complaint therein,. and that the 
title and ownership of the property and the 
right to the possession of said property were 
not, nor either of them, submitted to or tried 
or determined by said court in said cause. 
And they aver that at and before the time of 
the execution of said undertaking, and at the 
time of the said submission to trial of said 
matter, the said plaintiffs in that action were 
the owners, had the title, and were entitled 
to the ownership of said property and the 
proceeds thereof; that they were so the own­
ers thereof and entitled to the possession 
thereof and to the proceeds thereof, by vir­
tue of a mortgage made by Harlin and Boul­
den to them, a copy of which is alleged to 
be filed, and of the delivery of said goods to 
them, in discharge of the debts secured by 
said mortgage, after the execution of said 
mortgage upon the maturing of said debts, 
they not having paid said debts or any part 
thereof, or in any other manner than by the 
delivery of said property. 
The paragraph then professes to make a 
copy of the mortgage, and a transcript of the 
judgment and proceedings in the action of 
l'eplevin parts thereof. It is further alleged 
that the delivery of the said property to them 
by Harlin and Boulden, in pursuance of the 
mortgage, was before the time of the rendi­
tion of the said j udgments stated in plain­
tiffs' complaint, or any of them, and long be­
fore the issue or service of any of said execu­
tions, and that said property was of no great­
er value than the amount of the debts due 
from said Harlin and Boulden to said Lan­
ders and others; that all the matters involved 
and embraced in plaintiffs' complaint herein 
are involved and embraced in the complaint 
of the defendants against the plaintiffs in 
this action now pending in this cowt, and 
can and must be determined in said action, 
and they therefore ask that this cause be 
consolidated, tried, etc., in and with that ac­
tion. Wherefore, etc. 
The pld'intiffs demuned to the third and 
fifth paragraphs of the answer. The demur­
rer to the third was overruled, and t hat to 
the fifth was sustained. Reply in denial of 
the third paragraph of the answer. 
Cause number three was commenced last 
c t 
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in order of time, and was by the appellants 
against the appellees. In the complaint it is 
alleged that on the 15th day of January, 18G!), 
at, etc., Ilarlin and Boulden were indebted 
to the plaintiffs, stating the amounts, and 
copies of the notes are allegt!d to be filed and 
matle part or the complaint ; that they were 
then the owners Of the goods, etc., null mort­
gaged the same to the plaintiffs, auu a copy 
of the mortgage, it is alleged, is fileu, whicll 
was duly recorded, etc., on tlle day of its 
date; that afterward, in January, lSGO, Har­
lin and Boulcleu delivered the goods to tlle 
plaintiffs, in pursuance of the mortgage, they 
having failed to pay said debts, etc., to en­
able the plaintiffs to sell and dispose of the 
same, and out of the proceeds, to satisfy their 
debts ; that at the time of such delivery, the 
said goods, etc., were of no greater value than 
the amount of said debts of Harlin and 
Boulden to the plaintiffs ; that the plaintiffs, 
in the most careful and economical manner, 
sold the goods and received therefor about 
eighteen hundred dollars, and no more; that 
the expenses of such sale were about one 
hundred and forty dollars, leaving the net 
sum of about sixteen hundred and sixty dol­
lars, and no more. The dates and amounts 
of the judgments of the defendants are then 
stated, and it is alleged that on the 5th day 
of February, lSGO, executions were issued on 
each of said judgments to the defendant 
George, then sheriff of said county, wllich 
were then levied on the said goods, etc. ; 
that such proceedings were had that after­
ward, in the replevin suit, naming the par­
ties, on the 8th day of May, lSGD, these plain­
tiffs were ordered and adj udged to deliver 
said merchandise to the said George, as sucl 
sheriff, but before that time these plaintiffg 
had, in pursuance of their said mortgage and the 
delivery and transfer to them of said goods, 
etc., by Harlin and Boulden, fully sold and 
disposed of said goods, etc., as before aYer­
red. They aver that they yet have in their 
possession the said sum of sixteen hundred 
and sixty dollars, the net sum realized from 
the sale of said goods, which they aver be­
longs to them by virtue of said mortgage and 
transfer of merchandise to them. They al­
lege that �he lien of said executions upon said 
merchandise has been fully anll wholly dis­
charged, by reason of the fact that the pro­
ceeds of the same were wholly applied to pay 
their said mortgage, which was a lien on said 
goods, etc., prior to the jmlg-ments and ex­
ecutions of the defendants. Prayer, that the 
plaintiffs be adjudged · the owners of the sum 
of money realized from the sale of said 
goods, etc. ; that the defendants be adj mked 
to have no lien on the merchandise by 'l"irh1e 
of their judgments and executions or the le'l"y 
thPreof; that defendants be enjoined from 
enforcing said judgments for the return of 
said merchandise, or from having any action 
or proceeding arising out of, or connected with 
said judgments, etc. The mort::m.!!e. a copy 
of which is filed, is in the usual form uf 
O r1g1 r-a 1  from 
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chattel mortgages, and in the condition or
defeasance provides as follows: "Xow, if
the said Harlin and Boulden shall punctually
pay said sum of money when the same shall
become due, then the above conveyance to be
void, otherwise to be in full force. The said
Harlin and Boulden are to retain possession
of said i)roperty until said debts become due,
and upon default of payment of said money,
shall deliver said property to Landers, Gon-
dii & Co. and Landers, Pee & Co., in propor-
tion to the amount of their respective claims
against said Harlin and Boulden."
The defendants in this case, appellees here,
answered:
(1) A general denial.
(2) Payment by Harlin and Boulden be-
fore the suit was brought, in money and
property other and different from the goods,
etc., mentioned in the complaint.
(3) This paragraph was adjudged insuffi-
cient on demurrer, and need not be set out.
(4) That long before the commencement of
this action, the plaintiffs, in an action by
them instituted in the Tipton circuit court
against Henry George, etc., claimed by their
complaint to be the owners and entitled to
the possession of said personal property;
that the cause was put at issue; that by the
record and judgment in said cause it was
adjudged and determined that said goods
were of the value of twenty-nine hundred
dollars; that the question as to the value of
said goods was in issue, and the issue was
submitted to the court to find upon the evi-
dence; that it was competent for the court
to find the value of the goods In said cause,
and the court did find and adjudge that said
goods were of the value aforesaid; and the
court further found, in said <auso, that the
defendant in said cause was entitled to the
possession of the goods; that the i)laiiitiffs
should deliver the same to the defendant;
and that, on failure to deliver the same, tlie
defendant recover of the said plaintilTs
twenty-nine hundred dollars, the value of
the same. A tran.script of said cause number
one Is made part of this paragraph of tlio
answer. It Is also alleged that the plaintiffs
appealed from the said judgment to the su-
preme court, where the judgment was af-
firmed. Wherefore the i)la!iililTs are estui)-
ped to assort that the said goods wore of any
other value than said sum of twcnty-nlno
hundred dollars, and are estopped to deny
any of the facts adjudicated In said cause;
and defendants say said goods wore of the
value of twenty-nine hundred dollars; and
they deny that tlio said pl.'ilntlfTs were the
owners of said goods.
(."il That Iniig before the commcnremont of
this ai'llon, llip i)lalnllfrs rocelvod from Har-
lin and liouldoM, tlio porsnns who executed
to tlio plaintirfH said protended mortgage, a
largo amount of property, notes, effects, and
rhosoH In action of llio value of a thousand
dollars, a more parlhMilar description of
which cannot be given, which were rocolv(!d
on account of the indebtedness of said Har-
lin and Boulden to the p'-aiiitiffs. mentioned
in the plaintiffs' complaint, as a credit there-
on. Wherefore, etc.
Demurrers to the second and fourth para-
graphs of the answer were filed by the ijlaiu-
tiffs and overruled by the court.
The plaintiffs replied to the second and
fifth paragraphs of the answer by a general
denial; and to the fourth paragraph they re-
plied, that, admitting the bringing of the
action by them against said George, and
that the property in that case was and is
the same as that mentioned in the complaint
in this case, they say that the only matter,
question, or issue which it was competent
for the said court to hear and decide under
the submission thereof to the court, as shown
by the record thereof, was as to the value of
the said property, and that the title aud
ownership and right to the possession there-
of were not, nor was either of them, sub-
mitted to or decided by the court; that at
the time of the levy on said goods by said
George, as alleged in the fourth paragraph,
and at the time of the trial and determina-
tion of said cause, and until the same was
finally sold and converted into money, as al-
leged in the complaint, said property and the
proceeds thereof belonged to and was the
property of the said i)laintif[s, and they,
during all of said time, were entitled to the
possession thereof, by reason of the mort-
gage, sale, and delivery thereof to the plain-
tiffs by said Harlin and Boulden, as shown
in the plaintiffs' complaint herein; and they
say that the rights, questions, and allega-
tions averred, stated, and sot forth by them
in their complaint herein were not submit-
ted to, tried by, or heard and determined in,
the action set forth in said fourth paragraph
of defendants' answer or otherwise, but re-
main entire and (indeterniined; and they de-
ny such allegations In said fourth para-
graph of def(Midants' answer not specially
herein replied to and controverted.
The said actions numbers two and three,
being thus at issue, were, by agreement of
the parties and the order of the court, con-
solidated, and the cause proceeded in the
style of Landers and others v. George and
otheis, the style of action number three. A
trial was had by the court, and the court
found for the defendants, assessing their
damages at fifteen Innidred and throe dol-
lars !iud thirty-seven cents. The plaiulin's
moved the com't for a now trial. whl<-h mo-
tion was overruled, and final judgment was
rendered In favor of the di'fendant (Jeorgc,
and others, for the amount of the finding.
The following are the errors assigned:
(1) Sust.'ilidng tlio demurrer to aiipellants'
fifth paragraph of answer to appdloes' com-
plaint on the replevin bond. (2) Refusing
to permit appellants to give evidonce of-
fered at llie Irlal by wllm-sses Landers and
Boulden, as shown In exoopllons. (:b Itef us-
ing to grant a new trl.'ii on a]ipc'll:iii(s' nio-
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CllATTEL MORTG AGES. 
cila ttcl mortgages, and i n  tile condition or 
defeasance pro>ides as follows: "Xow, if 
the said Harlin and Boulden silall punctu.1lly 
pay said sum of money when the same shall 
become due, then the above conveyance to be 
void, otherwise to be in full force. The said 
Harli n  and Boulden are to retain possession 
of said property until said debts become due, 
and upon default of payment of said money, 
shall deliver said property to Landers, Con­
dit & Co. and Lauders, Pee & Co., in propor­
tion to the amount of their respective claims 
against said Harlin and Boulden." 
The defendants i n  this case, appellees here, 
an wered : 
(1) A general denial. 
(2) Payment by Harlin and Boulden be­
fore the suit was brought, i n  money and 
property other and different from the goods, 
etc., mentioned in the complaint. 
(3) This paragraph was adjudged insuffi­
cient on demurrer, and need not be set out. 
(4) That long before the commencement of 
this action, the plaintiffs, in an action by 
them in tituted in the Tipton circuit court 
again t Ilemy George, etc., claimed by their 
eomplaint to be the owners and entitled to 
the possession of said personal property ; 
that the cau e was put at issue; that by the 
record and j udgment in said cause it was 
adjud�ed and determined that said goods 
were of the value of twenty-nine hundred 
dollars; that the question as to tile value of 
said goods was i n  issue, and the issue was 
suhmitted to the court to find upon tile evi­
den1·e; tbat it was competent for tbe court 
to find the value of the goocls In said cause, 
and the court did find and adjudge that said 
goods were or the value a !oresa id ; and the 
court further found, i n  aid cause, that the 
derrnclant in snid cau e was u t i tled to the 
posspssion of the good s ;  that the pla i ntiITs 
shoulcl deliver the same to th defenda n t ;  
and t ha t, on failure t o  deliver t h  snmc, t h e 
dcfl'rnl ant rc<'over of t he said p la i ntiffs 
twenty-nine hundred dollars, tile v a l u e  of 
the same. A trnnscript or Raicl cause numher 
one is made pnrt of this parn �rn11h or t h  
ans wer. I t  I" nlso n l le�t'd that the pl a i n t i ffs 
n pprn INI from the sa irl Jud�nwnt to the u­
prrme C'Olll't, W hPl'C' ! ht' j rn l �mcnt Will! a f­
firnwrl . 'Y hcrPfnrP t I H' p i n  i n t i ITH n rc t'Hlnp­
rH·rl to :1 sPrt t h at thr. sail! gnml" wrrc of a n y  
nlh<'r vnlur t hn n  s:llcl 1m m ol' l we n l J  n l n<' 
h 1 1 1 1 r l rnl rlolln t'S, n n r l  :1 1'r. t'stoppPrl to rl rn y 
n ny ,,r t h r  fn 1·ts nrlj 11rl i<•n lPcl  t n  Hn ld c•:i 1 1sp; 
n 111l rl  •fr•ml n n t s  Rny 1;n lrl  gnr•dS Wl'l 'e of t h r 
v n l 1 1 r •  of t \n•n t y- nl 11 P h 1 1 1 1 r l n•d c l 1 1 1 l : 1 ni ;  n nr l  
l lH'V " " " Y  t h n t  1 1w "Il ic! pl:t l n l l ffs \\'l'H' t he 
11 \\'l l l 'f' " or . n l c l  v11orl". 
{:ii ' 1 l l n f  1011� hPffll'I' f )Jp C'Ollllllr'll<'l'lllf'llt or 
l h lH tl ! ' t lnn, l l H' pl:l i n t i ffs ""''l'f \' r·rl from J f n r-
1 1 11 ll l l r l  f : ot 1 J r ) f ' l l 1  1 1 11' J ll ' I' 111 1  \\' hn 1 '.'<•r • 1Jt f'<l 
In l h r• pl n l nt l ffs 11 n l r l prl ' t f'ndr•rl 1 1 1 nrt,.:n.i.:f', a 
ln rgr• 11 mo1111t  of pro 1wrty,  nnf P>l. < 'ff<'rls, n 1 1 r l  
c•ho ,. In nrt Ion or 1 111' \'II  I m•  nf n t ho11.,:1 n r l  
rl•11l11re, 11 lllfll'" pn rt l r u l a r  cll'!lr r l pt lnn o f  
\\ h!('!J f'llll llfl( 1 11' g i l  I ' l l ,  \\'h l<'ll  Wl'l'P l'l'l'f'J\·prJ 
D i g 1t1zed by 
I NTE RNET A R C H IV E  
on account of the indebtedn ess o f  said IT:1 1·­
l i n  and Boulden to the p:n i t i !Ts. mentioned 
i n  the pla intiffs' complai nt, as a credit tbere­
on. W herefore, etc. 
Demurrers to the second and fourth para­
graphs of the answer were filed by the plain­
tiffs and overruled by the court. 
The pla intiffs replied to the second a rn l  
fifth paragraphs o f  the answer b y  a general 
denia l ;  and to the fourth paragraph they re­
plied, that, admitting the bringing of the 
action by them against said George, and 
that the property in that case was and is 
the same as that mentioned i n  the compla int 
in this case, they say that the only matter, 
question, or issue which it was competent 
for the said court to hear and decide under 
the submi sion t hel'eof to the court, as shown 
by the record thel'eof, was as to the value of 
the said property, and that the title and 
ownership and right t o  the possession there­
of were not, nor was either of them, sub­
mitted to or decided by the court; that a t  
the time o f  the levy o n  a i d  goods b y  n i d  
George, as alleged i n  the fourth paragra ph, 
and at the ti me of the tl'ial and determ ina­
tion o f  said cause, and until the same was 
finally sold and converted into money, a al­
leged in the complai nt, sa icl property and the 
proceeds thereof belonged to and was the 
property of the said plaintiIT . and they, 
during all of said time, were ent itled to t he 
posse sion t hereof, by reason of the uwrt­
gage, sale. and delivery thereof to the pln in­
ti!Is by said Harlin and Boulden, as hown 
in the pla i n t i tis' compla int herei n ;  and they 
say that the rights, que lions, and al lega­
tions averred, stated, and set forth by t he m  
in their com1)laint herrin were not suhmit­
tcd to, trirtl by, or heard and determined in, 
the :l<"tion set for t h  in said fourth paragra ph 
o f  d fcnda ut ' an " er or ot herw ise. but re­
main entire a ncl undetermi ned ; and t hey de­
ny such allrgalions i n  said fourth para­
�l':tph of d fend a n t s' nnsw r not s11cda lly 
herein repli d lo and controv rted. 
The said acl iom; numbers two and three, 
being 1 bus a t  i::;Hue, were, lly agrc 'mcnt or 
t h e pa rl l N1 and t h e order or t he court, con­
so l ida t ed , : 1 1 1 1 1  t he rause lll'OC'eC'Cl<.'d in llH' 
style of Ln n cl r rs n ml ot hers v. G <.'<ll'g'l' an1 l 
o t h erl'l, t h <.' style Of ad lo n l l l t lllber t hl'C'{'. A 
t ri a l  \\ :u; ha d by t h  coul'l. a n d t h  court 
t'o 1 1 1 u l  fol' t h P ckfP1 1<ln nt H, :1HHcH1:1i1 1g t he i r  
tl : 1 111ng<'" n t  rl r t <.'en h 1 1 1 1cl l'ecl n nd thl'er 1 l ol­
i1Hs : 1 1111  t h i rl y Al'YPll c•e n t s. 'l'hc pl:t i n t i fTR 
1 1 10\ r'd ! h i' l'Oll l't rol' I\ 111.'W t 1'1:1 J.  \\ hlth 1110-
t lrm wn::i ovP1T11lrd, a n c l f i n n l  J1 1dg 1 1 1 P n t  \\ llR 
n•nr l c> recl In fnvor or t hr c1  . .  r<'nrl:1 1 1 t  n Pnrge, 
: l l lfl  o ( IJ Pl'H, fol' t h e• :1 1 1 1<11 1 1 1 (  or t h e f1 11cl l 1 1�. 
' I  h<' fol io\\ I n �  : 1 1·e t il l' l'l'l'Ol'H : tsHl �nc•r l : 
(1 ) H 1 1 H t : t l 1 1 l l 1 g  t l l <' dr1 11 11 rr<'r t o  n 1 11wll: 1 1 1 ll'l' 
Ort h f lll l':J �l': l ] 1 h  or H llRWCI' lo ll J 1 Jll'l lc•l'l:I' COlll­
p l:t l n t on t h r• l'Ppl r >v l n  hon r l .  (2) l l e f 1 11:1J ng 
t o  1 wr11 1 l t :t J 1 J1"ll11 1 1 l A  t o  �Ive C' \1lclr1wo of. 
f<'l'l'cl :i t t hi' t rl :1 I h� wi t ll l'A"eA L:tndcrH n 1 1 1 1  
Bn 1 1 hl f'll, : is  shown In ! ''(<' l ' J l l  l nnH. (:ll R<'f11s­
l 1 1 h  to i; 1 : 1 1 1 t  a lll'\\ l l'ln l ou : 1 1 1p<'l l : 1 1 1 t 1-1• 1 1 1 1 1· 
u r  r J1 
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tlon and reasons. (4) In overruling appel-
lants' demurrer to the second and fourth
paragrrphs of appelloes' answer, in the action
by appellants against appellees.
Counsel for appellants say: "The main
point variously presented for consideration
In this case may, we think, be stated as fol-
lows: Were the appellants, by the trial,
proceedings, and judgment in the action of
replevin begun by them in February, 18C9,
against the sheriff, Henry George, and de-
termined in April or May, 1869, precluded
from asserting in the subsequent actions,
which, being consolidated and tried, are now
before the court in this appeal, their title to
the property in dispute and its proceeds,
under their mortgage and the delivery to
them by the mortgagees and owners of the
property, in discharge of the debt, in accord-
ance with the stipulations of the mortgage,
before any right of appellees to the property
intervened? In other words, were the ques-
tions of appellants' rights, in relation to the
mortgaged property, so fuUy and fairly sub-
mitted, tried, and determined in the action
of replevin, as that when they began this
action they had no remedy to enforce their
rights left to them?" Counsel for the ap-
pellees say: "It is conceded by the appel-
lants, in tieir brief, that the record now be-
fore this court presents but one question,
and that is, whether the judgment in the
replevin suit proper concludes them as to the
title, right of possession, and value of the
goods in controversy."
Under this agreement as to the question
presented, we do not deem it necessary to ex-
amine the case with reference to each error
assigned. In the action of replevin, there
were two good paragraphs of answer: (1)
A general denial. (4) Property in the de-
fendant by virtue of the levy of the execu-
tions in his hands, it being alleged that the
property was the goods of the execution de-
fendants and subject to the executions. In
this condition of the issues, the cause went
to the court, and we think we must hold for
a full trial of the issues, notwithstanding
what the clerk says in the entry as to what
was to be tried. The plaintiffs had not made
default, ceased to prosecute the action, or
withdrawn their appearance. They were
yet in com-t when the cause was submitted
for trial, so far as anything appears. The
clerk says, they failed further "to except,"
the cause was submitted for trial, etc. The
issues must necessarily have been tried be-
fore the court could render the judgment
which was rendered. The court found that
the property was of the value of two thousand
nine himdred dollars, that the defendant was
entitled to have the property returned to
him, and that the damage of the defendant,
on account of the detention of the property,
was one dollar. The fact that there were
issues to be tried, and that the com-t did not
limit its finding to the ascertainment of the
value of the property merely, requires us to
hold that there was a trial of the Issues gen-
erally, and not a mere finding of the value of
the property, the statement of the clerk that
the trial was "as to the value of the prop-
erty" to the contrary notwithstanding.
We think that we must hold, also, that the
findings of the court decide the questions
that the plaintiffs were not the owners or
entitled to the possession of the property, as
they alleged in their complaint. Necessarily,
the plaintiffs must have failed to sustain
their title to the property and right to its
possession, or the court could not have found,
as it did, that the defendant was entitled to
a return of the property and damages for
its detention. The fact that Landers and
others had a mortgage of the goods, and that
the possession of the goods had been sur-
rendered to them, as they claim, if ti'ue, did
not prevent the sheriff from levying on them
and selling the equity of redemption in them.
Until the mortgagee had himself, by legal
notice and sale of the goods or by a judicial
foreclosure and sale of them, cut off the equi-
ty of redemption, they were hable to seizure
and sale by the creditors of the mortgagor. 2
Gavin & H. 240, § 436; Coe v. McBrown,
22 Ind. 252; State v. Sandlin, 44 Ind. 504.
There is nothing in the mortgage in this case
which vests the absolute ownership of the
goods in the mortgagees on failure to pay
the debt It is provided in the mortgage
that, upon default of payment of said money,
Harlin and Boulden shaU deliver the proper-
ty to Landers and others. But we do not
think that such deliveiy merely, if made,
would free the property from the equity of
redemption.
It was alleged, in the fourth paragraph of
the answer of the sheriff in the replevin suit,
that the property, when levied upon, was iu
the possession of the mortgagors, and it may
be inferred that the court found this to be
true, if the finding of that fact was necessary
to justify the judgment for a return of the
property to the sheriff. The court decided
the issues in favor of the defendant the sher-
iff, found the value of the property, and that
the defendant was entitled to a return of it.
It also rendered judgment for the return,
and in default of retm-n, for the value of the
property. This gave the defendant in that
action as the representative of the execution
plaintiffs, or in connection with them, a right
of action on the bond for the amoimt of the
damage to them, not exceeding the value of
the property which the plaintiffs had so
failed to return.
But appellants submit that they may al-
lege and prove that their rights were in fact
not considered and adjudicated in the case,
and they refer, in support of their position,
to the following cases: Cutler v. Cox, 2
Blackf. 178; Byrket v. State. 3 Ind. 248;
State V. Brutch, 12 Ind. 381: Brandon v. Ju-
dah, 7 Ind. 545; Hargus v. Goodman, 12 Ind.
629, and other similar cases. We have ex-
amined these authorities and think they do
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tlon and reasons. (4) In overruling appel­
lants' demurrer to the second and fourth 
paragn:phs of appellees' answer, in the action 
by appellants against appellees. 
Counsel for appellants say: "The main 
point variously presented for consideration 
in this case may, we think, be stated as fol­
lows: Were the appellants, by the trial. 
proceedings, and judgment in the action of 
replevin begun by them in February, 18G9, 
against the sheriff, Henry George, and de­
termined In April or May, 1869, precluded 
from asserting in the subsequent actions, 
which, being consolidated and tried, are now 
before the court in this appeal, their title t.o 
the property In dispute and its proceeds, 
under their mortgage and the delivery to 
them by the mortgagees and owners of the 
property, in discharge of the debt, in accord­
ance with the stipulations of the mortgage, 
before any right of appellees to the property 
intervened ? In other words, were the ques­
tions of appellants' rights, in relation to the 
mortgaged property, so fully and fairly sub­
mitted, tried, and determined in the action 
of replevin, as that when they began this 
action they had no remedy to enforce their 
rights left to the m ?" Counsel for the ap­
pellees say: "It is conceded by the appel­
lants, in their brief, that the record now be­
fore this court presents but one question. 
and that is, whether the j udgment in the 
replevin suit proper concludes them as to the 
title, right of possession, and value of the 
goods in controversy." 
Under this agreement as to the question 
presented, we do not deem it necessary to ex­
amine the case with reference to each error 
assigned. In the action of replevin, there 
were two good paragraphs of answer: (1) 
A general denial. (4) Property in the de­
fendant by virtue of the levy of the execu­
tions in bis bands, it being alleged that the 
property was the goods of the execution de­
fendants and subject to the executions. In 
this condition of tbe issues, tbe cause went 
to the court, and we think we must bold for 
a full trial of the i ssues, notwithstanding 
wbat tbe clerk says i n  the entry as to what 
was to be tried. Tbe plaintiffs bad not made 
default, ceased to prosecute tbe action, or 
withdrawn their appearance. They were 
yet in co urt when the cause was submitted 
for trial, so far as anything appears. The 
clerk says, they failed further "to except," 
the cause was submitted for trial, etc. Tbe 
issues must necessarily bave been tried be­
fore the court could render tbe judgment 
which was rendered. The court found that 
the property was of tbe value of two thousand 
nine hundred dollars, that the defendant was 
entitled to have tbe property returned to 
him, and that the damage of the defendant, 
on account of the detention of the property, 
was one dollar. The fact that there were 
issues to be tried, and that the court did not 
limit its finding to the ascertainment of the 
val°C Qf �e property merely, requires us to 
K L  -llVt 
bold that there was a trial o f  the Issues gen­
erally, and not a mere finding of the value of 
the property, the statement of the clerk that 
the trial was "as t.o the value of tbe prop­
erty" to the contrary notwithsta nding. 
W e  think that we must bold, also, that the 
findings of the court decide the questions 
tbat the plaintiffs were not the owners or 
entitled to the possession of the property, as 
they alleged in their complaint. Necessa1ily, 
the plaintiffs must have failed to sustain 
their title to the property and right to its 
possession, or the court could not bave found, 
as it did, tbat the defendant was entitled to 
a return of the property and damages for 
its detention. The fact that Landers and 
others bad a mortgage of the goods, and that 
the possession of the goods bad been sur­
rendered to them, as they claim, if true, did 
not prevent the sheriff from levying on them 
al,ld selling tbe equity of redemption in them. 
Until the mortgagee bad himself, by legal 
notice and sale of the goods or by a judicial 
foreclosure and sale of them, cut off the equi­
ty of redemption, they were liable to seizure 
and sale by the creditors of the mortgagor. 2 
Gavin & H. 240, § 436; Coe v. McBrown, 
22 Ind. 252; State v. Sandlin, 44 Ind. 504. 
There is nothing in the mortgage in this case 
which vests the absolute ownership of the 
goods in the mortgagees on failure to pay 
the debt. It is provided in the mortgage 
that, upon default of payment of said money, 
Harlin and Boulden shall deliver the proper­
ty to Landers and others. But we do not 
think that such delivery merely, if made, 
would free the property from the equity of 
redemption. 
It was alleged, in the fourth paragraph ot 
the answer of the sheriff in the replevin suit, 
that the property, when levied upon, was in 
the possession of the mortgagors, and it may 
be inferred that the court found this to be 
true, if the finding of that fact was necessary 
to justify tbe judgment for a return of the 
property to the sheriff. The court decided 
the issues in favor of the defendant the sher­
iff, found the value of the property, and that 
the defendant was entitled to a return of it. 
It also rendered judgment for the return, 
and in default of retlli'n, for the value of the 
property. This gave the defendant in that 
action as the representative of the execution 
plaintiffs, or in connection with them, a right 
of action on the bond for the amount of the 
damage to them, not exceeding the value of 
the property which the plaintiffs had so 
failed to return. 
But appellants submit that they may al­
lege and prove that their rights were in fact 
not considered and adjudicated in the case, 
and they refer, in support of their pos'tion. 
to the following cases: Cutler v. Cox, 2 
Blackf. 178; Byrket v. State. 3 Ind. 248; 
State v. Brutch, 12 I nd. 381 : Brandon "V. Ju­
dah, 7 Ind. 545; Hargus v. Goodman, 12 Ind. 
629, and other similar cases. ""e have ex­
amined these authorjties an<1 think they do T 
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not apply to the question which is here in-
volved. They are cases where the fact may
be alleged and proved without a contradic-
tion of the record, as to what was found
and adjudged by the court. Here, as we
have already said, the record must be re-
garded as showing a determination of the
ownership and right to the possession of the
property, and to allow an averment and
proof, to the contrary would be to allow the
record to be impeached and contradicted,
and that, too, in a proceeding in which the
record is used merely to establish a fact
found, and where it is attacked collaterally.
Counsel for appellants urge that there was
no consent of their clients to the trial of
any question in the ease without a jui^y, ex-
cept as to the value of the property. We
have already said that we regard the other
facts in the record as overruling the state-
ment of the clerk in his entry, that the trial
was to ascertain the value of the property
only. The plaintiffs were in court and made
no objection to the mode of trial, to the find-
ing of the court, or to the judgment ren-
dered. When they brought the case to this
court on appeal, they made no such objec-
tion, and the judgment was in all things af-
firmed. If the clerk's entry should be re-
garded as stating the fact, still, when the
court went beyond what was submitted and
made a finding of other matters, and ren-
dered judgment thereon, the plaintiffs
should have made the objection then in some
proper way, and if the error was not cor-
rected there, the point should have been
urged on appeal to this court. The record
of the finding and judgment cannot now, in
a collateral proceeding, be varied, amended,
or contradicted. If there was any error in
the finding or judgment, it is only an error,
and does not at all affect the judgment while
it remains unreversed. In favor of the con-
clusiveness of the finding and judgment, as
evidenced by the record, we may cite I'ischli
y.'Fischli, 1 Blaekf. 360. Day v. Vallette, 25
Ind. 42, Crosby v. Jeroloman, 37 Ind. 264, and
Carr v. Ellis, 37 Ind. 465. and cases cited.
It is clear that the answers of the appel-
lants, in the action on the replevin bond, ad-
mitting as they do, that they did not pmse-
cute the action of replevin with effect and
without delay, and that, although they wore
ordered to do so, they did not return the
property to the sheriff, can be no bar to that
action. Brown v. Parker, 5 Blaekf. 291;
Sherry v. Foresman, 6 Blaekf. 56; Wallace
V. Cl;u-k, 7 Blaekf. 29S; Davis v. Crow, Id.
129; lluUon v. Denton, 2 Ind. 644; O'Neal v.
Wade, 3 Ind. 410. The judgment is affirmed,
with costs.
BUSKIRK, C. J. I dissent from the fore-
going opinion and judgment
WUT rOUUBaiMU CO., I-BINTEIIH ANU aTKUEOTVPElU, ST. PADL, UIKM.
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not apply to the question which is here in­
'l'"Olved. They are cases where the fact may 
be alleged and proved without a contradic­
tion of the record, as to what was found 
and adjudged by the court. Here, as we 
have already said, the record must be re­
garded as showing a determination of the 
ownership and right to the possession of the 
property. and to allow an a"Verment and 
proof to the contrary would be to allow the 
recoru to be impeached and contradicted, 
and that. too, in a proceeding in whieh the 
record is used merely to establish a fact 
found, and where it is attacked collaterally. 
Counsel for appellants urge that there was 
no consent of their clients to the trial of 
any question in the case without a jury, ex­
cept as to the value of the property. We 
have already said that we regard the other 
facts in the record as overruling the state­
ment of the clerk in his entry, that the trial 
was to ascertain the value of the property 
only. The plaintiffs were in court and made 
no objection to the mode of trial, to the find­
ing of the court, or to the judgment ren­
dered. When they brought the case to this 
court on appeal, they made no such objec­
tion, and the judgment was in all things af­
firmed. If the clerk's entry should be re­
garded as stating the fact, still, when the 
court went beyond what was submitted and 
made a finding of other matters, and ren-
dered judgment thereon, the plaintiffs 
should have made the objection then in some 
proper way, and if the error was not cor­
rected there, the point should have been 
urged on appeal to this court. The record 
of the finding and judgment cannot now, in 
a collateral proceeding, be varied, amended, 
or contradicted. If there was any error in 
the finding or judgment, it is only an error, 
and does not at all affect the judgment while 
it remains unre"Versed. In favor of the con­
clusi·rnness of the finding and j udgment, as 
e-ridenced by the recoru, '"e ma} cite Fi.l·hli 
v. Fischli, 1 Blackf. 360, Day v. Vallette, 25 
Ind. 4.2, Crosby v. Jeroloman, 37 Ind. 264, and 
Carr v.  Ellis, 37 lnd. 465. and cases cited. 
It is clear that the answers of the appel­
lants, in the action on the replevin bond, ad­
mitting as they do, that they did not pr<ose­
cute the action o f  replevin with effect and 
without delay, and that, although they were 
ordered to do so, they did not return the 
property to the sheriff, can be no bar to that 
action. Bro,vn v. Parker, 5 Blackf. 201 ;  
Sherry v. Foresman, 6 Blackf. 56; Wallace 
v. Clark, 7 Blackf. 29 ; Davis v. Crnw, Id. 
12!> ; Hutton v. Denton, 2 Ind. G-H; O'Xeal v. 
Wade, 3 Ind. 410. The judgment is atlirmeu, 
with costs. 
BUSKIRK, C. J. I dissent from the fore­
going opinion and judgment. 
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